Chief Economist

Diana Choyleva

Enodo Economics

Enodo Economics is an independent macroeconomic forecasting company that untangles complexity, challenges the consensus, and makes sense of the future. Our focus is on China – one of the most misunderstood economies in the world, but one of the most important to figure out.  Enodo’s chief economist, Diana Choyleva, has been analysing China for almost 20 years, while Enodo’s team boasts a combined 140 years’ experience covering China’s economy, politics and markets. 

Macroeconomics

<h2>China News That Matters</h2><ul>
<li>About that lab of yours…</li>
<li>Crypto crackdown marches on</li>
<li>Managing Chinese wealth</li>
<li>Taming the world’s wildest stretch of river </li>
<li>Driverless deliveries by car and truck</li>
</ul><div class="content-remarks">In my weekly digest China News That Matters, I will give you selected summaries, sourced from a variety of local Chinese-language and international news outlets, and highlight why I think the news is significant. These posts are meant to neither be bullish nor bearish, but help you separate the signal from the noise.</div>

China News That Matters
About that lab of yours…
Crypto crackdown marches on
Managing Chinese wealth
Taming the world’s wildest stretch of river 
Driverless deliveries by car and truck
In my weekly digest China News That Matters, I will give you selected summaries, sourced from a variety of local Chinese-language and international news outlets, and highlight why I think the news is significant. These posts are meant to neither be bullish nor bearish, but help you separate the signal from the noise.

Covid-19/ Crypto/ Goldman/ Energy/ Unmanned

Independent Asian Credit Research, Bondcritic

Warut Promboon

Independent Asian Credit Research

Asian Fixed Income/Frontier Market Research

Bondcritic

Bondcritic, established in 2009, is designed to be an independent credit research voice that helps investors gain insights and unbiased analyses on Asian fixed income market. Our mission is to discover deep-value Asian high-yield and distressed bonds with a bottom-up approach, together with the help of our proprietary ESG (Environmental, Social Development, and Governance) model. At the same time, we focus on bringing investment cases of unrated and unloved issuers to the general public.

Credit

We highlighted <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-huarong-asset-management-26375cc4-728e-4f75-b058-64298b10f256" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28089:1" rel="noopener">China Huarong Asset Management (HUAZ CH)</a> (Huarong) in our debut  “The Chinese Credit Chronicle (CCC)” last month on Huarong’s annual report delay. The subsequent events have stabilized Huarong’s HRINTH complex somewhat before the market fears Huarong’s debt could be restructured.
The rating downgrades by Fitch and Moody’s are less of an issue, in our view, as they are simply actions to catch up with what the market fears. Huarong’s story is less flamboyant than the HNA Group Limited (HNA) and yet it highlights the very same problem with HNA in terms of a lack of transparency and implicit support by the Chinese government. Both were eventually rescued by state-owned Chinese banks and both could be restructured down the road.
At the end of the day, we believe Huarong has been viewed as a quasi-sovereign credit and even rating agencies have been being caught by surprise as the market doubts support from the Chinese government will be certain. For Huarong, we still believe government support can be expected, but we believe the dust has not settled yet on the liabilities (and losses) that Huarong may have in store for bondholders. As a result, we cannot recommend buying Huarong’s HRINTH complex.
In a greater context, the risk we see here is that the rating agencies may revamp their methodologies to assess Chinese government-related entities (GREs). The adjustment could result in a wholesale downgrade of those GREs which are spread negative, not just for the Chinese GREs, but also other Chinese credits with implicit support from the central and local Chinese governments. We note that Chinese issuers have come a long way in terms of corporate governance improvement but transparency remains one of the key reasons why developed market USD bonds trade much tighter than Chinese USD bonds with the same rating, and this Huarong saga is a reminder that the spread will not narrow anytime in the near future.

We highlighted China Huarong Asset Management (HUAZ CH) (Huarong) in our debut  “The Chinese Credit Chronicle (CCC)” last month on Huarong’s annual report delay. The subsequent events have stabilized Huarong’s HRINTH complex somewhat before the market fears Huarong’s debt could be restructured.
The rating downgrades by Fitch and Moody’s are less of an issue, in our view, as they are simply actions to catch up with what the market fears. Huarong’s story is less flamboyant than the HNA Group Limited (HNA) and yet it highlights the very same problem with HNA in terms of a lack of transparency and implicit support by the Chinese government. Both were eventually rescued by state-owned Chinese banks and both could be restructured down the road.
At the end of the day, we believe Huarong has been viewed as a quasi-sovereign credit and even rating agencies have been being caught by surprise as the market doubts support from the Chinese government will be certain. For Huarong, we still believe government support can be expected, but we believe the dust has not settled yet on the liabilities (and losses) that Huarong may have in store for bondholders. As a result, we cannot recommend buying Huarong’s HRINTH complex.
In a greater context, the risk we see here is that the rating agencies may revamp their methodologies to assess Chinese government-related entities (GREs). The adjustment could result in a wholesale downgrade of those GREs which are spread negative, not just for the Chinese GREs, but also other Chinese credits with implicit support from the central and local Chinese governments. We note that Chinese issuers have come a long way in terms of corporate governance improvement but transparency remains one of the key reasons why developed market USD bonds trade much tighter than Chinese USD bonds with the same rating, and this Huarong saga is a reminder that the spread will not narrow anytime in the near future.

Founder of Antler Capital

Stanley Tsai, CFA

Monthly Newsletter | May 2021
Monetary data in May suggest that the environment has turned a notch tighter in China. Loan and deposit growth surprised on the downside and signals the beginning of yet another challenging period for the Chinese banks in the months ahead.
Both the asset and liability sides of the banks' balance sheets hit a wall in April. Loan growth missed consensus by a notable margin, driven by a softer mortgage market and slower corporate credit expansion. The net decline in new deposits was more worrying and the risk of disintermediation is on the rise, particularly for the smaller banks.
Deleveraging real estate exposures remains a top priority for the regulators. New mortgage rates have edged up, continuing a trend since 1Q21. Margins have widened slightly for new corporate loans as well. This supports our view that net interest margins have bottomed out and is mildly positive for the H-share G-SIBs.  
We expect the central bank to maintain a neutral policy for the remainder of 2021. The policy rates and loan prime rate will likely hold steady. That said, smaller banks that rely extensively on the interbank market may find it increasingly difficult to source cheap funding. Interbank bank defaults among the unlisted banks are not a remote possibility.
We will remain underweight the H-share banks against MSCI China <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/msci-china-index" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22895:1" rel="noopener">(MXCN INDEX)</a> until 2Q21 earnings. Meanwhile, we will watch closely whether a sales rebound story will materialize for the life insurers, as bank deposit outflows may find their way into savings polices in the coming quarters.

<div>
Related Insights
</div>
<div>
<ul style="list-style-type: disc;">
<li>
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/icbc-the-prefs-are-junk-and-should-trade-like-it" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:51598" rel="noopener">ICBC: The Prefs Are Junk and Should Trade Like It</a> </li>
<li>
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/icbc-the-bond-identity-a-zero-growth-dividend-discount-story" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:51463" rel="noopener">ICBC: The Bond Identity | A Zero-Growth Dividend Discount Story</a> </li>
</ul>
</div>

Monthly Newsletter | May 2021
Monetary data in May suggest that the environment has turned a notch tighter in China. Loan and deposit growth surprised on the downside and signals the beginning of yet another challenging period for the Chinese banks in the months ahead.
Both the asset and liability sides of the banks' balance sheets hit a wall in April. Loan growth missed consensus by a notable margin, driven by a softer mortgage market and slower corporate credit expansion. The net decline in new deposits was more worrying and the risk of disintermediation is on the rise, particularly for the smaller banks.
Deleveraging real estate exposures remains a top priority for the regulators. New mortgage rates have edged up, continuing a trend since 1Q21. Margins have widened slightly for new corporate loans as well. This supports our view that net interest margins have bottomed out and is mildly positive for the H-share G-SIBs.  
We expect the central bank to maintain a neutral policy for the remainder of 2021. The policy rates and loan prime rate will likely hold steady. That said, smaller banks that rely extensively on the interbank market may find it increasingly difficult to source cheap funding. Interbank bank defaults among the unlisted banks are not a remote possibility.
We will remain underweight the H-share banks against MSCI China (MXCN INDEX) until 2Q21 earnings. Meanwhile, we will watch closely whether a sales rebound story will materialize for the life insurers, as bank deposit outflows may find their way into savings polices in the coming quarters.


Related Insights




ICBC: The Prefs Are Junk and Should Trade Like It 

ICBC: The Bond Identity | A Zero-Growth Dividend Discount Story 



Glut and Famine: China's Monetary Conditions a Notch Tighter in May

ICBC <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ind-comm-bk-of-china-h" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1119:1" rel="noopener">(1398 HK</a> | <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ind-comm-bk-of-china-a" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:494:1" rel="noopener">601398 CH)</a> 
The market has been much more generous to ICBC's USD preferred shareholders than to its H-shareholders. ICBCAS 3.58 PERP has had a strong run since it was printed in September 2020, interrupted only momentarily by the Huarong <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-huarong-asset-management" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:968:1" rel="noopener">(2799 HK)</a> scare. The prefs are trading at 103 for a dismal yield of 2.9%. In our view, the AT-1 instrument is overvalued and due for a correction.
ICBCAS 3.58 PERP is rated 'Ba1', but trades like an investment-grade bond. On a yield-to-call basis, the prefs are trading at a 200bp spread to 5-year US treasuries. The pickup over the bank's USD senior unsecured issues is 150bp, which is a very modest premium for a six-notch rating difference from 'A1' to 'Ba1'.  
The yield differential between ICBC-H <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ind-comm-bk-of-china-h" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1119:1" rel="noopener">(1398 HK)</a> and ICBCAS 3.58 PERP has widened to a recent high. The H-share / pref yield gap shows strong mean-reversion tendencies. At 425bp, we believe the spread has the potential to tighten over the coming weeks.
Supply-demand imbalance is the key driver of current price dislocations. We believe the prefs' scarcity value will gradually decline as the next round of AT-1 / senior bail-in instruments issued by the Big Four banks flood the primary market. That said, there is little we can do to change investors' perception of the Chinese G-SIBs as safe havens regardless of subordination.
We are short ICBCAS 3.58 PERP on the expectation that pending new AT-1 issues will dilute its price premium. For the long H-share / short pref trade to be worthwhile, we will probably have to wait till ICBC-H crosses below HKD4.50. Liquidity for the prefs should be plenty to facilitate these trades. The key risk is for the market to turn decidedly bearish on Chinese non-financial credits and default to bank papers for shelter.
Related Insight
<ul>
<li>
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/icbc-the-bond-identity-a-zero-growth-dividend-discount-story" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:51463" rel="noopener">ICBC: The Bond Identity | A Zero-Growth Dividend Discount Story</a> </li>
</ul>
(Attachment: Financial Summary)

ICBC (1398 HK | 601398 CH) 
The market has been much more generous to ICBC's USD preferred shareholders than to its H-shareholders. ICBCAS 3.58 PERP has had a strong run since it was printed in September 2020, interrupted only momentarily by the Huarong (2799 HK) scare. The prefs are trading at 103 for a dismal yield of 2.9%. In our view, the AT-1 instrument is overvalued and due for a correction.
ICBCAS 3.58 PERP is rated 'Ba1', but trades like an investment-grade bond. On a yield-to-call basis, the prefs are trading at a 200bp spread to 5-year US treasuries. The pickup over the bank's USD senior unsecured issues is 150bp, which is a very modest premium for a six-notch rating difference from 'A1' to 'Ba1'.  
The yield differential between ICBC-H (1398 HK) and ICBCAS 3.58 PERP has widened to a recent high. The H-share / pref yield gap shows strong mean-reversion tendencies. At 425bp, we believe the spread has the potential to tighten over the coming weeks.
Supply-demand imbalance is the key driver of current price dislocations. We believe the prefs' scarcity value will gradually decline as the next round of AT-1 / senior bail-in instruments issued by the Big Four banks flood the primary market. That said, there is little we can do to change investors' perception of the Chinese G-SIBs as safe havens regardless of subordination.
We are short ICBCAS 3.58 PERP on the expectation that pending new AT-1 issues will dilute its price premium. For the long H-share / short pref trade to be worthwhile, we will probably have to wait till ICBC-H crosses below HKD4.50. Liquidity for the prefs should be plenty to facilitate these trades. The key risk is for the market to turn decidedly bearish on Chinese non-financial credits and default to bank papers for shelter.
Related Insight


ICBC: The Bond Identity | A Zero-Growth Dividend Discount Story 

(Attachment: Financial Summary)

ICBC: The Prefs Are Junk and Should Trade Like It

Equity Bottom-Up

ICBC <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ind-comm-bk-of-china-h" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1119:1" rel="noopener">(1398 HK</a> | <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ind-comm-bk-of-china-a" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:494:1" rel="noopener">601398 CH)</a> 
The market rout since April has taken ICBC-H <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ind-comm-bk-of-china-h" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1119:1" rel="noopener">(1398 HK)</a> back to HKD5.00/share. The stock is now trading at historically low forward P/B and P/E multiples and offers a hefty yield of 7%. Investors are pricing the shares exactly as if the bank is a dividend stock with no perpetual growth.
A perpetual bond may just be what the bank is. The market-implied NPL ratio of over 8% is not out of the realm of possibility. We forecast cumulative loan write-offs of CNY1 trillion (USD155 billion) over the next five years. It doesn't take another global crisis for us to get there. Asset quality concerns will continue to weigh heavily on the stock and the lack of catalysts will limit re-rating potential, in our view.
A multi-year ROE compression story is taking shape. Even the most bullish forecasts see the bank's ROE trending lower as impairment charges eat into interest and fee income. A strong provision level helps to an extent. But we expect the bank to burn down its reserve cover considerably in 2021E to 2025E just to maintain its dividends. 
Asset quality will likely get worse, but the mortgage book provides a glimmer of hope. ICBC continues to be a major funding source of China's capital-intensive recovery. The bank's infrastructure book has grown by CNY1.6 trillion (USD247 billion) since 2016. Indirect exposures to local government finances have also been on the rise. On a more positive note, the mortgage book has been a star. Even if NPLs tick up moderately as the portfolio seasons, homeowners are paying most of the bank's shareholder dividends.
We are underweight ICBC-H against MSCI China <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/msci-china-index" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22895:1" rel="noopener">(MXCN INDEX)</a> and would look to build a net short position if the stock edges past HKD6.00/share. The bank's dividend capacity puts a floor on the stock, but offers limited room for capital appreciation. The key risks to our call are macro-related. Rising tides lift all boats and any unexpected form of monetary easing by the PBOC will drive the shares higher.
(Attachment: Financial Summary)

ICBC (1398 HK | 601398 CH) 
The market rout since April has taken ICBC-H (1398 HK) back to HKD5.00/share. The stock is now trading at historically low forward P/B and P/E multiples and offers a hefty yield of 7%. Investors are pricing the shares exactly as if the bank is a dividend stock with no perpetual growth.
A perpetual bond may just be what the bank is. The market-implied NPL ratio of over 8% is not out of the realm of possibility. We forecast cumulative loan write-offs of CNY1 trillion (USD155 billion) over the next five years. It doesn't take another global crisis for us to get there. Asset quality concerns will continue to weigh heavily on the stock and the lack of catalysts will limit re-rating potential, in our view.
A multi-year ROE compression story is taking shape. Even the most bullish forecasts see the bank's ROE trending lower as impairment charges eat into interest and fee income. A strong provision level helps to an extent. But we expect the bank to burn down its reserve cover considerably in 2021E to 2025E just to maintain its dividends. 
Asset quality will likely get worse, but the mortgage book provides a glimmer of hope. ICBC continues to be a major funding source of China's capital-intensive recovery. The bank's infrastructure book has grown by CNY1.6 trillion (USD247 billion) since 2016. Indirect exposures to local government finances have also been on the rise. On a more positive note, the mortgage book has been a star. Even if NPLs tick up moderately as the portfolio seasons, homeowners are paying most of the bank's shareholder dividends.
We are underweight ICBC-H against MSCI China (MXCN INDEX) and would look to build a net short position if the stock edges past HKD6.00/share. The bank's dividend capacity puts a floor on the stock, but offers limited room for capital appreciation. The key risks to our call are macro-related. Rising tides lift all boats and any unexpected form of monetary easing by the PBOC will drive the shares higher.
(Attachment: Financial Summary)

ICBC: The Bond Identity | A Zero-Growth Dividend Discount Story

China

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd provides a broad range of personal and corporate commercial banking services all over China.  The Bank's businesses include deposit, loan, credit card, fund underwriting and trust, and foreign currency settlement and trading.

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Ind & Comm Bk Of China (A) (601398 CH)

Covid-19/ Crypto/ Goldman/ Energy/ Unmanned

In my weekly digest, I will give you selected summaries, sourced from a variety of local Chinese-language and international news outlets, and...

Diana Choyleva

China Huarong: No Confidence Motion

China Huarong could be the first domino to fall on the confidence on the implicit support by the Chinese government. Rating agencies' scramble to...

Bondcritic

Glut and Famine: China's Monetary Conditions a Notch Tighter in May

Monetary data in May point to a tighter environment for both lending and funding. Mortgage rates have edged up, but the deposit drain is worrying....

Stanley Tsai, CFA

ICBC: The Prefs Are Junk and Should Trade Like It

The prefs have had a strong run and are trading at 103 for a yield-to-call of only 2.9%. The AT-1 is significantly overvalued relative to 5-year US...

Stanley Tsai, CFA

ICBC: The Bond Identity | A Zero-Growth Dividend Discount Story

ICBC-H offers a hefty yield of 7% and is trading precisely as a zero-growth dividend-paying stock. But we are not buyers just yet and there is a...

Stanley Tsai, CFA

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