Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Gross Operating Revenues Do NOT Cover Recurring Costs At HSBCNA: HSBC Holdings plc’s (HSBC) [5.HK/HSBA.LN] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (US only) [HSBCNA], reported yet another troubling set of results for 4Q20, losing USD 152.6 mn – down USD 312.6 mn (195.4%) on a linked quarter basis. Excluding non-recurring items, core operating income declined USD 313.6 mn (230.1%) for a loss of USD 177.3 mn over the same period. As it stands again, HSBCNA’s operating costs exceed recurring revenues; *HSBCNA Is Evolving Into An Indian State Bank: Given the credit weakness, we find that NPL/TL and problem assets/TL ratios significantly worsened 92 bp and 160 bp linked quarter, respectively, to 2.82% and 5.01%. By our calculation, we note that net new problem loan growth is a scary USD 867.9 mn  - for an annualized rate of growth of 155.4% - in line with the Indian state banks. By our calculation, HSBCNA’s reserves are light by USD 3.8 bn or 17.6% of HSBCNA’s stated equity. We would have compared the reserve shortfall to PBT, but HSBCNA simply loses money on an operating basis; and*HSBCNA Should Be Dumped At Any Price: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. We look forward to Group results on February 23rd, and the clarity we will receive on its hot mess in the US.

*Gross Operating Revenues Do NOT Cover Recurring Costs At HSBCNA: HSBC Holdings plc’s (HSBC) [5.HK/HSBA.LN] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (US only) [HSBCNA], reported yet another troubling set of results for 4Q20, losing USD 152.6 mn – down USD 312.6 mn (195.4%) on a linked quarter basis. Excluding non-recurring items, core operating income declined USD 313.6 mn (230.1%) for a loss of USD 177.3 mn over the same period. As it stands again, HSBCNA’s operating costs exceed recurring revenues; *HSBCNA Is Evolving Into An Indian State Bank: Given the credit weakness, we find that NPL/TL and problem assets/TL ratios significantly worsened 92 bp and 160 bp linked quarter, respectively, to 2.82% and 5.01%. By our calculation, we note that net new problem loan growth is a scary USD 867.9 mn  - for an annualized rate of growth of 155.4% - in line with the Indian state banks. By our calculation, HSBCNA’s reserves are light by USD 3.8 bn or 17.6% of HSBCNA’s stated equity. We would have compared the reserve shortfall to PBT, but HSBCNA simply loses money on an operating basis; and*HSBCNA Should Be Dumped At Any Price: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. We look forward to Group results on February 23rd, and the clarity we will receive on its hot mess in the US.     

HSBC Holdings Plc –American Result Intimates Group Miss

*PAL Improves, But Fundamentals Weak: Ping An Insurance (2318.HK)[Ping An] reported a 1H20 operating profit of CNY 74.3 bn, increasing just 1% YOY and 5% below consensus. As a recovery appears underway with Ping An Life (PAL), Ping An results appeared to be well-supported by a HOH improvement of CNY 13.2 bn bn (40.4%) in net profits  - although its value of new business (VONB) declined CNY 3.9 bn (11.9%); *P&amp;C Remains A Challenge: Auto combined ratio reversed course and increased by 250 bp to 100.6%, and certainly warrants watching a driving returns to normal in mainland China. Auto insurance reform will remain a challenge for profitability going forward, and pricing has yet to stabilize. The credit insurance segment remains challenged, due to defaults on underlying loans.*Awful Bank Result: For 4Q20, PAB reported results of CNY 6.5 bn – declining CNY 2.2 bn (25.1%) on a linked quarter basis. In this environment, credit troubles no doubt are a foregone conclusion. However, this was not necessarily PAB’s biggest issue in its most results announcement, where the bulk of the earnings decline was attributed to a CNY 1.9 bn (17.1%) linked quarter increase in costs.

*PAL Improves, But Fundamentals Weak: Ping An Insurance (2318.HK)[Ping An] reported a 1H20 operating profit of CNY 74.3 bn, increasing just 1% YOY and 5% below consensus. As a recovery appears underway with Ping An Life (PAL), Ping An results appeared to be well-supported by a HOH improvement of CNY 13.2 bn bn (40.4%) in net profits  - although its value of new business (VONB) declined CNY 3.9 bn (11.9%); *P&amp;C Remains A Challenge: Auto combined ratio reversed course and increased by 250 bp to 100.6%, and certainly warrants watching a driving returns to normal in mainland China. Auto insurance reform will remain a challenge for profitability going forward, and pricing has yet to stabilize. The credit insurance segment remains challenged, due to defaults on underlying loans.*Awful Bank Result: For 4Q20, PAB reported results of CNY 6.5 bn – declining CNY 2.2 bn (25.1%) on a linked quarter basis. In this environment, credit troubles no doubt are a foregone conclusion. However, this was not necessarily PAB’s biggest issue in its most results announcement, where the bulk of the earnings decline was attributed to a CNY 1.9 bn (17.1%) linked quarter increase in costs.

Ping An Insurance – Hope Is Not A Strategy

*Costs Now An Issue: Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB], the Ping An Insurance (2318.HK) [Ping An] banking subsidiary, reported CNY 6.5 bn – declining CNY 2.2 bn (25.1%) on a linked quarter basis. In this environment, credit troubles no doubt are a foregone conclusion. However, this was not necessarily PAB’s biggest issue in its most results announcement, where the bulk of the earnings decline was attributed to a CNY 1.9 bn (17.1%) linked quarter increase in costs;*Credit Is WEAKER Still:  We find that credit weakness is actually deteriorating at an even more accelerated pace than in 3Q20, as net new NPLs have increased CNY 20.5 bn or a massive 241% (223% in 3Q20) on an annualized basis. We also find that PAB’s reserves still remain quite light by CNY 152 bn if we assume a 2x NPL ratio. This shortfall represents 60% of stated equity; and*Fundamentally Challenged Still: Despite the Investor Day cheerleading session, Ping An P&amp;C operating profits declined CNY 2.6 bn (29.2%) HOH in 1H20, as the overall combined ratio eroded 1.5% to 98.1% due primarily to continued weakness within the credit insurance unit where the combined ratio came in at 125.6% (up 32.4%). The credit insurance segment reported a CNY 3.5 bn underwriting loss, due to defaults on underlying loans.

*Costs Now An Issue: Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB], the Ping An Insurance (2318.HK) [Ping An] banking subsidiary, reported CNY 6.5 bn – declining CNY 2.2 bn (25.1%) on a linked quarter basis. In this environment, credit troubles no doubt are a foregone conclusion. However, this was not necessarily PAB’s biggest issue in its most results announcement, where the bulk of the earnings decline was attributed to a CNY 1.9 bn (17.1%) linked quarter increase in costs;*Credit Is WEAKER Still:  We find that credit weakness is actually deteriorating at an even more accelerated pace than in 3Q20, as net new NPLs have increased CNY 20.5 bn or a massive 241% (223% in 3Q20) on an annualized basis. We also find that PAB’s reserves still remain quite light by CNY 152 bn if we assume a 2x NPL ratio. This shortfall represents 60% of stated equity; and*Fundamentally Challenged Still: Despite the Investor Day cheerleading session, Ping An P&amp;C operating profits declined CNY 2.6 bn (29.2%) HOH in 1H20, as the overall combined ratio eroded 1.5% to 98.1% due primarily to continued weakness within the credit insurance unit where the combined ratio came in at 125.6% (up 32.4%). The credit insurance segment reported a CNY 3.5 bn underwriting loss, due to defaults on underlying loans. 

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

David Blennerhassett

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

Last Week in Event SPACE: Toshiba, Cathay, OFAC's Walk Back, Trad Chi Med, Enplas, Car, Japan Asia

*Major BEA Shareholder Under Stress In Front Of Merger: CaixaBank SA (CABK.SM), an 17.3% holder of Bank of East Asia’s (23.HK) [BEA] shares, and still has significant capital concerns. Combined with the acquisition of Bankia (BKIA.SM), pro forma CaixaBank’s (surviving entity) core CET1 target is 11.9%. With CaixaBank's restructuring charge only sufficient to fund EUR 1 bn in cost cuts, CaixaBank will need to find additional ways to manufacture capital in order to fund the restructuring - including asset sales, lower dividends, and/or capital raise; and*Expecting A BEA Offload: With an ownership value at EUR 786 mn, a capital charge of EUR 1.6 bn at pro forma CaixaBank under Basel III, the aforementioned solvency constraints at Caixabank, a fundamentally struggling BEA, and a resurgent mainland China, CaixaBank would have to finally be looking for an exit – which would be a massive overhang on the shares of BEA. The key terms of the CaixaBank/BEA Shareholder  Agreement likely cannot be upheld by the former given that its financial problems prevent it from fulfilling its responsibilities.

*Major BEA Shareholder Under Stress In Front Of Merger: CaixaBank SA (CABK.SM), an 17.3% holder of Bank of East Asia’s (23.HK) [BEA] shares, and still has significant capital concerns. Combined with the acquisition of Bankia (BKIA.SM), pro forma CaixaBank’s (surviving entity) core CET1 target is 11.9%. With CaixaBank's restructuring charge only sufficient to fund EUR 1 bn in cost cuts, CaixaBank will need to find additional ways to manufacture capital in order to fund the restructuring - including asset sales, lower dividends, and/or capital raise; and*Expecting A BEA Offload: With an ownership value at EUR 786 mn, a capital charge of EUR 1.6 bn at pro forma CaixaBank under Basel III, the aforementioned solvency constraints at Caixabank, a fundamentally struggling BEA, and a resurgent mainland China, CaixaBank would have to finally be looking for an exit – which would be a massive overhang on the shares of BEA. The key terms of the CaixaBank/BEA Shareholder  Agreement likely cannot be upheld by the former given that its financial problems prevent it from fulfilling its responsibilities.  

Bank of East Asia – How Much Longer Can Caixa Hold On?

Hong Kong

Hang Seng Bank Limited and its subsidiaries provide banking and related financial services.

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Hang Seng Bank (11 HK)

HSBC Holdings Plc –American Result Intimates Group Miss

HSBC HOLDINGS PLC: HSBCNA reported troubling results in 4Q20 - declining 195% linked quarter, as operating costs exceed recurring revenues. This...

Thomas J. Monaco

Ping An Insurance – Hope Is Not A Strategy

PING AN INSURANCE: Ping An reported 2H20 an operating profit decline of 12.2% HOH. Despite bottom-line improvement in Life, results are truly...

Thomas J. Monaco

Ping An Insurance - Awful Bank Result

PING AN INSURANCE: PAB reported a 25.1% lower linked quarter result. The bulk of the earnings decline was attributed to a 17.1% increase in costs;...

Thomas J. Monaco

Last Week in Event SPACE: Toshiba, Cathay, OFAC's Walk Back, Trad Chi Med, Enplas, Car, Japan Asia

The weekend is here! Pour yourself a coffee, grab a comfortable seat, and sift through a brief summary of insights on various events discussed...

David Blennerhassett

Bank of East Asia – How Much Longer Can Caixa Hold On?

BANK OF EAST ASIA: CaixaBank is a 17.3% holder of BEA, and still has significant capital concerns. CaixaBank needs to find additional ways to...

Thomas J. Monaco

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