Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

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<li>
C’mon Guys, Where Have You Been?: S&amp;P issued a scathing report suggesting that China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] “will likely default because the company has lost its main business”;</li>
<li>
Other Pearls:S&amp;P also believes that “Evergrande’s massive debt will catch up with it”; and    </li>
<li>
Ratings Agencies Are More Than Culpable: Wouldn’t you know it, the sleepy, fee hungry ratings agencies are finally starting work on Evergrande after the market embarrasses them once again.</li>
</ul>



C’mon Guys, Where Have You Been?: S&amp;P issued a scathing report suggesting that China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] “will likely default because the company has lost its main business”;

Other Pearls:S&amp;P also believes that “Evergrande’s massive debt will catch up with it”; and    

Ratings Agencies Are More Than Culpable: Wouldn’t you know it, the sleepy, fee hungry ratings agencies are finally starting work on Evergrande after the market embarrasses them once again.


*Disposal of Shengjing Bank Stake: China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] announced that it is selling a 19.93% stake in Shengjing Bank (2066.HK) at a take-under price of CNY 5.70 per share (19.8% below market) or at a P/BV or 51.4% - representing a MTM loss of CNY 9.9 bn (USD 1.53 bn) or approximately 2.5% of Evergrande’s stated equity; and  *Systemic Banking Risk Highlighted: Evergrande is alleged to have USD 20 bn in “direct and indirect” risk due to Shengjing Bank, which would represent a true systemic challenge given the bank's size and importance. If the Evergrande exposure of CNY 129.4 bn is remotely correct, it would appear that Shenjiang Bank has been materially under-reporting NPLs. If this figure is correct, a reserve shortfall of CNY 128.4 (USD 19.9 bn) would appear to exist – representing 158% of 2Q21 stated equity and intimating Shengjing Bank is technically insolvent.

*Disposal of Shengjing Bank Stake: China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] announced that it is selling a 19.93% stake in Shengjing Bank (2066.HK) at a take-under price of CNY 5.70 per share (19.8% below market) or at a P/BV or 51.4% - representing a MTM loss of CNY 9.9 bn (USD 1.53 bn) or approximately 2.5% of Evergrande’s stated equity; and  *Systemic Banking Risk Highlighted: Evergrande is alleged to have USD 20 bn in “direct and indirect” risk due to Shengjing Bank, which would represent a true systemic challenge given the bank's size and importance. If the Evergrande exposure of CNY 129.4 bn is remotely correct, it would appear that Shenjiang Bank has been materially under-reporting NPLs. If this figure is correct, a reserve shortfall of CNY 128.4 (USD 19.9 bn) would appear to exist – representing 158% of 2Q21 stated equity and intimating Shengjing Bank is technically insolvent.

China Evergrande Group – Daisy Chain Pulled

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

*Gaming Caught In The Crosshairs: Mainland China indicated that changes are afoot to gaming regulations, including the appointment of government officials to supervise the companies - just as Macau's lucrative gaming licenses come up for re-bidding in 2022; and*Financials Likely Next: There appears to be a genuine timeline for each sector in mainland China to be taken out to the woodshed. Now that the gaming industry is now being placed under firm control, it would appear to only be a matter of time when the financial sector will be re-configured to suit mainland China’s vision – likely ahead of the national elections in 2022.

*Gaming Caught In The Crosshairs: Mainland China indicated that changes are afoot to gaming regulations, including the appointment of government officials to supervise the companies - just as Macau's lucrative gaming licenses come up for re-bidding in 2022; and*Financials Likely Next: There appears to be a genuine timeline for each sector in mainland China to be taken out to the woodshed. Now that the gaming industry is now being placed under firm control, it would appear to only be a matter of time when the financial sector will be re-configured to suit mainland China’s vision – likely ahead of the national elections in 2022.

Mainland China – Here Comes The Rein Again

*Document 15: Recently the China Bank and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued guidance to both banks and insurers on implicit debt of local government financing vehicles (LGFV) via Document 15 – tightening the screws even further; and*Clarification Was Necessary: Uncertainties surrounding the definition of local state-owned entity (SOE) with implicit financing support from the government has already led to an aggressive impact on lending. Numerous local infrastructure SOEs have subsidiaries with some form of implicit local government debt support, and without financing Document 15 would have had even more significant consequences. Still over 50% of LGFVs remain affected.

*Document 15: Recently the China Bank and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued guidance to both banks and insurers on implicit debt of local government financing vehicles (LGFV) via Document 15 – tightening the screws even further; and*Clarification Was Necessary: Uncertainties surrounding the definition of local state-owned entity (SOE) with implicit financing support from the government has already led to an aggressive impact on lending. Numerous local infrastructure SOEs have subsidiaries with some form of implicit local government debt support, and without financing Document 15 would have had even more significant consequences. Still over 50% of LGFVs remain affected.

China Banks – Some Clarity On LGFV Financing

Independent Asian Credit Research, Bondcritic

Warut Promboon

Independent Asian Credit Research

Asian Fixed Income/Frontier Market Research

Bondcritic

Bondcritic, established in 2009, is designed to be an independent credit research voice that helps investors gain insights and unbiased analyses on Asian fixed income market. Our mission is to discover deep-value Asian high-yield and distressed bonds with a bottom-up approach, together with the help of our proprietary ESG (Environmental, Social Development, and Governance) model. At the same time, we focus on bringing investment cases of unrated and unloved issuers to the general public.

Credit

Since our last China Credit Chronicle (CCC) on 28-April, the sentiment on high-yield credits in China has not improved, to say the least. The “3 Red Lines” requirements on Chinese property developers are proven to be a bit too draconian, in our view. The strict rule forced Chinese property developers to cut prices and may have incentivized a few to manipulate their balance sheets to lower their debt levels, in our judgment. The latest spotlight is on <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a> (China Evergrande Group) of which we are working on the updated report to capture additional information once the information from the group is sufficient to form a judgment.
In this flash note, we update recent events of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hna-group-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:25987:1" rel="noopener">HNA Group (HNAGRZ CH)</a>(HNA) on its on-going bankruptcy procedure. HNA-related bonds have not been active of late on a lack of liquidity and recent updates from the group. We believe it is impossible at this stage to gauge the recovery rate of the HNA complex on its hidden liabilities and potential frauds evidenced by the embezzlement cases this year.
At 29 cents on the dollar (ask), we are not confident to recommend a Buy on the maturing SANYPH 10/21s without additional knowledge on the restructuring plan, but we believe the market prices HNA’s recovery around 12 cents on the dollar, based on HONAIR Perp’s bid price.
At the end of the day, HNA shows us that these Chinese mega corporates (i.e. <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-huarong-asset-management-26375cc4-728e-4f75-b058-64298b10f256" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28089:1" rel="noopener">China Huarong Asset Management (HUAZ CH)</a> and China Evergrande Group) have enticed international investors (and perhaps rating agencies) to ignore credit fundamentals and believe they will be supported by the local and/or central government when necessary. Liquidity of these companies are all about credit facilities with Chinese banks, many of which are state-owned. Once the state support wanes, we believe the local bank credit facilities will be reduced and that could lead to an eventual default, in our view. We believe the fall of HNA and others to come is a necessary step of the learning curve for investors in Chinese credits although we do not believe the fallout will turn into a contagion for all Chinese high-yield credits.
That said, we believe investors need to learn how to price Chinese credits on a stand-alone basis properly, and rating agencies, especially Chinese rating agencies, need to adjust their rating models. In our opinion, wishful ratings at the issuances, followed by multiple and rush downgrades simply do not work and have left investors unprepared to sell bonds.

Since our last China Credit Chronicle (CCC) on 28-April, the sentiment on high-yield credits in China has not improved, to say the least. The “3 Red Lines” requirements on Chinese property developers are proven to be a bit too draconian, in our view. The strict rule forced Chinese property developers to cut prices and may have incentivized a few to manipulate their balance sheets to lower their debt levels, in our judgment. The latest spotlight is on Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK) (China Evergrande Group) of which we are working on the updated report to capture additional information once the information from the group is sufficient to form a judgment.
In this flash note, we update recent events of HNA Group (HNAGRZ CH)(HNA) on its on-going bankruptcy procedure. HNA-related bonds have not been active of late on a lack of liquidity and recent updates from the group. We believe it is impossible at this stage to gauge the recovery rate of the HNA complex on its hidden liabilities and potential frauds evidenced by the embezzlement cases this year.
At 29 cents on the dollar (ask), we are not confident to recommend a Buy on the maturing SANYPH 10/21s without additional knowledge on the restructuring plan, but we believe the market prices HNA’s recovery around 12 cents on the dollar, based on HONAIR Perp’s bid price.
At the end of the day, HNA shows us that these Chinese mega corporates (i.e. China Huarong Asset Management (HUAZ CH) and China Evergrande Group) have enticed international investors (and perhaps rating agencies) to ignore credit fundamentals and believe they will be supported by the local and/or central government when necessary. Liquidity of these companies are all about credit facilities with Chinese banks, many of which are state-owned. Once the state support wanes, we believe the local bank credit facilities will be reduced and that could lead to an eventual default, in our view. We believe the fall of HNA and others to come is a necessary step of the learning curve for investors in Chinese credits although we do not believe the fallout will turn into a contagion for all Chinese high-yield credits.
That said, we believe investors need to learn how to price Chinese credits on a stand-alone basis properly, and rating agencies, especially Chinese rating agencies, need to adjust their rating models. In our opinion, wishful ratings at the issuances, followed by multiple and rush downgrades simply do not work and have left investors unprepared to sell bonds.

The China Credit Chronicle:  Hazardous National Anecdote

China

China Huarong Asset Management Co., Ltd. operates as an investment management company. The Company offers financial services, asset management services, asset management services, and more. China Huarong Asset Management serves customers worldwide.

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China Huarong Asset Management (HUAZ CH)

China Evergrande Group – Thanks S&P

EVERGRANDE: S&P issued a scathing report suggesting that Evergrande “will likely default because the company has lost its main business. Not...

Thomas J. Monaco

China Evergrande Group – Daisy Chain Pulled

EVERGRANDE: Evergrande is selling a 19.9% stake in Shengjing Bank, leading to a MTM loss of USD 1.53 bn or 2.5% of equity. It's risk outstanding is...

Thomas J. Monaco

Mainland China – Here Comes The Rein Again

FINANCIALS IN CROSSHAIRS: Mainland China is appointing government officials to supervise the gaming companies. There appears to be a genuine...

Thomas J. Monaco

China Banks – Some Clarity On LGFV Financing

CHINA BANKS: Recently the CBIRC issued guidance to both banks and insurers on implicit debt of LGFV via Document 15. Clarification was needed given...

Thomas J. Monaco

The China Credit Chronicle: Hazardous National Anecdote

Here is an update on HNA, the recent fallout of more to come in the Chinese credit space. at 12c recovery, many factors remains uncertain....

Bondcritic

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