Brief Value Investing: Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 5 –  Summarecon Agung (SMRA IJ) and more

In this briefing:

1. Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 5 –  Summarecon Agung (SMRA IJ)
2. Brazilian Political Turmoil Adds to Market Volatility, and Concerns on Pension Reform
3. Is There Still a Bright Future for FutureBright?
4. Security Bank: Something Makes Me Feel Insecure
5. Philippines: El Niño’s Comeback – How Bad?

1. Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 5 –  Summarecon Agung (SMRA IJ)

In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks. 

The fifth company that we explore is Summarecon Agung (SMRA IJ), a township developer with over 40 years of track record and a combined development area of over 2,700ha. The company benefits from its exposure to the popular Serpong district, but an over expansion, coupled with tightening property regulations caused its balance sheet to suffer in the following years. Earnings have declined by -19% Cagr over the past five years as a consequence of lower margins and burgeoning debt levels.

The company has plans to divest its retail mall division, which can serve as a positive catalyst in the near term. Improving sentiment and better interest rate environment, as well as positive regulatory tailwinds should be a driver to SMRA’s share price this year. We see a 44% upside to our target price of IDR1,408 per share.

Summary of this insight:

• The success of SMRA’s first township, Kelapa Gading, paved way for the next six township development. The same township model is replicated to its Serpong, Bekasi, Bandung, Karawang, Makassar, and soon Bogor. 
• During the height of the property boom, every cluster launch in the Serpong area is 2-3x oversubscribed. Buyers were a mix of speculators and end-users, and both were happy customers benefiting from over 400% land price appreciation over the course of 2009-2013. Land ASP in 2009 was just below IDR3mn versus IDR12-15mn in 2013.
• Driven by the positive momentum of the property boom, SMRA ambitiously launched three new townships at the trough of the property market (2015-2018), growing its total township development area by more than a third. Poor cashflow management, stemming from the over-expansion during the property downturn took a massive toll on the balance sheet. SMRA turned from net cash in 2013 to holding IDR8.6tn of debt in 9M18 (1.2x gearing) with interest costs making up a chunky 49% of EBIT. 
• We have also seen a massive shift to the end-user market since 2014, as the company started to sell more smaller houses and affordable apartments rather than land lots and shophouses. At the peak, shophouses and land lots made up more than 50% of the company’s development revenues. As of 9M18, that number has declined to a mere 7% of revenues, while 93% comes from houses and apartments. Housing units launched in 2016-2017 are 36% cheaper than units launched in 2011-2014, as the company downsized in the area.

• SMRA has the second biggest retail mall portfolio in our coverage after Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ) with 258,000sqm net leasable area (NLA). The three malls generate about IDR1.3tn revenue per year, returning 42% EBITDA margin. About 40% of tenants in Bekasi and Serpong are up for a rental renewal in the next three years, and this could serve as a potential upside on the average rental rates. 

• Pros: Bank Indonesia (BI)’s move to loosen mortgage regulations last year, and plans to reduce luxury taxes and allow for friendlier foreign ownership scheme should give a breath of fresh air over the medium term. SMRA targets 18% presales growth in 2019, but they have been missing their presales target by an average of 22% over the past three years. We expect a more modest 5% presales recovery this year.
• Pros: Margin on houses show a massive improvement from 51% in 2014 to 59% in 9M18. The improvement brings up the consolidated property development margin by 600bps YoY. As a segment, this is the first margin uptick since 2014, leading to 44% YoY EBIT growth and 115% YoY NPAT growth in 9M18.
• Cons: The stellar property development growth, however, is diluted by the poor performances from the investment property division that recorded 14% YoY EBIT decline. Despite some improvements on the gross margin level and healthy topline growth, opex has doubled YoY, leading to 700bps reduction in the EBITDA margin. 
• Recommendation & catalyst: SMRA has underperformed the JCI by a steep 71% over the past 36 months as earnings and presales continue to disappoint. Discount to NAV, PE, and PB valuation are standing at -1 standard deviation below mean. Improving risk appetite for high beta stocks, better interest rate environment, accomodative policies from the government, and potential pick up of activity after the election are a few of the key catalysts for the stock and sector re-rating. The divestment of its retail arm should also help to clear some debt off the balance sheet and unlock value. We have a BUY recommendation.

2. Brazilian Political Turmoil Adds to Market Volatility, and Concerns on Pension Reform

• Brazil’s Ex-President Michel Temer has been arrested as part of the on-going CarWash (Lava Jato) criminal investigation, on bribery and corruption charges
• We believe that this increases the near-term downside risk to the BOVESPA index and blue chips, including the large cap banks
• This will also, we believe, heighten the negative “noise” around pension reform, potentially increasing the complexity of the reform process; even if this development alone should not serve to derail it, in our view
• Large cap Brazilian banks’ share prices have come under pressure recently, and we would expect the market correction to continue in the short term
• Nonetheless, we still see potential for Banco Do Brasil Sa (BBAS3 BZ) to re-rate over the medium term, and narrow the PBV gap with its core peers, Itau Unibanco Holding Sa (ITUB4 BZ) and Banco Bradesco Sa (BBDC4 BZ), as Banco do Brasil’s own internal restructuring takes effect

3. Is There Still a Bright Future for FutureBright?

Almost 12 months after posting our initial thesis on Future Bright Holdings (703 HK)Gambling on a Bright Future, we review FutureBright’s most recent results, raising questions on whether stalling improvement in the core restaurant business performance warrants taking chips off the table while waiting for key catalysts to materialise.

4. Security Bank: Something Makes Me Feel Insecure

Security Bank (SECB PM) trades at a premium to Asian banks on a P/Book, franchise valuation, earnings yield, and total return ratio basis.

The PH Score™ of 5.3 is neither good nor bad. (Asia median is 5.7).

In terms of fundamental traction, efficiency has eroded and interconnected profitability has narrowed. “Jaws” are negative. Funding cost growth is sharply in excess of interest income growth. On the other hand, liquidity and capital adequacy are moving in the right direction or are stable.

Asset quality seems to have dramatically improved. Headline non-performing loans are now very low due to adoption of PFRS9. These are calculated now as loans aligned to a default criteria. The bank seems to have reclassified part of “stage 3” impaired loans back into “stage 2”. “Stage 2” is comprised of assets which have experienced a SICR (significant increase in credit risk) since initial recognition, such as substandard, past-dues, and SMLs, and are not classified as NPLs. “Stage 2” represents almost 4% of the loan book versus a headline impaired or problem loan ratio of just 0.64%. In addition, unimpaired past-due loans (73% of headline NPLs) climbed 57% YoY. Charge-offs soared 47% YoY. Perhaps the asset quality is not as pristine as the NPL ratio intimates.

When we look back from 2004, we see an explosive increase in loans (+10x since 2004) coinciding with lower profitability over this period. This is not a good sign. As the bank shifts to consumer lending for growth, up 10x since 2012, we wonder whether a similar pattern will emerge.

In short, the bank resides in the bottom decile of our global VFM (Valuation, Fundamentals, Momentum) rankings.

5. Philippines: El Niño’s Comeback – How Bad?

• With SST (sea surface temperature) in the Pacific past 26^oC, El Niño’s comeback is highly likely. Past occurrences of severe El Niño was isolated in the farm sector with upside risks to food prices. While another round of contraction in farm output and employment would be expected, the liberal rice import policy would entice imports to plug the gap between demand-supply in 1H19 and ease potential rice/food price upticks. 

• The El Niño supply shock would coincide with the global macro slowdown and fiscal spending delays that spawn downside risks to growth. With a legally handicapped fiscal budget, monetary policy may have to step up to ease likelihood of severe, near-term constraints to growth. We believe monetary adjustments would be the appropriate responses to the macro challenges as inflation winds down. Sequencing and appropriate timing of monetary reaction remains key to credible policy responses starting with the bank reserve ratio cut in 2Q19 (staggered cuts for a maximum of 3% this year) followed by policy rate cuts commencing in 3Q19 (cumulative -50bp in 2H19) when inflation hits rock bottom of less than 2%.

• Buy bonds with preference for the curve’s belly to short-duration.