Brief Value Investing: Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 1 – Ciputra Development (CTRA IJ) and more

In this briefing:

1. Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 1 – Ciputra Development (CTRA IJ)
2. Bank of Kyoto – Nintendo Sale A Portent of Changes To Come?
3. BBTN: Indonesia Has Special Mention Problems Too
4. Westpac Banking: Looking Fragile
5. Tochigi Bank (8550JP): Red Flags but No White Flags (Yet)

1. Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 1 – Ciputra Development (CTRA IJ)

In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks. 

The first company that we explore is Ciputra Development (CTRA IJ), a township developer with 38 years of track record. With 75 ongoing township projects in 33 cities, CTRA has the widest coverage of any developer in Indonesia. However, tightening policies by the Bank Indonesia (BI), in particular the presales mortgage disbursement regulation caused a significant drop in operating cashflow and increased gearing level.

Earnings have been on a downtrend, as slower revenue recognition coupled with higher interest costs have weighed on the bottom line. As BI has recently started to relax property regulations, we may begin to see some positive impact on cash flows over the next few quarters, although earnings are likely to remain weak from declining presales over the past three years.

As we enter the election year, presales announcements may not be positive in the short term, but activities may improve after the electoral contest, helped by a pick up in sentiment and boosted by a better interest rate environment and positive regulatory tailwinds. Potential portfolio inflow to high beta stocks and rising risk appetite for smaller cap underperforming stocks should also drive CTRA’s share price outperformance in 2019. We see a 50% upside to our target price of IDR1,352 per share.

Summary of this insight:

• The property development product portfolio includes landed housing, high-rise condominiums, and offices. Landed housing projects are still CTRA’s bread and butter, comprising more than half of the company’s revenue and more than two-thirds of presales. As the property demand is currently dominated by the end-users, CTRA’s product offering is shifting towards smaller more affordable units. We have put together an example mortgage calculation and determine a key affordability level based on the average income per capita in the Greater Jakarta to illustrate how much should a housing unit be worth for the end users market.
• The investment properties portfolio consists of 4 malls, 9 hotels, and 4 hospitals across the major cities in Indonesia, making up 13%, 8%, and 6% of 9M18 total consolidated revenues respectively. This is a 68% increase in revenue contribution versus five years ago. The company has been actively building its investment property portfolio to weather out the volatility in the non-recurring or development revenue.
• Accessibility is a key factor to land appreciation and hence, company’s total NAV. With the traffic worsening around the Greater Jakarta area, time to commute is an increasingly important factor in determining where to stay and access to public transportation such as MRT and LRT will be a powerful driver going forward. CTRA has a very diverse property development portfolio, hence the benefit of the infrastructure rollout is more widespread across the different projects.
• 65% of CTRA’s presales are generated from units priced IDR2bn and below, which indicate that the majority of CTRA’s buyers are in the middle to middle-low segments. These buyers are price sensitive and are highly dependent on financing. CTRA’s mortgage and in-house installment proportion is one of the highest in our property universe, making the company more susceptible to the changes in the property mortgage regulation by the Central Bank (BI).

• The property mortgage regulation in Indonesia has had few rounds of changes in the past decade, with a series of tightening measures taking place between 2013-2014, and the start of loosening measures in 2016-2018. We will discuss in depth the various property regulations issued and its impact on CTRA’s cashflow. We also constructed a cashflow simulation time series for a sample housing sale to determine the time needed for the project to turn net cashflow positive and when can the developer reinvest for future landbank of equivalent value.
• Pros: as we expect a better rate of cash inflow from future mortgages, our model shows that the advances-to-inventory ratio, which is an indicative figure for the property developers’ working capital, will begin to rise in 2019, leading to an inflection point for CTRA’s FCF. One-off adjustment in the earlier booking of 2019’s first mortgage disbursement is the key driver. 

• Cons: CTRA booked three consecutive years of negative presales growth with a decline rate of -11% Cagr. This indicates that the accounting revenue growth will more likely be weaker over the next 12-18 months. We also estimate that margin should continue to trend down until 2020. As we continue to see a larger proportion of units priced below IDR1bn in the past 2 years, it is unlikely to see a pick up in margin in 2019-2020.

• Cons: Election year to election year, we may see some similarity between the 2014 and 2019’s quarterly presales split. 1Q14 and 2Q14 contributed 41% to total FY14 presales, while 4Q14 contributed a chunky 33%. If we assume the same quarterly split for 2019 presales target, we may potentially see 13%-27% YoY declines in the next three quarters of presales reporting. Note however that the BI issued its first round of tightening regulations at the end of 2013 and this may have an impact to the 1H14 presales. Also there is a difference in the election schedules as the 2014 election was dragged on until late August, while the 2019 contest will be done by end of April.
• Recommendation & catalyst: CTRA share price has underperformed the JCI by 24% in the past 12 months. Though the share price has a nice 28% rebound from its 5-year low point, CTRA’s discount to net asset value (NAV) and price-to-book (PB) ratio is still at more than -1 standard deviation below its historical mean. Its price-to-earnings (PE) ratio however is only slightly below the historical mean. Improving risk appetite for high beta stocks, better interest rate environment, accomodative policies from the government, and potential pick up of activity after the election are a few of the key catalysts for the stock and sector. This underlines our BUY recommendation on CTRA with 50% upside. Our bull case scenario of rerating to +1 standard deviation above mean valuation offers 26% additional upside to our TP. 

2. Bank of Kyoto – Nintendo Sale A Portent of Changes To Come?

On Friday 22 February after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP) announced a buyback (E, J), a share cancellation (E, J), and a public equity offering of secondary shares (J-only). This kind of event is not abnormal in a year when profits are weaker and share prices are down. Cross-holders often sell shares into the end of the year in order to realise profits and let unrealised gains from the balance sheet filter into the income statement.

This time it is five sellers from four banks which all hail from the area: Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP), Nomura Trust (which holds shares in a trust account for the MUFJ Bank pension fund as a beneficiary), Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s MUFJ Bank, Resona Holdings (8308 JP), and Shiga Bank (8366 JP). The MUFJ Bank holdings likely originate from Sanwa Bank which was Osaka-based before merging with BOT-Mitsubishi almost 15 years ago, and Resona is also from Osaka – next door to Kyoto where Nintendo was founded – and Shiga Bank is the prefecture next door.

This would look like a normal sell-down… except for one thing.

There was a note in the announcement to the effect that “in the context of how companies deal with their policy cross-holdings becoming the subject of greater focus, we confirmed that several shareholders desired to sell shares, and as a company subject to such cross-holdings, we are conducting the above-mentioned Offering.”

The “greater focus” comes from the both the change in the Japan Corporate Governance Code which was introduced last spring and went live June 1st (discussed in Japan’s Corporate Governance Code Amendments – A Much Bigger Stick for Activists and Stewards) which raised the bar for disclosure of reasons, and results, of such policy crossholdings in a revised version of Principle 1.4, and an example of how a board should make decisions and execute an unwind of corporate crossholdings. This example was given by Japan Exchange Group (8697 JP) itself regarding the TSE’s stake of 4.95% in Singapore Exchange (SGX SP) and was discussed in Japan Crossholdings: Japan Exchange’s Sale of SGX Shares Sets A Precedent – Watch Closely.  

In the TSE crossholding of SGX situation, the sale was not the most important part. The explanation of how the Board came to its decision and what they decided to do about it was important. 

On the other hand, Japan’s Corporate Governance Code (the Code), which was introduced in 2015, requires listed companies to examine and explain the economic rationale and future outlook of holding shares of other listed companies for reasons other than pure investment purposes. Following a review of the requirements under the Code, JPX reached the conclusion that the existing cooperative relationship with SGX would continue even without holding the shares of SGX.       [my bold]

The Japan Exchange Group had now provided the example for why even companies with cooperative business relationships should not own cross-holdings. And it is, if active stewards of capital choose to make it so, more subtle. Shareholders have even an even better pressure point. IF a company’s cooperative relationship with another company would not survive the unwinding of cross-holdings to improve capital efficiency for both sides, is that company truly independent? Is that company beholden to the company whose shares it holds? Is the cross-holding board doing its job?

And the Japan Exchange Group had said it would unwind its holdings of SGX over three years, so as not to overly impact the market for SGX shares. This provided an example of HOW to unwind, in addition to the WHY to unwind announced above.

The BIG QUESTION (And Nothing Else Matters)

The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains.

The Nintendo-specific situation is discussed in Nintendo Offering & Buyback: The Import & The Dynamics. 

An analysis of the Bank of Kyoto-specific situation is discussed below.

3. BBTN: Indonesia Has Special Mention Problems Too

Bank Tabungan Negara Persero (BBTN IJ) appears to have a nasty combination of high Special Mention Loans (SMLs) and elevated “past due but unimpaired Loans”.

The implication is that provisioning levels are insufficient in an environment of eroding asset quality.

But the bank continues to grow credit by around 20% YoY.

The bank is hugely exposed to the retail real estate market (91% of Loans).

In fact, the Indonesian Banking Sector is rife with high SMLs and in some cases elevated “past due but unimpaired Loans”.

SMLs are traditionally associated with Chinese under-reporting of underlying bad loans, and hence the production of a somewhat flattering Asset Quality picture.

Maybe, the health and valuation of the Indonesian Banking Sector needs to be reassessed with implications for IDR.

4. Westpac Banking: Looking Fragile

Westpac Banking (WBC AU) is facing a class action suit regarding alleged irresponsible lending in home loans since 2011. This is the first class action against a major Australian bank since the publication of the royal commission’s final report.

The ramifications of the royal commission report remain a source of debate with elections coming up. But, in general, banks will not be allowed to conduct operations in a “business-as-usual way”. There will be consequences for credit provision.

Westpac’s Balance Sheet looks decidedly fragile as it stands. The bank is entering a slowdown from a position of weakness.

Exposures to Australia’s slowing economy (not unrelated of course to China), the dovish turn at the Central Bank, and in particular its bubbly housing market make us hyper cautious. The highly volatile Aussie dollar tumbled from levels above $0.7200 to below $0.7100 following reports that China banned coal imports from the country at a major port.

Despite the sinking share prices of Australia’s main banks, valuations may still be too high given the varied headwinds.

5. Tochigi Bank (8550JP): Red Flags but No White Flags (Yet)

If one were looking for evidence of the inherent dangers of risk concentration in the banking industry, one need only look to tiny secondary regional bank Tochigi Bank (8550 JP), which reported its earnings for the nine months to end-December 2018 on 31 January 2019.  Having made consolidated net profits of ¥1.57 billion in 1H FY3/2019, the bank plunged into the red in 3Q by ¥1.80 billion as a result of losses on disposing of fixed-rate US$-denominated securities.  Rather surprisingly, foreign investors own just over 21% of outstanding shares.  Tochigi Bank may not be the only small Japanese bank to run into trouble with its foreign securities portfolio in CY2019.  Caveat emptor!  (May the buyer beware)!