In this briefing:
- Guangzhou Rural: All the Shakespearoes?
- ICBC: Opportunity in Disguise
- Newmark Group Inc (NMRK US): Valuation/Fundamentals Mismatch, Stock Trades At Bargain Levels
- Bank of Zhengzhou: “Bend One Cubit, Make Eight Cubits Straight”
- Jiangxi Bank: “No Sooner Has One Pushed a Gourd Under Water than Another Pops Up”
1. Guangzhou Rural: All the Shakespearoes?
I am partial to a bit of Confucius. Or to such thinking. Now and again. The chairman of Guangzhou Rural Commercial Bank (1551 HK) has a Confucian message (scholars will no doubt berate me) at the beginning of the report and accounts: “A single spark can start a prairie fire while a crack can lead to ice breaking”. From what I can glean, the chairman is alluding to the forty year process of China’s emergence. No satanic conflagration intended or any portends of global warming. For some reason, a tune by the 1970s new-wave group, The Stranglers, passed through my mind: “He got an ice pick that made his ears burn” and “They watched their Rome burn”. Cultural differences perhaps.
Guangzhou Rural Commercial Bank (1551 HK) shares many of the issues that affect Chinese lenders today. (The “Big four” are much less susceptible to deep stresses in this environment). Unsurprisingly, Asset Quality issues weigh on these results and earnings quality is subpar with trading gains and other assorted non-operating or “other items” playing a big part in the composition of Pre-Tax Profit. The latter flatters the “improving” headline Cost-Income ratio which is not really an indicator of greater efficiency here. In fact underlying “jaws” are highly negative. It is thus surprising that the wage bill should shoot up 30% YoY in such austere times. Given the aforementioned Asset Quality issues, such as booming substandard loans, ballooning credit costs, and high charge-offs, the “improving” NPL ratio is flattered by an exuberant denominator. Asset Quality does look volatile. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and LDR duly eroded.
Where the bank does better, in contrast to many other Chinese lenders, is on Net Interest Income. Guangzhou seems to have reduced its funding costs markedly. The bank managed to lower its corporate time deposit rates especially. The result is that Interest Expenses on Deposits rose by just 6.4% YoY. Liability management seems to be behind a reduction in Debt/Equity from 2.79x to 1.62x, thus decreasing Debt funding costs by 24% YoY. Spurred by corporate credit growth of 38% YoY, Interest Income on Loans climbed by 31% YoY. However, the bank does share an issue with some other lenders – a collapse in Interest Income on non-credit earning assets. This is, in part, due to a shrinkage of its FI holdings by some CN89.5bn. This means that despite the credit spurt, Interest Income in its totality edged up by barely 1% YoY. A disappointing performance on fee income (custody, wealth management, advisory) reduced Total underlying Income growth to 6% YoY. That 6% is all about rampant corporate credit supply and lower corporate deposit and debt interest costs.
Trends are thus decidedly mixed given the underlying picture behind the positive headline fundamental change in Efficiency, Asset Quality and ROAA. Liquidity deteriorated. It must be said that Provisioning was enhanced, Capitalisation moved in the right direction, while NIM and Interest Spread both improved.
Shares are trading at optically quite tempting levels: Earnings Yield of 17%, P/Book of 0.8x, and FV of 8%. But if you desire a Dividend Yield of 5%, or a similar level of aforementioned valuation, a safer bet would be with “The Big Four”.
2. ICBC: Opportunity in Disguise
ICBC (H) (1398 HK) delivered a robust PH Score of 8.5 – our quantamental value-quality gauge.
A highlight was the trend in cost-control. The bank delivered underlying “jaws” of 420bps. Besides OPEX restraint, including payroll, Efficiency gains were supported by robust underlying top-line expansion as growth in interest income on earning assets, underpinned by moderate credit growth, broadly matched expansion of interest expenses on interest-bearing Liabilities. This combination is not so prevalent in China these days, especially in smaller or medium-sized lenders.
It is well-flagged that the system is grappling with Asset Quality issues and there is a debate about the interrelated property market. ICBC is not immune, similar to other SOEs, from migration of souring loans. However, by China standards, rising asset writedowns which exerted a negative pull on Pre-Tax Profit as a % of pre-impairment Operating Profit, high charge-offs, and swelling (though not exploding) substandard and loss loans look arguably manageable given ICBC‘s sheer scale. The Asset Quality issue here is also not as bad as it was in bygone years (2004 springs to mind) when capital injections, asset transfers, and government-subsidised bad loan disposals were the order of the day. This is a “Big Four” player.
Shares are not expensive. ICBC trades at a P/Book of 0.8x, a Franchise Valuation of 10%, an Earnings Yield of 16.7%, a Dividend Yield of 4.9%, and a Total Return Ratio of 1.6x.
3. Newmark Group Inc (NMRK US): Valuation/Fundamentals Mismatch, Stock Trades At Bargain Levels
Having gained ~30% in a little more than two months following its full separation from BGC Partners (BGCP US) at the end of November 2018 after a dismal share price performance since coming to the market in a partial IPO at the end of December 2017, the shares of commercial real estate services company, Newmark Group (NMRK US) have experienced another slide over the past several weeks despite its cheap valuation which belies its positive fundanmental drivers and peer group comparisons.
Notwithstanding its robust fundamentals, notice of alterations it plans to make to its Non-GAAP earnings presentations to bring them more into line with many other US-listed companies, has brought the company into the headlights of the ongoing controversy caused by this topic, and in particular with respect to the treatement of stock-based compensation in Non-GAAP earnings. While Newmark follows many other companies by excluding it from Adjusted Earnings, its heavy use of stock-based compensation, which it intends to lessen going forward, makes it an easy target for critique of its earnings presentations. Nevertheless, we assess that Newmark is at least 35% undervalued relative to its peers after incorparting stock compensation expenses in its earnings-based valuation metrics. It is also noteworthy that Newmark is currently paying shareholders a yield of ~4% against barely any dividend being paid out by peers
4. Bank of Zhengzhou: “Bend One Cubit, Make Eight Cubits Straight”
Bank Of Zhengzhou (6196 HK) reveals a picture of cascading asset toxicity and subpar earnings quality. As elsewhere in China, it is difficult to decipher whether better NPL recognition is behind this profound asset quality deterioration or poor underwriting practice and discipline combined with troubled debtors: the answer may lie somewhere in between.
While the low PH Score (a value-quality gauge) of 4.7 is supported by a lowly valuation metric (earnings quality is not reassuring), it is more a testament to -and reflection of- core eroding fundamental trends across the board. Regarding trends, Capital Adequacy and Provisioning were the variables to post a positive change. But even then, not all Capitalisation and Provisioning metrics moved in the right direction.
Franchise Valuation at 12% does not indicate that the bank is especially cheap though P/Book of 0.64x is below the regional median of 0.78x.
5. Jiangxi Bank: “No Sooner Has One Pushed a Gourd Under Water than Another Pops Up”
Jiangxi Bank Co Ltd (1916 HK) initially attracted our attention with a subpar PH Score (a quantamental value-quality gauge). The bank only scored positively on Capital Adequacy and Efficiency trends. The latter is almost certainly not a true picture.
Further analysis reveals a bank ratcheting up the credit spigot exuberantly on the back of poor asset quality fundamentals (booming substandard loans and SML expansion) with ensuing elevated asset writedowns weighing on a reducing bottom-line despite gains from securities and a lower tax provision.
Valuations do not fully reflect a somewhat challenging picture. Shares trade at Book Value vs a regional median of 0.8x, at a Franchise Valuation of 13% vs a regional median of 9%, and at an Earnings Yield of 8.4% vs a regional median of 10%. Based on FY18 data, this is a bank that should trade at a discount rather than at a premium to peers.
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