Value Investing

Brief Value Investing: China Unicom Weak 4Q18 Mobile Results Offset by Strength in Fixed Line Business and more

In this briefing:

  1. China Unicom Weak 4Q18 Mobile Results Offset by Strength in Fixed Line Business
  2. Fujitec (6406) Value Buy
  3. Philippines: No Dovish Pivot in the Monetary Board’s Latest Meeting
  4. Bank of Tianjin: 太好了, 不可能是真的
  5. Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 5 –  Summarecon Agung (SMRA IJ)

1. China Unicom Weak 4Q18 Mobile Results Offset by Strength in Fixed Line Business

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China Unicom’s (762 HK) recent 4Q18 results were not great. The overall figures look ok due to strength in the fixed line business which offset weakness in mobile. However, they were the weakest of the three operators and the stock, which has had a strong run, now looks due for a pause. We have turned more cautious on the Chinese telcos on concerns that 5G spending could be higher than expected. Chris Hoare believes a major reason for the Chinese telcos outperforming in the past year has come from declining capex spending expectations. That trend may now start to reverse. While China Unicom has guided for only modest 5G capex in 2019 the focus will turn to 2020 where it is a much bigger issue and while we expect China Unicom to do a joint roll-out with China Telecom (728 HK) we expect the scale of the spending to be larger than an individual build. 

2. Fujitec (6406) Value Buy

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The shares are cheap. The company is cash rich and owns 10% in treasury stock; it owned more last year but has cancelled 4%. It has some Y6bn in long term investment. EV in our view is Y57bn vs the current market cap of Y110bn. With ebitda next year coming in at Y15bn, EV/ebitda is under 4x. The shares yield 3.4% and trade at book. They have slightly underperformed the market over the last 12 months. For now, we view this as a defensive buy. There remain many issues longer term as to its place in the global elevator world. A potential positive, however, is that in May the company will announce a new mid-term plan and in it, they will outline their view as regards to shareholder returns for the next three years. They are aware that they are very over capitalised, so greater returns are a real possibility.

3. Philippines: No Dovish Pivot in the Monetary Board’s Latest Meeting

  • The anticipated cut in the bank reserve ratio didn’t materialize in the latest Monetary Board (MB) meeting–the first one chaired by newly appointed BSP Gov. Benjamin Diokno. In the ANC televised interview, Diokno expressed his preference to reduce the high bank reserve requirement ratio (RRR: 18%) by 1% every quarter, fueling bond market excitement that severely compressed yields. The policy rate was also unchanged amid the dovish tone in the BSP’s press release after the meeting.
  • According to a senior monetary official, the RRR cut is a ‘live’ issue. That the timing of any adjustment is key given the operational and policy implications of an RRR cut.
  •  Accentuating the MB’s depiction of benign inflation is an inflation trajectory settled comfortably in its target band in 2019-20 with inflation expectations close to being anchored within the band as well.  Key downside risk to growth cited by the MB is the ‘current budget impasse in Congress is not resolved soon’. Prolonged El Niño is among those factors that can upset the broadly balanced risks to inflation.
  • A BSP under a pro-growth BSP chief need not necessarily change the ‘sequencing and timing’ of monetary policy decisions/actions facing liquidity and growth challenges. Likelihood that 1Q GDP (May 9 release) may be given slight emphasis in the BSP’s shift to accommodation starting with the bank reserve cut.  
  • We expect a bond market correction following excitement over the BSP’s dovish pivot this early that led to severe yield compression. Buy the 5yrs to short-duration on dips.

4. Bank of Tianjin: 太好了, 不可能是真的

Bank Of Tianjin (1578 HK) results at first look quite encouraging with firmer profitability, enhanced efficiency, improved capital adequacy, and increased provisioning.

Valuations are optically attractive: p/book of 0.5x, franchise valuation of 7%, earnings yield of 17%, and a total return ratio of 2.5x. These metrics are within the bargain hunter space.

However, optimism fades fast on closer inspection.

“Underlying” Income decreased by 21% YoY as the bank was squeezed by higher funding costs and non-interest expenses. Expenses on wholesale funding increased by 30% YoY. Debt funding now represents 71% of Gross Loans. Debt now stands at 4.3x SH. Funds. This type of funding has exploded by 10x since 2014. At the same time, deposits declined YoY. Deposits have increased by a more sedate 18% since 2014.

PT Profit would have been CNY1.4bn rather than CNY5.2bn but for hefty gains on securities. Loan loss provisions almost tripled YoY.

Regarding the Balance Sheet, Special Mention Loans rose sharply (+25% YoY) and represent 2.8x NPLs. A 127% and 108% YoY increase in “doubtful loans” and “loss loans” puts some perspective on a seemingly respectable NPL ratio of 1.64% and a LLR/NPLs of 250%.

Thus, Bank Of Tianjin (1578 HK) is cheap for a reason. We are reluctant to recommend taking a position at this juncture given the ongoing stresses in source of funding and asset quality.

5. Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 5 –  Summarecon Agung (SMRA IJ)

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In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks. 

The fifth company that we explore is Summarecon Agung (SMRA IJ), a township developer with over 40 years of track record and a combined development area of over 2,700ha. The company benefits from its exposure to the popular Serpong district, but an over expansion, coupled with tightening property regulations caused its balance sheet to suffer in the following years. Earnings have declined by -19% Cagr over the past five years as a consequence of lower margins and burgeoning debt levels.

The company has plans to divest its retail mall division, which can serve as a positive catalyst in the near term. Improving sentiment and better interest rate environment, as well as positive regulatory tailwinds should be a driver to SMRA’s share price this year. We see a 44% upside to our target price of IDR1,408 per share.

Summary of this insight:

  • The success of SMRA’s first township, Kelapa Gading, paved way for the next six township development. The same township model is replicated to its Serpong, Bekasi, Bandung, Karawang, Makassar, and soon Bogor. 
  • During the height of the property boom, every cluster launch in the Serpong area is 2-3x oversubscribed. Buyers were a mix of speculators and end-users, and both were happy customers benefiting from over 400% land price appreciation over the course of 2009-2013. Land ASP in 2009 was just below IDR3mn versus IDR12-15mn in 2013.
  • Driven by the positive momentum of the property boom, SMRA ambitiously launched three new townships at the trough of the property market (2015-2018), growing its total township development area by more than a third. Poor cashflow management, stemming from the over-expansion during the property downturn took a massive toll on the balance sheet. SMRA turned from net cash in 2013 to holding IDR8.6tn of debt in 9M18 (1.2x gearing) with interest costs making up a chunky 49% of EBIT. 
  • We have also seen a massive shift to the end-user market since 2014, as the company started to sell more smaller houses and affordable apartments rather than land lots and shophouses. At the peak, shophouses and land lots made up more than 50% of the company’s development revenues. As of 9M18, that number has declined to a mere 7% of revenues, while 93% comes from houses and apartments. Housing units launched in 2016-2017 are 36% cheaper than units launched in 2011-2014, as the company downsized in the area.
  • SMRA has the second biggest retail mall portfolio in our coverage after Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ) with 258,000sqm net leasable area (NLA). The three malls generate about IDR1.3tn revenue per year, returning 42% EBITDA margin. About 40% of tenants in Bekasi and Serpong are up for a rental renewal in the next three years, and this could serve as a potential upside on the average rental rates. 

  • Pros: Bank Indonesia (BI)’s move to loosen mortgage regulations last year, and plans to reduce luxury taxes and allow for friendlier foreign ownership scheme should give a breath of fresh air over the medium term. SMRA targets 18% presales growth in 2019, but they have been missing their presales target by an average of 22% over the past three years. We expect a more modest 5% presales recovery this year.
  • Pros: Margin on houses show a massive improvement from 51% in 2014 to 59% in 9M18. The improvement brings up the consolidated property development margin by 600bps YoY. As a segment, this is the first margin uptick since 2014, leading to 44% YoY EBIT growth and 115% YoY NPAT growth in 9M18.
  • Cons: The stellar property development growth, however, is diluted by the poor performances from the investment property division that recorded 14% YoY EBIT decline. Despite some improvements on the gross margin level and healthy topline growth, opex has doubled YoY, leading to 700bps reduction in the EBITDA margin. 
  • Recommendation & catalyst: SMRA has underperformed the JCI by a steep 71% over the past 36 months as earnings and presales continue to disappoint. Discount to NAV, PE, and PB valuation are standing at -1 standard deviation below mean. Improving risk appetite for high beta stocks, better interest rate environment, accomodative policies from the government, and potential pick up of activity after the election are a few of the key catalysts for the stock and sector re-rating. The divestment of its retail arm should also help to clear some debt off the balance sheet and unlock value. We have a BUY recommendation.

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