Thailand

Daily Thailand: Are Chip Oligopolies Real? and more

In this briefing:

  1. Are Chip Oligopolies Real?
  2. Global Banks: Some New Year Pointers
  3. Extraordinary Fiscal and Monetary Policies Have Disrupted the Global Economy
  4. A Golden Future?
  5. Uranium – About to Enter Its Own Nuclear Winter

1. Are Chip Oligopolies Real?

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In the semiconductor industry, particularly in the DRAM sector, there has been significant consolidation leading some to hypothesize that there’s now an oligopoly that will cause prices to normalize and thus end the business’ notorious revenue cycles.  Here we will take a critical look at this argument to explain its fallacy.

2. Global Banks: Some New Year Pointers

Here is a look at how regions fare regarding key indicators.

  • PH Score = value-quality (10 variables)
  • FV=Franchise Valuation
  • RSI
  • TRR= Dividend-adjusted PEG factor
  • ROE
  • EY=Earnings Yield

We have created a model that incorporates these components into a system that covers>1500 banks.

3. Extraordinary Fiscal and Monetary Policies Have Disrupted the Global Economy

In their public presentations, central banks seem to be contemplating the use of neutral interest rates (r*) in addition to unemployment/inflation theories. R* has the advantage of appearing to be subject to mathematical precision, yet it’s unobservable, and so unfalsifiable. Thus, it permits central banks to present any policy conclusion they want without fear of verifiable contradiction. R* is the policy rate that would equate the future supply of and demand for loans. It rises and falls as an economy strengthens and weakens. Long-term observation during the non-inflationary gold standard, period indicated that r* in an average economy was 2% plus, which would become 4% plus with today’s 2% inflation target. The Fed may soon end this tightening cycle with the fed funds rate at or near 2¾%, which would be r* if the rate of lending and borrowing in America remained stable thereafter. Rising (falling) lending would indicate a higher (lower) r*. 

4. A Golden Future?

The ability to have stable prices has great value.

According to Edward Gibbon, the decaying Roman Empire exhibited five hallmarks: 1) concern with displaying affluence instead of building wealth; 2) obsession with sex; 3) freakish and sensationalistic art; 4) widening disparity between the rich and the poor; and 5) increased demand to live off the state. Most DMs and many EMs display similar symptoms today because fiscal and monetary policies, the foundation of both ancient and modern societies, are identical: increasing welfare outlays by artificially inflating the money supply. The Roman Empire took more than four centuries to destroy what the Republic had built in the previous five centuries because clipping and debasing coins inflated currency supplies slowly. Entering debits and credits in the books of commercial and central banks is much more efficient. 

5. Uranium – About to Enter Its Own Nuclear Winter

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  • Quantifying nuclear statistics with substantial discrepancies
  • LT contracts & speculative hoarding driving recent 40% spot price increase
  • Primary/secondary Uranium supplies currently 112% of 2017 demand
  • Uranium supply deficits extremely unlikely before 2022
  • Global Uranium demand to fall 25-40% by 2050
  •  Primary Uranium sector LT SELL

We have independently audited global nuclear construction statistics in order to determine future Uranium demand.  Although near-term statistics match those in the public domain, long-term demand determined via construction pipeline illustrates substantial discrepancies.  Compiling planned plant construction, operational extensions, nameplate upgrades, versus decommissioning announcements/events, and in many cases, public policy inertia; has led us to believe that despite historical primary supply shortages, global nuclear demand peaked in 2006.

Since plateauing and despite strong Chinese growth, nuclear power generation has fallen <2% over the past two decades, a decline that is predicted to accelerate as a number of developed and developing nations pursue other energy options.

The macro-trend not replacing existing nuclear infrastructure means (dependent on assumptions), according to our calculations, global uranium demand will decrease between 20 to 40% by 2050.

As opposed to signifying a fundamental change in underlying demand, we believe that recent Uranium price increases are the result of producers closing primary operations, and substituting production with purchases on the spot market to meet long-term contract obligations.  In addition, hedge funds are buying physical uranium in order to realise profits on potential future commodity price increases.  Critically, we determine that primary and secondary supplies are more than sufficient to meet forecast demand over the next four to five years; before taking into account substantial existing global uranium stocks, some of which are able to re-enter the spot market at short notice.

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