Brief Macro: Monetary & Supply Side Takeaways From U.S. GDP and more

In this briefing:

1. Monetary & Supply Side Takeaways From U.S. GDP
2. FLASH: UK IP Buffeted by Energy Volatility in 1Q19
3. Widodo’s Generals Take Fire / Anti-Foreign Rhetoric Takes Toll / Land Hampers Adhi’s LRT / MRT Near
4. Precipitous Deceleration Implies 2019 Is a Year of Stress, Despite Help from US$ Weakness
5. Hong Kong’s Growth Mirage

1. Monetary & Supply Side Takeaways From U.S. GDP

• The U.S. GDP report released earlier this week contains some interesting information on U.S. growth and inflation trends and risks for 2019. 
• First, the economic growth strengthened in the fourth quarter as year-over-year real GDP growth firmed to 3.1%, which made 2018 the strongest year for growth since 2005. 
• Second, our core measure of demand (C+I) also grew at 3.1%, which means swing factors played little role in this growth performance (indeed the average contribution from inventory investment of 0.4% points was mostly offset by a widening of the trade gap that subtracted 0.3% points from growth). 
• Third, this strong growth performance accompanied by only a 0.3% point drop in the unemployment rate in 2018 suggests that potential growth in 2018 firmed to around 2½%.  The source of this faster potential growth has been rising labor force participation rather than faster productivity growth, which raises questions to its sustainability since aging of the population is likely to keep downward pressure on participation. 
• Fourth, nominal GDP growth of 5.3%, which is the fastest since 2005, suggests that monetary policy has reflated this important indicator to a pace that was viewed as desirable when trend real growth was at 3% since this would accommodate a 2% inflation rate.  However, if nominal GDP growth remains above 5% but real GDP growth slows towards trend (of 2½% or lower if the pick up in labor force participation stalls out), we would see inflation rising above the Fed’s target.

2. FLASH: UK IP Buffeted by Energy Volatility in 1Q19

• The UK’s manufacturing PMI slipped to 52.0, as expected, which is much better than the Euro area. Official manufacturing data remain weaker, though.
• A cold snap in January turned to unseasonable warmth in February, thereby raising volatility in energy utility output. Gas extraction looks likely to lean against this effect within IP, but the net effect has knocked my forecasts around nonetheless.

3. Widodo’s Generals Take Fire / Anti-Foreign Rhetoric Takes Toll / Land Hampers Adhi’s LRT / MRT Near

Sparring remains lively in the presidential campaign, with the Prabowo camp targeting a liability for Widodo: retired generals in the cabinet.  But Prabowo is still campaigning ineffectively and defections of allied governors shows that some in his camp consider his prospects dim.  Police controversially dropped charges against a chief hard-line Islamic figure.  Anti-foreign rhetoric, chiefly from Prabowo, threatens to tug policy discourse towards his vision of barriers, autarky and state control.  Two forthcoming regulations on the property sector aim to safeguard consumers.  A review of geothermal policies is possible.  Upstream energy investment may be improving.  The IA-Cepa may conclude on 4 March.  Adhi Karya’s Jabodebek LRT faces a thorny land problem in Bekasi, where the China-backed fast train project may have complicated matters by overpaying. 

Politics: Campaign sparring continues apace, as Gerindra Chair Prabowo Subianto criticized infrastructure projects (they enable imports to penetrate further) and reiterated that “Rp11,000 trillion in Indonesian assets reside abroad”.  Campaign officials for President Joko Widodo lambasted the remarks and recalled that both Prabowo and his running mate appeared in the ‘Panama Papers’.  Meanwhile, retired generals from the rival campaigns exchanged jabs about events of May 1998; for Prabowo, the topic contains pitfalls (Page 2).  In a rare example of violence in election campaigning, a fracas outside a rally in Yogyakarta caused three minor injuries among rival youth groups (p. 4).  Elite endorsements matter little, but Widodo has garnered overwhelming support from regional heads (p. 4).  Police controversially dropped charges on hard‑line Islamic leader Slamet Ma’arif (p. 5).  Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY) takes over Partai Demokrat’s campaigning as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono attends to his ill spouse (p. 6). 

Surveys: A newly released poll from the Cyrus Network shows Widodo’s lead intact – but the actual data is from mid‑January, a period that other polls already covered (p. 6). 

Policy News: Coordinating Maritime Affairs Minister Lt Gen (ret) Luhut Panjaitan urged greater state investment in geothermal power (p. 7).  Protecting consumers from misleading practices by property developers will reportedly be the focus of two forth­coming regulations (p. 8).  The IA-Cepa is reportedly due for signing on 4 March (p. 9).

Infrastructure: The Jakarta Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) will ramp up operations during a trial from 12-24 March, with commercial operations expected by end‑March (p. 9).  Press reports hint that the China‑financed Bandung fast train project may have overpaid for land in Bekasi, thereby complicating acquisition of nearby land needed for the Jakarta-Area Light Rail Train (LRT) project, which faces delay until April 2021 (p. 9). 

Economics: The trade minister touted FTAs (p. 11).  Upstream Regulatory Agency (SKK Migas) officials expressed optimism about investment flows into oil and gas (p. 12). 

Outlook: Although the winner is not yet clear, the loser thus far in the presidential election appears to be the international community.  Pronounced anti‑foreign rhetoric from the Prabowo camp threatens to cow policy­makers and jeopardize prudent economic management.  Excessive skepticism of international engagement would come at an awkward time: the current account deficit requires capital inflows, while protectionism would augur lower growth (p. 12). 

4. Precipitous Deceleration Implies 2019 Is a Year of Stress, Despite Help from US$ Weakness

China has won the trade war so far, with China’s exports to the US rising 11.3% YoY in 2018, while its imports from the US rose just 0.7% YoY. For the latest two months (Dec18-Jan19), China’s exports to the US declined 3% YoY, but its imports from the US declined a precipitous 38.5% YoY. (The logic is obvious: less than half of China’s exports to the US carry tariffs, while over 80% of US exports to China must pay large import tariffs). Luckily for China, US President Trump has still allowed the March 1st deadline to be extended. That, combined with a weak US$ (and a far more dovish US Federal Reserve than 3 months ago) have taken pressure off the stressed Chinese economy. That any US-China trade deal will result in a stronger RMB takes further pressure off China, which otherwise saw net capital and services/income outflows of US$105bn in Nov18-Jan19 even amid the weakening of the US$ (numbers that would have been worse if the US$ had stayed strong, inducing larger capital outflows). 

The stress is most evident in domestic demand, with China’s imports down 4.5% YoY in the latest two months. China’s car sales declined 6% YoY in 2018, the first yearly decline since 1990, with car sales down 16.7% YoY in 4Q 2018 and down 19% YoY in December, with Chinese car brands’ sales declining 22% YoY in January 2019 (while total passenger car sales fell 17.7% YoY). This was a climactic reversal, as China’s car output had grown 20-fold between 1995 and 2017. The PBOC has responded with 350bp of cuts in banks’ RRR (to 13.5% by , from 17% a year ago), in a move to boost the money-multiplier (but with a modest impact on M2 and loan growth). 

China’s total social financing (TSF) rose by a record RMB4.64tn in January 2019, betraying signs that policy makers were panicking, hence turning on the shadow lending taps anew. Although TSF rose less in 2018 than in either 2016 or 2017, it rose more in 2H 2018 than in 2H 2017, responding to the monetary easing in 2H 2018. Despite a year of persistent and aggressive monetary easing, China’s M2 had grown a modest 8.1% YoY in 2018, up only marginally from 8% YoY at the end of October and November 2018; in January 2019, M2 accelerated to 8.4% YoY growth in response to the latest RRR cuts. FAI (fixed asset investment) slumped to just 2.5% YoY growth in May and July 2018, but then rebounded in the rest of 2018 (growing 5.9% YoY for the whole year). Opening the spigot of shadow lending involves the last throw of the dice: Premier Li Keqiang is among leading critics of this policy approach. For now, both the possibility of a trade deal and the weakness of the US$ are near-term positives that will buoy China. But the only remaining factor consistently buoying China’s growth is exports: so China will perforce need to make significant concessions in the final trade negotiations. If it does not, the positive scenario will rapidly deteriorate, and China’s high-wire act will collapse.  We are cautiously bullish on China in the near-term (3-month horizon), but remain negative on a longer-term (9 months and longer) view. 

5. Hong Kong’s Growth Mirage

It may not feel like it. It may not smell like it. But make no mistake Hong Kong is in recession. We are underweight in our relative regional equity portfolio.  The only positives are that the real cost of lending is easing (which might bring some relief to mortgage owners) and Hong Kong corporate balance sheets are in good shape to weather the current downturn. But the negative overwhelm these positives.