Brief Japan: ZOZO: The Kingmaker Abandons His King and more

In this briefing:

1. ZOZO: The Kingmaker Abandons His King
2. GMO.internet FY2018 Results – The Shareholder’s [Re]Turn

1. ZOZO: The Kingmaker Abandons His King

United Arrows’ (7606 JP) decision to cancel its e-commerce services contract with ZOZO Inc (3092 JP) was not a surprise at all but could not have come at a worse time. While a move to direct operation of its online store was expected, United Arrows did not have to choose a moment when Zozo’s stock was collapsing. That it did shows how much cooler relations are between the two firms, a critical development given United Arrows was the principal reason for Zozo’s emergence as the leading fashion mall in the early 2000s.

United Arrows will still be selling through Zozotown and its president last week praised Zozotown’s capacity to bring new and younger customers to its brand. The bigger problem is that United Arrows relies less and less on sales from Zozotown each year and more from its own online store – direct e-commerce sales have increased from 20% of all e-commerce sales in FY2016 to 27% in 9M2018.

At Baycrews, another leading merchant on Zozotown, 50% of e-commerce sales are from its own online store, up 12 percentage points in two years.

A further problem is that other merchants are leaving. We reported before that Onward’s departure, while significant, is less of a threat than it might first appear given that Onward already garners 70-75% of sales from its own store so it did not cost much to leave Zozo. 

However, another big retailer, Right On, also quit Zozo last month despite the fact that more than 50% of its online sales come from Zozo and it has intermittently been one of the top 20 merchants on Zozo. Right On has struggled in recent years, so leaving Zozo cannot have been an easy decision, suggesting just how seriously upset it was.

Other merchants are likely to view these departures with some concern. Six months ago, the idea of quitting Zozo was not even a remote thought in Japan’s fashion industry but it is now a lively subject of discussion. While most merchants will stay,  the recent high profile departures will make a threat to leave look much more real, giving merchants more leverage to negotiate, particularly on Zozo’s take rates.

2. GMO.internet FY2018 Results – The Shareholder’s [Re]Turn

GMO internet (9449 JP) released 2018 full-year results in 12th February. 2018 was a turbulent year for the company as it ‘surfed’ the cryptocurrency wave. The subsequent downfall was swift and brutal. However, the company deserves some plaudits for cutting its (substantial) losses and attempting to move on (albeit somewhat half-heartedly). Unfortunately, GMO-i has ‘form’ in writing off large losses as shown above.  The positive consequence of this saga is a renewed commitment to return value to shareholders with a stated aim of returning 50% of profits. Two-third of that goal is to be met by quarterly dividends, with the balance allocated to share repurchases in the following year.  

Having royally ‘screwed up’ with ‘cryptocurrencies’, and trying the patience of remaining shareholders yet again, this policy is to be commended, particularly if more attention is paid to generating the wherewithal to meet the 50% without raiding the listed subsidiaries’ ‘piggy bank’.  Apart from the excitement that this move has generated and the year-long support this buying programme will provide to the share price, our two valuation models, find little in the way of further upside potential.

We remain sceptical of investing in GMO-i over the long-term and prefer GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP) – the best business in the GMO-i ‘stable’ – but consider GMO-PG’s stock overvalued at 57x EV/OP.