Brief Japan: 🇯🇵 Japan • Relative Price Scores – Market, Sectors & Peer Groups > Extreme Negative Divergence and more

In this briefing:

1. 🇯🇵 Japan • Relative Price Scores – Market, Sectors & Peer Groups > Extreme Negative Divergence
2. Organo (6368 JP): Company Visit Notes and Conclusions
3. Last Week in Event SPACE: Altaba, Nexon, MYOB, Panalpina, Ezion, Naspers, Melco
4. Battery Technology- The Key To An Electric Vehicle Future
5. Singapore REIT – The Draft Master Plan 2019 Boost and Q1 Scorecard

1. 🇯🇵 Japan • Relative Price Scores – Market, Sectors & Peer Groups > Extreme Negative Divergence

– RELATIVE PRICE SCORE – 

The Relative Price Score (RPS) is a measure of stock price performance relative to TOPIX calculated by comparing the current deviation with the mean absolute deviation of monthly and daily relative share prices. As all companies are put on a comparable scale, ‘Overbought’ and ‘Oversold’ outliers and changes in scoring can reveal short-term and longer-term trading opportunities. Company data is cap-weight-aggregated into 328 Peer Group and 30 Sector Relative Price Scores. Outlier thresholds are set at +4 & -2 for Companies, +3 & -1.5 for Peer Groups and +2 and -1 for Sectors. These thresholds equate with the top and bottom first-to-second percentiles of historical observations from which mean reversion normally takes only a few months.

OUTLIER TRENDS – In the past, increases in the percentage of companies that are either Overbought or Oversold has been a useful indicator of market trends with a rising number of Overbought outliers being bullish and an increasing number of Oversold outliers being bearish and the crossovers between the numbers of each offering market timing signals.  The current situation where both sets of outliers are rising has only occurred once before in the last 30 years – in 1999/2000 shortly before the peak of the ‘tech bubble’. We attribute some of the market’s distortions to the Bank of Japan’s market activities and the increase in algorithmic trading. Whatever the cause, repeating the 2000 tech bubble playbook is unlikely to end well. 

NEGATIVE ‘SPREAD’ – On a daily closing basis, the Oversold outlier percentage is currently 3.17%, the highest since December 25th 2018, despite the total market value being 14% higher than on that day. The ‘spread’ between Overbought and Oversold outliers is now -1.10, and has only been wider for three days at the end of last year either side of Christmas Day. Nevertheless, the Overbought percentage reached a new fifteen-year high at the end of March despite the total market value being 12.6% below the peak of January 2018. In a polarised market, the winners keep on winning, and the losers keep on losing.  

MARKET TIMING – Using the crossover from Net Overbought to Net Oversold has been a reasonably good market timing indicator over the last two decades and would have avoided the five-year-long slump from 2007-2012. The most recent monthly closing signal was generated in January when the total market value was ¥634t, 2.7% lower than the current level.

DAILY TIMING SIGNALS – Using daily closing prices but slightly wider parameters to reduce ‘noise’ the signals are reasonably effective. The last signal was a sell on 18th December 2018 when the total market value was ¥623b, 4.5% below the current level. Both monthly and daily indicators have large negative ‘spreads’ and are unlikely to generate ‘buy’ signals for some time. Both are also suggesting that further declines lie ahead.   

– SECTORS – 

28-YEAR TIMELINE – The twenty-eight-year history of Sectors’ Relative Price Score is shown above and chronicles the periodic extremes of both Overbought and Oversold and the persistence of each. Only seventeen Sectors have been Overbought during this period for a total of 546 months of which half were before 2001. The average Overbought persistence is 4.3 months or 3.4 months excluding the Internet Content & Services Sector.  Only fourteen Sectors have been Oversold since 1992 for a total of 243 months of which 55% were before 2001. The average Oversold persistence is 5.7 months although this has risen to 7.5 months since 2001. Currently, three Sectors are Overbought – Consumer Services, Other Consumer Products, and Healthcare, and two Sectors are Oversold – Banks and Utilities.    

In the DETAIL section below, we provide an update on recent Sector and Peer Group trends and make some specific recommendations. A second Insight will follow looking at the Relative Price Scores for Companies. 

2. Organo (6368 JP): Company Visit Notes and Conclusions

• Organo has rebounded from December’s sharp sell-off, but remains attractively valued on a long-term view, in our estimation. 
• New orders for water treatment systems from the semiconductor and other industries were up 22% year-on-year and exceeded sales by 33% in the nine months to December.
• According to management, orders continued to exceed sales in the three months to March, but are likely to drop below sales in 1H of FY Mar-20 due to the downturn in memory ICs.
• But the situation is not dire, as overall silicon wafer shipments and demand for image sensors both continue to rise, while foundry is doing better than memory.
• Longer term, management expects growth driven by IIoT, power devices,  electric vehicles, and a cyclical recovery in memory. The biggest uncertainty is Chinese domestic demand.
• Some orders have been deferred by one or two quarters, but the company has so far not suffered any cancellations. With a one-year lag from order to revenue recognition for larger projects, management believes it has sufficient visibility to predict improvement in 2H.
• Management has no plans to revise FY Mar-19 guidance, which is for a 14.9% increase in sales, a 43.9% increase in operating profit and a 33.1% increase in net profit to ¥322.5 per share. At ¥3,200 (Friday, April 5 closing price), this translates into a P/E ratio of 9.9x.
• In our estimation, this is cheap enough to be of interest to long-term investors. In the meantime, the calculations of Japan Analytics show upside to a no-growth valuation. Little or no growth appears to be the most likely scenario for FY Mar-20.

• Organo is Japan’s second-ranking industrial water treatment company after Kurita Water Industries (6370). Both provide ultra-pure water processing equipment and related products and services to the semiconductor industry. Kurita ranks first in Japan and Korea, Organo ranks first in Taiwan, and both companies compete in China.

3. Last Week in Event SPACE: Altaba, Nexon, MYOB, Panalpina, Ezion, Naspers, Melco

Last Week in Event SPACE …

• Here it is. The end – the culmination of years of effort and high balance sheet usage by hedge funds. Altaba Inc (AABA US) is going out with a whimper plus a little upside.
• Reportedly plans for the sale of NHC have been abandoned with a focus on selling its Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)gaming unit.
• That’s a wrap, as Manikay blinks and concedes to KKR’s Offer for MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU).
• Ezion Holdings (EZI SP) is tendered a necessary lifeboat from Yinson Holdings (YNS MK).
• We now have an agreed deal for Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) supported by the Ernst Göhner Foundation, the major activist shareholders, and Panalpina management.
• Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s discount to NAV narrows as it teases out more information on spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK).
• Melco International Development (200 HK) is potentially mispriced against Melco Resorts & Entertainment (MLCO US) after the release of FY18 earnings.

• Plus other events, CCASS movements and upcoming key dates for M&A transactions.

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

Altaba Inc (AABA US) (Mkt Cap: $42bn; Liquidity: $452mn)

Altaba will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which Altaba currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63/share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00/Alibaba share).”

• As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear, based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions.
• A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.
• It looks like there is upside as the stock closed at US$72.76 (at the time of the insight). But there is less than you think simply because it will take time to get out of it. And discount rates of the first portion may be low, but discount rates applied to the later payments post-delisting and post court workout for the Holdback Amount could be higher.
• Travis Lundy has opinions on what to do once you start getting into the arb risks. Do read his insight.

(link to Travis’ insight: ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew)

Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP) (Mkt Cap: $14bn; Liquidity: $50mn)

Sanghyun Park discussed Nexon sale after the FT reported bankers has stopped plans to sell the holding company NXC. The sale of NXC is probably the simplest exit path for Kim Jung-ju as it would be a more attractive tax outcome than selling Nexon Japan outright.

• But there’s a lot of other stuff in NXC that suitors don’t want to, which ideally should be sold before selling NXC. There’s also the issue of whether a tender offer would be required whether the sale of NXC or Nexon – Travis concludes an offer would be required while Sanghyun does not.

• Korean local news outlet reported that Tencent Holdings (700 HK)‘s US$6bn bond issuance may be a fund raising for a Nexon takeover. Still, South Korea would prefer keep Nexon’s ownership domestic, which may favour Kakao Games (1404796D KS) or PE outfit MBK.

(link to Sanghun’s insight: Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers)

Summit Ascent Holdings (102 HK) (Mkt Cap: $270mn; Liquidity: $1mn)

Summit Ascent announced that First Steamship (the major shareholder) and Kuo Jen Hao (chairman) are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 35%.

• Summit is trading at a trailing PER of 267x. CapIQ forecasts point to a threefold increase in earnings in FY19, although I would advise caution on those numbers given the tight cluster of target prices; historically, target prices for Summit have been wide of the mark.
• First Steamship bought in at $1.06 in December 2017, around the same price when this announcement was made. Should this sale complete, this would result in the third time the shares of the major shareholder have changed hands. This looks like a great opportunity to exit.

(link to my insight: Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope)

MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) (Mkt Cap: $1.4bn; Liquidity: $10mn)

On the 20th March, MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them. Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.

• On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.
• Mid-week, Manikay caved and said intends to vote all its shares for the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote. This is now MUCH closer to being a done deal. It will trade tight.

• Travis is a trifle surprised Manikay did not wait a little longer. They were able to increase their stake in the low A$3.30s because of the uncertainty of their intentions, and they could probably have gone close to 20% in the low 3.30s before saying “Yes.” That would have been a welcome extra profit.

(link to Travis’ insight: Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer)

Ezion Holdings (EZI SP) (Mkt Cap: $219mn; Liquidity: $2mn)

Lifeboat market play Ezion has received a bail-out from Malaysia’s Yinson Holdings (YNS MK) via a capitalisation of debt and option agreement. Ezion remains suspended.

• On the surface, this looks like a bargain for Yinson which is ostensibly taking over Ezion for US$200mn. However, Yinson said that it is still negotiating with the designated lenders of the US$916mn debt on the terms and conditions..
• Yinson’s business risks include contact risk, oil price fluctuations and the level of activities in the O&G industry. These risks do not change should the Ezion proposal complete.
• And offshore support companies face a raft of challenges: Ezra Holdings (EZRA SP) entered bankruptcy in 2017, Pacific Radiance (PACRA SP) has been voluntarily suspended since 28 Feb 2018 as it seeks a way to complete its debt restructuring; while Swiber Holdings (SWIB SP)recently announced its own US$200mn injection from Seaspan Corp. (SSW US), after the company had laboured in judicial management for the past two years.

(link to my insight: Yinson Tenders a Lifeboat for Ezion)

Kingboard Copper Foil Hldgs (KCF SP) (Mkt Cap: $320mn; Liquidity: <$100k)

For the second time in two years parent Kingboard Laminates Holdings (1888 HK) (ultimate parent being Kingboard Holdings (148 HK)) has launched an Offer to fully privatize KCF. This time at SGD 0.60/share vs SGD 0.40 two years ago.

• The last time came on the heels of a long independent review by EY which found KCF had given up profit to the parent through a series of relatively unfair interested party transaction agreements.
• At the end, the Bermudan Court of Appeals went against a Supreme Court decision which had decided that a replacement counterparty decision was prejudiced against minorities, and despite the April 2017 deal being not fair and not reasonable according to the IFA, the parent acquired ~10% (of the 28% it did not own) bringing their stake to 82.3%. A year later the parent acquired another 5.5% bringing them to almost 88%.
• Now an offer at SGD 0.60/share (compared to the Revalued NTA of SGD 0.7086/share from the IFA report (p36) of two years ago gets closer to the mark, but crucially, it is designed to squeeze out minorities with the threat of delisting. Kingboard Laminates only needs 2.05% to oblige a delisting from the SGX. As far as Travis can tell, it would require more – at least 95% of shares – to oblige a mandatory squeezeout of minorities according to Section 102-103 of Bermuda Companies Act.
• Travis thinks this one gets through.

(link to Travis’ insight: Kingboard Starts Voluntary Unconditional Offer for 88% Held Sub Kingboard Copper Foil)

Ying Li International Real Estate Ltd (YINGLI SP) (Mkt Cap: $260mn; Liquidity: truly tiny)

China Everbright (165 HK) has launched an MGO at SGD 0.14/share for the rest of Ying Li International Real Estate Ltd (YINGLI SP) after last week purchasing the 30.00% stake formerly held by the CEO, bringing its stake to 58.9%.

• The deal is at a negligible premium and is far, far below Tangible Book Value Per Share (which is almost three times the offer price). Given that the acquirer bought a large stake in the company and offered perpetual capital of almost the current market cap at a significant premium to the MGO price, Travis thinks it an unattractive offer.
• It is puzzling as to why the CEO would sell his shares at such a discount, especially when the company and Everbright co-own some of the assets.
• While the stated intention of the Offeror is to keep the stock listed, and the MGO is presented almost as “technical”, it would be enormously to Everbright’s benefit to buy as many shares as they could down at this price level. It will go from being underwater on an equity affiliate stake purchase to having a huge writeup in value if Everbright consolidates the asset post MGO.
• For that, Travis thinks there is a possibility of a bump just to make it more attractive, though the IFA report could come out with a not fair and reasonable result which shows NTA or NAV far, far higher than the Offer Price, which is not yet declared final.

(link to Travis’ insight: Everbright Mandatory Offer for Ying Li Intl Real Estate – Going Cheap)

Briefly …

In a mainly technical piece, I explained why China Three Gorges, China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK)‘s largest shareholder with 27.1% is currently required to abstain from voting at the forthcoming court meeting, despite the misleading statement in the  announcement that China Three Gorges has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme. (link to my insight: China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption)

Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) (Mkt Cap: $4.8bn; Liquidity: $27mn)

What was once a tough deal is now an agreed deal. The deal is 2.375 shares of DSV for every share of Panalpina, which as of the previous Friday’s close had a value of CHF 195.80/share which is a 43% premium to the CHF 137/share, where Panalpina was trading the day before DSV’s first bid.

• Panalpina is getting taken out at 28.1x reported 2018 EV/EBITDA multiple (pre-IFRS 16) calculated at a CHF 195.8 price. Panalpina shareholders will own ~23% of DSV shares out if all shares are exchanged and the Ernst Göhner Foundation will be the largest shareholder at ~11%.
• 69.9% of shares have irrevocably agreed to support the Exchange Offer. The customary condition is 80% to make it go through, meaning DSV needs another 10.1% out of the 30% extant (or just over one-third).
• Travis expects there is another 10-15% held by arbitrageurs and 5-7% held by indexers already so this deal looks to me like it is done. He expects the Exchange Offer may settle as early as early-August. If it trades tight, he would get out because DSV is probably priced to a very good level. 

(link to Travis’ insight: DSV Improves Bid and Göhner Foundation and Panalpina Agree)

Lenta Ltd (LNTA LI) (Mkt Cap: $1.7bn; Liquidity: $2mn)

Reuters reported that Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those TPG and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company. This was followed by Lenta announced confirming the cash offer. The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs. 

• The first 41.9% are sold conditional on FAS Clearance (presumably Mordashov has cleared this transaction with “the right people”) expected in May 2019, a few easily achieved conditions, and the condition of no sanctions being in play for any of the selling or buying parties. 
• Once cleared – expected in May 2019 – this becomes a straightforward offer with no minimum acceptances meaning that investors can sell shares into the deal or decide not to do so.
• It’s not an attractive offer price, with the possibility of a bump if enough people complain.  If you want to buy and hold, this deal is a put option.

(link to Travis’ insight: Severgroup Puts in a Cheeky Bid for Lenta – TPG and EBRD Bail)

Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ) / Tencent Holdings (700 HK)

Since announcing the intended listing of its international internet assets on Euronext Amsterdam “no earlier than H2 2019” – together with a secondary, inward listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange – I calculate Naspers discount to NAV has narrowed to 34.4% from 37.1%, the day before the announcement, placing the current discount a shade below the 12-month average.

• The likelihood of NewCo trading at a tighter discount to where Naspers’ previously (& currently trades) is universally accepted. Naspers will benefit from that reduced discount via its 75% stake; but it is not known where Naspers’ own discount will trade after the spin-off.
• There are indications the management want to see the group discount narrow to 30%, possibly down to the 20% level, which implies a significantly lower discount for Naspers, potentially around 10%. That would seem optimistic as investors focus more on the directly-held Tencent vehicle, and the fact Naspers is a holding company, holding a stake in another holding company.
• Naspers’ discount may drift narrower on the expectation Naspers’ spin-off works its magic. Greater clarity on the option into Naspers or NewCo may provide an additional boost; but conversely, if such an option is limited, there is likely to be disappointment.

(link to my insight: StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update)

Melco International Development (200 HK) / Melco Resorts & Entertainment (MLCO US)

With Melco trading at a (then) 32% discount to NAV, Curtis Lehnert recommends a set-up trade on a dollar for dollar basis. The current level, as I write, is statistically the most attractive according to the Smartkarma Holdco Tool, sitting at -1.8 standard deviations from the 180 DMA.

• Stub assets are minimal – around 8% of GAV – if excluding gaming licenses, goodwill and trademarks. Net cash is $6.4bn or $4.27/share.
• Those stub assets are still loss-making, after deconsolidating out MLCO, to the tune of $386mn in EBITDA, but that was an improvement on (HK$682mn) figure in FY17.
• Still, Curtis thinks now is the time to enter the trade to take advantage of both the statistical and fundamental supports to the trade. 

(link to Curtis’ insight: TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau)

For the month of March, ten new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$22.3bn. This overall number includes Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman’s proposal for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) after the Tender Offer was officially launched in March. This deal was first proposed in mid-January – which was rejected by the board – and subsequently an improved offer was tabled, which was then supported.

The average premium to last close for the new deals announced in March was 18%, while the average for the first quarter of 2019 is 33%.

(link to my insight: M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in March 2019)

• Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB)‘s results of the CVTO have been announced.  42.85% of shares tendered, therefore the offeror held 63.78% of shares at the close of the offer. The MSCI downweight occurred at the close Thursday, however shares popped 17.5%.

• Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s Scheme document has been delayed until the 25 April, from the 2 April.

• The Dairy Crest (DCG LN) takeover by Saputo was approved at the Court Meeting and Scheme Meeting yesterday.

• Ap Eagers Ltd (APE AU), Automotive Holdings (AHG AU)‘s largest shareholder, has proposed an all-scrip merger offer. AHG recommends shareholders take no action at this time.

• Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)‘s IFA recommends shareholders tender into Global Power Synergy Company Ltd (GPSC TB)‘s offer.

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

4. Battery Technology- The Key To An Electric Vehicle Future

The Insight is structured as follows:

• A. Key  Conclusions
• B. Report Highlights
• C.History of Electric Vehicles
• E. History of Rechargeable Battery Technologies And An In-Depth Analysis on Li-ion Batteries
• F. Batteries Beyond Li-ion
• G. Supply Constraints for Key Raw Materials
• H. The Competitive Landscape

A. Key  Conclusions

Global sales of EV’s reached 2m units in 2018. As a base case scenario, we expect a combination of improving EV battery cost-effectiveness, increasingly challenging emissions standards and ongoing incentives by various governments to propel unit sales to 8m units annually by 2025. Against this, we consider battery material price increases, a reduction of EV incentives in the US and China and political and environmental risks from the mining of metals used in batteries as downside risks which could delay the growth of the EV market.

Surprisingly, the EV battery technology that will drive us towards that 8m unit goal is still very much a work in progress. While Lithium Ion is the by far the dominant technology, there are striking differences between variants of the technology, battery pack design, battery management systems and manufacturing scale between the leading contenders. Furthermore, while there’s nothing on the horizon to completely displace Lithium Ion within the next decade, it remains unclear whether the technology will be the one to achieve the $100/kWh price target that would make the EV cost-neutral compared to its internal combustion predecessors. 

Quite apart from the technology,  the EV battery segment faces other significant challenges including increasing costs for core materials such as Cobalt, increasing safety concerns as the mix of that very same cobalt is reduced in the cathode, the growing risk of litigation amidst a fiercely competitive environment and last but not least, the appetite of various governments to maintain a favourable subsidy framework. 

5. Singapore REIT – The Draft Master Plan 2019 Boost and Q1 Scorecard

Singapore REITs (S-REITs) are up about 13% year-to-date in 2019 on a total returns basis against the Straits Times Index’s (STI) 8.3%. S-REITs is expected to continue its outperformance on the back of a pause in the US interest rate hike cycle, falling Singapore government bond yields, and improving demand and supply dynamics in the underlying sub-markets. Valuations of many S-REITs, however, may be appearing stretched as S-REITs’ yields have compressed significantly in the last six months, leaving the yield spread over the 10-year Singapore government bond yield at about 350 basis points, which is lower than the historical average spread of about 370 basis points.

Contrary to the popular belief that retail malls are no longer relevant, we view the outlook of the retail space market as positive due to the limited new supply from 2020 and new trend towards omnichannel retailing.  Our preference remains on selected retail REITs with exposure to suburban malls such as Frasers Centrepoint Trust (FCT SP) .

Office REITs are given more legs to run with the new CBD incentive scheme in the URA Draft Master Plan 2019. The sustained office upcycle may also spill over to the business parks and hi-specs industrial space, benefiting some of the business parks/industrial REITs.

We prefer selected industrial REITs with a diversified geographical exposure such as Mapletree Logistics Trust (MLT SP) and those with greater exposure to business parks and high-specs industrial space.

Referring to our earlier report Singapore REIT – Preferred Picks 2019 , two of our preferred picks, Mapletree Logistics Trust and Mapletree Greater China Commercial Trust (MAGIC SP) (now known as Mapletree North Asia Commercial Trust), were among the top five S-REITs performers year-to-date, having achieved the same total return of 17.6%. Manulife Us Reit (MUST SP) and Frasers Centrepoint Trust (FCT SP), also did well, beating the STI with total returns of 10.4% and 9.5%, respectively.