In this briefing:
- TRACKING TRAFFIC/Chinese Express & Logistics: Parcel Pricing Weak, Again
- Horiba (6856 JP): Bad News Largely Discounted
- EM Relative Strength Is Bottoming: Overweight
- FamilyMart: A Shrewd Head-Fake?
- FamilyMart Tender Offer for Don Quijote Misses The Mark as Mr. Partridge Stands Pat
1. TRACKING TRAFFIC/Chinese Express & Logistics: Parcel Pricing Weak, Again
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Tracking Traffic/Chinese Express & Logistics is the hub for our research on China’s express parcels and logistics sectors. Tracking Traffic/Chinese Express & Logistics features analysis of monthly Chinese express and logistics data, notes from our conversations with industry players, and links to company and thematic notes.
This month’s issue covers the following topics:
- November express parcel pricing remained weak. Average pricing per express parcel fell by 7.8% Y/Y to just 11.06 RMB per piece. November’s average price represents a new all-time low for the industry, and November’s Y/Y decline was the steepest monthly decline in over two years (excluding Lunar New Year months, which tend to be distorted by the timing of the holiday).
- Express parcel revenue growth dipped below 15% last month. Weak per-parcel pricing pulled express sector Y/Y revenue growth down to just 14.6% in November, the worst on record (again excluding distorted Lunar New Year comparisons). Chinese e-commerce demand has slowed and we suspect ‘O2O’ initiatives, under which online purchases are fulfilled via local stores, are also undermining express demand growth.
- Intra-city pricing (ie, local delivery) remains firm relative to inter-city. Relative to weak inter-city express pricing (where ZTO Express (ZTO US) and the other listed express companies compete), pricing for local, intra-city express deliveries remained firm. In the first 11 months of 2018, express pricing rose 1.7% Y/Y versus a -2.9% decline in inter-city shipments (international pricing fell sharply, -14.5% Y/Y). Relatively firm pricing on local shipments may make it hard for local food delivery companies like Meituan Dianping (3690 HK) and Alibaba Group Holding (BABA US) ‘s ele.me to beat down unit operating costs.
- Underlying domestic transport demand held up well again in November. Although demand for speedy, relatively expensive express service (and air freight) appears to be moderating, demand for rail and highway freight transport has held up well. The relative strength of rail and water transport (slow, cheap, industry-facing) versus express and air freight (fast, expensive, consumer-oriented) suggests a couple of things: a) upstream industrial activity is stronger than downstream retail activity and b) the people in charge of paying freight are shifting to cheaper modes of transport when possible.
We retain a negative view of China’s express industry’s fundamentals: demand growth is slowing and pricing appears to be falling faster than costs can be cut. Overall domestic transportation demand, however, remains solid and shows no signs of slowing.
2. Horiba (6856 JP): Bad News Largely Discounted
Horiba combines high gearing to semiconductor capital spending with a large and growing automotive test business characterized by upward trending but uneven profitability. At ¥4,545 (Friday, December 21, closing price), its share price has dropped by 53% from an all-time high of ¥9,590 reached last May. Falling demand for semiconductor production equipment and a downward revision to FY Dec-18 sales and profit guidance announced in November appear to be largely in the price.
The downward revision, which cut projected full-year operating profit growth from 15.5% to 2.5%, followed a 22.2% year-on-year decline in operating profit in 3Q and implies a similar rate of decline in 4Q. The weakness is concentrated in Semiconductor Equipment and Automotive Test, the former due to a cyclical downturn in overall demand, the latter due to M&A-related and other one-time expenses. New Automotive Test orders continued to outpace sales, leading to a 9.5% increase in the order backlog during 3Q.
Automotive Test sales and profits should rise next year, while semiconductor equipment sales and profits seem likely to bottom out. In a report issued on December 17, SEMI (the semiconductor equipment and materials industry organization) forecasts a further decline in wafer fab equipment sales in 1H of 2019, followed by recovery in 2H. Other industry sources we talked to before the report was issued had similar views.
This scenario could fall apart due to general economic weakness, American attempts to stifle China’s semiconductor industry, or both. On December 21, Reuters reported that Foxconn “…is in the final stages of talks with the local government of the Chinese city of Zhuhai to build a chip plant there with a total investment of about $9 billion… most of which would be shouldered by the Zhuhai government through subsidies and tax breaks…” This looks like a perfect target for the Americans, but whether or not they will notice or care remains to be seen.
Horiba is now selling at 9.6x our EPS estimate for this fiscal year, 13.4x our estimate for next year and 12.1x our estimate for FY Dec-20. These and other projected valuations are near the bottom of their 5-year historical ranges. If the Semiconductor Equipment division does not recover in 2H of 2019, historical data suggest that its operating profit could drop by 70% rather than the 47% we are now forecasting, resulting in a P/E ratio of 17x. Nevertheless, it is time to start considering when and at what price to buy Horiba.
Horiba is a diversified Japanese maker of precision and analytical devices and systems with a significant presence in the global markets for automotive test, industrial process and environmental analysis, hematology, semiconductor production equipment and scientific instruments. It is by far the world’s leading producer of automotive emission measurement systems (EMS), having supplied about 80% of the installed base worldwide, and also the world’s top manufacturer of mass flow controllers for the semiconductor industry, with an estimated global market share of nearly 60%.
3. EM Relative Strength Is Bottoming: Overweight
Relative strength for MSCI EM is bottoming vs. MSCI EAFE despite continued global equity market weakness. Although the MSCI EM’s price index remains in a downtrend, we are seeing signs of outperformance ona a relative strength basis and would add incremental exposure. In this report we highlight attractive and actionable themes within EM.
4. FamilyMart: A Shrewd Head-Fake?
We think the failed tender but continued asset sale between Familymart Uny (8028 JP) and Don Quijote (7532 JP) is astutely beneficial for Familymart Uny Holdings (8028 JP) and parent Itochu Corp (8001 JP) . More details below
5. FamilyMart Tender Offer for Don Quijote Misses The Mark as Mr. Partridge Stands Pat
In October, the Nikkei leaked and Familymart Uny Holdings (8028 JP) immediately thereafter announced that Familymart would sell the rest of its GMS (and financing) subsidiary UNY to Don Quijote Holdings (7532 JP) (which bought 40% of the company in 2017) and would conduct a Tender Offer later in 2018 at a 20% premium to the then-current price to buy a stake in Don Quijote of just over 20%. The Tender Offer was announced November 6th. Familymart had arranged to borrow shares it did not manage to buy in the tender so that at the next record date it will have 20% of the voting rights by hook or by crook.
Don Quijote shares jumped to the Tender Offer price the same day and then spent a day there before investors decided that the news and structure of the deal was better news for Don Quijote than Familymart had priced in.
Results of the Tender Offer have just been announced. Familymart had been trying to buy 32,108,700 shares for JPY 212 billion. They just missed. They got 0.08% of the total desired, or 24,721 shares for just over JPY 163 million.
THEY GOT NOTHING.
I expect Familymart had zero idea this would happen. I expect their bankers are surprised as well. They should not have been. They analysed this badly. There was a decent chance they would find it difficult to dislodge shares from owners.
In FamilyMart Tender for Don Quijote – Elmer vs Mr. Partridge? I recalled how “Old Turkey” (from Edwin Lefevre’s Reminiscences of a Stock Operator) did not want to lose his position while Elmer was eager to take profits.
“I couldn’t think of selling that stock.” “You couldn’t?” asked Elmer, beginning to look doubtful himself. It is a habit with most tip givers to be tip takers. “Why not?” And Elmer drew nearer. “Why, this is a bull market!” The old fellow said it as though he had given a long and detailed explanation.
Growth stock managers don’t like selling growth stocks until the growth stops growing. Don Quijote is still growing. And with UNY, Don Quijote may grow faster than previously expected.
The announcement at the end of the Tender Offer Results announcement is also VERY telling. There was a plan to make Don Quijote an equity-method affiliate by buying in the Tender Offer, buying in the market, or borrowing lots of shares. There was a plan for Familymart to appoint directors to DQ.
There was a clearly-available trading strategy based on that.
The new announcement puts that strategy into question. And Mr. Partridge might not be so inclined to call it a bull market. Since the launch of the deal, the markets have started the trip to Gehenna in a trug. From the one-month average prior to the Familymart bid news, Don Quijote is up 25%. Familymart is up 40%, the Nikkei 225 is down 10.7%, the TOPIX retail sector is down 5.5% but Familymart and Don Quijote have influenced that performance (without those two names, average performance is worse).