Industrials

Daily Industrials: M1 Offer Coming – Market Odds Suggest a Bump But… and more

In this briefing:

  1. M1 Offer Coming – Market Odds Suggest a Bump But…
  2. THK (6481 JP): Downturn Discounted, Recovery Depends on New Orders
  3. Recruit Holdings Down 30% From October; Still Not Cheap
  4. Last Week in Event SPACE: Harbin Electric, MYOB, TMB Bank, Halla Holdings
  5. Uber IPO: Its Sprawling Empire And Battle Lines (Part 3)

1. M1 Offer Coming – Market Odds Suggest a Bump But…

Screenshot%202019 01 02%20at%207.49.38%20am

Singapore telecom firm M1 announced on the 28th of December 2018 that Konnectivity Pte. Ltd. (a company jointly owned by Keppel Corp Ltd (KEP SP)  and Singapore Press Holdings (SPH SP)) had made a Voluntary Conditional General Offer following the satisfaction of the pre-condition (IMDA approval) mentioned in the pre-conditional offer made in September. 

The offer is to buy a minimum of 16.69% of the total share capital of M1 at a price of S$2.06 in order to increase the collective holding of the acquirer and its related parties from the current level of 33.32% to 50+% of fully-diluted shares (current shares out + 26.826mm Options + ~2.1mm Award shares). 

The Offerors will buy all shares tendered if they get to a minimum of 50+%.  

The other terms and conditions of this deal will be set out in the offer document which is expected to be despatched in mid-January 2019 (14-21 days from 28 December).  

The offer price of S$2.06 translated to a premium of 26.4% to the undisturbed price before the trading halt for the pre-conditional offer. At the time of writing, the stock is trading at S$2.10 which is higher than the proposed Offer Price, indicating the market is expecting a bump or an overbid.

We’ll see.

2. THK (6481 JP): Downturn Discounted, Recovery Depends on New Orders

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After dropping 60% from a high of ¥4,830 last February 27 to a 52-week low of ¥1,945 on December 26, THK closed at ¥2,062 on December 28, the last trading day of 2018.  

New orders peaked in the three months to Dec-17. The order backlog peaked in the three months to Mar-18, and so did the share price. Sales and operating profit peaked in the three months to Jun-18. Demand from the company’s top three user categories – electronics (semiconductor production equpment in particular), machine tools, and general industry – has been moving in parallel. By region, new orders from China have dropped most rapidly, followed by orders from Taiwan and Japan. 

After double-digit positive comparisons in the nine months to Sep-18, management is guiding for a 30% year-on-year decline in operating profit in 4Q of FY Dec-18. Judging from the orders trend and economic situation, substantial declines in sales and profits are likely in FY Dec-19. If demand from China picks up following a trade agreement with the U.S. sometime next year, there should be a moderate recovery going into FY Dec-20.

The shares are now selling at 7.7x management’s EPS guidance for FY Dec-18 and 0.9x book value at the end of Sep-18. Our forecast puts the shares on 11.9x earnings for FY Dec-19 and 10.4x earnings for FY Dec-20E. Valuations are at the bottom of their recent historical ranges. When orders recover, the stock price should, too.

THK is the world’s top producer of linear motion guides, which enable high-speed, high-precision operation of machine tools, semiconductor production equipment and other machinery. Management estimates the company’s global market share at about 50%. Competitors include Nippon Thompson (6480 JP) and NSK (6471 JP) in Japan and several companies headquartered in Europe, the U.S. and China. THK sells worldwide and has production facilities in Japan, Europe, the Americas, China, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and India. The company is financially sound, with a current ratio of 2.9x and net cash equal to 14% of equity at the end of Sep-18.

3. Recruit Holdings Down 30% From October; Still Not Cheap

Capture

The share price of Recruit Holdings (6098 JP) has fallen by around 30% over the past three months from an all-time high of JPY3,826 (on 1st October 2018) to JPY2,705 on 24th December 2018. Prior to this, Recruit’s share price saw a strong upward rally during May-September following the company’s announcement that it would acquire Glassdoor Inc. (the company which operates the employment information website glassdoor.com).

We expect Recruit’s consolidated revenue to grow 7.7% and 6.5% YoY in FY03/19E and FY03/20E respectively, driven by the acquisition of Glassdoor and steady growth in Japanese staffing operations, partially offset by a likely slowdown in global labour market activity. We also expect Recruit’s consolidated EBITDA margin to improve by around 50bps due to higher margin from Glassdoor.

Despite the recent dip in share price and steady topline and bottom line growth over the forecast period, at a FY2 EV/EBITDA multiple of 14.0x, Recruit doesn’t look particularly attractive to us. Recruit’s internet advertising business and employment business peers, Yahoo Japan (4689 JP) and Persol Holdings (2181 JP) are trading at FY2 EV/EBITDAs of 7.7x and 9.6x respectively.

Key Financials FY03/18-20E

 

FY03/18

FY03/19E

FY03/20E

Consolidated Revenue (JPYbn)

2,171

2,338

2,490

YoY Growth %

11.9%

7.7%

6.5%

Consolidated EBITDA (JPYbn)

258

288

312

EBITDA Margin %

11.9%

12.3%

12.5%

Source: Company Disclosures/LSR Estimates

4. Last Week in Event SPACE: Harbin Electric, MYOB, TMB Bank, Halla Holdings

29%20dec%20%202018

Last Week in Event SPACE …

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

M&A – ASIA-PAC

Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK) (Mkt Cap: $546mn; Liquidity: $0.4mn)

As previously discussed in Harbin Electric Expected To Be Privatised, Harbin Electric (HE) has now announced a privatisation Offer from parent and 60.41%-shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation (“HEC”) by way of a merger by absorption. The Offer price of $4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close, is bang in line with that paid by HEC in January this year for new domestic shares. The Offer price has been declared final. 

  • Of note, the Offer price is a 37% discount to HE’s net cash of $7.27/share as at 30 June 2018. Should the privatisation be successful, this Offer will cost HEC ~HK$3.08bn, following which it can pocket the remaining net cash of $9.3bn PLUS the power generation equipment manufacturer business thrown in for free.
  • On pricing, “fair” to me would be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers. That is not happening. It will be difficult to see how independent directors (and the IFA) can justify recommending an Offer to shareholders at any price below the net cash/share, especially when the underlying business is profit-generating.
  • Dissension rights are available, however, there is no administrative guidance on the substantive as well as procedural rules as to how the “fair price” will be determined under PRC and HK Law.
  • Trading at a gross/annualised spread of 15%/28% assuming end-July completion, based on the average timeline for merger by absorption precedents. As HEC is only waiting for approval from independent H-shareholders suggests this transaction may complete earlier than precedents. 

(link to my insight: Harbin Electric: The Price Is Not Right)  


MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) (Mkt Cap: $1.2bn; Liquidity: $7mn)

KKR and MYOB entered into Scheme Implementation Agreement (SIA) at $3.40/share, valuing MYOB, on a market cap basis, at A$2bn. MYOB’s board unanimously recommends shareholders to vote in favour of the Offer, in the absence of a superior proposal. The Offer price assumes no full-year dividend is paid.

  • On balance, MYOB’s board has made the right decision to accept KKR’s reduced Offer. The argument that MYOB is a “known turnaround story” is challenged as cloud-based accounting software providers Xero Ltd (XRO AU)  and Intuit Inc (INTU US) grab market share. This is also reflected in MYOB’s forecast 7% revenue growth in FY18 and follows a 10% decline in first-half profit, despite a 61% jump in online subscribers.
  • And there is justification for KKR’s lowering the Offer price: the ASX is down 10% since KKR’s initial tilt, the ASX technology index is off by ~14%, a basket of listed Aussie peers are down 17%, while Xero, the most comparable peer, is down ~20%. The Scheme Offer is at a ~27% premium to the estimated adjusted (for the ASX index) downside price of $2.68/share.
  • Bain was okay selling at $3.15/share to KKR and will be fine selling its remaining ~6.5% stake at $3.40. Presumably, MYOB sounded out the other major shareholders such as Fidelity, Yarra Funds Management, Vanguard etc as to their read on the revised $3.40 offer, before agreeing to the SIA with KKR.

  • If the markets avoid further declines, this deal will probably get up. If the markets rebound, the outcome is less assured. This Tuesday marks the beginning of a new year and a renewed mandate for investors to take risk, especially an agreed deal; but the current 5.3% annualised spread is tight.

(link to my insight: MYOB Caves And Agrees To KKR’s Reduced Offer)


TMB Bank PCL (TMB TB) (Mkt Cap: $1.2bn; Liquidity: $7mn)

The Ministry of Finance, the major shareholder of TMB, confirmed that both Krung Thai Bank Pub (KTB TB) and Thanachart Capital (TCAP TB) had engaged in merger talks with TMB. Considering an earlier KTB/TMB courtship failed, it is more likely, but by no means guaranteed, that the deal with Thanachart will happen. Bloomberg is also reporting that Thanachart and TMB want to do a deal before the next elections, which is less than two months away.

  • TMB is much bigger than Thanachart and therefore it may boil down to whether TMB wants to be the target or acquirer. In Athaporn Arayasantiparb, CFA‘s view, a deal with Thanachart would leave TMB as the acquirer rather than the target. But Thanachart’s management has a better track record than TMB.
  • Both banks have undergone extensive deals before this one: 1) TMB acquired DBS Thai Danu and IFCT; and 2) Thanachart engineered an acquisition of the much bigger, but struggling, SCIB.
  • A merger between the two would still leave them smaller than Bank Of Ayudhya (BAY TB) and would not change the bank rankings; but it would give TMB a bigger presence in asset management, hire-purchase finance and a re-entry into the securities business.

(link to Athaporn’s insight: Sathorn Series M: TMB-Thanachart Courtship)  

STUBS/HOLDCOS

Halla Holdings (060980 KS) / Mando Corp (204320 KS)

Mando accounts for 45% of Halla’s NAV, which is currently trading at a 50% discount. Sanghyun Park believes the recent narrowing in the discount may be due to the hype attached to Mando-Hella Elec, which he believes is overdone; and recommends a short Holdco and long Mando. Using Sanghyun’s figures, I see the discount to NAV at 51%, 2STD above the 12-month average of ~47%.

(link to Sanghyun’s insight: Halla Holdings Stub Trade: Downwardly Mean Reversion in Favor of Mando)  

SHARE CLASSIFICATIONS

OTHER M&A UPDATES

CCASS

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

Name

% change

Into

Out of

Comment

Putian Communication (1720 HK)
69.75%
Shanghai Pudong
Outside CCASS
37.68%
China Industrial
Outside CCASS
16.23%
HSBC
Outside CCASS
Source: HKEx

5. Uber IPO: Its Sprawling Empire And Battle Lines (Part 3)

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Although Uber aims to be an Amazon for transport, we will focus on the ride-hailing market in part 3 of this series. Here, we try to answer the following questions:

  1. What are the indicative ride-hailing market shares of Uber vs Lyft in North America?
  2. What is Uber’s share in other key countries?
  3. What are the lawsuits investors should watch out for?
  4. How do Uber’s revenue drivers compare with Lyft’s?
  5. What are the timelines and key figures for both companies’ IPOs?

This is the third note in a series about the expected 2019 IPO of global ride-hailing giant Uber Technologies (0084207D US) and Lyft. Please read the earlier two pieces in the series for better contexts:

Uber IPO Preview: Its Sprawling Empire and Battle Lines (Part 1) written by me.

Uber IPO Preview: Fast-Growing Uber Eats Has Become a Material Part of Uber (Part 2) written by Daniel Hellberg

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