In this briefing:
- CStone Pharma (基石药业) IPO: Thoughts on Valuation (Part 2)
- Shimadzu (7701 JP): 3Q Results Suggest a Trading Range
- Olympus: 3QFY03/19 Profits Decline on the Back of Litigation Related Costs
- CyberAgent: Tumbling Dice
1. CStone Pharma (基石药业) IPO: Thoughts on Valuation (Part 2)
CStone Pharma, a Wuxi Apptec related biotech company, plans to raise USD 300m to list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In our previous insight (link here), we have discussed CStone’s drug candidate pipeline, founders, management team and investors.
In this insight, we will provide a detailed valuation breakdown for its key products. Our base case post-money valuation for CStone is USD 1.4 bn, which is 30% above its pre-IPO valuation of USD 1.05 bn but at the low end of the guided valuation range.
Our coverage on biotech listing
- CStone Pharma (基石药业) IPO: Strong Assembly and Backing (Part 1)
- Viva Biotech (维亚生物) IPO: When CRO Becomes Early Stage Biotech Investor
- Hansoh Pharma (翰森制药) IPO: Takeaways from Recent 4+7 City Centralized Tender Results
- Hansoh Pharma (翰森制药) IPO: A Leading Generic Player with Regulatory Overhang (Part 1)
- WuXi Apptec (药明康德) IPO: This A+H Listing Will Be Different
- Frontage Holding (方达控股) IPO: More Disclosure Needed to Understand Moat and Growth Prospect
- Ascentage Pharma (亚盛医药) IPO: Too Early for an IPO
- Junshi Bioscience (君实医药) IPO: Thoughts on Valuation (Part 2)
- Junshi Bioscience (君实医药) IPO: Early in Application but Behind in Key Indications (Part 1)
- CanSino Biologics (康希诺) IPO: Promising Pre-Clinical Results but Vaccine Scandal Weighs (Part 1)
- AOBiome Therapeutics IPO: Hope for Natural Therapeutic Treatment
- Innovent Biologics (信达生物) IPO: Pricing the PD-1 and Biosimilars Competition (Part 2)
- Innovent Biologics (信达生物) IPO: A Major PD-1 MAb Competitor Might Have Just Emerged (Part 1)
- MicuRx Pharma (盟科医药) IPO: Betting on Single Drug in the Not so Attractive Antibiotic Segment
- Hua Medicine (华领医药) IPO: Thoughts on Valuation
- Hua Medicine (华领医药) IPO: Reviving Roche’s Failed Attempt?
- BeiGene (百济神州) IPO: Dual-Listing with Upside Capped in the Near Term
- Ascletis Pharma (歌礼制药) IPO: Valuation Not Justified by Ganovo and Ravidasvir NPV (Part 3)
- Ascletis Pharma (歌礼制药) IPO: Three Valuation Risk Factors (Part 2)
- Ascletis Pharma (歌礼制药) IPO: Emerging Player in the Crowded HCV Drug Market
- China Isotope & Radiation IPO: Oligopoly, Visible Growth and High Barrier to Entry
- Zai Lab IPO: Thoughts on Valuation, Risks and Upsides (Part 2)
- Zai Lab IPO: Experienced Team, Promising In-Licensing Drug Pipeline (Part 1)
2. Shimadzu (7701 JP): 3Q Results Suggest a Trading Range
Shimadzu’s 3Q results were good enough to reassure long-term investors, but not good enough to be called a buy signal. Sales and operating profit were up 4.5% and 4.6% year-on-year, respectively, in the three months to December, an improvement over 2Q but well below the double-digit increases recorded in 1Q and last fiscal year. Forex losses and other factors led to a 2.2% decline in net profit.
Sales were up in Japan, Europe and Asia ex-Japan and ex-China, but down in America, China and Other Regions. Sales of core Analytical & Measuring Instruments were up 2.4%, operating profit on those sales was up 4.1% and the operating margin rose to +15.4% from +15.1% the previous year.
Sales of Industrial Machinery were down 5.7%, but operating profit on those sales was up 2.7% and the division generated a +9.7% operating margin vs. +9.0% the previous year. Sales of turbo-molecular pumps, primarily to semiconductor equipment makers, were down 14.3%.
Medical System sales were up 10.6% and the division generated a +1.5% operating margin vs. + 0.1% the previous year. Aircraft Equipment sales were up 12.1% but the division made a -0.5% operating loss vs. +1.2% profit the previous year.
At ¥2,659 (Friday, February 8 closing price), the shares are selling at 24x our EPS estimate for FY Mar-19 and 12x EV/EBITDA. The five-year historical P/E range is 13x – 30x, the EV/EBITDA range is 6x – 16x. Over the next several quarters, we expect continued weakness in Industrial Machinery to offset single-digit growth in Instruments, keeping overall growth low.
3. Olympus: 3QFY03/19 Profits Decline on the Back of Litigation Related Costs
Olympus Corporation (7733 JP) reported its 3QFY03/19 results on Friday (08th February) after markets closed. The third quarter revenue dropped 1.7% YoY while operating profit declined by a significant 21.5% YoY, which was 12% below consensus estimates. The operating profit margin for the quarter was 8.8% compared to 11.1% for the same period last year.
Revenue and Operating Profit Fell Below Consensus Estimates for 3QFY03/19
JPY (bn) | 3QFY03/18 | 3QFY03/19 | YoY Change | Consensus | Company Vs. Consensus |
Revenue | 202.6 | 199.2 | -1.7% | 201.6 | -1.2% |
Operating Profit | 22.4 | 17.6 | -21.5% | 20.0 | -12.0% |
OPM | 11.1% | 8.8% |
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The cumulative nine-month results were not impressive either. Although revenue saw a marginal improvement of 1.6% YoY, operating profit declined by 66%, resulting in a 700 basis point decline in operating margin, which fell to just 3.5%. Revenue and operating profit missed consensus estimates by 0.4% and 10.4%, respectively.
Operating Profit for 9MFY03/19 Declined by More than Half Compared to a Year Ago
JPY (bn) | 9MFY03/18 | 9MFY03/19 | YoY Change | Consensus | Company Vs. Consensus |
Revenue | 572.1 | 581.0 | 1.6% | 583.4 | -0.4% |
Operating Profit | 59.8 | 20.6 | -65.6% | 23.0 | -10.4% |
OPM | 10.5% | 3.5% |
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The company shares are currently trading at JPY4,645 per share which we believe is overvalued based on our EV/EBIT valuation. The premium is not justified given the governance related issues and the scandals currently faced by the company. Further, Olympus’ financial performance has been disappointing recently, and the company’s largest segment is growing only at single-digits and the Imaging business continues to drag on company revenue and margins. The share price gained nearly 38% since the beginning of the year following the company’s announcement to transform its business and improve governance. In our view the potential for a transformation in governance and business practices is already fully-discounted in the share price.
4. CyberAgent: Tumbling Dice
![](https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/078/315/original/2019-02-09_12-04-43.png?1549681495)
Source: Japan Analytics
TUMBLING DICE – After ZOZO (3092 JP) (-52%) and Mercari (4385 JP) (-50%), CyberAgent (4751 JP) is the worst-performing large-cap Internet stock in Japan over the last seven months. The company is the sector’s leading foreigner-held stock with over 48% (60%+ of the float) held by institutional investors such as Baillie Gifford (11.9%), JP Morgan AM (6.9%), Tybourne Capital (5.1%) and Blackrock Japan (5.0%). Having outperformed the sector and the market annually over the last nine years by 38% and 25%, respectively, over the seven months since the stock peaked in terms of our Relative Price Score on 13th July, CyberAgent shares have declined by 56%, underperforming the market by 48% and the sector by 37%.
PASSIVE PERILS – We will discuss the ‘perils ‘ of Passive TV in the DETAIL below. However, CyberAgent is yet another good example of the ‘perils’ of passive investing. On September 5th Nikkei Inc. announced that CyberAgent would replace Furukawa (5715 JP) in the Nikkei 225 index, with the inclusion occurring on October 1st. Since the ¥6050 intraday peak of the week before inclusion in the index, the shares have declined by 49% in 90 trading days.
![](https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/078/317/original/2019-02-09_12-52-50.png?1549684397)
SUMMARY – CyberAgent’s business has three ‘pillars’, internet advertising, mobile gaming software, and media. The latter now includes the linear free-to-view AbemaTV business, which helped drive the share price to a post-listing high of ¥6930 in July 2018. Since then, business conditions for two of these ‘pillars’ have degraded significantly, while the fledgeling TV business remains in ‘up-front’ investment mode. To cap what will be a turbulent year for CyberAgent, the company is moving into a new head office building in Shibuya called ‘Abema Towers‘ in March. We shall refrain from making any analogies to the Skyscraper Index.
This Insight will review: –
- CyberAgent’s growth strategy
- The company’s track profitability track record from the perspective of Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT), Comprehensive Income and Operating Profit margins
- The three main business segments – Internet Advertising, Game Software, and Media
- Cash Flow and Valuation
We will also attempt to value AbemaTV and will reverse-engineer some target metrics that would justify the market’s current implied ¥41b valuation for this business, a valuation that reached ¥543b only seven months ago.
![](https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/078/318/original/2019-02-09_13-06-39.png?1549685220)
VISION SHIFT? – In previous years, CyberAgent had a clear vision statement – ‘To create the 21st century’s leading company’. The company’s recent performance has led to a change of tone, and CyberAgent is now rather more modestly just ‘Aiming to be a company with medium to long-term supporters’. In the vein of the lyrics from the best song on the best Rolling Stones album, Exile on Main Street, the business has recently been at ‘all sixes and sevens and nines’. In the search for new ‘supporters’, we encourage CyberAgent to just ‘keep on rolling’, letting the dice fall where they may.
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