Brief Event-Driven: StubWorld: PCCW Is “Cheap” but Stub Ops Are Deteriorating and more

In this briefing:

1. StubWorld: PCCW Is “Cheap” but Stub Ops Are Deteriorating
2. Panalpina To Have EGM to Approve One Share One Vote
3. Golden Land: Less An Offer, More A Consolidation Of Interests
4. DSME Perpetual CBs Owned by Korea Eximbank: Situational Assessment & Trade Approach
5. Hopewell’s Egregiously Bad Offer, But What Can You Do?

1. StubWorld: PCCW Is “Cheap” but Stub Ops Are Deteriorating

This week in StubWorld …

• Select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW Ltd (8 HK)‘s stub ops.

Preceding my comments on PCCW and other stubs are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.

These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.

2. Panalpina To Have EGM to Approve One Share One Vote

Yesterday, Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW)‘s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation, made a formal request to the directors of Panalpina to hold an Extraordinary General Meeting to be held prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights enshrined in Article 5 be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted.

The directors complied with this request.

The limit to now has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the Ernst Göhner Foundation which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change. The directors have the right to grant exceptions to this 5% rule, as discussed in The Panalpina Conundrum a bit over a week ago, but have not, leaving the combined 24+% total held by Cevian and Artisan Partners with only ~11.6% of the vote.

This move by the EGF is both “sneaky” AND interesting (and bullish) news. Given the current shareholder vote structure, it wouldn’t be impossible for the EGF to vote it down in the EGM, but I think EGF very specifically do not want to vote it down because the alternative is worse. But getting this passed would suddenly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance.

3. Golden Land: Less An Offer, More A Consolidation Of Interests

Frasers Property (Thailand) Pcl (FPT TB) has announced a conditional voluntary tender offer for Golden Land Prop Dvlp (GOLD TB) at Bt8.50/share, ~2.4% premium to last close.

Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP) owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicle Univentures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.

Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. There were no specific minimum acceptance conditions attached to the tender offer mentioned in the announcement.

Should FPP secure 90% of GOLD in the tender offer, it may proceed with its delisting. A voluntary delisting is still achievable with ~80% in the bag, but that is conditional on <10% of shareholders not voting against.

Preconditions to the commencement of the tender offer include the approval from disinterested shareholders in FPP, approval from “relevant contractual parties of GOLD and GOLD’s subsidiaries” and the approval from the Office of Trade Competition Commission.

The fact the Sirivadhanabhakdi family already holds, directly/indirectly ~80% in GOLD, such regulatory approvals should be forthcoming.

This appears a done deal. The only apparent risk is the expected shareholder vote of Univentures wherein Panote will likely need to abstain.

Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 1.8%/4.3% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.

4. DSME Perpetual CBs Owned by Korea Eximbank: Situational Assessment & Trade Approach

• DSME has this ₩2.3tril worth of CBs that carry a 30 year maturity. Korea Eximbank is the holder. HHI wants no change. Eximbank wants out as soon as possible. Current price of ₩32,600 is nearly a 20% discount to the conversion price of ₩40,350. It’d be still better for Eximbank to do conversion/sale even at this price. This is 27.54%. It will create huge overhang.
• HHI should be given much higher priority than DSME even when they are under the same roof. DSME acquisition is supposed to help HHI first, not the other way around. HHI shouldn’t be much incentivized to help turn around DSME in the short-term. Not only that, pressing down DSME price would probably be the only way for HHI to prevent Eximbank’s stake dumping.
• In a longer time horizon, things would depend on the outlook of the entire shipbuilding sector. To minimize risks, I’d go for long/short with HHI. What should be at least clear at this point is that HHI should be outperforming DSME in whatever fundamentals situations we are dealing with.

5. Hopewell’s Egregiously Bad Offer, But What Can You Do?

The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May.  The IFA (China Tonghai Capital) considers the $38.80/share Offer to be fair & reasonable. The Scheme is conditional on ≥75% for, ≤10% against from disinterested shareholders. As Hopewell is HK-incorporated, there is no “head count ” test.  The full timetable is as follows:

After hearing conflicting opinions on what constitutes a blocking stake, a chat with the banker confirmed the blocking stake, as per the Companies Ordinance, is tied to 63.07% of shares out (i.e. Scheme shareholders – see page 95); whereas the Takeovers Code is tied to 59.42% of shares out. Effectively there are two assessments on the blocking stake and the more stringent (the 59.42% out in this case) prevails. 

With the Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years (the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down), the IFA creatively argues that extenuating factors such as the premium to historical price needs to also be taken into account. Hardly original, but that is where investors must decide whether this is as good as it’s going to get – given the Wu family’s control, there will not be a competing offer – or to hold out for a superior price longer term. This is a final offer and it will not be increased.

What the IFA fails to discuss is that the widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK) in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.

Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. And that is the disingenuous conclusion from the IFA that the premium to last close and with reference to historical pricing, is in effect the overriding reason to conclude the Offer is reasonable. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.

A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK) privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ).

Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7%/37.5%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down. Tough one – the premium to last close and with reference to the 10-year price performance, should be sufficient to get it over the line, and the basis for this “bullish” insight. But only for the brave.