Brief Consumer: Ruhnn (如涵) Pre-IPO Review- Significant Concentration Risk and more

In this briefing:

1. Ruhnn (如涵) Pre-IPO Review- Significant Concentration Risk
2. Sell Prada (1913 HK): Accounting Inflates Margins and Facilitates Excessive Dividends
3. Descente Tamed, Itochu Delicacy Required And Investors Can Probably Wait
4. NIO: A Survivor Among All the Chinese Start-Ups
5. After You Looks Beyond Thailand For Opportunities

1. Ruhnn (如涵) Pre-IPO Review- Significant Concentration Risk

Ruhnn Holding Ltd (RUHN US) is looking to raise about US$200m in its upcoming IPO.

The company is an internet key opinion leader (KOL) incubator in China. Revenue and GMV grew at impressive rates of 63% and 57% YoY in FY2018, respectively.

The idea of being able to leverage on KOLs influence over consumers to understand demand and retain consumers is interesting but Ruhnn has yet to demonstrate that it has a sustainable business model. 

Gross margin has deteriorated and losses widened as a percentage of revenue. Service fee paid to KOLs as a percentage of revenue has increased and showed little improvement in 9M FY2019.  The company depends heavily on the top KOL, Zhang Dayi, to generate revenue, almost half of the company’s GMV and revenue is generated from her.

2. Sell Prada (1913 HK): Accounting Inflates Margins and Facilitates Excessive Dividends

In our first report on Prada S.P.A. (1913 HK): An expensive luxury, we explained how creative accounting was disguising their business reality.  Since then, the stock has fallen 44% and the dividend has been cut. However, we think the key issues have yet to be addressed. They report growth, good operating cashflow and a solid financial position, but in-store sales are stagnant, margins falling, inventory rising and credit quality declining. It seems that profits are being inflated in order to pay dividends, largely to the controlling family.

3. Descente Tamed, Itochu Delicacy Required And Investors Can Probably Wait

I started writing this over the weekend after the results of the Itochu Corp (8001 JP) Tender Offer for 9.56% of Descente Ltd (8114 JP) were announced late Friday. 

Itochu planned on buying 7.21 million shares out of the 75.37mm shares which bear voting rights (as of the commencement of the Tender), and 15,115,148mm shares were tendered, which led to a pro-ration rate of 47.7% which was 0.3% below my the middle of my “wide range” expected pro-ration rate of 42-54% and 0.7% beyond the 44-47% tighter range discussed in Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile of 28 February.

Two more central ideas were discussed in that piece:

1. The hostility shown by Descente management during the Tender Offer had led Itochu to abandon discussions about post-tender management until after the Tender Offer was completed. Both sides indicated a willingness to pick up where things had left off – at Descente’s request – but Descente needed to stew a bit.
2. The revelation by ANTA Sports in an interview with the CEO in the Nikkei in late February that ANTA supported Itochu meant that the likelihood of Itochu NOT having enough votes to put through its own slate of directors was almost zero. At a combined 47.0% of post-Tender voting rights, if 94% or less of shares were to vote, it would mean Itochu could get the majority of over 50% and determine the entire slate of directors themselves. If there was another shareholder holding a couple of percent which supported Itochu, it would be a done deal even if everyone voted. And that 2-3% existed.

So… the threat that Itochu would hold an EGM to seat new directors to oblige a stronger course for management was a very strong probability. Management who was rabidly opposed to Itochu owning the stake could not very well bow down in front of Itochu post-tender just to save its own hide – not after the employee union and the OB group came out against. President Ishimoto had effectively put himself in an untenable position unless a miracle occurred because Itochu could not legally walk away from its offer, and Ishimoto-san was bad-mouthing Itochu even as they were negotiating during the Tender Offer Period. 

It was not, therefore, any surprise that President Ishimoto would step down. The surprise for me was that the news he would go came out as talks commenced over the weekend (but did not “bridge the gap” as the Nikkei reported), before we got to the first business day post-results. 

Talks apparently continue with no resolution, and the media reports offer no hint as to what the issues might be. 

4. NIO: A Survivor Among All the Chinese Start-Ups

Since its announcement on 4Q2018 results and termination of Jiading plant construction, NIO’s share price has been halved. We believe the market has over-reacted on NIO’s cashflow risk. With the expected 30-50% reduction on NEV (New Energy Vehicle) subsidies, all the Start-ups would have worse-than-ever cashflow pressure in 2019. But NIO might survive.

In China’s NEV market, NIO’s market position remains unique among all the Chinese Start-ups. Tesla is still NIO’s main competitor. NIO’s ES6 has capability to compete with Tesla’s Model Y, based on our comparison. Tesla and NIO both have to rely on external funding. The other Chinese Start-ups have to compete with traditional OEMs who have much less cash flow pressures.

NIO’s 4Q2018 financial data were in good trend. We estimate its net loss in 2019 to be further narrowed to Rmb6.1bn. With estimated Rmb13.2bn cash balance at end-Feb 2019, NIO have enough money to cover its estimated cash outflow in the next two year. And it would be able to get another round of external funding in 2020/2021, as long as its business operation ramps up as expected.

5. After You Looks Beyond Thailand For Opportunities

We met up with management of two companies whose industries couldn’t have been more different. This is the quick run-down on what they are up to recently:

• After You posted 14% earnings growth on the back of 20% revenue growth. While this remains healthy, it realizes that domestic market opportunities will become more limited and has started to look abroad with HK as its first market.
• Locally, the desserts leader is still planning a slew of new products and some in exclusive partnerships with various airlines such as Air Asia and Thai Smile.
• In an effort to reduce storefront expenses, they will start selling certain products outside stores and even online, now 3% of total sales.
• Amata’s earnings crashed 28% in 2018 on the back of 2% revenue decline, as Vietnam retroactively forbid certain land sales and even fines the company for past transactions that abided with the law back then!