Brief Consumer: Nissan Governance Structure Report Out: Fog Dissipating Slowly. Sunny in Summer. Storms Next Winter? and more

In this briefing:

1. Nissan Governance Structure Report Out: Fog Dissipating Slowly. Sunny in Summer. Storms Next Winter?
2. Nissan: Atrocious Governance Should Be Rectified Before Even Thinking of a Merger
3. Cupid Ltd: Attractive Valuation Post Significant Correction
4. TRADE IDEA – PCCW (8 HK) Stub: The Li Legacy Lives On
5. Dali Foods (3799:HK) FY18 Results: Revenue Growth Collapses in H2, But Margins Hold Up So Far

1. Nissan Governance Structure Report Out: Fog Dissipating Slowly. Sunny in Summer. Storms Next Winter?

Six weeks ago I wrote that Nissan’s governance outlook was “Foggy Now, Sunny Later.” I said “Governance changes are afoot, with a steady flow of developments likely coming in March, April, May, and June.”

The last couple of months have seen numerous media articles about the process of Nissan Motor (7201 JP) and Renault SA (RNO FP) rebuilding their relationship. There have been visits to Tokyo by Renault’s new chairman of the board of directors Jean-Dominique Senard, and visits to Paris and Amsterdam by the CEOs of Nissan and Mitsubishi Motors (7211 JP). 

There have been many suggestions in French and European newspapers in the interim that Jean-Dominique Senard would be the obvious choice as a representative director of Nissan. There have been other articles out there in the Japanese press suggesting what conclusions the committee might come to as to what outcomes should result. The difference is notable. The French side still wants control. The Japanese/Nissan/committee side sees the need to fix governance.

Today there was a report in the FT suggesting that Renault “wants” to restart merger talks with Nissan and “aims to restart merger talks with Nissan within 12 months.” It should be noted that these two sentences are not exactly the same. It may still be that France wants Renault to do so, and therefore Renault aims to do so. The same article revealed past talks on Renault merging with FCA but France putting a stop to it and a current desire to acquire another automaker – perhaps FCA – after dealing with Nissan. 

Also today, the long-awaited Nissan Special Committee for Improving Governance (SCIG) report was released. It outlines some of the issues of governance which existed under Ghosn- both the ones which got him the boot, and the structural governance issues which were “discovered” after he got the boot. 

There are clear patches in the fog. Two things shine through immediately. 

1. Governance weaknesses under Ghosn were inexcusably bad. Worse than previously reported.
2. The recommendations to the board now are, on the whole, pretty decent. Some are sine qua non changes – formation of nomination and compensation committees, whistleblower reporting to the audit committee and not the CEO, and greater checks and balances. Some are stronger in terms of the independence of Nissan from Renault: the committee recommends a majority of independent board members, an independent chairman, and no representative directors from Renault, Mitsubishi, or principal shareholders.

There are, however, other issues which were not addressed, which for Nissan’s sake probably should be addressed. Yesterday was a first step on what will be a 3-month procession of news about the way Nissan will address the SCIG report’s recommendations, the process by which it will choose new directors when it does not have an official nomination committee, and the AGM in June to propose and confirm new directors. Then they will start their jobs in July. 

The fog looks to lift slowly. And one may anticipate some better weather beyond. But business concerns remain a threat, and while relations appear to be getting better after the departure of Carlos Ghosn and the arrival of Jean-Dominique Senard, it is not clear that a Franco-Japanese storm is not brewing in the distance.

More below.

2. Nissan: Atrocious Governance Should Be Rectified Before Even Thinking of a Merger

Today Nissan Motor (7201 JP) released its report from the Special Committee for Improving Governance. The FT also reported that Renault SA (RNO FP) (i.e. the French government) was keen to restart merger talks within twelve months with an eye towards then acquiring Fiat Chrysler Automobiles Nv (FCAU US).

The details of the former are unsurprising but disappointing, while Renault’s M&A ambitions just seem delusional at this point.

3. Cupid Ltd: Attractive Valuation Post Significant Correction

Cupid Ltd one of the largest manufacturers of condoms in India 9MFY19 revenue was largely as per our expectations, as there was some order slippages. As forecasted in our initiation report Cupid Ltd: Protecting the Needy, the company reported a 20% decline in revenue at Rs 505mn, which also resulted in lower profitability both at the operating as well as net level. EBITDA stood at INR 161.6 mn declining by 32.53% with EBITDA margin at 31.95%. PAT was INR 108.5 mn declining by 24.58% with PAT margin at 21.46%.

Despite this below-par performance in the 9MFY19, we are fairly positive on the future growth prospects of the company. As of March 2019, it has a healthy order book of INR 1300 m with Book to Bill ratio of  1.99 times on its TTM sales. We expect revenues to grow at 15% over FY18-19 and margins to improve in medium to long term horizon.

Having corrected by 67% from its peak, the stock currently trades at 10.20x its FY19 EPS and 8.34x its FY20 EPS; we believe that this provides a good entry point for this niche high margin healthcare company with attractive long term growth possibilities.

4. TRADE IDEA – PCCW (8 HK) Stub: The Li Legacy Lives On

Have you ever wondered how a company secures the Chinese lucky number “8” as their ticker in Hong Kong? I’ll explain later on, but let’s just say that being the son of Li Ka Shing helps. 

Li Ka Shing is a name that hardly needs introduction in Hong Kong and Richard Li, Li Ka Shing’s youngest son and Chairman of PCCW Ltd (8 HK), follows suit. After being born into Hong Kong’s richest family, Richard Li was educated in the US where he worked various odd jobs at McDonald’s and as a caddy at a local golf course before enrolling at Menlo College and eventually withdrawing without a degree. As fate would have it, Mr. Li went on to set up STAR TV, Asia’s satellite-delivered cable TV service, at the tender age of 24. Three years after starting STAR TV, Richard Li sold the venture, which had amassed a viewer base of 45 million people, to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp (NWS AU) for USD 1 billion in 1993. During the same year, Mr. Li founded the Pacific Century Group and began a streak of noteworthy acquisitions. 

You may be starting to wonder what all of this has to do with a trade on PCCW Ltd (8 HK) and I don’t blame you. In the rest of this insight I will:

• finish the historical overview of the Li family and PCCW
• present my trade idea and rationale
• give a detailed overview of the business units of PCCW and the associated performance of each
• recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each  

5. Dali Foods (3799:HK) FY18 Results: Revenue Growth Collapses in H2, But Margins Hold Up So Far

We launched coverage of Dali Foods Group (3799 HK) in February with a Sell rating and a HK$4.18 target price. FY18 financial results, which were released late Tuesday March 26th, appear to confirm at least half of our negative thesis (slowing revenue growth), though the other half (margin compression) has failed to materialize so far.

Dali Foods appears to have met — just — the FY18 consensus EPS target of HK$0.307 per share. The company cut its Final dividend from HK$0.10 to HK$0.075 per share. 

However, the pace of revenue growth plummeted in H218. From solid growth of +11.4% YoY in H118, H218 revenues actually declined by -0.6% YoY in the latter half of the year. This result was beyond even our pessimistic view and we believe bulls on the company will be forced to revisit their overly optimistic assumptions about double-digit revenue growth in 2019e.

Besides assuming slower revenue growth going forward, the other leg of our negative thesis on Dali Foods was the expectation of margin compression due to rising raw materials costs, specifically for paper and key food and beverage ingredients. Although H218 gross margin declined versus H217 (to 37.7% from 37.8%), it did so only marginally, and probably due to a change in product mix (ie, a decline in high-margin beverage sales). 

After reviewing FY and H218 results, we see no reasons to change our negative view of Dali Foods, and our HK$4.18 price target (-26% potential downside) and Sell rating remain unchanged.