Brief China: Up Fintech (Tiger Brokers) IPO Quick Take – It’s Not like Futu, Won’t Perform like It Either and more

In this briefing:

1. Up Fintech (Tiger Brokers) IPO Quick Take – It’s Not like Futu, Won’t Perform like It Either
2. Meituan Dianping 4Q2018 Quick Read: Monetization Rate and Margins Disappointed
3. NIO (NIO): NIO Is Essentially a Distributor, Not an OEM…3 Things to Keep in Mind at Lock-Up Expiry
4. REIT Discover: Sasseur Sizzles with 9% Yield
5. HK Connect Discovery Weekly: PICC, Xinyi Solar (2019-03-08)

1. Up Fintech (Tiger Brokers) IPO Quick Take – It’s Not like Futu, Won’t Perform like It Either

Up Fintech (TIGR US) plans to raise up to US$91m in its US listing. The company counts Xiaomi Corp (1810 HK) and Interactive Brokers Group, Inc (IBKR US) as its main investors.

In my earlier insights, I commented about Tiger’s reliance on IBKR and compared its operations with Futu Holdings Ltd (FHL US):

• Up Fintech (Tiger Brokers) Pre-IPO Quick Note – Much Too Reliant on IBKR
• Futu Holdings IPO Quick Note – Comparison with Tiger Brokers – Same Market, Different Economics

In this insight, I’ll run the deal through our framework and comment on valuations.

2. Meituan Dianping 4Q2018 Quick Read: Monetization Rate and Margins Disappointed

Meituan Dianping reported 4Q2018 numbers last night. As we covered the company’s IPO and lock-up expiry, we took a close look the company 4Q2018 results and listened in the conference call. While we are encouraged by the company’s strong transaction volume and revenue growth in 4Q2018, we are less bullish given the deceleration of monetization growth. We also note that the company trimmed down the details of reporting, in particular, the operation of its New Initiative segment and hence results were less transparent. 

3. NIO (NIO): NIO Is Essentially a Distributor, Not an OEM…3 Things to Keep in Mind at Lock-Up Expiry

NIO’s 6-month Lock-up expires today and as of the time of this writing the stock is down by 6.6% from the closing price on Friday, March 8.  The stock’s share overhang issue have been well covered on the Smartkarma platform by other analysts (see NIO Post-CBS Rally Making TSLA Valuation a Grand Bargain (Price Target =$3) , NIO (NIO US): Lock-Up Expiry – This Could Get Messy) so while we do not see a need to rehash those details in this insight, here are 3 things that we believe every NIO investor and would-be investor should keep in mind about the company especially if one wants to play the Tesla vs. NIO scenario:

1. Licensing/Regulatory Risk – NIO has an autonomous driving testing license but no EV manufacturing license.  An EV manufacturing license issued by the NDRC is required for EV manufacturers to market and sell their products but a 100k unit scale is a main prerequisite.  This is a key reason why NIO entered into a 5-year outsourcing relationship with JAC.  While this relationship was assumed to be temporary, there could be many hurdles for NIO to actually obtain a license in the coming years should it decide to invest in production facilities again.
2. Core IP Held by Suppliers – Powertrain technology is held by CATL and the State-owned JAC is listed as the ES8’s manufacturer on the Ministry of Information and Technology website.  Continental AG designs NIO’s vehicle suspension and chassis.  It is also unclear how much actual development work other than exterior/cockpit design is done in-house at NIO based on publicly available information.  Without scale and IP we believe NIO’s bargaining position with its suppliers is weak and displays stronger characteristics of a distributor than a final assembler. 
3. Low ASP, low margins – NIO’s ASP on the ES8 from what we have seen was $64k per unit in 2018 and $63k per unit in 1Q19 while Tesla’s Model X ASP is about $100k per unit.  There is a reason why gross margin at NIO is razor thin and it has more to do with low price point than low volumes in our view.   

Given differences between the U.S. and China operating environment for EV makers, we believe Tesla is not a good equity valuation comp for NIO, which is basically a distributor in our view.  As such, long term value drivers would most likely come from aftermarket and service revenues, while short-mid term value drivers seem elusive especially in the aftermath of the company’s decision to scrap its production plant investment plans in Shanghai.

The NIO ES8

4. REIT Discover: Sasseur Sizzles with 9% Yield

REIT Discover is an insight series featuring under-researched and off-the-radar REITs in an attempt to identify hidden gems and gems in-the-making. In this issue, we follow up on the first China outlet mall REIT listed in Singapore, Sasseur Real Estate Investment (SASSR SP) , whose share price is down 7.5% from its IPO price of S$0.80 since its debut on 28 March 2018. Its distributable income exceeded its IPO forecast for FY2018. Annualized distribution per unit (DPU) yield for FY2018 was 9.1% based on current price. Moving forward, FY2019 DPU projection is S$0.06, translating into a DPU yield of 8.1% compared to FY2018. It is likely that the DPU for the projection years are conservative and the REIT manager will endeavour to beat the IPO forecast for FY2019 and even the annualized DPU for FY2018.

Sasseur REIT’s business model differs from other typical retail malls which lease out assets and receive rental income based on an agreed rental rate. Instead, it has structured a complex form of master lease, called the Entrusted Management Agreement (EMA), where it received a percentage of tenants’ sales turnover as the rental. As such, income generated its portfolio of properties are mainly sales-driven and hence may be unstable.

Essentially, the EMA encompasses a set of obligations that binds the sponsor to a two-year income support to Sasseur REIT in exchange for a long-term master lease which limits DPU upside. This is because a large chunk of the portfolio’s potential revenue growth will go to the sponsor. 

We are not saying this is all bad; the master lease under the EMA provides income stability to the REIT given that gross revenue is sales-driven. Rather, we acknowledge the resilience of the outlet mall business model as seen from the long and successful track record of Tanger Factory Outlet Centers Inc (SKT US) in the United States and strong growth of Bailian Group’s outlet business in China.  What is striking is China’s small outlet market size relatively to the mature regions despite the sheer size of its growing middle to upper-middle class population. This suggests that China’s outlet industry could grow significantly.

At 29% gearing ratio, Sasseur REIT has additional debt headroom of S$283mn to tap on its right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) pipeline of assets to grow its S$1.5bn initial portfolio. Even without inorganic growth, two of its properties, representing 43% of total portfolio valuation, are relatively new assets in their third year of operation, suggesting strong potential for growth. Sasseur REIT looks promising based its results in the last three quarters. Sasseur REIT’s premium P/NAV of 1.03x at the point of listing was surprisingly expensive given that its properties are non-prime outlet malls in China’s Tier-Two cities. P/NAV has since fallen to an attractive 0.8x.  

5. HK Connect Discovery Weekly: PICC, Xinyi Solar (2019-03-08)

In our Discover HK Connect series, we aim to help our investors understand the flow of southbound trades via the Hong Kong Connect, as analyzed by our proprietary data engine. We will discuss the stocks that experienced the most inflow and outflow by mainland investors in the past seven days.

We split the stocks eligible for the Hong Kong Connect trade into three groups: component stocks in the HSCEI index, stocks with a market capitalization between USD 1 billion and USD 5 billion, and stocks with a market capitalization between USD 500 million and USD 1 billion.

In this insight, we will highlight PICC and Xinyi Solar.