Brief China: More Volatility in the LNG Markets as JKM Drops Below TTF – Oil Majors Increase Exposure to US LNG and more

In this briefing:

1. More Volatility in the LNG Markets as JKM Drops Below TTF – Oil Majors Increase Exposure to US LNG
2. Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers
3. Bank of Zhengzhou: “Bend One Cubit, Make Eight Cubits Straight”
4. Huya Offering: Everyone Else Was Doing It Excuse
5. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew

1. More Volatility in the LNG Markets as JKM Drops Below TTF – Oil Majors Increase Exposure to US LNG

The JKM has halved its value since December, continuing its steady decline and dropping below the TTF, the benchmark for European LNG prices. Asian LNG spot prices are now at their lowest level since May 2015. While a prolonged LNG price downturn could force many projects to be cancelled, the winners among the developers are starting to emerge, aggressively pushing ahead their projects closer to the final investment decision.

Both Tellurian Inc (TELL US) and NextDecade Corp (NEXT US) signed high-profile deals, respectively with Total Sa (FP FP) and Royal Dutch Shell (RDSA LN), that could significantly de-risk their proposed LNG projects and increase the probability to reach FID in 2019. In Russia, LNG newcomer Novatek PJSC (NVTK LI) agreed two long-term offtake deals with Repsol SA (REP SM) and Vitol thereby moving a step closer to FID its Arctic LNG 2 project.

2. Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers

This post discusses the key questions on Nexon sale at this point. It then provides the most realistic answers to these questions from various circumstantial aspects. This post is based on the recent news reports and also various local sources.

3. Bank of Zhengzhou: “Bend One Cubit, Make Eight Cubits Straight”

Bank Of Zhengzhou (6196 HK) reveals a picture of cascading asset toxicity and subpar earnings quality. As elsewhere in China, it is difficult to decipher whether better NPL recognition is behind this profound asset quality deterioration or poor underwriting practice and discipline combined with troubled debtors: the answer may lie somewhere in between.

While the low PH Score (a value-quality gauge) of 4.7 is supported by a lowly valuation metric (earnings quality is not reassuring), it is more a testament to -and reflection of- core eroding fundamental trends across the board. Regarding trends, Capital Adequacy and Provisioning were the variables to post a positive change. But even then, not all Capitalisation and Provisioning metrics moved in the right direction.

Franchise Valuation at 12% does not indicate that the bank is especially cheap though P/Book of 0.64x is below the regional median of 0.78x.

4. Huya Offering: Everyone Else Was Doing It Excuse

Follow-on offerings by Chinese ADRs are the flavour of the day. Hot on the heels of Qutoutiao Inc (QTT US) and Bilibili Inc (BILI US), HUYA Inc (HUYA US) filed for a potential $550 million public offering without presenting any details on the new ADS being offered. Also, certain selling shareholders will offer shares in the offering.

5. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew

On February 27th of this year, Altaba Inc (AABA US) held a “Strategic and Financial Update Conference Call.” In that call the company led by CEO Thomas McInerney said that effectively it was going to deal with its two major remaining assets (2.03bn shares of Yahoo Japan Corp (4689 JP) and 383.56mm shares of Alibaba Group Holding Ltd (BABA US)) in two stages, saying at the time they were “moving to an active monetization mode on [our] Yahoo Japan stake.”

That Yahoo Japan stake took longer, but the company worked to sell $20+bn of Alibaba last summer through a tender offer and selldown to generate cash for corporate liabilities and taxes, and then the company sold its Yahoo Japan stake in early September. 

Since then, there has been a period of watchful waiting. Some have been expecting a period with an acceptable amount of carry and then possible significant upside. I haven’t seen the upside but agree there has been some baseline carry. And if you can get lots of leverage on this and ride the volatility, it could produce an OK return from A to Z if you ignore the indignities and volatility of passing through stops B to Y.

The New News

Yesterday, Altaba and CEO McInerney held a conference call after filing a PRE 14A preliminary proxy statement related to the selldown/unwinding of its entire Alibaba stake and the proposed windup/dissolution of Altaba as an entity. 

The company will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which the Fund currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63 per Share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba Share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00 per Alibaba Share).”

As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear (and as discussed in the transcript linked above, which is short and worth reading), based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions. A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.

The figure of $76.72 – $79.72 represents a 5.44-9.56% premium to yesterday’s close of $72.76/share and represents the total of the Pre-Dissolution Liquidating Distribution in Q4 2019, a second distribution in Q4 2020, then residuals thereafter after the court-mandated holdback in the dissolution process pays its claims.

Fair value calculations, parameters, and risk discussion below.

Elaborate fair value calculations using different assumptions of appropriate discount rates for each payment, and exactly how much is in the last bit (and how long it takes to pay out) suggest a group of ranges of fair value, from about 3-4% below the last-traded price, to about 4-5% above. However, for a hedge fund to earn a 10% net return for investors from owning the trade at the close of yesterday, getting there requires a fair bit of leverage and the resulting information ratio may be lower than desirable.

Assuming the approximate time to payment as described in the proxy statement, and amount of payment in the first distribution as described, and a multi-year residual of US$5/share, current borrow rates and an assumption of slightly higher discount rate required for the portion of time the stock is unlisted and even higher when one is receiving residual claims, the current fair value of the stock ranges from about 2% below current price and 4% higher. If you assume a higher Holdback Amount, the range of outcomes shifts lower.