Ping An Bank Co Ltd A (000001 CH) results show gradual erosion in fundamental trends. We believe that positive fundamental momentum (within our quantamental approach) leads to higher stock prices.
Behind the headline numbers, there lies an acute rise in funding costs in excess of the growth in interest income on earnings assets. As elsewhere in China, there is a festering asset quality issue too. While not as toxic versus diverse peers, it is notable: the impaired asset portfolio more than doubled YoY.
Valuations are not especially cheap relative to the region (including Japan). Franchise Valuation at 10% and P/Book of 0.94x are at a premium to the regional medians of 8% and 0.77x, respectively. The Total Return Ratio is <1x.
In conclusion, we do not see a lot that has changed for the better at Ping An Bank (funding, liquidity, efficiency, profitability and asset quality) though the headline deterioration is not so drastic. Underlying concerns lie with core interest income generation given sky-high funding expenses and pervasive asset quality issues.
Golden Agri Resources (GGR SP) has started a basing process below pivot support at 0.30 as the daily MACD cycle has not been confirming recent lows for a case of underlying supportive bull divergence (sell pressure dwindling as downside momentum tapers off).
Bull divergence outlined in the MACD is supportive on a macro basis, however there is downside risk stemming from the micro rising wedge. A fresh diverging low is expected to market a price low to work into.
Immediate inflection levels at 0.30 and 0.26 will dictate near term direction out of the micro rising wedge.Ideal downside projections are noted along with a bullish resistance threshold.
China Unicom’s (762 HK) recent 4Q18 results were not great. The overall figures look ok due to strength in the fixed line business which offset weakness in mobile. However, they were the weakest of the three operators and the stock, which has had a strong run, now looks due for a pause. We have turned more cautious on the Chinese telcos on concerns that 5G spending could be higher than expected. Chris Hoare believes a major reason for the Chinese telcos outperforming in the past year has come from declining capex spending expectations. That trend may now start to reverse. While China Unicom has guided for only modest 5G capex in 2019 the focus will turn to 2020 where it is a much bigger issue and while we expect China Unicom to do a joint roll-out with China Telecom (728 HK) we expect the scale of the spending to be larger than an individual build.
The shares are cheap. The company is cash rich and owns 10% in treasury stock; it owned more last year but has cancelled 4%. It has some Y6bn in long term investment. EV in our view is Y57bn vs the current market cap of Y110bn. With ebitda next year coming in at Y15bn, EV/ebitda is under 4x. The shares yield 3.4% and trade at book. They have slightly underperformed the market over the last 12 months. For now, we view this as a defensive buy. There remain many issues longer term as to its place in the global elevator world. A potential positive, however, is that in May the company will announce a new mid-term plan and in it, they will outline their view as regards to shareholder returns for the next three years. They are aware that they are very over capitalised, so greater returns are a real possibility.
The anticipated cut in the bank reserve ratio didn’t materialize in the latest Monetary Board (MB) meeting–the first one chaired by newly appointed BSP Gov. Benjamin Diokno. In the ANC televised interview, Diokno expressed his preference to reduce the high bank reserve requirement ratio (RRR: 18%) by 1% every quarter, fueling bond market excitement that severely compressed yields. The policy rate was also unchanged amid the dovish tone in the BSP’s press release after the meeting.
According to a senior monetary official, the RRR cut is a ‘live’ issue. That the timing of any adjustment is key given the operational and policy implications of an RRR cut.
Accentuating the MB’s depiction of benign inflation is an inflation trajectory settled comfortably in its target band in 2019-20 with inflation expectations close to being anchored within the band as well. Key downside risk to growth cited by the MB is the ‘current budget impasse in Congress is not resolved soon’. Prolonged El Niño is among those factors that can upset the broadly balanced risks to inflation.
A BSP under a pro-growth BSP chief need not necessarily change the ‘sequencing and timing’ of monetary policy decisions/actions facing liquidity and growth challenges. Likelihood that 1Q GDP (May 9 release) may be given slight emphasis in the BSP’s shift to accommodation starting with the bank reserve cut.
We expect a bond market correction following excitement over the BSP’s dovish pivot this early that led to severe yield compression. Buy the 5yrs to short-duration on dips.
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Golden Agri Resources (GGR SP) has started a basing process below pivot support at 0.30 as the daily MACD cycle has not been confirming recent lows for a case of underlying supportive bull divergence (sell pressure dwindling as downside momentum tapers off).
Bull divergence outlined in the MACD is supportive on a macro basis, however there is downside risk stemming from the micro rising wedge. A fresh diverging low is expected to market a price low to work into.
Immediate inflection levels at 0.30 and 0.26 will dictate near term direction out of the micro rising wedge.Ideal downside projections are noted along with a bullish resistance threshold.
China Unicom’s (762 HK) recent 4Q18 results were not great. The overall figures look ok due to strength in the fixed line business which offset weakness in mobile. However, they were the weakest of the three operators and the stock, which has had a strong run, now looks due for a pause. We have turned more cautious on the Chinese telcos on concerns that 5G spending could be higher than expected. Chris Hoare believes a major reason for the Chinese telcos outperforming in the past year has come from declining capex spending expectations. That trend may now start to reverse. While China Unicom has guided for only modest 5G capex in 2019 the focus will turn to 2020 where it is a much bigger issue and while we expect China Unicom to do a joint roll-out with China Telecom (728 HK) we expect the scale of the spending to be larger than an individual build.
The shares are cheap. The company is cash rich and owns 10% in treasury stock; it owned more last year but has cancelled 4%. It has some Y6bn in long term investment. EV in our view is Y57bn vs the current market cap of Y110bn. With ebitda next year coming in at Y15bn, EV/ebitda is under 4x. The shares yield 3.4% and trade at book. They have slightly underperformed the market over the last 12 months. For now, we view this as a defensive buy. There remain many issues longer term as to its place in the global elevator world. A potential positive, however, is that in May the company will announce a new mid-term plan and in it, they will outline their view as regards to shareholder returns for the next three years. They are aware that they are very over capitalised, so greater returns are a real possibility.
The anticipated cut in the bank reserve ratio didn’t materialize in the latest Monetary Board (MB) meeting–the first one chaired by newly appointed BSP Gov. Benjamin Diokno. In the ANC televised interview, Diokno expressed his preference to reduce the high bank reserve requirement ratio (RRR: 18%) by 1% every quarter, fueling bond market excitement that severely compressed yields. The policy rate was also unchanged amid the dovish tone in the BSP’s press release after the meeting.
According to a senior monetary official, the RRR cut is a ‘live’ issue. That the timing of any adjustment is key given the operational and policy implications of an RRR cut.
Accentuating the MB’s depiction of benign inflation is an inflation trajectory settled comfortably in its target band in 2019-20 with inflation expectations close to being anchored within the band as well. Key downside risk to growth cited by the MB is the ‘current budget impasse in Congress is not resolved soon’. Prolonged El Niño is among those factors that can upset the broadly balanced risks to inflation.
A BSP under a pro-growth BSP chief need not necessarily change the ‘sequencing and timing’ of monetary policy decisions/actions facing liquidity and growth challenges. Likelihood that 1Q GDP (May 9 release) may be given slight emphasis in the BSP’s shift to accommodation starting with the bank reserve cut.
We expect a bond market correction following excitement over the BSP’s dovish pivot this early that led to severe yield compression. Buy the 5yrs to short-duration on dips.
Bank Of Tianjin (1578 HK) results at first look quite encouraging with firmer profitability, enhanced efficiency, improved capital adequacy, and increased provisioning.
Valuations are optically attractive: p/book of 0.5x, franchise valuation of 7%, earnings yield of 17%, and a total return ratio of 2.5x. These metrics are within the bargain hunter space.
However, optimism fades fast on closer inspection.
“Underlying” Income decreased by 21% YoY as the bank was squeezed by higher funding costs and non-interest expenses. Expenses on wholesale funding increased by 30% YoY. Debt funding now represents 71% of Gross Loans. Debt now stands at 4.3x SH. Funds. This type of funding has exploded by 10x since 2014. At the same time, deposits declined YoY. Deposits have increased by a more sedate 18% since 2014.
PT Profit would have been CNY1.4bn rather than CNY5.2bn but for hefty gains on securities. Loan loss provisions almost tripled YoY.
Regarding the Balance Sheet, Special Mention Loans rose sharply (+25% YoY) and represent 2.8x NPLs. A 127% and 108% YoY increase in “doubtful loans” and “loss loans” puts some perspective on a seemingly respectable NPL ratio of 1.64% and a LLR/NPLs of 250%.
Thus, Bank Of Tianjin (1578 HK) is cheap for a reason. We are reluctant to recommend taking a position at this juncture given the ongoing stresses in source of funding and asset quality.
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China Unicom’s (762 HK) recent 4Q18 results were not great. The overall figures look ok due to strength in the fixed line business which offset weakness in mobile. However, they were the weakest of the three operators and the stock, which has had a strong run, now looks due for a pause. We have turned more cautious on the Chinese telcos on concerns that 5G spending could be higher than expected. Chris Hoare believes a major reason for the Chinese telcos outperforming in the past year has come from declining capex spending expectations. That trend may now start to reverse. While China Unicom has guided for only modest 5G capex in 2019 the focus will turn to 2020 where it is a much bigger issue and while we expect China Unicom to do a joint roll-out with China Telecom (728 HK) we expect the scale of the spending to be larger than an individual build.
The shares are cheap. The company is cash rich and owns 10% in treasury stock; it owned more last year but has cancelled 4%. It has some Y6bn in long term investment. EV in our view is Y57bn vs the current market cap of Y110bn. With ebitda next year coming in at Y15bn, EV/ebitda is under 4x. The shares yield 3.4% and trade at book. They have slightly underperformed the market over the last 12 months. For now, we view this as a defensive buy. There remain many issues longer term as to its place in the global elevator world. A potential positive, however, is that in May the company will announce a new mid-term plan and in it, they will outline their view as regards to shareholder returns for the next three years. They are aware that they are very over capitalised, so greater returns are a real possibility.
The anticipated cut in the bank reserve ratio didn’t materialize in the latest Monetary Board (MB) meeting–the first one chaired by newly appointed BSP Gov. Benjamin Diokno. In the ANC televised interview, Diokno expressed his preference to reduce the high bank reserve requirement ratio (RRR: 18%) by 1% every quarter, fueling bond market excitement that severely compressed yields. The policy rate was also unchanged amid the dovish tone in the BSP’s press release after the meeting.
According to a senior monetary official, the RRR cut is a ‘live’ issue. That the timing of any adjustment is key given the operational and policy implications of an RRR cut.
Accentuating the MB’s depiction of benign inflation is an inflation trajectory settled comfortably in its target band in 2019-20 with inflation expectations close to being anchored within the band as well. Key downside risk to growth cited by the MB is the ‘current budget impasse in Congress is not resolved soon’. Prolonged El Niño is among those factors that can upset the broadly balanced risks to inflation.
A BSP under a pro-growth BSP chief need not necessarily change the ‘sequencing and timing’ of monetary policy decisions/actions facing liquidity and growth challenges. Likelihood that 1Q GDP (May 9 release) may be given slight emphasis in the BSP’s shift to accommodation starting with the bank reserve cut.
We expect a bond market correction following excitement over the BSP’s dovish pivot this early that led to severe yield compression. Buy the 5yrs to short-duration on dips.
Bank Of Tianjin (1578 HK) results at first look quite encouraging with firmer profitability, enhanced efficiency, improved capital adequacy, and increased provisioning.
Valuations are optically attractive: p/book of 0.5x, franchise valuation of 7%, earnings yield of 17%, and a total return ratio of 2.5x. These metrics are within the bargain hunter space.
However, optimism fades fast on closer inspection.
“Underlying” Income decreased by 21% YoY as the bank was squeezed by higher funding costs and non-interest expenses. Expenses on wholesale funding increased by 30% YoY. Debt funding now represents 71% of Gross Loans. Debt now stands at 4.3x SH. Funds. This type of funding has exploded by 10x since 2014. At the same time, deposits declined YoY. Deposits have increased by a more sedate 18% since 2014.
PT Profit would have been CNY1.4bn rather than CNY5.2bn but for hefty gains on securities. Loan loss provisions almost tripled YoY.
Regarding the Balance Sheet, Special Mention Loans rose sharply (+25% YoY) and represent 2.8x NPLs. A 127% and 108% YoY increase in “doubtful loans” and “loss loans” puts some perspective on a seemingly respectable NPL ratio of 1.64% and a LLR/NPLs of 250%.
Thus, Bank Of Tianjin (1578 HK) is cheap for a reason. We are reluctant to recommend taking a position at this juncture given the ongoing stresses in source of funding and asset quality.
In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks.
The fifth company that we explore is Summarecon Agung (SMRA IJ), a township developer with over 40 years of track record and a combined development area of over 2,700ha. The company benefits from its exposure to the popular Serpong district, but an over expansion, coupled with tightening property regulations caused its balance sheet to suffer in the following years. Earnings have declined by -19% Cagr over the past five years as a consequence of lower margins and burgeoning debt levels.
The company has plans to divest its retail mall division, which can serve as a positive catalyst in the near term. Improving sentiment and better interest rate environment, as well as positive regulatory tailwinds should be a driver to SMRA’s share price this year. We see a 44% upside to our target price of IDR1,408 per share.
Summary of this insight:
The success of SMRA’s first township, Kelapa Gading, paved way for the next six township development. The same township model is replicated to its Serpong, Bekasi, Bandung, Karawang, Makassar, and soon Bogor.
During the height of the property boom, every cluster launch in the Serpong area is 2-3x oversubscribed. Buyers were a mix of speculators and end-users, and both were happy customers benefiting from over 400% land price appreciation over the course of 2009-2013. Land ASP in 2009 was just below IDR3mn versus IDR12-15mn in 2013.
Driven by the positive momentum of the property boom, SMRA ambitiously launched three new townships at the trough of the property market (2015-2018), growing its total township development area by more than a third. Poor cashflow management, stemming from the over-expansion during the property downturn took a massive toll on the balance sheet. SMRA turned from net cash in 2013 to holding IDR8.6tn of debt in 9M18 (1.2x gearing) with interest costs making up a chunky 49% of EBIT.
We have also seen a massive shift to the end-user market since 2014, as the company started to sell more smaller houses and affordable apartments rather than land lots and shophouses. At the peak, shophouses and land lots made up more than 50% of the company’s development revenues. As of 9M18, that number has declined to a mere 7% of revenues, while 93% comes from houses and apartments. Housing units launched in 2016-2017 are 36% cheaper than units launched in 2011-2014, as the company downsized in the area.
SMRA has the second biggest retail mall portfolio in our coverage after Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ) with 258,000sqm net leasable area (NLA). The three malls generate about IDR1.3tn revenue per year, returning 42% EBITDA margin. About 40% of tenants in Bekasi and Serpong are up for a rental renewal in the next three years, and this could serve as a potential upside on the average rental rates.
Pros: Bank Indonesia (BI)’s move to loosen mortgage regulations last year, and plans to reduce luxury taxes and allow for friendlier foreign ownership scheme should give a breath of fresh air over the medium term. SMRA targets 18% presales growth in 2019, but they have been missing their presales target by an average of 22% over the past three years. We expect a more modest 5% presales recovery this year.
Pros: Margin on houses show a massive improvement from 51% in 2014 to 59% in 9M18. The improvement brings up the consolidated property development margin by 600bps YoY. As a segment, this is the first margin uptick since 2014, leading to 44% YoY EBIT growth and 115% YoY NPAT growth in 9M18.
Cons: The stellar property development growth, however, is diluted by the poor performances from the investment property division that recorded 14% YoY EBIT decline. Despite some improvements on the gross margin level and healthy topline growth, opex has doubled YoY, leading to 700bps reduction in the EBITDA margin.
Recommendation & catalyst: SMRA has underperformed the JCI by a steep 71% over the past 36 months as earnings and presales continue to disappoint. Discount to NAV, PE, and PB valuation are standing at -1 standard deviation below mean. Improving risk appetite for high beta stocks, better interest rate environment, accomodative policies from the government, and potential pick up of activity after the election are a few of the key catalysts for the stock and sector re-rating. The divestment of its retail arm should also help to clear some debt off the balance sheet and unlock value. We have a BUY recommendation.
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The shares are cheap. The company is cash rich and owns 10% in treasury stock; it owned more last year but has cancelled 4%. It has some Y6bn in long term investment. EV in our view is Y57bn vs the current market cap of Y110bn. With ebitda next year coming in at Y15bn, EV/ebitda is under 4x. The shares yield 3.4% and trade at book. They have slightly underperformed the market over the last 12 months. For now, we view this as a defensive buy. There remain many issues longer term as to its place in the global elevator world. A potential positive, however, is that in May the company will announce a new mid-term plan and in it, they will outline their view as regards to shareholder returns for the next three years. They are aware that they are very over capitalised, so greater returns are a real possibility.
The anticipated cut in the bank reserve ratio didn’t materialize in the latest Monetary Board (MB) meeting–the first one chaired by newly appointed BSP Gov. Benjamin Diokno. In the ANC televised interview, Diokno expressed his preference to reduce the high bank reserve requirement ratio (RRR: 18%) by 1% every quarter, fueling bond market excitement that severely compressed yields. The policy rate was also unchanged amid the dovish tone in the BSP’s press release after the meeting.
According to a senior monetary official, the RRR cut is a ‘live’ issue. That the timing of any adjustment is key given the operational and policy implications of an RRR cut.
Accentuating the MB’s depiction of benign inflation is an inflation trajectory settled comfortably in its target band in 2019-20 with inflation expectations close to being anchored within the band as well. Key downside risk to growth cited by the MB is the ‘current budget impasse in Congress is not resolved soon’. Prolonged El Niño is among those factors that can upset the broadly balanced risks to inflation.
A BSP under a pro-growth BSP chief need not necessarily change the ‘sequencing and timing’ of monetary policy decisions/actions facing liquidity and growth challenges. Likelihood that 1Q GDP (May 9 release) may be given slight emphasis in the BSP’s shift to accommodation starting with the bank reserve cut.
We expect a bond market correction following excitement over the BSP’s dovish pivot this early that led to severe yield compression. Buy the 5yrs to short-duration on dips.
Bank Of Tianjin (1578 HK) results at first look quite encouraging with firmer profitability, enhanced efficiency, improved capital adequacy, and increased provisioning.
Valuations are optically attractive: p/book of 0.5x, franchise valuation of 7%, earnings yield of 17%, and a total return ratio of 2.5x. These metrics are within the bargain hunter space.
However, optimism fades fast on closer inspection.
“Underlying” Income decreased by 21% YoY as the bank was squeezed by higher funding costs and non-interest expenses. Expenses on wholesale funding increased by 30% YoY. Debt funding now represents 71% of Gross Loans. Debt now stands at 4.3x SH. Funds. This type of funding has exploded by 10x since 2014. At the same time, deposits declined YoY. Deposits have increased by a more sedate 18% since 2014.
PT Profit would have been CNY1.4bn rather than CNY5.2bn but for hefty gains on securities. Loan loss provisions almost tripled YoY.
Regarding the Balance Sheet, Special Mention Loans rose sharply (+25% YoY) and represent 2.8x NPLs. A 127% and 108% YoY increase in “doubtful loans” and “loss loans” puts some perspective on a seemingly respectable NPL ratio of 1.64% and a LLR/NPLs of 250%.
Thus, Bank Of Tianjin (1578 HK) is cheap for a reason. We are reluctant to recommend taking a position at this juncture given the ongoing stresses in source of funding and asset quality.
In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks.
The fifth company that we explore is Summarecon Agung (SMRA IJ), a township developer with over 40 years of track record and a combined development area of over 2,700ha. The company benefits from its exposure to the popular Serpong district, but an over expansion, coupled with tightening property regulations caused its balance sheet to suffer in the following years. Earnings have declined by -19% Cagr over the past five years as a consequence of lower margins and burgeoning debt levels.
The company has plans to divest its retail mall division, which can serve as a positive catalyst in the near term. Improving sentiment and better interest rate environment, as well as positive regulatory tailwinds should be a driver to SMRA’s share price this year. We see a 44% upside to our target price of IDR1,408 per share.
Summary of this insight:
The success of SMRA’s first township, Kelapa Gading, paved way for the next six township development. The same township model is replicated to its Serpong, Bekasi, Bandung, Karawang, Makassar, and soon Bogor.
During the height of the property boom, every cluster launch in the Serpong area is 2-3x oversubscribed. Buyers were a mix of speculators and end-users, and both were happy customers benefiting from over 400% land price appreciation over the course of 2009-2013. Land ASP in 2009 was just below IDR3mn versus IDR12-15mn in 2013.
Driven by the positive momentum of the property boom, SMRA ambitiously launched three new townships at the trough of the property market (2015-2018), growing its total township development area by more than a third. Poor cashflow management, stemming from the over-expansion during the property downturn took a massive toll on the balance sheet. SMRA turned from net cash in 2013 to holding IDR8.6tn of debt in 9M18 (1.2x gearing) with interest costs making up a chunky 49% of EBIT.
We have also seen a massive shift to the end-user market since 2014, as the company started to sell more smaller houses and affordable apartments rather than land lots and shophouses. At the peak, shophouses and land lots made up more than 50% of the company’s development revenues. As of 9M18, that number has declined to a mere 7% of revenues, while 93% comes from houses and apartments. Housing units launched in 2016-2017 are 36% cheaper than units launched in 2011-2014, as the company downsized in the area.
SMRA has the second biggest retail mall portfolio in our coverage after Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ) with 258,000sqm net leasable area (NLA). The three malls generate about IDR1.3tn revenue per year, returning 42% EBITDA margin. About 40% of tenants in Bekasi and Serpong are up for a rental renewal in the next three years, and this could serve as a potential upside on the average rental rates.
Pros: Bank Indonesia (BI)’s move to loosen mortgage regulations last year, and plans to reduce luxury taxes and allow for friendlier foreign ownership scheme should give a breath of fresh air over the medium term. SMRA targets 18% presales growth in 2019, but they have been missing their presales target by an average of 22% over the past three years. We expect a more modest 5% presales recovery this year.
Pros: Margin on houses show a massive improvement from 51% in 2014 to 59% in 9M18. The improvement brings up the consolidated property development margin by 600bps YoY. As a segment, this is the first margin uptick since 2014, leading to 44% YoY EBIT growth and 115% YoY NPAT growth in 9M18.
Cons: The stellar property development growth, however, is diluted by the poor performances from the investment property division that recorded 14% YoY EBIT decline. Despite some improvements on the gross margin level and healthy topline growth, opex has doubled YoY, leading to 700bps reduction in the EBITDA margin.
Recommendation & catalyst: SMRA has underperformed the JCI by a steep 71% over the past 36 months as earnings and presales continue to disappoint. Discount to NAV, PE, and PB valuation are standing at -1 standard deviation below mean. Improving risk appetite for high beta stocks, better interest rate environment, accomodative policies from the government, and potential pick up of activity after the election are a few of the key catalysts for the stock and sector re-rating. The divestment of its retail arm should also help to clear some debt off the balance sheet and unlock value. We have a BUY recommendation.
Brazil’s Ex-President Michel Temer has been arrested as part of the on-going CarWash (Lava Jato) criminal investigation, on bribery and corruption charges
We believe that this increases the near-term downside risk to the BOVESPA index and blue chips, including the large cap banks
This will also, we believe, heighten the negative “noise” around pension reform, potentially increasing the complexity of the reform process; even if this development alone should not serve to derail it, in our view
Large cap Brazilian banks’ share prices have come under pressure recently, and we would expect the market correction to continue in the short term
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In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks.
The first company that we explore is Ciputra Development (CTRA IJ), a township developer with 38 years of track record. With 75 ongoing township projects in 33 cities, CTRA has the widest coverage of any developer in Indonesia. However, tightening policies by the Bank Indonesia (BI), in particular the presales mortgage disbursement regulation caused a significant drop in operating cashflow and increased gearing level.
Earnings have been on a downtrend, as slower revenue recognition coupled with higher interest costs have weighed on the bottom line. As BI has recently started to relax property regulations, we may begin to see some positive impact on cash flows over the next few quarters, although earnings are likely to remain weak from declining presales over the past three years.
As we enter the election year, presales announcements may not be positive in the short term, but activities may improve after the electoral contest, helped by a pick up in sentiment and boosted by a better interest rate environment and positive regulatory tailwinds. Potential portfolio inflow to high beta stocks and rising risk appetite for smaller cap underperforming stocks should also drive CTRA’s share price outperformance in 2019. We see a 50% upside to our target price of IDR1,352 per share.
Summary of this insight:
The property development product portfolio includes landed housing, high-rise condominiums, and offices. Landed housing projects are still CTRA’s bread and butter, comprising more than half of the company’s revenue and more than two-thirds of presales. As the property demand is currently dominated by the end-users, CTRA’s product offering is shifting towards smaller more affordable units. We have put together an example mortgage calculation and determine a key affordability level based on the average income per capita in the Greater Jakarta to illustrate how much should a housing unit be worth for the end users market.
The investment properties portfolio consists of 4 malls, 9 hotels, and 4 hospitals across the major cities in Indonesia, making up 13%, 8%, and 6% of 9M18 total consolidated revenues respectively. This is a 68% increase in revenue contribution versus five years ago. The company has been actively building its investment property portfolio to weather out the volatility in the non-recurring or development revenue.
Accessibility is a key factor to land appreciation and hence, company’s total NAV. With the traffic worsening around the Greater Jakarta area, time to commute is an increasingly important factor in determining where to stay and access to public transportation such as MRT and LRT will be a powerful driver going forward. CTRA has a very diverse property development portfolio, hence the benefit of the infrastructure rollout is more widespread across the different projects.
65% of CTRA’s presales are generated from units priced IDR2bn and below, which indicate that the majority of CTRA’s buyers are in the middle to middle-low segments. These buyers are price sensitive and are highly dependent on financing. CTRA’s mortgage and in-house installment proportion is one of the highest in our property universe, making the company more susceptible to the changes in the property mortgage regulation by the Central Bank (BI).
The property mortgage regulation in Indonesia has had few rounds of changes in the past decade, with a series of tightening measures taking place between 2013-2014, and the start of loosening measures in 2016-2018. We will discuss in depth the various property regulations issued and its impact on CTRA’s cashflow. We also constructed a cashflow simulation time series for a sample housing sale to determine the time needed for the project to turn net cashflow positive and when can the developer reinvest for future landbank of equivalent value.
Pros: as we expect a better rate of cash inflow from future mortgages, our model shows that the advances-to-inventory ratio, which is an indicative figure for the property developers’ working capital, will begin to rise in 2019, leading to an inflection point for CTRA’s FCF. One-off adjustment in the earlier booking of 2019’s first mortgage disbursement is the key driver.
Cons: CTRA booked three consecutive years of negative presales growth with a decline rate of -11% Cagr. This indicates that the accounting revenue growth will more likely be weaker over the next 12-18 months. We also estimate that margin should continue to trend down until 2020. As we continue to see a larger proportion of units priced below IDR1bn in the past 2 years, it is unlikely to see a pick up in margin in 2019-2020.
Cons: Election year to election year, we may see some similarity between the 2014 and 2019’s quarterly presales split. 1Q14 and 2Q14 contributed 41% to total FY14 presales, while 4Q14 contributed a chunky 33%. If we assume the same quarterly split for 2019 presales target, we may potentially see 13%-27% YoY declines in the next three quarters of presales reporting. Note however that the BI issued its first round of tightening regulations at the end of 2013 and this may have an impact to the 1H14 presales. Also there is a difference in the election schedules as the 2014 election was dragged on until late August, while the 2019 contest will be done by end of April.
Recommendation & catalyst: CTRA share price has underperformed the JCI by 24% in the past 12 months. Though the share price has a nice 28% rebound from its 5-year low point, CTRA’s discount to net asset value (NAV) and price-to-book (PB) ratio is still at more than -1 standard deviation below its historical mean. Its price-to-earnings (PE) ratio however is only slightly below the historical mean. Improving risk appetite for high beta stocks, better interest rate environment, accomodative policies from the government, and potential pick up of activity after the election are a few of the key catalysts for the stock and sector. This underlines our BUY recommendation on CTRA with 50% upside. Our bull case scenario of rerating to +1 standard deviation above mean valuation offers 26% additional upside to our TP.
On Friday 22 February after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP) announced a buyback (E, J), a share cancellation (E, J), and a public equity offering of secondary shares (J-only). This kind of event is not abnormal in a year when profits are weaker and share prices are down. Cross-holders often sell shares into the end of the year in order to realise profits and let unrealised gains from the balance sheet filter into the income statement.
This time it is five sellers from four banks which all hail from the area: Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP), Nomura Trust (which holds shares in a trust account for the MUFJ Bank pension fund as a beneficiary), Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s MUFJ Bank, Resona Holdings (8308 JP), and Shiga Bank (8366 JP). The MUFJ Bank holdings likely originate from Sanwa Bank which was Osaka-based before merging with BOT-Mitsubishi almost 15 years ago, and Resona is also from Osaka – next door to Kyoto where Nintendo was founded – and Shiga Bank is the prefecture next door.
This would look like a normal sell-down… except for one thing.
There was a note in the announcement to the effect that “in the context of how companies deal with their policy cross-holdings becoming the subject of greater focus, we confirmed that several shareholders desired to sell shares, and as a company subject to such cross-holdings, we are conducting the above-mentioned Offering.”
In the TSE crossholding of SGX situation, the sale was not the most important part. The explanation of how the Board came to its decision and what they decided to do about it was important.
On the other hand, Japan’s Corporate Governance Code (the Code), which was introduced in 2015, requires listed companies to examine and explain the economic rationale and future outlook of holding shares of other listed companies for reasons other than pure investment purposes. Following a review of the requirements under the Code, JPX reached the conclusion that the existing cooperative relationship with SGX would continue even without holding the shares of SGX. [my bold]
The Japan Exchange Group had now provided the example for why even companies with cooperative business relationships should not own cross-holdings. And it is, if active stewards of capital choose to make it so, more subtle. Shareholders have even an even better pressure point. IF a company’s cooperative relationship with another company would not survive the unwinding of cross-holdings to improve capital efficiency for both sides, is that company truly independent? Is that company beholden to the company whose shares it holds? Is the cross-holding board doing its job?
And the Japan Exchange Group had said it would unwind its holdings of SGX over three years, so as not to overly impact the market for SGX shares. This provided an example of HOW to unwind, in addition to the WHY to unwind announced above.
The BIG QUESTION (And Nothing Else Matters)
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains.
Bank Tabungan Negara Persero (BBTN IJ) appears to have a nasty combination of high Special Mention Loans (SMLs) and elevated “past due but unimpaired Loans”.
The implication is that provisioning levels are insufficient in an environment of eroding asset quality.
But the bank continues to grow credit by around 20% YoY.
The bank is hugely exposed to the retail real estate market (91% of Loans).
In fact, the Indonesian Banking Sector is rife with high SMLs and in some cases elevated “past due but unimpaired Loans”.
SMLs are traditionally associated with Chinese under-reporting of underlying bad loans, and hence the production of a somewhat flattering Asset Quality picture.
Maybe, the health and valuation of the Indonesian Banking Sector needs to be reassessed with implications for IDR.
Westpac Banking (WBC AU) is facing a class action suit regarding alleged irresponsible lending in home loans since 2011. This is the first class action against a major Australian bank since the publication of the royal commission’s final report.
The ramifications of the royal commission report remain a source of debate with elections coming up. But, in general, banks will not be allowed to conduct operations in a “business-as-usual way”. There will be consequences for credit provision.
Westpac’s Balance Sheet looks decidedly fragile as it stands. The bank is entering a slowdown from a position of weakness.
Exposures to Australia’s slowing economy (not unrelated of course to China), the dovish turn at the Central Bank, and in particular its bubbly housing market make us hyper cautious. The highly volatile Aussie dollar tumbled from levels above $0.7200 to below $0.7100 following reports that China banned coal imports from the country at a major port.
Despite the sinking share prices of Australia’s main banks, valuations may still be too high given the varied headwinds.
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The anticipated cut in the bank reserve ratio didn’t materialize in the latest Monetary Board (MB) meeting–the first one chaired by newly appointed BSP Gov. Benjamin Diokno. In the ANC televised interview, Diokno expressed his preference to reduce the high bank reserve requirement ratio (RRR: 18%) by 1% every quarter, fueling bond market excitement that severely compressed yields. The policy rate was also unchanged amid the dovish tone in the BSP’s press release after the meeting.
According to a senior monetary official, the RRR cut is a ‘live’ issue. That the timing of any adjustment is key given the operational and policy implications of an RRR cut.
Accentuating the MB’s depiction of benign inflation is an inflation trajectory settled comfortably in its target band in 2019-20 with inflation expectations close to being anchored within the band as well. Key downside risk to growth cited by the MB is the ‘current budget impasse in Congress is not resolved soon’. Prolonged El Niño is among those factors that can upset the broadly balanced risks to inflation.
A BSP under a pro-growth BSP chief need not necessarily change the ‘sequencing and timing’ of monetary policy decisions/actions facing liquidity and growth challenges. Likelihood that 1Q GDP (May 9 release) may be given slight emphasis in the BSP’s shift to accommodation starting with the bank reserve cut.
We expect a bond market correction following excitement over the BSP’s dovish pivot this early that led to severe yield compression. Buy the 5yrs to short-duration on dips.
Bank Of Tianjin (1578 HK) results at first look quite encouraging with firmer profitability, enhanced efficiency, improved capital adequacy, and increased provisioning.
Valuations are optically attractive: p/book of 0.5x, franchise valuation of 7%, earnings yield of 17%, and a total return ratio of 2.5x. These metrics are within the bargain hunter space.
However, optimism fades fast on closer inspection.
“Underlying” Income decreased by 21% YoY as the bank was squeezed by higher funding costs and non-interest expenses. Expenses on wholesale funding increased by 30% YoY. Debt funding now represents 71% of Gross Loans. Debt now stands at 4.3x SH. Funds. This type of funding has exploded by 10x since 2014. At the same time, deposits declined YoY. Deposits have increased by a more sedate 18% since 2014.
PT Profit would have been CNY1.4bn rather than CNY5.2bn but for hefty gains on securities. Loan loss provisions almost tripled YoY.
Regarding the Balance Sheet, Special Mention Loans rose sharply (+25% YoY) and represent 2.8x NPLs. A 127% and 108% YoY increase in “doubtful loans” and “loss loans” puts some perspective on a seemingly respectable NPL ratio of 1.64% and a LLR/NPLs of 250%.
Thus, Bank Of Tianjin (1578 HK) is cheap for a reason. We are reluctant to recommend taking a position at this juncture given the ongoing stresses in source of funding and asset quality.
In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks.
The fifth company that we explore is Summarecon Agung (SMRA IJ), a township developer with over 40 years of track record and a combined development area of over 2,700ha. The company benefits from its exposure to the popular Serpong district, but an over expansion, coupled with tightening property regulations caused its balance sheet to suffer in the following years. Earnings have declined by -19% Cagr over the past five years as a consequence of lower margins and burgeoning debt levels.
The company has plans to divest its retail mall division, which can serve as a positive catalyst in the near term. Improving sentiment and better interest rate environment, as well as positive regulatory tailwinds should be a driver to SMRA’s share price this year. We see a 44% upside to our target price of IDR1,408 per share.
Summary of this insight:
The success of SMRA’s first township, Kelapa Gading, paved way for the next six township development. The same township model is replicated to its Serpong, Bekasi, Bandung, Karawang, Makassar, and soon Bogor.
During the height of the property boom, every cluster launch in the Serpong area is 2-3x oversubscribed. Buyers were a mix of speculators and end-users, and both were happy customers benefiting from over 400% land price appreciation over the course of 2009-2013. Land ASP in 2009 was just below IDR3mn versus IDR12-15mn in 2013.
Driven by the positive momentum of the property boom, SMRA ambitiously launched three new townships at the trough of the property market (2015-2018), growing its total township development area by more than a third. Poor cashflow management, stemming from the over-expansion during the property downturn took a massive toll on the balance sheet. SMRA turned from net cash in 2013 to holding IDR8.6tn of debt in 9M18 (1.2x gearing) with interest costs making up a chunky 49% of EBIT.
We have also seen a massive shift to the end-user market since 2014, as the company started to sell more smaller houses and affordable apartments rather than land lots and shophouses. At the peak, shophouses and land lots made up more than 50% of the company’s development revenues. As of 9M18, that number has declined to a mere 7% of revenues, while 93% comes from houses and apartments. Housing units launched in 2016-2017 are 36% cheaper than units launched in 2011-2014, as the company downsized in the area.
SMRA has the second biggest retail mall portfolio in our coverage after Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ) with 258,000sqm net leasable area (NLA). The three malls generate about IDR1.3tn revenue per year, returning 42% EBITDA margin. About 40% of tenants in Bekasi and Serpong are up for a rental renewal in the next three years, and this could serve as a potential upside on the average rental rates.
Pros: Bank Indonesia (BI)’s move to loosen mortgage regulations last year, and plans to reduce luxury taxes and allow for friendlier foreign ownership scheme should give a breath of fresh air over the medium term. SMRA targets 18% presales growth in 2019, but they have been missing their presales target by an average of 22% over the past three years. We expect a more modest 5% presales recovery this year.
Pros: Margin on houses show a massive improvement from 51% in 2014 to 59% in 9M18. The improvement brings up the consolidated property development margin by 600bps YoY. As a segment, this is the first margin uptick since 2014, leading to 44% YoY EBIT growth and 115% YoY NPAT growth in 9M18.
Cons: The stellar property development growth, however, is diluted by the poor performances from the investment property division that recorded 14% YoY EBIT decline. Despite some improvements on the gross margin level and healthy topline growth, opex has doubled YoY, leading to 700bps reduction in the EBITDA margin.
Recommendation & catalyst: SMRA has underperformed the JCI by a steep 71% over the past 36 months as earnings and presales continue to disappoint. Discount to NAV, PE, and PB valuation are standing at -1 standard deviation below mean. Improving risk appetite for high beta stocks, better interest rate environment, accomodative policies from the government, and potential pick up of activity after the election are a few of the key catalysts for the stock and sector re-rating. The divestment of its retail arm should also help to clear some debt off the balance sheet and unlock value. We have a BUY recommendation.
Brazil’s Ex-President Michel Temer has been arrested as part of the on-going CarWash (Lava Jato) criminal investigation, on bribery and corruption charges
We believe that this increases the near-term downside risk to the BOVESPA index and blue chips, including the large cap banks
This will also, we believe, heighten the negative “noise” around pension reform, potentially increasing the complexity of the reform process; even if this development alone should not serve to derail it, in our view
Large cap Brazilian banks’ share prices have come under pressure recently, and we would expect the market correction to continue in the short term
Almost 12 months after posting our initial thesis on Future Bright Holdings (703 HK)Gambling on a Bright Future, we review FutureBright’s most recent results, raising questions on whether stalling improvement in the core restaurant business performance warrants taking chips off the table while waiting for key catalysts to materialise.
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On Friday 22 February after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP) announced a buyback (E, J), a share cancellation (E, J), and a public equity offering of secondary shares (J-only). This kind of event is not abnormal in a year when profits are weaker and share prices are down. Cross-holders often sell shares into the end of the year in order to realise profits and let unrealised gains from the balance sheet filter into the income statement.
This time it is five sellers from four banks which all hail from the area: Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP), Nomura Trust (which holds shares in a trust account for the MUFJ Bank pension fund as a beneficiary), Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s MUFJ Bank, Resona Holdings (8308 JP), and Shiga Bank (8366 JP). The MUFJ Bank holdings likely originate from Sanwa Bank which was Osaka-based before merging with BOT-Mitsubishi almost 15 years ago, and Resona is also from Osaka – next door to Kyoto where Nintendo was founded – and Shiga Bank is the prefecture next door.
This would look like a normal sell-down… except for one thing.
There was a note in the announcement to the effect that “in the context of how companies deal with their policy cross-holdings becoming the subject of greater focus, we confirmed that several shareholders desired to sell shares, and as a company subject to such cross-holdings, we are conducting the above-mentioned Offering.”
In the TSE crossholding of SGX situation, the sale was not the most important part. The explanation of how the Board came to its decision and what they decided to do about it was important.
On the other hand, Japan’s Corporate Governance Code (the Code), which was introduced in 2015, requires listed companies to examine and explain the economic rationale and future outlook of holding shares of other listed companies for reasons other than pure investment purposes. Following a review of the requirements under the Code, JPX reached the conclusion that the existing cooperative relationship with SGX would continue even without holding the shares of SGX. [my bold]
The Japan Exchange Group had now provided the example for why even companies with cooperative business relationships should not own cross-holdings. And it is, if active stewards of capital choose to make it so, more subtle. Shareholders have even an even better pressure point. IF a company’s cooperative relationship with another company would not survive the unwinding of cross-holdings to improve capital efficiency for both sides, is that company truly independent? Is that company beholden to the company whose shares it holds? Is the cross-holding board doing its job?
And the Japan Exchange Group had said it would unwind its holdings of SGX over three years, so as not to overly impact the market for SGX shares. This provided an example of HOW to unwind, in addition to the WHY to unwind announced above.
The BIG QUESTION (And Nothing Else Matters)
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains.
Bank Tabungan Negara Persero (BBTN IJ) appears to have a nasty combination of high Special Mention Loans (SMLs) and elevated “past due but unimpaired Loans”.
The implication is that provisioning levels are insufficient in an environment of eroding asset quality.
But the bank continues to grow credit by around 20% YoY.
The bank is hugely exposed to the retail real estate market (91% of Loans).
In fact, the Indonesian Banking Sector is rife with high SMLs and in some cases elevated “past due but unimpaired Loans”.
SMLs are traditionally associated with Chinese under-reporting of underlying bad loans, and hence the production of a somewhat flattering Asset Quality picture.
Maybe, the health and valuation of the Indonesian Banking Sector needs to be reassessed with implications for IDR.
Westpac Banking (WBC AU) is facing a class action suit regarding alleged irresponsible lending in home loans since 2011. This is the first class action against a major Australian bank since the publication of the royal commission’s final report.
The ramifications of the royal commission report remain a source of debate with elections coming up. But, in general, banks will not be allowed to conduct operations in a “business-as-usual way”. There will be consequences for credit provision.
Westpac’s Balance Sheet looks decidedly fragile as it stands. The bank is entering a slowdown from a position of weakness.
Exposures to Australia’s slowing economy (not unrelated of course to China), the dovish turn at the Central Bank, and in particular its bubbly housing market make us hyper cautious. The highly volatile Aussie dollar tumbled from levels above $0.7200 to below $0.7100 following reports that China banned coal imports from the country at a major port.
Despite the sinking share prices of Australia’s main banks, valuations may still be too high given the varied headwinds.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Bank Of Tianjin (1578 HK) results at first look quite encouraging with firmer profitability, enhanced efficiency, improved capital adequacy, and increased provisioning.
Valuations are optically attractive: p/book of 0.5x, franchise valuation of 7%, earnings yield of 17%, and a total return ratio of 2.5x. These metrics are within the bargain hunter space.
However, optimism fades fast on closer inspection.
“Underlying” Income decreased by 21% YoY as the bank was squeezed by higher funding costs and non-interest expenses. Expenses on wholesale funding increased by 30% YoY. Debt funding now represents 71% of Gross Loans. Debt now stands at 4.3x SH. Funds. This type of funding has exploded by 10x since 2014. At the same time, deposits declined YoY. Deposits have increased by a more sedate 18% since 2014.
PT Profit would have been CNY1.4bn rather than CNY5.2bn but for hefty gains on securities. Loan loss provisions almost tripled YoY.
Regarding the Balance Sheet, Special Mention Loans rose sharply (+25% YoY) and represent 2.8x NPLs. A 127% and 108% YoY increase in “doubtful loans” and “loss loans” puts some perspective on a seemingly respectable NPL ratio of 1.64% and a LLR/NPLs of 250%.
Thus, Bank Of Tianjin (1578 HK) is cheap for a reason. We are reluctant to recommend taking a position at this juncture given the ongoing stresses in source of funding and asset quality.
In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks.
The fifth company that we explore is Summarecon Agung (SMRA IJ), a township developer with over 40 years of track record and a combined development area of over 2,700ha. The company benefits from its exposure to the popular Serpong district, but an over expansion, coupled with tightening property regulations caused its balance sheet to suffer in the following years. Earnings have declined by -19% Cagr over the past five years as a consequence of lower margins and burgeoning debt levels.
The company has plans to divest its retail mall division, which can serve as a positive catalyst in the near term. Improving sentiment and better interest rate environment, as well as positive regulatory tailwinds should be a driver to SMRA’s share price this year. We see a 44% upside to our target price of IDR1,408 per share.
Summary of this insight:
The success of SMRA’s first township, Kelapa Gading, paved way for the next six township development. The same township model is replicated to its Serpong, Bekasi, Bandung, Karawang, Makassar, and soon Bogor.
During the height of the property boom, every cluster launch in the Serpong area is 2-3x oversubscribed. Buyers were a mix of speculators and end-users, and both were happy customers benefiting from over 400% land price appreciation over the course of 2009-2013. Land ASP in 2009 was just below IDR3mn versus IDR12-15mn in 2013.
Driven by the positive momentum of the property boom, SMRA ambitiously launched three new townships at the trough of the property market (2015-2018), growing its total township development area by more than a third. Poor cashflow management, stemming from the over-expansion during the property downturn took a massive toll on the balance sheet. SMRA turned from net cash in 2013 to holding IDR8.6tn of debt in 9M18 (1.2x gearing) with interest costs making up a chunky 49% of EBIT.
We have also seen a massive shift to the end-user market since 2014, as the company started to sell more smaller houses and affordable apartments rather than land lots and shophouses. At the peak, shophouses and land lots made up more than 50% of the company’s development revenues. As of 9M18, that number has declined to a mere 7% of revenues, while 93% comes from houses and apartments. Housing units launched in 2016-2017 are 36% cheaper than units launched in 2011-2014, as the company downsized in the area.
SMRA has the second biggest retail mall portfolio in our coverage after Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ) with 258,000sqm net leasable area (NLA). The three malls generate about IDR1.3tn revenue per year, returning 42% EBITDA margin. About 40% of tenants in Bekasi and Serpong are up for a rental renewal in the next three years, and this could serve as a potential upside on the average rental rates.
Pros: Bank Indonesia (BI)’s move to loosen mortgage regulations last year, and plans to reduce luxury taxes and allow for friendlier foreign ownership scheme should give a breath of fresh air over the medium term. SMRA targets 18% presales growth in 2019, but they have been missing their presales target by an average of 22% over the past three years. We expect a more modest 5% presales recovery this year.
Pros: Margin on houses show a massive improvement from 51% in 2014 to 59% in 9M18. The improvement brings up the consolidated property development margin by 600bps YoY. As a segment, this is the first margin uptick since 2014, leading to 44% YoY EBIT growth and 115% YoY NPAT growth in 9M18.
Cons: The stellar property development growth, however, is diluted by the poor performances from the investment property division that recorded 14% YoY EBIT decline. Despite some improvements on the gross margin level and healthy topline growth, opex has doubled YoY, leading to 700bps reduction in the EBITDA margin.
Recommendation & catalyst: SMRA has underperformed the JCI by a steep 71% over the past 36 months as earnings and presales continue to disappoint. Discount to NAV, PE, and PB valuation are standing at -1 standard deviation below mean. Improving risk appetite for high beta stocks, better interest rate environment, accomodative policies from the government, and potential pick up of activity after the election are a few of the key catalysts for the stock and sector re-rating. The divestment of its retail arm should also help to clear some debt off the balance sheet and unlock value. We have a BUY recommendation.
Brazil’s Ex-President Michel Temer has been arrested as part of the on-going CarWash (Lava Jato) criminal investigation, on bribery and corruption charges
We believe that this increases the near-term downside risk to the BOVESPA index and blue chips, including the large cap banks
This will also, we believe, heighten the negative “noise” around pension reform, potentially increasing the complexity of the reform process; even if this development alone should not serve to derail it, in our view
Large cap Brazilian banks’ share prices have come under pressure recently, and we would expect the market correction to continue in the short term
Almost 12 months after posting our initial thesis on Future Bright Holdings (703 HK)Gambling on a Bright Future, we review FutureBright’s most recent results, raising questions on whether stalling improvement in the core restaurant business performance warrants taking chips off the table while waiting for key catalysts to materialise.
Security Bank (SECB PM) trades at a premium to Asian banks on a P/Book, franchise valuation, earnings yield, and total return ratio basis.
The PH Score™ of 5.3 is neither good nor bad. (Asia median is 5.7).
In terms of fundamental traction, efficiency has eroded and interconnected profitability has narrowed. “Jaws” are negative. Funding cost growth is sharply in excess of interest income growth. On the other hand, liquidity and capital adequacy are moving in the right direction or are stable.
Asset quality seems to have dramatically improved. Headline non-performing loans are now very low due to adoption of PFRS9. These are calculated now as loans aligned to a default criteria. The bank seems to have reclassified part of “stage 3” impaired loans back into “stage 2”. “Stage 2” is comprised of assets which have experienced a SICR (significant increase in credit risk) since initial recognition, such as substandard, past-dues, and SMLs, and are not classified as NPLs. “Stage 2” represents almost 4% of the loan book versus a headline impaired or problem loan ratio of just 0.64%. In addition, unimpaired past-due loans (73% of headline NPLs) climbed 57% YoY. Charge-offs soared 47% YoY. Perhaps the asset quality is not as pristine as the NPL ratio intimates.
When we look back from 2004, we see an explosive increase in loans (+10x since 2004) coinciding with lower profitability over this period. This is not a good sign. As the bank shifts to consumer lending for growth, up 10x since 2012, we wonder whether a similar pattern will emerge.
In short, the bank resides in the bottom decile of our global VFM (Valuation, Fundamentals, Momentum) rankings.
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Bank Tabungan Negara Persero (BBTN IJ) appears to have a nasty combination of high Special Mention Loans (SMLs) and elevated “past due but unimpaired Loans”.
The implication is that provisioning levels are insufficient in an environment of eroding asset quality.
But the bank continues to grow credit by around 20% YoY.
The bank is hugely exposed to the retail real estate market (91% of Loans).
In fact, the Indonesian Banking Sector is rife with high SMLs and in some cases elevated “past due but unimpaired Loans”.
SMLs are traditionally associated with Chinese under-reporting of underlying bad loans, and hence the production of a somewhat flattering Asset Quality picture.
Maybe, the health and valuation of the Indonesian Banking Sector needs to be reassessed with implications for IDR.
Westpac Banking (WBC AU) is facing a class action suit regarding alleged irresponsible lending in home loans since 2011. This is the first class action against a major Australian bank since the publication of the royal commission’s final report.
The ramifications of the royal commission report remain a source of debate with elections coming up. But, in general, banks will not be allowed to conduct operations in a “business-as-usual way”. There will be consequences for credit provision.
Westpac’s Balance Sheet looks decidedly fragile as it stands. The bank is entering a slowdown from a position of weakness.
Exposures to Australia’s slowing economy (not unrelated of course to China), the dovish turn at the Central Bank, and in particular its bubbly housing market make us hyper cautious. The highly volatile Aussie dollar tumbled from levels above $0.7200 to below $0.7100 following reports that China banned coal imports from the country at a major port.
Despite the sinking share prices of Australia’s main banks, valuations may still be too high given the varied headwinds.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks.
The fifth company that we explore is Summarecon Agung (SMRA IJ), a township developer with over 40 years of track record and a combined development area of over 2,700ha. The company benefits from its exposure to the popular Serpong district, but an over expansion, coupled with tightening property regulations caused its balance sheet to suffer in the following years. Earnings have declined by -19% Cagr over the past five years as a consequence of lower margins and burgeoning debt levels.
The company has plans to divest its retail mall division, which can serve as a positive catalyst in the near term. Improving sentiment and better interest rate environment, as well as positive regulatory tailwinds should be a driver to SMRA’s share price this year. We see a 44% upside to our target price of IDR1,408 per share.
Summary of this insight:
The success of SMRA’s first township, Kelapa Gading, paved way for the next six township development. The same township model is replicated to its Serpong, Bekasi, Bandung, Karawang, Makassar, and soon Bogor.
During the height of the property boom, every cluster launch in the Serpong area is 2-3x oversubscribed. Buyers were a mix of speculators and end-users, and both were happy customers benefiting from over 400% land price appreciation over the course of 2009-2013. Land ASP in 2009 was just below IDR3mn versus IDR12-15mn in 2013.
Driven by the positive momentum of the property boom, SMRA ambitiously launched three new townships at the trough of the property market (2015-2018), growing its total township development area by more than a third. Poor cashflow management, stemming from the over-expansion during the property downturn took a massive toll on the balance sheet. SMRA turned from net cash in 2013 to holding IDR8.6tn of debt in 9M18 (1.2x gearing) with interest costs making up a chunky 49% of EBIT.
We have also seen a massive shift to the end-user market since 2014, as the company started to sell more smaller houses and affordable apartments rather than land lots and shophouses. At the peak, shophouses and land lots made up more than 50% of the company’s development revenues. As of 9M18, that number has declined to a mere 7% of revenues, while 93% comes from houses and apartments. Housing units launched in 2016-2017 are 36% cheaper than units launched in 2011-2014, as the company downsized in the area.
SMRA has the second biggest retail mall portfolio in our coverage after Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ) with 258,000sqm net leasable area (NLA). The three malls generate about IDR1.3tn revenue per year, returning 42% EBITDA margin. About 40% of tenants in Bekasi and Serpong are up for a rental renewal in the next three years, and this could serve as a potential upside on the average rental rates.
Pros: Bank Indonesia (BI)’s move to loosen mortgage regulations last year, and plans to reduce luxury taxes and allow for friendlier foreign ownership scheme should give a breath of fresh air over the medium term. SMRA targets 18% presales growth in 2019, but they have been missing their presales target by an average of 22% over the past three years. We expect a more modest 5% presales recovery this year.
Pros: Margin on houses show a massive improvement from 51% in 2014 to 59% in 9M18. The improvement brings up the consolidated property development margin by 600bps YoY. As a segment, this is the first margin uptick since 2014, leading to 44% YoY EBIT growth and 115% YoY NPAT growth in 9M18.
Cons: The stellar property development growth, however, is diluted by the poor performances from the investment property division that recorded 14% YoY EBIT decline. Despite some improvements on the gross margin level and healthy topline growth, opex has doubled YoY, leading to 700bps reduction in the EBITDA margin.
Recommendation & catalyst: SMRA has underperformed the JCI by a steep 71% over the past 36 months as earnings and presales continue to disappoint. Discount to NAV, PE, and PB valuation are standing at -1 standard deviation below mean. Improving risk appetite for high beta stocks, better interest rate environment, accomodative policies from the government, and potential pick up of activity after the election are a few of the key catalysts for the stock and sector re-rating. The divestment of its retail arm should also help to clear some debt off the balance sheet and unlock value. We have a BUY recommendation.
Brazil’s Ex-President Michel Temer has been arrested as part of the on-going CarWash (Lava Jato) criminal investigation, on bribery and corruption charges
We believe that this increases the near-term downside risk to the BOVESPA index and blue chips, including the large cap banks
This will also, we believe, heighten the negative “noise” around pension reform, potentially increasing the complexity of the reform process; even if this development alone should not serve to derail it, in our view
Large cap Brazilian banks’ share prices have come under pressure recently, and we would expect the market correction to continue in the short term
Almost 12 months after posting our initial thesis on Future Bright Holdings (703 HK)Gambling on a Bright Future, we review FutureBright’s most recent results, raising questions on whether stalling improvement in the core restaurant business performance warrants taking chips off the table while waiting for key catalysts to materialise.
Security Bank (SECB PM) trades at a premium to Asian banks on a P/Book, franchise valuation, earnings yield, and total return ratio basis.
The PH Score™ of 5.3 is neither good nor bad. (Asia median is 5.7).
In terms of fundamental traction, efficiency has eroded and interconnected profitability has narrowed. “Jaws” are negative. Funding cost growth is sharply in excess of interest income growth. On the other hand, liquidity and capital adequacy are moving in the right direction or are stable.
Asset quality seems to have dramatically improved. Headline non-performing loans are now very low due to adoption of PFRS9. These are calculated now as loans aligned to a default criteria. The bank seems to have reclassified part of “stage 3” impaired loans back into “stage 2”. “Stage 2” is comprised of assets which have experienced a SICR (significant increase in credit risk) since initial recognition, such as substandard, past-dues, and SMLs, and are not classified as NPLs. “Stage 2” represents almost 4% of the loan book versus a headline impaired or problem loan ratio of just 0.64%. In addition, unimpaired past-due loans (73% of headline NPLs) climbed 57% YoY. Charge-offs soared 47% YoY. Perhaps the asset quality is not as pristine as the NPL ratio intimates.
When we look back from 2004, we see an explosive increase in loans (+10x since 2004) coinciding with lower profitability over this period. This is not a good sign. As the bank shifts to consumer lending for growth, up 10x since 2012, we wonder whether a similar pattern will emerge.
In short, the bank resides in the bottom decile of our global VFM (Valuation, Fundamentals, Momentum) rankings.
With SST (sea surface temperature) in the Pacific past 26oC, El Niño’s comeback is highly likely. Past occurrences of severe El Niño was isolated in the farm sector with upside risks to food prices. While another round of contraction in farm output and employment would be expected, the liberal rice import policy would entice imports to plug the gap between demand-supply in 1H19 and ease potential rice/food price upticks.
The El Niño supply shock would coincide with the global macro slowdown and fiscal spending delays that spawn downside risks to growth. With a legally handicapped fiscal budget, monetary policy may have to step up to ease likelihood of severe, near-term constraints to growth. We believe monetary adjustments would be the appropriate responses to the macro challenges as inflation winds down. Sequencing and appropriate timing of monetary reaction remains key to credible policy responses starting with the bank reserve ratio cut in 2Q19 (staggered cuts for a maximum of 3% this year) followed by policy rate cuts commencing in 3Q19 (cumulative -50bp in 2H19) when inflation hits rock bottom of less than 2%.
Buy bonds with preference for the curve’s belly to short-duration.
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