The Indonesian property sector has only had a few glittering moments in the sun over the past five years, since the boom times of 2012-2013. The sector continues to trade at near record discounts to NAV despite the back-drop of record-low mortgage rates, rising affordability and high levels of pent-up demand. In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks.
In this series of Insights we will discuss in depth:
The drivers to the property sector, including the economic drivers, with a more benign outlook on interest rates, overall supply and demand, correlations to mortgage rates, the currency impact, construction costs, regulation and tax law change over the years and the influx of foreign developers and potential buyers.
The profiles of the biggest players in each segment of the property market. We will also map out the details of each company’s location, accessibility, and longevity of their land bank.
How each development is interconnected and how it benefits from new infrastructure projects, such as the new toll roads or MRT, or LRT projects, and the rise of the T.O.D. (transport orientated development).
Each developer’s target segment, whether they are focused on landed township developments, high rise, mixed-use, or industrial developments, and how each segment fared during boom time (2012-2014) or bust (2015-2018).
How much of each developer’s revenues are coming from recurrent investment property sources such as the office, hotel, or retail properties, and which have the biggest proportion of speculative buyers versus end-users?
Last year saw a pick-up in sales activity for most developers but the question is can this be sustained going forward? With a more benign outlook on interest rates and a less hawkish tack from Bank Indonesia for 2019, the potential for positive regulatory changes to support the property sector, and a potential post-election tailwind from May onwards, there are good reasons to revisit this beaten up sector.
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The Indonesian property sector has only had a few glittering moments in the sun over the past five years, since the boom times of 2012-2013. The sector continues to trade at near record discounts to NAV despite the back-drop of record-low mortgage rates, rising affordability and high levels of pent-up demand. In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks.
In this series of Insights we will discuss in depth:
The drivers to the property sector, including the economic drivers, with a more benign outlook on interest rates, overall supply and demand, correlations to mortgage rates, the currency impact, construction costs, regulation and tax law change over the years and the influx of foreign developers and potential buyers.
The profiles of the biggest players in each segment of the property market. We will also map out the details of each company’s location, accessibility, and longevity of their land bank.
How each development is interconnected and how it benefits from new infrastructure projects, such as the new toll roads or MRT, or LRT projects, and the rise of the T.O.D. (transport orientated development).
Each developer’s target segment, whether they are focused on landed township developments, high rise, mixed-use, or industrial developments, and how each segment fared during boom time (2012-2014) or bust (2015-2018).
How much of each developer’s revenues are coming from recurrent investment property sources such as the office, hotel, or retail properties, and which have the biggest proportion of speculative buyers versus end-users?
Last year saw a pick-up in sales activity for most developers but the question is can this be sustained going forward? With a more benign outlook on interest rates and a less hawkish tack from Bank Indonesia for 2019, the potential for positive regulatory changes to support the property sector, and a potential post-election tailwind from May onwards, there are good reasons to revisit this beaten up sector.
Fundamental trends at Asia Commercial Bank/Vietnam (ACB VN) are benign and stand out within Vietnam’s improving banking universe. The bank has delivered on its objectives over the last year and key metrics/signals at 12M18 underline positive fundamental momentum and quality-value attributes, embodied in a high PH Score™.
ACB’s improvements reflect a sound macro backdrop (upgraded sovereign strength) as well as a strategy that is based on higher-margin consumer lending, and to a lesser extent SMEs, balanced by a rising CASA deposit base. More than 50% of the loan book stems from retail accounts, of which a third this relates to mortgages.
The bank targets greater efficiency, a digitalization drive (some 25% of transactions are on-line), and an expanding customer base, including SME payroll accounts.
Vietnam exhibits broad-based, mild-inflationary, growth. Reforms continue in the banking sector, privatisations and reducing red tape. However, economic distortions and capacity constraints remain, as do external and domestic risks and longer-term challenges. The robust economy though provides an opportunity for additional reforms to boost investment, ensure durable growth and resilient balance sheets, and reduce the external surplus.
Regarding banks, SOCBs need to be capitalized with government funds, and private sector and foreign ownership limits raised (lifting a 30% foreign investor limit to banking and aviation is underway). Vietnam needs to develop a macroprudential framework and to enhance data quality on balance sheet exposures to better monitor and manage risks, and to ensure that robust liquidity and crisis management frameworks are in place from a legal and operational perspective in order to mitigate financial sector risks. The broad picture though reflects an improved macro profile combined with progress at banks in writing off legacy problem assets and boosting capitalisation – especially in the case of ACB as well as ABB, ACB, Military Bank, OCB, TPbank, VIB, and Techcombank. However, (outperforming) Sacombank faces a risk from its problem assets while VP is constrained by risk from its consumer finance portfolio.
Shares of ACB are not unattractively priced, though not deep value, trading on an earnings yield of 15%, a PEG factor of >3x, a P/B of 1.9x,and a franchise value of 14% with the tailwinds of a quintile 1 PH Score™. They offer quality at a reasonable price. A RSI of 52 intimates that shares are not over bought.
TOPPAN PRINTING (7911 JP) is Japan’s current Negative Enterprise Value ‘champion’. Although only growing in the low single digits and with margins to match, comprehensive income margins and returns are significantly higher, as they take Toppan’s significant investment portfolio gains into account. The investment portfolio has grown at a 39.1% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) over the last five years, outperforming Toppan’s core operations (6.4% CAGR) and the overall stock market (7.5% CAGR).
Source: Japan Analytics
MARKET MYOPIA – Despite the investment portfolio’s ¥411b contribution to Shareholder’s Equity, which has otherwise only increased by ¥98b, the stock market preferred to focus on the stagnating top-line, and the shares have been serial underperformers. Toppan’s market capitalisation has grown by only 2% per annum or just ¥34b since December 2013. From the recent peak in June 2017, Toppan shares have underperformed the market by 27% and, for the last year, have been at their most extreme value relative to TOPIX over the previous thirty years. During this period, Toppan’s equity holdings rose from 43% of the company’s market capitalisation to close to parity at the recent market peak in September 2018.
Source: Japan Analytics
BOTTOMING OUT – With the upcoming boost to sales in the printing business from the change in Japan’s gengō (元号) or era name on the accession of the new Emperor in April, the shares have finally broken out of a one-year period in the Oversold ‘doldrums’.
Source: Toppan Printing Investor Presentation November 12th 2018
SELLING STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS – More importantly, the company has become more proactive in managing equity risk. On 23rd January, Toppan sold 10.5m shares in Recruit Holdings (6098 JP) for approximately ¥31.5b, reducing Toppan’s holding in Japan’s leading listing employment services business from 6.57% to 6.05%. Despite the boilerplate language used to describe the company’s strategy towards strategic shareholdings, Toppan has begun to address the portfolio more proactively and in accordance with the spirit of the new guidelines on Corporate Governance in Japan.
Source: Japan Analytics
BUYBACK POTENTIAL – With this sale, Toppan’s liquid assets will now exceed US$3b or 58% of the current market capitalisation, while the company has committed to capital expenditures totalling only ¥125b over the next five years. Toppan last conducted a modest 0.2% share buyback in 2015-Q2, which was ‘unwound’ by a 0.5% reduction in Treasury Stock in 2017-Q3, which was not accompanied by a share cancellation. With just 8% of shares outstanding held in treasury, there is ample room for further buybacks.
Source: Japan Analytics
For Japan’s ‘Deep Value’ investors or even the ‘activists’, Toppan is an attractive opportunity.
In the DETAIL below, we list the ‘top’ twenty-five negative enterprise value companies in Japan and provide a brief overview of Toppan’s business, the investment portfolio and explain why, with apologies to our ‘Brothers in Arms’, Dire Straits, investors in Toppan are, at present, getting their ‘money for nothin’ and clicks for free’.
Dire Straits: Brothers in Arms/Money for Nothing – Knopfler/Sting – 1985
AMLO push to increase financial inclusion in Mexico, focused on the low income and rural population, may add to bank sector costs at the margin without materially impacting revenues
Early fears of increased intervention in the bank sector – such as capping fees and commissions – appear to have abated. Interest-free loans for micro-entrepreneurs have hit sentiment on microfinance and consumer finance stocks, especially Gentera SAB De CV (GENTERA* MM EQUITY); we believe, on a medium-term view, these concerns may be overdone
We would be cautious on the Mexican big cap banks, and especially Grupo Financiero Banorte-O (GFNORTEO MM) ; we see downside risk to consensus estimates from overly-positive GFI acquisition synergies, and potential pressure on local government loan rates over the medium term
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Farm loan waivers have been a key driver in the pre-election polls as well as 2019 Lok Sabha polls. Apart from monsoons, the overall agriculture sector is affected by any incentive from the government such as farm loan waivers, infrastructure creation, or other initiatives taken for increasing income of small and marginal farmers.
Farm loan waivers not only impact the banks and financial institutions but also have a major influence on the revenue of various agricultural related industries. One such impact can be seen in the sales of tractors. It has been historically seen that whenever there is an announcement of incentivizing the income of farmers like the farm loan waiver, there has been an uptick in the demand of tractors.
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Based in Malaysia, AFFIN Bank Bhd (ABANK MK) is the product of two mergers over the last decade. Today AFFIN is a small-medium-sized financial services group, with 107 branches, combining corporate and SME banking; consumer banking (remittance services, vehicle loans, mortgages, personal loans, credit cards, unit trusts, and bancassurance products); Investment/Merchant Banking via AFFIN Hwang (AHAM), including corporate finance, capital market services and investment management; plus underwriting of general and life insurance (an underpenetrated market) through AAGI and AALI. AFFIN Islamic is a wholly owned subsidiary.
The core shareholders are LTAT (the superannuation fund for the Armed Forces), the Bank of East Asia, and Boustead Holdings which limits the float.
Malaysia has a tailwind of a new administration, vowing to overturn many aspects of its predecessor – including cancelling mega infra projects and reducing the “real” National debt.
The economy is pretty buoyant and is slated to generate an average of 4.75% GDP growth over 2018-2022. Inflation has mellowed, supported by the cut in GST, but will still, once these effects diminish, be modest, at around 2%, this year. The current and trade accounts are in surplus.
Malaysia, however, has a high level (by Asian standards) of household (excluding mortgages) indebtedness, dominated by credit cards, auto/vehicle finance, and personal loans. This had led to a moderately high risk in terms of the credit-to-GDP gap. The corporate sector is not excessively leveraged.
AFFIN trades at a P/B ratio of 0.5x and a Mkt Cap./Deposits of 8%, well below the global and EM medians. Earnings Yield lies at 13.3%. The limited float will have a bearing on the valuation. A quintile 1 PH Score™ of 7.9 captures above-average metric change (though not in asset quality and efficiency) and value-quality attributes. Combining technical momentum, franchise valuation, and the PH Score™, the overall ranking stands in the top decile globally. A RSI of 43 points to potential upside.
China Meidong Auto (1268 HK) has been on a rollercoaster ride in 2018. The stock price of Meidong started 2018 around 2.7 HKD and recently has been trading around 2.9 HKD.
Nice and steady ride? Not exactly, as it has swung from 4.3 HKD in June to 2.6 HKD in August. After analyzing how NPAT estimates evolved over the past year there should be no justifications for these wild swings.
Meidong is likely to report solid FY18 results by late March vs industry peers which are expected to report a weak 2H18. While BMW dealers have been reportedly suffering in China during 2018, Meidong was fortunate to have other luxury brands pick up the slack.
FY19 should be another growth year for Meidong as 1) recently acquired BMW showrooms contribute their maiden results and 2) other luxury brands continue to perform despite overall doom and gloom in the Chinese auto market. Should the Chinese government launch car replacement stimulus measures this would be icing on the cake.
Fair Value lowered slightly from 4.7 HKD to 4.4 HKD (10x 2019E) on lower 2019 profit estimates, which leaves 52% upside excluding dividends.
Since our bearish Insight on Tokyo Kiraboshi Financial Group (7173 JP) issued in November 2018, Tokyo Kiraboshi FG (7173 JP): Shooting Star, the stock’s subsequent performance has fully justified our pessimism, with the share price finishing CY2018 down 47.7% year-on-year (YoY). Having touched a low of ¥1,504 on Christmas Day, the shares have recovered 10.1% to ¥1,656 as of Friday’s close: slightly better than the Topix Bank Index, which closed on Friday at 154.44, up 9.0% over the same period. Trading on a forward-looking price/earnings multiple of 12.5x (using the bank’s current FY3/2019 guidance) and a price/book ratio of 0.21x, TKFG looks cheap. This is deceptive. Adjusting the group’s earnings per share (EPS) for the ¥55 billion (US$507 million) in two still-outstanding preference share issues pushes the PER to over 18x: hardly a bargain. Meanwhile, the group’s RoA and RoE ratios are woefully low, loan growth has collapsed since end-March 2018, deposits have fallen alarmingly, and main bank subsidiary Kiraboshi Bank is struggling to keep its net return on funds deployed (NRFD) in positive territory. A stock best avoided.
Trawling through >1500 global banks, based on the last quarter of reported Balance Sheets, we apply the discipline of the PH Score™ , a value-quality fundamental momentum screen, plus a low RSI screen, and a low Franchise Valuation (FV) screen to deliver our latest rankings for global banks.
While not all of top decile 1 scores are a buy – some are value traps while others maybe somewhat small and obscure and traded sparsely- the bottom decile names should awaken caution. We would be hard pressed to recommend some of the more popular and fashionable names from the bottom decile. Names such as ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN) , Credicorp of Peru, Bank Central Asia (BBCA IJ) and Itau Unibanco Holding Sa (ITUB US) are EM favourites. Their share prices have performed well for an extended period and thus carry valuation risk. They represent pricey quality in some cases. They are not priced for disappointment but rather for hope. Are the constituents of the bottom decile not fertile grounds for short sellers?
Why pay top dollar for a bank franchise given risks related to domestic (let alone global) politics and the economy? Some investors and analysts have expressed “inspiration” for developments in Brazil and Argentina. But Brazilian bonds are now trading as if the country is Investment Grade again. (This is relevant for banks especially). Guedes and co. may deliver on pension/social security reform. If so, prices will become even more inflated. But what happens if they don’t deliver on reform? Why pay top dollar for hope given the ramp up in prices already? Argentina is an even more fragile “hope narrative”. More of a “Hope take 2”. Similar to Brazil, bank Franchise Valuations are elevated. While the current account adjustment and easing inflation are to be expected, the political and social scene will be a challenge. LATAM seems to be “hot” again with investment bankers talking of resilience. But resilience is different from valuation. Banks from Chile, Peru, and Colombia feature in the bottom decile too. If an investor wants to be in these markets and desires bank exposure, surely it makes sense to look for the best value on offer. Grupo Aval Acciones y Valores (AVAL CB) may represent one such opportunity.
Our bottom decile rankings feature a great deal of banks from Indonesia. In a promising market such as Indonesia, given bank valuations, one needs to tread extremely carefully to not end up paying over the odds, to not pay for extrapolation. In addition, India is a susceptible jurisdiction for any bank operating there – no bank is “superhuman” and especially not at the prices on offer for the popular private sector “winners”. Saudi Arabia is another market that suddenly became popular last year. We are mindful of valuations and FX.
Does it not make more sense to look at opportunity in the top decile? While some of the names here will be too small or illiquid (mea culpa), there are genuine portfolio candidates. South Korea stands out in the rankings. Woori Bank (WF US) is top of the rankings after a share price plunge related to a stock overhang but this will pass. Hana Financial (086790 KS) , Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK LX) and DGB Financial Group (139130 KS) are portfolio candidates. Elsewhere, Russia and Vietnam rightly feature while Sri Lanka and Pakistan contribute some names despite very real political and macro risks. We would caution on some of the relatively small Chinese names but recommend the big 4 versus EM peers – they are not expensive. In fact some of the big 4 feature in decile 2 of our rankings. There are many Japanese banks here too. And many, like some Chinese lenders, are cheap for a reason. While the technical picture for Japanese banks is bearish, at some stage selective weeding out of opportunity within Japan’s banking sector may be rewarding. The megabanks are certainly not dear. Europe is another matter. Despite valuations, we are cautious on French lenders and on German consolidation narratives – did a merger of 2 weak banks ever deliver shareholder value? The inclusion of two Romanian banks in the top decile is somewhat of a headscratcher. These are perfectly investable opportunities but share prices have been poor of late.
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Analysing Shin Kong Financial Holding (2888 TT)is like evaluating an investment trust with operating cash flow and a robust demand deposit funding base derived from 106 bank branches. The consolidated asset-base (68% of which consists of securities) is a float (long for claim reserves and short for premium reserves) composed of low beta high dividend yielding stocks but mainly overseas FI, some NT$1.7trillion worth yielding 4.7%, as well as loans (20% of Assets).
SKFH is the holding for life insurance (SKL), the bank (SKB), property insurance, mainly auto and fire insurance (SKPIA), the investment trust (SKIT), Masterlink securities, and VC operations (SKVC). SKFH is mainly life insurance (73% of Assets) and the bank (24%).
Management is focused on enhancing integration initiatives, efficiencies, initiatives and synergies within the Group. “Shin Kong: Pioneering a digital mobile future” is a programme to drive digital evolution through AI, big data, and smart robots.
With 317 branches, the secure and mature insurance franchise (mainly life but also health) is concentrated on selling foreign FX protection and policies in order to support interest spreads and contain hedging costs. While Net Profit at the life insurance subsidiary jumped exuberantly at 9M18, there were signs of deterioration in the underlying underwriting business with the claims: premium plus expenses: premium ratios eroding somewhat which shows up in the Consolidated statement in a decrease in “Net Income on Life Insurance”.
The bank is scaling up its presence in wealth management (bancassurance, mutual funds), trade finance, syndicated loans, and retail plus SME credit. Fee income is now 20% of total Revenues. A negative take, as elsewhere, was the rise in interest expenses after Fed tightening though this helps improve returns from life insurers’ assets, which have a shorter duration than their insurance liabilities. However, value-quality trends at SKB (the bank) are positive. Key metrics/signals at 9M18 in consolidated accounts and separate bank statements underline positive fundamental momentum embodied in a high PH Score™.
Consolidated results perhaps better reflect earnings pressures in insurance than the life insurance Balance Sheet as well as showing gains from FX and the sale of investments across divisions and a solid banking performance despite aforementioned interest expenses growth.
Shares of SKFH trade on an earnings yield of 21%, a P/B of 0.57x, a franchise value of 15%, and a Dividend Yield of 4% with the tailwinds of a decile 1 PH Score™. A RSI of 36 intimates that shares are under bought. Shares have had a poor run of late with the P/B at a 3-year low, and may have found a bottom. Caveats include underlying insurance results, the tough underwriting environment, and scale and interest costs within the banking franchise. The jury is out as to whether SKFH might be a value trap.
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Tracking Traffic/Containers & Air Cargo is the hub for all of our research on container shipping and air cargo, featuring analysis of monthly industry data, notes from our conversations with industry participants, and links to recent company and thematic pieces.
Tracking Traffic/Containers & Air Cargo aims to highlight changes to existing trends, relationships, and views affecting the leading Asian companies in these two sectors. This month’s note includes data from about twenty different sources.
In this issue readers will find:
An analysis of December container shipping rates: Our proprietary index suggests average container shipping rates firmed again in December. Firmer rates in Q418, combined with a moderation in fuel prices, probably lifted carrier margins in the period, and this improvement is likely to spill over into Q119.
A look at December air cargo activity, which slumped, again: The five Asia-based airlines we track reported a ~2% Y/Y decline in air cargo handled. After growing by a healthy +6.3% Y/Y in H118, air cargo demand at these five carriers has shown a consistent monthly decline, growing by just 1% in Q418 and shrinking slightly in November and December.
For container carriers and airlines, fuel price increases have continued to moderate. As of mid-January, the price of bunker fuel was up just 4% Y/Y, and the price of jet fuel had declined by around 7%. Throughout much of 2018, fuel prices had risen 20-40% Y/Y, or more.
Japanese carriers’ December quarter earnings on the horizon: We will soon find out whether improving conditions in container shipping showed up in the carriers’ P&Ls, as the three major Japanese shipping companies are set to report December quarter results at the break on January 31.
Although slowing demand growth is unlikely to generate impressive top-line improvements, firmer pricing combined with lower fuel costs should support an ongoing improvement in profitability for container carriers in the near-term. Meanwhile, the slump in air cargo demand has not yet hit air cargo yields, but it’s becoming clearer that an economic slowdown is hurting demand for this relatively expensive mode of transport.
The political decision to exit the European Union has unpredictable negative consequences for both the UK economy and stockmarket. My purpose is to identify a portfolio of UK shorts and occasional longs.
Lloyds Banking: What does it do ?
Lloyds Banking Group is the UK’s largest retail bank with a 20% share of both consumer credit and mortgage lending. It has no investment banking activities or overseas activities.
Why is it in the long portfolio ?
After a 10 year period of rehabilitation post the Financial Crisis the group is now profitable at the statutory level and generating a healthy double return on tangible equity (ROE). This year the consensus expectation is for a dividend of 3.3p per share (+7%) leaving the shares on a yield of 5.7%. In addition management completed a GBP1bn share buyback, the combination of buy-back and divided represents 4.7p per share or an effective yield of 8.1%. If future projections prove correct then the ROE should morph into the mid-teens by 2020. A return at this level should be sufficient to lift the shares well above book value.
What are the risks ?
A key risk is economic dislocation from Brexit. Management believe that EU exit along the lines of the current withdrawal agreement will be compatible with only a marginal increase in credit losses.
Founded in 1992 and acquired by Mr. Roman Avdeev in 1994,Credit Bank Of Moscow Pjsc (CBOM RM) benefits from an entrenched market position and strong brand recognition in its strategic market of Moscow which represents 25% of Russian GDP. CBM is an established operation in Moscow and the Moscow region with over 7,000 devices in high traffic locations.
CBM has expanded fast, from commanding a mere 0.7% share of system Assets in 2013 to 2.9% today.
The bank has a defined strategy underpinned by blue-chip, large, and medium-sized corporate services (fees, settlements, cash handling); high-margin consumer lending; and investment banking (SOVA Capital synergies, interbank, ECM, DCM, M&A). CBM commands a client-base of 15k corporates: companies represent 87% of loans. The bank has 1.5MM retail customers: accounting for a third of deposits.
In 2015 CBM acquired Inkakhran, swelling its nationwide cash handling market share to 17%. In this segment, CBM commands a client-base of 3k, of which 164 are banks, with 876 armoured vehicles covering 33k collection points.
Management is focused on above-system growth, based on a relatively robust liquid Balance Sheet, reducing funding costs, and enhancing operating efficiency and productivity. 2018 was marked by building up liquidity and strengthening capital adequacy as well as managing Balance Sheet risk -after 5 years of forceful growth- while maintaining profitability and cost efficiencies.
Technology highlights include the Your Bank Online system, MKB Business, and Foreign Exchange Control Dashboard.
Avdeev’s Rossium, a domestic group with interests in agriculture, timber, oil and a pharmacy chain, is the majority shareholder (56%) while the EBRD holds a position which reduces the float (18%). The supervisory board contains 5 out of 10 independent non executives while 2 more are nominees of minority shareholders. Related party lending is 3.5% of the loan book. Rosneft exposure though represents a caveat to CBM and to the system in general though some view this more of a strength.
CBM trades below Book Value, lies on a low Mkt Cap./Deposits rating of 13%, below the global and EM median, and commands an Earnings Yield of 13%. A quintile 1 PH Score™ of 8.0 captures the valuation dynamic while metric change is satisfactory. Combining franchise valuation, technical momentum, and the PH Score™, CBM stands in the top quintile of opportunity globally.
Income available for distribution to Unitholders was 8.6% higher than the IPO forecast. The outperformance was due to contribution from the Westpark Portfolio which was acquired on 30th Nov 2018. Excluding the impact of Westpark Portfolio, income from the underlying IPO portfolio was generally in line with the forecast.
For the full year, total income available for distribution to Unitholders was US$43.8 mil.
KORE reiterated that the US tax regulation changes and convergence of Barbados tax rates for domestic and international companies are not expected to have any material impact on NTA and DPU. There will be no further changes expected to the trust structure.
The outlook for KORE remains positive. KORE has positioned itself well for defensive growth in the coming year.
Positive set of results and outlook is expected to continue driving the re-rating of KORE. The immediate price target for KORE is US$0.78 per unit (parity to NAV) that will translate to a forward yield of 7.3%.
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Since our bearish Insight on Tokyo Kiraboshi Financial Group (7173 JP) issued in November 2018, Tokyo Kiraboshi FG (7173 JP): Shooting Star, the stock’s subsequent performance has fully justified our pessimism, with the share price finishing CY2018 down 47.7% year-on-year (YoY). Having touched a low of ¥1,504 on Christmas Day, the shares have recovered 10.1% to ¥1,656 as of Friday’s close: slightly better than the Topix Bank Index, which closed on Friday at 154.44, up 9.0% over the same period. Trading on a forward-looking price/earnings multiple of 12.5x (using the bank’s current FY3/2019 guidance) and a price/book ratio of 0.21x, TKFG looks cheap. This is deceptive. Adjusting the group’s earnings per share (EPS) for the ¥55 billion (US$507 million) in two still-outstanding preference share issues pushes the PER to over 18x: hardly a bargain. Meanwhile, the group’s RoA and RoE ratios are woefully low, loan growth has collapsed since end-March 2018, deposits have fallen alarmingly, and main bank subsidiary Kiraboshi Bank is struggling to keep its net return on funds deployed (NRFD) in positive territory. A stock best avoided.
Trawling through >1500 global banks, based on the last quarter of reported Balance Sheets, we apply the discipline of the PH Score™ , a value-quality fundamental momentum screen, plus a low RSI screen, and a low Franchise Valuation (FV) screen to deliver our latest rankings for global banks.
While not all of top decile 1 scores are a buy – some are value traps while others maybe somewhat small and obscure and traded sparsely- the bottom decile names should awaken caution. We would be hard pressed to recommend some of the more popular and fashionable names from the bottom decile. Names such as ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN) , Credicorp of Peru, Bank Central Asia (BBCA IJ) and Itau Unibanco Holding Sa (ITUB US) are EM favourites. Their share prices have performed well for an extended period and thus carry valuation risk. They represent pricey quality in some cases. They are not priced for disappointment but rather for hope. Are the constituents of the bottom decile not fertile grounds for short sellers?
Why pay top dollar for a bank franchise given risks related to domestic (let alone global) politics and the economy? Some investors and analysts have expressed “inspiration” for developments in Brazil and Argentina. But Brazilian bonds are now trading as if the country is Investment Grade again. (This is relevant for banks especially). Guedes and co. may deliver on pension/social security reform. If so, prices will become even more inflated. But what happens if they don’t deliver on reform? Why pay top dollar for hope given the ramp up in prices already? Argentina is an even more fragile “hope narrative”. More of a “Hope take 2”. Similar to Brazil, bank Franchise Valuations are elevated. While the current account adjustment and easing inflation are to be expected, the political and social scene will be a challenge. LATAM seems to be “hot” again with investment bankers talking of resilience. But resilience is different from valuation. Banks from Chile, Peru, and Colombia feature in the bottom decile too. If an investor wants to be in these markets and desires bank exposure, surely it makes sense to look for the best value on offer. Grupo Aval Acciones y Valores (AVAL CB) may represent one such opportunity.
Our bottom decile rankings feature a great deal of banks from Indonesia. In a promising market such as Indonesia, given bank valuations, one needs to tread extremely carefully to not end up paying over the odds, to not pay for extrapolation. In addition, India is a susceptible jurisdiction for any bank operating there – no bank is “superhuman” and especially not at the prices on offer for the popular private sector “winners”. Saudi Arabia is another market that suddenly became popular last year. We are mindful of valuations and FX.
Does it not make more sense to look at opportunity in the top decile? While some of the names here will be too small or illiquid (mea culpa), there are genuine portfolio candidates. South Korea stands out in the rankings. Woori Bank (WF US) is top of the rankings after a share price plunge related to a stock overhang but this will pass. Hana Financial (086790 KS) , Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK LX) and DGB Financial Group (139130 KS) are portfolio candidates. Elsewhere, Russia and Vietnam rightly feature while Sri Lanka and Pakistan contribute some names despite very real political and macro risks. We would caution on some of the relatively small Chinese names but recommend the big 4 versus EM peers – they are not expensive. In fact some of the big 4 feature in decile 2 of our rankings. There are many Japanese banks here too. And many, like some Chinese lenders, are cheap for a reason. While the technical picture for Japanese banks is bearish, at some stage selective weeding out of opportunity within Japan’s banking sector may be rewarding. The megabanks are certainly not dear. Europe is another matter. Despite valuations, we are cautious on French lenders and on German consolidation narratives – did a merger of 2 weak banks ever deliver shareholder value? The inclusion of two Romanian banks in the top decile is somewhat of a headscratcher. These are perfectly investable opportunities but share prices have been poor of late.
Value-quality trends at Saigon Hanoi Commericial (SHB VN) stand out within Vietnam’s improving banking universe. Key metrics/signals at 9M18 underline positive fundamental momentum embodied in a high PH Score™. SHB’s improvements reflect macro backdrop (upgraded sovereign strength).
Formerly known as Nhon Ai Rural Commercial, SHB incorporated Hanoi Building Commercial Bank and Vinaconex – Viettel Finance in 2012 and 2017, respectively, in line with system restructuring. SHB borrows short in order to lend short and long as well as purchase high-yielding government bonds. More than 79% of loans stem from credit provision up to 1 month and from 1-3 months, broadly matching short-duration market funding. (The liquidity gap is sound). Credit is diverse with an emphasis on agriculture, manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade. SHB is increasing higher-margin consumer lending which represents just 22% of the loan portfolio. Some 8% of the portfolio relates to state-owned enterprises.
Vietnam exhibits broad-based, mild-inflationary, growth. Reforms continue in the banking sector, privatisations and reducing red tape. However, economic distortions and capacity constraints remain, as do external and domestic risks and longer-term challenges. The robust economy though provides an opportunity for additional reforms to boost investment, ensure durable growth and resilient balance sheets, and reduce the external surplus.
Regarding banks, SOCBs need to be capitalized with government funds, and private sector and foreign ownership limits raised (lifting a 30% foreign investor limit to banking and aviation is underway). Vietnam needs to develop a macroprudential framework and to enhance data quality on balance sheet exposures to better monitor and manage risks, and to ensure that robust liquidity and crisis management frameworks are in place from a legal and operational perspective in order to mitigate financial sector risks. The broad picture though reflects an improved macro profile combined with progress at banks in writing off legacy problem assets and boosting capitalisation – especially in the case of ABB, ACB, Military Bank, OCB, TPbank, VIB, and Techcombank. However, Sacombank faces a significant risk from its problem assets while VP is constrained by risk from its consumer finance portfolio.
Shares of SHB trade on an earnings yield of 20%, a P/B of 0.5x, and a franchise value of 4% with the tailwinds of a quintile 1 PH Score™. A RSI of 39 intimates that shares are under bought. Shares have had a poor run of late (no doubt reflecting caveats mentioned below) and may have found a bottom. Caveats include modest solvency (similar to Sacombank, MCB, Lien Viet, BIDV, Vietcombank, Vietinbank), a model reliance on market funding as opposed to CASA, soft loan growth, slow fee income revenues, and inefficiencies within its operations in the northern zone of Vietnam.
Analysing Shin Kong Financial Holding (2888 TT)is like evaluating an investment trust with operating cash flow and a robust demand deposit funding base derived from 106 bank branches. The consolidated asset-base (68% of which consists of securities) is a float (long for claim reserves and short for premium reserves) composed of low beta high dividend yielding stocks but mainly overseas FI, some NT$1.7trillion worth yielding 4.7%, as well as loans (20% of Assets).
SKFH is the holding for life insurance (SKL), the bank (SKB), property insurance, mainly auto and fire insurance (SKPIA), the investment trust (SKIT), Masterlink securities, and VC operations (SKVC). SKFH is mainly life insurance (73% of Assets) and the bank (24%).
Management is focused on enhancing integration initiatives, efficiencies, initiatives and synergies within the Group. “Shin Kong: Pioneering a digital mobile future” is a programme to drive digital evolution through AI, big data, and smart robots.
With 317 branches, the secure and mature insurance franchise (mainly life but also health) is concentrated on selling foreign FX protection and policies in order to support interest spreads and contain hedging costs. While Net Profit at the life insurance subsidiary jumped exuberantly at 9M18, there were signs of deterioration in the underlying underwriting business with the claims: premium plus expenses: premium ratios eroding somewhat which shows up in the Consolidated statement in a decrease in “Net Income on Life Insurance”.
The bank is scaling up its presence in wealth management (bancassurance, mutual funds), trade finance, syndicated loans, and retail plus SME credit. Fee income is now 20% of total Revenues. A negative take, as elsewhere, was the rise in interest expenses after Fed tightening though this helps improve returns from life insurers’ assets, which have a shorter duration than their insurance liabilities. However, value-quality trends at SKB (the bank) are positive. Key metrics/signals at 9M18 in consolidated accounts and separate bank statements underline positive fundamental momentum embodied in a high PH Score™.
Consolidated results perhaps better reflect earnings pressures in insurance than the life insurance Balance Sheet as well as showing gains from FX and the sale of investments across divisions and a solid banking performance despite aforementioned interest expenses growth.
Shares of SKFH trade on an earnings yield of 21%, a P/B of 0.57x, a franchise value of 15%, and a Dividend Yield of 4% with the tailwinds of a decile 1 PH Score™. A RSI of 36 intimates that shares are under bought. Shares have had a poor run of late with the P/B at a 3-year low, and may have found a bottom. Caveats include underlying insurance results, the tough underwriting environment, and scale and interest costs within the banking franchise. The jury is out as to whether SKFH might be a value trap.
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The political decision to exit the European Union has unpredictable negative consequences for both the UK economy and stockmarket. My purpose is to identify a portfolio of UK shorts and occasional longs.
Lloyds Banking: What does it do ?
Lloyds Banking Group is the UK’s largest retail bank with a 20% share of both consumer credit and mortgage lending. It has no investment banking activities or overseas activities.
Why is it in the long portfolio ?
After a 10 year period of rehabilitation post the Financial Crisis the group is now profitable at the statutory level and generating a healthy double return on tangible equity (ROE). This year the consensus expectation is for a dividend of 3.3p per share (+7%) leaving the shares on a yield of 5.7%. In addition management completed a GBP1bn share buyback, the combination of buy-back and divided represents 4.7p per share or an effective yield of 8.1%. If future projections prove correct then the ROE should morph into the mid-teens by 2020. A return at this level should be sufficient to lift the shares well above book value.
What are the risks ?
A key risk is economic dislocation from Brexit. Management believe that EU exit along the lines of the current withdrawal agreement will be compatible with only a marginal increase in credit losses.
Founded in 1992 and acquired by Mr. Roman Avdeev in 1994,Credit Bank Of Moscow Pjsc (CBOM RM) benefits from an entrenched market position and strong brand recognition in its strategic market of Moscow which represents 25% of Russian GDP. CBM is an established operation in Moscow and the Moscow region with over 7,000 devices in high traffic locations.
CBM has expanded fast, from commanding a mere 0.7% share of system Assets in 2013 to 2.9% today.
The bank has a defined strategy underpinned by blue-chip, large, and medium-sized corporate services (fees, settlements, cash handling); high-margin consumer lending; and investment banking (SOVA Capital synergies, interbank, ECM, DCM, M&A). CBM commands a client-base of 15k corporates: companies represent 87% of loans. The bank has 1.5MM retail customers: accounting for a third of deposits.
In 2015 CBM acquired Inkakhran, swelling its nationwide cash handling market share to 17%. In this segment, CBM commands a client-base of 3k, of which 164 are banks, with 876 armoured vehicles covering 33k collection points.
Management is focused on above-system growth, based on a relatively robust liquid Balance Sheet, reducing funding costs, and enhancing operating efficiency and productivity. 2018 was marked by building up liquidity and strengthening capital adequacy as well as managing Balance Sheet risk -after 5 years of forceful growth- while maintaining profitability and cost efficiencies.
Technology highlights include the Your Bank Online system, MKB Business, and Foreign Exchange Control Dashboard.
Avdeev’s Rossium, a domestic group with interests in agriculture, timber, oil and a pharmacy chain, is the majority shareholder (56%) while the EBRD holds a position which reduces the float (18%). The supervisory board contains 5 out of 10 independent non executives while 2 more are nominees of minority shareholders. Related party lending is 3.5% of the loan book. Rosneft exposure though represents a caveat to CBM and to the system in general though some view this more of a strength.
CBM trades below Book Value, lies on a low Mkt Cap./Deposits rating of 13%, below the global and EM median, and commands an Earnings Yield of 13%. A quintile 1 PH Score™ of 8.0 captures the valuation dynamic while metric change is satisfactory. Combining franchise valuation, technical momentum, and the PH Score™, CBM stands in the top quintile of opportunity globally.
Income available for distribution to Unitholders was 8.6% higher than the IPO forecast. The outperformance was due to contribution from the Westpark Portfolio which was acquired on 30th Nov 2018. Excluding the impact of Westpark Portfolio, income from the underlying IPO portfolio was generally in line with the forecast.
For the full year, total income available for distribution to Unitholders was US$43.8 mil.
KORE reiterated that the US tax regulation changes and convergence of Barbados tax rates for domestic and international companies are not expected to have any material impact on NTA and DPU. There will be no further changes expected to the trust structure.
The outlook for KORE remains positive. KORE has positioned itself well for defensive growth in the coming year.
Positive set of results and outlook is expected to continue driving the re-rating of KORE. The immediate price target for KORE is US$0.78 per unit (parity to NAV) that will translate to a forward yield of 7.3%.
Based in Malaysia, AFFIN Bank Bhd (ABANK MK) is the product of two mergers over the last decade. Today AFFIN is a small-medium-sized financial services group, with 107 branches, combining corporate and SME banking; consumer banking (remittance services, vehicle loans, mortgages, personal loans, credit cards, unit trusts, and bancassurance products); Investment/Merchant Banking via AFFIN Hwang (AHAM), including corporate finance, capital market services and investment management; plus underwriting of general and life insurance (an underpenetrated market) through AAGI and AALI. AFFIN Islamic is a wholly owned subsidiary.
The core shareholders are LTAT (the superannuation fund for the Armed Forces), the Bank of East Asia, and Boustead Holdings which limits the float.
Malaysia has a tailwind of a new administration, vowing to overturn many aspects of its predecessor – including cancelling mega infra projects and reducing the “real” National debt.
The economy is pretty buoyant and is slated to generate an average of 4.75% GDP growth over 2018-2022. Inflation has mellowed, supported by the cut in GST, but will still, once these effects diminish, be modest, at around 2%, this year. The current and trade accounts are in surplus.
Malaysia, however, has a high level (by Asian standards) of household (excluding mortgages) indebtedness, dominated by credit cards, auto/vehicle finance, and personal loans. This had led to a moderately high risk in terms of the credit-to-GDP gap. The corporate sector is not excessively leveraged.
AFFIN trades at a P/B ratio of 0.5x and a Mkt Cap./Deposits of 8%, well below the global and EM medians. Earnings Yield lies at 13.3%. The limited float will have a bearing on the valuation. A quintile 1 PH Score™ of 7.9 captures above-average metric change (though not in asset quality and efficiency) and value-quality attributes. Combining technical momentum, franchise valuation, and the PH Score™, the overall ranking stands in the top decile globally. A RSI of 43 points to potential upside.
China Meidong Auto (1268 HK) has been on a rollercoaster ride in 2018. The stock price of Meidong started 2018 around 2.7 HKD and recently has been trading around 2.9 HKD.
Nice and steady ride? Not exactly, as it has swung from 4.3 HKD in June to 2.6 HKD in August. After analyzing how NPAT estimates evolved over the past year there should be no justifications for these wild swings.
Meidong is likely to report solid FY18 results by late March vs industry peers which are expected to report a weak 2H18. While BMW dealers have been reportedly suffering in China during 2018, Meidong was fortunate to have other luxury brands pick up the slack.
FY19 should be another growth year for Meidong as 1) recently acquired BMW showrooms contribute their maiden results and 2) other luxury brands continue to perform despite overall doom and gloom in the Chinese auto market. Should the Chinese government launch car replacement stimulus measures this would be icing on the cake.
Fair Value lowered slightly from 4.7 HKD to 4.4 HKD (10x 2019E) on lower 2019 profit estimates, which leaves 52% upside excluding dividends.
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Value-quality trends at Saigon Hanoi Commericial (SHB VN) stand out within Vietnam’s improving banking universe. Key metrics/signals at 9M18 underline positive fundamental momentum embodied in a high PH Score™. SHB’s improvements reflect macro backdrop (upgraded sovereign strength).
Formerly known as Nhon Ai Rural Commercial, SHB incorporated Hanoi Building Commercial Bank and Vinaconex – Viettel Finance in 2012 and 2017, respectively, in line with system restructuring. SHB borrows short in order to lend short and long as well as purchase high-yielding government bonds. More than 79% of loans stem from credit provision up to 1 month and from 1-3 months, broadly matching short-duration market funding. (The liquidity gap is sound). Credit is diverse with an emphasis on agriculture, manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade. SHB is increasing higher-margin consumer lending which represents just 22% of the loan portfolio. Some 8% of the portfolio relates to state-owned enterprises.
Vietnam exhibits broad-based, mild-inflationary, growth. Reforms continue in the banking sector, privatisations and reducing red tape. However, economic distortions and capacity constraints remain, as do external and domestic risks and longer-term challenges. The robust economy though provides an opportunity for additional reforms to boost investment, ensure durable growth and resilient balance sheets, and reduce the external surplus.
Regarding banks, SOCBs need to be capitalized with government funds, and private sector and foreign ownership limits raised (lifting a 30% foreign investor limit to banking and aviation is underway). Vietnam needs to develop a macroprudential framework and to enhance data quality on balance sheet exposures to better monitor and manage risks, and to ensure that robust liquidity and crisis management frameworks are in place from a legal and operational perspective in order to mitigate financial sector risks. The broad picture though reflects an improved macro profile combined with progress at banks in writing off legacy problem assets and boosting capitalisation – especially in the case of ABB, ACB, Military Bank, OCB, TPbank, VIB, and Techcombank. However, Sacombank faces a significant risk from its problem assets while VP is constrained by risk from its consumer finance portfolio.
Shares of SHB trade on an earnings yield of 20%, a P/B of 0.5x, and a franchise value of 4% with the tailwinds of a quintile 1 PH Score™. A RSI of 39 intimates that shares are under bought. Shares have had a poor run of late (no doubt reflecting caveats mentioned below) and may have found a bottom. Caveats include modest solvency (similar to Sacombank, MCB, Lien Viet, BIDV, Vietcombank, Vietinbank), a model reliance on market funding as opposed to CASA, soft loan growth, slow fee income revenues, and inefficiencies within its operations in the northern zone of Vietnam.
Analysing Shin Kong Financial Holding (2888 TT)is like evaluating an investment trust with operating cash flow and a robust demand deposit funding base derived from 106 bank branches. The consolidated asset-base (68% of which consists of securities) is a float (long for claim reserves and short for premium reserves) composed of low beta high dividend yielding stocks but mainly overseas FI, some NT$1.7trillion worth yielding 4.7%, as well as loans (20% of Assets).
SKFH is the holding for life insurance (SKL), the bank (SKB), property insurance, mainly auto and fire insurance (SKPIA), the investment trust (SKIT), Masterlink securities, and VC operations (SKVC). SKFH is mainly life insurance (73% of Assets) and the bank (24%).
Management is focused on enhancing integration initiatives, efficiencies, initiatives and synergies within the Group. “Shin Kong: Pioneering a digital mobile future” is a programme to drive digital evolution through AI, big data, and smart robots.
With 317 branches, the secure and mature insurance franchise (mainly life but also health) is concentrated on selling foreign FX protection and policies in order to support interest spreads and contain hedging costs. While Net Profit at the life insurance subsidiary jumped exuberantly at 9M18, there were signs of deterioration in the underlying underwriting business with the claims: premium plus expenses: premium ratios eroding somewhat which shows up in the Consolidated statement in a decrease in “Net Income on Life Insurance”.
The bank is scaling up its presence in wealth management (bancassurance, mutual funds), trade finance, syndicated loans, and retail plus SME credit. Fee income is now 20% of total Revenues. A negative take, as elsewhere, was the rise in interest expenses after Fed tightening though this helps improve returns from life insurers’ assets, which have a shorter duration than their insurance liabilities. However, value-quality trends at SKB (the bank) are positive. Key metrics/signals at 9M18 in consolidated accounts and separate bank statements underline positive fundamental momentum embodied in a high PH Score™.
Consolidated results perhaps better reflect earnings pressures in insurance than the life insurance Balance Sheet as well as showing gains from FX and the sale of investments across divisions and a solid banking performance despite aforementioned interest expenses growth.
Shares of SKFH trade on an earnings yield of 21%, a P/B of 0.57x, a franchise value of 15%, and a Dividend Yield of 4% with the tailwinds of a decile 1 PH Score™. A RSI of 36 intimates that shares are under bought. Shares have had a poor run of late with the P/B at a 3-year low, and may have found a bottom. Caveats include underlying insurance results, the tough underwriting environment, and scale and interest costs within the banking franchise. The jury is out as to whether SKFH might be a value trap.
Holding floor support is vital for this trade to work. In absolute terms both APG and APC display similarly weak chart structures with risk of a final bout of weakness. APG displays a more depressed chart reading however.
It was reported that South Korea’s population increased only 0.09% YoY at the end of 2018. The population growth has been declining in the past three decades in Korea. The population growth rate of 0.09% YoY in 2018 is even lower than the growth rate of 0.16% YoY in 2017. (Source: Korean Ministry of the Interior and Safety) The previous general estimates by various government agencies/research institutes of when the population in South Korea would decline were around 2028-2032.
With the new available data, it is likely that these estimates will be revised drastically. In fact, it is possible that South Korea’s population could start declining around 2020-2022, contrary to previous estimates that suggested that South Korea’s population to start declining around 2028-2032.
The two leading Korean banks including Shinhan Financial (055550 KS) and Kb Financial Group (105560 KS) have been in a decade plus bear market. While these stocks may move up or down 10-15% within a short period of time, we think they are a structural, long-term short. Bank of Korea has been hesitant on raising the base interest rate. There are simply an overwhelming pressure to not to crash the real estate market. Because of this enormous pressure, the Korean banks have been losing out on the higher interest rate spreads they could have earned if the interest rates were raised much higher.
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Based in Malaysia, AFFIN Bank Bhd (ABANK MK) is the product of two mergers over the last decade. Today AFFIN is a small-medium-sized financial services group, with 107 branches, combining corporate and SME banking; consumer banking (remittance services, vehicle loans, mortgages, personal loans, credit cards, unit trusts, and bancassurance products); Investment/Merchant Banking via AFFIN Hwang (AHAM), including corporate finance, capital market services and investment management; plus underwriting of general and life insurance (an underpenetrated market) through AAGI and AALI. AFFIN Islamic is a wholly owned subsidiary.
The core shareholders are LTAT (the superannuation fund for the Armed Forces), the Bank of East Asia, and Boustead Holdings which limits the float.
Malaysia has a tailwind of a new administration, vowing to overturn many aspects of its predecessor – including cancelling mega infra projects and reducing the “real” National debt.
The economy is pretty buoyant and is slated to generate an average of 4.75% GDP growth over 2018-2022. Inflation has mellowed, supported by the cut in GST, but will still, once these effects diminish, be modest, at around 2%, this year. The current and trade accounts are in surplus.
Malaysia, however, has a high level (by Asian standards) of household (excluding mortgages) indebtedness, dominated by credit cards, auto/vehicle finance, and personal loans. This had led to a moderately high risk in terms of the credit-to-GDP gap. The corporate sector is not excessively leveraged.
AFFIN trades at a P/B ratio of 0.5x and a Mkt Cap./Deposits of 8%, well below the global and EM medians. Earnings Yield lies at 13.3%. The limited float will have a bearing on the valuation. A quintile 1 PH Score™ of 7.9 captures above-average metric change (though not in asset quality and efficiency) and value-quality attributes. Combining technical momentum, franchise valuation, and the PH Score™, the overall ranking stands in the top decile globally. A RSI of 43 points to potential upside.
China Meidong Auto (1268 HK) has been on a rollercoaster ride in 2018. The stock price of Meidong started 2018 around 2.7 HKD and recently has been trading around 2.9 HKD.
Nice and steady ride? Not exactly, as it has swung from 4.3 HKD in June to 2.6 HKD in August. After analyzing how NPAT estimates evolved over the past year there should be no justifications for these wild swings.
Meidong is likely to report solid FY18 results by late March vs industry peers which are expected to report a weak 2H18. While BMW dealers have been reportedly suffering in China during 2018, Meidong was fortunate to have other luxury brands pick up the slack.
FY19 should be another growth year for Meidong as 1) recently acquired BMW showrooms contribute their maiden results and 2) other luxury brands continue to perform despite overall doom and gloom in the Chinese auto market. Should the Chinese government launch car replacement stimulus measures this would be icing on the cake.
Fair Value lowered slightly from 4.7 HKD to 4.4 HKD (10x 2019E) on lower 2019 profit estimates, which leaves 52% upside excluding dividends.
Since our bearish Insight on Tokyo Kiraboshi Financial Group (7173 JP) issued in November 2018, Tokyo Kiraboshi FG (7173 JP): Shooting Star, the stock’s subsequent performance has fully justified our pessimism, with the share price finishing CY2018 down 47.7% year-on-year (YoY). Having touched a low of ¥1,504 on Christmas Day, the shares have recovered 10.1% to ¥1,656 as of Friday’s close: slightly better than the Topix Bank Index, which closed on Friday at 154.44, up 9.0% over the same period. Trading on a forward-looking price/earnings multiple of 12.5x (using the bank’s current FY3/2019 guidance) and a price/book ratio of 0.21x, TKFG looks cheap. This is deceptive. Adjusting the group’s earnings per share (EPS) for the ¥55 billion (US$507 million) in two still-outstanding preference share issues pushes the PER to over 18x: hardly a bargain. Meanwhile, the group’s RoA and RoE ratios are woefully low, loan growth has collapsed since end-March 2018, deposits have fallen alarmingly, and main bank subsidiary Kiraboshi Bank is struggling to keep its net return on funds deployed (NRFD) in positive territory. A stock best avoided.
Trawling through >1500 global banks, based on the last quarter of reported Balance Sheets, we apply the discipline of the PH Score™ , a value-quality fundamental momentum screen, plus a low RSI screen, and a low Franchise Valuation (FV) screen to deliver our latest rankings for global banks.
While not all of top decile 1 scores are a buy – some are value traps while others maybe somewhat small and obscure and traded sparsely- the bottom decile names should awaken caution. We would be hard pressed to recommend some of the more popular and fashionable names from the bottom decile. Names such as ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN) , Credicorp of Peru, Bank Central Asia (BBCA IJ) and Itau Unibanco Holding Sa (ITUB US) are EM favourites. Their share prices have performed well for an extended period and thus carry valuation risk. They represent pricey quality in some cases. They are not priced for disappointment but rather for hope. Are the constituents of the bottom decile not fertile grounds for short sellers?
Why pay top dollar for a bank franchise given risks related to domestic (let alone global) politics and the economy? Some investors and analysts have expressed “inspiration” for developments in Brazil and Argentina. But Brazilian bonds are now trading as if the country is Investment Grade again. (This is relevant for banks especially). Guedes and co. may deliver on pension/social security reform. If so, prices will become even more inflated. But what happens if they don’t deliver on reform? Why pay top dollar for hope given the ramp up in prices already? Argentina is an even more fragile “hope narrative”. More of a “Hope take 2”. Similar to Brazil, bank Franchise Valuations are elevated. While the current account adjustment and easing inflation are to be expected, the political and social scene will be a challenge. LATAM seems to be “hot” again with investment bankers talking of resilience. But resilience is different from valuation. Banks from Chile, Peru, and Colombia feature in the bottom decile too. If an investor wants to be in these markets and desires bank exposure, surely it makes sense to look for the best value on offer. Grupo Aval Acciones y Valores (AVAL CB) may represent one such opportunity.
Our bottom decile rankings feature a great deal of banks from Indonesia. In a promising market such as Indonesia, given bank valuations, one needs to tread extremely carefully to not end up paying over the odds, to not pay for extrapolation. In addition, India is a susceptible jurisdiction for any bank operating there – no bank is “superhuman” and especially not at the prices on offer for the popular private sector “winners”. Saudi Arabia is another market that suddenly became popular last year. We are mindful of valuations and FX.
Does it not make more sense to look at opportunity in the top decile? While some of the names here will be too small or illiquid (mea culpa), there are genuine portfolio candidates. South Korea stands out in the rankings. Woori Bank (WF US) is top of the rankings after a share price plunge related to a stock overhang but this will pass. Hana Financial (086790 KS) , Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK LX) and DGB Financial Group (139130 KS) are portfolio candidates. Elsewhere, Russia and Vietnam rightly feature while Sri Lanka and Pakistan contribute some names despite very real political and macro risks. We would caution on some of the relatively small Chinese names but recommend the big 4 versus EM peers – they are not expensive. In fact some of the big 4 feature in decile 2 of our rankings. There are many Japanese banks here too. And many, like some Chinese lenders, are cheap for a reason. While the technical picture for Japanese banks is bearish, at some stage selective weeding out of opportunity within Japan’s banking sector may be rewarding. The megabanks are certainly not dear. Europe is another matter. Despite valuations, we are cautious on French lenders and on German consolidation narratives – did a merger of 2 weak banks ever deliver shareholder value? The inclusion of two Romanian banks in the top decile is somewhat of a headscratcher. These are perfectly investable opportunities but share prices have been poor of late.
Value-quality trends at Saigon Hanoi Commericial (SHB VN) stand out within Vietnam’s improving banking universe. Key metrics/signals at 9M18 underline positive fundamental momentum embodied in a high PH Score™. SHB’s improvements reflect macro backdrop (upgraded sovereign strength).
Formerly known as Nhon Ai Rural Commercial, SHB incorporated Hanoi Building Commercial Bank and Vinaconex – Viettel Finance in 2012 and 2017, respectively, in line with system restructuring. SHB borrows short in order to lend short and long as well as purchase high-yielding government bonds. More than 79% of loans stem from credit provision up to 1 month and from 1-3 months, broadly matching short-duration market funding. (The liquidity gap is sound). Credit is diverse with an emphasis on agriculture, manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade. SHB is increasing higher-margin consumer lending which represents just 22% of the loan portfolio. Some 8% of the portfolio relates to state-owned enterprises.
Vietnam exhibits broad-based, mild-inflationary, growth. Reforms continue in the banking sector, privatisations and reducing red tape. However, economic distortions and capacity constraints remain, as do external and domestic risks and longer-term challenges. The robust economy though provides an opportunity for additional reforms to boost investment, ensure durable growth and resilient balance sheets, and reduce the external surplus.
Regarding banks, SOCBs need to be capitalized with government funds, and private sector and foreign ownership limits raised (lifting a 30% foreign investor limit to banking and aviation is underway). Vietnam needs to develop a macroprudential framework and to enhance data quality on balance sheet exposures to better monitor and manage risks, and to ensure that robust liquidity and crisis management frameworks are in place from a legal and operational perspective in order to mitigate financial sector risks. The broad picture though reflects an improved macro profile combined with progress at banks in writing off legacy problem assets and boosting capitalisation – especially in the case of ABB, ACB, Military Bank, OCB, TPbank, VIB, and Techcombank. However, Sacombank faces a significant risk from its problem assets while VP is constrained by risk from its consumer finance portfolio.
Shares of SHB trade on an earnings yield of 20%, a P/B of 0.5x, and a franchise value of 4% with the tailwinds of a quintile 1 PH Score™. A RSI of 39 intimates that shares are under bought. Shares have had a poor run of late (no doubt reflecting caveats mentioned below) and may have found a bottom. Caveats include modest solvency (similar to Sacombank, MCB, Lien Viet, BIDV, Vietcombank, Vietinbank), a model reliance on market funding as opposed to CASA, soft loan growth, slow fee income revenues, and inefficiencies within its operations in the northern zone of Vietnam.
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