In our Discover HK Connect series, we aim to help our investors understand the flow of southbound trades via the Hong Kong Connect, as analyzed by our proprietary data engine. We will discuss the stocks that experienced the most inflow and outflow by mainland investors in the past seven days.
We split the stocks eligible for the Hong Kong Connect trade into three groups: component stocks in the HSCEI index, stocks with a market capitalization between USD 1 billion and USD 5 billion, and stocks with a market capitalization between USD 500 million and USD 1 billion.
In this insight, we will provide an analysis of the performance of selected stocks that just joined the Stock Connect last week.
Sutl Enterprise (SUTL SP) did not grow revenues in 2018 as it continued to operate only its flagship Sentosa marina. Change is coming as it has 9 projects in the pipeline which could dramatically alter the financial future of the company by FY21.
The biggest news is the groundbreaking of Puteri Harbor in Malaysia last week. With a sales gallery opening by May 2019, it will be very interesting to follow the progress on this project and its contribution to SUTL’s top/bottom-line results in FY19/FY20.
SUTL is misunderstood by investors because management disclosure is lacking and liquidity is poor. The valuation of SUTL could be improved if investors had a better understanding of the earnings trajectory we could expect in FY19-FY21.
We realize the Tay family is not looking to sell its stake anytime soon so is not concerned about its current market cap. We caution that this might not be a smart way to run a publicly listed company as a more expensive ‘currency’ (stock price) might help the company be taken more seriously when attempting to make acquisitions overseas.
However, this does not alter the fact that 84% of the market cap is cash and the EV of this consistently profitable company is barely 6.7M USD. SUTL is undeniably one of the cheapest stocks on SGX.
PagerDuty Inc (PD US)is a US based software company which is ready to complete its IPO in the next several weeks. Founded in 2009, PagerDuty helps companies to respond quickly when their websites go down. PagerDuty’s software helps companies to respond to items such as customer complaints and helps companies to spot problems. The company is known for capitalizing on its AI (Artificial Intelligence) models to quickly solve problems of why websites go down.
The company has an excellent, diversified base of more than 10,000 customers in 90 countries including IBM, The World Bank, Airbnb, Netflix, GE, and Gap. One of the strong points of PagerDuty is the fact that it has gathered massive amounts of data from its more than 10,000 customers. The company also boasts a very high customer retention rate (139% net retention rate). A combination of the company’s strong AI capability coupled with the increasing amounts of Big Data provide a strong competitive advantage for the company since its AI capability may improve and get smarter with additional Big Data and continuous problem solving of why websites go down.
PagerDuty was most recently valued at $1.3 billion in September 2018 in a private market valuation (led by T.Rowe Price Group investing $90 million in the company), representing 16x the company’s annual revenue of $79.6 million as of 12 months ending January 2018.
ZTO Express (ZTO US)‘s earnings will fail to meet the high expectations of sell-side analysts and investors who seeit as a cheap proxy for Chinese e-commerce activity.
China’s express sector revenue grew 43.5% YoY in 2016, the year ZTO went public. Last year, revenue growth was just half that (21.8%), and we expect the sector’s growth to continue to moderate over the next few years.
The express sector is also evolving in ways that will put downward pressure on profitability and require greater investment from the express companies.
We expect the profitability of ZTO’s express business to decline in the medium-term as the company adjusts to slowing demand and emerging sector trends. Our earnings estimates, which are far below consensus figures, reflect these challenges.
ZTO suffers from declining earnings quality and two accounting issues that we feel make it a risky, unattractive investment. Our 12-month target price for ZTO is US$13.31, based on 16 times our blended 2019-20 EPS estimates. We rate the stock Sell.
The legal battle between Reliance Communications (RCOM IN) and its lender group has further intensified after the Supreme Court directed the company to submit INR4.53bn within four weeks. The Court ruled that Chairman Anil Ambani had wilfully not paid INR5.5 bn to Swedish Telecom equipment maker Ericsson (Lm) Tel-Sp Adr (ERIC US). In our view, the situation has become almost untenable for RCOM and Mr. Ambani as the company will struggle to sell off its spectrum and other assets in time. In addition, The spectrum sale is yet to be resolved and this means that raising funds quickly remains a challenge. We have revised our recommendation for RCOM 6.5% 20s from NEUTRAL to UNDERWEIGHT due to the on-going negative headlines which we believe is an asymmetric downside risk to the bonds. This is despite some positive developments we highlighted in our last report (Reliance Communications Ltd. •Too Few Steps Forward• dated 18-Oct-18) and our recovery calculation in our previous report (Reliance Communications: Waiting to Exhale dated 07-Jul-18), which is proven wrong by the market.
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KCL-SPH again extended the closing date of the offer from 18 February to 4 March 2019. M1’s shares are trading at S$2.04 per share, marginally below the VGO price of S$2.06 per share. We believe that the KCL-SPH should get the valid acceptances to complete the delisting and wholly own M1.
Softbank has announced a buyback of ¥600bn – its largest buyback ever. At ~¥10,500/share it is 57mm shares or 5.2% of shares out. At ¥12,000/share it is 50mm shares or 4.6%. The “official” float is about 68.7% or 750mm shares. However, by Travis’ estimate, only 44.5% of shares out or 488mm shares are Real World Float. 57mm shares out of 488mm shares is 11.7%. That is a non-negligible portion of float, and will mean significant reduction in foreign active management exposure to Softbank, or significant reduction in individual investor exposure to Softbank, or both.
Travis Lundy wrote the buyback will have further impact on the stock price simply because of flow dynamics. It isn’t easy to buy 10% of float. And we should remember that the BOJ is still buying ¥100bn+ of Softbank shares per year as it continues to buy ¥6trln of ETFs per year. And given the stock will be in the top momentum ranks of large cap Japan, Travis expects momentum flows will join the party adding more inflow.
For trading types, he thought Softbank was a buy, relatively and on an absolute basis. The Japan market is CHEAP on a current year and forecast year ahead, which suggests either the market is “wrong” or economic headwinds are picking up to a greater extent than pundits suggest.
The pre-conditons have been fulfilled and Delta Electronics (2308 TT)will now move to a tender offer. But there exist a number of unknowns for the transaction, which could delay the Offer timetable.
Although the initial wording in the August conditional voluntary tender offer announcement suggests the offer will be for ALL shares, there is talk there may be a maximum acceptance condition, therefore possible clawback for shareholders tendering. A rumoured 60% maximum translates to a minimum 50% pro-rata, potentially 67% if the family tenders 40% and the rest of holders tender half.
It is not clear whether the FY18 dividend will be netted. DELTA has announced two sets of quarterly results since the initial Offer announcement and it would be unjust for DEISG to net off any dividend. It would likely suit the family to receive the dividend. The Offer is pitched at a 1.79% premium to the then-current price. If the dividend is netted, then the Offer price will, in fact, be at a discount to last close as of announcement. DELTA will announce its full-year dividend tomorrow (18th February) and the terms of the deal may also be announced the same day. The AGM to ratify the dividend will take place around the 2 April.
Currently trading at terms or a gross/annualised spread of 4.6/21%, if including a Bt3.30 FY18 dividend and mid-May payment. That looks overly tight in the face of timing delays and actual consideration to be paid if indeed it comes out to be a partial offer.
Three months ago, Minebea Mitsumi (6479 JP) announced it would launch a Tender Offer for U Shin and it would take just under three months until the approvals were received and it could officially start the Tender Offer process. The background to the Tender Offer was discussed in Minebea Mitsumi Launches Offer for U-SHIN in early November. Travis first conclusion in November was that this was the “riskiest” straight-out non-hostile TOB he had seen in a while. Minebea Mitsumi has now announced the launch of its Tender Offer, at the same price as originally planned (¥985/share).
This deal is still perplexing to Travis. It’s easy enough from an industrial standpoint. Why not buy relatively cheap assets then see if you can cross-sell or assume some attrition? But for investors, he wonders why they put up with this. The process of reaching a “fair” valuation is, by definition, conflicted. It cannot NOT be conflicted. And just because some independent directors who don’t have skin in the game, and may have no clue about corporate valuation methodology, or fair market price, agree to a price that the acquiree’s managers, not wanting to lose their jobs, agree to doesn’t make this “fair.”
The tender offer period is QUITE long. Most tender offers are 30 days in order to give time for people to tender or “offer sufficient time for a rival bidder.” This time Travis thinks it is longer so people can take their time and get bored and tender.
Travis would sell shares now and use the balance sheet elsewhere until an activist shows his hand. If no activist, this deal is not an interesting one.
After multiple news outlets reported that LG Uplus Corp (032640 KS) will finalise a transaction with the CJ Hello, a deal was done at ₩800bn (instead of ₩1tn speculated), and only 50%+1 share instead of the full 53.92% stake held by CJ ENM (035760 KS). The acquisition price of ₩20,659 is a 107% premium to last price and translates to a EV/EBITDA multiple of 6.6x.
This is a straight stock acquisition deal. CJ Hello will be a subsidiary of LG Uplus and will continue to exist as a separate listed company. CJ ENM still owns nearly 4% CJH stake. SKT owns 8.61%.
LG Group is publicly saying that they have no plan of an immediate merger, which means neither party requires shareholder approval. But the transaction is subject to local regulator approval – MSIT and Korea FTC. MSIT approval is not an issue. FTC rejected the SKT-CJH deal last time. This time, the FTC’s head Kim Sang-jo is hinting that this deal will go through.
LG Uplus’ acquisition of CJ Hellovision is likely to further accelerate the consolidation of the Korean cable TV/media sector. KT Corp (030200 KS)is now likely to aggressively try to acquire cable-operator D’Live. SK Telecom (017670 KS) has shown some interests in acquiring Tbroad cable company.
Glow announced that the Energy Regulatory Commission (“ERC”) has resolved to approve the merger with GPSC, provided Glow sells its Glow SPP1 plant before or at the same time as the merger. A number of conditions were also attached to some of the remaining power plants. No price has been disclosed for the 69.11% stake in Glow, ex the SPP1 plant, but it will be in reference to the Bt94.892 Offer price previously announced, net of expenses with selling SPP1 and the reduced synergy thereon.
Given SPP1 is an immaterial contributor (~5%) to Glow, in terms of revenue, it can be argued that GPSC may make only a minimal change to the Offer price. Still, even a 5% downward adjustment would equate to a price below where Glow is trading.
The downside is ~8%, if using the closing price on the 11 October. Glow/GPSC/Engie want this deal to complete. I think the final Offer price will come in very close to that initially proposed. But I would not buy through Bt90, preferring to pick up shares at Bt89 or below. The merger is expected to be completed by next month, triggering a mandatory tender offer, which may take an additional 2 months or so to complete.
Sigma Healthcare released a 2-page Market Update saying the four month Business Review had identified A$100mm of annual cost savings, confirmed the FY19 EBIT guidance of A$75mn, and confirmed the FY20 EBITDA guidance of $55-60mm. The business review sees 10% underlying EBITDA growth from FY20 to FY23 so that after cost savings are included, FY23 sees the same EBITDA as FY19 [i.e. almost A$90mm].
On a standalone basis, at the end of FY22 looking towards FY23, at 8x EV/EBITDA, it looks like there is something like 60-80% upside. EBITDA might be worth even more than A$90mm in FY23 as long as the DCs can run at high capacity. And at mid-high teens PER that would be a pretty great result. They won’t get that 60-80% upside from now doing a deal with API, but they won’t have to wait for 4 years to get it either.
Travis expects another A$0.15 of value would do it. He doesn’t think they need A$0.20. The shares bounced and traded around A$0.80-1.00 from mid summer 2017 to mid-summer 2018. But that is when EBIT was supposed to fall to A$90mm. And that was nearer-term. Now we have a forecast of EBITDA of A$90mm and that is 3+ years out.
Travis thinks this could get done at 0.42-0.45 shares of API and A$0.23 of cash, given that would probably impact API shares a little bit, that would end up being a 10-15% bump vs original terms, but all told that would be pretty good – and almost a double from undisturbed.
KDDI Corp (9433 JP) announced its intention to conduct a Tender Offer for Kabu.com through a made-for-purpose SPC. The deal is not terribly different in scope than the one discussed in KDDI Deal for Kabu.com (8703 JP) Coming? about two weeks ago.
The Tender Offer is to purchase a minimum of 45,758,400 shares at ¥559/share, which is a 5.67% premium to last close and a 46.3% premium to the undisturbed price of 23 January 2019. Obtaining the minimum would get the combination of KDDI and MUFJ Securities (which currently holds 52.96% of the shares outstanding, and will not tender) to 66.67% which would allow the combination to do a Two Step Squeezeout, which KDDI states in the document that it intends to do.
Anti-trust and regulatory approvals are required (Travis can’t imagine any issues), and KDDI expects that the Tender Offer will commence in late April. This looks pretty easy as a deal, with few impediments. A rival bid is unlikely – KDDI has a headstart with the shares of MUFG Bank which have committed to the deal.
This is going to be boring. One can make markets, carry it, or allocate capital to something more interesting. However Kabu.com’s ¥6/share dividend for end March 2019 WILL BE PAID according to a press release by Kabu.com today after the close. That means there will be a down-shift in price on the ex-date of the dividend at end-March.
Via subsidiary NSITEXE, Inc, Denso has acquired a stake in Californian start-up quadric.io. NSITEXE was established to develop high performance, next generation semiconductor devices for automated driving solutions. quadric’s edge processing units compliment this technology push.
Xingfa announced its major shareholder, Guangxin Aluminium (a wholly-owned Guangdong SASAC vehicle), has acquired 5,000 shares, lifting its stake to 30.001%, triggering a mandatory general offer. The offer price is $5.60, a premium of just 2.94% to last close.
Guangxin, together with certain management of Xingfa, attempted to take Xingfa private at $3.70/share back in 1H17. That scheme failed comprehensively, which was a good outcome for minorities as FY17 net income increased 28%. 1H18 profit was also a 25% improvement over the corresponding period.
The offer price is in line with where Xingfa traded last October and is 23% below the recent peak back in mid-June 2018. It is also 37% below where China Lesso Group Holdings (2128 HK) acquired its 26.3% stake in April last year.
There has to be some behind the scenes play for Xingfa’s shares, and this potentially centres on China Lesso. While a look at CCASS shows Liao Yuqing (an ED in Xingfa) intriguingly moving his entire 48.2mn (11.5% of shares out) outside of CCASS in early December 2018.
OSLO NS is the target of competing tender offers from Euronext NV (ENX FP)andNasdaq Inc (NDAQ US). Euronext owns 5.3% and has irrevocables for 45.2% of OSLO NS shares, for 50.5% total. It launched an Offer to acquire all shares at NOK 145, and just raised that to NOK 158 on February 11, 2019. Nasdaq has irrevocables for 35.2% of OSLO NS shares and has launched an Offer to acquire all OSLO NS shares at NOK 152 per share. Nasdaq’s Offer received the unanimous recommendation of Oslo Børs VPS’s Board when it was announced. The IFA opined that NOK 152 per share is above the top end of what shareholders could expect.
Nasdaq’s undertakings are irrevocable and binding, including in the event of a higher offer. The pre-acceptances further include an obligation on the part of the pre-accepting shareholders not to accept the Euronext Offer. Irrevocables for both bidders have an end date of 31 December 2019, after which they are no longer binding.
Nasdaq, which is conditional on a 90% acceptance level, seems to have the weaker hand since its acceptance threshold condition won’t be met unless Euronext folds its cards and walks away; while Euronext (with a 50.01% acceptance condition) can keep its 50.5% “stake” as long as it gets regulatory approval. Therefore, Nasdaq would need to waive its 90% acceptance condition in order to stay in the game.
The Norwegian Ministry of Finance MoF may resolve this by approving both bidders, provided they reach a super majority acceptance threshold of two-thirds or 90% of shares outstanding (but not less). In this scenario, either party will have enough to block the other from reaching the threshold while the irrevocables are binding.
If the MoF says both parties have approval if they get to whatever super majority the MoF decides or is statutorily permitted to impose, and puts a deadline on getting there of some date after the irrevocable lock-up expiration (say, January 31, 2020), then the formerly locked-up shares are free to go to whichever bidder they chose.
I estimate HLG’s discount to NAV at 41% compared to its one-year average of 38%. The implied stub is right at the 2STD extreme and excluding a brief dip in late April 2018, is at the lowest level since June 2013.
What assets HLG does directly own at the stub level are intertwined with HLP’s own investments. There is therefore, very little to distinguish between the two companies. In addition, HLG has gradually offloaded its HK properties – to HLP no less – further increasing its exposure to China and blurring the lines between HLP and HLG’s business exposure.
HLG has also been increasing its stake in HLP since June 2011, from 48.96% to 57.62% as at 31 Dec 2018. It’s a pretty astute trade to sell a property at book to HLP, then “buy” it back indirectly via increasing its stake in HLP, which trades at 0.6x P/B.
There is no significant catalyst for the NAV discount to narrow. And liquidity does play a role, although HLG’s volume has narrowed the gap to HLP’s in recent years. Nevertheless, a ~40% discount to NAV is extreme for a straightforward, passive, single stock holdco structure.
Athaporn Arayasantiparb, CFA discussed his one-on-one with Intouch. Of interest is his discussions on the stub assets specifically InVent, a venture capital arm and considered the market leader in growth stage funding. In 2018, InVent invested Bt30m into ytm thailand, an end-to-end digital marketing and feedback platform, which used the proceeds to buy offline digital access; Bt40m into Choco CRM, a CRM and POS (point of sales) platform for SME; and Bt40m into E Studio, a B2C lifestyle portal.
Other investments discussed by Athaporn, at the stub level, include Wongnai and HSN. Wongnai is an online foodie guide and one of their largest investments to date, boasted 8m active users, 120m page views, 200,000 patron restaurants, and 10m pictures posted so far. Revenue grew 60% in 2018 to Bt250mn, and is expected to grow at 50%. HSN is an online shopping venture between Intuch and Hyundai, which managed to breakeven on a net basis.
The overall value of these investments, and the estimated 11 other start-up companies under InVent, is very much a “finger in the air” calculation. They may exceed the value of Intouch’s 41.1% stake in Thaicom Pcl (THCOM TB), but that still would be just 1% of NAV.
I estimate Intouch’s discount to NAV at ~21% (vs. the one-year average of 27%), having significantly narrowed in response to rumours of a purported sale of Thaicom (discussed in StubWorld: Intouch Gains On Possible Sale of Thaicom). At the time, I thought Intouch had run its course, noting Intouch had denied any definitive approach/agreement.
New Street Research also met with AIS and remains cautious on this telco in the current slowing environment ahead of delayed elections.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Issuance of the new shares and common stock to be delisted on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
C
Japan
Showa Shell
Scheme
1-Apr
Close of offer
E
NZ
Trade Me Group
Scheme
19-Feb
Application for initial orders filed
C
Singapore
Courts Asia
Scheme
15-Mar
Offer Close Date
C
Singapore
M1 Limited
Off Mkt
18-Feb
Closing date of offer
C
Singapore
PCI Limited
Scheme
February
Release of Scheme Booklet
E
Thailand
Delta
Off Mkt
18-Feb
Submit Tender Offer Form
C
Finland
Amer Sports
Off Mkt
28-Feb
Offer Period Expires
C
Norway
Oslo Børs VPS
Off Mkt
4-Mar
Nasdaq Offer Close Date
C
Switzerland
Panalpina
Off Mkt
27-Feb
Binding offer to be announced
E
US
Red Hat, Inc.
Scheme
March/April
Deal lodged for approval with EU Regulators
C
Source: Company announcements. E = our estimates; C =confirmed
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Sutl Enterprise (SUTL SP) did not grow revenues in 2018 as it continued to operate only its flagship Sentosa marina. Change is coming as it has 9 projects in the pipeline which could dramatically alter the financial future of the company by FY21.
The biggest news is the groundbreaking of Puteri Harbor in Malaysia last week. With a sales gallery opening by May 2019, it will be very interesting to follow the progress on this project and its contribution to SUTL’s top/bottom-line results in FY19/FY20.
SUTL is misunderstood by investors because management disclosure is lacking and liquidity is poor. The valuation of SUTL could be improved if investors had a better understanding of the earnings trajectory we could expect in FY19-FY21.
We realize the Tay family is not looking to sell its stake anytime soon so is not concerned about its current market cap. We caution that this might not be a smart way to run a publicly listed company as a more expensive ‘currency’ (stock price) might help the company be taken more seriously when attempting to make acquisitions overseas.
However, this does not alter the fact that 84% of the market cap is cash and the EV of this consistently profitable company is barely 6.7M USD. SUTL is undeniably one of the cheapest stocks on SGX.
PagerDuty Inc (PD US)is a US based software company which is ready to complete its IPO in the next several weeks. Founded in 2009, PagerDuty helps companies to respond quickly when their websites go down. PagerDuty’s software helps companies to respond to items such as customer complaints and helps companies to spot problems. The company is known for capitalizing on its AI (Artificial Intelligence) models to quickly solve problems of why websites go down.
The company has an excellent, diversified base of more than 10,000 customers in 90 countries including IBM, The World Bank, Airbnb, Netflix, GE, and Gap. One of the strong points of PagerDuty is the fact that it has gathered massive amounts of data from its more than 10,000 customers. The company also boasts a very high customer retention rate (139% net retention rate). A combination of the company’s strong AI capability coupled with the increasing amounts of Big Data provide a strong competitive advantage for the company since its AI capability may improve and get smarter with additional Big Data and continuous problem solving of why websites go down.
PagerDuty was most recently valued at $1.3 billion in September 2018 in a private market valuation (led by T.Rowe Price Group investing $90 million in the company), representing 16x the company’s annual revenue of $79.6 million as of 12 months ending January 2018.
ZTO Express (ZTO US)‘s earnings will fail to meet the high expectations of sell-side analysts and investors who seeit as a cheap proxy for Chinese e-commerce activity.
China’s express sector revenue grew 43.5% YoY in 2016, the year ZTO went public. Last year, revenue growth was just half that (21.8%), and we expect the sector’s growth to continue to moderate over the next few years.
The express sector is also evolving in ways that will put downward pressure on profitability and require greater investment from the express companies.
We expect the profitability of ZTO’s express business to decline in the medium-term as the company adjusts to slowing demand and emerging sector trends. Our earnings estimates, which are far below consensus figures, reflect these challenges.
ZTO suffers from declining earnings quality and two accounting issues that we feel make it a risky, unattractive investment. Our 12-month target price for ZTO is US$13.31, based on 16 times our blended 2019-20 EPS estimates. We rate the stock Sell.
The legal battle between Reliance Communications (RCOM IN) and its lender group has further intensified after the Supreme Court directed the company to submit INR4.53bn within four weeks. The Court ruled that Chairman Anil Ambani had wilfully not paid INR5.5 bn to Swedish Telecom equipment maker Ericsson (Lm) Tel-Sp Adr (ERIC US). In our view, the situation has become almost untenable for RCOM and Mr. Ambani as the company will struggle to sell off its spectrum and other assets in time. In addition, The spectrum sale is yet to be resolved and this means that raising funds quickly remains a challenge. We have revised our recommendation for RCOM 6.5% 20s from NEUTRAL to UNDERWEIGHT due to the on-going negative headlines which we believe is an asymmetric downside risk to the bonds. This is despite some positive developments we highlighted in our last report (Reliance Communications Ltd. •Too Few Steps Forward• dated 18-Oct-18) and our recovery calculation in our previous report (Reliance Communications: Waiting to Exhale dated 07-Jul-18), which is proven wrong by the market.
On March 6th, a day before the Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) Taiwan elevator business Tender Offer for just over a third of Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, notably because the acquiring entity had not yet received Taiwan Ministry of Economy Investment Commission approval for the foreign investment, and the Fair Trading Commission had not yet given the green light, so there was no hope of getting it done by the next day in accordance with Taiwan’s Public Acquisition of Public Company Shares Administrative Law Article 18 Para 2. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60.
While there have been noises in the market that both Otis and Schindler, which are reported to hold roughly 5-6% each (last year’s shareholder list included UT Park View which United Technologies (UTX US)‘s 10-K showed was a wholly-owned sub) were willing to offer more than Hitachi’s offered NT$60 (and MOPS filings indicate the board approval meeting in end-January referenced a NT$63 potential bid), there was no competitive bid made public and to the authorities by five business days prior to the first bid close (which would have been 26 Feb) as per the same law Article 7 Para 2.
Since then, there have also been other ructions. While terms remain unchanged, it is worthwhile looking into what has been going on. This is still interesting and because of its various inputs, slightly disconcerting to some, and the modalities continue to surprise me.
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KCL-SPH again extended the closing date of the offer from 18 February to 4 March 2019. M1’s shares are trading at S$2.04 per share, marginally below the VGO price of S$2.06 per share. We believe that the KCL-SPH should get the valid acceptances to complete the delisting and wholly own M1.
Softbank has announced a buyback of ¥600bn – its largest buyback ever. At ~¥10,500/share it is 57mm shares or 5.2% of shares out. At ¥12,000/share it is 50mm shares or 4.6%. The “official” float is about 68.7% or 750mm shares. However, by Travis’ estimate, only 44.5% of shares out or 488mm shares are Real World Float. 57mm shares out of 488mm shares is 11.7%. That is a non-negligible portion of float, and will mean significant reduction in foreign active management exposure to Softbank, or significant reduction in individual investor exposure to Softbank, or both.
Travis Lundy wrote the buyback will have further impact on the stock price simply because of flow dynamics. It isn’t easy to buy 10% of float. And we should remember that the BOJ is still buying ¥100bn+ of Softbank shares per year as it continues to buy ¥6trln of ETFs per year. And given the stock will be in the top momentum ranks of large cap Japan, Travis expects momentum flows will join the party adding more inflow.
For trading types, he thought Softbank was a buy, relatively and on an absolute basis. The Japan market is CHEAP on a current year and forecast year ahead, which suggests either the market is “wrong” or economic headwinds are picking up to a greater extent than pundits suggest.
The pre-conditons have been fulfilled and Delta Electronics (2308 TT)will now move to a tender offer. But there exist a number of unknowns for the transaction, which could delay the Offer timetable.
Although the initial wording in the August conditional voluntary tender offer announcement suggests the offer will be for ALL shares, there is talk there may be a maximum acceptance condition, therefore possible clawback for shareholders tendering. A rumoured 60% maximum translates to a minimum 50% pro-rata, potentially 67% if the family tenders 40% and the rest of holders tender half.
It is not clear whether the FY18 dividend will be netted. DELTA has announced two sets of quarterly results since the initial Offer announcement and it would be unjust for DEISG to net off any dividend. It would likely suit the family to receive the dividend. The Offer is pitched at a 1.79% premium to the then-current price. If the dividend is netted, then the Offer price will, in fact, be at a discount to last close as of announcement. DELTA will announce its full-year dividend tomorrow (18th February) and the terms of the deal may also be announced the same day. The AGM to ratify the dividend will take place around the 2 April.
Currently trading at terms or a gross/annualised spread of 4.6/21%, if including a Bt3.30 FY18 dividend and mid-May payment. That looks overly tight in the face of timing delays and actual consideration to be paid if indeed it comes out to be a partial offer.
Three months ago, Minebea Mitsumi (6479 JP) announced it would launch a Tender Offer for U Shin and it would take just under three months until the approvals were received and it could officially start the Tender Offer process. The background to the Tender Offer was discussed in Minebea Mitsumi Launches Offer for U-SHIN in early November. Travis first conclusion in November was that this was the “riskiest” straight-out non-hostile TOB he had seen in a while. Minebea Mitsumi has now announced the launch of its Tender Offer, at the same price as originally planned (¥985/share).
This deal is still perplexing to Travis. It’s easy enough from an industrial standpoint. Why not buy relatively cheap assets then see if you can cross-sell or assume some attrition? But for investors, he wonders why they put up with this. The process of reaching a “fair” valuation is, by definition, conflicted. It cannot NOT be conflicted. And just because some independent directors who don’t have skin in the game, and may have no clue about corporate valuation methodology, or fair market price, agree to a price that the acquiree’s managers, not wanting to lose their jobs, agree to doesn’t make this “fair.”
The tender offer period is QUITE long. Most tender offers are 30 days in order to give time for people to tender or “offer sufficient time for a rival bidder.” This time Travis thinks it is longer so people can take their time and get bored and tender.
Travis would sell shares now and use the balance sheet elsewhere until an activist shows his hand. If no activist, this deal is not an interesting one.
After multiple news outlets reported that LG Uplus Corp (032640 KS) will finalise a transaction with the CJ Hello, a deal was done at ₩800bn (instead of ₩1tn speculated), and only 50%+1 share instead of the full 53.92% stake held by CJ ENM (035760 KS). The acquisition price of ₩20,659 is a 107% premium to last price and translates to a EV/EBITDA multiple of 6.6x.
This is a straight stock acquisition deal. CJ Hello will be a subsidiary of LG Uplus and will continue to exist as a separate listed company. CJ ENM still owns nearly 4% CJH stake. SKT owns 8.61%.
LG Group is publicly saying that they have no plan of an immediate merger, which means neither party requires shareholder approval. But the transaction is subject to local regulator approval – MSIT and Korea FTC. MSIT approval is not an issue. FTC rejected the SKT-CJH deal last time. This time, the FTC’s head Kim Sang-jo is hinting that this deal will go through.
LG Uplus’ acquisition of CJ Hellovision is likely to further accelerate the consolidation of the Korean cable TV/media sector. KT Corp (030200 KS)is now likely to aggressively try to acquire cable-operator D’Live. SK Telecom (017670 KS) has shown some interests in acquiring Tbroad cable company.
Glow announced that the Energy Regulatory Commission (“ERC”) has resolved to approve the merger with GPSC, provided Glow sells its Glow SPP1 plant before or at the same time as the merger. A number of conditions were also attached to some of the remaining power plants. No price has been disclosed for the 69.11% stake in Glow, ex the SPP1 plant, but it will be in reference to the Bt94.892 Offer price previously announced, net of expenses with selling SPP1 and the reduced synergy thereon.
Given SPP1 is an immaterial contributor (~5%) to Glow, in terms of revenue, it can be argued that GPSC may make only a minimal change to the Offer price. Still, even a 5% downward adjustment would equate to a price below where Glow is trading.
The downside is ~8%, if using the closing price on the 11 October. Glow/GPSC/Engie want this deal to complete. I think the final Offer price will come in very close to that initially proposed. But I would not buy through Bt90, preferring to pick up shares at Bt89 or below. The merger is expected to be completed by next month, triggering a mandatory tender offer, which may take an additional 2 months or so to complete.
Sigma Healthcare released a 2-page Market Update saying the four month Business Review had identified A$100mm of annual cost savings, confirmed the FY19 EBIT guidance of A$75mn, and confirmed the FY20 EBITDA guidance of $55-60mm. The business review sees 10% underlying EBITDA growth from FY20 to FY23 so that after cost savings are included, FY23 sees the same EBITDA as FY19 [i.e. almost A$90mm].
On a standalone basis, at the end of FY22 looking towards FY23, at 8x EV/EBITDA, it looks like there is something like 60-80% upside. EBITDA might be worth even more than A$90mm in FY23 as long as the DCs can run at high capacity. And at mid-high teens PER that would be a pretty great result. They won’t get that 60-80% upside from now doing a deal with API, but they won’t have to wait for 4 years to get it either.
Travis expects another A$0.15 of value would do it. He doesn’t think they need A$0.20. The shares bounced and traded around A$0.80-1.00 from mid summer 2017 to mid-summer 2018. But that is when EBIT was supposed to fall to A$90mm. And that was nearer-term. Now we have a forecast of EBITDA of A$90mm and that is 3+ years out.
Travis thinks this could get done at 0.42-0.45 shares of API and A$0.23 of cash, given that would probably impact API shares a little bit, that would end up being a 10-15% bump vs original terms, but all told that would be pretty good – and almost a double from undisturbed.
KDDI Corp (9433 JP) announced its intention to conduct a Tender Offer for Kabu.com through a made-for-purpose SPC. The deal is not terribly different in scope than the one discussed in KDDI Deal for Kabu.com (8703 JP) Coming? about two weeks ago.
The Tender Offer is to purchase a minimum of 45,758,400 shares at ¥559/share, which is a 5.67% premium to last close and a 46.3% premium to the undisturbed price of 23 January 2019. Obtaining the minimum would get the combination of KDDI and MUFJ Securities (which currently holds 52.96% of the shares outstanding, and will not tender) to 66.67% which would allow the combination to do a Two Step Squeezeout, which KDDI states in the document that it intends to do.
Anti-trust and regulatory approvals are required (Travis can’t imagine any issues), and KDDI expects that the Tender Offer will commence in late April. This looks pretty easy as a deal, with few impediments. A rival bid is unlikely – KDDI has a headstart with the shares of MUFG Bank which have committed to the deal.
This is going to be boring. One can make markets, carry it, or allocate capital to something more interesting. However Kabu.com’s ¥6/share dividend for end March 2019 WILL BE PAID according to a press release by Kabu.com today after the close. That means there will be a down-shift in price on the ex-date of the dividend at end-March.
Via subsidiary NSITEXE, Inc, Denso has acquired a stake in Californian start-up quadric.io. NSITEXE was established to develop high performance, next generation semiconductor devices for automated driving solutions. quadric’s edge processing units compliment this technology push.
Xingfa announced its major shareholder, Guangxin Aluminium (a wholly-owned Guangdong SASAC vehicle), has acquired 5,000 shares, lifting its stake to 30.001%, triggering a mandatory general offer. The offer price is $5.60, a premium of just 2.94% to last close.
Guangxin, together with certain management of Xingfa, attempted to take Xingfa private at $3.70/share back in 1H17. That scheme failed comprehensively, which was a good outcome for minorities as FY17 net income increased 28%. 1H18 profit was also a 25% improvement over the corresponding period.
The offer price is in line with where Xingfa traded last October and is 23% below the recent peak back in mid-June 2018. It is also 37% below where China Lesso Group Holdings (2128 HK) acquired its 26.3% stake in April last year.
There has to be some behind the scenes play for Xingfa’s shares, and this potentially centres on China Lesso. While a look at CCASS shows Liao Yuqing (an ED in Xingfa) intriguingly moving his entire 48.2mn (11.5% of shares out) outside of CCASS in early December 2018.
OSLO NS is the target of competing tender offers from Euronext NV (ENX FP)andNasdaq Inc (NDAQ US). Euronext owns 5.3% and has irrevocables for 45.2% of OSLO NS shares, for 50.5% total. It launched an Offer to acquire all shares at NOK 145, and just raised that to NOK 158 on February 11, 2019. Nasdaq has irrevocables for 35.2% of OSLO NS shares and has launched an Offer to acquire all OSLO NS shares at NOK 152 per share. Nasdaq’s Offer received the unanimous recommendation of Oslo Børs VPS’s Board when it was announced. The IFA opined that NOK 152 per share is above the top end of what shareholders could expect.
Nasdaq’s undertakings are irrevocable and binding, including in the event of a higher offer. The pre-acceptances further include an obligation on the part of the pre-accepting shareholders not to accept the Euronext Offer. Irrevocables for both bidders have an end date of 31 December 2019, after which they are no longer binding.
Nasdaq, which is conditional on a 90% acceptance level, seems to have the weaker hand since its acceptance threshold condition won’t be met unless Euronext folds its cards and walks away; while Euronext (with a 50.01% acceptance condition) can keep its 50.5% “stake” as long as it gets regulatory approval. Therefore, Nasdaq would need to waive its 90% acceptance condition in order to stay in the game.
The Norwegian Ministry of Finance MoF may resolve this by approving both bidders, provided they reach a super majority acceptance threshold of two-thirds or 90% of shares outstanding (but not less). In this scenario, either party will have enough to block the other from reaching the threshold while the irrevocables are binding.
If the MoF says both parties have approval if they get to whatever super majority the MoF decides or is statutorily permitted to impose, and puts a deadline on getting there of some date after the irrevocable lock-up expiration (say, January 31, 2020), then the formerly locked-up shares are free to go to whichever bidder they chose.
I estimate HLG’s discount to NAV at 41% compared to its one-year average of 38%. The implied stub is right at the 2STD extreme and excluding a brief dip in late April 2018, is at the lowest level since June 2013.
What assets HLG does directly own at the stub level are intertwined with HLP’s own investments. There is therefore, very little to distinguish between the two companies. In addition, HLG has gradually offloaded its HK properties – to HLP no less – further increasing its exposure to China and blurring the lines between HLP and HLG’s business exposure.
HLG has also been increasing its stake in HLP since June 2011, from 48.96% to 57.62% as at 31 Dec 2018. It’s a pretty astute trade to sell a property at book to HLP, then “buy” it back indirectly via increasing its stake in HLP, which trades at 0.6x P/B.
There is no significant catalyst for the NAV discount to narrow. And liquidity does play a role, although HLG’s volume has narrowed the gap to HLP’s in recent years. Nevertheless, a ~40% discount to NAV is extreme for a straightforward, passive, single stock holdco structure.
Athaporn Arayasantiparb, CFA discussed his one-on-one with Intouch. Of interest is his discussions on the stub assets specifically InVent, a venture capital arm and considered the market leader in growth stage funding. In 2018, InVent invested Bt30m into ytm thailand, an end-to-end digital marketing and feedback platform, which used the proceeds to buy offline digital access; Bt40m into Choco CRM, a CRM and POS (point of sales) platform for SME; and Bt40m into E Studio, a B2C lifestyle portal.
Other investments discussed by Athaporn, at the stub level, include Wongnai and HSN. Wongnai is an online foodie guide and one of their largest investments to date, boasted 8m active users, 120m page views, 200,000 patron restaurants, and 10m pictures posted so far. Revenue grew 60% in 2018 to Bt250mn, and is expected to grow at 50%. HSN is an online shopping venture between Intuch and Hyundai, which managed to breakeven on a net basis.
The overall value of these investments, and the estimated 11 other start-up companies under InVent, is very much a “finger in the air” calculation. They may exceed the value of Intouch’s 41.1% stake in Thaicom Pcl (THCOM TB), but that still would be just 1% of NAV.
I estimate Intouch’s discount to NAV at ~21% (vs. the one-year average of 27%), having significantly narrowed in response to rumours of a purported sale of Thaicom (discussed in StubWorld: Intouch Gains On Possible Sale of Thaicom). At the time, I thought Intouch had run its course, noting Intouch had denied any definitive approach/agreement.
New Street Research also met with AIS and remains cautious on this telco in the current slowing environment ahead of delayed elections.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Issuance of the new shares and common stock to be delisted on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
C
Japan
Showa Shell
Scheme
1-Apr
Close of offer
E
NZ
Trade Me Group
Scheme
19-Feb
Application for initial orders filed
C
Singapore
Courts Asia
Scheme
15-Mar
Offer Close Date
C
Singapore
M1 Limited
Off Mkt
18-Feb
Closing date of offer
C
Singapore
PCI Limited
Scheme
February
Release of Scheme Booklet
E
Thailand
Delta
Off Mkt
18-Feb
Submit Tender Offer Form
C
Finland
Amer Sports
Off Mkt
28-Feb
Offer Period Expires
C
Norway
Oslo Børs VPS
Off Mkt
4-Mar
Nasdaq Offer Close Date
C
Switzerland
Panalpina
Off Mkt
27-Feb
Binding offer to be announced
E
US
Red Hat, Inc.
Scheme
March/April
Deal lodged for approval with EU Regulators
C
Source: Company announcements. E = our estimates; C =confirmed
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KCL-SPH again extended the closing date of the offer from 18 February to 4 March 2019. M1’s shares are trading at S$2.04 per share, marginally below the VGO price of S$2.06 per share. We believe that the KCL-SPH should get the valid acceptances to complete the delisting and wholly own M1.
Softbank has announced a buyback of ¥600bn – its largest buyback ever. At ~¥10,500/share it is 57mm shares or 5.2% of shares out. At ¥12,000/share it is 50mm shares or 4.6%. The “official” float is about 68.7% or 750mm shares. However, by Travis’ estimate, only 44.5% of shares out or 488mm shares are Real World Float. 57mm shares out of 488mm shares is 11.7%. That is a non-negligible portion of float, and will mean significant reduction in foreign active management exposure to Softbank, or significant reduction in individual investor exposure to Softbank, or both.
Travis Lundy wrote the buyback will have further impact on the stock price simply because of flow dynamics. It isn’t easy to buy 10% of float. And we should remember that the BOJ is still buying ¥100bn+ of Softbank shares per year as it continues to buy ¥6trln of ETFs per year. And given the stock will be in the top momentum ranks of large cap Japan, Travis expects momentum flows will join the party adding more inflow.
For trading types, he thought Softbank was a buy, relatively and on an absolute basis. The Japan market is CHEAP on a current year and forecast year ahead, which suggests either the market is “wrong” or economic headwinds are picking up to a greater extent than pundits suggest.
The pre-conditons have been fulfilled and Delta Electronics (2308 TT)will now move to a tender offer. But there exist a number of unknowns for the transaction, which could delay the Offer timetable.
Although the initial wording in the August conditional voluntary tender offer announcement suggests the offer will be for ALL shares, there is talk there may be a maximum acceptance condition, therefore possible clawback for shareholders tendering. A rumoured 60% maximum translates to a minimum 50% pro-rata, potentially 67% if the family tenders 40% and the rest of holders tender half.
It is not clear whether the FY18 dividend will be netted. DELTA has announced two sets of quarterly results since the initial Offer announcement and it would be unjust for DEISG to net off any dividend. It would likely suit the family to receive the dividend. The Offer is pitched at a 1.79% premium to the then-current price. If the dividend is netted, then the Offer price will, in fact, be at a discount to last close as of announcement. DELTA will announce its full-year dividend tomorrow (18th February) and the terms of the deal may also be announced the same day. The AGM to ratify the dividend will take place around the 2 April.
Currently trading at terms or a gross/annualised spread of 4.6/21%, if including a Bt3.30 FY18 dividend and mid-May payment. That looks overly tight in the face of timing delays and actual consideration to be paid if indeed it comes out to be a partial offer.
Three months ago, Minebea Mitsumi (6479 JP) announced it would launch a Tender Offer for U Shin and it would take just under three months until the approvals were received and it could officially start the Tender Offer process. The background to the Tender Offer was discussed in Minebea Mitsumi Launches Offer for U-SHIN in early November. Travis first conclusion in November was that this was the “riskiest” straight-out non-hostile TOB he had seen in a while. Minebea Mitsumi has now announced the launch of its Tender Offer, at the same price as originally planned (¥985/share).
This deal is still perplexing to Travis. It’s easy enough from an industrial standpoint. Why not buy relatively cheap assets then see if you can cross-sell or assume some attrition? But for investors, he wonders why they put up with this. The process of reaching a “fair” valuation is, by definition, conflicted. It cannot NOT be conflicted. And just because some independent directors who don’t have skin in the game, and may have no clue about corporate valuation methodology, or fair market price, agree to a price that the acquiree’s managers, not wanting to lose their jobs, agree to doesn’t make this “fair.”
The tender offer period is QUITE long. Most tender offers are 30 days in order to give time for people to tender or “offer sufficient time for a rival bidder.” This time Travis thinks it is longer so people can take their time and get bored and tender.
Travis would sell shares now and use the balance sheet elsewhere until an activist shows his hand. If no activist, this deal is not an interesting one.
After multiple news outlets reported that LG Uplus Corp (032640 KS) will finalise a transaction with the CJ Hello, a deal was done at ₩800bn (instead of ₩1tn speculated), and only 50%+1 share instead of the full 53.92% stake held by CJ ENM (035760 KS). The acquisition price of ₩20,659 is a 107% premium to last price and translates to a EV/EBITDA multiple of 6.6x.
This is a straight stock acquisition deal. CJ Hello will be a subsidiary of LG Uplus and will continue to exist as a separate listed company. CJ ENM still owns nearly 4% CJH stake. SKT owns 8.61%.
LG Group is publicly saying that they have no plan of an immediate merger, which means neither party requires shareholder approval. But the transaction is subject to local regulator approval – MSIT and Korea FTC. MSIT approval is not an issue. FTC rejected the SKT-CJH deal last time. This time, the FTC’s head Kim Sang-jo is hinting that this deal will go through.
LG Uplus’ acquisition of CJ Hellovision is likely to further accelerate the consolidation of the Korean cable TV/media sector. KT Corp (030200 KS)is now likely to aggressively try to acquire cable-operator D’Live. SK Telecom (017670 KS) has shown some interests in acquiring Tbroad cable company.
Glow announced that the Energy Regulatory Commission (“ERC”) has resolved to approve the merger with GPSC, provided Glow sells its Glow SPP1 plant before or at the same time as the merger. A number of conditions were also attached to some of the remaining power plants. No price has been disclosed for the 69.11% stake in Glow, ex the SPP1 plant, but it will be in reference to the Bt94.892 Offer price previously announced, net of expenses with selling SPP1 and the reduced synergy thereon.
Given SPP1 is an immaterial contributor (~5%) to Glow, in terms of revenue, it can be argued that GPSC may make only a minimal change to the Offer price. Still, even a 5% downward adjustment would equate to a price below where Glow is trading.
The downside is ~8%, if using the closing price on the 11 October. Glow/GPSC/Engie want this deal to complete. I think the final Offer price will come in very close to that initially proposed. But I would not buy through Bt90, preferring to pick up shares at Bt89 or below. The merger is expected to be completed by next month, triggering a mandatory tender offer, which may take an additional 2 months or so to complete.
Sigma Healthcare released a 2-page Market Update saying the four month Business Review had identified A$100mm of annual cost savings, confirmed the FY19 EBIT guidance of A$75mn, and confirmed the FY20 EBITDA guidance of $55-60mm. The business review sees 10% underlying EBITDA growth from FY20 to FY23 so that after cost savings are included, FY23 sees the same EBITDA as FY19 [i.e. almost A$90mm].
On a standalone basis, at the end of FY22 looking towards FY23, at 8x EV/EBITDA, it looks like there is something like 60-80% upside. EBITDA might be worth even more than A$90mm in FY23 as long as the DCs can run at high capacity. And at mid-high teens PER that would be a pretty great result. They won’t get that 60-80% upside from now doing a deal with API, but they won’t have to wait for 4 years to get it either.
Travis expects another A$0.15 of value would do it. He doesn’t think they need A$0.20. The shares bounced and traded around A$0.80-1.00 from mid summer 2017 to mid-summer 2018. But that is when EBIT was supposed to fall to A$90mm. And that was nearer-term. Now we have a forecast of EBITDA of A$90mm and that is 3+ years out.
Travis thinks this could get done at 0.42-0.45 shares of API and A$0.23 of cash, given that would probably impact API shares a little bit, that would end up being a 10-15% bump vs original terms, but all told that would be pretty good – and almost a double from undisturbed.
KDDI Corp (9433 JP) announced its intention to conduct a Tender Offer for Kabu.com through a made-for-purpose SPC. The deal is not terribly different in scope than the one discussed in KDDI Deal for Kabu.com (8703 JP) Coming? about two weeks ago.
The Tender Offer is to purchase a minimum of 45,758,400 shares at ¥559/share, which is a 5.67% premium to last close and a 46.3% premium to the undisturbed price of 23 January 2019. Obtaining the minimum would get the combination of KDDI and MUFJ Securities (which currently holds 52.96% of the shares outstanding, and will not tender) to 66.67% which would allow the combination to do a Two Step Squeezeout, which KDDI states in the document that it intends to do.
Anti-trust and regulatory approvals are required (Travis can’t imagine any issues), and KDDI expects that the Tender Offer will commence in late April. This looks pretty easy as a deal, with few impediments. A rival bid is unlikely – KDDI has a headstart with the shares of MUFG Bank which have committed to the deal.
This is going to be boring. One can make markets, carry it, or allocate capital to something more interesting. However Kabu.com’s ¥6/share dividend for end March 2019 WILL BE PAID according to a press release by Kabu.com today after the close. That means there will be a down-shift in price on the ex-date of the dividend at end-March.
Via subsidiary NSITEXE, Inc, Denso has acquired a stake in Californian start-up quadric.io. NSITEXE was established to develop high performance, next generation semiconductor devices for automated driving solutions. quadric’s edge processing units compliment this technology push.
Xingfa announced its major shareholder, Guangxin Aluminium (a wholly-owned Guangdong SASAC vehicle), has acquired 5,000 shares, lifting its stake to 30.001%, triggering a mandatory general offer. The offer price is $5.60, a premium of just 2.94% to last close.
Guangxin, together with certain management of Xingfa, attempted to take Xingfa private at $3.70/share back in 1H17. That scheme failed comprehensively, which was a good outcome for minorities as FY17 net income increased 28%. 1H18 profit was also a 25% improvement over the corresponding period.
The offer price is in line with where Xingfa traded last October and is 23% below the recent peak back in mid-June 2018. It is also 37% below where China Lesso Group Holdings (2128 HK) acquired its 26.3% stake in April last year.
There has to be some behind the scenes play for Xingfa’s shares, and this potentially centres on China Lesso. While a look at CCASS shows Liao Yuqing (an ED in Xingfa) intriguingly moving his entire 48.2mn (11.5% of shares out) outside of CCASS in early December 2018.
OSLO NS is the target of competing tender offers from Euronext NV (ENX FP)andNasdaq Inc (NDAQ US). Euronext owns 5.3% and has irrevocables for 45.2% of OSLO NS shares, for 50.5% total. It launched an Offer to acquire all shares at NOK 145, and just raised that to NOK 158 on February 11, 2019. Nasdaq has irrevocables for 35.2% of OSLO NS shares and has launched an Offer to acquire all OSLO NS shares at NOK 152 per share. Nasdaq’s Offer received the unanimous recommendation of Oslo Børs VPS’s Board when it was announced. The IFA opined that NOK 152 per share is above the top end of what shareholders could expect.
Nasdaq’s undertakings are irrevocable and binding, including in the event of a higher offer. The pre-acceptances further include an obligation on the part of the pre-accepting shareholders not to accept the Euronext Offer. Irrevocables for both bidders have an end date of 31 December 2019, after which they are no longer binding.
Nasdaq, which is conditional on a 90% acceptance level, seems to have the weaker hand since its acceptance threshold condition won’t be met unless Euronext folds its cards and walks away; while Euronext (with a 50.01% acceptance condition) can keep its 50.5% “stake” as long as it gets regulatory approval. Therefore, Nasdaq would need to waive its 90% acceptance condition in order to stay in the game.
The Norwegian Ministry of Finance MoF may resolve this by approving both bidders, provided they reach a super majority acceptance threshold of two-thirds or 90% of shares outstanding (but not less). In this scenario, either party will have enough to block the other from reaching the threshold while the irrevocables are binding.
If the MoF says both parties have approval if they get to whatever super majority the MoF decides or is statutorily permitted to impose, and puts a deadline on getting there of some date after the irrevocable lock-up expiration (say, January 31, 2020), then the formerly locked-up shares are free to go to whichever bidder they chose.
I estimate HLG’s discount to NAV at 41% compared to its one-year average of 38%. The implied stub is right at the 2STD extreme and excluding a brief dip in late April 2018, is at the lowest level since June 2013.
What assets HLG does directly own at the stub level are intertwined with HLP’s own investments. There is therefore, very little to distinguish between the two companies. In addition, HLG has gradually offloaded its HK properties – to HLP no less – further increasing its exposure to China and blurring the lines between HLP and HLG’s business exposure.
HLG has also been increasing its stake in HLP since June 2011, from 48.96% to 57.62% as at 31 Dec 2018. It’s a pretty astute trade to sell a property at book to HLP, then “buy” it back indirectly via increasing its stake in HLP, which trades at 0.6x P/B.
There is no significant catalyst for the NAV discount to narrow. And liquidity does play a role, although HLG’s volume has narrowed the gap to HLP’s in recent years. Nevertheless, a ~40% discount to NAV is extreme for a straightforward, passive, single stock holdco structure.
Athaporn Arayasantiparb, CFA discussed his one-on-one with Intouch. Of interest is his discussions on the stub assets specifically InVent, a venture capital arm and considered the market leader in growth stage funding. In 2018, InVent invested Bt30m into ytm thailand, an end-to-end digital marketing and feedback platform, which used the proceeds to buy offline digital access; Bt40m into Choco CRM, a CRM and POS (point of sales) platform for SME; and Bt40m into E Studio, a B2C lifestyle portal.
Other investments discussed by Athaporn, at the stub level, include Wongnai and HSN. Wongnai is an online foodie guide and one of their largest investments to date, boasted 8m active users, 120m page views, 200,000 patron restaurants, and 10m pictures posted so far. Revenue grew 60% in 2018 to Bt250mn, and is expected to grow at 50%. HSN is an online shopping venture between Intuch and Hyundai, which managed to breakeven on a net basis.
The overall value of these investments, and the estimated 11 other start-up companies under InVent, is very much a “finger in the air” calculation. They may exceed the value of Intouch’s 41.1% stake in Thaicom Pcl (THCOM TB), but that still would be just 1% of NAV.
I estimate Intouch’s discount to NAV at ~21% (vs. the one-year average of 27%), having significantly narrowed in response to rumours of a purported sale of Thaicom (discussed in StubWorld: Intouch Gains On Possible Sale of Thaicom). At the time, I thought Intouch had run its course, noting Intouch had denied any definitive approach/agreement.
New Street Research also met with AIS and remains cautious on this telco in the current slowing environment ahead of delayed elections.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
We met AIS (ADVANC TB) earlier this week at their Analyst Day in Bangkok. The recent results confirm our concerns over market growth slowing, with service revenue flat YoY. The guided 4-6% growth for 2019 may be difficult to achieve. On the mobile side, AIS is feeling competitive pressure from a resurgent DTAC (DTAC TB) and continuing gains from TRUE (TRUE TB) . While “hostilities” have eased recently (less aggressive price offers), we remain wary of the outlook for 2019. On the fixed side, AIS is making slow progress and we continue to think M&A is warranted.
There was a fair amount of discussion around 5G at the meeting, but this looks like a long term issue for AIS. Thailand has never been in the forefront on telecom technology upgrades in the past and there is plenty to do with 4G and fixed broadband still.
Chris Hoare remains cautious on AIS in the current slowing environment, and ahead of delayed elections. Earnings forecasts have edged lower recently and that is translating to lower dividends (a 70% payout ratio to be retained for now). We remain at Neutral with a target price of THB187.
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PagerDuty Inc (PD US)is a US based software company which is ready to complete its IPO in the next several weeks. Founded in 2009, PagerDuty helps companies to respond quickly when their websites go down. PagerDuty’s software helps companies to respond to items such as customer complaints and helps companies to spot problems. The company is known for capitalizing on its AI (Artificial Intelligence) models to quickly solve problems of why websites go down.
The company has an excellent, diversified base of more than 10,000 customers in 90 countries including IBM, The World Bank, Airbnb, Netflix, GE, and Gap. One of the strong points of PagerDuty is the fact that it has gathered massive amounts of data from its more than 10,000 customers. The company also boasts a very high customer retention rate (139% net retention rate). A combination of the company’s strong AI capability coupled with the increasing amounts of Big Data provide a strong competitive advantage for the company since its AI capability may improve and get smarter with additional Big Data and continuous problem solving of why websites go down.
PagerDuty was most recently valued at $1.3 billion in September 2018 in a private market valuation (led by T.Rowe Price Group investing $90 million in the company), representing 16x the company’s annual revenue of $79.6 million as of 12 months ending January 2018.
ZTO Express (ZTO US)‘s earnings will fail to meet the high expectations of sell-side analysts and investors who seeit as a cheap proxy for Chinese e-commerce activity.
China’s express sector revenue grew 43.5% YoY in 2016, the year ZTO went public. Last year, revenue growth was just half that (21.8%), and we expect the sector’s growth to continue to moderate over the next few years.
The express sector is also evolving in ways that will put downward pressure on profitability and require greater investment from the express companies.
We expect the profitability of ZTO’s express business to decline in the medium-term as the company adjusts to slowing demand and emerging sector trends. Our earnings estimates, which are far below consensus figures, reflect these challenges.
ZTO suffers from declining earnings quality and two accounting issues that we feel make it a risky, unattractive investment. Our 12-month target price for ZTO is US$13.31, based on 16 times our blended 2019-20 EPS estimates. We rate the stock Sell.
The legal battle between Reliance Communications (RCOM IN) and its lender group has further intensified after the Supreme Court directed the company to submit INR4.53bn within four weeks. The Court ruled that Chairman Anil Ambani had wilfully not paid INR5.5 bn to Swedish Telecom equipment maker Ericsson (Lm) Tel-Sp Adr (ERIC US). In our view, the situation has become almost untenable for RCOM and Mr. Ambani as the company will struggle to sell off its spectrum and other assets in time. In addition, The spectrum sale is yet to be resolved and this means that raising funds quickly remains a challenge. We have revised our recommendation for RCOM 6.5% 20s from NEUTRAL to UNDERWEIGHT due to the on-going negative headlines which we believe is an asymmetric downside risk to the bonds. This is despite some positive developments we highlighted in our last report (Reliance Communications Ltd. •Too Few Steps Forward• dated 18-Oct-18) and our recovery calculation in our previous report (Reliance Communications: Waiting to Exhale dated 07-Jul-18), which is proven wrong by the market.
On March 6th, a day before the Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) Taiwan elevator business Tender Offer for just over a third of Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, notably because the acquiring entity had not yet received Taiwan Ministry of Economy Investment Commission approval for the foreign investment, and the Fair Trading Commission had not yet given the green light, so there was no hope of getting it done by the next day in accordance with Taiwan’s Public Acquisition of Public Company Shares Administrative Law Article 18 Para 2. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60.
While there have been noises in the market that both Otis and Schindler, which are reported to hold roughly 5-6% each (last year’s shareholder list included UT Park View which United Technologies (UTX US)‘s 10-K showed was a wholly-owned sub) were willing to offer more than Hitachi’s offered NT$60 (and MOPS filings indicate the board approval meeting in end-January referenced a NT$63 potential bid), there was no competitive bid made public and to the authorities by five business days prior to the first bid close (which would have been 26 Feb) as per the same law Article 7 Para 2.
Since then, there have also been other ructions. While terms remain unchanged, it is worthwhile looking into what has been going on. This is still interesting and because of its various inputs, slightly disconcerting to some, and the modalities continue to surprise me.
Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) (Delta) released its opinion (Form 250-2) and the opinion of the Independent Financial Advisor (IFA) on the tender offer. Delta Electronics (2308 TT) (DEI) launched the conditional voluntary tender offer for Delta, an electronics contract manufacturer, on 26 February 2019. The tender offer of THB71.00 cash per share values Delta at an EV of THB72 billion ($2.2 billion).
The IFA valued Delta at THB62.33-67.80 per share. Unsurprisingly, both the Delta Board and the IFA concluded that the shareholders should accept the tender offer. While the tender offer’s premium to underlying value is unlikely to set the pulse racing for minority shareholders, we continue to recommend minority shareholders to accept the tender offer.
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Last Friday, Gds Holdings (Adr) (GDS US), the largest third-party data centre operator in China, announced the placing price of its public offering of 11.9 million ADS. At the placing price of $33.50 per share, GDS will raise net proceeds of $385.5 million which will be used for the development and acquisition of new data centres.
We are positive on GDS as the business remains in rude health due to strong revenue growth, rising margins and high revenue visibility. Overall, we would participate in the public offering at the placing price.
Something of a slower week on Smartkarma this week (I contributed to that slowness by being away and under the weather when back) with about 120 insights published. A list of the insights to do with Japan and Korea this week are listed below.
SamE Common/1P reached a +2σ level. On a 120D horizon, price ratio is currently at the peak. Pref discount is at 21.04%. This of course is a 120D high. We are now right at the AGM phase (Mar 20). Common gets boosted around this time. It seems true that the recent M&A stories also helped Common move over 1P.
I don’t expect to see a continued upwardly divergence in favor of Common from this point. AGM factor should be gone this week. We still have M&A factor. This will likely be offset by shorter-term fundamentals factors such as further falling profits and DRAM design flaws.
Div yield difference on FY19e is 0.87%p. This is even higher than last year which was a record high in 3 years. I expect SamE 1P to make a move over Common from this point.
The eagerly awaited and long promised Model Y is out and it looks…like Model 3. That’s OK, just no shock and awe which Tesla really needed to jumpstart sales momentum–and a wave of sorely needed cash reservations.
Tesla Motors (TSLA US) unveiled Model Y on, perhaps not coincidentally, March 14th which also is Pi Day. Pi is the fundamental ratio which demonstrates that all circles are related–as Model Y is overwhelmingly related with the seminal Model 3 which contributes 75-80% of the newcomer’s platform and technology.
Which means Model Y may be originating with Model 3’s many inherent problems, as I discussed in Tesla’s Plan B 2.0; Y Not, just as Tesla also is juggling the ramp-up of the newly launched $35,000-base model of Model 3 along with sales expansion into Europe and China as well as building a new plant on a shoestring in Shanghai. All this just as the company also has lurched into a radical new online-only sales model with apparently little if any considered preparation (see Tesla’s New Plan: Buy Before You Try).
Another is that Model Y won’t be available until late 2020–at best–which is much later than expected. It’s still not clear when or where Model Y will be in full production or, even more critical, when Tesla will make even a penny of profit on it. Model 3 only recently became marginally profitable, excluding the likely money-losing $35k version, and sales of more profitable but aging Models S and X are in accelerating decline.
And, as I observed last week, Tesla’s track record of long delays in delivering new models coupled with Model 3’s alarming quality and reliability may seriously diminish the hoped-for early bird reservation cash which the company sorely needs to ease its liquidity crunch. At the same time, the pending arrival of Model Y over the next year or so is likely to further dampen already waning demand for Model 3.
In any case, it’s too late for Tesla to preserve profitability in the calamitous first quarter, if not for the full year.
In this insight, we will look at the updates on financials and operating metrics, compare it to other listed online education companies, and run the deal through our framework.
The increase in spending on marketing has not yielded the intended results as the growth rates of student enrollment and gross billings slowing down. Furthermore, aggressive spending behavior is similar to that of STG and LAIX and both companies did not perform well post listing.
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Softbank has announced a buyback of ¥600bn – its largest buyback ever. At ~¥10,500/share it is 57mm shares or 5.2% of shares out. At ¥12,000/share it is 50mm shares or 4.6%. The “official” float is about 68.7% or 750mm shares. However, by Travis’ estimate, only 44.5% of shares out or 488mm shares are Real World Float. 57mm shares out of 488mm shares is 11.7%. That is a non-negligible portion of float, and will mean significant reduction in foreign active management exposure to Softbank, or significant reduction in individual investor exposure to Softbank, or both.
Travis Lundy wrote the buyback will have further impact on the stock price simply because of flow dynamics. It isn’t easy to buy 10% of float. And we should remember that the BOJ is still buying ¥100bn+ of Softbank shares per year as it continues to buy ¥6trln of ETFs per year. And given the stock will be in the top momentum ranks of large cap Japan, Travis expects momentum flows will join the party adding more inflow.
For trading types, he thought Softbank was a buy, relatively and on an absolute basis. The Japan market is CHEAP on a current year and forecast year ahead, which suggests either the market is “wrong” or economic headwinds are picking up to a greater extent than pundits suggest.
The pre-conditons have been fulfilled and Delta Electronics (2308 TT)will now move to a tender offer. But there exist a number of unknowns for the transaction, which could delay the Offer timetable.
Although the initial wording in the August conditional voluntary tender offer announcement suggests the offer will be for ALL shares, there is talk there may be a maximum acceptance condition, therefore possible clawback for shareholders tendering. A rumoured 60% maximum translates to a minimum 50% pro-rata, potentially 67% if the family tenders 40% and the rest of holders tender half.
It is not clear whether the FY18 dividend will be netted. DELTA has announced two sets of quarterly results since the initial Offer announcement and it would be unjust for DEISG to net off any dividend. It would likely suit the family to receive the dividend. The Offer is pitched at a 1.79% premium to the then-current price. If the dividend is netted, then the Offer price will, in fact, be at a discount to last close as of announcement. DELTA will announce its full-year dividend tomorrow (18th February) and the terms of the deal may also be announced the same day. The AGM to ratify the dividend will take place around the 2 April.
Currently trading at terms or a gross/annualised spread of 4.6/21%, if including a Bt3.30 FY18 dividend and mid-May payment. That looks overly tight in the face of timing delays and actual consideration to be paid if indeed it comes out to be a partial offer.
Three months ago, Minebea Mitsumi (6479 JP) announced it would launch a Tender Offer for U Shin and it would take just under three months until the approvals were received and it could officially start the Tender Offer process. The background to the Tender Offer was discussed in Minebea Mitsumi Launches Offer for U-SHIN in early November. Travis first conclusion in November was that this was the “riskiest” straight-out non-hostile TOB he had seen in a while. Minebea Mitsumi has now announced the launch of its Tender Offer, at the same price as originally planned (¥985/share).
This deal is still perplexing to Travis. It’s easy enough from an industrial standpoint. Why not buy relatively cheap assets then see if you can cross-sell or assume some attrition? But for investors, he wonders why they put up with this. The process of reaching a “fair” valuation is, by definition, conflicted. It cannot NOT be conflicted. And just because some independent directors who don’t have skin in the game, and may have no clue about corporate valuation methodology, or fair market price, agree to a price that the acquiree’s managers, not wanting to lose their jobs, agree to doesn’t make this “fair.”
The tender offer period is QUITE long. Most tender offers are 30 days in order to give time for people to tender or “offer sufficient time for a rival bidder.” This time Travis thinks it is longer so people can take their time and get bored and tender.
Travis would sell shares now and use the balance sheet elsewhere until an activist shows his hand. If no activist, this deal is not an interesting one.
After multiple news outlets reported that LG Uplus Corp (032640 KS) will finalise a transaction with the CJ Hello, a deal was done at ₩800bn (instead of ₩1tn speculated), and only 50%+1 share instead of the full 53.92% stake held by CJ ENM (035760 KS). The acquisition price of ₩20,659 is a 107% premium to last price and translates to a EV/EBITDA multiple of 6.6x.
This is a straight stock acquisition deal. CJ Hello will be a subsidiary of LG Uplus and will continue to exist as a separate listed company. CJ ENM still owns nearly 4% CJH stake. SKT owns 8.61%.
LG Group is publicly saying that they have no plan of an immediate merger, which means neither party requires shareholder approval. But the transaction is subject to local regulator approval – MSIT and Korea FTC. MSIT approval is not an issue. FTC rejected the SKT-CJH deal last time. This time, the FTC’s head Kim Sang-jo is hinting that this deal will go through.
LG Uplus’ acquisition of CJ Hellovision is likely to further accelerate the consolidation of the Korean cable TV/media sector. KT Corp (030200 KS)is now likely to aggressively try to acquire cable-operator D’Live. SK Telecom (017670 KS) has shown some interests in acquiring Tbroad cable company.
Glow announced that the Energy Regulatory Commission (“ERC”) has resolved to approve the merger with GPSC, provided Glow sells its Glow SPP1 plant before or at the same time as the merger. A number of conditions were also attached to some of the remaining power plants. No price has been disclosed for the 69.11% stake in Glow, ex the SPP1 plant, but it will be in reference to the Bt94.892 Offer price previously announced, net of expenses with selling SPP1 and the reduced synergy thereon.
Given SPP1 is an immaterial contributor (~5%) to Glow, in terms of revenue, it can be argued that GPSC may make only a minimal change to the Offer price. Still, even a 5% downward adjustment would equate to a price below where Glow is trading.
The downside is ~8%, if using the closing price on the 11 October. Glow/GPSC/Engie want this deal to complete. I think the final Offer price will come in very close to that initially proposed. But I would not buy through Bt90, preferring to pick up shares at Bt89 or below. The merger is expected to be completed by next month, triggering a mandatory tender offer, which may take an additional 2 months or so to complete.
Sigma Healthcare released a 2-page Market Update saying the four month Business Review had identified A$100mm of annual cost savings, confirmed the FY19 EBIT guidance of A$75mn, and confirmed the FY20 EBITDA guidance of $55-60mm. The business review sees 10% underlying EBITDA growth from FY20 to FY23 so that after cost savings are included, FY23 sees the same EBITDA as FY19 [i.e. almost A$90mm].
On a standalone basis, at the end of FY22 looking towards FY23, at 8x EV/EBITDA, it looks like there is something like 60-80% upside. EBITDA might be worth even more than A$90mm in FY23 as long as the DCs can run at high capacity. And at mid-high teens PER that would be a pretty great result. They won’t get that 60-80% upside from now doing a deal with API, but they won’t have to wait for 4 years to get it either.
Travis expects another A$0.15 of value would do it. He doesn’t think they need A$0.20. The shares bounced and traded around A$0.80-1.00 from mid summer 2017 to mid-summer 2018. But that is when EBIT was supposed to fall to A$90mm. And that was nearer-term. Now we have a forecast of EBITDA of A$90mm and that is 3+ years out.
Travis thinks this could get done at 0.42-0.45 shares of API and A$0.23 of cash, given that would probably impact API shares a little bit, that would end up being a 10-15% bump vs original terms, but all told that would be pretty good – and almost a double from undisturbed.
KDDI Corp (9433 JP) announced its intention to conduct a Tender Offer for Kabu.com through a made-for-purpose SPC. The deal is not terribly different in scope than the one discussed in KDDI Deal for Kabu.com (8703 JP) Coming? about two weeks ago.
The Tender Offer is to purchase a minimum of 45,758,400 shares at ¥559/share, which is a 5.67% premium to last close and a 46.3% premium to the undisturbed price of 23 January 2019. Obtaining the minimum would get the combination of KDDI and MUFJ Securities (which currently holds 52.96% of the shares outstanding, and will not tender) to 66.67% which would allow the combination to do a Two Step Squeezeout, which KDDI states in the document that it intends to do.
Anti-trust and regulatory approvals are required (Travis can’t imagine any issues), and KDDI expects that the Tender Offer will commence in late April. This looks pretty easy as a deal, with few impediments. A rival bid is unlikely – KDDI has a headstart with the shares of MUFG Bank which have committed to the deal.
This is going to be boring. One can make markets, carry it, or allocate capital to something more interesting. However Kabu.com’s ¥6/share dividend for end March 2019 WILL BE PAID according to a press release by Kabu.com today after the close. That means there will be a down-shift in price on the ex-date of the dividend at end-March.
Via subsidiary NSITEXE, Inc, Denso has acquired a stake in Californian start-up quadric.io. NSITEXE was established to develop high performance, next generation semiconductor devices for automated driving solutions. quadric’s edge processing units compliment this technology push.
Xingfa announced its major shareholder, Guangxin Aluminium (a wholly-owned Guangdong SASAC vehicle), has acquired 5,000 shares, lifting its stake to 30.001%, triggering a mandatory general offer. The offer price is $5.60, a premium of just 2.94% to last close.
Guangxin, together with certain management of Xingfa, attempted to take Xingfa private at $3.70/share back in 1H17. That scheme failed comprehensively, which was a good outcome for minorities as FY17 net income increased 28%. 1H18 profit was also a 25% improvement over the corresponding period.
The offer price is in line with where Xingfa traded last October and is 23% below the recent peak back in mid-June 2018. It is also 37% below where China Lesso Group Holdings (2128 HK) acquired its 26.3% stake in April last year.
There has to be some behind the scenes play for Xingfa’s shares, and this potentially centres on China Lesso. While a look at CCASS shows Liao Yuqing (an ED in Xingfa) intriguingly moving his entire 48.2mn (11.5% of shares out) outside of CCASS in early December 2018.
OSLO NS is the target of competing tender offers from Euronext NV (ENX FP)andNasdaq Inc (NDAQ US). Euronext owns 5.3% and has irrevocables for 45.2% of OSLO NS shares, for 50.5% total. It launched an Offer to acquire all shares at NOK 145, and just raised that to NOK 158 on February 11, 2019. Nasdaq has irrevocables for 35.2% of OSLO NS shares and has launched an Offer to acquire all OSLO NS shares at NOK 152 per share. Nasdaq’s Offer received the unanimous recommendation of Oslo Børs VPS’s Board when it was announced. The IFA opined that NOK 152 per share is above the top end of what shareholders could expect.
Nasdaq’s undertakings are irrevocable and binding, including in the event of a higher offer. The pre-acceptances further include an obligation on the part of the pre-accepting shareholders not to accept the Euronext Offer. Irrevocables for both bidders have an end date of 31 December 2019, after which they are no longer binding.
Nasdaq, which is conditional on a 90% acceptance level, seems to have the weaker hand since its acceptance threshold condition won’t be met unless Euronext folds its cards and walks away; while Euronext (with a 50.01% acceptance condition) can keep its 50.5% “stake” as long as it gets regulatory approval. Therefore, Nasdaq would need to waive its 90% acceptance condition in order to stay in the game.
The Norwegian Ministry of Finance MoF may resolve this by approving both bidders, provided they reach a super majority acceptance threshold of two-thirds or 90% of shares outstanding (but not less). In this scenario, either party will have enough to block the other from reaching the threshold while the irrevocables are binding.
If the MoF says both parties have approval if they get to whatever super majority the MoF decides or is statutorily permitted to impose, and puts a deadline on getting there of some date after the irrevocable lock-up expiration (say, January 31, 2020), then the formerly locked-up shares are free to go to whichever bidder they chose.
I estimate HLG’s discount to NAV at 41% compared to its one-year average of 38%. The implied stub is right at the 2STD extreme and excluding a brief dip in late April 2018, is at the lowest level since June 2013.
What assets HLG does directly own at the stub level are intertwined with HLP’s own investments. There is therefore, very little to distinguish between the two companies. In addition, HLG has gradually offloaded its HK properties – to HLP no less – further increasing its exposure to China and blurring the lines between HLP and HLG’s business exposure.
HLG has also been increasing its stake in HLP since June 2011, from 48.96% to 57.62% as at 31 Dec 2018. It’s a pretty astute trade to sell a property at book to HLP, then “buy” it back indirectly via increasing its stake in HLP, which trades at 0.6x P/B.
There is no significant catalyst for the NAV discount to narrow. And liquidity does play a role, although HLG’s volume has narrowed the gap to HLP’s in recent years. Nevertheless, a ~40% discount to NAV is extreme for a straightforward, passive, single stock holdco structure.
Athaporn Arayasantiparb, CFA discussed his one-on-one with Intouch. Of interest is his discussions on the stub assets specifically InVent, a venture capital arm and considered the market leader in growth stage funding. In 2018, InVent invested Bt30m into ytm thailand, an end-to-end digital marketing and feedback platform, which used the proceeds to buy offline digital access; Bt40m into Choco CRM, a CRM and POS (point of sales) platform for SME; and Bt40m into E Studio, a B2C lifestyle portal.
Other investments discussed by Athaporn, at the stub level, include Wongnai and HSN. Wongnai is an online foodie guide and one of their largest investments to date, boasted 8m active users, 120m page views, 200,000 patron restaurants, and 10m pictures posted so far. Revenue grew 60% in 2018 to Bt250mn, and is expected to grow at 50%. HSN is an online shopping venture between Intuch and Hyundai, which managed to breakeven on a net basis.
The overall value of these investments, and the estimated 11 other start-up companies under InVent, is very much a “finger in the air” calculation. They may exceed the value of Intouch’s 41.1% stake in Thaicom Pcl (THCOM TB), but that still would be just 1% of NAV.
I estimate Intouch’s discount to NAV at ~21% (vs. the one-year average of 27%), having significantly narrowed in response to rumours of a purported sale of Thaicom (discussed in StubWorld: Intouch Gains On Possible Sale of Thaicom). At the time, I thought Intouch had run its course, noting Intouch had denied any definitive approach/agreement.
New Street Research also met with AIS and remains cautious on this telco in the current slowing environment ahead of delayed elections.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
We met AIS (ADVANC TB) earlier this week at their Analyst Day in Bangkok. The recent results confirm our concerns over market growth slowing, with service revenue flat YoY. The guided 4-6% growth for 2019 may be difficult to achieve. On the mobile side, AIS is feeling competitive pressure from a resurgent DTAC (DTAC TB) and continuing gains from TRUE (TRUE TB) . While “hostilities” have eased recently (less aggressive price offers), we remain wary of the outlook for 2019. On the fixed side, AIS is making slow progress and we continue to think M&A is warranted.
There was a fair amount of discussion around 5G at the meeting, but this looks like a long term issue for AIS. Thailand has never been in the forefront on telecom technology upgrades in the past and there is plenty to do with 4G and fixed broadband still.
Chris Hoare remains cautious on AIS in the current slowing environment, and ahead of delayed elections. Earnings forecasts have edged lower recently and that is translating to lower dividends (a 70% payout ratio to be retained for now). We remain at Neutral with a target price of THB187.
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ZTO Express (ZTO US)‘s earnings will fail to meet the high expectations of sell-side analysts and investors who seeit as a cheap proxy for Chinese e-commerce activity.
China’s express sector revenue grew 43.5% YoY in 2016, the year ZTO went public. Last year, revenue growth was just half that (21.8%), and we expect the sector’s growth to continue to moderate over the next few years.
The express sector is also evolving in ways that will put downward pressure on profitability and require greater investment from the express companies.
We expect the profitability of ZTO’s express business to decline in the medium-term as the company adjusts to slowing demand and emerging sector trends. Our earnings estimates, which are far below consensus figures, reflect these challenges.
ZTO suffers from declining earnings quality and two accounting issues that we feel make it a risky, unattractive investment. Our 12-month target price for ZTO is US$13.31, based on 16 times our blended 2019-20 EPS estimates. We rate the stock Sell.
The legal battle between Reliance Communications (RCOM IN) and its lender group has further intensified after the Supreme Court directed the company to submit INR4.53bn within four weeks. The Court ruled that Chairman Anil Ambani had wilfully not paid INR5.5 bn to Swedish Telecom equipment maker Ericsson (Lm) Tel-Sp Adr (ERIC US). In our view, the situation has become almost untenable for RCOM and Mr. Ambani as the company will struggle to sell off its spectrum and other assets in time. In addition, The spectrum sale is yet to be resolved and this means that raising funds quickly remains a challenge. We have revised our recommendation for RCOM 6.5% 20s from NEUTRAL to UNDERWEIGHT due to the on-going negative headlines which we believe is an asymmetric downside risk to the bonds. This is despite some positive developments we highlighted in our last report (Reliance Communications Ltd. •Too Few Steps Forward• dated 18-Oct-18) and our recovery calculation in our previous report (Reliance Communications: Waiting to Exhale dated 07-Jul-18), which is proven wrong by the market.
On March 6th, a day before the Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) Taiwan elevator business Tender Offer for just over a third of Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, notably because the acquiring entity had not yet received Taiwan Ministry of Economy Investment Commission approval for the foreign investment, and the Fair Trading Commission had not yet given the green light, so there was no hope of getting it done by the next day in accordance with Taiwan’s Public Acquisition of Public Company Shares Administrative Law Article 18 Para 2. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60.
While there have been noises in the market that both Otis and Schindler, which are reported to hold roughly 5-6% each (last year’s shareholder list included UT Park View which United Technologies (UTX US)‘s 10-K showed was a wholly-owned sub) were willing to offer more than Hitachi’s offered NT$60 (and MOPS filings indicate the board approval meeting in end-January referenced a NT$63 potential bid), there was no competitive bid made public and to the authorities by five business days prior to the first bid close (which would have been 26 Feb) as per the same law Article 7 Para 2.
Since then, there have also been other ructions. While terms remain unchanged, it is worthwhile looking into what has been going on. This is still interesting and because of its various inputs, slightly disconcerting to some, and the modalities continue to surprise me.
Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) (Delta) released its opinion (Form 250-2) and the opinion of the Independent Financial Advisor (IFA) on the tender offer. Delta Electronics (2308 TT) (DEI) launched the conditional voluntary tender offer for Delta, an electronics contract manufacturer, on 26 February 2019. The tender offer of THB71.00 cash per share values Delta at an EV of THB72 billion ($2.2 billion).
The IFA valued Delta at THB62.33-67.80 per share. Unsurprisingly, both the Delta Board and the IFA concluded that the shareholders should accept the tender offer. While the tender offer’s premium to underlying value is unlikely to set the pulse racing for minority shareholders, we continue to recommend minority shareholders to accept the tender offer.
Last Friday, Gds Holdings (Adr) (GDS US), the largest third-party data centre operator in China, announced the placing price of its public offering of 11.9 million ADS. At the placing price of $33.50 per share, GDS will raise net proceeds of $385.5 million which will be used for the development and acquisition of new data centres.
We are positive on GDS as the business remains in rude health due to strong revenue growth, rising margins and high revenue visibility. Overall, we would participate in the public offering at the placing price.
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The legal battle between Reliance Communications (RCOM IN) and its lender group has further intensified after the Supreme Court directed the company to submit INR4.53bn within four weeks. The Court ruled that Chairman Anil Ambani had wilfully not paid INR5.5 bn to Swedish Telecom equipment maker Ericsson (Lm) Tel-Sp Adr (ERIC US). In our view, the situation has become almost untenable for RCOM and Mr. Ambani as the company will struggle to sell off its spectrum and other assets in time. In addition, The spectrum sale is yet to be resolved and this means that raising funds quickly remains a challenge. We have revised our recommendation for RCOM 6.5% 20s from NEUTRAL to UNDERWEIGHT due to the on-going negative headlines which we believe is an asymmetric downside risk to the bonds. This is despite some positive developments we highlighted in our last report (Reliance Communications Ltd. •Too Few Steps Forward• dated 18-Oct-18) and our recovery calculation in our previous report (Reliance Communications: Waiting to Exhale dated 07-Jul-18), which is proven wrong by the market.
On March 6th, a day before the Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) Taiwan elevator business Tender Offer for just over a third of Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, notably because the acquiring entity had not yet received Taiwan Ministry of Economy Investment Commission approval for the foreign investment, and the Fair Trading Commission had not yet given the green light, so there was no hope of getting it done by the next day in accordance with Taiwan’s Public Acquisition of Public Company Shares Administrative Law Article 18 Para 2. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60.
While there have been noises in the market that both Otis and Schindler, which are reported to hold roughly 5-6% each (last year’s shareholder list included UT Park View which United Technologies (UTX US)‘s 10-K showed was a wholly-owned sub) were willing to offer more than Hitachi’s offered NT$60 (and MOPS filings indicate the board approval meeting in end-January referenced a NT$63 potential bid), there was no competitive bid made public and to the authorities by five business days prior to the first bid close (which would have been 26 Feb) as per the same law Article 7 Para 2.
Since then, there have also been other ructions. While terms remain unchanged, it is worthwhile looking into what has been going on. This is still interesting and because of its various inputs, slightly disconcerting to some, and the modalities continue to surprise me.
Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) (Delta) released its opinion (Form 250-2) and the opinion of the Independent Financial Advisor (IFA) on the tender offer. Delta Electronics (2308 TT) (DEI) launched the conditional voluntary tender offer for Delta, an electronics contract manufacturer, on 26 February 2019. The tender offer of THB71.00 cash per share values Delta at an EV of THB72 billion ($2.2 billion).
The IFA valued Delta at THB62.33-67.80 per share. Unsurprisingly, both the Delta Board and the IFA concluded that the shareholders should accept the tender offer. While the tender offer’s premium to underlying value is unlikely to set the pulse racing for minority shareholders, we continue to recommend minority shareholders to accept the tender offer.
Last Friday, Gds Holdings (Adr) (GDS US), the largest third-party data centre operator in China, announced the placing price of its public offering of 11.9 million ADS. At the placing price of $33.50 per share, GDS will raise net proceeds of $385.5 million which will be used for the development and acquisition of new data centres.
We are positive on GDS as the business remains in rude health due to strong revenue growth, rising margins and high revenue visibility. Overall, we would participate in the public offering at the placing price.
Something of a slower week on Smartkarma this week (I contributed to that slowness by being away and under the weather when back) with about 120 insights published. A list of the insights to do with Japan and Korea this week are listed below.
For me, the MUST READS of this weak are the cashless payment-related pieces by Kirk Boodry and Michael Causton shown at the bottom.
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