Preceding my comments on Naspers are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.
These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.
Huya, a leading live streaming player in China, announced share placement of USD 550 million after market close on April 3rd. In this insight, we will look at recent developments of Huya and score the deal in our ECM Framework.
Naspers (NPN SJ) recently announced another attempt to reduce the holdco discount which has remained stubbornly high despite previous attempts by management to reduce it. Since the announcement there has been movement, so perhaps this time it really is different!
So what is being done? Naspers will spin off its international internet assets, which account for >99% of its value, into a newco. They will then list 25% of newco on the Euronext in Amsterdam by issuing these shares to Naspers’ shareholders. The intention is to create a vehicle which can attract increased foreign and tech investors without the complication of a South African listing. The company believes this has been a key factor behind the wide holdco discount. The move also reduces Naspers weighting in South African indices which is another contributing factor.
Alastair Jones sees the announcement as a positive, although there are still issues with the main listing being in South Africa. He still believes a buyback would be the most effective way to reduce the discount, but Naspers is also keen to keep investing.
* Youku, the online TV subsidiary of BABA, is transforming its risk of loss to content providers.
* Youku is dismissing employees.
* We believe both of Youku’s decisions are positive for cost control and the operating margin will recover in FY2020.
* The P/E band suggests a price target HKD250, which is 38% upside above the market price.
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The company has been reporting flattish earnings for the past few years and remains well positioned in its main segments. HOLI is net cash, it has ample cash for that matter, and it has been generating operating cash flow consistently. It hasn’t provided any specific reasons for the capital raise. Which makes one wonder if this is just an opportunistic raise.
In my view, either the company needs to clearly disclose the intended use of capital or it needs to offer the deal at a very wide discount to where the shares are currently trading.
Hoya will continue to refresh its lineup of endoscopes this year as the company introduces new models once in every five to six years and we believe the company’s existing endoscope systems are nearing the end of their life cycles. We believe, this should result in growth in revenues for the company.
Hoya was the first company to introduce its Disposable Injector Development system which is one of the fastest growing businesses for Hoya. The global intraocular market is forecasted to grow at a CAGR of 5.4% until 2024 resulting in growth in top-line for Hoya which has been gradually taking share in this market.
The Luxottica/Essilor merger could pose a significant long-term threat to Hoya and will have a knock-on effect on the rest of the spectacle and eyewear manufacturers due to their market domination. That being said, we forecast the eyeglass and contact lenses to continue to witness growth due to Hoya’s strong presence in the markets in which it operates and a tailwind in the short-term as customers switch to Hoya for diversification reasons. The company’s acquisition of the eyewear business of 3M will also add to the revenue growth.
Hoya holds a monopoly in the glass HDD substrates market and the market is currently underpenetrated. The superior features of glass substrates compared to aluminum should shift the demand towards glass, which is sold at twice the price of aluminum.
Hoya Corporation is currently trading at a 1-year forward EV/EBIT multiple of 16.75x, which is close to its 52-week high of 16.79x. When compared with 5 year forward EBIT multiples there is still room for some multiple expansion in the short-term leading to price appreciation.
Almost 150 years ago in 1871, a modern postal service was established in Japan by the new Meiji government. The following year, a government-sponsored nationwide network of postal services was launched. Postal money orders started in 1875 and other money and payment services started in the following two decades. In the first decade of the 20th century, domestic money transfers and pension payment receipt were launched. In 1916 postal life insurance sales began. Life annuity sales began a decade later. The Japanese postal system of teigaku deposits started in 1941. In 1949, postal operations were established as the Ministry of Posts alongside the Ministry of Electric Communications (Telecommunications), and eventually both were subsumed into the Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications. In 2001, the business of the Japanese postal system was separated into the Japan Postal Agency, a short-lived entity set up under “central government restructuring” which took place that year. In 2003, the postal system was set up as the Japan Post Corporation under a law which established it as a statutory public corporation (in England, the Bank of England, the BBC, and the Civil Aviation Authority are such companies).
The issue of privatisation – i.e. making it responsible for its own accounts, which would take things one step further rather than being a government budget item – had long been mooted but constantly rejected because it might cost jobs and reduce services. Finally after several Lower House LDP politicians voted against Koizumi’s proposal to split the Japan Post Corporation into four parts in summer 2005 and the Upper House knocked it down, Koizumi dissolved both houses of the Diet and called a snap election saying that it was a referendum on postal privatization. He won easily and the bill was passed a month later. Things were iffy as a privatized company for a few years until after the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake, after which the government needed to find sources of extra funds to finance reconstruction. In 2012, the government announced it would sell shares to the public within three years.
Three years ago and change, the government of Japan launched the promised public offering for Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) (“JPH”), which acted as a holding company for Japan Post Bank (7182 JP) (“JPB”), and affiliated insurance arm Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP) (“JPI”). At the time, the triple-IPO at ¥1.4 trillion was the largest one-day offering in almost two decades, and the situation created some significant and interesting short-term trading opportunities.
In the end, there was always going to be “overhang” because the explicit goal of the privatization policy was to get JPH’s ownership of JPB and JPI below 50%. In doing so, the bank and insurance operations could then go out and compete with other banks and insurers; currently they are to a large extent restricted from offering new products and entering new markets.
Japan Post Insurance announced on April 4th after the close that JPH would offer 168.1mm shares of Japan Post Insurance to the public, with another 16.9mm shares offered in an over-allotment. This is big news as it is almost 31% of the shares outstanding of Japan Post Insurance and will dramatically increase its float.
One can say it is a big deal – ¥450bn (~US$4bn) of stock and at announcement it was equivalent to the last 477 days of traded volume. More importantly, this ALMOST like an IPO in that the placement is almost 3x the original IPO size (66mm shares) and will get a lot of foreign investor attention.
In addition, JPI announced it would conduct a buyback for up to 50 million shares (with a spending limit of ¥100 billion) on the ToSTNeT-3 off-hours auction-like trading system on days between April 8th and April 12th.
JPH announced in its “Intention To Sell shares” announcement (end of section 1 on p2) that if it sold shares in the ToSTNeT-3 trade, it would likely reduce the number of shares it offered.
The stock rallied very sharply Friday, rising 3% at the open and ending the morning session up 3% but rising much further in the afternoon to end up 9.9%.
After the close Friday, the company announced it would spend ¥100bn to buy up to 37.411mm shares pre-open on ToSTNeT-3 on Monday morning. That was 6.2% of shares outstanding.
The dynamics of this ToSTNeT-3 buyback were discussed in Japan Post Insurance – The ToSTNeT-3 Buyback. The ToSTNeT-3 buyback was, at its basest, an interesting garbitrage trade for a limited number of traders but the resulting dynamics are important. They influence the supply in the Offering, the dynamics of demand, and may influence trading patterns into pricing.
There are several things going on here. There is a huge offering, a buyback, earnings accretion, a float change, substantial sale to foreigners this time, and index changes. Sooner and later, it will mean a substantial move towards getting closer to 50%, and the fact that this is now investable for lots of institutional investors.
It is worth looking at these aspects independently to better understand demand for the offering as a whole.
After a WSJ article on Sunday suggesting as much, Monday morning 8 April 2018 saw the announcement of a Proposed Merger between OUE Commercial Real Estate Investment Tr (OUECT SP) and OUE Hospitality Trust (OUEHT SP) whereby OUEHT unitholders would receive a combination of cash and OUECT shares (S$0.04075 + 1.3853 shares of OUECT) for every share of OUEHT held. Investors in each would receive any “permitted distributions” (dividends, etc) declared by the respective managers in respect of the period from 1 Jan 2019 up to the day immediately before the date on which Trust Scheme becomes effective.
This would create a REIT with S$6.8bn of assets, a pro-forma market cap of ~S$2.9bn, and a free-float of S$1.1bn (up by 57%). OUE Group would continue to own 48.3% of the total.
The benefits to investors would be increased scale (2.2mm square feet of commercial net lettable area, + 1,640 hotel rooms), more borrowing capacity, increased diversification as asset concentration would be lowered, and because the scope of NewREIT would be broader, it would allow REIT managers more flexibility. The above-mentioned points are advertised as being the fodder for a re-rating. The idea of possible index inclusion is mooted as well.
The OUECT presentation says that the merger is “DPU accretive to unitholders” (+2.1% on a 2018 pro-forma basis) while the OUEHT presentation says that the merger is “value accretive to stapled securityholders” (+18.7% NAV uplift per stapled security).
Details of how this all works below.
Separately, two other Singapore deals announced at the end of last week include:
In our Discover HK Connect series, we aim to help our investors understand the flow of southbound trades via the Hong Kong Connect, as analyzed by our proprietary data engine. We will discuss the stocks that experienced the most inflow and outflow by mainland investors in the past seven days.
We split the stocks eligible for the Hong Kong Connect trade into three groups: component stocks in the HSCEI index, stocks with a market capitalization between USD 1 billion and USD 5 billion, and stocks with a market capitalization between USD 500 million and USD 1 billion.
In this insight, we will highlight Air China and Great Wall Motor.
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Meituan Dianping (3690 HK)‘s shares currently trade 18% below its IPO price of HK$69.00 per share. Meituan will announce its 4Q18 results on Monday, 11 March 2019, after market close. Notably, Meituan’s six-month lock-up period expires on 19 March 2019.
We believe that should Meituan deliver a strong 4Q18; it will likely not experience Xiaomi Corp (1810 HK)’s share price collapse after the end of its six-month lock-up period.
The DSME deal between HHI and KDB was officially finalized last Friday. We will then have the following four step process. Schedule detail is yet to come out. HHI intermediate holdco is named Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering, or KSOE.
HHI went south by nearly 4% last Friday when the deal was finalized. DSME stayed flat. Why did this happen? There was another story we heard last Friday. HHI and Korea Eximbank agreed that the ₩2.3tril CBs wouldn’t be converted into DSME shares and disposed any time soon. Not only that, there will be a downwardly interest adjustment to help ease DSME’s financial burden.
This agreement immediately sparked a speculation that HHI must have pledged Korea Eximbank some sort of DSME valuation pushings. This is like a value transfer rather from HHI to DSME. I’d wrap the current HHI long/DSEM short position at this point. Short-term, I expect DSME outperforming HHI. Longer term, I still doubt what value transfer from who to who. I’d rather stay away from both.
Friday 8 March after the close, the Nikkei announced that because the third party share sale of Pioneer Corp (6773 JP) had been completed, it would be deleted from the Nikkei 225 Average (and the Nikkei 500 Index). Omron Corp (6645 JP) will replace Pioneer in the Nikkei 225 Average, with a deemed par value of 50 yen per share.
The date for this index deletion and inclusion event is the 15th of March, as per the schedule of the February 19th announcement as to how the Pioneer event would be treated.
This affords special sits/events followers a couple of different events to look at.
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Hoya will continue to refresh its lineup of endoscopes this year as the company introduces new models once in every five to six years and we believe the company’s existing endoscope systems are nearing the end of their life cycles. We believe, this should result in growth in revenues for the company.
Hoya was the first company to introduce its Disposable Injector Development system which is one of the fastest growing businesses for Hoya. The global intraocular market is forecasted to grow at a CAGR of 5.4% until 2024 resulting in growth in top-line for Hoya which has been gradually taking share in this market.
The Luxottica/Essilor merger could pose a significant long-term threat to Hoya and will have a knock-on effect on the rest of the spectacle and eyewear manufacturers due to their market domination. That being said, we forecast the eyeglass and contact lenses to continue to witness growth due to Hoya’s strong presence in the markets in which it operates and a tailwind in the short-term as customers switch to Hoya for diversification reasons. The company’s acquisition of the eyewear business of 3M will also add to the revenue growth.
Hoya holds a monopoly in the glass HDD substrates market and the market is currently underpenetrated. The superior features of glass substrates compared to aluminum should shift the demand towards glass, which is sold at twice the price of aluminum.
Hoya Corporation is currently trading at a 1-year forward EV/EBIT multiple of 16.75x, which is close to its 52-week high of 16.79x. When compared with 5 year forward EBIT multiples there is still room for some multiple expansion in the short-term leading to price appreciation.
Almost 150 years ago in 1871, a modern postal service was established in Japan by the new Meiji government. The following year, a government-sponsored nationwide network of postal services was launched. Postal money orders started in 1875 and other money and payment services started in the following two decades. In the first decade of the 20th century, domestic money transfers and pension payment receipt were launched. In 1916 postal life insurance sales began. Life annuity sales began a decade later. The Japanese postal system of teigaku deposits started in 1941. In 1949, postal operations were established as the Ministry of Posts alongside the Ministry of Electric Communications (Telecommunications), and eventually both were subsumed into the Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications. In 2001, the business of the Japanese postal system was separated into the Japan Postal Agency, a short-lived entity set up under “central government restructuring” which took place that year. In 2003, the postal system was set up as the Japan Post Corporation under a law which established it as a statutory public corporation (in England, the Bank of England, the BBC, and the Civil Aviation Authority are such companies).
The issue of privatisation – i.e. making it responsible for its own accounts, which would take things one step further rather than being a government budget item – had long been mooted but constantly rejected because it might cost jobs and reduce services. Finally after several Lower House LDP politicians voted against Koizumi’s proposal to split the Japan Post Corporation into four parts in summer 2005 and the Upper House knocked it down, Koizumi dissolved both houses of the Diet and called a snap election saying that it was a referendum on postal privatization. He won easily and the bill was passed a month later. Things were iffy as a privatized company for a few years until after the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake, after which the government needed to find sources of extra funds to finance reconstruction. In 2012, the government announced it would sell shares to the public within three years.
Three years ago and change, the government of Japan launched the promised public offering for Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) (“JPH”), which acted as a holding company for Japan Post Bank (7182 JP) (“JPB”), and affiliated insurance arm Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP) (“JPI”). At the time, the triple-IPO at ¥1.4 trillion was the largest one-day offering in almost two decades, and the situation created some significant and interesting short-term trading opportunities.
In the end, there was always going to be “overhang” because the explicit goal of the privatization policy was to get JPH’s ownership of JPB and JPI below 50%. In doing so, the bank and insurance operations could then go out and compete with other banks and insurers; currently they are to a large extent restricted from offering new products and entering new markets.
Japan Post Insurance announced on April 4th after the close that JPH would offer 168.1mm shares of Japan Post Insurance to the public, with another 16.9mm shares offered in an over-allotment. This is big news as it is almost 31% of the shares outstanding of Japan Post Insurance and will dramatically increase its float.
One can say it is a big deal – ¥450bn (~US$4bn) of stock and at announcement it was equivalent to the last 477 days of traded volume. More importantly, this ALMOST like an IPO in that the placement is almost 3x the original IPO size (66mm shares) and will get a lot of foreign investor attention.
In addition, JPI announced it would conduct a buyback for up to 50 million shares (with a spending limit of ¥100 billion) on the ToSTNeT-3 off-hours auction-like trading system on days between April 8th and April 12th.
JPH announced in its “Intention To Sell shares” announcement (end of section 1 on p2) that if it sold shares in the ToSTNeT-3 trade, it would likely reduce the number of shares it offered.
The stock rallied very sharply Friday, rising 3% at the open and ending the morning session up 3% but rising much further in the afternoon to end up 9.9%.
After the close Friday, the company announced it would spend ¥100bn to buy up to 37.411mm shares pre-open on ToSTNeT-3 on Monday morning. That was 6.2% of shares outstanding.
The dynamics of this ToSTNeT-3 buyback were discussed in Japan Post Insurance – The ToSTNeT-3 Buyback. The ToSTNeT-3 buyback was, at its basest, an interesting garbitrage trade for a limited number of traders but the resulting dynamics are important. They influence the supply in the Offering, the dynamics of demand, and may influence trading patterns into pricing.
There are several things going on here. There is a huge offering, a buyback, earnings accretion, a float change, substantial sale to foreigners this time, and index changes. Sooner and later, it will mean a substantial move towards getting closer to 50%, and the fact that this is now investable for lots of institutional investors.
It is worth looking at these aspects independently to better understand demand for the offering as a whole.
After a WSJ article on Sunday suggesting as much, Monday morning 8 April 2018 saw the announcement of a Proposed Merger between OUE Commercial Real Estate Investment Tr (OUECT SP) and OUE Hospitality Trust (OUEHT SP) whereby OUEHT unitholders would receive a combination of cash and OUECT shares (S$0.04075 + 1.3853 shares of OUECT) for every share of OUEHT held. Investors in each would receive any “permitted distributions” (dividends, etc) declared by the respective managers in respect of the period from 1 Jan 2019 up to the day immediately before the date on which Trust Scheme becomes effective.
This would create a REIT with S$6.8bn of assets, a pro-forma market cap of ~S$2.9bn, and a free-float of S$1.1bn (up by 57%). OUE Group would continue to own 48.3% of the total.
The benefits to investors would be increased scale (2.2mm square feet of commercial net lettable area, + 1,640 hotel rooms), more borrowing capacity, increased diversification as asset concentration would be lowered, and because the scope of NewREIT would be broader, it would allow REIT managers more flexibility. The above-mentioned points are advertised as being the fodder for a re-rating. The idea of possible index inclusion is mooted as well.
The OUECT presentation says that the merger is “DPU accretive to unitholders” (+2.1% on a 2018 pro-forma basis) while the OUEHT presentation says that the merger is “value accretive to stapled securityholders” (+18.7% NAV uplift per stapled security).
Details of how this all works below.
Separately, two other Singapore deals announced at the end of last week include:
In our Discover HK Connect series, we aim to help our investors understand the flow of southbound trades via the Hong Kong Connect, as analyzed by our proprietary data engine. We will discuss the stocks that experienced the most inflow and outflow by mainland investors in the past seven days.
We split the stocks eligible for the Hong Kong Connect trade into three groups: component stocks in the HSCEI index, stocks with a market capitalization between USD 1 billion and USD 5 billion, and stocks with a market capitalization between USD 500 million and USD 1 billion.
In this insight, we will highlight Air China and Great Wall Motor.
In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks.
In the seventh company in ongoing Smartkarma Originals series on the property space in Indonesia, we now look at Indonesia’s oldest Industrial Estate developer and operator Kawasan Industri Jababeka (KIJA IJ). The company’s largest and the original estate is in Cikarang to the East of Jakarta and comprises 1,239 hectares of industrial land bank and a masterplan of 5,600 ha.
The company has also expanded its presence to Kendal, close to Semarang in Central Java, where it has a joint venture with Singapore listed company Sembcorp Industries (SCI SP). This estate covers a total area of 2,700 ha to be developed in three phases over a period of 25 years and is focused on manufacturing in industries.
The company also has successfully installed a 140 MW gas-fired power station at its Cikarang, providing a recurrent stream utility-type earnings, which cushion against the volatility in its industrial estate and property earnings. After some issues with one of its boilers (non-recurrent) and issues early last year with PLN, this asset now looks set to provide a stable earnings stream for the company.
KIJA has also built a dry-port at Cikarang estate which has been increasing throughput by around +25% every year, providing its customers with the facility for customs clearance at a faster pace of that at the Tanjong Priok port, as well as logistics support.
After two difficult years where the company has been hit by a combination of problems at its power plant, foreign exchange write-downs, and slower demand for industrial plots, the company now looks set to see a strong recovery in earnings in 2019 and beyond.
The company has seen coverage from equity analysts dwindle, which means there are no consensus estimates but it looks attractive from both a PBV and an NAV basis trading on 0.85x FY19E PBV and at a 73% discount to NAV. If the company were to trade back to its historical mean from a PBV and PER point of view, this would imply an upside of 33% to IDR325, using a blend of the two measures. An absence of one-off charges in 2019 and a pick up in industrial sales should mean a significant recovery in earnings, putting the company on an FY19E PER multiple of 9.7x, which is by no means expensive given its strategic positioning and given that this is a recovery story.
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This post estimates Nexon Japan tender price. For this, I use the same approach that a local PE named “MBK Partners” would use based on EBITDA multiple and IRR on a 3 year exit. From their position, the only proven value-up path would be KOSPI moving. MBK must try to stay as conservative as possible. Whatever Netmarble value addition should be an extra when deciding on a tender price. So, I base my estimation solely based on KOSPI moving effect. For this, I use NCsoft as a sole valuation comp.
On April 4, we attended the DTAC shareholders’ meeting and listened to how management defended their strategic decisions in various areas such as legal settlements, marketing, and spectrum bidding. This is our take on their responses to various issue:
Settlement with CAT. DTAC plans to do a further settlement worth Bt9.05bn nett with CAT to resolve all past bilateral issues, but will resume paying dividends in H2’19.
Spectrum. Since they still have less spectrum than both AIS and True Move, we can’t really fault them for bidding for the 900MHz spectrum, especially since competition has come down considerably.
Marketing. Like AIS, they are looking beyond just voice airtime. Mobile gaming is one area they will look at. DTAC’s subsidy on game-centric iPhones and the data airtime that comes with it is significantly more than both True Move and AIS.
Others. They also managed to get a raise for the Chairman and do finishing touches on the PaySabai (a payment platform) consolidation. In our view, these are really formalities at this phase, since PaySabai is pretty much wholly owned.
Here it is. The end – the culmination of years of effort and high balance sheet usage by hedge funds. Altaba Inc (AABA US) is going out with a whimper plus a little upside.
Reportedly plans for the sale of NHC have been abandoned with a focus on selling its Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)gaming unit.
We now have an agreed deal for Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) supported by the Ernst Göhner Foundation, the major activist shareholders, and Panalpina management.
Altaba will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which Altaba currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63/share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00/Alibaba share).”
As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear, based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions.
A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.
It looks like there is upside as the stock closed at US$72.76 (at the time of the insight). But there is less than you think simply because it will take time to get out of it. And discount rates of the first portion may be low, but discount rates applied to the later payments post-delisting and post court workout for the Holdback Amount could be higher.
Travis Lundy has opinions on what to do once you start getting into the arb risks. Do read his insight.
Sanghyun Park discussed Nexon sale after the FT reported bankers has stopped plans to sell the holding company NXC. The sale of NXC is probably the simplest exit path for Kim Jung-ju as it would be a more attractive tax outcome than selling Nexon Japan outright.
But there’s a lot of other stuff in NXC that suitors don’t want to, which ideally should be sold before selling NXC. There’s also the issue of whether a tender offer would be required whether the sale of NXC or Nexon – Travis concludes an offer would be required while Sanghyun does not.
Korean local news outlet reported thatTencent Holdings (700 HK)‘s US$6bn bond issuance may be a fund raising for a Nexon takeover. Still, South Korea would prefer keep Nexon’s ownership domestic, which may favour Kakao Games (1404796D KS) or PE outfit MBK.
Summit Ascent announced that First Steamship (the major shareholder) and Kuo Jen Hao (chairman) are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 35%.
Summit is trading at a trailing PER of 267x. CapIQ forecasts point to a threefold increase in earnings in FY19, although I would advise caution on those numbers given the tight cluster of target prices; historically, target prices for Summit have been wide of the mark.
First Steamship bought in at $1.06 in December 2017, around the same price when this announcement was made. Should this sale complete, this would result in the third time the shares of the major shareholder have changed hands. This looks like a great opportunity to exit.
On the 20th March, MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them. Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.
On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.
Mid-week, Manikay caved and said intends to vote all its shares for the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote. This is now MUCH closer to being a done deal. It will trade tight.
Travis is a trifle surprised Manikay did not wait a little longer. They were able to increase their stake in the low A$3.30s because of the uncertainty of their intentions, and they could probably have gone close to 20% in the low 3.30s before saying “Yes.” That would have been a welcome extra profit.
Lifeboat market play Ezion has received a bail-out from Malaysia’sYinson Holdings (YNS MK) via a capitalisation of debt and option agreement. Ezion remains suspended.
On the surface, this looks like a bargain for Yinson which is ostensibly taking over Ezion for US$200mn. However, Yinson said that it is still negotiating with the designated lenders of the US$916mn debt on the terms and conditions..
Yinson’s business risks include contact risk, oil price fluctuations and the level of activities in the O&G industry. These risks do not change should the Ezion proposal complete.
The last time came on the heels of a long independent review by EY which found KCF had given up profit to the parent through a series of relatively unfair interested party transaction agreements.
At the end, the Bermudan Court of Appeals went against a Supreme Court decision which had decided that a replacement counterparty decision was prejudiced against minorities, and despite the April 2017 deal being not fair and not reasonable according to the IFA, the parent acquired ~10% (of the 28% it did not own) bringing their stake to 82.3%. A year later the parent acquired another 5.5% bringing them to almost 88%.
Now an offer at SGD 0.60/share (compared to the Revalued NTA of SGD 0.7086/share from the IFA report (p36) of two years ago gets closer to the mark, but crucially, it is designed to squeeze out minorities with the threat of delisting. Kingboard Laminates only needs 2.05% to oblige a delisting from the SGX. As far as Travis can tell, it would require more – at least 95% of shares – to oblige a mandatory squeezeout of minorities according to Section 102-103 of Bermuda Companies Act.
The deal is at a negligible premium and is far, far below Tangible Book Value Per Share (which is almost three times the offer price). Given that the acquirer bought a large stake in the company and offered perpetual capital of almost the current market cap at a significant premium to the MGO price, Travis thinks it an unattractive offer.
It is puzzling as to why the CEO would sell his shares at such a discount, especially when the company and Everbright co-own some of the assets.
While the stated intention of the Offeror is to keep the stock listed, and the MGO is presented almost as “technical”, it would be enormously to Everbright’s benefit to buy as many shares as they could down at this price level. It will go from being underwater on an equity affiliate stake purchase to having a huge writeup in value if Everbright consolidates the asset post MGO.
For that, Travis thinks there is a possibility of a bump just to make it more attractive, though the IFA report could come out with a not fair and reasonable result which shows NTA or NAV far, far higher than the Offer Price, which is not yet declared final.
In a mainly technical piece, I explained why China Three Gorges, China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK)‘s largest shareholder with 27.1% is currently required to abstain from voting at the forthcoming court meeting, despite the misleading statement in the announcement that China Three Gorges has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme. (link to my insight: China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption)
What was once a tough deal is now an agreed deal. The deal is 2.375 shares of DSV for every share of Panalpina, which as of the previous Friday’s close had a value of CHF 195.80/share which is a 43% premium to the CHF 137/share, where Panalpina was trading the day before DSV’s first bid.
Panalpina is getting taken out at 28.1x reported 2018 EV/EBITDA multiple (pre-IFRS 16) calculated at a CHF 195.8 price. Panalpina shareholders will own ~23% of DSV shares out if all shares are exchanged and the Ernst Göhner Foundation will be the largest shareholder at ~11%.
69.9% of shares have irrevocably agreed to support the Exchange Offer. The customary condition is 80% to make it go through, meaning DSV needs another 10.1% out of the 30% extant (or just over one-third).
Travis expects there is another 10-15% held by arbitrageurs and 5-7% held by indexers already so this deal looks to me like it is done. He expects the Exchange Offer may settle as early as early-August. If it trades tight, he would get out because DSV is probably priced to a very good level.
Reuters reported that Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those TPG and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company. This was followed by Lenta announced confirming the cash offer. The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs.
The first 41.9% are sold conditional on FAS Clearance (presumably Mordashov has cleared this transaction with “the right people”) expected in May 2019, a few easily achieved conditions, and the condition of no sanctions being in play for any of the selling or buying parties.
Once cleared – expected in May 2019 – this becomes a straightforward offer with no minimum acceptances meaning that investors can sell shares into the deal or decide not to do so.
It’s not an attractive offer price, with the possibility of a bump if enough people complain. If you want to buy and hold, this deal is a put option.
Since announcing the intended listing of its international internet assets on Euronext Amsterdam “no earlier than H2 2019” – together with a secondary, inward listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange – I calculate Naspers discount to NAV has narrowed to 34.4% from 37.1%, the day before the announcement, placing the current discount a shade below the 12-month average.
The likelihood of NewCo trading at a tighter discount to where Naspers’ previously (& currently trades) is universally accepted. Naspers will benefit from that reduced discount via its 75% stake; but it is not known where Naspers’ own discount will trade after the spin-off.
There are indications the management want to see the group discount narrow to 30%, possibly down to the 20% level, which implies a significantly lower discount for Naspers, potentially around 10%. That would seem optimistic as investors focus more on the directly-held Tencent vehicle, and the fact Naspers is a holding company, holding a stake in another holding company.
Naspers’ discount may drift narrower on the expectation Naspers’ spin-off works its magic. Greater clarity on the option into Naspers or NewCo may provide an additional boost; but conversely, if such an option is limited, there is likely to be disappointment.
With Melco trading at a (then) 32% discount to NAV, Curtis Lehnert recommends a set-up trade on a dollar for dollar basis. The current level, as I write, is statistically the most attractive according to the Smartkarma Holdco Tool, sitting at -1.8 standard deviations from the 180 DMA.
Stub assets are minimal – around 8% of GAV – if excluding gaming licenses, goodwill and trademarks. Net cash is $6.4bn or $4.27/share.
Those stub assets are still loss-making, after deconsolidating out MLCO, to the tune of $386mn in EBITDA, but that was an improvement on (HK$682mn) figure in FY17.
Still, Curtis thinks now is the time to enter the trade to take advantage of both the statistical and fundamental supports to the trade.
For the month of March, ten new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$22.3bn. This overall number includes Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman’s proposal for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) after the Tender Offer was officially launched in March. This deal was first proposed in mid-January – which was rejected by the board – and subsequently an improved offer was tabled, which was then supported.
The average premium to last close for the new deals announced in March was 18%, while the average for the first quarter of 2019 is 33%.
Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB)‘s results of the CVTO have been announced. 42.85% of shares tendered, therefore the offeror held 63.78% of shares at the close of the offer. The MSCI downweight occurred at the close Thursday, however shares popped 17.5%.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
This is a “clean-up” as Kingboard Laminates owns 87.96% of Kingboard Copper Foil already.
It is unconditional in all respects and the Offeror owns 87.96%. The goal is delisting. If they get 17.03% of the minority, they will be able to engineer a delisting. Squeezeout is a bit further out but is far from impossible.
This looks like a done deal. This one should trade at shouldn’t trade at a premium UNLESS…
Quiddity’s new Quiddity Singapore M&A Guide 2019 is now published with guidelines to the relevant rules, regulations, documentation, and pointers to the Singapore M&A landscape. Watch for more in the series to be published shortly.
Aequitas Research puts out a weekly update on the deals that have been covered by Smartkarma Insight Providers recently, along with updates for upcoming IPOs.
Placements activity picked up momentum this week as evidenced by the number of follow-on offerings launched by a handful of US-listed Chinese tech companies. It all started with Qutoutiao Inc (QTT US) ‘s follow-on offering, then followed by Bilibili Inc (BILI US)‘s equity + convertible note placement, and ending the week with HUYA Inc (HUYA US)‘s follow-on offering and Baozun Inc. (BZUN US)‘s convertible bond and placement.
On the other hand, Ruhnn Holding Ltd (RUHN US)‘s debut this week had been a total disaster. It closed 37% below its IPO price on the first day. This is the worst first-day performance among Chinese ADRs (deal size >US$100m) in the past six months.
Back in Hong Kong, Dongzheng Automotive Finance (2718 HK) also broke its IPO price on the first day after relaunching at a much lower price. As per our trading update note, considering that there will be greenshoe support, we thought that the risk to reward could be favorable for a trade (from its first day mid-day price of HK$2.57).
As for placements, Ronshine China Holdings (3301 HK) seems to have made its equity raise a yearly affair. The company is back to tap the equity market through a top-up placement and it has done the same in 2017 and 2018. The initial deal size was small, US$122m, but was upsized later on. The share price traded well post-placement, closing 9.5% above its deal price of HK$10.95 on Thursday.
Map Aktif Adiperkasa PT (MAPA IJ) will be closing its bookbuild for its follow-on offering next Tuesday (pricing on Wednesday). We heard that books are already covered as of Thursday.
Accuracy Rate:
Our overall accuracy rate is 72.4% for IPOs and 63.5% for Placements
(Performance measurement criteria is explained at the end of the note)
New IPO filings
Changliao AKA 派派(Hong Kong, ~US$100m)
Below is a snippet of our IPO tool showing upcoming events for the next week. The IPO tool is designed to provide readers with timely information on all IPO related events (Book open/closing, listing, initiation, lock-up expiry, etc) for all the deals that we have worked on. You can access the tool here or through the tools menu.
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Meituan Dianping (3690 HK)‘s shares currently trade 18% below its IPO price of HK$69.00 per share. Meituan will announce its 4Q18 results on Monday, 11 March 2019, after market close. Notably, Meituan’s six-month lock-up period expires on 19 March 2019.
We believe that should Meituan deliver a strong 4Q18; it will likely not experience Xiaomi Corp (1810 HK)’s share price collapse after the end of its six-month lock-up period.
The DSME deal between HHI and KDB was officially finalized last Friday. We will then have the following four step process. Schedule detail is yet to come out. HHI intermediate holdco is named Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering, or KSOE.
HHI went south by nearly 4% last Friday when the deal was finalized. DSME stayed flat. Why did this happen? There was another story we heard last Friday. HHI and Korea Eximbank agreed that the ₩2.3tril CBs wouldn’t be converted into DSME shares and disposed any time soon. Not only that, there will be a downwardly interest adjustment to help ease DSME’s financial burden.
This agreement immediately sparked a speculation that HHI must have pledged Korea Eximbank some sort of DSME valuation pushings. This is like a value transfer rather from HHI to DSME. I’d wrap the current HHI long/DSEM short position at this point. Short-term, I expect DSME outperforming HHI. Longer term, I still doubt what value transfer from who to who. I’d rather stay away from both.
Friday 8 March after the close, the Nikkei announced that because the third party share sale of Pioneer Corp (6773 JP) had been completed, it would be deleted from the Nikkei 225 Average (and the Nikkei 500 Index). Omron Corp (6645 JP) will replace Pioneer in the Nikkei 225 Average, with a deemed par value of 50 yen per share.
The date for this index deletion and inclusion event is the 15th of March, as per the schedule of the February 19th announcement as to how the Pioneer event would be treated.
This affords special sits/events followers a couple of different events to look at.
While not new news, US-based hedge fund – somewhat well-known for being involved in M&A situations – started accumulating a position in MYOB in January and has now reached a stake of 11%. The last chunks purchased appear to have been done at (or around) A$3.40/share, which is equal to terms. The Manikay letter to the Board asks the Board to consider the market movements since December and posits a fair value in excess of A$4.00/share.
Manikay says that it is interested in becoming a long-term shareholder. But the letter seems to level its criticism of the deal price most pointedly at the fact that the deal was offered and agreed to just a few days off a two-year low in the S&P/ASX200 Index and since then the index has rebounded to within 1.5% of an 11-year high.
A “market context” bump is not a bad case in and of itself because of where peers have moved and where the market has moved, and we won’t know whether that point is taken up by the IER in the Scheme Document.
This strikes Travis Lundy as not a bad reward/risk to buy up to 1-2% through terms. The back end “undisturbed price” has risen and the recent earnings release shows online penetration continues to grow.
Irrespective of whether the Malaysian rare earth processing licence provided to Lynas was without adequate due process (as has been speculated) or whether the facility is indeed an environmental concern; the fact remains the Malaysian government has reneged on the previously agreed-upon three-step licence process – imposing unachievable pre-conditions by the licence renewal date this September – and that is wrong.
Ongoing negotiation with the Malaysian government is the only course of action by which Lynas will achieve the renewal of its operating licence (unencumbered or with “acceptable” caveats). The agreed management pathway for NUF provides scope for a positive outcome from extensive consultation.
But even if a viable resolution is reached, it would only serve to temporarily manage Lynas out of its current predicament – given the vocal domestic opposition, the long-term prognosis is likely the shuttering and removal of the LAMP.
Shares are down 45% from the pre-general election (for Malaysia) peak and ~24% down from when the Review Committee was first mooted in September 2018, and roughly a similar % compared to the 3 December closing price, the day before the pre-conditions were introduced. That still appears too optimistic. Resolving the Malaysian government roadblock will quite likely be a stop-gap measure, at best.
Posco Chemtech is to merge with POSCO ESM through a stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. The merger will be effective as of April 1. The merged company is planning to move from KOSDAQ to KOSPI. These proposals will be put to the vote at the upcoming AGM scheduled for March 18.
KOSPI 200’s re-balancing reference date is after the close of the last trading day in April and the change takes effect on the next trading day after the 2nd Thursday of June. If the KRX approves it before the end of April, Chemtech’s KOSPI inclusion will happen this June. If not, it will have to wait until next year.
New passive money flowing into Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bn. This represents 1.69% of market cap and 4.82% of float market cap. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
In a follow-up note John DeMasi provides an update of events, looking into VSM’s corporate governance documents, reviewing relevant landmark Delaware takeover case law, and elaborating on a possible path to control of Versum for Merck KGaA (MRK GR).
Merck has now filed form DFAN14A filed with the SEC. The talking points/Q&A confirm that the VSM/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) deal caught Merck by surprise as they had not been contacted by Versum as part of any market check.
Other important takeaways include number 7, where Merck stress (yet again) they are fully committed to pursuing their proposal; number 11, where they don’t rule out raising their price; and number 21, where they answer whether they have purchased any VSM shares with “The number of shares of Versum common stock held by Merck … does not exceed a level that would require disclosure.”
Merck continues to speak and act like a bidder who is not going away, and its upcoming roadshow in New York with shareholders underscores its commitment to the deal, adding to the pressure on the Versum Board.
JM has bought 662k shares in JS since the beginning of March, averaging 47.5% of daily volume, narrowing the simple ratio (JM/JS). JM has consistently bought back shares in JS over the years. Since December 2011, buybacks have taken place at an average price/book (for JS) of 0.75x (it is currently at 0.70x according to CapIQ) and at an average JM/JS ratio of 1.75x. The current ratio is 1.70x, bang in line with its 7+ year average. The 20-year average is 1.82x.
Presumably the Keswick family’s long-term plan is collapsing the circularity. But given the significant costs involved – either JM privatizing JS or vice versa – for now, the family will likely opt for the circularity creep, by continuing to chip away at minority ownership as JS takes its dividends in-specie, JM acquires JS, gradually increasing the inter holdings of the two entities.
JS is also trading “cheap”, at a 42% discount to NAV, adjusted for cross-holdings. JS is now around 25% points “cheaper” than JM (which has a discount to NAV of 17%), compared to a one-year average of ~24%. A year ago, the % difference was 6%.
JM has bought 1.8mn shares YTD compared to 2.5mn for the same period last year, while 4.9mn shares were acquired in 2018, compared to 7.6mn, 8.2mn, and 2.1mn in 2015-2017 respectively. The very long-term ratio is marginally in favour of JM, yet the more recent yearly average suggests it is line. JS looks cheap on a discount to NAV basis and it makes sense for JM to continue to acquire shares, favouring JS near-term. I also tilt in favour of this outcome.
Youngone Holdings (009970 KS)‘s 50.5%-held sub Youngone Corp (111770 KS) accounts for 70% of NAV. On a 20D MA, they are now at 312% of σ while the current price ratio is at a 120D high. Sanghyun recommended a set-up. The parent is up 9% this week vs 12% down for the sub. The NAV discount is now out of whack – plugging Sanghyun’s numbers I get a discount to NAV of 35% vs. an average of 48%. The parent is very illiquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide)
Restaurant Brands Nz (RBD NZ) has announced “Consent has now been granted in respect of the Partial Takeover by certain subsidiaries of Yum! Brands“. The remaining condition is receipt of acceptance from 75% of shareholders. Acceptances currently total 40.68%.
NASDAQ raised its bid for Oslo Bors VPS Holding ASA (OSLO NS) to NOK 158 and lowered its minimum acceptance condition from 90% to two-thirds. The offer period is extended to 29 March. The Long Stop is extended to 4 Mar 2020.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Source: Company announcements. E = our estimates; C =confirmed
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Almost 150 years ago in 1871, a modern postal service was established in Japan by the new Meiji government. The following year, a government-sponsored nationwide network of postal services was launched. Postal money orders started in 1875 and other money and payment services started in the following two decades. In the first decade of the 20th century, domestic money transfers and pension payment receipt were launched. In 1916 postal life insurance sales began. Life annuity sales began a decade later. The Japanese postal system of teigaku deposits started in 1941. In 1949, postal operations were established as the Ministry of Posts alongside the Ministry of Electric Communications (Telecommunications), and eventually both were subsumed into the Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications. In 2001, the business of the Japanese postal system was separated into the Japan Postal Agency, a short-lived entity set up under “central government restructuring” which took place that year. In 2003, the postal system was set up as the Japan Post Corporation under a law which established it as a statutory public corporation (in England, the Bank of England, the BBC, and the Civil Aviation Authority are such companies).
The issue of privatisation – i.e. making it responsible for its own accounts, which would take things one step further rather than being a government budget item – had long been mooted but constantly rejected because it might cost jobs and reduce services. Finally after several Lower House LDP politicians voted against Koizumi’s proposal to split the Japan Post Corporation into four parts in summer 2005 and the Upper House knocked it down, Koizumi dissolved both houses of the Diet and called a snap election saying that it was a referendum on postal privatization. He won easily and the bill was passed a month later. Things were iffy as a privatized company for a few years until after the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake, after which the government needed to find sources of extra funds to finance reconstruction. In 2012, the government announced it would sell shares to the public within three years.
Three years ago and change, the government of Japan launched the promised public offering for Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) (“JPH”), which acted as a holding company for Japan Post Bank (7182 JP) (“JPB”), and affiliated insurance arm Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP) (“JPI”). At the time, the triple-IPO at ¥1.4 trillion was the largest one-day offering in almost two decades, and the situation created some significant and interesting short-term trading opportunities.
In the end, there was always going to be “overhang” because the explicit goal of the privatization policy was to get JPH’s ownership of JPB and JPI below 50%. In doing so, the bank and insurance operations could then go out and compete with other banks and insurers; currently they are to a large extent restricted from offering new products and entering new markets.
Japan Post Insurance announced on April 4th after the close that JPH would offer 168.1mm shares of Japan Post Insurance to the public, with another 16.9mm shares offered in an over-allotment. This is big news as it is almost 31% of the shares outstanding of Japan Post Insurance and will dramatically increase its float.
One can say it is a big deal – ¥450bn (~US$4bn) of stock and at announcement it was equivalent to the last 477 days of traded volume. More importantly, this ALMOST like an IPO in that the placement is almost 3x the original IPO size (66mm shares) and will get a lot of foreign investor attention.
In addition, JPI announced it would conduct a buyback for up to 50 million shares (with a spending limit of ¥100 billion) on the ToSTNeT-3 off-hours auction-like trading system on days between April 8th and April 12th.
JPH announced in its “Intention To Sell shares” announcement (end of section 1 on p2) that if it sold shares in the ToSTNeT-3 trade, it would likely reduce the number of shares it offered.
The stock rallied very sharply Friday, rising 3% at the open and ending the morning session up 3% but rising much further in the afternoon to end up 9.9%.
After the close Friday, the company announced it would spend ¥100bn to buy up to 37.411mm shares pre-open on ToSTNeT-3 on Monday morning. That was 6.2% of shares outstanding.
The dynamics of this ToSTNeT-3 buyback were discussed in Japan Post Insurance – The ToSTNeT-3 Buyback. The ToSTNeT-3 buyback was, at its basest, an interesting garbitrage trade for a limited number of traders but the resulting dynamics are important. They influence the supply in the Offering, the dynamics of demand, and may influence trading patterns into pricing.
There are several things going on here. There is a huge offering, a buyback, earnings accretion, a float change, substantial sale to foreigners this time, and index changes. Sooner and later, it will mean a substantial move towards getting closer to 50%, and the fact that this is now investable for lots of institutional investors.
It is worth looking at these aspects independently to better understand demand for the offering as a whole.
After a WSJ article on Sunday suggesting as much, Monday morning 8 April 2018 saw the announcement of a Proposed Merger between OUE Commercial Real Estate Investment Tr (OUECT SP) and OUE Hospitality Trust (OUEHT SP) whereby OUEHT unitholders would receive a combination of cash and OUECT shares (S$0.04075 + 1.3853 shares of OUECT) for every share of OUEHT held. Investors in each would receive any “permitted distributions” (dividends, etc) declared by the respective managers in respect of the period from 1 Jan 2019 up to the day immediately before the date on which Trust Scheme becomes effective.
This would create a REIT with S$6.8bn of assets, a pro-forma market cap of ~S$2.9bn, and a free-float of S$1.1bn (up by 57%). OUE Group would continue to own 48.3% of the total.
The benefits to investors would be increased scale (2.2mm square feet of commercial net lettable area, + 1,640 hotel rooms), more borrowing capacity, increased diversification as asset concentration would be lowered, and because the scope of NewREIT would be broader, it would allow REIT managers more flexibility. The above-mentioned points are advertised as being the fodder for a re-rating. The idea of possible index inclusion is mooted as well.
The OUECT presentation says that the merger is “DPU accretive to unitholders” (+2.1% on a 2018 pro-forma basis) while the OUEHT presentation says that the merger is “value accretive to stapled securityholders” (+18.7% NAV uplift per stapled security).
Details of how this all works below.
Separately, two other Singapore deals announced at the end of last week include:
In our Discover HK Connect series, we aim to help our investors understand the flow of southbound trades via the Hong Kong Connect, as analyzed by our proprietary data engine. We will discuss the stocks that experienced the most inflow and outflow by mainland investors in the past seven days.
We split the stocks eligible for the Hong Kong Connect trade into three groups: component stocks in the HSCEI index, stocks with a market capitalization between USD 1 billion and USD 5 billion, and stocks with a market capitalization between USD 500 million and USD 1 billion.
In this insight, we will highlight Air China and Great Wall Motor.
In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks.
In the seventh company in ongoing Smartkarma Originals series on the property space in Indonesia, we now look at Indonesia’s oldest Industrial Estate developer and operator Kawasan Industri Jababeka (KIJA IJ). The company’s largest and the original estate is in Cikarang to the East of Jakarta and comprises 1,239 hectares of industrial land bank and a masterplan of 5,600 ha.
The company has also expanded its presence to Kendal, close to Semarang in Central Java, where it has a joint venture with Singapore listed company Sembcorp Industries (SCI SP). This estate covers a total area of 2,700 ha to be developed in three phases over a period of 25 years and is focused on manufacturing in industries.
The company also has successfully installed a 140 MW gas-fired power station at its Cikarang, providing a recurrent stream utility-type earnings, which cushion against the volatility in its industrial estate and property earnings. After some issues with one of its boilers (non-recurrent) and issues early last year with PLN, this asset now looks set to provide a stable earnings stream for the company.
KIJA has also built a dry-port at Cikarang estate which has been increasing throughput by around +25% every year, providing its customers with the facility for customs clearance at a faster pace of that at the Tanjong Priok port, as well as logistics support.
After two difficult years where the company has been hit by a combination of problems at its power plant, foreign exchange write-downs, and slower demand for industrial plots, the company now looks set to see a strong recovery in earnings in 2019 and beyond.
The company has seen coverage from equity analysts dwindle, which means there are no consensus estimates but it looks attractive from both a PBV and an NAV basis trading on 0.85x FY19E PBV and at a 73% discount to NAV. If the company were to trade back to its historical mean from a PBV and PER point of view, this would imply an upside of 33% to IDR325, using a blend of the two measures. An absence of one-off charges in 2019 and a pick up in industrial sales should mean a significant recovery in earnings, putting the company on an FY19E PER multiple of 9.7x, which is by no means expensive given its strategic positioning and given that this is a recovery story.
Below is a recap of the key IPO/placement research produced by the Global Equity Research team. This week, we update on the bevvy of placements offered by various companies. After placements by Pinduoduo (PDD US) and Sea Ltd (SE US) , we saw more offerings from HUYA Inc (HUYA US) , Bilibili Inc (BILI US) and Qutoutiao Inc (QTT US). We update on these three offerings and perhaps big picture, this could reflect a signalling inflection point in these shares. More details below
In addition, we have provided an updated calendar of upcoming catalysts for EVENT driven names below.
Best of luck for the new week – Arun, Venkat and Rickin
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After a WSJ article on Sunday suggesting as much, Monday morning 8 April 2018 saw the announcement of a Proposed Merger between OUE Commercial Real Estate Investment Tr (OUECT SP) and OUE Hospitality Trust (OUEHT SP) whereby OUEHT unitholders would receive a combination of cash and OUECT shares (S$0.04075 + 1.3853 shares of OUECT) for every share of OUEHT held. Investors in each would receive any “permitted distributions” (dividends, etc) declared by the respective managers in respect of the period from 1 Jan 2019 up to the day immediately before the date on which Trust Scheme becomes effective.
This would create a REIT with S$6.8bn of assets, a pro-forma market cap of ~S$2.9bn, and a free-float of S$1.1bn (up by 57%). OUE Group would continue to own 48.3% of the total.
The benefits to investors would be increased scale (2.2mm square feet of commercial net lettable area, + 1,640 hotel rooms), more borrowing capacity, increased diversification as asset concentration would be lowered, and because the scope of NewREIT would be broader, it would allow REIT managers more flexibility. The above-mentioned points are advertised as being the fodder for a re-rating. The idea of possible index inclusion is mooted as well.
The OUECT presentation says that the merger is “DPU accretive to unitholders” (+2.1% on a 2018 pro-forma basis) while the OUEHT presentation says that the merger is “value accretive to stapled securityholders” (+18.7% NAV uplift per stapled security).
Details of how this all works below.
Separately, two other Singapore deals announced at the end of last week include:
In our Discover HK Connect series, we aim to help our investors understand the flow of southbound trades via the Hong Kong Connect, as analyzed by our proprietary data engine. We will discuss the stocks that experienced the most inflow and outflow by mainland investors in the past seven days.
We split the stocks eligible for the Hong Kong Connect trade into three groups: component stocks in the HSCEI index, stocks with a market capitalization between USD 1 billion and USD 5 billion, and stocks with a market capitalization between USD 500 million and USD 1 billion.
In this insight, we will highlight Air China and Great Wall Motor.
In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks.
In the seventh company in ongoing Smartkarma Originals series on the property space in Indonesia, we now look at Indonesia’s oldest Industrial Estate developer and operator Kawasan Industri Jababeka (KIJA IJ). The company’s largest and the original estate is in Cikarang to the East of Jakarta and comprises 1,239 hectares of industrial land bank and a masterplan of 5,600 ha.
The company has also expanded its presence to Kendal, close to Semarang in Central Java, where it has a joint venture with Singapore listed company Sembcorp Industries (SCI SP). This estate covers a total area of 2,700 ha to be developed in three phases over a period of 25 years and is focused on manufacturing in industries.
The company also has successfully installed a 140 MW gas-fired power station at its Cikarang, providing a recurrent stream utility-type earnings, which cushion against the volatility in its industrial estate and property earnings. After some issues with one of its boilers (non-recurrent) and issues early last year with PLN, this asset now looks set to provide a stable earnings stream for the company.
KIJA has also built a dry-port at Cikarang estate which has been increasing throughput by around +25% every year, providing its customers with the facility for customs clearance at a faster pace of that at the Tanjong Priok port, as well as logistics support.
After two difficult years where the company has been hit by a combination of problems at its power plant, foreign exchange write-downs, and slower demand for industrial plots, the company now looks set to see a strong recovery in earnings in 2019 and beyond.
The company has seen coverage from equity analysts dwindle, which means there are no consensus estimates but it looks attractive from both a PBV and an NAV basis trading on 0.85x FY19E PBV and at a 73% discount to NAV. If the company were to trade back to its historical mean from a PBV and PER point of view, this would imply an upside of 33% to IDR325, using a blend of the two measures. An absence of one-off charges in 2019 and a pick up in industrial sales should mean a significant recovery in earnings, putting the company on an FY19E PER multiple of 9.7x, which is by no means expensive given its strategic positioning and given that this is a recovery story.
Below is a recap of the key IPO/placement research produced by the Global Equity Research team. This week, we update on the bevvy of placements offered by various companies. After placements by Pinduoduo (PDD US) and Sea Ltd (SE US) , we saw more offerings from HUYA Inc (HUYA US) , Bilibili Inc (BILI US) and Qutoutiao Inc (QTT US). We update on these three offerings and perhaps big picture, this could reflect a signalling inflection point in these shares. More details below
In addition, we have provided an updated calendar of upcoming catalysts for EVENT driven names below.
Best of luck for the new week – Arun, Venkat and Rickin
This post estimates Nexon Japan tender price. For this, I use the same approach that a local PE named “MBK Partners” would use based on EBITDA multiple and IRR on a 3 year exit. From their position, the only proven value-up path would be KOSPI moving. MBK must try to stay as conservative as possible. Whatever Netmarble value addition should be an extra when deciding on a tender price. So, I base my estimation solely based on KOSPI moving effect. For this, I use NCsoft as a sole valuation comp.
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The DSME deal between HHI and KDB was officially finalized last Friday. We will then have the following four step process. Schedule detail is yet to come out. HHI intermediate holdco is named Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering, or KSOE.
HHI went south by nearly 4% last Friday when the deal was finalized. DSME stayed flat. Why did this happen? There was another story we heard last Friday. HHI and Korea Eximbank agreed that the ₩2.3tril CBs wouldn’t be converted into DSME shares and disposed any time soon. Not only that, there will be a downwardly interest adjustment to help ease DSME’s financial burden.
This agreement immediately sparked a speculation that HHI must have pledged Korea Eximbank some sort of DSME valuation pushings. This is like a value transfer rather from HHI to DSME. I’d wrap the current HHI long/DSEM short position at this point. Short-term, I expect DSME outperforming HHI. Longer term, I still doubt what value transfer from who to who. I’d rather stay away from both.
Friday 8 March after the close, the Nikkei announced that because the third party share sale of Pioneer Corp (6773 JP) had been completed, it would be deleted from the Nikkei 225 Average (and the Nikkei 500 Index). Omron Corp (6645 JP) will replace Pioneer in the Nikkei 225 Average, with a deemed par value of 50 yen per share.
The date for this index deletion and inclusion event is the 15th of March, as per the schedule of the February 19th announcement as to how the Pioneer event would be treated.
This affords special sits/events followers a couple of different events to look at.
While not new news, US-based hedge fund – somewhat well-known for being involved in M&A situations – started accumulating a position in MYOB in January and has now reached a stake of 11%. The last chunks purchased appear to have been done at (or around) A$3.40/share, which is equal to terms. The Manikay letter to the Board asks the Board to consider the market movements since December and posits a fair value in excess of A$4.00/share.
Manikay says that it is interested in becoming a long-term shareholder. But the letter seems to level its criticism of the deal price most pointedly at the fact that the deal was offered and agreed to just a few days off a two-year low in the S&P/ASX200 Index and since then the index has rebounded to within 1.5% of an 11-year high.
A “market context” bump is not a bad case in and of itself because of where peers have moved and where the market has moved, and we won’t know whether that point is taken up by the IER in the Scheme Document.
This strikes Travis Lundy as not a bad reward/risk to buy up to 1-2% through terms. The back end “undisturbed price” has risen and the recent earnings release shows online penetration continues to grow.
Irrespective of whether the Malaysian rare earth processing licence provided to Lynas was without adequate due process (as has been speculated) or whether the facility is indeed an environmental concern; the fact remains the Malaysian government has reneged on the previously agreed-upon three-step licence process – imposing unachievable pre-conditions by the licence renewal date this September – and that is wrong.
Ongoing negotiation with the Malaysian government is the only course of action by which Lynas will achieve the renewal of its operating licence (unencumbered or with “acceptable” caveats). The agreed management pathway for NUF provides scope for a positive outcome from extensive consultation.
But even if a viable resolution is reached, it would only serve to temporarily manage Lynas out of its current predicament – given the vocal domestic opposition, the long-term prognosis is likely the shuttering and removal of the LAMP.
Shares are down 45% from the pre-general election (for Malaysia) peak and ~24% down from when the Review Committee was first mooted in September 2018, and roughly a similar % compared to the 3 December closing price, the day before the pre-conditions were introduced. That still appears too optimistic. Resolving the Malaysian government roadblock will quite likely be a stop-gap measure, at best.
Posco Chemtech is to merge with POSCO ESM through a stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. The merger will be effective as of April 1. The merged company is planning to move from KOSDAQ to KOSPI. These proposals will be put to the vote at the upcoming AGM scheduled for March 18.
KOSPI 200’s re-balancing reference date is after the close of the last trading day in April and the change takes effect on the next trading day after the 2nd Thursday of June. If the KRX approves it before the end of April, Chemtech’s KOSPI inclusion will happen this June. If not, it will have to wait until next year.
New passive money flowing into Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bn. This represents 1.69% of market cap and 4.82% of float market cap. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
In a follow-up note John DeMasi provides an update of events, looking into VSM’s corporate governance documents, reviewing relevant landmark Delaware takeover case law, and elaborating on a possible path to control of Versum for Merck KGaA (MRK GR).
Merck has now filed form DFAN14A filed with the SEC. The talking points/Q&A confirm that the VSM/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) deal caught Merck by surprise as they had not been contacted by Versum as part of any market check.
Other important takeaways include number 7, where Merck stress (yet again) they are fully committed to pursuing their proposal; number 11, where they don’t rule out raising their price; and number 21, where they answer whether they have purchased any VSM shares with “The number of shares of Versum common stock held by Merck … does not exceed a level that would require disclosure.”
Merck continues to speak and act like a bidder who is not going away, and its upcoming roadshow in New York with shareholders underscores its commitment to the deal, adding to the pressure on the Versum Board.
JM has bought 662k shares in JS since the beginning of March, averaging 47.5% of daily volume, narrowing the simple ratio (JM/JS). JM has consistently bought back shares in JS over the years. Since December 2011, buybacks have taken place at an average price/book (for JS) of 0.75x (it is currently at 0.70x according to CapIQ) and at an average JM/JS ratio of 1.75x. The current ratio is 1.70x, bang in line with its 7+ year average. The 20-year average is 1.82x.
Presumably the Keswick family’s long-term plan is collapsing the circularity. But given the significant costs involved – either JM privatizing JS or vice versa – for now, the family will likely opt for the circularity creep, by continuing to chip away at minority ownership as JS takes its dividends in-specie, JM acquires JS, gradually increasing the inter holdings of the two entities.
JS is also trading “cheap”, at a 42% discount to NAV, adjusted for cross-holdings. JS is now around 25% points “cheaper” than JM (which has a discount to NAV of 17%), compared to a one-year average of ~24%. A year ago, the % difference was 6%.
JM has bought 1.8mn shares YTD compared to 2.5mn for the same period last year, while 4.9mn shares were acquired in 2018, compared to 7.6mn, 8.2mn, and 2.1mn in 2015-2017 respectively. The very long-term ratio is marginally in favour of JM, yet the more recent yearly average suggests it is line. JS looks cheap on a discount to NAV basis and it makes sense for JM to continue to acquire shares, favouring JS near-term. I also tilt in favour of this outcome.
Youngone Holdings (009970 KS)‘s 50.5%-held sub Youngone Corp (111770 KS) accounts for 70% of NAV. On a 20D MA, they are now at 312% of σ while the current price ratio is at a 120D high. Sanghyun recommended a set-up. The parent is up 9% this week vs 12% down for the sub. The NAV discount is now out of whack – plugging Sanghyun’s numbers I get a discount to NAV of 35% vs. an average of 48%. The parent is very illiquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide)
Restaurant Brands Nz (RBD NZ) has announced “Consent has now been granted in respect of the Partial Takeover by certain subsidiaries of Yum! Brands“. The remaining condition is receipt of acceptance from 75% of shareholders. Acceptances currently total 40.68%.
NASDAQ raised its bid for Oslo Bors VPS Holding ASA (OSLO NS) to NOK 158 and lowered its minimum acceptance condition from 90% to two-thirds. The offer period is extended to 29 March. The Long Stop is extended to 4 Mar 2020.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Source: Company announcements. E = our estimates; C =confirmed
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While not new news, US-based hedge fund – somewhat well-known for being involved in M&A situations – started accumulating a position in MYOB in January and has now reached a stake of 11%. The last chunks purchased appear to have been done at (or around) A$3.40/share, which is equal to terms. The Manikay letter to the Board asks the Board to consider the market movements since December and posits a fair value in excess of A$4.00/share.
Manikay says that it is interested in becoming a long-term shareholder. But the letter seems to level its criticism of the deal price most pointedly at the fact that the deal was offered and agreed to just a few days off a two-year low in the S&P/ASX200 Index and since then the index has rebounded to within 1.5% of an 11-year high.
A “market context” bump is not a bad case in and of itself because of where peers have moved and where the market has moved, and we won’t know whether that point is taken up by the IER in the Scheme Document.
This strikes Travis Lundy as not a bad reward/risk to buy up to 1-2% through terms. The back end “undisturbed price” has risen and the recent earnings release shows online penetration continues to grow.
Irrespective of whether the Malaysian rare earth processing licence provided to Lynas was without adequate due process (as has been speculated) or whether the facility is indeed an environmental concern; the fact remains the Malaysian government has reneged on the previously agreed-upon three-step licence process – imposing unachievable pre-conditions by the licence renewal date this September – and that is wrong.
Ongoing negotiation with the Malaysian government is the only course of action by which Lynas will achieve the renewal of its operating licence (unencumbered or with “acceptable” caveats). The agreed management pathway for NUF provides scope for a positive outcome from extensive consultation.
But even if a viable resolution is reached, it would only serve to temporarily manage Lynas out of its current predicament – given the vocal domestic opposition, the long-term prognosis is likely the shuttering and removal of the LAMP.
Shares are down 45% from the pre-general election (for Malaysia) peak and ~24% down from when the Review Committee was first mooted in September 2018, and roughly a similar % compared to the 3 December closing price, the day before the pre-conditions were introduced. That still appears too optimistic. Resolving the Malaysian government roadblock will quite likely be a stop-gap measure, at best.
Posco Chemtech is to merge with POSCO ESM through a stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. The merger will be effective as of April 1. The merged company is planning to move from KOSDAQ to KOSPI. These proposals will be put to the vote at the upcoming AGM scheduled for March 18.
KOSPI 200’s re-balancing reference date is after the close of the last trading day in April and the change takes effect on the next trading day after the 2nd Thursday of June. If the KRX approves it before the end of April, Chemtech’s KOSPI inclusion will happen this June. If not, it will have to wait until next year.
New passive money flowing into Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bn. This represents 1.69% of market cap and 4.82% of float market cap. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
In a follow-up note John DeMasi provides an update of events, looking into VSM’s corporate governance documents, reviewing relevant landmark Delaware takeover case law, and elaborating on a possible path to control of Versum for Merck KGaA (MRK GR).
Merck has now filed form DFAN14A filed with the SEC. The talking points/Q&A confirm that the VSM/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) deal caught Merck by surprise as they had not been contacted by Versum as part of any market check.
Other important takeaways include number 7, where Merck stress (yet again) they are fully committed to pursuing their proposal; number 11, where they don’t rule out raising their price; and number 21, where they answer whether they have purchased any VSM shares with “The number of shares of Versum common stock held by Merck … does not exceed a level that would require disclosure.”
Merck continues to speak and act like a bidder who is not going away, and its upcoming roadshow in New York with shareholders underscores its commitment to the deal, adding to the pressure on the Versum Board.
JM has bought 662k shares in JS since the beginning of March, averaging 47.5% of daily volume, narrowing the simple ratio (JM/JS). JM has consistently bought back shares in JS over the years. Since December 2011, buybacks have taken place at an average price/book (for JS) of 0.75x (it is currently at 0.70x according to CapIQ) and at an average JM/JS ratio of 1.75x. The current ratio is 1.70x, bang in line with its 7+ year average. The 20-year average is 1.82x.
Presumably the Keswick family’s long-term plan is collapsing the circularity. But given the significant costs involved – either JM privatizing JS or vice versa – for now, the family will likely opt for the circularity creep, by continuing to chip away at minority ownership as JS takes its dividends in-specie, JM acquires JS, gradually increasing the inter holdings of the two entities.
JS is also trading “cheap”, at a 42% discount to NAV, adjusted for cross-holdings. JS is now around 25% points “cheaper” than JM (which has a discount to NAV of 17%), compared to a one-year average of ~24%. A year ago, the % difference was 6%.
JM has bought 1.8mn shares YTD compared to 2.5mn for the same period last year, while 4.9mn shares were acquired in 2018, compared to 7.6mn, 8.2mn, and 2.1mn in 2015-2017 respectively. The very long-term ratio is marginally in favour of JM, yet the more recent yearly average suggests it is line. JS looks cheap on a discount to NAV basis and it makes sense for JM to continue to acquire shares, favouring JS near-term. I also tilt in favour of this outcome.
Youngone Holdings (009970 KS)‘s 50.5%-held sub Youngone Corp (111770 KS) accounts for 70% of NAV. On a 20D MA, they are now at 312% of σ while the current price ratio is at a 120D high. Sanghyun recommended a set-up. The parent is up 9% this week vs 12% down for the sub. The NAV discount is now out of whack – plugging Sanghyun’s numbers I get a discount to NAV of 35% vs. an average of 48%. The parent is very illiquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide)
Restaurant Brands Nz (RBD NZ) has announced “Consent has now been granted in respect of the Partial Takeover by certain subsidiaries of Yum! Brands“. The remaining condition is receipt of acceptance from 75% of shareholders. Acceptances currently total 40.68%.
NASDAQ raised its bid for Oslo Bors VPS Holding ASA (OSLO NS) to NOK 158 and lowered its minimum acceptance condition from 90% to two-thirds. The offer period is extended to 29 March. The Long Stop is extended to 4 Mar 2020.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Source: Company announcements. E = our estimates; C =confirmed
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.