Hoya will continue to refresh its lineup of endoscopes this year as the company introduces new models once in every five to six years and we believe the company’s existing endoscope systems are nearing the end of their life cycles. We believe, this should result in growth in revenues for the company.
Hoya was the first company to introduce its Disposable Injector Development system which is one of the fastest growing businesses for Hoya. The global intraocular market is forecasted to grow at a CAGR of 5.4% until 2024 resulting in growth in top-line for Hoya which has been gradually taking share in this market.
The Luxottica/Essilor merger could pose a significant long-term threat to Hoya and will have a knock-on effect on the rest of the spectacle and eyewear manufacturers due to their market domination. That being said, we forecast the eyeglass and contact lenses to continue to witness growth due to Hoya’s strong presence in the markets in which it operates and a tailwind in the short-term as customers switch to Hoya for diversification reasons. The company’s acquisition of the eyewear business of 3M will also add to the revenue growth.
Hoya holds a monopoly in the glass HDD substrates market and the market is currently underpenetrated. The superior features of glass substrates compared to aluminum should shift the demand towards glass, which is sold at twice the price of aluminum.
Hoya Corporation is currently trading at a 1-year forward EV/EBIT multiple of 16.75x, which is close to its 52-week high of 16.79x. When compared with 5 year forward EBIT multiples there is still room for some multiple expansion in the short-term leading to price appreciation.
Almost 150 years ago in 1871, a modern postal service was established in Japan by the new Meiji government. The following year, a government-sponsored nationwide network of postal services was launched. Postal money orders started in 1875 and other money and payment services started in the following two decades. In the first decade of the 20th century, domestic money transfers and pension payment receipt were launched. In 1916 postal life insurance sales began. Life annuity sales began a decade later. The Japanese postal system of teigaku deposits started in 1941. In 1949, postal operations were established as the Ministry of Posts alongside the Ministry of Electric Communications (Telecommunications), and eventually both were subsumed into the Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications. In 2001, the business of the Japanese postal system was separated into the Japan Postal Agency, a short-lived entity set up under “central government restructuring” which took place that year. In 2003, the postal system was set up as the Japan Post Corporation under a law which established it as a statutory public corporation (in England, the Bank of England, the BBC, and the Civil Aviation Authority are such companies).
The issue of privatisation – i.e. making it responsible for its own accounts, which would take things one step further rather than being a government budget item – had long been mooted but constantly rejected because it might cost jobs and reduce services. Finally after several Lower House LDP politicians voted against Koizumi’s proposal to split the Japan Post Corporation into four parts in summer 2005 and the Upper House knocked it down, Koizumi dissolved both houses of the Diet and called a snap election saying that it was a referendum on postal privatization. He won easily and the bill was passed a month later. Things were iffy as a privatized company for a few years until after the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake, after which the government needed to find sources of extra funds to finance reconstruction. In 2012, the government announced it would sell shares to the public within three years.
Three years ago and change, the government of Japan launched the promised public offering for Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) (“JPH”), which acted as a holding company for Japan Post Bank (7182 JP) (“JPB”), and affiliated insurance arm Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP) (“JPI”). At the time, the triple-IPO at ¥1.4 trillion was the largest one-day offering in almost two decades, and the situation created some significant and interesting short-term trading opportunities.
In the end, there was always going to be “overhang” because the explicit goal of the privatization policy was to get JPH’s ownership of JPB and JPI below 50%. In doing so, the bank and insurance operations could then go out and compete with other banks and insurers; currently they are to a large extent restricted from offering new products and entering new markets.
Japan Post Insurance announced on April 4th after the close that JPH would offer 168.1mm shares of Japan Post Insurance to the public, with another 16.9mm shares offered in an over-allotment. This is big news as it is almost 31% of the shares outstanding of Japan Post Insurance and will dramatically increase its float.
One can say it is a big deal – ¥450bn (~US$4bn) of stock and at announcement it was equivalent to the last 477 days of traded volume. More importantly, this ALMOST like an IPO in that the placement is almost 3x the original IPO size (66mm shares) and will get a lot of foreign investor attention.
In addition, JPI announced it would conduct a buyback for up to 50 million shares (with a spending limit of ¥100 billion) on the ToSTNeT-3 off-hours auction-like trading system on days between April 8th and April 12th.
JPH announced in its “Intention To Sell shares” announcement (end of section 1 on p2) that if it sold shares in the ToSTNeT-3 trade, it would likely reduce the number of shares it offered.
The stock rallied very sharply Friday, rising 3% at the open and ending the morning session up 3% but rising much further in the afternoon to end up 9.9%.
After the close Friday, the company announced it would spend ¥100bn to buy up to 37.411mm shares pre-open on ToSTNeT-3 on Monday morning. That was 6.2% of shares outstanding.
The dynamics of this ToSTNeT-3 buyback were discussed in Japan Post Insurance – The ToSTNeT-3 Buyback. The ToSTNeT-3 buyback was, at its basest, an interesting garbitrage trade for a limited number of traders but the resulting dynamics are important. They influence the supply in the Offering, the dynamics of demand, and may influence trading patterns into pricing.
There are several things going on here. There is a huge offering, a buyback, earnings accretion, a float change, substantial sale to foreigners this time, and index changes. Sooner and later, it will mean a substantial move towards getting closer to 50%, and the fact that this is now investable for lots of institutional investors.
It is worth looking at these aspects independently to better understand demand for the offering as a whole.
I’ve covered some of the background and index weightage impact in my earlier insight: Japan Post Insurance Placement – 3x the IPO Size – Basics and Index Impact. For people interested in reading more about the history and background, I’ve covered the IPO and JPH sell down in the below series of insights:
At noon Sydney time Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) held an investor briefing by webcast regarding comments made by the Malaysian Prime Minister in his first cabinet press conference on Friday 5 April 2019. Those comments were noted in the ASX regulatory update.
This post estimates Nexon Japan tender price. For this, I use the same approach that a local PE named “MBK Partners” would use based on EBITDA multiple and IRR on a 3 year exit. From their position, the only proven value-up path would be KOSPI moving. MBK must try to stay as conservative as possible. Whatever Netmarble value addition should be an extra when deciding on a tender price. So, I base my estimation solely based on KOSPI moving effect. For this, I use NCsoft as a sole valuation comp.
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Downturns in the semiconductor, auto and other user industries have caught up with SMC. Sales were down 4.0% year-on-year in the three months to December (the first decline in more than two years) and the decline in profits accelerated, with gross profit down 5.4%, operating profit down 10.6% and net profit down 18.8%. Year-on-year comparisons are likely to remain difficult for at least another two quarters.
In December, we wrote: “Management reports that semiconductor-related demand is down in all markets and that auto-related demand is down in the U.S. Auto sales are also declining in China.” (SMC (6273 JP): Profits Start to Decline ) Last week, WSTS reported the first decline in semiconductor sales in 30 months and the Nikkei newspaper reported that “Japanese chipmaker Renesas Electronics will temporarily halt work at 13 of the company’s 14 production facilities, including all nine domestic plants, due to high inventory levels and possible impact as Chinese demand for automotive and machinery tools plummets.” On Friday, March 8, SMC’s share price dropped by 3%.
SMC has left FY Mar-19 guidance unchanged, implying a 4.1% decline in sales and a 2.9% decline in operating profit in 4Q. In view of current trends, this looks over-optimistic. The shares are now selling at 17.8x our EPS estimate for FY Mar-19 and 18.6x our estimate for FY Mar-20. These multiples compare with a 5-year historical P/E range of 13.8x – 28.5x.
SMC is a leading supplier of pneumatic and other automated control equipment for the electronics, auto, machine tool and other industries.
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I’ve covered some of the background and index weightage impact in my earlier insight: Japan Post Insurance Placement – 3x the IPO Size – Basics and Index Impact. For people interested in reading more about the history and background, I’ve covered the IPO and JPH sell down in the below series of insights:
At noon Sydney time Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) held an investor briefing by webcast regarding comments made by the Malaysian Prime Minister in his first cabinet press conference on Friday 5 April 2019. Those comments were noted in the ASX regulatory update.
This post estimates Nexon Japan tender price. For this, I use the same approach that a local PE named “MBK Partners” would use based on EBITDA multiple and IRR on a 3 year exit. From their position, the only proven value-up path would be KOSPI moving. MBK must try to stay as conservative as possible. Whatever Netmarble value addition should be an extra when deciding on a tender price. So, I base my estimation solely based on KOSPI moving effect. For this, I use NCsoft as a sole valuation comp.
Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP)announced on April 4th after the close that Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) would offer 168.1mm shares of Japan Post Insurance to the public, with another 16.9mm shares offered in an over-allotment. This is big news as it is almost 31% of the shares outstanding of Japan Post Insurance and will dramatically increase its float.
One can say it is a big deal – ¥450bn (~US$4bn) of stock and at announcement it was equivalent to the last 477 days of traded volume. More importantly, this ALMOST like an IPO in that the placement is almost 3x the original IPO size (66mm shares) and will get a lot of foreign investor attention.
In addition, JPI announced it would conduct a buyback for up to 50 million shares (with a spending limit of ¥100 billion) on the ToSTNeT-3 off-hours auction-like trading system on days between April 8th and April 12th.
In its announcement of the decision to sell shares, Japan Post Holdings said that if JPI did indeed conduct the buyback, it might participate, in which case the size of the offering “may decrease.”
The stock rallied very sharply Friday, rising 3% at the open and ending the morning session up 3% but rising much further in the afternoon to end up 9.9%.
After the close Friday, JPI announced it would spend ¥100bn to buy up to 37.411mm shares pre-open on ToSTNeT-3 on Monday morning. That is 6.2% of shares outstanding.
Understanding the dynamics and the rules here AND about the offering may tell you something about how this will work.
The Relative Price Score (RPS) is a measure of stock price performance relative to TOPIX calculated by comparing the current deviation with the mean absolute deviation of monthly and daily relative share prices. As all companies are put on a comparable scale, ‘Overbought’ and ‘Oversold’ outliers and changes in scoring can reveal short-term and longer-term trading opportunities. Company data is cap-weight-aggregated into 328 Peer Group and 30 Sector Relative Price Scores. Outlier thresholds are set at +4 & -2 for Companies, +3 & -1.5 for Peer Groups and +2 and -1 for Sectors. These thresholds equate with the top and bottom first-to-second percentiles of historical observations from which mean reversion normally takes only a few months.
Source: Japan Analytics
OUTLIER TRENDS – In the past, increases in the percentage of companies that are either Overbought or Oversold has been a useful indicator of market trends with a rising number of Overbought outliers being bullish and an increasing number of Oversold outliers being bearish and the crossovers between the numbers of each offering market timing signals. The current situation where both sets of outliers are rising has only occurred once before in the last 30 years – in 1999/2000 shortly before the peak of the ‘tech bubble’. We attribute some of the market’s distortions to the Bank of Japan’s market activities and the increase in algorithmic trading. Whatever the cause, repeating the 2000 tech bubble playbook is unlikely to end well.
Source: Japan Analytics
NEGATIVE ‘SPREAD’ – On a daily closing basis, the Oversold outlier percentage is currently 3.17%, the highest since December 25th 2018, despite the total market value being 14% higher than on that day. The ‘spread’ between Overbought and Oversold outliers is now -1.10, and has only been wider for three days at the end of last year either side of Christmas Day. Nevertheless, the Overbought percentage reached a new fifteen-year high at the end of March despite the total market value being 12.6% below the peak of January 2018. In a polarised market, the winners keep on winning, and the losers keep on losing.
Source: Japan Analytics
MARKET TIMING – Using the crossover from Net Overbought to Net Oversold has been a reasonably good market timing indicator over the last two decades and would have avoided the five-year-long slump from 2007-2012. The most recent monthly closing signal was generated in January when the total market value was ¥634t, 2.7% lower than the current level.
Source: Japan Analytics
DAILY TIMING SIGNALS – Using daily closing prices but slightly wider parameters to reduce ‘noise’ the signals are reasonably effective. The last signal was a sell on 18th December 2018 when the total market value was ¥623b, 4.5% below the current level. Both monthly and daily indicators have large negative ‘spreads’ and are unlikely to generate ‘buy’ signals for some time. Both are also suggesting that further declines lie ahead.
– SECTORS –
Source: Japan Analytics
28-YEAR TIMELINE – The twenty-eight-year history of Sectors’ Relative Price Score is shown above and chronicles the periodic extremes of both Overbought and Oversold and the persistence of each. Only seventeen Sectors have been Overbought during this period for a total of 546 months of which half were before 2001. The average Overbought persistence is 4.3 months or 3.4 months excluding the Internet Content & Services Sector. Only fourteen Sectors have been Oversold since 1992 for a total of 243 months of which 55% were before 2001. The average Oversold persistence is 5.7 months although this has risen to 7.5 months since 2001. Currently, three Sectors are Overbought – Consumer Services, Other Consumer Products, and Healthcare, and two Sectors are Oversold – Banks and Utilities.
In the DETAIL section below, we provide an update on recent Sector and Peer Group trends and make some specific recommendations. A second Insight will follow looking at the Relative Price Scores for Companies.
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At noon Sydney time Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) held an investor briefing by webcast regarding comments made by the Malaysian Prime Minister in his first cabinet press conference on Friday 5 April 2019. Those comments were noted in the ASX regulatory update.
This post estimates Nexon Japan tender price. For this, I use the same approach that a local PE named “MBK Partners” would use based on EBITDA multiple and IRR on a 3 year exit. From their position, the only proven value-up path would be KOSPI moving. MBK must try to stay as conservative as possible. Whatever Netmarble value addition should be an extra when deciding on a tender price. So, I base my estimation solely based on KOSPI moving effect. For this, I use NCsoft as a sole valuation comp.
Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP)announced on April 4th after the close that Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) would offer 168.1mm shares of Japan Post Insurance to the public, with another 16.9mm shares offered in an over-allotment. This is big news as it is almost 31% of the shares outstanding of Japan Post Insurance and will dramatically increase its float.
One can say it is a big deal – ¥450bn (~US$4bn) of stock and at announcement it was equivalent to the last 477 days of traded volume. More importantly, this ALMOST like an IPO in that the placement is almost 3x the original IPO size (66mm shares) and will get a lot of foreign investor attention.
In addition, JPI announced it would conduct a buyback for up to 50 million shares (with a spending limit of ¥100 billion) on the ToSTNeT-3 off-hours auction-like trading system on days between April 8th and April 12th.
In its announcement of the decision to sell shares, Japan Post Holdings said that if JPI did indeed conduct the buyback, it might participate, in which case the size of the offering “may decrease.”
The stock rallied very sharply Friday, rising 3% at the open and ending the morning session up 3% but rising much further in the afternoon to end up 9.9%.
After the close Friday, JPI announced it would spend ¥100bn to buy up to 37.411mm shares pre-open on ToSTNeT-3 on Monday morning. That is 6.2% of shares outstanding.
Understanding the dynamics and the rules here AND about the offering may tell you something about how this will work.
The Relative Price Score (RPS) is a measure of stock price performance relative to TOPIX calculated by comparing the current deviation with the mean absolute deviation of monthly and daily relative share prices. As all companies are put on a comparable scale, ‘Overbought’ and ‘Oversold’ outliers and changes in scoring can reveal short-term and longer-term trading opportunities. Company data is cap-weight-aggregated into 328 Peer Group and 30 Sector Relative Price Scores. Outlier thresholds are set at +4 & -2 for Companies, +3 & -1.5 for Peer Groups and +2 and -1 for Sectors. These thresholds equate with the top and bottom first-to-second percentiles of historical observations from which mean reversion normally takes only a few months.
Source: Japan Analytics
OUTLIER TRENDS – In the past, increases in the percentage of companies that are either Overbought or Oversold has been a useful indicator of market trends with a rising number of Overbought outliers being bullish and an increasing number of Oversold outliers being bearish and the crossovers between the numbers of each offering market timing signals. The current situation where both sets of outliers are rising has only occurred once before in the last 30 years – in 1999/2000 shortly before the peak of the ‘tech bubble’. We attribute some of the market’s distortions to the Bank of Japan’s market activities and the increase in algorithmic trading. Whatever the cause, repeating the 2000 tech bubble playbook is unlikely to end well.
Source: Japan Analytics
NEGATIVE ‘SPREAD’ – On a daily closing basis, the Oversold outlier percentage is currently 3.17%, the highest since December 25th 2018, despite the total market value being 14% higher than on that day. The ‘spread’ between Overbought and Oversold outliers is now -1.10, and has only been wider for three days at the end of last year either side of Christmas Day. Nevertheless, the Overbought percentage reached a new fifteen-year high at the end of March despite the total market value being 12.6% below the peak of January 2018. In a polarised market, the winners keep on winning, and the losers keep on losing.
Source: Japan Analytics
MARKET TIMING – Using the crossover from Net Overbought to Net Oversold has been a reasonably good market timing indicator over the last two decades and would have avoided the five-year-long slump from 2007-2012. The most recent monthly closing signal was generated in January when the total market value was ¥634t, 2.7% lower than the current level.
Source: Japan Analytics
DAILY TIMING SIGNALS – Using daily closing prices but slightly wider parameters to reduce ‘noise’ the signals are reasonably effective. The last signal was a sell on 18th December 2018 when the total market value was ¥623b, 4.5% below the current level. Both monthly and daily indicators have large negative ‘spreads’ and are unlikely to generate ‘buy’ signals for some time. Both are also suggesting that further declines lie ahead.
– SECTORS –
Source: Japan Analytics
28-YEAR TIMELINE – The twenty-eight-year history of Sectors’ Relative Price Score is shown above and chronicles the periodic extremes of both Overbought and Oversold and the persistence of each. Only seventeen Sectors have been Overbought during this period for a total of 546 months of which half were before 2001. The average Overbought persistence is 4.3 months or 3.4 months excluding the Internet Content & Services Sector. Only fourteen Sectors have been Oversold since 1992 for a total of 243 months of which 55% were before 2001. The average Oversold persistence is 5.7 months although this has risen to 7.5 months since 2001. Currently, three Sectors are Overbought – Consumer Services, Other Consumer Products, and Healthcare, and two Sectors are Oversold – Banks and Utilities.
In the DETAIL section below, we provide an update on recent Sector and Peer Group trends and make some specific recommendations. A second Insight will follow looking at the Relative Price Scores for Companies.
Organo has rebounded from December’s sharp sell-off, but remains attractively valued on a long-term view, in our estimation.
New orders for water treatment systems from the semiconductor and other industries were up 22% year-on-year and exceeded sales by 33% in the nine months to December.
According to management, orders continued to exceed sales in the three months to March, but are likely to drop below sales in 1H of FY Mar-20 due to the downturn in memory ICs.
But the situation is not dire, as overall silicon wafer shipments and demand for image sensors both continue to rise, while foundry is doing better than memory.
Longer term, management expects growth driven by IIoT, power devices, electric vehicles, and a cyclical recovery in memory. The biggest uncertainty is Chinese domestic demand.
Some orders have been deferred by one or two quarters, but the company has so far not suffered any cancellations. With a one-year lag from order to revenue recognition for larger projects, management believes it has sufficient visibility to predict improvement in 2H.
Management has no plans to revise FY Mar-19 guidance, which is for a 14.9% increase in sales, a 43.9% increase in operating profit and a 33.1% increase in net profit to ¥322.5 per share. At ¥3,200 (Friday, April 5 closing price), this translates into a P/E ratio of 9.9x.
In our estimation, this is cheap enough to be of interest to long-term investors. In the meantime, the calculations of Japan Analytics show upside to a no-growth valuation. Little or no growth appears to be the most likely scenario for FY Mar-20.
Organo is Japan’s second-ranking industrial water treatment company after Kurita Water Industries (6370). Both provide ultra-pure water processing equipment and related products and services to the semiconductor industry. Kurita ranks first in Japan and Korea, Organo ranks first in Taiwan, and both companies compete in China.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
This post estimates Nexon Japan tender price. For this, I use the same approach that a local PE named “MBK Partners” would use based on EBITDA multiple and IRR on a 3 year exit. From their position, the only proven value-up path would be KOSPI moving. MBK must try to stay as conservative as possible. Whatever Netmarble value addition should be an extra when deciding on a tender price. So, I base my estimation solely based on KOSPI moving effect. For this, I use NCsoft as a sole valuation comp.
Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP)announced on April 4th after the close that Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) would offer 168.1mm shares of Japan Post Insurance to the public, with another 16.9mm shares offered in an over-allotment. This is big news as it is almost 31% of the shares outstanding of Japan Post Insurance and will dramatically increase its float.
One can say it is a big deal – ¥450bn (~US$4bn) of stock and at announcement it was equivalent to the last 477 days of traded volume. More importantly, this ALMOST like an IPO in that the placement is almost 3x the original IPO size (66mm shares) and will get a lot of foreign investor attention.
In addition, JPI announced it would conduct a buyback for up to 50 million shares (with a spending limit of ¥100 billion) on the ToSTNeT-3 off-hours auction-like trading system on days between April 8th and April 12th.
In its announcement of the decision to sell shares, Japan Post Holdings said that if JPI did indeed conduct the buyback, it might participate, in which case the size of the offering “may decrease.”
The stock rallied very sharply Friday, rising 3% at the open and ending the morning session up 3% but rising much further in the afternoon to end up 9.9%.
After the close Friday, JPI announced it would spend ¥100bn to buy up to 37.411mm shares pre-open on ToSTNeT-3 on Monday morning. That is 6.2% of shares outstanding.
Understanding the dynamics and the rules here AND about the offering may tell you something about how this will work.
The Relative Price Score (RPS) is a measure of stock price performance relative to TOPIX calculated by comparing the current deviation with the mean absolute deviation of monthly and daily relative share prices. As all companies are put on a comparable scale, ‘Overbought’ and ‘Oversold’ outliers and changes in scoring can reveal short-term and longer-term trading opportunities. Company data is cap-weight-aggregated into 328 Peer Group and 30 Sector Relative Price Scores. Outlier thresholds are set at +4 & -2 for Companies, +3 & -1.5 for Peer Groups and +2 and -1 for Sectors. These thresholds equate with the top and bottom first-to-second percentiles of historical observations from which mean reversion normally takes only a few months.
Source: Japan Analytics
OUTLIER TRENDS – In the past, increases in the percentage of companies that are either Overbought or Oversold has been a useful indicator of market trends with a rising number of Overbought outliers being bullish and an increasing number of Oversold outliers being bearish and the crossovers between the numbers of each offering market timing signals. The current situation where both sets of outliers are rising has only occurred once before in the last 30 years – in 1999/2000 shortly before the peak of the ‘tech bubble’. We attribute some of the market’s distortions to the Bank of Japan’s market activities and the increase in algorithmic trading. Whatever the cause, repeating the 2000 tech bubble playbook is unlikely to end well.
Source: Japan Analytics
NEGATIVE ‘SPREAD’ – On a daily closing basis, the Oversold outlier percentage is currently 3.17%, the highest since December 25th 2018, despite the total market value being 14% higher than on that day. The ‘spread’ between Overbought and Oversold outliers is now -1.10, and has only been wider for three days at the end of last year either side of Christmas Day. Nevertheless, the Overbought percentage reached a new fifteen-year high at the end of March despite the total market value being 12.6% below the peak of January 2018. In a polarised market, the winners keep on winning, and the losers keep on losing.
Source: Japan Analytics
MARKET TIMING – Using the crossover from Net Overbought to Net Oversold has been a reasonably good market timing indicator over the last two decades and would have avoided the five-year-long slump from 2007-2012. The most recent monthly closing signal was generated in January when the total market value was ¥634t, 2.7% lower than the current level.
Source: Japan Analytics
DAILY TIMING SIGNALS – Using daily closing prices but slightly wider parameters to reduce ‘noise’ the signals are reasonably effective. The last signal was a sell on 18th December 2018 when the total market value was ¥623b, 4.5% below the current level. Both monthly and daily indicators have large negative ‘spreads’ and are unlikely to generate ‘buy’ signals for some time. Both are also suggesting that further declines lie ahead.
– SECTORS –
Source: Japan Analytics
28-YEAR TIMELINE – The twenty-eight-year history of Sectors’ Relative Price Score is shown above and chronicles the periodic extremes of both Overbought and Oversold and the persistence of each. Only seventeen Sectors have been Overbought during this period for a total of 546 months of which half were before 2001. The average Overbought persistence is 4.3 months or 3.4 months excluding the Internet Content & Services Sector. Only fourteen Sectors have been Oversold since 1992 for a total of 243 months of which 55% were before 2001. The average Oversold persistence is 5.7 months although this has risen to 7.5 months since 2001. Currently, three Sectors are Overbought – Consumer Services, Other Consumer Products, and Healthcare, and two Sectors are Oversold – Banks and Utilities.
In the DETAIL section below, we provide an update on recent Sector and Peer Group trends and make some specific recommendations. A second Insight will follow looking at the Relative Price Scores for Companies.
Organo has rebounded from December’s sharp sell-off, but remains attractively valued on a long-term view, in our estimation.
New orders for water treatment systems from the semiconductor and other industries were up 22% year-on-year and exceeded sales by 33% in the nine months to December.
According to management, orders continued to exceed sales in the three months to March, but are likely to drop below sales in 1H of FY Mar-20 due to the downturn in memory ICs.
But the situation is not dire, as overall silicon wafer shipments and demand for image sensors both continue to rise, while foundry is doing better than memory.
Longer term, management expects growth driven by IIoT, power devices, electric vehicles, and a cyclical recovery in memory. The biggest uncertainty is Chinese domestic demand.
Some orders have been deferred by one or two quarters, but the company has so far not suffered any cancellations. With a one-year lag from order to revenue recognition for larger projects, management believes it has sufficient visibility to predict improvement in 2H.
Management has no plans to revise FY Mar-19 guidance, which is for a 14.9% increase in sales, a 43.9% increase in operating profit and a 33.1% increase in net profit to ¥322.5 per share. At ¥3,200 (Friday, April 5 closing price), this translates into a P/E ratio of 9.9x.
In our estimation, this is cheap enough to be of interest to long-term investors. In the meantime, the calculations of Japan Analytics show upside to a no-growth valuation. Little or no growth appears to be the most likely scenario for FY Mar-20.
Organo is Japan’s second-ranking industrial water treatment company after Kurita Water Industries (6370). Both provide ultra-pure water processing equipment and related products and services to the semiconductor industry. Kurita ranks first in Japan and Korea, Organo ranks first in Taiwan, and both companies compete in China.
Here it is. The end – the culmination of years of effort and high balance sheet usage by hedge funds. Altaba Inc (AABA US) is going out with a whimper plus a little upside.
Reportedly plans for the sale of NHC have been abandoned with a focus on selling its Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)gaming unit.
We now have an agreed deal for Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) supported by the Ernst Göhner Foundation, the major activist shareholders, and Panalpina management.
Altaba will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which Altaba currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63/share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00/Alibaba share).”
As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear, based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions.
A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.
It looks like there is upside as the stock closed at US$72.76 (at the time of the insight). But there is less than you think simply because it will take time to get out of it. And discount rates of the first portion may be low, but discount rates applied to the later payments post-delisting and post court workout for the Holdback Amount could be higher.
Travis Lundy has opinions on what to do once you start getting into the arb risks. Do read his insight.
Sanghyun Park discussed Nexon sale after the FT reported bankers has stopped plans to sell the holding company NXC. The sale of NXC is probably the simplest exit path for Kim Jung-ju as it would be a more attractive tax outcome than selling Nexon Japan outright.
But there’s a lot of other stuff in NXC that suitors don’t want to, which ideally should be sold before selling NXC. There’s also the issue of whether a tender offer would be required whether the sale of NXC or Nexon – Travis concludes an offer would be required while Sanghyun does not.
Korean local news outlet reported thatTencent Holdings (700 HK)‘s US$6bn bond issuance may be a fund raising for a Nexon takeover. Still, South Korea would prefer keep Nexon’s ownership domestic, which may favour Kakao Games (1404796D KS) or PE outfit MBK.
Summit Ascent announced that First Steamship (the major shareholder) and Kuo Jen Hao (chairman) are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 35%.
Summit is trading at a trailing PER of 267x. CapIQ forecasts point to a threefold increase in earnings in FY19, although I would advise caution on those numbers given the tight cluster of target prices; historically, target prices for Summit have been wide of the mark.
First Steamship bought in at $1.06 in December 2017, around the same price when this announcement was made. Should this sale complete, this would result in the third time the shares of the major shareholder have changed hands. This looks like a great opportunity to exit.
On the 20th March, MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them. Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.
On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.
Mid-week, Manikay caved and said intends to vote all its shares for the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote. This is now MUCH closer to being a done deal. It will trade tight.
Travis is a trifle surprised Manikay did not wait a little longer. They were able to increase their stake in the low A$3.30s because of the uncertainty of their intentions, and they could probably have gone close to 20% in the low 3.30s before saying “Yes.” That would have been a welcome extra profit.
Lifeboat market play Ezion has received a bail-out from Malaysia’sYinson Holdings (YNS MK) via a capitalisation of debt and option agreement. Ezion remains suspended.
On the surface, this looks like a bargain for Yinson which is ostensibly taking over Ezion for US$200mn. However, Yinson said that it is still negotiating with the designated lenders of the US$916mn debt on the terms and conditions..
Yinson’s business risks include contact risk, oil price fluctuations and the level of activities in the O&G industry. These risks do not change should the Ezion proposal complete.
The last time came on the heels of a long independent review by EY which found KCF had given up profit to the parent through a series of relatively unfair interested party transaction agreements.
At the end, the Bermudan Court of Appeals went against a Supreme Court decision which had decided that a replacement counterparty decision was prejudiced against minorities, and despite the April 2017 deal being not fair and not reasonable according to the IFA, the parent acquired ~10% (of the 28% it did not own) bringing their stake to 82.3%. A year later the parent acquired another 5.5% bringing them to almost 88%.
Now an offer at SGD 0.60/share (compared to the Revalued NTA of SGD 0.7086/share from the IFA report (p36) of two years ago gets closer to the mark, but crucially, it is designed to squeeze out minorities with the threat of delisting. Kingboard Laminates only needs 2.05% to oblige a delisting from the SGX. As far as Travis can tell, it would require more – at least 95% of shares – to oblige a mandatory squeezeout of minorities according to Section 102-103 of Bermuda Companies Act.
The deal is at a negligible premium and is far, far below Tangible Book Value Per Share (which is almost three times the offer price). Given that the acquirer bought a large stake in the company and offered perpetual capital of almost the current market cap at a significant premium to the MGO price, Travis thinks it an unattractive offer.
It is puzzling as to why the CEO would sell his shares at such a discount, especially when the company and Everbright co-own some of the assets.
While the stated intention of the Offeror is to keep the stock listed, and the MGO is presented almost as “technical”, it would be enormously to Everbright’s benefit to buy as many shares as they could down at this price level. It will go from being underwater on an equity affiliate stake purchase to having a huge writeup in value if Everbright consolidates the asset post MGO.
For that, Travis thinks there is a possibility of a bump just to make it more attractive, though the IFA report could come out with a not fair and reasonable result which shows NTA or NAV far, far higher than the Offer Price, which is not yet declared final.
In a mainly technical piece, I explained why China Three Gorges, China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK)‘s largest shareholder with 27.1% is currently required to abstain from voting at the forthcoming court meeting, despite the misleading statement in the announcement that China Three Gorges has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme. (link to my insight: China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption)
What was once a tough deal is now an agreed deal. The deal is 2.375 shares of DSV for every share of Panalpina, which as of the previous Friday’s close had a value of CHF 195.80/share which is a 43% premium to the CHF 137/share, where Panalpina was trading the day before DSV’s first bid.
Panalpina is getting taken out at 28.1x reported 2018 EV/EBITDA multiple (pre-IFRS 16) calculated at a CHF 195.8 price. Panalpina shareholders will own ~23% of DSV shares out if all shares are exchanged and the Ernst Göhner Foundation will be the largest shareholder at ~11%.
69.9% of shares have irrevocably agreed to support the Exchange Offer. The customary condition is 80% to make it go through, meaning DSV needs another 10.1% out of the 30% extant (or just over one-third).
Travis expects there is another 10-15% held by arbitrageurs and 5-7% held by indexers already so this deal looks to me like it is done. He expects the Exchange Offer may settle as early as early-August. If it trades tight, he would get out because DSV is probably priced to a very good level.
Reuters reported that Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those TPG and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company. This was followed by Lenta announced confirming the cash offer. The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs.
The first 41.9% are sold conditional on FAS Clearance (presumably Mordashov has cleared this transaction with “the right people”) expected in May 2019, a few easily achieved conditions, and the condition of no sanctions being in play for any of the selling or buying parties.
Once cleared – expected in May 2019 – this becomes a straightforward offer with no minimum acceptances meaning that investors can sell shares into the deal or decide not to do so.
It’s not an attractive offer price, with the possibility of a bump if enough people complain. If you want to buy and hold, this deal is a put option.
Since announcing the intended listing of its international internet assets on Euronext Amsterdam “no earlier than H2 2019” – together with a secondary, inward listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange – I calculate Naspers discount to NAV has narrowed to 34.4% from 37.1%, the day before the announcement, placing the current discount a shade below the 12-month average.
The likelihood of NewCo trading at a tighter discount to where Naspers’ previously (& currently trades) is universally accepted. Naspers will benefit from that reduced discount via its 75% stake; but it is not known where Naspers’ own discount will trade after the spin-off.
There are indications the management want to see the group discount narrow to 30%, possibly down to the 20% level, which implies a significantly lower discount for Naspers, potentially around 10%. That would seem optimistic as investors focus more on the directly-held Tencent vehicle, and the fact Naspers is a holding company, holding a stake in another holding company.
Naspers’ discount may drift narrower on the expectation Naspers’ spin-off works its magic. Greater clarity on the option into Naspers or NewCo may provide an additional boost; but conversely, if such an option is limited, there is likely to be disappointment.
With Melco trading at a (then) 32% discount to NAV, Curtis Lehnert recommends a set-up trade on a dollar for dollar basis. The current level, as I write, is statistically the most attractive according to the Smartkarma Holdco Tool, sitting at -1.8 standard deviations from the 180 DMA.
Stub assets are minimal – around 8% of GAV – if excluding gaming licenses, goodwill and trademarks. Net cash is $6.4bn or $4.27/share.
Those stub assets are still loss-making, after deconsolidating out MLCO, to the tune of $386mn in EBITDA, but that was an improvement on (HK$682mn) figure in FY17.
Still, Curtis thinks now is the time to enter the trade to take advantage of both the statistical and fundamental supports to the trade.
For the month of March, ten new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$22.3bn. This overall number includes Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman’s proposal for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) after the Tender Offer was officially launched in March. This deal was first proposed in mid-January – which was rejected by the board – and subsequently an improved offer was tabled, which was then supported.
The average premium to last close for the new deals announced in March was 18%, while the average for the first quarter of 2019 is 33%.
Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB)‘s results of the CVTO have been announced. 42.85% of shares tendered, therefore the offeror held 63.78% of shares at the close of the offer. The MSCI downweight occurred at the close Thursday, however shares popped 17.5%.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
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SOUTHBOUND – The upside we anticipated two weeks ago turned out to be only ¥6t before the harsh realities of some weak macro data intervened and sent the market 3% lower over the last two trading days suggesting the bear market rally is now over. After peaking at 48%, the market-value-based percentage above the weighted sum of moving averages has now retreated to 33%.
– SECTORS –
LEGEND: The ‘sparklines’ show the three-year trend in the weighted percentage above moving average relative to the Market Composite and the ‘STDev’ column is a measure of the variability of that relative measure. The table also provides averages for the breaks above and breaks below and the positive and negative crossovers.
SECTOR BREAKDOWN – The top six sectors remain domestic and defensive and are unchanged from two weeks ago with REITs, the clear leader. Equally predictable is the bottom half-dozen – Banks, Non-Bank Finance, Retail, Autos, and Metals remain from two weeks ago, with Machinery replacing Construction. Banks stay at the bottom, and the sector had its largest volume ‘day’ as measured by our Volume Score since September 21st, 2018 on Friday although many other sectors were ‘active.’
Source: Japan Analytics
– COMPANIES –
COMPANY MOVING AVERAGE OUTLIERS – As with the Market Composite and Sectors, the Moving Average Outlier indicator uses a weighted sum of each company’s share price relative to its 5-day, 20-day, 60-day, 120-day and 240-day moving averages. ‘Extreme’ values are weighted sums greater than 100% and less than -100%. We would caution that this indicator is best used for timing shorter-term reversals and, in many cases, higher highs and lower lows will be seen.
In the DETAIL section below, we highlight the current top and bottom twenty-five large capitalisation outliers, as well as those companies that have seen the most significant positive and negative changes in their outlier percentage in the last two weeks and provide short comments on companies of particular note.
Our most extreme positive outlier two weeks ago, Pksha Technology (3993 JP) declined by 8% and ‘tops’ our most negative two-week change list, while the most negative outlierSanBio (4592 JP)rose by 3%. Leopalace21 (8848 JP)which was also featured recovered by 9%.
AnGes (4563 JP) is currently the most extreme large cap positive outlier having peaked at ‘492’ on 26th February up from a ‘trough’ of -132 in December. Biotechnology peer SanBio (4592 JP) is, for the third time this year, the most extreme negative outlier, having topped the 13th January and 24th February positive outlier lists and is another ’round-tripper’.
JAPAN CORPORATE CASH FLOW UPDATE – This insight updates our previous Insight with data from all of the most recent quarterly reports. Our market composite cash flow model reformulates disclosed cash flows into four categories which sum to Change in Cash: –
Operating Cash Flow
Investing Cash Flow (which includes Inventory Cash Flow)
Free Cash Flow (Operating Cash Flow less Investing Cash Flow)
Financing Cash Flow
Shareholder Cash Flow (Equity Cash Flow and Dividend Cash Flow)
= Change in Cash (including Minorities Cash Flow)
OCF COLLAPSES – In the last three months, Japan’s non-financial companies generated only ¥2.1t in Operating Cash Flow (OCF), ¥10.1t less than the previous quarter. ¥2.1t is the lowest quarterly OCF since 2016-Q2, and the quarter-on-quarter decline is the largest since 2009 and represents a substantial ‘red flag’ for the market.
FCF NEGATIVE – Aggregate spending on fixed assets shrunk by ¥4.5t qoq to ¥4.6t resulting in Free Cash Flow for the quarter of -¥2.5t, the first negative Free Cash Flow quarter since 2012-Q4. Softbank Group (9984 JP), NTT Docomo (9437 JP) and Fast Retailing (9983 JP) together generated ¥3.3t in positive Free Cash Flow for the quarter. Excluding these three companies, the aggregate total quarterly FCF was -¥5.8t, equivalent to an annualised Free Cash Flow yield of -4.3% for the universe of listed non-financial companies.
BACK TO BORROWING – To finance ¥4.5t in dividend payments, Japanese non-financial companies borrowed ¥4.8t in new debt, sold investment securities worth ¥1.9t (the most significant reduction since 2016-Q2) and raised 0.28t in new equity net of share buybacks. This increase in financing cash flow was the largest in any quarter since 2009.
Downturns in the semiconductor, auto and other user industries have caught up with SMC. Sales were down 4.0% year-on-year in the three months to December (the first decline in more than two years) and the decline in profits accelerated, with gross profit down 5.4%, operating profit down 10.6% and net profit down 18.8%. Year-on-year comparisons are likely to remain difficult for at least another two quarters.
In December, we wrote: “Management reports that semiconductor-related demand is down in all markets and that auto-related demand is down in the U.S. Auto sales are also declining in China.” (SMC (6273 JP): Profits Start to Decline ) Last week, WSTS reported the first decline in semiconductor sales in 30 months and the Nikkei newspaper reported that “Japanese chipmaker Renesas Electronics will temporarily halt work at 13 of the company’s 14 production facilities, including all nine domestic plants, due to high inventory levels and possible impact as Chinese demand for automotive and machinery tools plummets.” On Friday, March 8, SMC’s share price dropped by 3%.
SMC has left FY Mar-19 guidance unchanged, implying a 4.1% decline in sales and a 2.9% decline in operating profit in 4Q. In view of current trends, this looks over-optimistic. The shares are now selling at 17.8x our EPS estimate for FY Mar-19 and 18.6x our estimate for FY Mar-20. These multiples compare with a 5-year historical P/E range of 13.8x – 28.5x.
SMC is a leading supplier of pneumatic and other automated control equipment for the electronics, auto, machine tool and other industries.
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SOUTHBOUND – The upside we anticipated two weeks ago turned out to be only ¥6t before the harsh realities of some weak macro data intervened and sent the market 3% lower over the last two trading days suggesting the bear market rally is now over. After peaking at 48%, the market-value-based percentage above the weighted sum of moving averages has now retreated to 33%.
– SECTORS –
LEGEND: The ‘sparklines’ show the three-year trend in the weighted percentage above moving average relative to the Market Composite and the ‘STDev’ column is a measure of the variability of that relative measure. The table also provides averages for the breaks above and breaks below and the positive and negative crossovers.
SECTOR BREAKDOWN – The top six sectors remain domestic and defensive and are unchanged from two weeks ago with REITs, the clear leader. Equally predictable is the bottom half-dozen – Banks, Non-Bank Finance, Retail, Autos, and Metals remain from two weeks ago, with Machinery replacing Construction. Banks stay at the bottom, and the sector had its largest volume ‘day’ as measured by our Volume Score since September 21st, 2018 on Friday although many other sectors were ‘active.’
Source: Japan Analytics
– COMPANIES –
COMPANY MOVING AVERAGE OUTLIERS – As with the Market Composite and Sectors, the Moving Average Outlier indicator uses a weighted sum of each company’s share price relative to its 5-day, 20-day, 60-day, 120-day and 240-day moving averages. ‘Extreme’ values are weighted sums greater than 100% and less than -100%. We would caution that this indicator is best used for timing shorter-term reversals and, in many cases, higher highs and lower lows will be seen.
In the DETAIL section below, we highlight the current top and bottom twenty-five large capitalisation outliers, as well as those companies that have seen the most significant positive and negative changes in their outlier percentage in the last two weeks and provide short comments on companies of particular note.
Our most extreme positive outlier two weeks ago, Pksha Technology (3993 JP) declined by 8% and ‘tops’ our most negative two-week change list, while the most negative outlierSanBio (4592 JP)rose by 3%. Leopalace21 (8848 JP)which was also featured recovered by 9%.
AnGes (4563 JP) is currently the most extreme large cap positive outlier having peaked at ‘492’ on 26th February up from a ‘trough’ of -132 in December. Biotechnology peer SanBio (4592 JP) is, for the third time this year, the most extreme negative outlier, having topped the 13th January and 24th February positive outlier lists and is another ’round-tripper’.
JAPAN CORPORATE CASH FLOW UPDATE – This insight updates our previous Insight with data from all of the most recent quarterly reports. Our market composite cash flow model reformulates disclosed cash flows into four categories which sum to Change in Cash: –
Operating Cash Flow
Investing Cash Flow (which includes Inventory Cash Flow)
Free Cash Flow (Operating Cash Flow less Investing Cash Flow)
Financing Cash Flow
Shareholder Cash Flow (Equity Cash Flow and Dividend Cash Flow)
= Change in Cash (including Minorities Cash Flow)
OCF COLLAPSES – In the last three months, Japan’s non-financial companies generated only ¥2.1t in Operating Cash Flow (OCF), ¥10.1t less than the previous quarter. ¥2.1t is the lowest quarterly OCF since 2016-Q2, and the quarter-on-quarter decline is the largest since 2009 and represents a substantial ‘red flag’ for the market.
FCF NEGATIVE – Aggregate spending on fixed assets shrunk by ¥4.5t qoq to ¥4.6t resulting in Free Cash Flow for the quarter of -¥2.5t, the first negative Free Cash Flow quarter since 2012-Q4. Softbank Group (9984 JP), NTT Docomo (9437 JP) and Fast Retailing (9983 JP) together generated ¥3.3t in positive Free Cash Flow for the quarter. Excluding these three companies, the aggregate total quarterly FCF was -¥5.8t, equivalent to an annualised Free Cash Flow yield of -4.3% for the universe of listed non-financial companies.
BACK TO BORROWING – To finance ¥4.5t in dividend payments, Japanese non-financial companies borrowed ¥4.8t in new debt, sold investment securities worth ¥1.9t (the most significant reduction since 2016-Q2) and raised 0.28t in new equity net of share buybacks. This increase in financing cash flow was the largest in any quarter since 2009.
Downturns in the semiconductor, auto and other user industries have caught up with SMC. Sales were down 4.0% year-on-year in the three months to December (the first decline in more than two years) and the decline in profits accelerated, with gross profit down 5.4%, operating profit down 10.6% and net profit down 18.8%. Year-on-year comparisons are likely to remain difficult for at least another two quarters.
In December, we wrote: “Management reports that semiconductor-related demand is down in all markets and that auto-related demand is down in the U.S. Auto sales are also declining in China.” (SMC (6273 JP): Profits Start to Decline ) Last week, WSTS reported the first decline in semiconductor sales in 30 months and the Nikkei newspaper reported that “Japanese chipmaker Renesas Electronics will temporarily halt work at 13 of the company’s 14 production facilities, including all nine domestic plants, due to high inventory levels and possible impact as Chinese demand for automotive and machinery tools plummets.” On Friday, March 8, SMC’s share price dropped by 3%.
SMC has left FY Mar-19 guidance unchanged, implying a 4.1% decline in sales and a 2.9% decline in operating profit in 4Q. In view of current trends, this looks over-optimistic. The shares are now selling at 17.8x our EPS estimate for FY Mar-19 and 18.6x our estimate for FY Mar-20. These multiples compare with a 5-year historical P/E range of 13.8x – 28.5x.
SMC is a leading supplier of pneumatic and other automated control equipment for the electronics, auto, machine tool and other industries.
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Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP)announced on April 4th after the close that Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) would offer 168.1mm shares of Japan Post Insurance to the public, with another 16.9mm shares offered in an over-allotment. This is big news as it is almost 31% of the shares outstanding of Japan Post Insurance and will dramatically increase its float.
One can say it is a big deal – ¥450bn (~US$4bn) of stock and at announcement it was equivalent to the last 477 days of traded volume. More importantly, this ALMOST like an IPO in that the placement is almost 3x the original IPO size (66mm shares) and will get a lot of foreign investor attention.
In addition, JPI announced it would conduct a buyback for up to 50 million shares (with a spending limit of ¥100 billion) on the ToSTNeT-3 off-hours auction-like trading system on days between April 8th and April 12th.
In its announcement of the decision to sell shares, Japan Post Holdings said that if JPI did indeed conduct the buyback, it might participate, in which case the size of the offering “may decrease.”
The stock rallied very sharply Friday, rising 3% at the open and ending the morning session up 3% but rising much further in the afternoon to end up 9.9%.
After the close Friday, JPI announced it would spend ¥100bn to buy up to 37.411mm shares pre-open on ToSTNeT-3 on Monday morning. That is 6.2% of shares outstanding.
Understanding the dynamics and the rules here AND about the offering may tell you something about how this will work.
The Relative Price Score (RPS) is a measure of stock price performance relative to TOPIX calculated by comparing the current deviation with the mean absolute deviation of monthly and daily relative share prices. As all companies are put on a comparable scale, ‘Overbought’ and ‘Oversold’ outliers and changes in scoring can reveal short-term and longer-term trading opportunities. Company data is cap-weight-aggregated into 328 Peer Group and 30 Sector Relative Price Scores. Outlier thresholds are set at +4 & -2 for Companies, +3 & -1.5 for Peer Groups and +2 and -1 for Sectors. These thresholds equate with the top and bottom first-to-second percentiles of historical observations from which mean reversion normally takes only a few months.
Source: Japan Analytics
OUTLIER TRENDS – In the past, increases in the percentage of companies that are either Overbought or Oversold has been a useful indicator of market trends with a rising number of Overbought outliers being bullish and an increasing number of Oversold outliers being bearish and the crossovers between the numbers of each offering market timing signals. The current situation where both sets of outliers are rising has only occurred once before in the last 30 years – in 1999/2000 shortly before the peak of the ‘tech bubble’. We attribute some of the market’s distortions to the Bank of Japan’s market activities and the increase in algorithmic trading. Whatever the cause, repeating the 2000 tech bubble playbook is unlikely to end well.
Source: Japan Analytics
NEGATIVE ‘SPREAD’ – On a daily closing basis, the Oversold outlier percentage is currently 3.17%, the highest since December 25th 2018, despite the total market value being 14% higher than on that day. The ‘spread’ between Overbought and Oversold outliers is now -1.10, and has only been wider for three days at the end of last year either side of Christmas Day. Nevertheless, the Overbought percentage reached a new fifteen-year high at the end of March despite the total market value being 12.6% below the peak of January 2018. In a polarised market, the winners keep on winning, and the losers keep on losing.
Source: Japan Analytics
MARKET TIMING – Using the crossover from Net Overbought to Net Oversold has been a reasonably good market timing indicator over the last two decades and would have avoided the five-year-long slump from 2007-2012. The most recent monthly closing signal was generated in January when the total market value was ¥634t, 2.7% lower than the current level.
Source: Japan Analytics
DAILY TIMING SIGNALS – Using daily closing prices but slightly wider parameters to reduce ‘noise’ the signals are reasonably effective. The last signal was a sell on 18th December 2018 when the total market value was ¥623b, 4.5% below the current level. Both monthly and daily indicators have large negative ‘spreads’ and are unlikely to generate ‘buy’ signals for some time. Both are also suggesting that further declines lie ahead.
– SECTORS –
Source: Japan Analytics
28-YEAR TIMELINE – The twenty-eight-year history of Sectors’ Relative Price Score is shown above and chronicles the periodic extremes of both Overbought and Oversold and the persistence of each. Only seventeen Sectors have been Overbought during this period for a total of 546 months of which half were before 2001. The average Overbought persistence is 4.3 months or 3.4 months excluding the Internet Content & Services Sector. Only fourteen Sectors have been Oversold since 1992 for a total of 243 months of which 55% were before 2001. The average Oversold persistence is 5.7 months although this has risen to 7.5 months since 2001. Currently, three Sectors are Overbought – Consumer Services, Other Consumer Products, and Healthcare, and two Sectors are Oversold – Banks and Utilities.
In the DETAIL section below, we provide an update on recent Sector and Peer Group trends and make some specific recommendations. A second Insight will follow looking at the Relative Price Scores for Companies.
Organo has rebounded from December’s sharp sell-off, but remains attractively valued on a long-term view, in our estimation.
New orders for water treatment systems from the semiconductor and other industries were up 22% year-on-year and exceeded sales by 33% in the nine months to December.
According to management, orders continued to exceed sales in the three months to March, but are likely to drop below sales in 1H of FY Mar-20 due to the downturn in memory ICs.
But the situation is not dire, as overall silicon wafer shipments and demand for image sensors both continue to rise, while foundry is doing better than memory.
Longer term, management expects growth driven by IIoT, power devices, electric vehicles, and a cyclical recovery in memory. The biggest uncertainty is Chinese domestic demand.
Some orders have been deferred by one or two quarters, but the company has so far not suffered any cancellations. With a one-year lag from order to revenue recognition for larger projects, management believes it has sufficient visibility to predict improvement in 2H.
Management has no plans to revise FY Mar-19 guidance, which is for a 14.9% increase in sales, a 43.9% increase in operating profit and a 33.1% increase in net profit to ¥322.5 per share. At ¥3,200 (Friday, April 5 closing price), this translates into a P/E ratio of 9.9x.
In our estimation, this is cheap enough to be of interest to long-term investors. In the meantime, the calculations of Japan Analytics show upside to a no-growth valuation. Little or no growth appears to be the most likely scenario for FY Mar-20.
Organo is Japan’s second-ranking industrial water treatment company after Kurita Water Industries (6370). Both provide ultra-pure water processing equipment and related products and services to the semiconductor industry. Kurita ranks first in Japan and Korea, Organo ranks first in Taiwan, and both companies compete in China.
Here it is. The end – the culmination of years of effort and high balance sheet usage by hedge funds. Altaba Inc (AABA US) is going out with a whimper plus a little upside.
Reportedly plans for the sale of NHC have been abandoned with a focus on selling its Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)gaming unit.
We now have an agreed deal for Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) supported by the Ernst Göhner Foundation, the major activist shareholders, and Panalpina management.
Altaba will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which Altaba currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63/share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00/Alibaba share).”
As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear, based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions.
A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.
It looks like there is upside as the stock closed at US$72.76 (at the time of the insight). But there is less than you think simply because it will take time to get out of it. And discount rates of the first portion may be low, but discount rates applied to the later payments post-delisting and post court workout for the Holdback Amount could be higher.
Travis Lundy has opinions on what to do once you start getting into the arb risks. Do read his insight.
Sanghyun Park discussed Nexon sale after the FT reported bankers has stopped plans to sell the holding company NXC. The sale of NXC is probably the simplest exit path for Kim Jung-ju as it would be a more attractive tax outcome than selling Nexon Japan outright.
But there’s a lot of other stuff in NXC that suitors don’t want to, which ideally should be sold before selling NXC. There’s also the issue of whether a tender offer would be required whether the sale of NXC or Nexon – Travis concludes an offer would be required while Sanghyun does not.
Korean local news outlet reported thatTencent Holdings (700 HK)‘s US$6bn bond issuance may be a fund raising for a Nexon takeover. Still, South Korea would prefer keep Nexon’s ownership domestic, which may favour Kakao Games (1404796D KS) or PE outfit MBK.
Summit Ascent announced that First Steamship (the major shareholder) and Kuo Jen Hao (chairman) are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 35%.
Summit is trading at a trailing PER of 267x. CapIQ forecasts point to a threefold increase in earnings in FY19, although I would advise caution on those numbers given the tight cluster of target prices; historically, target prices for Summit have been wide of the mark.
First Steamship bought in at $1.06 in December 2017, around the same price when this announcement was made. Should this sale complete, this would result in the third time the shares of the major shareholder have changed hands. This looks like a great opportunity to exit.
On the 20th March, MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them. Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.
On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.
Mid-week, Manikay caved and said intends to vote all its shares for the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote. This is now MUCH closer to being a done deal. It will trade tight.
Travis is a trifle surprised Manikay did not wait a little longer. They were able to increase their stake in the low A$3.30s because of the uncertainty of their intentions, and they could probably have gone close to 20% in the low 3.30s before saying “Yes.” That would have been a welcome extra profit.
Lifeboat market play Ezion has received a bail-out from Malaysia’sYinson Holdings (YNS MK) via a capitalisation of debt and option agreement. Ezion remains suspended.
On the surface, this looks like a bargain for Yinson which is ostensibly taking over Ezion for US$200mn. However, Yinson said that it is still negotiating with the designated lenders of the US$916mn debt on the terms and conditions..
Yinson’s business risks include contact risk, oil price fluctuations and the level of activities in the O&G industry. These risks do not change should the Ezion proposal complete.
The last time came on the heels of a long independent review by EY which found KCF had given up profit to the parent through a series of relatively unfair interested party transaction agreements.
At the end, the Bermudan Court of Appeals went against a Supreme Court decision which had decided that a replacement counterparty decision was prejudiced against minorities, and despite the April 2017 deal being not fair and not reasonable according to the IFA, the parent acquired ~10% (of the 28% it did not own) bringing their stake to 82.3%. A year later the parent acquired another 5.5% bringing them to almost 88%.
Now an offer at SGD 0.60/share (compared to the Revalued NTA of SGD 0.7086/share from the IFA report (p36) of two years ago gets closer to the mark, but crucially, it is designed to squeeze out minorities with the threat of delisting. Kingboard Laminates only needs 2.05% to oblige a delisting from the SGX. As far as Travis can tell, it would require more – at least 95% of shares – to oblige a mandatory squeezeout of minorities according to Section 102-103 of Bermuda Companies Act.
The deal is at a negligible premium and is far, far below Tangible Book Value Per Share (which is almost three times the offer price). Given that the acquirer bought a large stake in the company and offered perpetual capital of almost the current market cap at a significant premium to the MGO price, Travis thinks it an unattractive offer.
It is puzzling as to why the CEO would sell his shares at such a discount, especially when the company and Everbright co-own some of the assets.
While the stated intention of the Offeror is to keep the stock listed, and the MGO is presented almost as “technical”, it would be enormously to Everbright’s benefit to buy as many shares as they could down at this price level. It will go from being underwater on an equity affiliate stake purchase to having a huge writeup in value if Everbright consolidates the asset post MGO.
For that, Travis thinks there is a possibility of a bump just to make it more attractive, though the IFA report could come out with a not fair and reasonable result which shows NTA or NAV far, far higher than the Offer Price, which is not yet declared final.
In a mainly technical piece, I explained why China Three Gorges, China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK)‘s largest shareholder with 27.1% is currently required to abstain from voting at the forthcoming court meeting, despite the misleading statement in the announcement that China Three Gorges has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme. (link to my insight: China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption)
What was once a tough deal is now an agreed deal. The deal is 2.375 shares of DSV for every share of Panalpina, which as of the previous Friday’s close had a value of CHF 195.80/share which is a 43% premium to the CHF 137/share, where Panalpina was trading the day before DSV’s first bid.
Panalpina is getting taken out at 28.1x reported 2018 EV/EBITDA multiple (pre-IFRS 16) calculated at a CHF 195.8 price. Panalpina shareholders will own ~23% of DSV shares out if all shares are exchanged and the Ernst Göhner Foundation will be the largest shareholder at ~11%.
69.9% of shares have irrevocably agreed to support the Exchange Offer. The customary condition is 80% to make it go through, meaning DSV needs another 10.1% out of the 30% extant (or just over one-third).
Travis expects there is another 10-15% held by arbitrageurs and 5-7% held by indexers already so this deal looks to me like it is done. He expects the Exchange Offer may settle as early as early-August. If it trades tight, he would get out because DSV is probably priced to a very good level.
Reuters reported that Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those TPG and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company. This was followed by Lenta announced confirming the cash offer. The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs.
The first 41.9% are sold conditional on FAS Clearance (presumably Mordashov has cleared this transaction with “the right people”) expected in May 2019, a few easily achieved conditions, and the condition of no sanctions being in play for any of the selling or buying parties.
Once cleared – expected in May 2019 – this becomes a straightforward offer with no minimum acceptances meaning that investors can sell shares into the deal or decide not to do so.
It’s not an attractive offer price, with the possibility of a bump if enough people complain. If you want to buy and hold, this deal is a put option.
Since announcing the intended listing of its international internet assets on Euronext Amsterdam “no earlier than H2 2019” – together with a secondary, inward listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange – I calculate Naspers discount to NAV has narrowed to 34.4% from 37.1%, the day before the announcement, placing the current discount a shade below the 12-month average.
The likelihood of NewCo trading at a tighter discount to where Naspers’ previously (& currently trades) is universally accepted. Naspers will benefit from that reduced discount via its 75% stake; but it is not known where Naspers’ own discount will trade after the spin-off.
There are indications the management want to see the group discount narrow to 30%, possibly down to the 20% level, which implies a significantly lower discount for Naspers, potentially around 10%. That would seem optimistic as investors focus more on the directly-held Tencent vehicle, and the fact Naspers is a holding company, holding a stake in another holding company.
Naspers’ discount may drift narrower on the expectation Naspers’ spin-off works its magic. Greater clarity on the option into Naspers or NewCo may provide an additional boost; but conversely, if such an option is limited, there is likely to be disappointment.
With Melco trading at a (then) 32% discount to NAV, Curtis Lehnert recommends a set-up trade on a dollar for dollar basis. The current level, as I write, is statistically the most attractive according to the Smartkarma Holdco Tool, sitting at -1.8 standard deviations from the 180 DMA.
Stub assets are minimal – around 8% of GAV – if excluding gaming licenses, goodwill and trademarks. Net cash is $6.4bn or $4.27/share.
Those stub assets are still loss-making, after deconsolidating out MLCO, to the tune of $386mn in EBITDA, but that was an improvement on (HK$682mn) figure in FY17.
Still, Curtis thinks now is the time to enter the trade to take advantage of both the statistical and fundamental supports to the trade.
For the month of March, ten new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$22.3bn. This overall number includes Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman’s proposal for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) after the Tender Offer was officially launched in March. This deal was first proposed in mid-January – which was rejected by the board – and subsequently an improved offer was tabled, which was then supported.
The average premium to last close for the new deals announced in March was 18%, while the average for the first quarter of 2019 is 33%.
Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB)‘s results of the CVTO have been announced. 42.85% of shares tendered, therefore the offeror held 63.78% of shares at the close of the offer. The MSCI downweight occurred at the close Thursday, however shares popped 17.5%.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
E. History of Rechargeable Battery Technologies And An In-Depth Analysis on Li-ion Batteries
F. Batteries Beyond Li-ion
G. Supply Constraints for Key Raw Materials
H. The Competitive Landscape
A. Key Conclusions
Global sales of EV’s reached 2m units in 2018. As a base case scenario, we expect a combination of improving EV battery cost-effectiveness, increasingly challenging emissions standards and ongoing incentives by various governments to propel unit sales to 8m units annually by 2025. Against this, we consider battery material price increases, a reduction of EV incentives in the US and China and political and environmental risks from the mining of metals used in batteries as downside risks which could delay the growth of the EV market.
Surprisingly, the EV battery technology that will drive us towards that 8m unit goal is still very much a work in progress. While Lithium Ion is the by far the dominant technology, there are striking differences between variants of the technology, battery pack design, battery management systems and manufacturing scale between the leading contenders. Furthermore, while there’s nothing on the horizon to completely displace Lithium Ion within the next decade, it remains unclear whether the technology will be the one to achieve the $100/kWh price target that would make the EV cost-neutral compared to its internal combustion predecessors.
Quite apart from the technology, the EV battery segment faces other significant challenges including increasing costs for core materials such as Cobalt, increasing safety concerns as the mix of that very same cobalt is reduced in the cathode, the growing risk of litigation amidst a fiercely competitive environment and last but not least, the appetite of various governments to maintain a favourable subsidy framework.
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JAPAN CORPORATE CASH FLOW UPDATE – This insight updates our previous Insight with data from all of the most recent quarterly reports. Our market composite cash flow model reformulates disclosed cash flows into four categories which sum to Change in Cash: –
Operating Cash Flow
Investing Cash Flow (which includes Inventory Cash Flow)
Free Cash Flow (Operating Cash Flow less Investing Cash Flow)
Financing Cash Flow
Shareholder Cash Flow (Equity Cash Flow and Dividend Cash Flow)
= Change in Cash (including Minorities Cash Flow)
OCF COLLAPSES – In the last three months, Japan’s non-financial companies generated only ¥2.1t in Operating Cash Flow (OCF), ¥10.1t less than the previous quarter. ¥2.1t is the lowest quarterly OCF since 2016-Q2, and the quarter-on-quarter decline is the largest since 2009 and represents a substantial ‘red flag’ for the market.
FCF NEGATIVE – Aggregate spending on fixed assets shrunk by ¥4.5t qoq to ¥4.6t resulting in Free Cash Flow for the quarter of -¥2.5t, the first negative Free Cash Flow quarter since 2012-Q4. Softbank Group (9984 JP), NTT Docomo (9437 JP) and Fast Retailing (9983 JP) together generated ¥3.3t in positive Free Cash Flow for the quarter. Excluding these three companies, the aggregate total quarterly FCF was -¥5.8t, equivalent to an annualised Free Cash Flow yield of -4.3% for the universe of listed non-financial companies.
BACK TO BORROWING – To finance ¥4.5t in dividend payments, Japanese non-financial companies borrowed ¥4.8t in new debt, sold investment securities worth ¥1.9t (the most significant reduction since 2016-Q2) and raised 0.28t in new equity net of share buybacks. This increase in financing cash flow was the largest in any quarter since 2009.
Downturns in the semiconductor, auto and other user industries have caught up with SMC. Sales were down 4.0% year-on-year in the three months to December (the first decline in more than two years) and the decline in profits accelerated, with gross profit down 5.4%, operating profit down 10.6% and net profit down 18.8%. Year-on-year comparisons are likely to remain difficult for at least another two quarters.
In December, we wrote: “Management reports that semiconductor-related demand is down in all markets and that auto-related demand is down in the U.S. Auto sales are also declining in China.” (SMC (6273 JP): Profits Start to Decline ) Last week, WSTS reported the first decline in semiconductor sales in 30 months and the Nikkei newspaper reported that “Japanese chipmaker Renesas Electronics will temporarily halt work at 13 of the company’s 14 production facilities, including all nine domestic plants, due to high inventory levels and possible impact as Chinese demand for automotive and machinery tools plummets.” On Friday, March 8, SMC’s share price dropped by 3%.
SMC has left FY Mar-19 guidance unchanged, implying a 4.1% decline in sales and a 2.9% decline in operating profit in 4Q. In view of current trends, this looks over-optimistic. The shares are now selling at 17.8x our EPS estimate for FY Mar-19 and 18.6x our estimate for FY Mar-20. These multiples compare with a 5-year historical P/E range of 13.8x – 28.5x.
SMC is a leading supplier of pneumatic and other automated control equipment for the electronics, auto, machine tool and other industries.
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The Relative Price Score (RPS) is a measure of stock price performance relative to TOPIX calculated by comparing the current deviation with the mean absolute deviation of monthly and daily relative share prices. As all companies are put on a comparable scale, ‘Overbought’ and ‘Oversold’ outliers and changes in scoring can reveal short-term and longer-term trading opportunities. Company data is cap-weight-aggregated into 328 Peer Group and 30 Sector Relative Price Scores. Outlier thresholds are set at +4 & -2 for Companies, +3 & -1.5 for Peer Groups and +2 and -1 for Sectors. These thresholds equate with the top and bottom first-to-second percentiles of historical observations from which mean reversion normally takes only a few months.
Source: Japan Analytics
OUTLIER TRENDS – In the past, increases in the percentage of companies that are either Overbought or Oversold has been a useful indicator of market trends with a rising number of Overbought outliers being bullish and an increasing number of Oversold outliers being bearish and the crossovers between the numbers of each offering market timing signals. The current situation where both sets of outliers are rising has only occurred once before in the last 30 years – in 1999/2000 shortly before the peak of the ‘tech bubble’. We attribute some of the market’s distortions to the Bank of Japan’s market activities and the increase in algorithmic trading. Whatever the cause, repeating the 2000 tech bubble playbook is unlikely to end well.
Source: Japan Analytics
NEGATIVE ‘SPREAD’ – On a daily closing basis, the Oversold outlier percentage is currently 3.17%, the highest since December 25th 2018, despite the total market value being 14% higher than on that day. The ‘spread’ between Overbought and Oversold outliers is now -1.10, and has only been wider for three days at the end of last year either side of Christmas Day. Nevertheless, the Overbought percentage reached a new fifteen-year high at the end of March despite the total market value being 12.6% below the peak of January 2018. In a polarised market, the winners keep on winning, and the losers keep on losing.
Source: Japan Analytics
MARKET TIMING – Using the crossover from Net Overbought to Net Oversold has been a reasonably good market timing indicator over the last two decades and would have avoided the five-year-long slump from 2007-2012. The most recent monthly closing signal was generated in January when the total market value was ¥634t, 2.7% lower than the current level.
Source: Japan Analytics
DAILY TIMING SIGNALS – Using daily closing prices but slightly wider parameters to reduce ‘noise’ the signals are reasonably effective. The last signal was a sell on 18th December 2018 when the total market value was ¥623b, 4.5% below the current level. Both monthly and daily indicators have large negative ‘spreads’ and are unlikely to generate ‘buy’ signals for some time. Both are also suggesting that further declines lie ahead.
– SECTORS –
Source: Japan Analytics
28-YEAR TIMELINE – The twenty-eight-year history of Sectors’ Relative Price Score is shown above and chronicles the periodic extremes of both Overbought and Oversold and the persistence of each. Only seventeen Sectors have been Overbought during this period for a total of 546 months of which half were before 2001. The average Overbought persistence is 4.3 months or 3.4 months excluding the Internet Content & Services Sector. Only fourteen Sectors have been Oversold since 1992 for a total of 243 months of which 55% were before 2001. The average Oversold persistence is 5.7 months although this has risen to 7.5 months since 2001. Currently, three Sectors are Overbought – Consumer Services, Other Consumer Products, and Healthcare, and two Sectors are Oversold – Banks and Utilities.
In the DETAIL section below, we provide an update on recent Sector and Peer Group trends and make some specific recommendations. A second Insight will follow looking at the Relative Price Scores for Companies.
Organo has rebounded from December’s sharp sell-off, but remains attractively valued on a long-term view, in our estimation.
New orders for water treatment systems from the semiconductor and other industries were up 22% year-on-year and exceeded sales by 33% in the nine months to December.
According to management, orders continued to exceed sales in the three months to March, but are likely to drop below sales in 1H of FY Mar-20 due to the downturn in memory ICs.
But the situation is not dire, as overall silicon wafer shipments and demand for image sensors both continue to rise, while foundry is doing better than memory.
Longer term, management expects growth driven by IIoT, power devices, electric vehicles, and a cyclical recovery in memory. The biggest uncertainty is Chinese domestic demand.
Some orders have been deferred by one or two quarters, but the company has so far not suffered any cancellations. With a one-year lag from order to revenue recognition for larger projects, management believes it has sufficient visibility to predict improvement in 2H.
Management has no plans to revise FY Mar-19 guidance, which is for a 14.9% increase in sales, a 43.9% increase in operating profit and a 33.1% increase in net profit to ¥322.5 per share. At ¥3,200 (Friday, April 5 closing price), this translates into a P/E ratio of 9.9x.
In our estimation, this is cheap enough to be of interest to long-term investors. In the meantime, the calculations of Japan Analytics show upside to a no-growth valuation. Little or no growth appears to be the most likely scenario for FY Mar-20.
Organo is Japan’s second-ranking industrial water treatment company after Kurita Water Industries (6370). Both provide ultra-pure water processing equipment and related products and services to the semiconductor industry. Kurita ranks first in Japan and Korea, Organo ranks first in Taiwan, and both companies compete in China.
Here it is. The end – the culmination of years of effort and high balance sheet usage by hedge funds. Altaba Inc (AABA US) is going out with a whimper plus a little upside.
Reportedly plans for the sale of NHC have been abandoned with a focus on selling its Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)gaming unit.
We now have an agreed deal for Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) supported by the Ernst Göhner Foundation, the major activist shareholders, and Panalpina management.
Altaba will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which Altaba currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63/share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00/Alibaba share).”
As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear, based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions.
A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.
It looks like there is upside as the stock closed at US$72.76 (at the time of the insight). But there is less than you think simply because it will take time to get out of it. And discount rates of the first portion may be low, but discount rates applied to the later payments post-delisting and post court workout for the Holdback Amount could be higher.
Travis Lundy has opinions on what to do once you start getting into the arb risks. Do read his insight.
Sanghyun Park discussed Nexon sale after the FT reported bankers has stopped plans to sell the holding company NXC. The sale of NXC is probably the simplest exit path for Kim Jung-ju as it would be a more attractive tax outcome than selling Nexon Japan outright.
But there’s a lot of other stuff in NXC that suitors don’t want to, which ideally should be sold before selling NXC. There’s also the issue of whether a tender offer would be required whether the sale of NXC or Nexon – Travis concludes an offer would be required while Sanghyun does not.
Korean local news outlet reported thatTencent Holdings (700 HK)‘s US$6bn bond issuance may be a fund raising for a Nexon takeover. Still, South Korea would prefer keep Nexon’s ownership domestic, which may favour Kakao Games (1404796D KS) or PE outfit MBK.
Summit Ascent announced that First Steamship (the major shareholder) and Kuo Jen Hao (chairman) are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 35%.
Summit is trading at a trailing PER of 267x. CapIQ forecasts point to a threefold increase in earnings in FY19, although I would advise caution on those numbers given the tight cluster of target prices; historically, target prices for Summit have been wide of the mark.
First Steamship bought in at $1.06 in December 2017, around the same price when this announcement was made. Should this sale complete, this would result in the third time the shares of the major shareholder have changed hands. This looks like a great opportunity to exit.
On the 20th March, MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them. Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.
On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.
Mid-week, Manikay caved and said intends to vote all its shares for the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote. This is now MUCH closer to being a done deal. It will trade tight.
Travis is a trifle surprised Manikay did not wait a little longer. They were able to increase their stake in the low A$3.30s because of the uncertainty of their intentions, and they could probably have gone close to 20% in the low 3.30s before saying “Yes.” That would have been a welcome extra profit.
Lifeboat market play Ezion has received a bail-out from Malaysia’sYinson Holdings (YNS MK) via a capitalisation of debt and option agreement. Ezion remains suspended.
On the surface, this looks like a bargain for Yinson which is ostensibly taking over Ezion for US$200mn. However, Yinson said that it is still negotiating with the designated lenders of the US$916mn debt on the terms and conditions..
Yinson’s business risks include contact risk, oil price fluctuations and the level of activities in the O&G industry. These risks do not change should the Ezion proposal complete.
The last time came on the heels of a long independent review by EY which found KCF had given up profit to the parent through a series of relatively unfair interested party transaction agreements.
At the end, the Bermudan Court of Appeals went against a Supreme Court decision which had decided that a replacement counterparty decision was prejudiced against minorities, and despite the April 2017 deal being not fair and not reasonable according to the IFA, the parent acquired ~10% (of the 28% it did not own) bringing their stake to 82.3%. A year later the parent acquired another 5.5% bringing them to almost 88%.
Now an offer at SGD 0.60/share (compared to the Revalued NTA of SGD 0.7086/share from the IFA report (p36) of two years ago gets closer to the mark, but crucially, it is designed to squeeze out minorities with the threat of delisting. Kingboard Laminates only needs 2.05% to oblige a delisting from the SGX. As far as Travis can tell, it would require more – at least 95% of shares – to oblige a mandatory squeezeout of minorities according to Section 102-103 of Bermuda Companies Act.
The deal is at a negligible premium and is far, far below Tangible Book Value Per Share (which is almost three times the offer price). Given that the acquirer bought a large stake in the company and offered perpetual capital of almost the current market cap at a significant premium to the MGO price, Travis thinks it an unattractive offer.
It is puzzling as to why the CEO would sell his shares at such a discount, especially when the company and Everbright co-own some of the assets.
While the stated intention of the Offeror is to keep the stock listed, and the MGO is presented almost as “technical”, it would be enormously to Everbright’s benefit to buy as many shares as they could down at this price level. It will go from being underwater on an equity affiliate stake purchase to having a huge writeup in value if Everbright consolidates the asset post MGO.
For that, Travis thinks there is a possibility of a bump just to make it more attractive, though the IFA report could come out with a not fair and reasonable result which shows NTA or NAV far, far higher than the Offer Price, which is not yet declared final.
In a mainly technical piece, I explained why China Three Gorges, China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK)‘s largest shareholder with 27.1% is currently required to abstain from voting at the forthcoming court meeting, despite the misleading statement in the announcement that China Three Gorges has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme. (link to my insight: China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption)
What was once a tough deal is now an agreed deal. The deal is 2.375 shares of DSV for every share of Panalpina, which as of the previous Friday’s close had a value of CHF 195.80/share which is a 43% premium to the CHF 137/share, where Panalpina was trading the day before DSV’s first bid.
Panalpina is getting taken out at 28.1x reported 2018 EV/EBITDA multiple (pre-IFRS 16) calculated at a CHF 195.8 price. Panalpina shareholders will own ~23% of DSV shares out if all shares are exchanged and the Ernst Göhner Foundation will be the largest shareholder at ~11%.
69.9% of shares have irrevocably agreed to support the Exchange Offer. The customary condition is 80% to make it go through, meaning DSV needs another 10.1% out of the 30% extant (or just over one-third).
Travis expects there is another 10-15% held by arbitrageurs and 5-7% held by indexers already so this deal looks to me like it is done. He expects the Exchange Offer may settle as early as early-August. If it trades tight, he would get out because DSV is probably priced to a very good level.
Reuters reported that Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those TPG and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company. This was followed by Lenta announced confirming the cash offer. The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs.
The first 41.9% are sold conditional on FAS Clearance (presumably Mordashov has cleared this transaction with “the right people”) expected in May 2019, a few easily achieved conditions, and the condition of no sanctions being in play for any of the selling or buying parties.
Once cleared – expected in May 2019 – this becomes a straightforward offer with no minimum acceptances meaning that investors can sell shares into the deal or decide not to do so.
It’s not an attractive offer price, with the possibility of a bump if enough people complain. If you want to buy and hold, this deal is a put option.
Since announcing the intended listing of its international internet assets on Euronext Amsterdam “no earlier than H2 2019” – together with a secondary, inward listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange – I calculate Naspers discount to NAV has narrowed to 34.4% from 37.1%, the day before the announcement, placing the current discount a shade below the 12-month average.
The likelihood of NewCo trading at a tighter discount to where Naspers’ previously (& currently trades) is universally accepted. Naspers will benefit from that reduced discount via its 75% stake; but it is not known where Naspers’ own discount will trade after the spin-off.
There are indications the management want to see the group discount narrow to 30%, possibly down to the 20% level, which implies a significantly lower discount for Naspers, potentially around 10%. That would seem optimistic as investors focus more on the directly-held Tencent vehicle, and the fact Naspers is a holding company, holding a stake in another holding company.
Naspers’ discount may drift narrower on the expectation Naspers’ spin-off works its magic. Greater clarity on the option into Naspers or NewCo may provide an additional boost; but conversely, if such an option is limited, there is likely to be disappointment.
With Melco trading at a (then) 32% discount to NAV, Curtis Lehnert recommends a set-up trade on a dollar for dollar basis. The current level, as I write, is statistically the most attractive according to the Smartkarma Holdco Tool, sitting at -1.8 standard deviations from the 180 DMA.
Stub assets are minimal – around 8% of GAV – if excluding gaming licenses, goodwill and trademarks. Net cash is $6.4bn or $4.27/share.
Those stub assets are still loss-making, after deconsolidating out MLCO, to the tune of $386mn in EBITDA, but that was an improvement on (HK$682mn) figure in FY17.
Still, Curtis thinks now is the time to enter the trade to take advantage of both the statistical and fundamental supports to the trade.
For the month of March, ten new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$22.3bn. This overall number includes Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman’s proposal for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) after the Tender Offer was officially launched in March. This deal was first proposed in mid-January – which was rejected by the board – and subsequently an improved offer was tabled, which was then supported.
The average premium to last close for the new deals announced in March was 18%, while the average for the first quarter of 2019 is 33%.
Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB)‘s results of the CVTO have been announced. 42.85% of shares tendered, therefore the offeror held 63.78% of shares at the close of the offer. The MSCI downweight occurred at the close Thursday, however shares popped 17.5%.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
E. History of Rechargeable Battery Technologies And An In-Depth Analysis on Li-ion Batteries
F. Batteries Beyond Li-ion
G. Supply Constraints for Key Raw Materials
H. The Competitive Landscape
A. Key Conclusions
Global sales of EV’s reached 2m units in 2018. As a base case scenario, we expect a combination of improving EV battery cost-effectiveness, increasingly challenging emissions standards and ongoing incentives by various governments to propel unit sales to 8m units annually by 2025. Against this, we consider battery material price increases, a reduction of EV incentives in the US and China and political and environmental risks from the mining of metals used in batteries as downside risks which could delay the growth of the EV market.
Surprisingly, the EV battery technology that will drive us towards that 8m unit goal is still very much a work in progress. While Lithium Ion is the by far the dominant technology, there are striking differences between variants of the technology, battery pack design, battery management systems and manufacturing scale between the leading contenders. Furthermore, while there’s nothing on the horizon to completely displace Lithium Ion within the next decade, it remains unclear whether the technology will be the one to achieve the $100/kWh price target that would make the EV cost-neutral compared to its internal combustion predecessors.
Quite apart from the technology, the EV battery segment faces other significant challenges including increasing costs for core materials such as Cobalt, increasing safety concerns as the mix of that very same cobalt is reduced in the cathode, the growing risk of litigation amidst a fiercely competitive environment and last but not least, the appetite of various governments to maintain a favourable subsidy framework.
Singapore REITs (S-REITs) are up about 13% year-to-date in 2019 on a total returns basis against the Straits Times Index’s (STI) 8.3%. S-REITs is expected to continue its outperformance on the back of a pause in the US interest rate hike cycle, falling Singapore government bond yields, and improving demand and supply dynamics in the underlying sub-markets. Valuations of many S-REITs, however, may be appearing stretched as S-REITs’ yields have compressed significantly in the last six months, leaving the yield spread over the 10-year Singapore government bond yield at about 350 basis points, which is lower than the historical average spread of about 370 basis points.
Contrary to the popular belief that retail malls are no longer relevant, we view the outlook of the retail space market as positive due to the limited new supply from 2020 and new trend towards omnichannel retailing. Our preference remains on selected retail REITs with exposure to suburban malls such as Frasers Centrepoint Trust (FCT SP) .
Office REITs are given more legs to run with the new CBD incentive scheme in the URA Draft Master Plan 2019. The sustained office upcycle may also spill over to the business parks and hi-specs industrial space, benefiting some of the business parks/industrial REITs.
We prefer selected industrial REITs with a diversified geographical exposure such as Mapletree Logistics Trust (MLT SP) and those with greater exposure to business parks and high-specs industrial space.
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