Japan

In this briefing:

1. Maybe Koito’s Premium Can Be Justified
2. 🇯🇵 Japan • Relative Price Scores – Overbought & Oversold Companies – April 2019
3. Japan Post Holdings and Japan Post Bank – Early Thoughts on a Choice of Two Trades
4. Asian Bank Asset Quality: “One Overdue, Two Bad” 一逾两呆 The Complex Journey of the NPL
5. Japan 5G Spectrum Allocations In-Line With Expectations

1. Maybe Koito’s Premium Can Be Justified

We mentioned in Koito Outperforms in 3Q While Stanley Disappoints; Latter Still on Track to Achieve FY03/19E Target, that Koito Manufacturing (7276 JP) has managed to beat consensus estimates in 3Q after a series of disappointing results in the previous quarters. This was despite the weak nine-month ended results. The company cited the loss in sales from China (as a result of the deconsolidation of the Shanghai unit) alongside unfavourable economic conditions especially in China and Europe as key reasons for the decline in earnings. Our visit to Koito in March, gave us more insight on the effect of its deconsolidated Shanghai unit and its future plans in China, alongside their investment for capacity expansions and new products. Following these insights, we have revised our view on Koito in a slightly positive manner.

2. 🇯🇵 Japan • Relative Price Scores – Overbought & Oversold Companies – April 2019

– RELATIVE PRICE SCORE – 

INTRODUCTION – The Relative Price Score (RPS) is a measure of stock price performance relative to TOPIX calculated by comparing the current deviation with the mean absolute deviation of monthly and daily relative share prices. As all companies are thus on a comparable scale, ‘Overbought’ and ‘Oversold’ outliers and changes in scoring can reveal short-term and longer-term trading opportunities. Company outlier thresholds are set at +4 & -2 and equate to the top and bottom first-to-second percentiles of historical observations from which mean reversion takes a matter of months. This insight updates our list of Overbought and Oversold companies, reviews the best and worst performing companies in terms of RPS over the last three months and adds some specific comments on stocks on each category.

STATISTICS – Currently, of the 3,804 listed companies for which daily RPS data is available, 79 companies are ‘Overbought’, and 117 are ‘Oversold’ – 2.1% and 3.1%, respectively of the total. For the 779 companies with a market capitalisation of over ¥100b, there are 42 ‘Overbought’ and 28 ‘Oversold’ companies, 5.4% and 3.6%, respectively illustrating the relative strength of larger capitalisation stocks at this stage of the cycle. 

RPS ‘TOPS’ – In the last two years, 438 companies have achieved an RPS of ‘4’ or more and the average Overbought ‘persistence’ is 45 days.  For companies with a market capitalisation higher than ¥100b, the numbers are 92 companies and 83 days – demonstrating the superior persistence of large capitalisation companies in this regard. Some examples of RPS mean reversion in the last three months have been Kyudenko (1959 JP), Nichirei (2871 JP). Fancl (4921 JP), FamilyMart Uny (8028 JP), Infocom Corp (4348 JP), and SanBio (4592 JP). 

RPS ‘BOTTOMS’ – 360 companies have seen their RPS fall to ‘-2’ or below in the last two years, and the average Oversold ‘persistence’ is 59 days. For larger capitalisation companies, the numbers are 82 companies and 84 days. Some recent examples of positive RPS mean reversion in the last two months have been Mercari (4385 JP), AGC (5201 JP), and Pksha Technology (3993 JP).

3. Japan Post Holdings and Japan Post Bank – Early Thoughts on a Choice of Two Trades

Post market close on 9th of April, as per media reports, the Japanese government said that it plans to sell another 1.06bn share of Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) (JPH). The government aims to do so as soon as Sep 2019. The sale, at around US$12bn, would amount to 23.5% of the company and nearly 41% of the government’s current shareholding. It would mark the second sell down by the government since JPH listed in 2015. Post the news release, JPH shares closed down 3% on 10th of April. They are now trading below the IPO price, below the last placement price and just off their all-time lows.

The postal service privatization act seems to be in full swing, with JPH about to enter its third round of selling and Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP) (JPI) in the midst of its first post IPO sell down. However, Japan Post Bank (7182 JP) (JPB) has yet to see a sell down even though the recent deposit ceiling revision required JPH to reduce its holding in JPB. Were JPH to sell some of its JPB stake ahead of the government sale of JPH, it could mitigate a large part of its own placement using the cash that it generates from JPI and possible JPB stake sale to buyback some stock. Thus, there is a possibility that JPB placement might come before JPH’s next placement.

For people interested in reading more about the history and background, I’ve covered the IPO and JPH sell down in the below series of insights:

• All three IPOs: When the bank is cheap and holdco discount makes the mothership cheaper, then who needs insurance?
• JPH IPO: Final call to board the mothership. They don’t come much cheaper than this
• JPH Placement: Japan Post Holdings Placement – Similar Reasons, Similar Price Will Probably Yield Similar Returns
• JPI IPO: Three’s a crowd – A minnow amongst giants risks getting lost in the chatter
• JPI Placement: Japan Post Insurance Placement – 3x the IPO Size – Basics and Index Impact
• JPI Placement: Japan Post Insurance Placement – Performance of Other Big Deals Indicates a Need for Correction
• JPB IPO: Dividend yield looks enticing versus JGBs yield, while risks are similar

4. Asian Bank Asset Quality: “One Overdue, Two Bad” 一逾两呆 The Complex Journey of the NPL

• Asset Quality recognition is something of a black art with varied definitions for non-performing loans (“NPLs”).
• Firstly, we analyse what a NPL is.
• We then evaluate provisioning changes across Asia. We rank countries.
• We further analyse specific underlying NPL recognition issues in China.
• We then rank a sample of regional banks and countries by NPL recognition.
• Later, we take a look at how different systems come under NPL stress and how they cope often in a crisis environment.
• Finally, we wrap things up with some concluding insights about the cultural backdrop which defines systemic asset quality.

5. Japan 5G Spectrum Allocations In-Line With Expectations

The Ministry of Industry Affairs and Communications (MIC, the regulator) announced 5G spectrum allocations today with KDDI and NTT DoCoMo securing three bands and Rakuten and Softbank two, in line with one of the two expected scenarios we discussed last month.  This dramatically expands the spectrum portfolio for the industry and sets the stage for the deployment of 5G services in later this year and in 2020. We think all operators benefit although sentiment may favor Rakuten for receiving two more bands and KDDI/DoCoMo for receiving the highest allocations. 

In this briefing:

1. CyberAgent (4751 JP): Key Takeaways from Our Discussion with the IR Team
2. Shinetsu Buyback – Maybe More Than It Appears
3. Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders

1. CyberAgent (4751 JP): Key Takeaways from Our Discussion with the IR Team

Our recent conversation with CyberAgent’s IR team suggests that a significant improvement in the OP margin is unlikely in the next few quarters. The OP margins of both Game business and the Internet Advertisement, while likely to improve gradually, are likely to remain low compared to recent history due to higher advertising and personnel costs.

Upfront investments in AbemaTV are likely to continue until the target of 10m Weekly Average Users (WAU) is met, which could take a year or more. The company expects around 50% of AbemaTV revenue to eventually come from premium users, which seems to be a shift in strategy, from a “free” service towards a more hybrid model.

CyberAgent’s share price closed at ¥4,050 on Tuesday, up 7.1% from its previous close, following the news that the stock was added to the Goldman Sachs’ conviction list with a reiterated buy rating. However, even before this, CyberAgent’s share price had been on a steady increase over the past two weeks (+29.0%), recovering from a one-year low in early February. This increase, despite rather mediocre 1Q results, a downward revision of OP guidance, and lack of any major short term catalysts is an indication that the market deems CyberAgent to be undervalued – mainly on the AbemaTV front.

2. Shinetsu Buyback – Maybe More Than It Appears

On 12 March 2019 after the close, Shin Etsu Chemical (4063 JP)announced a share buyback program to buy up to 14 million shares for up to ¥100 billion. If it bought all 14 million shares, that would be 3.3% of shares outstanding. Simultaneously, it announced a ToSTNeT-3 buyback of 11,001,100 shares at today’s closing price of ¥9,090/share which if all bought would complete the buyback program. 

As I write, the shares are up 4-6% in thin trading in the ADRs. 

There was some speculation across the Street there would be a buyback because of slowing earnings expectations and a surfeit of capital, which was itself important because of the company’s lack of recent history of buybacks (the last and only time the company has bought back shares (to date) was a repurchase of 3 million shares for ¥13.6 billion in late October 2008 when things were hairy (and cheap)). 

The shares are down over the past year, but the price in the past few days is not dramatically at the low end of the range of the past six months or so.

There may be some information in the context and structure of this buyback which tells you something different than people’s first reaction. 

3. Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders

The key point of interest for investors regarding Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) continues to be details surrounding its upcoming capital raise. The company has, since early November when it incurred these losses, offered scant details regarding the structure of the capital raise, except to note that the components would include additional loans and equity from industrial partners and most likely, main shareholder Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP).

We visited the company to gather as much information as possible on the potential structure of the capital increase and to update the order outlook and reasons for further cost overruns.

In this briefing:

1. Shinetsu Buyback – Maybe More Than It Appears
2. Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders

1. Shinetsu Buyback – Maybe More Than It Appears

On 12 March 2019 after the close, Shin Etsu Chemical (4063 JP)announced a share buyback program to buy up to 14 million shares for up to ¥100 billion. If it bought all 14 million shares, that would be 3.3% of shares outstanding. Simultaneously, it announced a ToSTNeT-3 buyback of 11,001,100 shares at today’s closing price of ¥9,090/share which if all bought would complete the buyback program. 

As I write, the shares are up 4-6% in thin trading in the ADRs. 

There was some speculation across the Street there would be a buyback because of slowing earnings expectations and a surfeit of capital, which was itself important because of the company’s lack of recent history of buybacks (the last and only time the company has bought back shares (to date) was a repurchase of 3 million shares for ¥13.6 billion in late October 2008 when things were hairy (and cheap)). 

The shares are down over the past year, but the price in the past few days is not dramatically at the low end of the range of the past six months or so.

There may be some information in the context and structure of this buyback which tells you something different than people’s first reaction. 

2. Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders

The key point of interest for investors regarding Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) continues to be details surrounding its upcoming capital raise. The company has, since early November when it incurred these losses, offered scant details regarding the structure of the capital raise, except to note that the components would include additional loans and equity from industrial partners and most likely, main shareholder Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP).

We visited the company to gather as much information as possible on the potential structure of the capital increase and to update the order outlook and reasons for further cost overruns.

In this briefing:

1. Shinetsu Buyback – Maybe More Than It Appears
2. Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders
3. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

1. Shinetsu Buyback – Maybe More Than It Appears

On 12 March 2019 after the close, Shin Etsu Chemical (4063 JP)announced a share buyback program to buy up to 14 million shares for up to ¥100 billion. If it bought all 14 million shares, that would be 3.3% of shares outstanding. Simultaneously, it announced a ToSTNeT-3 buyback of 11,001,100 shares at today’s closing price of ¥9,090/share which if all bought would complete the buyback program. 

As I write, the shares are up 4-6% in thin trading in the ADRs. 

There was some speculation across the Street there would be a buyback because of slowing earnings expectations and a surfeit of capital, which was itself important because of the company’s lack of recent history of buybacks (the last and only time the company has bought back shares (to date) was a repurchase of 3 million shares for ¥13.6 billion in late October 2008 when things were hairy (and cheap)). 

The shares are down over the past year, but the price in the past few days is not dramatically at the low end of the range of the past six months or so.

There may be some information in the context and structure of this buyback which tells you something different than people’s first reaction. 

2. Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders

The key point of interest for investors regarding Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) continues to be details surrounding its upcoming capital raise. The company has, since early November when it incurred these losses, offered scant details regarding the structure of the capital raise, except to note that the components would include additional loans and equity from industrial partners and most likely, main shareholder Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP).

We visited the company to gather as much information as possible on the potential structure of the capital increase and to update the order outlook and reasons for further cost overruns.

3. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

Yesterday, King Street sent a letter to Toshiba Corp (6502 JP) CEO Nobuaki Kurumatani, applying pressure by threatening to nominate alternative directors to the company’s board. The full contents of the letter can be found here.

King Street’s requirements for the new board are stated as:

Among other things, the new Board must:

(i) ensure management applies rigorous financial discipline to capital allocation decisions, including use of excess cash, determination of optimal capital structure and capital expenditure return requirements;

(ii) drive management to re-examine Toshiba’s business portfolio with a critical eye on competitive position, sector landscape, synergies available and profitable growth prospects;

(iii) direct management to evaluate non-operating and underperforming businesses and assets (while respecting that Toshiba may need to be engaged in certain activities important to Japan’s national security interests);

(iv) ensure that management attains global peer profitability levels at each business segment based on projections supported by robust, bottoms-up analysis; and

(v) instill a culture of accountability and ownership at all levels of the organization.

By and large these demands amount to, “follow the instructions in our previous presentation“. That presentation, while thorough in some respects struck us as being naively optimistic, as we noted in Toshiba: King Street Assumptions Look Exceedingly Optimistic.

Travis Lundy also commented on the presentation in Toshiba: King Street’s Buyback Proposals Lack Required Detail and Toshiba: King Street’s Valuation Analysis Is… Punchy?

Given developments in the intervening time period including a sell-down of about 27% of King Street’s initial stake at a price of ¥3,925 (some 64% below the “well over ¥11,000” per share they feel Toshiba is worth) according to Bloomberg, and a downward revision to OP guidance from ¥60bn to ¥20bn, we feel that there is little reason to change our assessment.

In this briefing:

1. 🇯🇵 Japan • Relative Price Scores – Overbought & Oversold Companies – April 2019
2. Japan Post Holdings and Japan Post Bank – Early Thoughts on a Choice of Two Trades
3. Asian Bank Asset Quality: “One Overdue, Two Bad” 一逾两呆 The Complex Journey of the NPL
4. Japan 5G Spectrum Allocations In-Line With Expectations
5. China’s New Semiconductor Thrust – Part 2: Commodities as a Quick Path to Success

1. 🇯🇵 Japan • Relative Price Scores – Overbought & Oversold Companies – April 2019

– RELATIVE PRICE SCORE – 

INTRODUCTION – The Relative Price Score (RPS) is a measure of stock price performance relative to TOPIX calculated by comparing the current deviation with the mean absolute deviation of monthly and daily relative share prices. As all companies are thus on a comparable scale, ‘Overbought’ and ‘Oversold’ outliers and changes in scoring can reveal short-term and longer-term trading opportunities. Company outlier thresholds are set at +4 & -2 and equate to the top and bottom first-to-second percentiles of historical observations from which mean reversion takes a matter of months. This insight updates our list of Overbought and Oversold companies, reviews the best and worst performing companies in terms of RPS over the last three months and adds some specific comments on stocks on each category.

STATISTICS – Currently, of the 3,804 listed companies for which daily RPS data is available, 79 companies are ‘Overbought’, and 117 are ‘Oversold’ – 2.1% and 3.1%, respectively of the total. For the 779 companies with a market capitalisation of over ¥100b, there are 42 ‘Overbought’ and 28 ‘Oversold’ companies, 5.4% and 3.6%, respectively illustrating the relative strength of larger capitalisation stocks at this stage of the cycle. 

RPS ‘TOPS’ – In the last two years, 438 companies have achieved an RPS of ‘4’ or more and the average Overbought ‘persistence’ is 45 days.  For companies with a market capitalisation higher than ¥100b, the numbers are 92 companies and 83 days – demonstrating the superior persistence of large capitalisation companies in this regard. Some examples of RPS mean reversion in the last three months have been Kyudenko (1959 JP), Nichirei (2871 JP). Fancl (4921 JP), FamilyMart Uny (8028 JP), Infocom Corp (4348 JP), and SanBio (4592 JP). 

RPS ‘BOTTOMS’ – 360 companies have seen their RPS fall to ‘-2’ or below in the last two years, and the average Oversold ‘persistence’ is 59 days. For larger capitalisation companies, the numbers are 82 companies and 84 days. Some recent examples of positive RPS mean reversion in the last two months have been Mercari (4385 JP), AGC (5201 JP), and Pksha Technology (3993 JP).

2. Japan Post Holdings and Japan Post Bank – Early Thoughts on a Choice of Two Trades

Post market close on 9th of April, as per media reports, the Japanese government said that it plans to sell another 1.06bn share of Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) (JPH). The government aims to do so as soon as Sep 2019. The sale, at around US$12bn, would amount to 23.5% of the company and nearly 41% of the government’s current shareholding. It would mark the second sell down by the government since JPH listed in 2015. Post the news release, JPH shares closed down 3% on 10th of April. They are now trading below the IPO price, below the last placement price and just off their all-time lows.

The postal service privatization act seems to be in full swing, with JPH about to enter its third round of selling and Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP) (JPI) in the midst of its first post IPO sell down. However, Japan Post Bank (7182 JP) (JPB) has yet to see a sell down even though the recent deposit ceiling revision required JPH to reduce its holding in JPB. Were JPH to sell some of its JPB stake ahead of the government sale of JPH, it could mitigate a large part of its own placement using the cash that it generates from JPI and possible JPB stake sale to buyback some stock. Thus, there is a possibility that JPB placement might come before JPH’s next placement.

For people interested in reading more about the history and background, I’ve covered the IPO and JPH sell down in the below series of insights:

• All three IPOs: When the bank is cheap and holdco discount makes the mothership cheaper, then who needs insurance?
• JPH IPO: Final call to board the mothership. They don’t come much cheaper than this
• JPH Placement: Japan Post Holdings Placement – Similar Reasons, Similar Price Will Probably Yield Similar Returns
• JPI IPO: Three’s a crowd – A minnow amongst giants risks getting lost in the chatter
• JPI Placement: Japan Post Insurance Placement – 3x the IPO Size – Basics and Index Impact
• JPI Placement: Japan Post Insurance Placement – Performance of Other Big Deals Indicates a Need for Correction
• JPB IPO: Dividend yield looks enticing versus JGBs yield, while risks are similar

3. Asian Bank Asset Quality: “One Overdue, Two Bad” 一逾两呆 The Complex Journey of the NPL

• Asset Quality recognition is something of a black art with varied definitions for non-performing loans (“NPLs”).
• Firstly, we analyse what a NPL is.
• We then evaluate provisioning changes across Asia. We rank countries.
• We further analyse specific underlying NPL recognition issues in China.
• We then rank a sample of regional banks and countries by NPL recognition.
• Later, we take a look at how different systems come under NPL stress and how they cope often in a crisis environment.
• Finally, we wrap things up with some concluding insights about the cultural backdrop which defines systemic asset quality.

4. Japan 5G Spectrum Allocations In-Line With Expectations

The Ministry of Industry Affairs and Communications (MIC, the regulator) announced 5G spectrum allocations today with KDDI and NTT DoCoMo securing three bands and Rakuten and Softbank two, in line with one of the two expected scenarios we discussed last month.  This dramatically expands the spectrum portfolio for the industry and sets the stage for the deployment of 5G services in later this year and in 2020. We think all operators benefit although sentiment may favor Rakuten for receiving two more bands and KDDI/DoCoMo for receiving the highest allocations. 

5. China’s New Semiconductor Thrust – Part 2: Commodities as a Quick Path to Success

China’s current efforts to gain prominence in the semiconductor market targets memory chips – large commodities.  This three-part series of insights examines how China determined its strategy and explains which companies are the most threatened by it.

This second part of the series explains how China chose commodity semiconductors (DRAM and NAND flash memory chips) as the best technology to pursue.

In this briefing:

1. Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders
2. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

1. Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders

The key point of interest for investors regarding Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) continues to be details surrounding its upcoming capital raise. The company has, since early November when it incurred these losses, offered scant details regarding the structure of the capital raise, except to note that the components would include additional loans and equity from industrial partners and most likely, main shareholder Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP).

We visited the company to gather as much information as possible on the potential structure of the capital increase and to update the order outlook and reasons for further cost overruns.

2. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

Yesterday, King Street sent a letter to Toshiba Corp (6502 JP) CEO Nobuaki Kurumatani, applying pressure by threatening to nominate alternative directors to the company’s board. The full contents of the letter can be found here.

King Street’s requirements for the new board are stated as:

Among other things, the new Board must:

(i) ensure management applies rigorous financial discipline to capital allocation decisions, including use of excess cash, determination of optimal capital structure and capital expenditure return requirements;

(ii) drive management to re-examine Toshiba’s business portfolio with a critical eye on competitive position, sector landscape, synergies available and profitable growth prospects;

(iii) direct management to evaluate non-operating and underperforming businesses and assets (while respecting that Toshiba may need to be engaged in certain activities important to Japan’s national security interests);

(iv) ensure that management attains global peer profitability levels at each business segment based on projections supported by robust, bottoms-up analysis; and

(v) instill a culture of accountability and ownership at all levels of the organization.

By and large these demands amount to, “follow the instructions in our previous presentation“. That presentation, while thorough in some respects struck us as being naively optimistic, as we noted in Toshiba: King Street Assumptions Look Exceedingly Optimistic.

Travis Lundy also commented on the presentation in Toshiba: King Street’s Buyback Proposals Lack Required Detail and Toshiba: King Street’s Valuation Analysis Is… Punchy?

Given developments in the intervening time period including a sell-down of about 27% of King Street’s initial stake at a price of ¥3,925 (some 64% below the “well over ¥11,000” per share they feel Toshiba is worth) according to Bloomberg, and a downward revision to OP guidance from ¥60bn to ¥20bn, we feel that there is little reason to change our assessment.

In this briefing:

1. Japan Post Holdings and Japan Post Bank – Early Thoughts on a Choice of Two Trades
2. Asian Bank Asset Quality: “One Overdue, Two Bad” 一逾两呆 The Complex Journey of the NPL
3. Japan 5G Spectrum Allocations In-Line With Expectations
4. China’s New Semiconductor Thrust – Part 2: Commodities as a Quick Path to Success
5. NTT DoCoMo: Sale of HTHK Mobile Stake Is the End of an Era (Thankfully)

1. Japan Post Holdings and Japan Post Bank – Early Thoughts on a Choice of Two Trades

Post market close on 9th of April, as per media reports, the Japanese government said that it plans to sell another 1.06bn share of Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) (JPH). The government aims to do so as soon as Sep 2019. The sale, at around US$12bn, would amount to 23.5% of the company and nearly 41% of the government’s current shareholding. It would mark the second sell down by the government since JPH listed in 2015. Post the news release, JPH shares closed down 3% on 10th of April. They are now trading below the IPO price, below the last placement price and just off their all-time lows.

The postal service privatization act seems to be in full swing, with JPH about to enter its third round of selling and Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP) (JPI) in the midst of its first post IPO sell down. However, Japan Post Bank (7182 JP) (JPB) has yet to see a sell down even though the recent deposit ceiling revision required JPH to reduce its holding in JPB. Were JPH to sell some of its JPB stake ahead of the government sale of JPH, it could mitigate a large part of its own placement using the cash that it generates from JPI and possible JPB stake sale to buyback some stock. Thus, there is a possibility that JPB placement might come before JPH’s next placement.

For people interested in reading more about the history and background, I’ve covered the IPO and JPH sell down in the below series of insights:

• All three IPOs: When the bank is cheap and holdco discount makes the mothership cheaper, then who needs insurance?
• JPH IPO: Final call to board the mothership. They don’t come much cheaper than this
• JPH Placement: Japan Post Holdings Placement – Similar Reasons, Similar Price Will Probably Yield Similar Returns
• JPI IPO: Three’s a crowd – A minnow amongst giants risks getting lost in the chatter
• JPI Placement: Japan Post Insurance Placement – 3x the IPO Size – Basics and Index Impact
• JPI Placement: Japan Post Insurance Placement – Performance of Other Big Deals Indicates a Need for Correction
• JPB IPO: Dividend yield looks enticing versus JGBs yield, while risks are similar

2. Asian Bank Asset Quality: “One Overdue, Two Bad” 一逾两呆 The Complex Journey of the NPL

• Asset Quality recognition is something of a black art with varied definitions for non-performing loans (“NPLs”).
• Firstly, we analyse what a NPL is.
• We then evaluate provisioning changes across Asia. We rank countries.
• We further analyse specific underlying NPL recognition issues in China.
• We then rank a sample of regional banks and countries by NPL recognition.
• Later, we take a look at how different systems come under NPL stress and how they cope often in a crisis environment.
• Finally, we wrap things up with some concluding insights about the cultural backdrop which defines systemic asset quality.

3. Japan 5G Spectrum Allocations In-Line With Expectations

The Ministry of Industry Affairs and Communications (MIC, the regulator) announced 5G spectrum allocations today with KDDI and NTT DoCoMo securing three bands and Rakuten and Softbank two, in line with one of the two expected scenarios we discussed last month.  This dramatically expands the spectrum portfolio for the industry and sets the stage for the deployment of 5G services in later this year and in 2020. We think all operators benefit although sentiment may favor Rakuten for receiving two more bands and KDDI/DoCoMo for receiving the highest allocations. 

4. China’s New Semiconductor Thrust – Part 2: Commodities as a Quick Path to Success

China’s current efforts to gain prominence in the semiconductor market targets memory chips – large commodities.  This three-part series of insights examines how China determined its strategy and explains which companies are the most threatened by it.

This second part of the series explains how China chose commodity semiconductors (DRAM and NAND flash memory chips) as the best technology to pursue.

5. NTT DoCoMo: Sale of HTHK Mobile Stake Is the End of an Era (Thankfully)

NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP) recently announced it would sell its 25% stake in Hutchinson Telecom Hong Kong’s ( Hutchison Telecommunications Hk Hld (215 HK)  mobile unit for US$60mn with closing expected at the end of May. This ends a 20-year association with Hutchinson forged in the initial excitement over 3G in 1999 but it hasn’t been a good ride for DoCoMo which lost close to 90% on its Hutchison investments and its other international forays were not much better.  On a related note, the HK mobile sale follows soon after DoCoMo’s exit from its credit card joint venture with Sumitomo Mitsui but we would not read anything into this beyond a rationalization of its non-core investments.

In this briefing:

1. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

1. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

Yesterday, King Street sent a letter to Toshiba Corp (6502 JP) CEO Nobuaki Kurumatani, applying pressure by threatening to nominate alternative directors to the company’s board. The full contents of the letter can be found here.

King Street’s requirements for the new board are stated as:

Among other things, the new Board must:

(i) ensure management applies rigorous financial discipline to capital allocation decisions, including use of excess cash, determination of optimal capital structure and capital expenditure return requirements;

(ii) drive management to re-examine Toshiba’s business portfolio with a critical eye on competitive position, sector landscape, synergies available and profitable growth prospects;

(iii) direct management to evaluate non-operating and underperforming businesses and assets (while respecting that Toshiba may need to be engaged in certain activities important to Japan’s national security interests);

(iv) ensure that management attains global peer profitability levels at each business segment based on projections supported by robust, bottoms-up analysis; and

(v) instill a culture of accountability and ownership at all levels of the organization.

By and large these demands amount to, “follow the instructions in our previous presentation“. That presentation, while thorough in some respects struck us as being naively optimistic, as we noted in Toshiba: King Street Assumptions Look Exceedingly Optimistic.

Travis Lundy also commented on the presentation in Toshiba: King Street’s Buyback Proposals Lack Required Detail and Toshiba: King Street’s Valuation Analysis Is… Punchy?

Given developments in the intervening time period including a sell-down of about 27% of King Street’s initial stake at a price of ¥3,925 (some 64% below the “well over ¥11,000” per share they feel Toshiba is worth) according to Bloomberg, and a downward revision to OP guidance from ¥60bn to ¥20bn, we feel that there is little reason to change our assessment.

In this briefing:

1. Toshiba: King Street Round Two
2. Nsk (6471) Conditions Have Deteriorated Significantly but Given Valuations, This Is Now in the Price

1. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

Yesterday, King Street sent a letter to Toshiba Corp (6502 JP) CEO Nobuaki Kurumatani, applying pressure by threatening to nominate alternative directors to the company’s board. The full contents of the letter can be found here.

King Street’s requirements for the new board are stated as:

Among other things, the new Board must:

(i) ensure management applies rigorous financial discipline to capital allocation decisions, including use of excess cash, determination of optimal capital structure and capital expenditure return requirements;

(ii) drive management to re-examine Toshiba’s business portfolio with a critical eye on competitive position, sector landscape, synergies available and profitable growth prospects;

(iii) direct management to evaluate non-operating and underperforming businesses and assets (while respecting that Toshiba may need to be engaged in certain activities important to Japan’s national security interests);

(iv) ensure that management attains global peer profitability levels at each business segment based on projections supported by robust, bottoms-up analysis; and

(v) instill a culture of accountability and ownership at all levels of the organization.

By and large these demands amount to, “follow the instructions in our previous presentation“. That presentation, while thorough in some respects struck us as being naively optimistic, as we noted in Toshiba: King Street Assumptions Look Exceedingly Optimistic.

Travis Lundy also commented on the presentation in Toshiba: King Street’s Buyback Proposals Lack Required Detail and Toshiba: King Street’s Valuation Analysis Is… Punchy?

Given developments in the intervening time period including a sell-down of about 27% of King Street’s initial stake at a price of ¥3,925 (some 64% below the “well over ¥11,000” per share they feel Toshiba is worth) according to Bloomberg, and a downward revision to OP guidance from ¥60bn to ¥20bn, we feel that there is little reason to change our assessment.

2. Nsk (6471) Conditions Have Deteriorated Significantly but Given Valuations, This Is Now in the Price

Over the last 12 months, these shares have been a dreadful performer (as have the other ball bearing makers), both in absolute terms (-36%) and on a relative basis (underperformed TOPIX by 30%). Operating profits for the full year have recently been revised down (for the second time). The operating environment has deteriorated markedly into 4Q. It would appear to us that the market, and analysts, are aware of the current poor trading conditions. The question is when will conditions start to improve. The first half of next year will be very poor indeed with profits down perhaps 35% year-on-year. And it now appears that some analyst’s numbers do not assume recovery for any of next fiscal year, which we believe as too harsh.

Clearly the first half of next year (3/20) is going to show very poor year on year comparisons. This will be unavoidable given a good first half this year and business conditions now. The company itself is now forecasting a 4Q operating profit of Y16.7bn (-40%) having made Y24.8bn in 1Q, Y20.2bn in 2Q and Y21.3bn in 3Q. Assuming this level carries on into the first half of next year before starting a gradual recovery in the second half, then first half operating profit may well come in at about Y32-33bn, a 35% year-on-year fall. The consensus for the full year is currently about Y70bn with the lowest number being Y64bn. Sell recommendations have also begun to appear. To us this appear to be a bit after the event given where earnings are now and where the shares are trading.

The shares currently yield 4.2% and the pay-out ratio this year is 36%. Management’s target is for 30% but at the same time they are reluctant to cut the dividend going forward. This may well prove some support. Meanwhile the company owns 7% of itself and on our calculation is trading on an EV/ebitda of just under 4x. Finally, its book value (0.9x) relative to the market’s book value is now at a very depressed level (see chart below) which suggests to us that although there may be some short term down side risk, we would look to buy on a longer term.

In this briefing:

1. Toshiba: King Street Round Two
2. Nsk (6471) Conditions Have Deteriorated Significantly but Given Valuations, This Is Now in the Price
3. Smartkarma’s Week that Was in JP/​​​​​KR: Nexon, Rakuten, POSCO and Samsung Electronics

1. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

Yesterday, King Street sent a letter to Toshiba Corp (6502 JP) CEO Nobuaki Kurumatani, applying pressure by threatening to nominate alternative directors to the company’s board. The full contents of the letter can be found here.

King Street’s requirements for the new board are stated as:

Among other things, the new Board must:

(i) ensure management applies rigorous financial discipline to capital allocation decisions, including use of excess cash, determination of optimal capital structure and capital expenditure return requirements;

(ii) drive management to re-examine Toshiba’s business portfolio with a critical eye on competitive position, sector landscape, synergies available and profitable growth prospects;

(iii) direct management to evaluate non-operating and underperforming businesses and assets (while respecting that Toshiba may need to be engaged in certain activities important to Japan’s national security interests);

(iv) ensure that management attains global peer profitability levels at each business segment based on projections supported by robust, bottoms-up analysis; and

(v) instill a culture of accountability and ownership at all levels of the organization.

By and large these demands amount to, “follow the instructions in our previous presentation“. That presentation, while thorough in some respects struck us as being naively optimistic, as we noted in Toshiba: King Street Assumptions Look Exceedingly Optimistic.

Travis Lundy also commented on the presentation in Toshiba: King Street’s Buyback Proposals Lack Required Detail and Toshiba: King Street’s Valuation Analysis Is… Punchy?

Given developments in the intervening time period including a sell-down of about 27% of King Street’s initial stake at a price of ¥3,925 (some 64% below the “well over ¥11,000” per share they feel Toshiba is worth) according to Bloomberg, and a downward revision to OP guidance from ¥60bn to ¥20bn, we feel that there is little reason to change our assessment.

2. Nsk (6471) Conditions Have Deteriorated Significantly but Given Valuations, This Is Now in the Price

Over the last 12 months, these shares have been a dreadful performer (as have the other ball bearing makers), both in absolute terms (-36%) and on a relative basis (underperformed TOPIX by 30%). Operating profits for the full year have recently been revised down (for the second time). The operating environment has deteriorated markedly into 4Q. It would appear to us that the market, and analysts, are aware of the current poor trading conditions. The question is when will conditions start to improve. The first half of next year will be very poor indeed with profits down perhaps 35% year-on-year. And it now appears that some analyst’s numbers do not assume recovery for any of next fiscal year, which we believe as too harsh.

Clearly the first half of next year (3/20) is going to show very poor year on year comparisons. This will be unavoidable given a good first half this year and business conditions now. The company itself is now forecasting a 4Q operating profit of Y16.7bn (-40%) having made Y24.8bn in 1Q, Y20.2bn in 2Q and Y21.3bn in 3Q. Assuming this level carries on into the first half of next year before starting a gradual recovery in the second half, then first half operating profit may well come in at about Y32-33bn, a 35% year-on-year fall. The consensus for the full year is currently about Y70bn with the lowest number being Y64bn. Sell recommendations have also begun to appear. To us this appear to be a bit after the event given where earnings are now and where the shares are trading.

The shares currently yield 4.2% and the pay-out ratio this year is 36%. Management’s target is for 30% but at the same time they are reluctant to cut the dividend going forward. This may well prove some support. Meanwhile the company owns 7% of itself and on our calculation is trading on an EV/ebitda of just under 4x. Finally, its book value (0.9x) relative to the market’s book value is now at a very depressed level (see chart below) which suggests to us that although there may be some short term down side risk, we would look to buy on a longer term.

3. Smartkarma’s Week that Was in JP/​​​​​KR: Nexon, Rakuten, POSCO and Samsung Electronics

Below is the list of the Japan/Korea-related posts put on the Smartkarma platform during the week of March 4th: