We’ve reviewed 10 companies in the sector. Of those, three are the consensus favorites of our Tokyo based panel of industry, financial and economics observers of the IR initiative over many years.
Based on pachinko alone, the stocks of these companies are fully valued. Based on potential tailwind from a license award within 6 months, they could be vastly undervalued.
Each of the three noted here brings strength to a bid less based on financials than corporate focus, outlook and experience in the field.
With U.S. markets stumbling, the MSCI ACWI index is breaking down to new lows: defensive Sectors remain attractive. Relative to MSCI ACWI however, emerging markets are the place to be.China, Brazil, Hungary, Qatar, India, Poland, and Indonesia all display positive price and/or RS trends. In this report we recap technical important levels on all major indexes and highlight attractive stocks within Real Estate, Health Care/Pharma, Precious Metals Mining, and Utilities.
The key operational and strategic themes relevant to investors in CVS in Japan:
The Japanese convenience store sector may have reached saturation but this has just encouraged the top three operators to speed up their quest to take over the remaining smaller chains while pushing into regions where they have fewer stores.
At the same time, all are looking at new forms of retailing to expand further:
All of the top three had previously failed to come up with coherent e-commerce strategies, but this year Seven Eleven and Lawson have launched new ideas that make better use of their existing store networks and could reach national coverage quite soon.
Diversification is another strategy to overcome saturation, and Familymart, in particular, is tying with all manner of partners to try and come up with a hit hybrid format to find new growth.
While competition from drugstores and discount food retailers is a threat, convenience stores will continue to find new sources of growth from e-commerce, hybrid stores and innovative products.
With the FTSE ST REIT index’s decline of 9.3% year-to-date, value has emerged for some of the bellwether names in the Singapore REITs sector. The forward yield spread between these REITs and the Singapore government 10-year bond yield (2.13%) currently stand at least 390 basis points. In view of the increasing concerns over global economic growth, rising interest rates and the ongoing trade tension between the US and China, I present three quality REITs with fortified portfolios that are well-positioned to weather the near-term market uncertainties. They possess growth potential from acquisitions, positive rental reversions and deliver resilient forward distribution yield of more than 6%. Some of the bellwether names in the more resilient retail REIT sector, while offering lower yield of around 5.0% – 5.7%, are also in my buy list.
After months of skirting around inventory build-up and a weakening demand outlook, Micron used their latest earnings report to call closing time on a revenue and profitability party that began in Q4 2016 and just got better and better with each passing quarter.
Micron reported Q1 FY2019 results on December 18’th and while revenues were largely in line with recently lowered guidance from the company, their outlook for both Q2 and 2019 as a whole was worse than even the most bearish of expectations.
Citing high inventory levels at key customers, Micron guided Q2 FY2019 revenues for $6 billion at the midpoint, down a staggering $1.9 billion, 24% QoQ and 18% YoY. At the same time, Micron revised down their CY2019 bit demand growth forecast for both DRAM (from 20% to 16%) and NAND (35%, the bottom of the previously forecasted range). The company plans to adjust both CapEx and bit supply output downwards to match.
In the wake of their guidance bombshell, Micron’s share price closed down almost 8% the following day to end the session at $31.41, a level last seen in August 2017. Micron is unique in reporting out of sync with its industry peers, making it the proverbial canary in a coal mine. The company’s gloomy outlook and clarion call for further CapEx reductions in a bid to rebalance supply and demand spells troubled times ahead for an already beleaguered semiconductor segment ahead of the upcoming earnings season.
TRADING ZONE – As of last Friday, the Japan All Market Composite has now entered a bear market, having declined by 20% from the January 23rd high if Y757t. At the close, only 8% by number and 11% by value of Japanese stocks were trading above their weighted composite of 5, 20, 60, 120, and 240-day moving averages. These were the lowest closing values since February 2016 when the All Market Composite reached a low of Y475tand offer an entry point for a short-term trade for those happy to hold over the extended New Year Holiday period.
Source: Japan Analytics
BREAKOUTS – The ‘Breaking Bad’ percentage reached 11% on December 4th, the tenth-lowest reading in three years bu thas yet to fall below ‘-15-. Adding the Breaking Above and Breaking Below percentages together provides a more straightforward view of the 15% threshold that has marked previous short and medium-term turning points, and which again we have yet to reach.
SECTORS
LEGEND: The ‘sparklines’ show the three-year trend in the weighted percentage above moving average relative to the Market Composite and the ‘STDev’ column is a measure of the variability of that relative measure. The table also provides averages for the breaks above and breaks below and the positive and negative ‘crossovers’.
SECTOR BREAKDOWN – The top six sectors measured by the percentage above the weighted average of 5-240 Days are all, predictably, domestic and defensive – Food, Beverages & Tobacco, REITs, Information Technology, Internet, Media and Utilities. Equally predictable are the bottom half-dozen – Banks, Non-Bank Finance, Autos, Metals, Electrical Equipment and Chemicals.
COMPANIES
COMPANY MOVING AVERAGE OUTLIERS – As with the market and sectors, out moving average outlier indicator uses a weighted sum of the share price relative to its 5-day, 20-day, 60-day, 120 day and 240-day moving averages. Extreme values are weighted sums greater than 100% and less than -100%. We would caution that this indicator is best used for timing shorter-term reversals and, in many cases, higher highs and lower lows will be seen.
Source: Japan Analytics
THE 100% CLUB – As of Friday 21st, there were 16 extreme positive outliers and 622 extreme negative outliers. The number of extreme negative outliers suggests we are a short-term bottom.
In the DETAIL section below, we highlight the current top and bottom twenty-five larger capitalisation outliers as well as those companies that have seen the most significant positive and negative changes in their outlier percentage in the last two weeks and provide short comments on companies of particular note.
Waymo CEO John Krafcik made some bold decisions after taking the helm at Alphabet‘s self-driving project in September 2015. Chief among them was the fact that the company abandon its plans for Level 3 automated driving and focus exclusively on levels 4 & 5. Furthermore, he decreed that Waymo would no longer manufacture its own vehicles but would instead integrate their technology into those of other automakers. Three years later, those decisions would appear to be finally paying off.
On October 10 2018, Waymo reached a significant milestone having completed 10 million self-driving miles across 25 cities in the US. While their first million self-driving miles took 18 months to complete, Waymo now clocks up over a million self-driving miles per month. The company also recently announced the launch of its robo taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona and looks set to quickly follow suit in California. Plans to extend its self-driving technology beyond robotaxis, most notably for trucks and last-mile transportation solutions are also in the works. Furthermore, the company has begun laying down a framework of innovative B2B revenue models which should help accelerate the speed with which they can eventually monetize their technology.
It hasn’t been smooth sailing all the way for Waymo however. Earlier this year, the company was derided for the driving style of its autonomous vehicles and faced the criticism that its driverless cars continue to have safety drivers. There was also an embarrassing incident where one of those very safety drivers caused the self-driving car he was monitoring to hit a motorcyclist when he attempted to take control of the vehicle. According to Waymo’s own analysis of the vehicle log files, the accident would not have happened had he not intervened.
With ten million self-driving miles under their belt and a thoughtful, strategic approach to monetizing their technology beginning to emerge, Waymo remains firmly ahead of their peers in leading the autonomous driving charge.
Our review of ten Asian gaming companies forward prospects for 2019 yielded our top five picks. Two of those comprise this insight. Three more will follow in Part Two. There is, in our opinion, some disconnect between continuing macro headwinds in both the VIP and mass sectors and a more bullish tone based on a recent upside trend in Macau, strong results in the Philippines and Cambodia. Given the battering of the market in general, the already 8 month old bearish tone to the sector and the current pricing of the two stocks noted here, we see significant upside opportunity as we near the beginning of 2019.
During the second half of December 2018, Japan saw two telecom companies list on the Tokyo Stock Exchange: Softbank Corp (9434 JP) and ARTERIA Networks (4423 JP). After years of industry consolidation, which saw several stocks delist, this felt like a Christmas miracle (at least for those watching the sector’s stocks).
It would be hard to find two companies in the same industry that are so different – both in their business models as well as in how their IPOs were positioned to investors. One stock is 100 times larger than the other, but this is not a story of David and Goliath. It is two unique stories in parallel.
While each company took a very different approach to selling its stock, both have suffered from the subsequent broader market weakness, irrespective of company specifics. We can’t say it has been the worst of times, but it certainly has been a tough time with SoftBank Corp down 13% and Arteria down 20% from their IPO prices.
In this Insight we explore how each company approached its IPO and how each has fared since.
There are striking parallels between 1929 and 2018.
The 1929 crash put a halt to a nine-year bull run on the market.
Up until October 1929, same as this year, market consensus was that asset prices could only go up from their current level.
As we mentioned in When the Tide Goes Out, Dominoes Fall, a decade of building up excesses meant a painful burst, back 79 years ago: between October of 1929 and September of 1932, eighty-nine percent of the value of stocks was erased and the market didn’t recover to its former peak until 25 years later.
The key operational and strategic themes relevant to investors regarding the Big Three in Japan:
Saturation has encouraged the top three operators to take over the remaining smaller chains while pushing into regions where they have fewer stores.
All are expanding new forms of retail:
Seven Eleven and Lawson have launched new e-commerce ventures that make the best use of their existing store networks and could reach national coverage quite soon.
Diversification: Familymart, in particular, is tying with all manner of partners to try and come up with a hit hybrid format to find new growth.
While competition from drugstores and discount food retailers is a threat, convenience stores will continue to find new growth from e-commerce, hybrid stores and innovative products.
The year 2018 has proven tumultuous for global markets. Rapidly changing geopolitical priorities of the US, an erstwhile hegemon, have played a role no less significant than the withdrawal of liquidity by leading central banks or US monetary policy tightening. The US has openly declared that it is in a state of “cold war” with China. Despite the recent truce, signs are abundant that the confrontation between the two global superpowers will continue into 2019 and beyond. In 2019, we expect more countries to find themselves in a position where they must choose who they want to side with, the US or China. There are other tectonic shifts, too, which are causing re-alignment of global geopolitical alliances.
As the colder winter weather is felt and the icy blast of industry tariff cuts continues to chill sentiment, we seek some respite (at least mentally) in the warmer climes of Okinawa. Okinawa Cellular is a unique company. It’s a small cap telecom network operator in Japan with a focus on the sub-tropical islands of Okinawa Prefecture. As part of the KDDI group, the company benefits from its parent’s economies of scale, but with its local presence, it also benefits from being the hometown hero.
Because the stock is relatively small, from an investment perspective it runs into liquidity constraints that the other telcos do not have, so it’s a different type of investment but one that we think is worth looking at. Over the past 12 months Okinawa Cellular’s stock has fallen by 12.3%, but over the past year the stock has delivered a return in the middle of its peer group and has outperformed the broad TOPIX by about 5.5%. Like most telcos, Okinawa Cellular is also ramping its dividend payments, and the current yield is about 3.5%.
THE GMO INTERNET (9449 JP) STORY – GMO internet (GMO-i) has attracted much attention in the last eighteen months from an unusual trinity of value, activist and ‘cryptocurrency’ equity investors.
VALUE– Many traditional, but mostly foreign, value investors have seen the persistent negative difference between GMO-i’s market capitalisation and the value of the company’s holdings in its eight listed consolidated subsidiaries as an opportunity to invest in GMO-i with a considerable ‘margin of safety’.
ACTIVIST – Since July 2017, the activist investor, Oasis, has waged a so-far-unsuccessful campaign with the aim of improving GMO’s corporate governance, removing takeover defences, addressing a ‘secularly undervalued stock price we are not able to tolerate’ (sic), and redefining the role and influence of the company’s Chairman, President, Representative Director and largest shareholder, Masatoshi Kumagai.
‘CRYPTO!’ – In December 2017, GMO-i committed to spending more than ¥35b or 10% of non-current assets. The aim was threefold: to set up a bitcoin ‘mining’ headquarters in Switzerland (with the ‘mining’ operations being carried out at an undisclosed location in Scandinavia), to develop proprietary state-of-the-art 7nm-node ‘mining chips’, and, in due course, to sell GMO-branded and developed ‘mining’ machines. The move was hailed in the ‘crypto’ fraternity as GMO-i became the largest non-Chinese and the first well-established Internet conglomerate to make a major investment in ‘cryptocurrency’ infrastructure.
OUTSTANDING – Following the December 2017 announcement, trading volumes spiked into ‘Overtraded’ territory – as measured by our Volume Score. Many investors saw GMO-i shares as a safer way of gaining exposure to ‘cryptocurrencies’, even as the price of bitcoin began to subside. By early June 2018, GMO-i’s shares had reached a closing price of ¥3,020: up 157% from the low of the prior year and outperforming TOPIX by 135%. Whatever the primary driver of this outstanding performance, each of our trio of investor groups no doubt felt vindicated in their approach to the stock.
CRYPTO CLOSURE – On December 25th 2018, GMO-i’s shares reached a new 52-week low of ¥1,325, a decline of 56% from the June high. Year to date, GMO-i shares have now declined by 31%, underperforming TOPIX by nine percentage points. On the same day, GMO-i announced that the company would post an extraordinary ¥35.5b loss for the fourth quarter, incurring an impairment loss of ¥11.5b in relation to the closure of the Swiss ‘mining’ headquarters and a loss of ¥24b to cover the closure of the ‘mining chip’ and ‘mining machine’ development, manufacturing and sales businesses. GMO-i will continue to ‘mine’ bitcoin from its Tokyo headquarters and intends to relocate the ‘mining’ centre from Scandinavia to (sic) ‘a region that will allow us to secure cleaner and less expensive power supply, but we have not yet decided the details’. Unlisted subsidiary GMO Coin’s ‘cryptocurrency’ exchange will also continue to operate, and the previously-announced plans to launch a ¥-based ‘stablecoin’ in 2019 will proceed. In the two trading days following this announcement, the shares have recovered 13% to ¥1,505.
RAIDING THE LISTCO PIGGY BANK – As we shall relate, this is the second time since listing that GMO-i has written off a significant new business venture which the company had commenced only a short time before. In both cases, the company was forced to sell stakes in its listed consolidated subsidiaries to offset the resulting losses. On this occasion, the sale of shares in GMO Financial (7177 JP) (GMO-F) on September 25 2018, and GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP) (GMO-PG) on December 17 2018, raised a combined ¥55.6b and, after the deduction of the yet-to-be-determined tax on the realised gains, should more than offset the ‘crypto’ losses. According to CFO Yasuda, any surplus from this exercise will be used to pay down debt. Also discussed below and in keeping with this GMO-i ‘MO’, in 2015, the company twice sold shares in its listed subsidiaries to ‘smooth out’ less-than-desirable operating results.
In the DETAIL section below we will cover the following topics:-
I: THE GMO-i TRACK RECORD – TOP-DOWN v. BOTTOM UP
BOTTOM LINE No. 1: NET INCOME
BOTTOM LINE No.2 – COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
II: THE GMO-i BUSINESS MODEL – THROWING JELLY AT THE WALL
III: THE GMO-i BALANCE SHEET – NOT SO HAPPY RETURNS
IV: THE GMO-i CASH FLOW – DEBT-FUNDED CASH PILE
V: THE GMO-i VALUATION – TWO METHODS > SAME RESULT
VALUATION METHOD No.1 – THE ‘LISTCO DISCOUNT’
VALUATION METHOD No.2 – RESIDUAL INCOME
CONCLUSION – For those unable or unwilling to read further, we conclude that GMO-i ‘rump’ is a grossly-overrated business. Despite having started and spun off several valuable GMO Group entities, CEO Kumagai bears responsibility for two decades of serial and very poorly-timed ‘mal-investments’. As a result, the stock market has, except for the ‘cryptocurrency’-induced frenzy of the first six months of 2018, historically not accorded GMO-i any premium for future growth, and has correctly looked beyond the ‘siren song’ of the ‘HoldCo discount’. According to the two valuation methodologies described below, the company is, however, fairly valued at the current share price of ¥1,460. Investors looking for a return to the market-implied 3% perpetual growth rate of mid–2018 are likely to be as disappointed as those wishing for BTC to triple from here.
THE GMO INTERNET (9449 JP) STORY – GMO internet (GMO-i) has attracted much attention in the last eighteen months from an unusual trinity of value, activist and ‘cryptocurrency’ equity investors.
VALUE– Many traditional, but mostly foreign, value investors have seen the persistent negative difference between GMO-i’s market capitalisation and the value of the company’s holdings in its eight listed consolidated subsidiaries as an opportunity to invest in GMO-i with a considerable ‘margin of safety’.
ACTIVIST – Since July 2017, the activist investor, Oasis, has waged a so-far-unsuccessful campaign with the aim of improving GMO’s corporate governance, removing takeover defences, addressing a ‘secularly undervalued stock price we are not able to tolerate’ (sic), and redefining the role and influence of the company’s Chairman, President, Representative Director and largest shareholder, Masatoshi Kumagai.
‘CRYPTO!’ – In December 2017, GMO-i committed to spending more than ¥35b or 10% of non-current assets. The aim was threefold: to set up a bitcoin ‘mining’ headquarters in Switzerland (with the ‘mining’ operations being carried out at an undisclosed location in Scandinavia), to develop proprietary state-of-the-art 7nm-node ‘mining chips’, and, in due course, to sell GMO-branded and developed ‘mining’ machines. The move was hailed in the ‘crypto’ fraternity as GMO-i became the largest non-Chinese and the first well-established Internet conglomerate to make a major investment in ‘cryptocurrency’ infrastructure.
OUTSTANDING – Following the December 2017 announcement, trading volumes spiked into ‘Overtraded’ territory – as measured by our Volume Score. Many investors saw GMO-i shares as a safer way of gaining exposure to ‘cryptocurrencies’, even as the price of bitcoin began to subside. By early June 2018, GMO-i’s shares had reached a closing price of ¥3,020: up 157% from the low of the prior year and outperforming TOPIX by 135%. Whatever the primary driver of this outstanding performance, each of our trio of investor groups no doubt felt vindicated in their approach to the stock.
CRYPTO CLOSURE – On December 25th 2018, GMO-i’s shares reached a new 52-week low of ¥1,325, a decline of 56% from the June high. Year to date, GMO-i shares have now declined by 31%, underperforming TOPIX by nine percentage points. On the same day, GMO-i announced that the company would post an extraordinary ¥35.5b loss for the fourth quarter, incurring an impairment loss of ¥11.5b in relation to the closure of the Swiss ‘mining’ headquarters and a loss of ¥24b to cover the closure of the ‘mining chip’ and ‘mining machine’ development, manufacturing and sales businesses. GMO-i will continue to ‘mine’ bitcoin from its Tokyo headquarters and intends to relocate the ‘mining’ centre from Scandinavia to (sic) ‘a region that will allow us to secure cleaner and less expensive power supply, but we have not yet decided the details’. Unlisted subsidiary GMO Coin’s ‘cryptocurrency’ exchange will also continue to operate, and the previously-announced plans to launch a ¥-based ‘stablecoin’ in 2019 will proceed. In the two trading days following this announcement, the shares have recovered 13% to ¥1,505.
RAIDING THE LISTCO PIGGY BANK – As we shall relate, this is the second time since listing that GMO-i has written off a significant new business venture which the company had commenced only a short time before. In both cases, the company was forced to sell stakes in its listed consolidated subsidiaries to offset the resulting losses. On this occasion, the sale of shares in GMO Financial (7177 JP) (GMO-F) on September 25 2018, and GMO Payment Gateway (3769 JP) (GMO-PG) on December 17 2018, raised a combined ¥55.6b and, after the deduction of the yet-to-be-determined tax on the realised gains, should more than offset the ‘crypto’ losses. According to CFO Yasuda, any surplus from this exercise will be used to pay down debt. Also discussed below and in keeping with this GMO-i ‘MO’, in 2015, the company twice sold shares in its listed subsidiaries to ‘smooth out’ less-than-desirable operating results.
In the DETAIL section below we will cover the following topics:-
I: THE GMO-i TRACK RECORD – TOP-DOWN v. BOTTOM UP
BOTTOM LINE No. 1: NET INCOME
BOTTOM LINE No.2 – COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
II: THE GMO-i BUSINESS MODEL – THROWING JELLY AT THE WALL
III: THE GMO-i BALANCE SHEET – NOT SO HAPPY RETURNS
IV: THE GMO-i CASH FLOW – DEBT-FUNDED CASH PILE
V: THE GMO-i VALUATION – TWO METHODS > SAME RESULT
VALUATION METHOD No.1 – THE ‘LISTCO DISCOUNT’
VALUATION METHOD No.2 – RESIDUAL INCOME
CONCLUSION – For those unable or unwilling to read further, we conclude that GMO-i ‘rump’ is a grossly-overrated business. Despite having started and spun off several valuable GMO Group entities, CEO Kumagai bears responsibility for two decades of serial and very poorly-timed ‘mal-investments’. As a result, the stock market has, except for the ‘cryptocurrency’-induced frenzy of the first six months of 2018, historically not accorded GMO-i any premium for future growth, and has correctly looked beyond the ‘siren song’ of the ‘HoldCo discount’. According to the two valuation methodologies described below, the company is, however, fairly valued at the current share price of ¥1,460. Investors looking for a return to the market-implied 3% perpetual growth rate of mid–2018 are likely to be as disappointed as those wishing for BTC to triple from here.
Waymo CEO John Krafcik made some bold decisions after taking the helm at Alphabet‘s self-driving project in September 2015. Chief among them was the fact that the company abandon its plans for Level 3 automated driving and focus exclusively on levels 4 & 5. Furthermore, he decreed that Waymo would no longer manufacture its own vehicles but would instead integrate their technology into those of other automakers. Three years later, those decisions would appear to be finally paying off.
On October 10 2018, Waymo reached a significant milestone having completed 10 million self-driving miles across 25 cities in the US. While their first million self-driving miles took 18 months to complete, Waymo now clocks up over a million self-driving miles per month. The company also recently announced the launch of its robo taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona and looks set to quickly follow suit in California. Plans to extend its self-driving technology beyond robotaxis, most notably for trucks and last-mile transportation solutions are also in the works. Furthermore, the company has begun laying down a framework of innovative B2B revenue models which should help accelerate the speed with which they can eventually monetize their technology.
It hasn’t been smooth sailing all the way for Waymo however. Earlier this year, the company was derided for the driving style of its autonomous vehicles and faced the criticism that its driverless cars continue to have safety drivers. There was also an embarrassing incident where one of those very safety drivers caused the self-driving car he was monitoring to hit a motorcyclist when he attempted to take control of the vehicle. According to Waymo’s own analysis of the vehicle log files, the accident would not have happened had he not intervened.
With ten million self-driving miles under their belt and a thoughtful, strategic approach to monetizing their technology beginning to emerge, Waymo remains firmly ahead of their peers in leading the autonomous driving charge.
Our review of ten Asian gaming companies forward prospects for 2019 yielded our top five picks. Two of those comprise this insight. Three more will follow in Part Two. There is, in our opinion, some disconnect between continuing macro headwinds in both the VIP and mass sectors and a more bullish tone based on a recent upside trend in Macau, strong results in the Philippines and Cambodia. Given the battering of the market in general, the already 8 month old bearish tone to the sector and the current pricing of the two stocks noted here, we see significant upside opportunity as we near the beginning of 2019.
During the second half of December 2018, Japan saw two telecom companies list on the Tokyo Stock Exchange: Softbank Corp (9434 JP) and ARTERIA Networks (4423 JP). After years of industry consolidation, which saw several stocks delist, this felt like a Christmas miracle (at least for those watching the sector’s stocks).
It would be hard to find two companies in the same industry that are so different – both in their business models as well as in how their IPOs were positioned to investors. One stock is 100 times larger than the other, but this is not a story of David and Goliath. It is two unique stories in parallel.
While each company took a very different approach to selling its stock, both have suffered from the subsequent broader market weakness, irrespective of company specifics. We can’t say it has been the worst of times, but it certainly has been a tough time with SoftBank Corp down 13% and Arteria down 20% from their IPO prices.
In this Insight we explore how each company approached its IPO and how each has fared since.
There are striking parallels between 1929 and 2018.
The 1929 crash put a halt to a nine-year bull run on the market.
Up until October 1929, same as this year, market consensus was that asset prices could only go up from their current level.
As we mentioned in When the Tide Goes Out, Dominoes Fall, a decade of building up excesses meant a painful burst, back 79 years ago: between October of 1929 and September of 1932, eighty-nine percent of the value of stocks was erased and the market didn’t recover to its former peak until 25 years later.
Softbank Group (9984 JP)’s market cap has consistently traded below its NAV. A popular expectation was that the Softbank Corp (9434 JP) IPO should be a catalyst to narrow the conglomerate discount (holdco discount). On its trading debut today, SoftBank Corp’s shares fell 14.5% from its IPO price of JPY1,500 to JPY1,282 per share – the worst first-day decline ever for a major IPO in Japan since the Japan Display (6740 JP) IPO in 2014.
In our previous research, we stated that the SoftBank Corp IPO is unlikely to meaningfully narrow SoftBank’s holdco discount. Our updated SoftBank SoTP analysis which reflects SoftBank Corp’s trading debut suggests that SoftBank’s holdco discount has not meaningfully narrowed.
SEMI, the global industry association serving the manufacturing supply chain for the electronics industry, published three different forecasts for wafer fab equipment (WFE) sales in the past week. While the forecasts differ in approach and detail, they all agree on one thing, WFE revenues are continuing to fall and the outlook for 2019 is sharply down on previous estimates.
Specifically, Q4 2018 WFE revenues are set to decline 20.8% or $3.3 billion QoQ and the forecast which had just six months ago predicted 7% growth in 2019 is now calling for an 8% decline next year.
These latest forecasts cast a dark shadow over the predictions of the leading WFE manufacturers that H1 2019 would be stronger than H2 2018 and we anticipate a strong downward revision of forward guidance in the upcoming earnings season.
There may be a glimmer of hope on the horizon however as SEMI forecasts a strong rebound in the second half of 2019 leading to a return to growth of ~20% in 2020. Let’s see.
Event – Bristol Myers Squibb Co (BMY US)‘s French OTC business UPSA has been on the block since June 2018. According to a December 17, 2018 Bloomberg report (link), Taisho has emerged as the frontrunner to acquire UPSA for ~$1.6b
Our Take
If Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdin (4581 JP) indeed goes ahead, it would get access to UPSA’s established (matured) OTC business, which generated ~$480m in sales in FY17
UPSC’s key OTC brands include Aspirine, Dafalgan and Efferalgan pain relievers; Donormyl sleep aid; and Fervex cold and flu remedies
Taisho also gains a foothold in France, contributing ~60% of UPSA sales (the rest is from other EU countries and China), by leveraging UPSA’s production facilities and distribution channels to perhaps market some of its own OTC products
Valuation
Preliminary analysis suggests that the potential acquisition would have only a marginal impact on Taisho’s financials in the short to medium term due to:
Acquisition of a matured OTC portfolio that is projected to decline by 3-5% per year
Absence of cost synergies; Taisho’s SG&A expense to increase by ~¥12-15b from FY19e
Post deal Cash and Eq. of ~ $1b (assuming UPSA is an all cash deal)
Net, net we would maintain our EW rating and Fair Value estimate of ¥11,300 / share.
The key operational and strategic themes relevant to investors in CVS in Japan:
The Japanese convenience store sector may have reached saturation but this has just encouraged the top three operators to speed up their quest to take over the remaining smaller chains while pushing into regions where they have fewer stores.
At the same time, all are looking at new forms of retailing to expand further:
All of the top three had previously failed to come up with coherent e-commerce strategies, but this year Seven Eleven and Lawson have launched new ideas that make better use of their existing store networks and could reach national coverage quite soon.
Diversification is another strategy to overcome saturation, and Familymart, in particular, is tying with all manner of partners to try and come up with a hit hybrid format to find new growth.
While competition from drugstores and discount food retailers is a threat, convenience stores will continue to find new sources of growth from e-commerce, hybrid stores and innovative products.
With the FTSE ST REIT index’s decline of 9.3% year-to-date, value has emerged for some of the bellwether names in the Singapore REITs sector. The forward yield spread between these REITs and the Singapore government 10-year bond yield (2.13%) currently stand at least 390 basis points. In view of the increasing concerns over global economic growth, rising interest rates and the ongoing trade tension between the US and China, I present three quality REITs with fortified portfolios that are well-positioned to weather the near-term market uncertainties. They possess growth potential from acquisitions, positive rental reversions and deliver resilient forward distribution yield of more than 6%. Some of the bellwether names in the more resilient retail REIT sector, while offering lower yield of around 5.0% – 5.7%, are also in my buy list.
After months of skirting around inventory build-up and a weakening demand outlook, Micron used their latest earnings report to call closing time on a revenue and profitability party that began in Q4 2016 and just got better and better with each passing quarter.
Micron reported Q1 FY2019 results on December 18’th and while revenues were largely in line with recently lowered guidance from the company, their outlook for both Q2 and 2019 as a whole was worse than even the most bearish of expectations.
Citing high inventory levels at key customers, Micron guided Q2 FY2019 revenues for $6 billion at the midpoint, down a staggering $1.9 billion, 24% QoQ and 18% YoY. At the same time, Micron revised down their CY2019 bit demand growth forecast for both DRAM (from 20% to 16%) and NAND (35%, the bottom of the previously forecasted range). The company plans to adjust both CapEx and bit supply output downwards to match.
In the wake of their guidance bombshell, Micron’s share price closed down almost 8% the following day to end the session at $31.41, a level last seen in August 2017. Micron is unique in reporting out of sync with its industry peers, making it the proverbial canary in a coal mine. The company’s gloomy outlook and clarion call for further CapEx reductions in a bid to rebalance supply and demand spells troubled times ahead for an already beleaguered semiconductor segment ahead of the upcoming earnings season.
TRADING ZONE – As of last Friday, the Japan All Market Composite has now entered a bear market, having declined by 20% from the January 23rd high if Y757t. At the close, only 8% by number and 11% by value of Japanese stocks were trading above their weighted composite of 5, 20, 60, 120, and 240-day moving averages. These were the lowest closing values since February 2016 when the All Market Composite reached a low of Y475tand offer an entry point for a short-term trade for those happy to hold over the extended New Year Holiday period.
Source: Japan Analytics
BREAKOUTS – The ‘Breaking Bad’ percentage reached 11% on December 4th, the tenth-lowest reading in three years bu thas yet to fall below ‘-15-. Adding the Breaking Above and Breaking Below percentages together provides a more straightforward view of the 15% threshold that has marked previous short and medium-term turning points, and which again we have yet to reach.
SECTORS
LEGEND: The ‘sparklines’ show the three-year trend in the weighted percentage above moving average relative to the Market Composite and the ‘STDev’ column is a measure of the variability of that relative measure. The table also provides averages for the breaks above and breaks below and the positive and negative ‘crossovers’.
SECTOR BREAKDOWN – The top six sectors measured by the percentage above the weighted average of 5-240 Days are all, predictably, domestic and defensive – Food, Beverages & Tobacco, REITs, Information Technology, Internet, Media and Utilities. Equally predictable are the bottom half-dozen – Banks, Non-Bank Finance, Autos, Metals, Electrical Equipment and Chemicals.
COMPANIES
COMPANY MOVING AVERAGE OUTLIERS – As with the market and sectors, out moving average outlier indicator uses a weighted sum of the share price relative to its 5-day, 20-day, 60-day, 120 day and 240-day moving averages. Extreme values are weighted sums greater than 100% and less than -100%. We would caution that this indicator is best used for timing shorter-term reversals and, in many cases, higher highs and lower lows will be seen.
Source: Japan Analytics
THE 100% CLUB – As of Friday 21st, there were 16 extreme positive outliers and 622 extreme negative outliers. The number of extreme negative outliers suggests we are a short-term bottom.
In the DETAIL section below, we highlight the current top and bottom twenty-five larger capitalisation outliers as well as those companies that have seen the most significant positive and negative changes in their outlier percentage in the last two weeks and provide short comments on companies of particular note.
Horiba combines high gearing to semiconductor capital spending with a large and growing automotive test business characterized by upward trending but uneven profitability. At ¥4,545 (Friday, December 21, closing price), its share price has dropped by 53% from an all-time high of ¥9,590 reached last May. Falling demand for semiconductor production equipment and a downward revision to FY Dec-18 sales and profit guidance announced in November appear to be largely in the price.
The downward revision, which cut projected full-year operating profit growth from 15.5% to 2.5%, followed a 22.2% year-on-year decline in operating profit in 3Q and implies a similar rate of decline in 4Q. The weakness is concentrated in Semiconductor Equipment and Automotive Test, the former due to a cyclical downturn in overall demand, the latter due to M&A-related and other one-time expenses. New Automotive Test orders continued to outpace sales, leading to a 9.5% increase in the order backlog during 3Q.
Automotive Test sales and profits should rise next year, while semiconductor equipment sales and profits seem likely to bottom out. In a report issued on December 17, SEMI (the semiconductor equipment and materials industry organization) forecasts a further decline in wafer fab equipment sales in 1H of 2019, followed by recovery in 2H. Other industry sources we talked to before the report was issued had similar views.
This scenario could fall apart due to general economic weakness, American attempts to stifle China’s semiconductor industry, or both. On December 21, Reuters reported that Foxconn “…is in the final stages of talks with the local government of the Chinese city of Zhuhai to build a chip plant there with a total investment of about $9 billion… most of which would be shouldered by the Zhuhai government through subsidies and tax breaks…” This looks like a perfect target for the Americans, but whether or not they will notice or care remains to be seen.
Horiba is now selling at 9.6x our EPS estimate for this fiscal year, 13.4x our estimate for next year and 12.1x our estimate for FY Dec-20. These and other projected valuations are near the bottom of their 5-year historical ranges. If the Semiconductor Equipment division does not recover in 2H of 2019, historical data suggest that its operating profit could drop by 70% rather than the 47% we are now forecasting, resulting in a P/E ratio of 17x. Nevertheless, it is time to start considering when and at what price to buy Horiba.
Horiba is a diversified Japanese maker of precision and analytical devices and systems with a significant presence in the global markets for automotive test, industrial process and environmental analysis, hematology, semiconductor production equipment and scientific instruments. It is by far the world’s leading producer of automotive emission measurement systems (EMS), having supplied about 80% of the installed base worldwide, and also the world’s top manufacturer of mass flow controllers for the semiconductor industry, with an estimated global market share of nearly 60%.
Our review of ten Asian gaming companies forward prospects for 2019 yielded our top five picks. Two of those comprise this insight. Three more will follow in Part Two. There is, in our opinion, some disconnect between continuing macro headwinds in both the VIP and mass sectors and a more bullish tone based on a recent upside trend in Macau, strong results in the Philippines and Cambodia. Given the battering of the market in general, the already 8 month old bearish tone to the sector and the current pricing of the two stocks noted here, we see significant upside opportunity as we near the beginning of 2019.
During the second half of December 2018, Japan saw two telecom companies list on the Tokyo Stock Exchange: Softbank Corp (9434 JP) and ARTERIA Networks (4423 JP). After years of industry consolidation, which saw several stocks delist, this felt like a Christmas miracle (at least for those watching the sector’s stocks).
It would be hard to find two companies in the same industry that are so different – both in their business models as well as in how their IPOs were positioned to investors. One stock is 100 times larger than the other, but this is not a story of David and Goliath. It is two unique stories in parallel.
While each company took a very different approach to selling its stock, both have suffered from the subsequent broader market weakness, irrespective of company specifics. We can’t say it has been the worst of times, but it certainly has been a tough time with SoftBank Corp down 13% and Arteria down 20% from their IPO prices.
In this Insight we explore how each company approached its IPO and how each has fared since.
There are striking parallels between 1929 and 2018.
The 1929 crash put a halt to a nine-year bull run on the market.
Up until October 1929, same as this year, market consensus was that asset prices could only go up from their current level.
As we mentioned in When the Tide Goes Out, Dominoes Fall, a decade of building up excesses meant a painful burst, back 79 years ago: between October of 1929 and September of 1932, eighty-nine percent of the value of stocks was erased and the market didn’t recover to its former peak until 25 years later.
The key operational and strategic themes relevant to investors regarding the Big Three in Japan:
Saturation has encouraged the top three operators to take over the remaining smaller chains while pushing into regions where they have fewer stores.
All are expanding new forms of retail:
Seven Eleven and Lawson have launched new e-commerce ventures that make the best use of their existing store networks and could reach national coverage quite soon.
Diversification: Familymart, in particular, is tying with all manner of partners to try and come up with a hit hybrid format to find new growth.
While competition from drugstores and discount food retailers is a threat, convenience stores will continue to find new growth from e-commerce, hybrid stores and innovative products.
Recapping the original plan: when Familymart Uny Holdings (8028 JP)(“FM”) sold the remaining 60% of UNY to Don Quijote Holdings (7532 JP) (DQ), it entered into an agreement to buy 20+% in DQ, for one of two reasons; 1) a company wants to prove to the employees of a division being sold that they are maintaining a watchful eye over them, or (as is now evident) 2) the buyer wants to gain an equity method affiliate and the income from it (including the placeholder for frontrunner status to future capital events).
FM launched a Partial Tender Offer at a 20% premium to last in order to buy these shares, and in the MOU to launch the tender offer there was a clause which said that if FM did not reach the full 20%, it had made arrangements to borrow shares in order to get to 20% of the voting rights. And if FM did not manage to get to the full 20%, there was an agreement between DQ which allowed FM to buy shares in the market to get to a 20% (but not larger) position.
If FM managed to get the shares, it was going to buy from the weak hands. Growth stock managers don’t like selling growth stocks until the growth stops growing. DQ is still growing, and with UNY, DQ may grow faster than previously expected. The upshot is that everyone decided they’d stand pat – FM got nothing in the tender (0.08% of the total desired).
Shares in DQ could fall because of a lack of hard strategy announced by FM to buy all the shares at a higher price immediately. That shouldn’t be a big worry – it wasn’t going to happen.
Travis Lundy sees DQ having a performance skew which includes a “cushion of sorts” in the ¥5500-6600/share zone where he would expect FM to acquire shares. He does not see a cushion for the shares of FM, and expects them to be volatile.
It is possible this suspension is not in relation to a takeover, but a major sale of assets, for example, from the parent to the sub. This would make sense given the recent share purchase by HEC (completed in January this year), and the fact HE is playing catch-up to Dongfang Electric Corporation (1072 HK)& Shanghai Electric Group Company (2727 HK). Arguably, launching a takeover shortly after subscribing for more shares is unusual. Then again, when the two SOE railway behemoths CNR and CSR merged in 2015, a merger was disputed (at the time) when both were suspended on account of the fact CNR was only listed (on the HK exchange) in 2Q14.
HE has perennially traded at discount to net cash. As at its last traded price, the discount to net cash (using the 2018 interim figure of HK$12.4bn, or HK$7.27/share) was 65%.
“Fair” pricing to me would be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on PER. I simply don’t see this happening. And if it doesn’t, the fiduciary duty of independent directors will be tested/scrutinised if they recommend an offer to shareholders at any price less than the net cash/share of the company.
Reportedly Motherson has entered merger/acquisition talks withLeoni AG (LEO GR), a leading provider of cables and cable systems for the automotive sector and other industries. Motherson has made four acquisitions so far in this business segment with the latest being PKC in 2017.
Motherson has always aimed at strengthening this business area internationally, therefore the news about a merger with Leoni comes as no surprise and was mentioned as a potential acquisition target in LightStream Research‘s earlier insight Two More Acquisitions on the Way for Motherson Sumi.
Motherson has a strong balance sheet that could support this acquisition, although its ability to make further acquisitions in the short-to-medium term may be hampered – Leoni would be at the higher end of the price range for recent acquisitions. Should the acquisition go through, the company will be very well positioned to reach its US$18bn revenue target by 2020E, given that the combined revenue for FY2017 alone is ~US$13bn.
Currently, Motherson is trading at an FY1 EV/EBITDA of 10x, slightly above peers such as Mahindra Cie Automotive (MACA IN)(9x) and below peers such as Bosch Ltd (BOS IN) (25x). If the deal goes through, Motherson’s FY1 EV/EBITDA of ~12x would be at a slight premium to local players, but still reasonable compared to international players.
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts reduced its indicative offer to $3.40 from $3.77 on Thursday after sifting through MYOB’s books, with MYOB announcing:
Following completion of due diligence and finalisation of debt funding commitments, KKR has revised the offer price to $3.40 per share. … The board has informed KKR that it is not in a position to recommend the revised proposal, however it remains in discussions with KKR regarding its proposal. (my emphasis)
KKR’s revised non-binding proposal expired at 5pm on Friday, which came and went without any ASX announcement. Presumably, an announcement will be made before the market opens tomorrow (rendering this commentary redundant) with either MYOB grudgingly accepting the lower offer, or MYOB rejecting and KKR walking away (for now), or going hostile.
The Nikkei carried an article noting that the Japanese government’s FY2019 budget currently being formed proposes a sale of ¥160bn of shares in NTT to help fund any revenue impact from the upcoming consumption tax rate hike from 8% to 10% next October. The article helpfully notes that they plan on selling when NTT is buying back shares. One of the longstanding features of buybacks for NTT is that NTT is subject to the NTT Law which requires (for the moment) that the government hold at least one-third of the shares outstanding in NTT.
Travis estimates NTT has ~1.95bn shares outstanding, or ~1.917bn shares outstanding ex-Treasury shares, after recent buybacks. If NTT cancelled the shares it has bought back prior to buying back shares from the government, this would allow NTT to buy back 59mm shares from the government (assuming those shares are also cancelled). If it did not, it would mean NTT could only buy back about 42-43mm shares. 59mm shares backs out ¥250bn; 43mm shares at a 10% discount would be ¥180bn. That means there is about 10% leeway in stock price to buy ¥160bn from the government IF shares repurchased under the current buyback are not cancelled.
But that also means that there would be no more buybacks from the government after that until the company buys back more shares from the market. If the company wanted to buy back another ¥200bn from the government, ceteris paribus it would have to buy back something like ¥400-450bn first from the market in order to reduce the denominator. Travis concludes there is still more on-market buying to do.
At an NTT/ NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP) ratio of 1.80x, buybacks coming, expected ongoing strong dividend policy (and lots of headroom to do so, unlike perhaps Softbank Corp (9434 JP)), and investor suspicion of what comes next for Docomo, NTT is the home of the cashflow.
The IPO of Softbank Corp and the Merger of Takeda and Shire Pharmaceuticals create significant changes in TOPIX, MSCI, and FTSE because of the addition of roughly ¥5tn of “new” market capitalization in major Japan indices. Pure passive investors have something like ¥1.35tn of Softbank Corp and Takeda Pharmaceutical to buy.
However, after Travis’ initial note (Softbank Corp, Takeda, and Newton’s Three Laws of Motion), TSE unhelpfully changed their mind on timing (for Takeda) based on an unhelpful change by the LSE. With the changes at FTSE and now TOPIX and JPX Nikkei 400, we no longer have quite the same clarity of forces on the bodies, and therefore less clarity on the resulting motion. The LSE’s announced market change appears to have led the MSCI to change its deletion date for Shire as well, now also (along with FTSE) deleting Shire at the close of the 21st. The new schedule is:
Index Deletion
Shire (shs mm)
Index Inclusion
Takeda (shs mm)
Index Effect (US$ bn)
Net Delta (US$bn)
21 Dec
MSCI
-50
MSCI JP
+75
– $0.3bn
+$1.3bn
21 Dec
FTSE UK, All-Share,
-100-130
FTSE JP
+15
-$5.2bn+
– $2.1bn
rest of December – end of a pretty bad year for hedge funds, but illiquid
all of January
30 Jan
TOPIX
-$1.9bn
TOPIX, JPXN400
+60
+$2.1bn
+$2.1bn
30 Jan
TOPIX
-$3.5bn
TOPIX
Softbank
+$3.5bn
+$3.5bn
all of February
27 Feb
TOPIX, JPXN400
+60
+$2.1bn
+$2.1bn
It doesn’t change the amounts but a lot more time allows for more risk and preparation and there will no longer be any potential settlement issues on the TOPIX side. There is still the same amount of Takeda to buy in TOPIX and JPX Nikkei 400.
In principle, Travis would want to be long Takeda at the close of the year of 2018, but given the LSE and TSE changes there is less support to give and the payoff is substantially more distant.
Speciality steel maker Nisshin Steel (5413 JP)is slated to merge with parent company Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal (5401 JP)as of January 1, 2019. For that, Nisshin Steel will be delisted on December 26th (i.e. the last day of trading is the 25th) and that means the Nikkei Inc was obliged to choose a replacement for Nisshin Steel in the Nikkei 225 and other indices. On December 11th, the Nikkei Inc announcedItoham Yonekyu Holdings Inc (2296 JP) would take Nisshin’s place in the Nikkei 500 Index; announced that Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) would join the Nikkei 300 Index; and announced thatDic Corp (4631 JP)would replace Nisshin Steel in the Nikkei Stock Average, better known as the Nikkei 225.
Nisshin Steel’s deletion is a nothing-burger.
The possibility of a DIC addition was well-flagged as early as May when sell-side brokers started compiling Annual and Ad Hoc Review lists for the Nikkei 225 changes to come in September and as a result of the Nisshin Steel merger. Travis would rather be long DIC than short DIC through the close of December 21st or probably December 25th.
YP appeared “cheap” back in April when I last discussed this Holdco, and is now cheaper, with its holding in KZ accounting for near-on 200% of its market cap. I can’t think of any other parent/subsidiary relationship – one which is essentially a single stock structure – with such a deep discount. Especially one where the stub ops operate in a similar space to that of the listed holding.
On the negative front, an investigation into YP’s Seokpo zinc smelter remains ongoing on account of perceived environmental transgressions. The Seokpo smelter is located in a national park on the Nakdong river. Wastewater containing above-legal limits of certain chemicals (fluoride and selenium) allegedly flowed downstream to residents, who are heavily reliant on this water.
YP’s stub and KZ are in the same business, but there are differences. YP does not have a balanced product mix as KZ does, with around 84% of its revenue coming from zinc-related production (for the 9M18 period), compared to 42.5% (on a revenue basis) for KZ, followed by lead (20.4%), silver (20.2%), and gold (7.6%).
However, YP and KZ remain inextricably intertwined and the current discount is unjustifiably steep. Just that YP’s liquidity, uncertainty on Seokpo, and lack of a near-term catalyst make for a difficult stub set-up.
A forgettable trading debut for Japan’s largest-ever IPO, with Softbank Corp,closing at ¥1,282/share, down from the IPO price of ¥1,500, and closing at ¥1,316/share on Friday, the same day as its FTSE inclusion.
At around 22% of NAV and 16% of GAV – by my calcs – Corp is a material % of Softbank Group (9984 JP). However as repeatedly seen when a conglomerate adds yet another listco to its stable (in Hong Kong, Wheelock & (20 HK)and Great Eagle Holdings (41 HK) spring to mind), a sustained narrowing in the holdco discount is often not the end result. Nor should it be. Softbank is effectively swapping shares for cash.
With seven stocks promoted/reassigned from TSE2, MOTHERS, and JASDAQ in November 2018 leading to the same seven stocks being included in TOPIX at the end of December, Travis tested 340+ TOPIX inclusions over the past five years to see what really happens around TOPIX inclusions?
If you own all but the smallest stocks (with a market cap of less than ¥15bn), odds are that, ON AVERAGE, they will underperform TOPIX from inclusion date or the day after, for many months.
The larger the market cap, the more marked the AVERAGE underperformance immediately following inclusion.
For names in the ¥25-50bn sweet spot of “large enough to be “small cap” with somebody paying attention to it”, outperformance vs underperformance in the next 10 days is a 47/53 proposition. That is a bigger risk. It may be data-idiosyncratic, but it is not clear.
In the case of the 7 names going into TOPIX at month-end this month, the averages would suggest one could still be long the four largest (at the time of Travis’ insight), but one would not want to be long the others; and one could sell long positions in all the names as of the close of the 27th or 28th and have it be an ex-ante expected net positive outcome vs TOPIX over the following 10-60 trading days.
CJ Corp (001040 KS) announced both Common and Pref will get 0.15 class B pref shares for each share they already own. This new class B pref is convertible to Common with a 10-year duration, and it provides an extra 2% of the face value to what Common gets. Price ratio wise, 1P is currently close to the 2Y mean. This stock dividend should push 1P up, as should CJ’s announcement it would pay a cash dividend. The current div yield difference is a historic high at 1.53%. (link to Sanghyun Park ‘s insight: CJ Corp Share Class: Huge Net Gain Difference Between Common & Pref from Stock Dividend)
LCY Chemical Corp (1704 TT). MOEA (Ministry of Economic Affairs) approval has now been received and LCY has applied for the delisting from the TWSE. The last trading day is the 23 Jan 2019 and the stock delists on the 30 Jan. The settlement is expected to take place mid-Feb.
Healthscope Ltd (HSO AU). In an ASX announcement on Friday Brookfield said: “based on its enquiries and financing discussions to date, it has no reason to believe it will not be willing and able to proceed with the proposal“. The exclusivity provisions have been extended to 18 January. Separately, Healthscope has also received correspondence from the BGH-AustralianSuper Consortium that it has indicated it is able to commence due diligence immediately. HSO’s board stated it will consider the correspondence. These are both positive developments.
CCASS
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
The Japanese government recently announced its decision to initiate an ad-hoc price reduction of ~4.35%, to be levied in October 2019, this will be in addition to the scheduled biennial price revisions (source).
The October 2019 scheduled price cuts will have nominal overall impact; however, we highlight a few companies that are relatively more vulnerable to ongoing price reforms.
Mitsubishi Tanabe, Taisho, Santen, Kaken, Kyorin and Kissei generate >50% of revenue from the domestic market and are projected to continue to do so over next 3-5 years.
Furthermore, the contribution from long listed (LL) drugs is much higher for the above-mentioned companies, which makes them relatively vulnerable to ongoing price reforms (price cuts for LL drugs are much higher than the average).
On the other hand, Ono, KHK and Nippon Shinyaku, despite a high proportion of domestic revenue (as a % of total revenue), have only limited contribution from LL drugs.
Ono’s Opdivo, however, will continue to face market expansion led special price cuts going forward.
Source: Company data, Pathology Associates research
* Companies with financial year ending December, Taisho domestic pharma includes OTC sales, N Kayaku domestic pharma sales includes Generics and Biosimilar sales
Japanese policymakers are panicking. Economic activity contracted in 3Q. Inflation is slowing, up 0.8% YoY in December vs 1.4% YoY previously. Exports are flat lining. Unsurprisingly the BoJ left monetary policy unchanged this month while Abe’s cabinet, taking no chances approved a record initial budget for fiscal 2019 this week. We see few real signs of the economy slowing yet though. We remain overweight Japanese equities and are forecasting 1% nominal GDP growth in 2019, the same as the first three quarters of 2018.
After the market action on Thursday, this Insight provides a brief rundown of the technical position of our Japan Market Composite. I would categorise the current state of play as ‘The End of the Beginning’ and, despite the potential of short-term rallies, would still advise caution for the first quarter as the impact of the slowdown in global trade feeds through into earnings.
In October, the Nikkei leaked and Familymart Uny Holdings (8028 JP) immediately thereafter announced that Familymart would sell the rest of its GMS (and financing) subsidiary UNY to Don Quijote Holdings (7532 JP) (which bought 40% of the company in 2017) and would conduct a Tender Offer later in 2018 at a 20% premium to the then-current price to buy a stake in Don Quijote of just over 20%. The Tender Offer was announced November 6th. Familymart had arranged to borrow shares it did not manage to buy in the tender so that at the next record date it will have 20% of the voting rights by hook or by crook.
Don Quijote shares jumped to the Tender Offer price the same day and then spent a day there before investors decided that the news and structure of the deal was better news for Don Quijote than Familymart had priced in.
Results of the Tender Offer have just been announced. Familymart had been trying to buy 32,108,700 shares for JPY 212 billion. They just missed. They got 0.08% of the total desired, or 24,721 shares for just over JPY 163 million.
THEY GOT NOTHING.
I expect Familymart had zero idea this would happen. I expect their bankers are surprised as well. They should not have been. They analysed this badly. There was a decent chance they would find it difficult to dislodge shares from owners.
“I couldn’t think of selling that stock.” “You couldn’t?” asked Elmer, beginning to look doubtful himself. It is a habit with most tip givers to be tip takers. “Why not?” And Elmer drew nearer. “Why, this is a bull market!” The old fellow said it as though he had given a long and detailed explanation.
Growth stock managers don’t like selling growth stocks until the growth stops growing. Don Quijote is still growing. And with UNY, Don Quijote may grow faster than previously expected.
The announcement at the end of the Tender Offer Results announcement is also VERY telling. There was a plan to make Don Quijote an equity-method affiliate by buying in the Tender Offer, buying in the market, or borrowing lots of shares. There was a plan for Familymart to appoint directors to DQ.
There was a clearly-available trading strategy based on that.
The new announcement puts that strategy into question. And Mr. Partridge might not be so inclined to call it a bull market. Since the launch of the deal, the markets have started the trip to Gehenna in a trug. From the one-month average prior to the Familymart bid news, Don Quijote is up 25%. Familymart is up 40%, the Nikkei 225 is down 10.7%, the TOPIX retail sector is down 5.5% but Familymart and Don Quijote have influenced that performance (without those two names, average performance is worse).
We looked back and identified which factors drove the Japanese market in 2018. We found that Value, which is historically strong in Japan, did poorly and really the only investment styles/factors that did well were large-cap and names with a high percent of retail investors.
We’ve reviewed 10 companies in the sector. Of those, three are the consensus favorites of our Tokyo based panel of industry, financial and economics observers of the IR initiative over many years.
Based on pachinko alone, the stocks of these companies are fully valued. Based on potential tailwind from a license award within 6 months, they could be vastly undervalued.
Each of the three noted here brings strength to a bid less based on financials than corporate focus, outlook and experience in the field.
With U.S. markets stumbling, the MSCI ACWI index is breaking down to new lows: defensive Sectors remain attractive. Relative to MSCI ACWI however, emerging markets are the place to be.China, Brazil, Hungary, Qatar, India, Poland, and Indonesia all display positive price and/or RS trends. In this report we recap technical important levels on all major indexes and highlight attractive stocks within Real Estate, Health Care/Pharma, Precious Metals Mining, and Utilities.
