In this version of the GER weekly research wrap, we dig into the debt tender for Softbank Group (9984 JP) and assess the merger between TPG Telecom Ltd (TPM AU) and VHA. On the IPO front, we initiate on CStone Pharma (CSTONE HK) while we update on Ebang (EBANG HK) . Finally, we dig into the beat at Facebook Inc A (FB US) and assess whether there are further legs for the investment case. We also provide a list of upcoming catalysts for upcoming event-driven ideas.
More details can be found below.
Best of luck for the new week – Rickin, Venkat and Arun
We look at the main topics of interest that came out of the results so far and what this means for the oil and gas sector. The areas in focus were the strong cash flow generation and capex plans, reserve replacement, new LNG projects, IMO impact for the refining sector and digitalisation. The upstream areas that got the most focus were the US onshore (specifically the Permian), US Gulf of Mexico, Guyana, Brazil and Venezuela. This follows on from our note 2019 Energy Market Themes & Stocks with Exposure: Focus on Oil, Refining, LNG, M&A & Renewables.
Results for the nine months to end-December 2018, reported on 31 January 2019 by Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP), or MHFG for short, reveal the continuing pressure on management to stabilize revenues and profitability. MHFG reported consolidated recurring profits for the nine months to end-December 2018 of ¥547.56 billion (down 15.0% YoY) and net profits of ¥409.92 billion (down 13.8% YoY) on higher revenues of ¥2.858 trillion (+6.9% YoY). Core earnings dropped into the red as net interest and fee income is now insufficient to cover overhead expenses, while the group is running out of surplus loan-loss reserves to write back to profit to keep the megabank in the black. On a quarterly basis, results were much worse: 3QFY3/2019 was the worst quarterly performance reported by the megabank group since 2Q FY3/2014, with recurring profits falling 62.2% YoY to ¥80.64 billion while net profits fell 68.2% to just ¥50.56 billion.
Mizuho, which significantly outperformed both of its rival megabanks Mitsubishi Ufj Financial Group (8306 JP) and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP) in share price performance terms throughout CY2018 (largely through having lower foreign ownership than the other two), is nominally the cheapest of the three megabanks on standard valuation methods; however, the difference between all three at present is marginal. We expect that all three megabank groups will continue to see further downward pressure on domestic margins, while their overseas operations (especially in Asia) remain vulnerable to any further increases in US$ interest rates. In the absence of any significant catalysts to prompt foreign investors to actively buy the shares, we expect all three megabanks to disappoint in terms of share price performance in CY2019.
Consolidated results for the nine months to end-December 2018, announced by SMFG (8306 JP) on 31 January 2019, represented 91% of management’s full-year target of ¥700 billion for consolidated net profits. Nevertheless, 3Q results (October-December 2018) were well down year-on-year, with rising funding costs and higher credit costs offsetting much of the positives from the earlier deconsolidation of its two retail banking subsidiaries. Full-year guidance remains unchanged. SMFG is now poised to exceed its ¥700 billion FY3/2019 consolidated net profit target, although probably not by much.
The megabanks are always a ‘crowded trade’ for foreign investors when it comes to exposure to the Japanese banking sector: the choice usually coming down to either MUFG or SMFG. Mizuho, which significantly outperformed both MUFG and SMFG throughout CY2018, is nominally the cheapest of the three megabanks on standard valuation methods; however, the difference between all three at present is marginal. We expect that all three megabank groups will continue to see further downward pressure on domestic margins, while their overseas operations (especially in Asia) remain vulnerable to any further increases in US$ interest rates. In the absence of any significant catalysts to prompt foreign investors to actively buy the shares, we expect all three megabanks to disappoint in terms of share price performance in CY2019.
Note: The Results & Revision Score is the average of our Results Score and Forecasts/Revision Score and is updated daily for each company and then cap-weighted-aggregated into Peer Groups, Sectors and the Market Composite. Both scores have a maximum of +30 and a minimum of -30 for each period. The Results Score is calculated quarterly, using the most recent eight quarters of company data for revenues, operating income and operating margin and measures the rate, degree and consistency of change for each metric. The Forecast/Revision Score is based on Annual and Interim period company forecasts and compares changes from previous forecasts as well as against the trailing twelve-month or previous first-half results, with annual forecasts being double-weighted.
DRIP, DRIP, DRIP – We ‘lead’ this fortnight’s update with our All-Market Composite Results & Revision Score. Calculated daily, the score is a ‘real-time’ measure of the state of, and the outlook for, listed Japanese corporations. As the scoring methodology includes earnings momentum ‘factors’, the data series can be a useful leading indicator of forward earnings. The correlation with the market over the last four years is 0.578, with the indicator leading more often than lagging. Since peaking on 16th November 2017, the Results & Revisions Score has fallen by 62% and has now returned to the level of May 2017. In the last ten years, the score has only been lower than at present one-third of the time – mostly during the fiscal year ended March 2017 when the total market value averaged ¥550t, close to the December 2018 low. If we are to repeat the relatively-mild cyclical downturn of 2016, the Results & Revision Score will turn negative in May of this year, and the 25th December 2018 low will be retested.
Source: Japan Analytics
PAST THE PEAK – Our earnings indicator peaked 14 months ago, two months ahead of the market’s high point on 26th January 2018. It now appears that aggregate reported earnings, as well as aggregate company forecasts for the current year, are now turning decisively lower after nine quarters of uninterrupted growth. Forecast Net Income for the current year is now 7% below the high point in trailing-twelve-month (TTM) Net Income from this cycle, which was reached two months ago. Operating Income is, as usual, ‘lagging’ and forecasts are still marginally ahead of TTM. The TTM all-market price-earnings ratio reached 11.5 times on Christmas Day, which will prove to be the cycle low point. We expect the return to median levels, to be achieved more through lower ‘E’ as opposed to a higher ‘P’. Mr Market is currently implying that Japanese corporate profits are due to fall by 23% on average from the cycle peak, or by 30% if we are to revisit the December low-point.
Source: Japan Analytics
THE FIRST CUT – 23% of listed companies reported their most recent quarterly earnings results in the last two weeks. For these companies, TTM revenues grew by 5.1% year-on-year, but only by 0.5% quarter-on-quarter, the lowest qoq growth rate in over a year. TTM Operating Income is now 0.8% lower than the TTM total of one year ago and declined by 4.4% qoq. Operating margins fell by 49bps year-on-year. Current forecasts for this group of companies imply 3.1% yoy top line growth, but only 0.3% compared to the quarter just declared. For Operating Income, the rates are -2.0% and 0.6%, reflecting the normal TTM-to-forecast ‘lag’. Corporate Japan’s profits are now rolling over and will be in a ‘recession’ by the fiscal year-end.
Source: Japan Analytics
INTERREGNUM – Our bear market rally has paused to look at and digest the earnings-announcement news flow and will likely be trendless for the next few weeks as ‘good’ reactions offset ‘bad’. In due course, we expect the preponderance of negative momentum to tip the scales.
Source: Japan Analytics
TORAKU @110 – The Toraku advance-decline indicator has continued to recover and is within ten points of the overbought zone, which has only been breached once since the market peak of January 2018. This signal is ‘amber’ and could be ‘red’ by the end of next week.
OUTLOOK & RECOMMENDATIONS
We continue to recommend an underweight position in Japan in global portfolios.
The equity market decline at the end of last year was well in advance of the underlying trends in the economy and corporate profits; the recent 10% rally has corrected that imbalance. Nevertheless, the global cycle has turned down sharply, and many economies will be in a recession by the end of this quarter. We expect Japanese corporate earnings to follow suit.
Although some of the coming decline in aggregate earnings has been well-discounted, our Results & Revision Score has yet to turn negative. Accordingly, we expect the market to retest the December 2018 low, probably in May when the FY2020 forecasts are announced and our score starts ‘seeing red’.
In the near term and despite the rally in the more cyclical sectors, we continue to favour undervalued domestically-orientated companies in the Information Technology, Internet, Media, and Telecommunications sectors. We would avoid or short Banks and Non-Bank Finance.
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KDDI’s (9433 JP) 3Q results were a small miss (2% vs our forecasts), at both the revenue and profit lines, but not enough to change our positive stance. A key part of our view is derived from our negative view on Apple (AAPL US) from August 2018 where we see an “air-pocket” of demand loss coming through. This is particularly important to Japan where the iPhone accounts for around 75% of smartphones. Apple has downgraded guidance and we believe is in a secular downtrend as refresh cycles elongate and that has been accentuated by the pull forward of demadn for the iPhone X.
This is playing out in Japan, with KDDI reporting handset revenues down 13% YoY, and the key cause of the revenue miss. KDDI increased discounting to offset falling sales in 3Q adding a ¥9.9bn increase in handset costs in the quarter. Without that, EBIT would have beaten expectations. KPIs were generally strong, and service revenue trends improved to -0.1% YoY from -0.8%. Given the nature of the miss, and the fact the company is reiterating guidance we do not expect material changes to forecasts. Our price target is ¥4,100, and our recommendation remains Buy.
An earlier post outlined the general direction of the Objective Analysis 2019 forecast but didn’t provide any numbers. In this post I explain the 5%+ decrease in revenues that the market will experience and how and why various elements play into that number.
NGK Spark Plug (5334) – results in line, the shares are very cheap. The business should should continue to see steady growth – BUY
Foster (6794) – upward for the full year. This is nonetheless a poor year for the company but it is addressing this and earnings will bounce next year.
M&A Capital (6080) – results much better and expected, and after poor second have next year, mainly due to timing of bookings, growth set to continue.
Vector (6058) – BUY – this PR agent is oversold but growing fast.
DOWN AND OUT – ZOZO (3092 JP)‘s third-quarter results which were announced yesterday, saw a 28% quarter-on-quarter increase in sales and trailing-twelve-month (TTM) revenues increased by 25%. Elsewhere the wheels are gradually coming off. In ZOZO most important quarter of the year, Operating Income rose by just 8.2% year-on-year and Net Income by 9.5%. As we mentioned in our previous Insight, Buying a Stairway to Heaven, ZOZO required at least ¥46b in revenues and ¥15b in operating income to meet their full-year forecasts. ¥36b and ¥10b failed to reach this high hurdle and, for the first time since listing, ZOZO has been required to revise down the company’s earnings forecasts. Revenues have been revised down by 20%, OPerating Income by 34% and Net Income by 36% compared to the company’s previous forecasts. Compared to the trailing-twelve-month number the revisions are +1% and -11%, respectively.
Source: Japan Analytics
DOWNSIDE RISK – If ZOZO has entered an era of low or no-growth, a revaluation fo the business to reflect such a reality could see the company’s shares fall by up to 50%
SCSK currently holds 2,900,000 shares or 55.59% of voting rights.
The Tender Offer is at ¥6,700/share which is a 43.6% premium to the last traded price of the day before the announcement (¥4,665), a 44.6% premium to the one-month average, a 28.3% premium to the 3-month average, and a 36.6% premium to the 6-month average.
The price does not seem egregiously unfair, but for investors who own it who think it has another double in it this year they might get upset.
This is one of those situations with which the currently underway METI M&A Fairness enquiry might have a problem.
And if you care about the fairness of the M&A bidding and response process, and ensuring that minority investors get their interests defended by process, have a look at the METI Fair M&A panel and its consultation paper and by all means offer your comments.
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Asian LNG spot prices have dropped for a short time below the UK NBP gas price, reversing the established trend that sees Asian LNG offering a premium to the European LNG price benchmarks. This note takes a look at the latest trends in the LNG markets and the renewed plans unveiled by Qatar to challenge its competitors, in particular, those from the US.
Keyence reported higher sales and profits but lower rates of growth in the three month to December. Consolidated sales were up 11.8% year-on-year compared with 15.2% growth in 2Q and 19.7% growth in 1Q. Operating profit was up 9.1% compared with 12.7% growth in 2Q and 21.2% growth in 1Q. The operating margin declined to 53.8% compared with 55.2% in 2Q, 54.6% in 1Q and 56.6% in 4Q of FY Mar-18.
Once again, the results at Keyence were much better than those at other factory automation related companies – notably Fanuc (6954 JP) and Omron (6645 JP), where operating profits dropped at double-digit rates. But Keyence is geared to incremental improvements rather than large capital outlays, and to customers’ R&D spending, and it has a diversified base of user industries. On the other hand, it is not immune to weakening demand in China, Europe and elsewhere.
Since hitting a 52-week low of ¥50, 780 on October 26, Keyence has rebounded by 13%. At ¥57,270, the shares are now selling at 30x our EPS estimate for this fiscal year and 27x our estimate for FY Mar-20. Their 5-year historical P/E range is 18x – 42x. Other valuations are also well up in their historical ranges.
The sales and profit data suggest difficult year-on-year comparisons for the next few quarters.
Hoya Corporation (7741 JP) reported its 3QFY03/19 earnings yesterday (01st Feb). The revenues grew at 4.9% YoY while operating profit increased by a hefty 20.2% YoY during the quarter. On a constant currency basis, revenues grew 6.6% YoY while pre-tax profit increased 15.0% YoY during the period. In addition, Hoya’s margin too witnessed an expansion with operating profit margin reaching 27.8% from 24.3%, while it reported a pre-tax margin of 27.7% compared to 25.4% a year ago. Moreover, the company beat consensus estimates on revenue, operating profit and pre-tax profit.
JPY (bn)
3QFY03/18
3QFY03/19
YoY Change
Consensus Median
Actual Vs. Consensus
Revenue
136.8
143.4
4.9%
141.6
1.3%
Operating Profit
33.2
39.9
20.2%
37.3
7.0%
OPM
24.3%
27.8%
26.4%
Pre-tax Profit
34.7
39.7
14.4%
37.7
5.3%
Pre-tax Margin
25.4%
27.7%
26.6%
Source: Company Disclosures, Cap IQ
Revenues grew thanks to strong performances by the Life Care and Electronics businesses although the Imaging business saw a decline.
Earnings have been announced for Intel, Samsung, SK hynix, and Western Digital, and the memory business is clearly undermining all of these companies’ earnings. In this Insight I review each of the companies to show where they are, and will explain what the future holds for them as today’s oversupply unfolds.
The past year has all been about dollar strength. That is an accepted wisdom. But the truth of the matter is that the dollar averaged 93.6 on the DXY in 2018 (3 January 2018 to 31 December 2018) and, as we write, stands at 95.5. From 1 January 2015 to 1 July 2017 the DXY averaged 97.2. The dollar is not strong, even by recent history standards. Moreover, it is no longer as important as it once was in policy making terms – and neither is the Federal Reserve.
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Misumi Group sold off after announcing poor 3Q results and another downward revision to FY Mar-19 sales and profit guidance, but bounced right back to finish at ¥2,480 yesterday (January 31), which is 30x management’s new EPS estimate for this fiscal year. Price/book value (as of the end of December) is 3.6x. The indicated dividend was cut in line with guidance, maintaining management’s 25% payout ratio target but resulting in a dividend yield of 0.8%.
Operating and net profits are now expected to decline. Management is guiding for a 7.1% increase in sales in FY Mar-19 as a whole, but monthly data shows year-on-year growth dropping to 5.2% in November and 3.1% in December. Factory Automation sales were unchanged in November and down 1.3% in December,
In the three months to December, operating profit dropped 17.8% year-on-year on a 5.7% increase in sales, with Factory Automation profit down 16.9% and VONA profit down 35.4%. Inventory was up while receivables were down. Sales growth in China turned negative.
The company continues to invest in production capacity, logistics and IT, aiming to expand its Factory Automation and VONA e-commerce businesses in Japan, Asia, America and Europe. The goal is to create a unified, cloud-based, rapid-response distribution system with the world’s largest components and production materials database. The anticipated success of this plan appears to explain both the rebound in the share price and relatively high current valuation, but with the China growth trajectory broken and the economic outlook uncertain, it may take longer and come with lower margins than originally expected.
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Cyberagent Inc (4751 JP) reported 1Q FY09/19 financial results on Wednesday (30th January) after the market close. CyberAgent reported revenue of JPY110.8bn (+13.2%YoY) and OP of JPY5.3bn (-35.2%YoY) for 1Q FY09/19.
Revenue and OP both missed consensus (JPY111.7bn and JPY8.2bn respectively). This was mostly due to low OP from the Game business due to increased advertising expenditure for new titles. OP margin of the Internet Advertisement business also fell due to upfront investments for expansion. Media business, driven by AbemaTV, demonstrated strong topline growth driven by robust increase in the number of AbemaTV premium users but continued to make losses due to heavy investment in content development.
CyberAgent revised down its full-year FY03/19E OP guidance to JPY20bn from JPY30bn previously, but we continue to remain positive about the company’s long term performance, driven by the prospects of its passive TV business (see Mio Kato‘s previous note on this Cyberagent: Aggressive Plans for Passive TV).
CyberAgent’s share price closed at JPY3,500 on Thursday (31st January) down 16% from its previous close. CyberAgent’s share price has been on a bearish trend for the last two quarters, down 49% from an all-time high of JPY6,800 in July. We believe this presents an ideal buying opportunity for the stock. Our SOTP valuation for CyberAgent gives a FY1 target price of JPY4,480 which implies a 28% upside to the current market price.
TDK revised its FY03/19E guidance following the 3QFY03/19 earnings release, which underperformed both consensus and LSR expectations.
The company has been affected by the US-China trade war and the deceleration of the Chinese economy in the third quarter.
Revenue guidance for FY03/19E has been decreased to JPY1,370bn from JPY1,420bn (-3.5%) projected in October 2018. OP guidance for the year has been reduced to JPY110bn compared to the previous expectation of JPY120bn (-8.3%).
On our estimates, TDK is currently trading at a FY1 PE of 12x, lower than its historical median of 16.4x.
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A Japanese newspaper recently reported that JDI is expected to post a consolidated loss for the current fiscal year. However, the company claims that the newspaper report was not based on any forecast made by JDI. The company has stated that it is currently calculating topline and bottomline for the third quarter and it expects the economic slowdown in China, prolonged user lifecycles for smartphones and the US China trade war to in fact have a greater than expected impact on the company’s financial performance. While its third quarter results are to be released in mid-February 2019, consensus expects the company to turnaround its losses to make an overall net profit for the year.
Koito Manufacturing (7276 JP) released its 3QFY03/19 earnings that saw revenue outpace consensus estimates by +2%, while Stanley Electric (6923 JP) ’s revenue fell below consensus estimates by -1%. While Koito witnessed revenue growth of 10% YoY, Stanley posted a decline in revenue for the quarter by -4% YoY. On profitability as well, Koito witnessed growth of +6% YoY, achieving an OPM of 12%. Stanley, on the other hand, experienced a decline in OP for the quarter by -7% YoY, although still managing to achieve a relatively higher OPM of 13%. Here again, Koito managed to beat consensus estimates by +1% while Stanley fell below consensus estimates by -3%. Our conservative estimates for 3Q looked a bit light for Koito while they were slightly high for Stanley. Koito has been the company which usually disappoints the market with its earnings results, although it has proved otherwise this quarter.
That being said, it should be noted that, although Stanley’s three months ended results did not look particularly robust, its nine months ended results were quite favourable. The company witnessed the revenue grow 0.5% YoY (for the nine months ended 30th Dec 2018) while OP grew by 5.9% YoY, supported by the steady growth in the high-margin LED headlamps. For Koito, on the other hand, the three months ended results seemed quite favourable, although the nine months ended results displayed a revenue decline of -5.1% YoY and OP decline of -2.4% YoY, citing the deconsolidation of its Chinese subsidiary and the decrease in the volume of automobile production in some of its business regions as the key reasons. Thus, the overall YTD financial performance of Stanley looks still attractive compared to that of Koito. Following the earnings release, Stanley opened -3.7% down on Thursday from Tuesday’s close, while Koito closed +4.8% up on Wednesday since Friday’s close.
SCSK currently holds 4,768,000 shares or 69.52% of voting rights.
The Tender Offer is at ¥2,750/share which is a 39.3% premium to the last traded price of the day before the announcement (¥1,974), a 38% premium to the one-month average, and a 41% premium to the 3-month and 6-month averages.
It is being done at about 7.5x TTM EV/EBITDA.
This is one of those situations with which the currently underway METI M&A Fairness enquiry might have a problem.
TOPPAN PRINTING (7911 JP) is Japan’s current Negative Enterprise Value ‘champion’. Although only growing in the low single digits and with margins to match, comprehensive income margins and returns are significantly higher, as they take Toppan’s significant investment portfolio gains into account. The investment portfolio has grown at a 39.1% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) over the last five years, outperforming Toppan’s core operations (6.4% CAGR) and the overall stock market (7.5% CAGR).
Source: Japan Analytics
MARKET MYOPIA – Despite the investment portfolio’s ¥411b contribution to Shareholder’s Equity, which has otherwise only increased by ¥98b, the stock market preferred to focus on the stagnating top-line, and the shares have been serial underperformers. Toppan’s market capitalisation has grown by only 2% per annum or just ¥34b since December 2013. From the recent peak in June 2017, Toppan shares have underperformed the market by 27% and, for the last year, have been at their most extreme value relative to TOPIX over the previous thirty years. During this period, Toppan’s equity holdings rose from 43% of the company’s market capitalisation to close to parity at the recent market peak in September 2018.
Source: Japan Analytics
BOTTOMING OUT – With the upcoming boost to sales in the printing business from the change in Japan’s gengō (元号) or era name on the accession of the new Emperor in April, the shares have finally broken out of a one-year period in the Oversold ‘doldrums’.
Source: Toppan Printing Investor Presentation November 12th 2018
SELLING STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS – More importantly, the company has become more proactive in managing equity risk. On 23rd January, Toppan sold 10.5m shares in Recruit Holdings (6098 JP) for approximately ¥31.5b, reducing Toppan’s holding in Japan’s leading listing employment services business from 6.57% to 6.05%. Despite the boilerplate language used to describe the company’s strategy towards strategic shareholdings, Toppan has begun to address the portfolio more proactively and in accordance with the spirit of the new guidelines on Corporate Governance in Japan.
Source: Japan Analytics
BUYBACK POTENTIAL – With this sale, Toppan’s liquid assets will now exceed US$3b or 58% of the current market capitalisation, while the company has committed to capital expenditures totalling only ¥125b over the next five years. Toppan last conducted a modest 0.2% share buyback in 2015-Q2, which was ‘unwound’ by a 0.5% reduction in Treasury Stock in 2017-Q3, which was not accompanied by a share cancellation. With just 8% of shares outstanding held in treasury, there is ample room for further buybacks.
Source: Japan Analytics
For Japan’s ‘Deep Value’ investors or even the ‘activists’, Toppan is an attractive opportunity.
In the DETAIL below, we list the ‘top’ twenty-five negative enterprise value companies in Japan and provide a brief overview of Toppan’s business, the investment portfolio and explain why, with apologies to our ‘Brothers in Arms’, Dire Straits, investors in Toppan are, at present, getting their ‘money for nothin’ and clicks for free’.
Dire Straits: Brothers in Arms/Money for Nothing – Knopfler/Sting – 1985
This share class monitor provides a snapshot of the premium/discounts for various share classifications around the region, and comprises four sets of data:
The average premium/discount for each set over a one-year period is graphed below.
Source: CapIQ
For a granular breakdown of each data set, PDFs are attached at the bottom of this insight.
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An earlier post outlined the general direction of the Objective Analysis 2019 forecast but didn’t provide any numbers. In this post I explain the 5%+ decrease in revenues that the market will experience and how and why various elements play into that number.
NGK Spark Plug (5334) – results in line, the shares are very cheap. The business should should continue to see steady growth – BUY
Foster (6794) – upward for the full year. This is nonetheless a poor year for the company but it is addressing this and earnings will bounce next year.
M&A Capital (6080) – results much better and expected, and after poor second have next year, mainly due to timing of bookings, growth set to continue.
Vector (6058) – BUY – this PR agent is oversold but growing fast.
DOWN AND OUT – ZOZO (3092 JP)‘s third-quarter results which were announced yesterday, saw a 28% quarter-on-quarter increase in sales and trailing-twelve-month (TTM) revenues increased by 25%. Elsewhere the wheels are gradually coming off. In ZOZO most important quarter of the year, Operating Income rose by just 8.2% year-on-year and Net Income by 9.5%. As we mentioned in our previous Insight, Buying a Stairway to Heaven, ZOZO required at least ¥46b in revenues and ¥15b in operating income to meet their full-year forecasts. ¥36b and ¥10b failed to reach this high hurdle and, for the first time since listing, ZOZO has been required to revise down the company’s earnings forecasts. Revenues have been revised down by 20%, OPerating Income by 34% and Net Income by 36% compared to the company’s previous forecasts. Compared to the trailing-twelve-month number the revisions are +1% and -11%, respectively.
Source: Japan Analytics
DOWNSIDE RISK – If ZOZO has entered an era of low or no-growth, a revaluation fo the business to reflect such a reality could see the company’s shares fall by up to 50%
SCSK currently holds 2,900,000 shares or 55.59% of voting rights.
The Tender Offer is at ¥6,700/share which is a 43.6% premium to the last traded price of the day before the announcement (¥4,665), a 44.6% premium to the one-month average, a 28.3% premium to the 3-month average, and a 36.6% premium to the 6-month average.
The price does not seem egregiously unfair, but for investors who own it who think it has another double in it this year they might get upset.
This is one of those situations with which the currently underway METI M&A Fairness enquiry might have a problem.
And if you care about the fairness of the M&A bidding and response process, and ensuring that minority investors get their interests defended by process, have a look at the METI Fair M&A panel and its consultation paper and by all means offer your comments.
Misumi Group sold off after announcing poor 3Q results and another downward revision to FY Mar-19 sales and profit guidance, but bounced right back to finish at ¥2,480 yesterday (January 31), which is 30x management’s new EPS estimate for this fiscal year. Price/book value (as of the end of December) is 3.6x. The indicated dividend was cut in line with guidance, maintaining management’s 25% payout ratio target but resulting in a dividend yield of 0.8%.
Operating and net profits are now expected to decline. Management is guiding for a 7.1% increase in sales in FY Mar-19 as a whole, but monthly data shows year-on-year growth dropping to 5.2% in November and 3.1% in December. Factory Automation sales were unchanged in November and down 1.3% in December,
In the three months to December, operating profit dropped 17.8% year-on-year on a 5.7% increase in sales, with Factory Automation profit down 16.9% and VONA profit down 35.4%. Inventory was up while receivables were down. Sales growth in China turned negative.
The company continues to invest in production capacity, logistics and IT, aiming to expand its Factory Automation and VONA e-commerce businesses in Japan, Asia, America and Europe. The goal is to create a unified, cloud-based, rapid-response distribution system with the world’s largest components and production materials database. The anticipated success of this plan appears to explain both the rebound in the share price and relatively high current valuation, but with the China growth trajectory broken and the economic outlook uncertain, it may take longer and come with lower margins than originally expected.
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Shin-Etsu reported its 3QFY03/19 results yesterday (29th January 2019) which saw the company revenue growing at 13.4% YoY in 3QFY03/19 while its operating profit increased at a stellar 32.5% YoY during the quarter. Shin-Etsu has witnessed positive performance across all its segments while the Semiconductor Silicon segment reported the highest growth in revenue and operating profit. Further, the company beat consensus revenue and operating profit estimates by 1.5% and 6.4% respectively.
Weak car sales in China, Nissan’s removal of Carlos Ghosn, Akebono Brake Industry share price plunge – facts that make everyone cringe at the sound of it. High indebtedness, low margin and weak sales growth were the chief reasons why Akebono’s share price plunge. Kumho Tire’s high debt to equity ratio has been reduced by an equity investment from a Chinese group but will that help to turn the company around?
The average growth among the top 100 shopping centres (SCs) in Japan in 2017-18 was 2.6% compared to 2.3% for the shopping centre market overall.
The top 100 SCs had average sales densities of ¥86,230 per sqm per month, compared to ¥50,833 per sqm per month for the sector overall, showing the stark contrast in performance between the best SCs (and the better developers) and the rest.
The improvement in sales by outlet malls after a retreat in 2016-17 was the big story in SC retailing last year – among the top 30 SCs by sales growth, 10 were outlet malls and all posted growth of more than 5% compared to just a single SC in 2016.
After an article appeared on Nikkei Asian Review on 29th January 2019 stating that Kao Corp (4452 JP) is going to miss its revenue and profit projections for FY2018E, we witnessed no panic in the market. Kao Corporation shares opened trading at JPY 7,621.00 per share up by 0.1% from the previous close price of JPY 7,610.00. The price increased further to JPY 7,657.00 before decreasing towards the day’s low of JPY 7,521.00 and it closed at JPY 7,583.00 which was about 0.4% down from the previous day’s closing price. However, the volume traded had an impact because of this news. For the past 3 months, the average daily volume traded has been around 1.73m shares a day, but declined 27.2% on 29th Jan 2019.
This news came to light from a third-party source, but Kao responded to it on its investor relations website saying:
“The article in the Nikkei on Jan. 29 regarding the earning forecast consolidated results, is not based on any announcement made by Kao Corporation.”
In their latest release to their investor relations website, Kao Corporation keeps quiet on its ability to meet its 2018E guidance.
This has been happening at Kao for the past few years. Each time a news article has been released regarding Kao’s annual results, by a third party a few days prior to the official announcement.
Despite elevated uncertainty and lowered growth expectations for 2019, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) still expects continued global economic expansion, thereby potentially placing it at variance with the expectations embedded in financial markets.
The remaining efficacy of monetary policy in the Eurozone is being undermined by the conspicuous absence of an interest rate buffer that could ultimately be detrimental to any future attempts to support aggregate demand.
Meanwhile, the Bank of Japan will continue its ultra-accommodative policy stance due to downside risks to medium and long-term inflationary expectations, but low corporate profits growth expectations limit downside equity market risks.
Current expectations for corporate profits growth in the Eurozone and China require downgrading due to their respective economic outlooks, implying downward pressure on equity prices.
Crucially, US corporate profit expectations have been scaled back to match revenue expansion, thereby indicating that analysts have finally embraced a more realistic approach towards the future path of operating margins.
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“I’ve been a manager for almost half a century, but this is the first time I’ve seen such a large single-month drop in orders for us. What we witnessed in November and December was just extraordinary.”
Nidec CEO – Shigenobu Nagamori
Source: Japan Analytics
BEAR MARKET RALLY ON CUE – The bear market rally we envisaged has seen the Market Composite recover by nearly 5% this year and 10% from the Christmas Day low of ¥533t. Seven of the last nine trading days have been ‘up’, and the Bank of Japan dutifully intervened on one of the two ‘down’ days – January 16th. The US dollar has also retraced three-quarters of the ¥6.5 decline from December 26th to January as concerns over US-China relations temporarily subsided.
Source: Japan Analytics
5D RSI @75 –The 5-day Relative Strength Index is now at a level that suggests the bulk of this initial move is complete, and a consolidation can be expected in the weeks ahead as the majority of third-quarter earnings are released – particularly if, as we discuss further below, Nidec (6594 JP) has set a trend.
Source: Japan Analytics
VALUE TRADED RATIO – After reaching a three-month high of 64bps on 21st December, the Value Traded Ratio (value traded/total market value) has returned to below-trend levels for the last two days – another indicator of a coming pause in the uptrend.
Source: Japan Analytics
% ABOVE MOVING AVERAGE – The percentage of stocks trading above a weighted sum of five periods of moving averages has recovered to above ’20’ as measured by market value, although the stock count percentage is still below that level. We expect the pattern of 2016 to be replayed here, which suggests an ultimate ‘low’ in the summer of 2019.
Source: Japan Analytics
TORAKU > 80 – On a further positive note, on Friday the 25-day Toraku advance-decline indicator finally recovered to above the ’80’ level, indicating that the December 25th ‘low’ is unlikely to be breached in the short term.
Source: Japan Analytics
THE NIDEC CANARY – Despite the market’s nonchalant reaction to Nidec’s downward revision, the company’s revised forecasts have broader implications. For the first time since March 2017, forecasts for our Market Composite for Operating Income are now lower than the trailing-twelve-month (TTM) Operating Income. Also, the ‘gap’ between forecast Net Income and TTM Net Income is now ¥2.9t – the largest such gap in over ten years. Mr. Market is suggesting that Japanese corporate profits are due to fall by 18% on average, to the level last reached in the first quarter of 2017 – implying bottom-line declines of up to 50% for some key ‘global’ sectors such as Autos, Machinery, Chemicals, Electrical Equipment and Technology Hardware, which together comprise one-third of aggregate Net Income.
Source: Japan Analytics
Note: The Results & Revision Score is the average of our Results Score and Forecasts/Revision Score for each company. Both scores are cap-weighted and have a maximum of +30 and a minimum of -30 for each period. The Results Score is calculated quarterly, using the most recent eight quarters of company data for revenues, operating income and operating margin and measures the rate, degree and consistency of change for each metric. The Forecast/Revision Score is based on Annual and Interim period company forecasts and compares changes from previous forecasts as well as against the trailing twelve-month (TTM) or previous first-half results, with annual forecasts being double-weighted.
LEADING OR LAGGING? – Our cap-weighted Results & Revision Score bottomed at -2.55 in December 2016 and reached a two-decade high on 16th November 2017, two months before the market peak in January 2018. Since October last year, the market has been leading on the downside. If we are to repeat the relatively-mild cyclical downturn of 2016, the Results & Revision Score will turn negative at the time of the full-year results and forecasts for the new fiscal year, which, for the majority of companies, will be released in May. We expect the market to retest the lows of April 2017 and December 2018 around that time.
OUTLOOK & RECOMMENDATIONS
We continue to recommend an underweight position in Japan in global portfolios.
The equity market decline at the end of last year was well in advance of the underlying trends in the economy and corporate profits; the recent 10% rally has corrected that imbalance. Nevertheless, the global cycle has turned down sharply, and many economies will be in a recession by the end of this quarter.
The Japanese economy is still enjoying a robust domestically-driven growth cycle and is close to full employment. As Nidec and Yaskawa Electric have demonstrated and as other companies will soon confirm, Japan’s globally-orientated manufacturing companies are not immune to global trends. Although some of the coming downturn in earnings has been well-discounted, our Results & Revision Score has yet to turn negative. Accordingly, we expect the market to retest the December 2018 low, probably in May when the FY2020 forecasts are announced.
In the near term, we continue to favour undervalued domestically-orientated companies in the Information Technology, Internet, Media and Telecommunications sectors.
Since our bearish Insight on Tokyo Kiraboshi Financial Group (7173 JP) issued in November 2018, Tokyo Kiraboshi FG (7173 JP): Shooting Star, the stock’s subsequent performance has fully justified our pessimism, with the share price finishing CY2018 down 47.7% year-on-year (YoY). Having touched a low of ¥1,504 on Christmas Day, the shares have recovered 10.1% to ¥1,656 as of Friday’s close: slightly better than the Topix Bank Index, which closed on Friday at 154.44, up 9.0% over the same period. Trading on a forward-looking price/earnings multiple of 12.5x (using the bank’s current FY3/2019 guidance) and a price/book ratio of 0.21x, TKFG looks cheap. This is deceptive. Adjusting the group’s earnings per share (EPS) for the ¥55 billion (US$507 million) in two still-outstanding preference share issues pushes the PER to over 18x: hardly a bargain. Meanwhile, the group’s RoA and RoE ratios are woefully low, loan growth has collapsed since end-March 2018, deposits have fallen alarmingly, and main bank subsidiary Kiraboshi Bank is struggling to keep its net return on funds deployed (NRFD) in positive territory. A stock best avoided.
After 6.5bn+ shares came off lockup last week (by Travis Lundy’s estimate), Xiaomi made a placement equal to about 1% of shares outstanding at a sharp discount to the close. This follows a block of 120mm shares last Thursday at HK$8.80 (at a 13+% discount); Apoletto reported a distribution (sale) of 594+mm shares on January 9th to reduce their total position across all funds from 9.25% to 4.99%; and there was a block placement launched earlier in the week for 231mm shares for sale between HK$9.28 and HK$9.60.
While as much as 1bn shares may have already transacted (assuming most of the 594mm shares distributed by Apoletto have been sold in the market), there were ~6.5 billion shares which could be sold and an additional 1bn+ of additional conversions designed to be sold.
In another 6 months, there will be another 4bn+ shares which come off LockUp. In total, that is up to 10-11bn shares coming off lockup between a week ago and 6 months from now. That is four times the total IPO size, and 70-80% of the total position coming off lock-up has an average in-price of HK$2.00 or less. Apoletto’s average in-price was HK$9.72.
Travis is also skeptical that the company’s capital deserves a premium to peers, and is not entirely convinced that the pre-IPO profit forecasts are going to be met in the medium-term. In the meantime, a lot of the current capital structure base is looking to get out.
Nota Bene: Bloomberg’s 3bn-shares-to-come-off-lockup number was confirmed by Travis (the day he published the piece linked below) with the people who tallied the info for the CACS function. They had neglected to count a certain group of shareholders. The actual number will be well north of 6 billion shares.
After the close of trading on the 15 January, NTT announced it had repurchased 3.395mm shares for ¥15.349bn in the first 7 trading days of the month, purchasing 10.9% of the volume traded. This announcement was bang in line with Travis’ insight the prior day, where he anticipated the buybacks would soon be done.
The push to buy shares on-market at NTT vs off-market at NTT Docomo has had some effect but not a huge effect. The NTT/Docomo price ratio is a bit more than 5% off its late October 2018 lows prior to the “Docomo Shock”, but the ratio is off highs. Off the lows, the Stub Trade has done really well.
NTT DoCoMo bought back ¥600bn of shares from NTT at the end of 2018. That means NTT DoCoMo could buy back perhaps ¥300-400bn of shares from the market over the next year or so before ‘feeling the need’ to buy back shares from NTT again. NTT will likely buy back at least ¥160bn of NTT shares from the government in FY19 starting April 1st, which means there will be room to buy back another ¥100bn from the government before not having any more room to do so.
There could be an NTT buyback from the market in FY2019, and one should expect that for the company to buy back shares from the government again, if NTT follows the pattern shown to date, there should be another ¥400-500bn of buybacks from the market over the next two years, and if EPS threatens a further fall on NTT DoCoMo earnings weakness, NTT might boost the buyback to make up for that.
The very large sale by NTT of NTT Docomo shares this past December will free up a significant amount of Distributable Capital Surplus.
On a three-year basis, Travis would rather own NTT than NTT Docomo. But he expects the drift on the ratio will not be overwhelming unless NTT does “something significant”.
Singaporean real-estate group Capitaland has entered into a SPA to buy Ascendas-Singbridge (ASB) from its controlling shareholder, Temasek. The proposed acquisition values ASB at an enterprise value of S$10.9bn and equity value of S$6.0bn. Capitaland will fund the acquisition through 50% cash and 50% in shares (862.3mn shares @$3.25/share – ~17% dilution). Capitaland-ASB will have a pro-forma AUM of S$116bn, making it the largest real estate investment manager in Asia and the ninth largest global real estate manager.
Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)announced it had received approvals from the relevant government authorities, and its Tender Offer for Yungtay (at TWD 60/share) has now launched. The Tender Offer will go through March 7th 2019 with the target of reaching 100% ownership. Son of the founder, former CEO, and Honorary Chairman Hsu Tso-Li (Chou-Li) of Yungtay has agreed to tender his 4.27% holding. The main difference between the offer details as discussed in Going Up! Hitachi Tender for Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) back in October, is a minimum threshold for success of reaching just over one-third of the shares outstanding, with a minimum to buy of 88,504,328 shares (21.66%, including the 4.27% to be tendered by Hsu Tso-Li).
This deal looks pretty straightforward, but the stock has been trading reasonably tight to terms, with annualized spreads on a reasonable expectation of closing date in the 3.5-4.5% annualized range for a decent part of December, rising into early January before seeing a jump in price and drop in annualized on the second trading day of the year. This shows some expectation of a fight and a bump.
To avoid that fight and bump – the Baojia Group, which supported Hsu Tso-Ming’s board revolt last summer (discussed in the previous insight), has reportedly accumulated a 10% stake – Hitachi has lowered its minimum threshold to complete the deal to get to one-third plus a share. Given that it controls 11.7% itself as the largest shareholder, and has another 4.3% from the chairman in the bag, that means it needs about 17.3% of the remaining 84% to be successful.
Because the minimum is only about 21% of the float, this deal has quite decent odds of getting up unless someone makes a more serious run for it. As an arb, Travis sees a small chance of a bump because of some potential harassment value by Hsu Tso-Ming’s friends at Baojia Group. Hitachi has already taken that into account with the lowering of the minimum, but it is possible that enough noise can be created to obtain a bump.
Courts, a leading electrical, consumer electronics and furniture retailer predominantly in Singapore and Malaysia, has announced a voluntary conditional offer from Japanese big box electronics retailer Nojima Corp (7419 JP) at $0.205/share, a 34.9% premium to the last closing price. The key condition to the Offer is the valid acceptances of 50% of shares out. Singapore Retail Group, with 73.8%, has given an irrevocable to tender. Once tendered, this offer will become unconditional. The question is whether minorities should hold on.
Barings/Topaz-controlled Singapore Retail Group are exiting, having not altered their shareholding since CAL’s 2012 listing. If Nojima receives acceptances from 90% of shareholders, it will move to compulsory delisting of the shares. If the Offer closes with Nojima holding >75% of shares, it could still launch an exit/delisting offer pursuant to Rule 1307 and Rule 1308.
Long-suffering shareholders may wish to hold on for a potential turnaround should Nojima extract expected synergies. But this looks like a decent opportunity (of sorts) to also exit along with the controlling shareholder.
The board of Navitas, a global education provider, has unanimously backed a revised bid by 18.4% shareholder BGH Consortium of A$5.825/share, 6% higher than its previous rejected offer and a 34% premium to undisturbed price.
The revised proposal drops the “lock out” conditions attached to BGH Consortium’s previous offer, enabling BGH to support a superior proposal. BGH has also been granted an exclusivity period until the 18 Feb.
Panalpina Welttransport announced that it had received an unsolicited, non-binding proposal from DSV A/S (DSV DC) to acquire the company at a price of CHF 170 per share, consisting of 1.58 DSV shares and CHF 55 in cash for each Panalpina share. The offer comes at a premium of 24% to Panalpina’s closing share price of CHF 137.5 as of 11 January 2019 and 31% to the 60-day VWAP of CHF 129.5 as of 11 January 2019. Following the announcement, Panalpina’s shares surged above the terms of the offer implying that the market was anticipating a higher bid from DSV or one of its competitors.
Investors lashed out at Panalpina’s board last year (after years of griping by some of the top holders), eventually forcing the main shareholder to support the installation of a new chairman of the board.
The stock is clearly in play. And the sector is seeing ongoing consolidation. DSV’s approach to Panalpina comes just months after it failed in an attempt to buy Switzerland’sCeva Logistics AG (CEVA SW). Media reports suggested Switzerland’s Kuehne & Nagel are also rumoured to be considering an offer for Panalpina.
Panalpina’s largest shareholder, Ernst Goehner Foundation, owns a stake of approximately 46%. If EGS wants to see OPMs up at global standards level – in the area of DSV and KNIN – then they may need to see someone else manage the assets. If EGS is steadfastly against Panalpina losing its independence, a deal will not get done. That said, if a deal does not get done because the board reflects the interest of EGS, that proves the board is not as independent as previously claimed. But one must imagine there is a right price for everything.
Earlier this month, Bristol Myers Squibb Co (BMY US)and Celgene announced a definitive agreement for BMY to acquire Celgene in a $74bn cash and stock deal. The headline price of $102.43 per Celgene share plus one CVR (contingent value right) is a 53.7% premium to CELG’s closing price of $66.64 on January 2, 2019, before assigning any value to the CVR. The CVR has a binary outcome: it will either be worth zero or will be worth a $9 cash payment upon the FDA approval of three drugs.
While there don’t appear to be any major problems in commercial products, it remains to be seen whether the antitrust authorities go further into the pipeline to determine whether potential competition from drugs still in clinical trials could present issues in the future.
Overall, the merger agreement appears fairly standard, but it does (also) require BMY shareholder approval which typically overlays a higher risk premium. For John DeMasi, the attraction for this arb is the current risk/reward.
ANTYA Investments Inc. chimes in on the deal and considers it unlikely that a suitor for CELG emerges at a higher price, whereas rumours of suitors for BMY abound, and would therefore make a long bet on BMY.
On the 10 January, PAH announced CKI had entered into a placing agreement to sell 43.8mn shares (2.05% of shares out) at HK$52.93/share (a 4.7% discount to last close), reducing CKI’s holding in PAH to 35.96%. This is CKI’s first stake sale in PAH since the 2015 restructuring of the Li Ka Shing group of companies, and it has been over three years since the CKI/PAH scheme merger was blocked by minority shareholders. It is also around two months since FIRB blocked CKI/PAH/CKA/CKHH in its scheme offer for APA Group (APA AU).
I don’t see a sale of PAH as being a realistic outcome – this is more likely an opportunity to take some money (the placement is just US$328mn) off the table. CKI remains intertwined with PAH via their utility JVs in Australia, Europe and UK, and in most investments, together they have absolute control.
I would also not discount a merger re-load. The pushback in 2015 was that the (revised) merger ratio of 1.066x (PAH/CKI) was too low and took advantage of CKI’s outperformance prior to the announcement. That ratio is now around 0.9x. A relaunched deal at ~1x would probably get up – the average since the deal-break is 1.02x and the 12-month average is 0.95x. And a merger ratio at these levels would ensure Ck Hutchison Holdings (1 HK)‘s holding into the merged entity would be <50%, so it would not be required to consolidate. This recent sell-down does not, however, elevate the near-term chances of a renewed merger.
The takeaway is that the stub is very choppy, it often (but not always) widens after the full-year results, and the highest implied stub/EBITDA occurred outside of FY16, its most profitable year. The downward trend since January last year reflects the anticipated ~17% decline in EBITDA for FY18 to ₩148bn, its lowest level in the past four years.
Sanghyun mentioned that there are signs of improving fundamentals for local cosmetics stocks (as reflected in CapIQ) and that Holdcos have traditionally been more susceptible to fundamental changes. This should augur a shift to the upside in the implied stub.
I see the discount to NAV at 27%, right on the 2STD line and compares to a 12-month average of 3%. This looks like an interesting set-up level.
The Offer for Selangor Properties (SPR MK)has been bumped again, to RM6.30 from RM6.00. The original Offer was pitched at RM5.70/share. This latest proposal is a 55% premium to the undisturbed price and 10% above the initial bid. This is starting to look reasonable, at 0.89x P/B. On balance, this will probably now get up. (link to my earlier insight: Selangor Props – Privatisation Offer Does Not Reflect Full Value)
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Trawling through >1500 global banks, based on the last quarter of reported Balance Sheets, we apply the discipline of the PH Score™ , a value-quality fundamental momentum screen, plus a low RSI screen, and a low Franchise Valuation (FV) screen to deliver our latest rankings for global banks.
While not all of top decile 1 scores are a buy – some are value traps while others maybe somewhat small and obscure and traded sparsely- the bottom decile names should awaken caution. We would be hard pressed to recommend some of the more popular and fashionable names from the bottom decile. Names such as ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN) , Credicorp of Peru, Bank Central Asia (BBCA IJ) and Itau Unibanco Holding Sa (ITUB US) are EM favourites. Their share prices have performed well for an extended period and thus carry valuation risk. They represent pricey quality in some cases. They are not priced for disappointment but rather for hope. Are the constituents of the bottom decile not fertile grounds for short sellers?
Why pay top dollar for a bank franchise given risks related to domestic (let alone global) politics and the economy? Some investors and analysts have expressed “inspiration” for developments in Brazil and Argentina. But Brazilian bonds are now trading as if the country is Investment Grade again. (This is relevant for banks especially). Guedes and co. may deliver on pension/social security reform. If so, prices will become even more inflated. But what happens if they don’t deliver on reform? Why pay top dollar for hope given the ramp up in prices already? Argentina is an even more fragile “hope narrative”. More of a “Hope take 2”. Similar to Brazil, bank Franchise Valuations are elevated. While the current account adjustment and easing inflation are to be expected, the political and social scene will be a challenge. LATAM seems to be “hot” again with investment bankers talking of resilience. But resilience is different from valuation. Banks from Chile, Peru, and Colombia feature in the bottom decile too. If an investor wants to be in these markets and desires bank exposure, surely it makes sense to look for the best value on offer. Grupo Aval Acciones y Valores (AVAL CB) may represent one such opportunity.
Our bottom decile rankings feature a great deal of banks from Indonesia. In a promising market such as Indonesia, given bank valuations, one needs to tread extremely carefully to not end up paying over the odds, to not pay for extrapolation. In addition, India is a susceptible jurisdiction for any bank operating there – no bank is “superhuman” and especially not at the prices on offer for the popular private sector “winners”. Saudi Arabia is another market that suddenly became popular last year. We are mindful of valuations and FX.
Does it not make more sense to look at opportunity in the top decile? While some of the names here will be too small or illiquid (mea culpa), there are genuine portfolio candidates. South Korea stands out in the rankings. Woori Bank (WF US) is top of the rankings after a share price plunge related to a stock overhang but this will pass. Hana Financial (086790 KS) , Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK LX) and DGB Financial Group (139130 KS) are portfolio candidates. Elsewhere, Russia and Vietnam rightly feature while Sri Lanka and Pakistan contribute some names despite very real political and macro risks. We would caution on some of the relatively small Chinese names but recommend the big 4 versus EM peers – they are not expensive. In fact some of the big 4 feature in decile 2 of our rankings. There are many Japanese banks here too. And many, like some Chinese lenders, are cheap for a reason. While the technical picture for Japanese banks is bearish, at some stage selective weeding out of opportunity within Japan’s banking sector may be rewarding. The megabanks are certainly not dear. Europe is another matter. Despite valuations, we are cautious on French lenders and on German consolidation narratives – did a merger of 2 weak banks ever deliver shareholder value? The inclusion of two Romanian banks in the top decile is somewhat of a headscratcher. These are perfectly investable opportunities but share prices have been poor of late.
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Meanwhile, Descente has brought in Wacoal (3591 JP) as a white knight and made a splash in the business media about its recent success.
Itochu insists that Descente needs Itochu’s management skills, particularly to build a stronger business in China and other overseas markets, and says the only way to make Descente listen is to buy more stock – more than its current nearly 30%.
A week ago, former Nissan Chief Performance Officer and onetime potential successor to Ghosn and/or Saikawa-san – Jose Munoz – who was put on leave to help Nissan deal with its internal investigation – resigned effective immediately. Some suggest this is the start of a bloodbath of Ghosn loyalists.
Former Nissan CEO and still-CEO at Renault Carlos Ghosn was in court to appeal the decision to not allow him bail. I expect that will end up at the Supreme Court in not too long, but for the moment he might stay in detention for another 7-8 weeks.
Nissan sources said (according to a Reuters report) earlier in the week they would be looking to file suit for damages against Ghosn.
Nissan and Mitsubishi officiallyannounced Friday that as a result of a joint investigation by Nissan and Mitsubishi Motors (7211 JP) into the Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance entity (Nissan Mitsubishi BV), it was discovered that “Ghosn entered into a personal employment contract with NMBV and that under that contract he received a total of 7,822,206.12 euros (including tax) in compensation and other payments of NMBV funds. Despite the clear requirement that any decisions regarding director compensation and employment contracts specifying compensation must be approved by NMBV’s board of directors, Ghosn entered into the contract without any discussion with the other board members, Nissan CEO Hiroto Saikawa and Mitsubishi Motors CEO Osamu Masuko, to improperly receive the payments.” Saikawa and Masuko were not informed and did not also get paid by the company. The NMBV entity will attempt to recoup the funds from Ghosn. Nissan and Mitsubishi are thinking of dissolving their Dutch alliance entity.
The Nissan panel reviewing Nissan’s governance structure, made up of three independent directors and four external members, met for the first time Sunday. The proposals are due end-March, upon which the board will propose a new management system/structure for approval at the shareholder meeting at end-June 2019. The co-chair said in a comment after today’s meeting that Ghosn perhaps had questionable ethics.
French business newspaper Les Echos carried an “exclusive” interview with Nissan CEO Hiroto Saikawa which was reasonably enlightening, or should have been from a French point of view. In the interview, Saikawa is adamant that he fully supports the Renault-Nissan Alliance saying that it was not just important but “crucial” and he “would do nothing to render it harm”, and that the French state’s stake in Renault “posed no problem at all” because the “French state does not impose in any way on Nissan.” Saikawa-san also noted that he had no intention of ridding Nissan of French/foreign employees.
Renault Director Martin Vial visited Japan with French officials including Emmanuel Moulin – chief of staff to Bruno Le Maire, who is French Minister of the Economy – to meet with Hiroto Saikawa and Japanese officials Wednesday and Thursday. This trip was first reported by Le Figaro in the early hours of Wednesday morning (15 Jan) Asia time, and the point of the trip was reportedly to discuss the changes in governance at the top of Renault which might be coming – i.e. a new chairman as the French state and Renault’s independent directors appear to have decided that another two months of detention for Carlos Ghosn is enough to warrant a change even if they still presume his innocence in the charges brought in Japan. They were also to inquire after Ghosn’s case, though that seemed to have been secondary.
As a sidebar to this trip, Bruno Le Maire came out Wednesday saying that the State had asked the Renault board to hold a board meeting to replace Ghosn, and said that the French state would leave it to Renault’s directors to choose, but also came out and said that Cie Generale Des Etablissement MIchelin (ML FP) CEO Jean-Dominique Senard would be a great choice (though other suggestions are that he might take the role of Chairman as others note that Renault Interim CEO Thierry Bolloré’s role could be made permanent). His comments about Mr. Senard included those suggesting that Mr. Senard adheres to certain ideas of the “social responsibilities” of the company – ideas which Mr. Le Maire shares.
Mr Le Maire also said this week…
“Nous souhaitons la pérennité de l’alliance. La question des participations au sein de l’alliance n’est pas sur la table.”
Another quote from an article which came out Saturday night at midnight Paris time was similar.
“Un rééquilibrage actionnarial, une modification des participations croisées entre Renault et Nissan n’est pas sur la table”, déclare Bruno Le Maire. “Nous sommes attachés au bon fonctionnement de cette alliance qui fait sa force.”
Both quotes say “we” (the French state) seek for the Alliance to continue functioning in a stable manner and changes of the crossholding relationship or ownership rates between the companies were not on the table.
The second appears to be a quote from the Journal du Dimanche (article linked above) which was probably conducted a day or two earlier – and it makes a reference to it having been conducted just after his return from Tokyo (it was not revealed earlier this week that he had made the trip with Mssrs. Vial and Moulin so this is something of a question mark).
All of this was out by Friday. It was all very measured and reassuring.
Then Sunday saw a bombshell dropped… again…
In the Nikkei and Bloomberg, it was revealed that the French visitors to Tokyo had informed Japanese officials of their intention to have Renault appoint the next chairman of Nissan (as apparently the Alliance agreement allows) and of the French State’s intention to seek to integrate Nissan and Renault under the umbrella of a single holding company.
This is interesting for three reasons…
A holding company where the two companies stay listed does nothing that the Alliance does not do now except put a single board in place on top of both companies. That would be a Dutch Foundation structure. A holding company where one of the two companies loses its listing (because it is taken over) would require one of those companies lose a set of shareholders.
A Dutch Foundation (which is effectively the same thing if the two companies stay listed) was an idea which a year ago in the previous kerfuffle last spring about merging was “not an option acceptable to the government” (Les Echos, 7-Mar-18)
This is, once again, the French state seeking to intervene in the governance of Nissan. That’s a no-no according to the Alliance Agreement as modified in December 2015.
This is widely reported in English, Japanese, and French on Sunday.
There is a conciliatory article in Bloomberg with a headline suggesting a French official (Le Maire) downplayed the French comments about a holding company, but that refers to the JDD article, which is probably days old and repeated the same comment he made publicly earlier this week, reported by Les Echos and Le Figaro about a lack of change in cross-holding, but a careful read of the timeline suggests his comments were made in France before someone leaked this to the Nikkei.
Saikawa-san was reported to have said this morning (Monday 21 Jan 2019) that he had not heard about this, but that now was not the time to consider revising capital ties.
One should note, once again, that this is not the CEO or independent Chairman of Renault saying this. It is not the board or Nissan saying this. It is the French state.
What does this all mean? What are the possibilities and ramifications? Read on…
Tracking Traffic/Chinese Express & Logistics is the hub for our research on China’s express parcels and logistics sectors. Tracking Traffic/Chinese Express & Logistics features analysis of monthly Chinese express and logistics data, notes from our conversations with industry players, and links to company and thematic notes.
This month’s issue covers the following topics:
December express parcel pricing fell by over 9% Y/Y. Average pricing per express parcel fell by 9.1% Y/Y, the worst decline since Q216 (excluding January/February figures distorted by the Lunar New Year holiday).
Express parcel revenue growth remained well below 20% last month. Weak pricing dragged sector revenue growth down to 17% in December, the 4th consecutive month of sub-20% growth.
Intra-city pricing (ie, local delivery) was strong in 2018. Relative to weak inter-city pricing (down 3.1% Y/Y in 2018), pricing for intra-city express shipments was firm, rising by 0.1% last year. In fact, average pricing for intra-city express shipments has risen in four of the last five years.
Underlying domestic transport demand remained firm in December. Although demand for inter-city express shipments appears to be moderating (from high levels), underlying transportation activity in December remained firm. The three modes of freight transport we track (rail, highway, air) in aggregate rose 6.6% Y/Y in December, even as the growth of air freight slowed.
We retain a negative view of China’s express industry’s fundamentals: demand growth is slowing and pricing for inter-city shipments appears to be falling faster than costs can be cut, leading to margin compression.
The recent negative sales in the Chinese auto industry and Nissan’s case of Carlos Ghosn removal could put additional pressure on the already thin margin of auto supplier industry. One of the Carlos Ghosn early contribution to Nissan was to cut cost and outsource the auto parts maker to a wide variety of suppliers including to Hanon Systems (018880 KS) . Nissan’s new management may want to undo some of Carlos Ghosn’ legacy including changing the selection criteria of parts supplier.
Hanon’s global peers also experienced a decrease in the inventory turnover and most of them have been priced at PER <10 but Hanon is still trading at 24x PER while its sales growth and profitability is still in low single digit? Facing the onset of the slowdown in the Chinese auto industry, won’t it be another headwind for Hanon Systems?
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