This has been a fantastic performer. Since our buy note one year ago, the shares are up just over 3 times. Earnings growth has been very strong, and much better than we had anticipated. The story is even better now than it was then. Unfortunately, the valuations are not! The company is very focussed on growing revenue for the time being. If one is happy to buy a very fast growing new business, then this is still worth looking at.
We visited Renesas Electronics (6723 JP) this week to discuss progress on inventory reduction and its likely ramp of utilisation rates/wafer throughput, as well as to gather further details on the IDT acquisition and its long -term strategy. On the whole, we continue to like the long-term picture, consider the stock to be undervalued and believe investors with long time horizons should be looking at the stock on the long side. However, our discussions suggested to us that while production cuts to reduce inventory should be completed this month or at worst in 1Q2019, a ramp in utilisation rates could take longer than is implied by consensus.
Following this comment Renesas Electronics (6723 JP) traded directionally with the market though in very volatile fashion, first dropping 17% before rebounding 69%. Now, with Nikkei reporting that the company would halt production at most facilities during the year and for as much as two months in some cases, the stock is once again giving up its gains and is limit down -14%. This leaves it just 10% above where we previously commented on the stock and as it approaches the ¥500 level again we feel it is becoming interesting again. We examine the potential financial impact from the production halts below.
Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP) (MHFG) has slashed its forecast for FY3/2019 consolidated net profits from ¥570 billion to just ¥80 billion, citing previously-unbudgeted write-downs on physical branch assets and retail banking software, as well as valuation losses on marking to market part of the group’s foreign bond portfolio, especially on derivative products. Total additional costs to be incurred in FY3/2019 are now expected to be around ¥680 billion.
In effect, MHFG is attempting to ‘clear the decks’ of redundant and uneconomic assets – a legacy from its 20th century role as a branch-based deposit taker and lender – and is now positioning itself for 21st century ‘cashless’ banking centred on electronic transaction and payment systems. While this is a laudable effort, MHFG is late to do this; rivals Mitsubishi Ufj Financial Group (8306 JP) and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP) slimmed down their branch networks in FY3/2018, incurring heavy costs in doing so.
We remain skeptical that this signals the end of MHFG’s problems, and continue to recommend an Underweight position in Japanese bank stocks generally.
MHFG’s uneconomic asset problems are far from unique. This news may just be the first of a succession of similar announcements from other banks over the next 2-3 years as they face not only an ongoing ultra-low interest rate environment but now also the stark economic realities of a declining local population, high overheads as a result of over-manned and under-utilised branches, a clear shift towards Internet banking and the increasing use of ‘cashless’ alternative payment systems by retail customers.
The Semiconductor Industry Association in the US released the latest WSTS figures for January chip revenues. Monthly revenues are down 15.6% from January of 2018. While this is not a surprise to our clients it is frightening to those who anticipated that 2019 would be a continuation of the bonanza enjoyed in 2018.
Accordia Golf Trust (AGT SP) is the second largest golf course operator in Japan that offers stable DPU with assets that are less correlated to the global economic cycle but they have their own challenges; aging demographics that makes the number of games played lower over time, volatile weather in Japan (unlike in Singapore where it’s sunny summer all year long), limited upside impact from automation initiative and golf tax.
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We visited Renesas Electronics (6723 JP) this week to discuss progress on inventory reduction and its likely ramp of utilisation rates/wafer throughput, as well as to gather further details on the IDT acquisition and its long -term strategy. On the whole, we continue to like the long-term picture, consider the stock to be undervalued and believe investors with long time horizons should be looking at the stock on the long side. However, our discussions suggested to us that while production cuts to reduce inventory should be completed this month or at worst in 1Q2019, a ramp in utilisation rates could take longer than is implied by consensus.
Following this comment Renesas Electronics (6723 JP) traded directionally with the market though in very volatile fashion, first dropping 17% before rebounding 69%. Now, with Nikkei reporting that the company would halt production at most facilities during the year and for as much as two months in some cases, the stock is once again giving up its gains and is limit down -14%. This leaves it just 10% above where we previously commented on the stock and as it approaches the ¥500 level again we feel it is becoming interesting again. We examine the potential financial impact from the production halts below.
Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP) (MHFG) has slashed its forecast for FY3/2019 consolidated net profits from ¥570 billion to just ¥80 billion, citing previously-unbudgeted write-downs on physical branch assets and retail banking software, as well as valuation losses on marking to market part of the group’s foreign bond portfolio, especially on derivative products. Total additional costs to be incurred in FY3/2019 are now expected to be around ¥680 billion.
In effect, MHFG is attempting to ‘clear the decks’ of redundant and uneconomic assets – a legacy from its 20th century role as a branch-based deposit taker and lender – and is now positioning itself for 21st century ‘cashless’ banking centred on electronic transaction and payment systems. While this is a laudable effort, MHFG is late to do this; rivals Mitsubishi Ufj Financial Group (8306 JP) and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP) slimmed down their branch networks in FY3/2018, incurring heavy costs in doing so.
We remain skeptical that this signals the end of MHFG’s problems, and continue to recommend an Underweight position in Japanese bank stocks generally.
MHFG’s uneconomic asset problems are far from unique. This news may just be the first of a succession of similar announcements from other banks over the next 2-3 years as they face not only an ongoing ultra-low interest rate environment but now also the stark economic realities of a declining local population, high overheads as a result of over-manned and under-utilised branches, a clear shift towards Internet banking and the increasing use of ‘cashless’ alternative payment systems by retail customers.
The Semiconductor Industry Association in the US released the latest WSTS figures for January chip revenues. Monthly revenues are down 15.6% from January of 2018. While this is not a surprise to our clients it is frightening to those who anticipated that 2019 would be a continuation of the bonanza enjoyed in 2018.
Accordia Golf Trust (AGT SP) is the second largest golf course operator in Japan that offers stable DPU with assets that are less correlated to the global economic cycle but they have their own challenges; aging demographics that makes the number of games played lower over time, volatile weather in Japan (unlike in Singapore where it’s sunny summer all year long), limited upside impact from automation initiative and golf tax.
The publication of Lyft’s IPO prospectus is a clear positive for Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) . As a pure investment, Rakuten’s return on its Lyft investments could be 273-366% or ¥101-136 per share based on the $20-25bn valuation range reported by the press. There has been a lot of focus on the investment gains Rakuten should accrue but the real upside is a timely boost to liquidity plus accounting cover as mobile investment accelerates. Whether one believes Rakuten can succeed in mobile or not, it has the capital and paper profits to support a splashy introduction and spending is already accelerating.
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Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP) (MHFG) has slashed its forecast for FY3/2019 consolidated net profits from ¥570 billion to just ¥80 billion, citing previously-unbudgeted write-downs on physical branch assets and retail banking software, as well as valuation losses on marking to market part of the group’s foreign bond portfolio, especially on derivative products. Total additional costs to be incurred in FY3/2019 are now expected to be around ¥680 billion.
In effect, MHFG is attempting to ‘clear the decks’ of redundant and uneconomic assets – a legacy from its 20th century role as a branch-based deposit taker and lender – and is now positioning itself for 21st century ‘cashless’ banking centred on electronic transaction and payment systems. While this is a laudable effort, MHFG is late to do this; rivals Mitsubishi Ufj Financial Group (8306 JP) and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP) slimmed down their branch networks in FY3/2018, incurring heavy costs in doing so.
We remain skeptical that this signals the end of MHFG’s problems, and continue to recommend an Underweight position in Japanese bank stocks generally.
MHFG’s uneconomic asset problems are far from unique. This news may just be the first of a succession of similar announcements from other banks over the next 2-3 years as they face not only an ongoing ultra-low interest rate environment but now also the stark economic realities of a declining local population, high overheads as a result of over-manned and under-utilised branches, a clear shift towards Internet banking and the increasing use of ‘cashless’ alternative payment systems by retail customers.
The Semiconductor Industry Association in the US released the latest WSTS figures for January chip revenues. Monthly revenues are down 15.6% from January of 2018. While this is not a surprise to our clients it is frightening to those who anticipated that 2019 would be a continuation of the bonanza enjoyed in 2018.
Accordia Golf Trust (AGT SP) is the second largest golf course operator in Japan that offers stable DPU with assets that are less correlated to the global economic cycle but they have their own challenges; aging demographics that makes the number of games played lower over time, volatile weather in Japan (unlike in Singapore where it’s sunny summer all year long), limited upside impact from automation initiative and golf tax.
The publication of Lyft’s IPO prospectus is a clear positive for Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) . As a pure investment, Rakuten’s return on its Lyft investments could be 273-366% or ¥101-136 per share based on the $20-25bn valuation range reported by the press. There has been a lot of focus on the investment gains Rakuten should accrue but the real upside is a timely boost to liquidity plus accounting cover as mobile investment accelerates. Whether one believes Rakuten can succeed in mobile or not, it has the capital and paper profits to support a splashy introduction and spending is already accelerating.
Our positive view of the Asian region in 2018 was not reflected in stock market performance. But now is not the time to discard fundamentals and fundamental analysis. Unlike the US, the Asian region is in the early stages of a profit upcycle. As we have argued on many occasions, that is the building block required to kick start the investment cycle. But theoretical explanations of the growth process aside, is there any empirical support for the argument that profits and investment, and therefore growth, are related? We would answer in the affirmative and, in the following report, we try to show how the process works and where Asia stands on two of our Austrian Stress Indicators (ASIs). Market volatility aside, the conditions for good growth gains are firmly in place in most of the region.
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The Semiconductor Industry Association in the US released the latest WSTS figures for January chip revenues. Monthly revenues are down 15.6% from January of 2018. While this is not a surprise to our clients it is frightening to those who anticipated that 2019 would be a continuation of the bonanza enjoyed in 2018.
Accordia Golf Trust (AGT SP) is the second largest golf course operator in Japan that offers stable DPU with assets that are less correlated to the global economic cycle but they have their own challenges; aging demographics that makes the number of games played lower over time, volatile weather in Japan (unlike in Singapore where it’s sunny summer all year long), limited upside impact from automation initiative and golf tax.
The publication of Lyft’s IPO prospectus is a clear positive for Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) . As a pure investment, Rakuten’s return on its Lyft investments could be 273-366% or ¥101-136 per share based on the $20-25bn valuation range reported by the press. There has been a lot of focus on the investment gains Rakuten should accrue but the real upside is a timely boost to liquidity plus accounting cover as mobile investment accelerates. Whether one believes Rakuten can succeed in mobile or not, it has the capital and paper profits to support a splashy introduction and spending is already accelerating.
Our positive view of the Asian region in 2018 was not reflected in stock market performance. But now is not the time to discard fundamentals and fundamental analysis. Unlike the US, the Asian region is in the early stages of a profit upcycle. As we have argued on many occasions, that is the building block required to kick start the investment cycle. But theoretical explanations of the growth process aside, is there any empirical support for the argument that profits and investment, and therefore growth, are related? We would answer in the affirmative and, in the following report, we try to show how the process works and where Asia stands on two of our Austrian Stress Indicators (ASIs). Market volatility aside, the conditions for good growth gains are firmly in place in most of the region.
In Q3, Lenovo (992 HK) reported revenue growth – well ahead of market expectations, improved margins and US$1.9bn of cashflow. This was a considerable surprise to us – and the market. However, having analysed the results, most of the reported revenue and profit growth comes from the Fujitsu Ltd (6702 JP) acquisition. The rise in cashflow largely came from working capital, but also benefitted from the structure of the Fujitsu deal. We think real full-year cashflow after investment, US$0.8bn, will yet again, fail to cover finance costs and dividends, and Lenovo will need to borrow another US$400m.
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Accordia Golf Trust (AGT SP) is the second largest golf course operator in Japan that offers stable DPU with assets that are less correlated to the global economic cycle but they have their own challenges; aging demographics that makes the number of games played lower over time, volatile weather in Japan (unlike in Singapore where it’s sunny summer all year long), limited upside impact from automation initiative and golf tax.
The publication of Lyft’s IPO prospectus is a clear positive for Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) . As a pure investment, Rakuten’s return on its Lyft investments could be 273-366% or ¥101-136 per share based on the $20-25bn valuation range reported by the press. There has been a lot of focus on the investment gains Rakuten should accrue but the real upside is a timely boost to liquidity plus accounting cover as mobile investment accelerates. Whether one believes Rakuten can succeed in mobile or not, it has the capital and paper profits to support a splashy introduction and spending is already accelerating.
Our positive view of the Asian region in 2018 was not reflected in stock market performance. But now is not the time to discard fundamentals and fundamental analysis. Unlike the US, the Asian region is in the early stages of a profit upcycle. As we have argued on many occasions, that is the building block required to kick start the investment cycle. But theoretical explanations of the growth process aside, is there any empirical support for the argument that profits and investment, and therefore growth, are related? We would answer in the affirmative and, in the following report, we try to show how the process works and where Asia stands on two of our Austrian Stress Indicators (ASIs). Market volatility aside, the conditions for good growth gains are firmly in place in most of the region.
In Q3, Lenovo (992 HK) reported revenue growth – well ahead of market expectations, improved margins and US$1.9bn of cashflow. This was a considerable surprise to us – and the market. However, having analysed the results, most of the reported revenue and profit growth comes from the Fujitsu Ltd (6702 JP) acquisition. The rise in cashflow largely came from working capital, but also benefitted from the structure of the Fujitsu deal. We think real full-year cashflow after investment, US$0.8bn, will yet again, fail to cover finance costs and dividends, and Lenovo will need to borrow another US$400m.
Late last year, in the final run-up to the vote to determine whether Alpine (6816 JP) investors would subject themselves to a bad share exchange ratio or would choose to oblige Alps (6770 JP) to have another run at it in a different format, Alps announced a shareholder return policy which included buying back ¥40 billion of shares.
It is to be noted that this meant that the combined entity was going to be left with less cash than the total deemed necessary by the two companies just a very short while before. Why? Because Alps – with the strong governance it has – obviously had the right amount – and Alpine also had the right amount (it needed substantial equity-funded cash as “working capital” because otherwise it would run a serious danger of business disruption and deterioration. So despite this severe business risk, the two companies effectively announced they would disburse 90% of Alpine’s cash on hand to shareholders POST-MERGER through the special dividend offered to sweeten the pot to get the merger through, and the ¥40 billion buyback.
The merger, of course, went through, and the ¥28.4 billion* buyback is proceeding apace.
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The publication of Lyft’s IPO prospectus is a clear positive for Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) . As a pure investment, Rakuten’s return on its Lyft investments could be 273-366% or ¥101-136 per share based on the $20-25bn valuation range reported by the press. There has been a lot of focus on the investment gains Rakuten should accrue but the real upside is a timely boost to liquidity plus accounting cover as mobile investment accelerates. Whether one believes Rakuten can succeed in mobile or not, it has the capital and paper profits to support a splashy introduction and spending is already accelerating.
Our positive view of the Asian region in 2018 was not reflected in stock market performance. But now is not the time to discard fundamentals and fundamental analysis. Unlike the US, the Asian region is in the early stages of a profit upcycle. As we have argued on many occasions, that is the building block required to kick start the investment cycle. But theoretical explanations of the growth process aside, is there any empirical support for the argument that profits and investment, and therefore growth, are related? We would answer in the affirmative and, in the following report, we try to show how the process works and where Asia stands on two of our Austrian Stress Indicators (ASIs). Market volatility aside, the conditions for good growth gains are firmly in place in most of the region.
In Q3, Lenovo (992 HK) reported revenue growth – well ahead of market expectations, improved margins and US$1.9bn of cashflow. This was a considerable surprise to us – and the market. However, having analysed the results, most of the reported revenue and profit growth comes from the Fujitsu Ltd (6702 JP) acquisition. The rise in cashflow largely came from working capital, but also benefitted from the structure of the Fujitsu deal. We think real full-year cashflow after investment, US$0.8bn, will yet again, fail to cover finance costs and dividends, and Lenovo will need to borrow another US$400m.
Late last year, in the final run-up to the vote to determine whether Alpine (6816 JP) investors would subject themselves to a bad share exchange ratio or would choose to oblige Alps (6770 JP) to have another run at it in a different format, Alps announced a shareholder return policy which included buying back ¥40 billion of shares.
It is to be noted that this meant that the combined entity was going to be left with less cash than the total deemed necessary by the two companies just a very short while before. Why? Because Alps – with the strong governance it has – obviously had the right amount – and Alpine also had the right amount (it needed substantial equity-funded cash as “working capital” because otherwise it would run a serious danger of business disruption and deterioration. So despite this severe business risk, the two companies effectively announced they would disburse 90% of Alpine’s cash on hand to shareholders POST-MERGER through the special dividend offered to sweeten the pot to get the merger through, and the ¥40 billion buyback.
The merger, of course, went through, and the ¥28.4 billion* buyback is proceeding apace.
Historically, Germany and China have depended on exports to lead growth. With the US unwilling to play the role of consumer of last resort and being determined to limit its current account deficit, this avenue is not available anymore. In the absence of a rethink by German policy makers as to how to make German growth more self -sustaining a deflationary feedback loop is developing between the EU and China.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Our positive view of the Asian region in 2018 was not reflected in stock market performance. But now is not the time to discard fundamentals and fundamental analysis. Unlike the US, the Asian region is in the early stages of a profit upcycle. As we have argued on many occasions, that is the building block required to kick start the investment cycle. But theoretical explanations of the growth process aside, is there any empirical support for the argument that profits and investment, and therefore growth, are related? We would answer in the affirmative and, in the following report, we try to show how the process works and where Asia stands on two of our Austrian Stress Indicators (ASIs). Market volatility aside, the conditions for good growth gains are firmly in place in most of the region.
In Q3, Lenovo (992 HK) reported revenue growth – well ahead of market expectations, improved margins and US$1.9bn of cashflow. This was a considerable surprise to us – and the market. However, having analysed the results, most of the reported revenue and profit growth comes from the Fujitsu Ltd (6702 JP) acquisition. The rise in cashflow largely came from working capital, but also benefitted from the structure of the Fujitsu deal. We think real full-year cashflow after investment, US$0.8bn, will yet again, fail to cover finance costs and dividends, and Lenovo will need to borrow another US$400m.
Late last year, in the final run-up to the vote to determine whether Alpine (6816 JP) investors would subject themselves to a bad share exchange ratio or would choose to oblige Alps (6770 JP) to have another run at it in a different format, Alps announced a shareholder return policy which included buying back ¥40 billion of shares.
It is to be noted that this meant that the combined entity was going to be left with less cash than the total deemed necessary by the two companies just a very short while before. Why? Because Alps – with the strong governance it has – obviously had the right amount – and Alpine also had the right amount (it needed substantial equity-funded cash as “working capital” because otherwise it would run a serious danger of business disruption and deterioration. So despite this severe business risk, the two companies effectively announced they would disburse 90% of Alpine’s cash on hand to shareholders POST-MERGER through the special dividend offered to sweeten the pot to get the merger through, and the ¥40 billion buyback.
The merger, of course, went through, and the ¥28.4 billion* buyback is proceeding apace.
Historically, Germany and China have depended on exports to lead growth. With the US unwilling to play the role of consumer of last resort and being determined to limit its current account deficit, this avenue is not available anymore. In the absence of a rethink by German policy makers as to how to make German growth more self -sustaining a deflationary feedback loop is developing between the EU and China.
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
In Q3, Lenovo (992 HK) reported revenue growth – well ahead of market expectations, improved margins and US$1.9bn of cashflow. This was a considerable surprise to us – and the market. However, having analysed the results, most of the reported revenue and profit growth comes from the Fujitsu Ltd (6702 JP) acquisition. The rise in cashflow largely came from working capital, but also benefitted from the structure of the Fujitsu deal. We think real full-year cashflow after investment, US$0.8bn, will yet again, fail to cover finance costs and dividends, and Lenovo will need to borrow another US$400m.
Late last year, in the final run-up to the vote to determine whether Alpine (6816 JP) investors would subject themselves to a bad share exchange ratio or would choose to oblige Alps (6770 JP) to have another run at it in a different format, Alps announced a shareholder return policy which included buying back ¥40 billion of shares.
It is to be noted that this meant that the combined entity was going to be left with less cash than the total deemed necessary by the two companies just a very short while before. Why? Because Alps – with the strong governance it has – obviously had the right amount – and Alpine also had the right amount (it needed substantial equity-funded cash as “working capital” because otherwise it would run a serious danger of business disruption and deterioration. So despite this severe business risk, the two companies effectively announced they would disburse 90% of Alpine’s cash on hand to shareholders POST-MERGER through the special dividend offered to sweeten the pot to get the merger through, and the ¥40 billion buyback.
The merger, of course, went through, and the ¥28.4 billion* buyback is proceeding apace.
Historically, Germany and China have depended on exports to lead growth. With the US unwilling to play the role of consumer of last resort and being determined to limit its current account deficit, this avenue is not available anymore. In the absence of a rethink by German policy makers as to how to make German growth more self -sustaining a deflationary feedback loop is developing between the EU and China.
Assuming a sum of the parts valuation the shares are cheap. We can assume the fintech business is worth perhaps Y800-900bn (based on 10x ebit, similar to Credit Saison), the domestic e-commerce operation (which makes an operating profit of about Y70bn on revenue of Y450bn) is worth perhaps Y1.2tr (assuming a valuation of 3x sales vs. 3.5x for Amazon). There are other parts of the business which detract and there are others, including a Y350bn plus investment portfolio which add but overall, all this compares with a market cap of a mere Y1.3tr. This suggests the market is thinking that Rakuten is more than throwing its MNO investment of Y600bn away. Given the Governments desire to reduce prices in the mobile market, and its desire for 4 operators, we would suggest this is overly negative. The recent announcement that Lyft will seek an IPO has lifted the share price given its 10% stake in this name (rumoured valuation of $23bn vs. $15bn currently), but we suspect the shares have much further to run. The market knows earnings will be depressed for the next 2 years or so but does not anticipate any recovery thereafter it would appear.
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Korea’s local news house Hankyung reported the names that should be included in the short list. They are Kakao, MBK Partners (with NetMarble), Tencent, Bain Capital and another foreign PE whose name isn’t disclosed. Apparently, Amazon, Comcast and EA, didn’t make the short list. Those in the short list now get a chance to do due diligence. They will then participate in the main bidding round that is scheduled for early April.
It is being reported that only Kakao and NetMarble (with MBK Partners) are truly interested in taking over Nexon’s management right. Tencent is expected to join either Kakao or NetMarble-led consortium in the end. Bain is looking into possible investment opportunities that may be created if this sale leads to a mandatory tender offer to Nexon minority shareholders. It seems safe to say that this comes down to a two-horse race: either Kakao or NetMarble.
Lyft Inc (0812823D US) has kicked off its IPO by posting its S-1 filing last Friday. Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) is Lyft’s single largest shareholder with a 13.05% stake. Rakuten has invested around $700 million to acquire its current Lyft stake and stands to make 3-4 times its investment if Lyft achieves its rumoured IPO valuation range of $20-25 billion.
Lyft’s IPO valuation range was first reported by Reuters on 20 February 2019. On the back of the news, Rakuten’s shares have so far risen around 10%. Notably, at the IPO valuation range, the Lyft stake would account for 20-25% of Rakuten’s current market cap. While the Lyft IPO will prove to be a big winner for Rakuten from an ROI perspective, we believe that from a valuation perspective, the upside is modest.
LIQUIDITY RULES – Despite the continuous stream of negative macroeconomic news from Japan and other economies, financial liquidity trends are the strongest in over two years, and much of this ‘boom’ is flowing into risk assets. Large-scale repatriation of offshore funds by US companies has also helped boost the US dollar against the yen. The Market Composite responded by rising 2.3% over the last two weeks, although only by 1% in US dollar terms.
WEAK MACRO – Net exports and higher inventories offset private investment and consumption during the fourth quarter, resulting in flat GDP growth year-on-year. January industrial production fell to the lowest level in 30 months, and, with the manufacturing PMI nearing 50, the prospect is for further weakness this quarter. Inventories continue to rise and, in North Asia, to levels last seen in 2005. Combined with the sharp fall in exports in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, export pricing in back in deflationary territory, putting further upward pressure on real interest rates. Meanwhile, January retail sales saw the largest month-on-month decline in over three years as department stores saw fewer Chinese tourists over the New Year. Equity markets are living on ‘borrowed time’.
Source: Japan Analytics
HOLD FOR NOW – This bear market rally is two months old and is maturing. The Value Traded ratio is below trend again, the RSI is neutral, and the Toraku is signalling caution. We expect another month of liquidity/weak Yen-driven strength before the economic realities begin to prevail.
MARKET/SECTOR STRATEGY- We continue to recommend an underweight position in Japan in global portfolios and favour undervalued domestically-orientated companies in the Information Technology, Internet, Media, Transportation, Healthcare and Telecommunications sectors. We would avoid or short the financial sectors Banks, Non-Bank Finance and Multi-Industry. We would underweight the Auto, Retail and Other Consumer Products sectors as consumer spending contracts further in the US, Europe, China and Japan.
Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)‘s offering and the buyback are strong symbols and practical examples of what the Corporate Governance Code wants to accomplish.
With the combination of increased hostility leading to a greater likelihood of eventual private takeout, shorts will cover and foreigners may buy, squeezing existing Descente Ltd (8114 JP) minorities up and out.
Nintendo announced (J) a Secondary Share Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding. Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the then-last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe. On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33bn worth (whichever is reached first) to be commenced the day after settlement of the Offering.
These banks (such as Bank of Kyoto) which have long-held policy cross-holdings in a Kyoto company with a diehard Kyoto cultural heritage (which can often include a diehard cross-holding culture) may have all succumbed to the new Corporate Governance Code. This is really important.
This deal is going to retail investors, quite specifically because Nintendo management and board view retail investors as both “sticky” investors and likely to largely follow management’s agenda in AGMs. Management might have misjudged how much this will get flipped.
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains. Given the size, it looks like the former though it will be difficult to get confirmation. Travis Lundy would want to be long Bank of Kyoto both outright and against the cross-holding portfolio.
NTT Docomo announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February. The buyback has already occurred. However, by the vagaries of TSE-calculated indices, they lead to index down-weightings (unless otherwise offset).
This is a very large cancellation for a very large company, so it means a selldown of – by Travis’ estimate – 21.5-22.8mm shares at the close of trading March 28th. Traders looking to tilt short NTT Docomo or tilt long NTT short NTT Docomo will have that as a tailwind.
Panalpina’s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation (EGF), made a formal request to hold an EGM prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted. The situation has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the EGF which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change.
EGF wants to pass this giving everyone their capital share percentage vote because the alternative is worse. Getting this passed would slightly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance but it would mean that the EGF could continue to block any deal it did not like. The thing is, there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants EGF that “grandfathered” exemption.
Cevian wants to block such this from going through, and to have the EGF capped at 5% like the Articles of Association suggest all should be. Cevian says that Panalpina has unlawfully maintained a grandfathering exemption from the 5% cap for the EGF. IF the EGF is capped, it means that effectively the EGF loses the ability to block deals they don’t like.
The situation is weird. It is possible that Panalpina is asking a convoluted and possibly unlawful voting structure with non-best-practice registration deadlines to vote on changing the vote structure. To Travis, this actually probably deserves a court challenge.
Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum with the announcement of a $48/share (51.7% premium to the undisturbed) acquisition proposal. Late last month Versum and Entegris announced a $9bn (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the remaining 52.5%.
It’s now in VSM’s court. Should it opt to ditch Entegris’ merger-of-equals proposal and side with Merck, it would incur a US$140mn termination fee or $1.28/share.
John DeMasi reckons Merck’s proposal is superior, however a pure cash offer vs. stock swap are not directly comparable. The prospect of Entegris substantially increasing the exchange ratio or adding a chunk of cash to the merger consideration seems remote. John expects we will see a bump in Merck’s offer to make it friendly, and a recommended deal, in short order.
Brake supplier, Wabco confirmed that it is in takeover talks with ZF Friedrichshafen, one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany. ZF and Wabco jointly develop the Evasive Manoeuvre Assist system for trucks, combining Wabco’s braking and vehicle dynamics control systems alongside ZF’s active steering technology.
The pushback is the Zeppelin Foundation, ZF’s controlling shareholder, and its aversion to taking on excess debt. Management and the foundation previously clashed over the €13.5bn TRW transaction in 2015.
Back in October last year, Hanergy Mobile Energy Holdings Group Limited (HMEH), Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s majority shareholder, announced an intention to privatise the company at “no less than HK$5/share” via cash or scrip. Hanergy has now announced the intention of HMEH to privatise the company by way of a Scheme. The ultimate intention of HMEH still remains the listing of Hanergy’s business in China. The key issue, putting aside the fact Hanergy has been suspended for near-on four years, is that the scrip consideration has no assigned value.
Long-suffering shareholders, who comprise 32.49% of shares out, have the dubious honour of holding SPV shares (with an as yet undermined jurisdiction), which may remain in A-share pre-listing purgatory; or should the Scheme fail/lapse, they will hold unlisted shares if Hanergy fails to resume trading by end-July 2019, as would be the case per recently introduced HKEx guidelines. Such an outcome affords HMEH the flexibility to potentially squeeze out minorities at a bargain price.
It is not clear why the SFC is okay with this takeover proposal, apart from simply being open to any idea to remove Hanergy from the Exchange. At a guess, the SPV consideration structure (as opposed to a straightforward cash offer) is possibly geared to reduce shareholder rights compared to those available under Bermuda Companies Act, Bermuda being where Hanergy is incorporated.
The Scheme doc, due out later this month, or early next, requires sign-off from the SFC. Presumably the SPV jurisdiction should at least be known by then. It is hard to believe an official takeover document would be dispatched boasting no determinate offer value in addition to unknown shareholder protection rights attached to the unlisted scrip.
Descente said will release its Mid-Term Plan early in an effort to encourage shareholders to not tender. For its part, Itochu has released an amendment to its original doc, saying Descente has been naughty (bad-mouthing Itochu to the press while in negotiations), and that it will wait until after the Tender Offer is completed to re-engage. Itochu effectively reserves the right to go full hostile.
ANTA’s CEO was quoted in an interview saying ANTA supports Itochu’s tender offer and management restructuring and governance initiatives because they say they believe it will lift corporate value. That means Itochu+ANTA have a functional majority if not absolute.
This should raise back end values. Descente management is quite stuck here. To Travis, there is likely some upside optionality. Some may decide to stick with the company, raising pro-ration rates.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May.
The Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years – the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down. The widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. Therefore, the IFA concluded the Offer is reasonable by referencing the premium to last close and historical pricing. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ). Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7.8%/45.4%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down.
Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer at VND 120,000 (3.5% premium to the previous close when the doc was prepared), this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG, lifting its stake to 56.69%.
The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) owns 43.31%. IF the SCIC tenders, the minimum proration is 33.38%. IF the SCIC does NOT tender their shares, this is effectively a full tender. All of your shares would be purchased.
The very recent performance has been most curious. The last 11 days – before the announcement – have seen the stock move 37.6% on 9x average volume, with little to no news to drive it as far as Travis can tell. Looks some leakage ahead of the partial offer announcement.
Travis thinks there is a non-negligible possibility that Taisho will have to bump their Tender Offer Price. And a non-negligible chance that SCIC tenders.
OYO, the largest budget hotel network in India, announced a JV with Yahoo Japan to expand its co-living rental service, “OYO Living”, to Japan. OYO will own 66.1% while YJ will own the remainder of the JV, named “Oyo Technology & Hospitality Japan”.
Rebranded as “OYO Life”, the service would be the first of its kind, in the virtually non-existent co-living market in Japan. In Japan, apartments are usually compact single-occupier units as opposed to shared spaces, which might pose a problem for OYO’s co-living model.
Assuming the model is a success and OYO Life could ramp up its capacity to around 150,000 beds in Tokyo, which is around 5% of the total apartment stock in central Tokyo, this would contribute around ¥3bn (2% of net income in FY03/18) to Yahoo Japan’s net income. There is potential for further gains, however, this would depend on how ready Tokyo is to move into a “Co-Living” culture en masse.
Ruralco has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.
Nutrien has first mover advantage, however a counter from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) is possible. The two companies have a history after Ruralco attempted to buy out Elders in 2012, but failed over a disagreement in pricing.
ACCC should not be issue to this transaction. A 2013 ruling did not oppose a Ruralco/Elders tie-up, and a similar conclusion is expected for Nutrien.
The gross/annualised spread of 0.2%/0.7% is unattractive. But at this deal price, Elders could still come over the top. Trading itself at 11.4x EV/EBITDA (according to CapIQ), upping the price by 10% would still be accretive to Elders.
Revealed in the release of notes about the Board approval of the Independent Review Committee’s review in late January was the news that Otis offered to buy the company for NT$63/share but it didn’t go anywhere. In addition, some directors – most likely the partisan ones installed in the failed board proxy fight last summer – objected to the lower minimum threshold, which is a sign they don’t want the deal to go through (because the lowering of that threshold is otherwise an unmitigated positive for minority investors).
Despite stories of a suit of breach of trust against six directors for not entertaining or pursuing offers at NT$63 by Otis and/or Schindler, the company had not received any notification from judicial authorities and has not updated the market about Tender-related matters in the last two weeks.
Travis thinks there is the small possibility of a bump to NT$63; but it is not a difficult deal to get done at the minimum threshold at NT$60.
Frasers Property (Thailand) Pcl (FPT TB)has announced a conditional voluntary tender offer for GOLD at Bt8.50/share, ~2.4% premium to last close. Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
This tender offer therefore has been initiated to consolidate the Sirivadhanabhakdi family’s holding into GOLD. Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. The tender offer will be unconditional.
The intention to delist GOLD is evident although it will be challenging for FPT to secure 90%+ in the tender offer process, given the single-digit premium to last close, and the fact GOLD traded above the current terms as recently as early December. Getting to 90% requires almost 50% of the minority to submit their shares.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 2.4%/5.9% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
Diageo announced it had approached the board of directors of Sichuan Swellfun with a proposal to increase its stake from 60% to 70% at RMB 45.00/share. This was a 19.33% premium to the last close and a 40.05% premium to the 30-day average.
On a trading basis, this is somewhat interesting. If you are quite bullish the stock, you have a partial put (and you own it already). If you are tentatively bullish A-shares, this offers you a partial put, but there is a possibility that the RMB 45.00 price creates a kind of short-term cap just because it is a sticky price in peoples’ minds.
Travis is not particularly bearish the stock despite the fact that the earnings forecasts have dropped a fair bit since he looked at this six months ago. The consensus EPS forecasts for Dec 2020 today are roughly the same as they were for Dec 2019 six months ago.
The new news on Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) is that the independent statutory auditor Nakatsuji-san has officially expressed his opposition to the Tender Offer. With the shares 19% through terms despite what appears to be no increase by the main activist in the last two weeks, the likelihood retail will tender at ¥610/share looks low, and this seems a situation where the deal may fail unless there is a bump. (link to Travis’ insight: Kosaido (7868 JP) TOB Extended)
On the 28 Feb, Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ)‘s shares went ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected, but Travis thinks they could fall further: there is no compelling reason to own the bank after it goes ex-rights to receive cash. (link to Travis’ insight: Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights)
FY18 results for PCCW, HKT, and PCPD are out. Plugging in the de-consolidated numbers, I estimate PCCW’s discount to NAV at ~37%, right on the 2 STD line. On a simple ratio (PCCW/HKT), it is again approaching an all-time low.
Still select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW’s stub ops, recording negative EBITDA in FY18, reversing the positive figure recorded in FY17. FY16’s stub EBITDA was also negative.
One positive takeaway is that the dividend pass through is holding at around 90%.
Douglas provided the one-year share price comparisons of 30 Korean holdcos and the opcos as well as changes to the foreign ownership stakes of these companies YTD. Significant changes to the foreign shareholdings of these companies sometimes lead to opportunities in the holdco/opco pair trades.
Sanghyun Park points out that Hyundai Motor Co (005380 KS)‘s Common vs. pref ratio is getting out of whack, possibly because of Elliott’s ₩4.5tn dividend demand. Both 1P and 2PB are sufficiently undervalued relative to the Common. The div yield difference to Common is also at the highest levels for both pref types. Sanghyun suggests shorting the Common and being long 1P or 2PB now. 1P is probably a safer bet, but 2PB is more liquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Hyundai Motor Share Class: Time to Short Common & Long Pref)
For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$12.3bn. This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component. A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal. The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.
Pioneer Corp (6773 JP)announced that the deal had received all relevant anti-trust approvals, and payment for shares by the Acquirer (BPAE) of the Third Party Placement was now expected to take place on March 8th.
Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)announced it has entered an S&P to sell Glow SPP1 to B. Grimm Power Service for Bt3.3bn. The P/B was not provided. This is equivalent to ~2.5% of Glow’s market cap.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
A visit in Jakarta to the Blue Bird (BIRD IJ) office was well-timed as the company is close to the conclusion of two corporate actions, as well as an interesting extension to its relationship with Go-Jek Indonesia (1379371D IJ).
Both acquisitions are synergistic with its existing business and represent long-term opportunities rather than an immediate significant boost to earnings.
The company’s underlying fundamentals continue to improve with fleet utilisation up versus last year in 4Q18, as was the average revenue per taxi.
The company continues to see the benefits of its tie-up with Go-Jek, which will soon morph into something even more significant.
Blue Bird (BIRD IJ) remains an interesting way to play the rising levels of affluence amongst the rising middle classes in Indonesia. the company is close to completing two corporate actions including a new venture into the car auction business with Mitsubishi UFJ and the acquisition of an intercity bus company. It is also close to signing an extension and expansion of its relationship with Go-Jek, which will help to cement its position in the online ride-hailing space. Underlying fundamentals continue to improve both in terms of fleet utilisation and average revenue per taxi. According to Capital IQ consensus, the company trades on 14.9x FY19E PER and 13.7x FY20E PER, with forecast EPS growth of +16.2% and +8.9% for FY19E and FY20E respectively. The near-term completion of two corporate actions and an extension of its agreement with Go-Jek Indonesia (1379371D IJ) should provide positive catalysts for the share price coupled with improving ridership, average revenue per taxi, and fleet utilisation.
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Late last year, in the final run-up to the vote to determine whether Alpine (6816 JP) investors would subject themselves to a bad share exchange ratio or would choose to oblige Alps (6770 JP) to have another run at it in a different format, Alps announced a shareholder return policy which included buying back ¥40 billion of shares.
It is to be noted that this meant that the combined entity was going to be left with less cash than the total deemed necessary by the two companies just a very short while before. Why? Because Alps – with the strong governance it has – obviously had the right amount – and Alpine also had the right amount (it needed substantial equity-funded cash as “working capital” because otherwise it would run a serious danger of business disruption and deterioration. So despite this severe business risk, the two companies effectively announced they would disburse 90% of Alpine’s cash on hand to shareholders POST-MERGER through the special dividend offered to sweeten the pot to get the merger through, and the ¥40 billion buyback.
The merger, of course, went through, and the ¥28.4 billion* buyback is proceeding apace.
Historically, Germany and China have depended on exports to lead growth. With the US unwilling to play the role of consumer of last resort and being determined to limit its current account deficit, this avenue is not available anymore. In the absence of a rethink by German policy makers as to how to make German growth more self -sustaining a deflationary feedback loop is developing between the EU and China.
Assuming a sum of the parts valuation the shares are cheap. We can assume the fintech business is worth perhaps Y800-900bn (based on 10x ebit, similar to Credit Saison), the domestic e-commerce operation (which makes an operating profit of about Y70bn on revenue of Y450bn) is worth perhaps Y1.2tr (assuming a valuation of 3x sales vs. 3.5x for Amazon). There are other parts of the business which detract and there are others, including a Y350bn plus investment portfolio which add but overall, all this compares with a market cap of a mere Y1.3tr. This suggests the market is thinking that Rakuten is more than throwing its MNO investment of Y600bn away. Given the Governments desire to reduce prices in the mobile market, and its desire for 4 operators, we would suggest this is overly negative. The recent announcement that Lyft will seek an IPO has lifted the share price given its 10% stake in this name (rumoured valuation of $23bn vs. $15bn currently), but we suspect the shares have much further to run. The market knows earnings will be depressed for the next 2 years or so but does not anticipate any recovery thereafter it would appear.
7-Eleven partners up with Future Retail in an effort to enter the growing Indian Market
Indian E-Commerce giants pose a significant threat to 7-Eleven’s plans
7-Eleven’s recent shift focuses more on developing markets.
Lack of profitability in India could require changes to the standard franchise agreement in order to attract franchisees
On 28th February 2019, Seven & I Holdings (3382 JP), the operator of the world’s largest convenience store chain 7-Eleven, announced that the company has signed a master franchise agreement with Kishore Biyani’s Future Retail, the operator of the Indian large format store chain Big Bazaar, to expand the 7-Eleven convenience stores into India. Future Retail and Seven & I Holdings expect the first 7-Eleven convenience store in India to be opened in Mumbai in 2019.
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