There are currently 241 listed Japanese companies that can be categorised as Internet businesses. Our classification overlaps with the TOPIX-33 Information & Communication sub-Sector but is broader in that it encompasses all companies listed on all sections and exchanges but is also narrower in that we have excluded Telecommunications (including Softbank Group (9984 JP)) and Information Technology companies. We have adopted a ‘quantamental’ approach which covers the long-term and current trends for Japan’s Internet Sector as a whole, as well as eight sub-Sectors or Peer Groups and the Sectors’ leading companies by market capitalisation. Our focus is exclusively on the locally-listed universe and is based on disclosed financial and market data. We do not provide any forecasts, other than the companies’ own forecasts and we do not attempt to make any business model or strategic judgments. Our focus is purely on financial and market performance. We do not cover unlisted and defunct companies such as Livedoor and, therefore, there is implicit survivor bias in the data.
The broad themes that are developed in DETAIL below are grouped into six topics as follows: –
OVERVIEW – As will be covered in greater DETAIL below, Japan has failed to evolve a substantial Internet Sector and, in many business models, has been passed by global competitors including in the home market. Although Internet Sector revenues have grown steadily and now account for close to 1% of the total for all listed companies, operating margins have declined by half in the last seven years and are now only four percentage points higher than the market average. Accordingly, as measured by our Results & Revision Score, the Sector is close to a twelve-year low. The market’s response is an unchanged Sector weight in the market composite despite the addition of 111 new companies in the last six years, and a Relative Price Score that has moved in a narrow range over that period. The Sector averages disguise the weak business and market performance of a handful of Sector leaders as well as the overvaluation of the Sector’s more successful business models, which is partly a result of a lack of alternatives. Despite the world’s most significant Internet investor – Softbank Group (9984 JP)‘s Vision Fund – being based in Japan, this fund and other global investors in Internet business have been right to give Japan a ‘pass’.
Sony Corp (6758 JP) is forming a bullish descending wedge/channel that once mature will chisel out an intermediate low with scope to clear medium term breakout resistance. The tactical low near 4,400 lies just above more strategic support.
Clear pivot points will help manage positioning within the bull wedge that is in the final innings.
The tactical buy level is not that far from strategic support with a more bullish macro lean.
MACD bull divergence is not only supportive into near term weakness but also points to a breakout above medium resistance. Risk lies with Sony not looking back after hitting our tactical low target.
According to management, weak demand for factory automation sensors had a significant negative impact on sales and profits in 1Q of FY Dec-19. Also, in our estimation, it is likely to cause 1H results to fall short of guidance. But this should be in the share price, which has dropped by nearly 50% from its 52-week high.
In the year to December 2018, operating profit was up only 2.1% on a 7.0% increase in sales, largely due to an increase in machine vision marketing expenses. In January and February 2019, factory automation orders and sales dropped abruptly as customers sought to reduce excess inventories. In March, some new orders were received for delivery in May, indicating that the situation may stabilize in 2H. Demand for security and automatic door sensors continues to grow at low single-digit rates.
For FY Dec-19 as a whole, management is guiding for a 6.2% increase in operating profit on a 7.2% increase in sales. Our forecast is for flat operating profit on a 2% increase in sales. Sales and profit growth should pick up over the following two years, in our estimation, but remain in single digits.
At ¥1,765 (Friday, March 29, closing price), Optex is selling at 18x our EPS estimate for FY Dec-19 and 17x our estimate for FY Dec-20. Over the past 5 years, the P/E has ranged from 13x to 36x. On a trailing 12-month basis, Japan Analytics calculates 5% upside to a no-growth valuation, which is in line with our forecast for this fiscal year. This suggests: buy either for the bounce or for the long term.
Japanese cosmetic companies showed a bit of concern in January when the inbound sales, which had been growing steadily over the past few years turned red all of a sudden.
Tourist arrivals kept their growth momentum going into January, However per capita spend by tourists has been on the decline for a couple of years
Chinese e-commerce legislation did have an impact on Japanese cosmetic companies, however, the impact wasn’t as significant for cosmetic companies as it was for some of the other retailers
Inbound and travel retail sales: back on track from February onwards
The semiconductor silicon wafer market saw continued growth in demand for all wafer diameters supported by applications for servers, data centers, automobiles and IoT applications.
While the demand for semiconductors, data centers and other IoT applications are declining, Sumco expects firm demand from power semiconductors, sensors and automotive uses. The management expects the demand from the 5G market also to aid in top-line growth.
Sumco has posted an extraordinary loss following the early termination of a long-term polysilicon purchasing agreement. The long-term contract with Osaka Titanium is expected to end in March 2019. We expect this move to help Sumco switch to cheaper polysilicon which in turn should help reduce costs. That being said, some of the long-term contracts for polysilicon are still continuing, and there is still significant inventory built-up so this impact could take four to five years to be fully realised.
Having visited the company recently, Sumco still has more potential brownfield capacity available, which we believe can be used in the event the demand picks up enabling the company to add new capacity faster than its competitors and enjoy the benefits from growing demand and increasing prices.
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Korea’s local news house Hankyung reported the names that should be included in the short list. They are Kakao, MBK Partners (with NetMarble), Tencent, Bain Capital and another foreign PE whose name isn’t disclosed. Apparently, Amazon, Comcast and EA, didn’t make the short list. Those in the short list now get a chance to do due diligence. They will then participate in the main bidding round that is scheduled for early April.
It is being reported that only Kakao and NetMarble (with MBK Partners) are truly interested in taking over Nexon’s management right. Tencent is expected to join either Kakao or NetMarble-led consortium in the end. Bain is looking into possible investment opportunities that may be created if this sale leads to a mandatory tender offer to Nexon minority shareholders. It seems safe to say that this comes down to a two-horse race: either Kakao or NetMarble.
Lyft Inc (0812823D US) has kicked off its IPO by posting its S-1 filing last Friday. Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) is Lyft’s single largest shareholder with a 13.05% stake. Rakuten has invested around $700 million to acquire its current Lyft stake and stands to make 3-4 times its investment if Lyft achieves its rumoured IPO valuation range of $20-25 billion.
Lyft’s IPO valuation range was first reported by Reuters on 20 February 2019. On the back of the news, Rakuten’s shares have so far risen around 10%. Notably, at the IPO valuation range, the Lyft stake would account for 20-25% of Rakuten’s current market cap. While the Lyft IPO will prove to be a big winner for Rakuten from an ROI perspective, we believe that from a valuation perspective, the upside is modest.
LIQUIDITY RULES – Despite the continuous stream of negative macroeconomic news from Japan and other economies, financial liquidity trends are the strongest in over two years, and much of this ‘boom’ is flowing into risk assets. Large-scale repatriation of offshore funds by US companies has also helped boost the US dollar against the yen. The Market Composite responded by rising 2.3% over the last two weeks, although only by 1% in US dollar terms.
WEAK MACRO – Net exports and higher inventories offset private investment and consumption during the fourth quarter, resulting in flat GDP growth year-on-year. January industrial production fell to the lowest level in 30 months, and, with the manufacturing PMI nearing 50, the prospect is for further weakness this quarter. Inventories continue to rise and, in North Asia, to levels last seen in 2005. Combined with the sharp fall in exports in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, export pricing in back in deflationary territory, putting further upward pressure on real interest rates. Meanwhile, January retail sales saw the largest month-on-month decline in over three years as department stores saw fewer Chinese tourists over the New Year. Equity markets are living on ‘borrowed time’.
Source: Japan Analytics
HOLD FOR NOW – This bear market rally is two months old and is maturing. The Value Traded ratio is below trend again, the RSI is neutral, and the Toraku is signalling caution. We expect another month of liquidity/weak Yen-driven strength before the economic realities begin to prevail.
MARKET/SECTOR STRATEGY- We continue to recommend an underweight position in Japan in global portfolios and favour undervalued domestically-orientated companies in the Information Technology, Internet, Media, Transportation, Healthcare and Telecommunications sectors. We would avoid or short the financial sectors Banks, Non-Bank Finance and Multi-Industry. We would underweight the Auto, Retail and Other Consumer Products sectors as consumer spending contracts further in the US, Europe, China and Japan.
Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)‘s offering and the buyback are strong symbols and practical examples of what the Corporate Governance Code wants to accomplish.
With the combination of increased hostility leading to a greater likelihood of eventual private takeout, shorts will cover and foreigners may buy, squeezing existing Descente Ltd (8114 JP) minorities up and out.
Nintendo announced (J) a Secondary Share Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding. Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the then-last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe. On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33bn worth (whichever is reached first) to be commenced the day after settlement of the Offering.
These banks (such as Bank of Kyoto) which have long-held policy cross-holdings in a Kyoto company with a diehard Kyoto cultural heritage (which can often include a diehard cross-holding culture) may have all succumbed to the new Corporate Governance Code. This is really important.
This deal is going to retail investors, quite specifically because Nintendo management and board view retail investors as both “sticky” investors and likely to largely follow management’s agenda in AGMs. Management might have misjudged how much this will get flipped.
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains. Given the size, it looks like the former though it will be difficult to get confirmation. Travis Lundy would want to be long Bank of Kyoto both outright and against the cross-holding portfolio.
NTT Docomo announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February. The buyback has already occurred. However, by the vagaries of TSE-calculated indices, they lead to index down-weightings (unless otherwise offset).
This is a very large cancellation for a very large company, so it means a selldown of – by Travis’ estimate – 21.5-22.8mm shares at the close of trading March 28th. Traders looking to tilt short NTT Docomo or tilt long NTT short NTT Docomo will have that as a tailwind.
Panalpina’s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation (EGF), made a formal request to hold an EGM prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted. The situation has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the EGF which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change.
EGF wants to pass this giving everyone their capital share percentage vote because the alternative is worse. Getting this passed would slightly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance but it would mean that the EGF could continue to block any deal it did not like. The thing is, there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants EGF that “grandfathered” exemption.
Cevian wants to block such this from going through, and to have the EGF capped at 5% like the Articles of Association suggest all should be. Cevian says that Panalpina has unlawfully maintained a grandfathering exemption from the 5% cap for the EGF. IF the EGF is capped, it means that effectively the EGF loses the ability to block deals they don’t like.
The situation is weird. It is possible that Panalpina is asking a convoluted and possibly unlawful voting structure with non-best-practice registration deadlines to vote on changing the vote structure. To Travis, this actually probably deserves a court challenge.
Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum with the announcement of a $48/share (51.7% premium to the undisturbed) acquisition proposal. Late last month Versum and Entegris announced a $9bn (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the remaining 52.5%.
It’s now in VSM’s court. Should it opt to ditch Entegris’ merger-of-equals proposal and side with Merck, it would incur a US$140mn termination fee or $1.28/share.
John DeMasi reckons Merck’s proposal is superior, however a pure cash offer vs. stock swap are not directly comparable. The prospect of Entegris substantially increasing the exchange ratio or adding a chunk of cash to the merger consideration seems remote. John expects we will see a bump in Merck’s offer to make it friendly, and a recommended deal, in short order.
Brake supplier, Wabco confirmed that it is in takeover talks with ZF Friedrichshafen, one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany. ZF and Wabco jointly develop the Evasive Manoeuvre Assist system for trucks, combining Wabco’s braking and vehicle dynamics control systems alongside ZF’s active steering technology.
The pushback is the Zeppelin Foundation, ZF’s controlling shareholder, and its aversion to taking on excess debt. Management and the foundation previously clashed over the €13.5bn TRW transaction in 2015.
Back in October last year, Hanergy Mobile Energy Holdings Group Limited (HMEH), Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s majority shareholder, announced an intention to privatise the company at “no less than HK$5/share” via cash or scrip. Hanergy has now announced the intention of HMEH to privatise the company by way of a Scheme. The ultimate intention of HMEH still remains the listing of Hanergy’s business in China. The key issue, putting aside the fact Hanergy has been suspended for near-on four years, is that the scrip consideration has no assigned value.
Long-suffering shareholders, who comprise 32.49% of shares out, have the dubious honour of holding SPV shares (with an as yet undermined jurisdiction), which may remain in A-share pre-listing purgatory; or should the Scheme fail/lapse, they will hold unlisted shares if Hanergy fails to resume trading by end-July 2019, as would be the case per recently introduced HKEx guidelines. Such an outcome affords HMEH the flexibility to potentially squeeze out minorities at a bargain price.
It is not clear why the SFC is okay with this takeover proposal, apart from simply being open to any idea to remove Hanergy from the Exchange. At a guess, the SPV consideration structure (as opposed to a straightforward cash offer) is possibly geared to reduce shareholder rights compared to those available under Bermuda Companies Act, Bermuda being where Hanergy is incorporated.
The Scheme doc, due out later this month, or early next, requires sign-off from the SFC. Presumably the SPV jurisdiction should at least be known by then. It is hard to believe an official takeover document would be dispatched boasting no determinate offer value in addition to unknown shareholder protection rights attached to the unlisted scrip.
Descente said will release its Mid-Term Plan early in an effort to encourage shareholders to not tender. For its part, Itochu has released an amendment to its original doc, saying Descente has been naughty (bad-mouthing Itochu to the press while in negotiations), and that it will wait until after the Tender Offer is completed to re-engage. Itochu effectively reserves the right to go full hostile.
ANTA’s CEO was quoted in an interview saying ANTA supports Itochu’s tender offer and management restructuring and governance initiatives because they say they believe it will lift corporate value. That means Itochu+ANTA have a functional majority if not absolute.
This should raise back end values. Descente management is quite stuck here. To Travis, there is likely some upside optionality. Some may decide to stick with the company, raising pro-ration rates.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May.
The Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years – the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down. The widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. Therefore, the IFA concluded the Offer is reasonable by referencing the premium to last close and historical pricing. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ). Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7.8%/45.4%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down.
Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer at VND 120,000 (3.5% premium to the previous close when the doc was prepared), this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG, lifting its stake to 56.69%.
The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) owns 43.31%. IF the SCIC tenders, the minimum proration is 33.38%. IF the SCIC does NOT tender their shares, this is effectively a full tender. All of your shares would be purchased.
The very recent performance has been most curious. The last 11 days – before the announcement – have seen the stock move 37.6% on 9x average volume, with little to no news to drive it as far as Travis can tell. Looks some leakage ahead of the partial offer announcement.
Travis thinks there is a non-negligible possibility that Taisho will have to bump their Tender Offer Price. And a non-negligible chance that SCIC tenders.
OYO, the largest budget hotel network in India, announced a JV with Yahoo Japan to expand its co-living rental service, “OYO Living”, to Japan. OYO will own 66.1% while YJ will own the remainder of the JV, named “Oyo Technology & Hospitality Japan”.
Rebranded as “OYO Life”, the service would be the first of its kind, in the virtually non-existent co-living market in Japan. In Japan, apartments are usually compact single-occupier units as opposed to shared spaces, which might pose a problem for OYO’s co-living model.
Assuming the model is a success and OYO Life could ramp up its capacity to around 150,000 beds in Tokyo, which is around 5% of the total apartment stock in central Tokyo, this would contribute around ¥3bn (2% of net income in FY03/18) to Yahoo Japan’s net income. There is potential for further gains, however, this would depend on how ready Tokyo is to move into a “Co-Living” culture en masse.
Ruralco has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.
Nutrien has first mover advantage, however a counter from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) is possible. The two companies have a history after Ruralco attempted to buy out Elders in 2012, but failed over a disagreement in pricing.
ACCC should not be issue to this transaction. A 2013 ruling did not oppose a Ruralco/Elders tie-up, and a similar conclusion is expected for Nutrien.
The gross/annualised spread of 0.2%/0.7% is unattractive. But at this deal price, Elders could still come over the top. Trading itself at 11.4x EV/EBITDA (according to CapIQ), upping the price by 10% would still be accretive to Elders.
Revealed in the release of notes about the Board approval of the Independent Review Committee’s review in late January was the news that Otis offered to buy the company for NT$63/share but it didn’t go anywhere. In addition, some directors – most likely the partisan ones installed in the failed board proxy fight last summer – objected to the lower minimum threshold, which is a sign they don’t want the deal to go through (because the lowering of that threshold is otherwise an unmitigated positive for minority investors).
Despite stories of a suit of breach of trust against six directors for not entertaining or pursuing offers at NT$63 by Otis and/or Schindler, the company had not received any notification from judicial authorities and has not updated the market about Tender-related matters in the last two weeks.
Travis thinks there is the small possibility of a bump to NT$63; but it is not a difficult deal to get done at the minimum threshold at NT$60.
Frasers Property (Thailand) Pcl (FPT TB)has announced a conditional voluntary tender offer for GOLD at Bt8.50/share, ~2.4% premium to last close. Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
This tender offer therefore has been initiated to consolidate the Sirivadhanabhakdi family’s holding into GOLD. Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. The tender offer will be unconditional.
The intention to delist GOLD is evident although it will be challenging for FPT to secure 90%+ in the tender offer process, given the single-digit premium to last close, and the fact GOLD traded above the current terms as recently as early December. Getting to 90% requires almost 50% of the minority to submit their shares.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 2.4%/5.9% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
Diageo announced it had approached the board of directors of Sichuan Swellfun with a proposal to increase its stake from 60% to 70% at RMB 45.00/share. This was a 19.33% premium to the last close and a 40.05% premium to the 30-day average.
On a trading basis, this is somewhat interesting. If you are quite bullish the stock, you have a partial put (and you own it already). If you are tentatively bullish A-shares, this offers you a partial put, but there is a possibility that the RMB 45.00 price creates a kind of short-term cap just because it is a sticky price in peoples’ minds.
Travis is not particularly bearish the stock despite the fact that the earnings forecasts have dropped a fair bit since he looked at this six months ago. The consensus EPS forecasts for Dec 2020 today are roughly the same as they were for Dec 2019 six months ago.
The new news on Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) is that the independent statutory auditor Nakatsuji-san has officially expressed his opposition to the Tender Offer. With the shares 19% through terms despite what appears to be no increase by the main activist in the last two weeks, the likelihood retail will tender at ¥610/share looks low, and this seems a situation where the deal may fail unless there is a bump. (link to Travis’ insight: Kosaido (7868 JP) TOB Extended)
On the 28 Feb, Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ)‘s shares went ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected, but Travis thinks they could fall further: there is no compelling reason to own the bank after it goes ex-rights to receive cash. (link to Travis’ insight: Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights)
FY18 results for PCCW, HKT, and PCPD are out. Plugging in the de-consolidated numbers, I estimate PCCW’s discount to NAV at ~37%, right on the 2 STD line. On a simple ratio (PCCW/HKT), it is again approaching an all-time low.
Still select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW’s stub ops, recording negative EBITDA in FY18, reversing the positive figure recorded in FY17. FY16’s stub EBITDA was also negative.
One positive takeaway is that the dividend pass through is holding at around 90%.
Douglas provided the one-year share price comparisons of 30 Korean holdcos and the opcos as well as changes to the foreign ownership stakes of these companies YTD. Significant changes to the foreign shareholdings of these companies sometimes lead to opportunities in the holdco/opco pair trades.
Sanghyun Park points out that Hyundai Motor Co (005380 KS)‘s Common vs. pref ratio is getting out of whack, possibly because of Elliott’s ₩4.5tn dividend demand. Both 1P and 2PB are sufficiently undervalued relative to the Common. The div yield difference to Common is also at the highest levels for both pref types. Sanghyun suggests shorting the Common and being long 1P or 2PB now. 1P is probably a safer bet, but 2PB is more liquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Hyundai Motor Share Class: Time to Short Common & Long Pref)
For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$12.3bn. This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component. A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal. The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.
Pioneer Corp (6773 JP)announced that the deal had received all relevant anti-trust approvals, and payment for shares by the Acquirer (BPAE) of the Third Party Placement was now expected to take place on March 8th.
Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)announced it has entered an S&P to sell Glow SPP1 to B. Grimm Power Service for Bt3.3bn. The P/B was not provided. This is equivalent to ~2.5% of Glow’s market cap.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Source: Company announcements. E = our estimates; C =confirmed
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Sony Corp (6758 JP) is forming a bullish descending wedge/channel that once mature will chisel out an intermediate low with scope to clear medium term breakout resistance. The tactical low near 4,400 lies just above more strategic support.
Clear pivot points will help manage positioning within the bull wedge that is in the final innings.
The tactical buy level is not that far from strategic support with a more bullish macro lean.
MACD bull divergence is not only supportive into near term weakness but also points to a breakout above medium resistance. Risk lies with Sony not looking back after hitting our tactical low target.
According to management, weak demand for factory automation sensors had a significant negative impact on sales and profits in 1Q of FY Dec-19. Also, in our estimation, it is likely to cause 1H results to fall short of guidance. But this should be in the share price, which has dropped by nearly 50% from its 52-week high.
In the year to December 2018, operating profit was up only 2.1% on a 7.0% increase in sales, largely due to an increase in machine vision marketing expenses. In January and February 2019, factory automation orders and sales dropped abruptly as customers sought to reduce excess inventories. In March, some new orders were received for delivery in May, indicating that the situation may stabilize in 2H. Demand for security and automatic door sensors continues to grow at low single-digit rates.
For FY Dec-19 as a whole, management is guiding for a 6.2% increase in operating profit on a 7.2% increase in sales. Our forecast is for flat operating profit on a 2% increase in sales. Sales and profit growth should pick up over the following two years, in our estimation, but remain in single digits.
At ¥1,765 (Friday, March 29, closing price), Optex is selling at 18x our EPS estimate for FY Dec-19 and 17x our estimate for FY Dec-20. Over the past 5 years, the P/E has ranged from 13x to 36x. On a trailing 12-month basis, Japan Analytics calculates 5% upside to a no-growth valuation, which is in line with our forecast for this fiscal year. This suggests: buy either for the bounce or for the long term.
Japanese cosmetic companies showed a bit of concern in January when the inbound sales, which had been growing steadily over the past few years turned red all of a sudden.
Tourist arrivals kept their growth momentum going into January, However per capita spend by tourists has been on the decline for a couple of years
Chinese e-commerce legislation did have an impact on Japanese cosmetic companies, however, the impact wasn’t as significant for cosmetic companies as it was for some of the other retailers
Inbound and travel retail sales: back on track from February onwards
The semiconductor silicon wafer market saw continued growth in demand for all wafer diameters supported by applications for servers, data centers, automobiles and IoT applications.
While the demand for semiconductors, data centers and other IoT applications are declining, Sumco expects firm demand from power semiconductors, sensors and automotive uses. The management expects the demand from the 5G market also to aid in top-line growth.
Sumco has posted an extraordinary loss following the early termination of a long-term polysilicon purchasing agreement. The long-term contract with Osaka Titanium is expected to end in March 2019. We expect this move to help Sumco switch to cheaper polysilicon which in turn should help reduce costs. That being said, some of the long-term contracts for polysilicon are still continuing, and there is still significant inventory built-up so this impact could take four to five years to be fully realised.
Having visited the company recently, Sumco still has more potential brownfield capacity available, which we believe can be used in the event the demand picks up enabling the company to add new capacity faster than its competitors and enjoy the benefits from growing demand and increasing prices.
The global gaming market is transitioning towards mobile gaming, which currently captures around 50% of market share. This has resulted in Korean gaming company Nexon slowly shifting its focus towards mobile games.
Over the year’s Nexon’s mobile gaming segment has grown faster than the PC online segment. When looking at the five-year revenue CAGR between the two business segments, the PC online segment has grown at a CAGR of 9.4% over FY2013-18 while the mobile games segment has grown at a double digit CAGR of 14.1% over the same period.
For the mobile gaming segment, in the future, Nexon’s primary focus includes developing mobile games based on IPs of older PC games.
The company has a steady line up of mobile games planned for FY2019, with ten titles set to release in the first half.
On our estimates, Nexon seems over-valued, currently trading at a FY1 EV/OP of 9.6x compared to its five-year historical median of 7.7x.
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According to management, weak demand for factory automation sensors had a significant negative impact on sales and profits in 1Q of FY Dec-19. Also, in our estimation, it is likely to cause 1H results to fall short of guidance. But this should be in the share price, which has dropped by nearly 50% from its 52-week high.
In the year to December 2018, operating profit was up only 2.1% on a 7.0% increase in sales, largely due to an increase in machine vision marketing expenses. In January and February 2019, factory automation orders and sales dropped abruptly as customers sought to reduce excess inventories. In March, some new orders were received for delivery in May, indicating that the situation may stabilize in 2H. Demand for security and automatic door sensors continues to grow at low single-digit rates.
For FY Dec-19 as a whole, management is guiding for a 6.2% increase in operating profit on a 7.2% increase in sales. Our forecast is for flat operating profit on a 2% increase in sales. Sales and profit growth should pick up over the following two years, in our estimation, but remain in single digits.
At ¥1,765 (Friday, March 29, closing price), Optex is selling at 18x our EPS estimate for FY Dec-19 and 17x our estimate for FY Dec-20. Over the past 5 years, the P/E has ranged from 13x to 36x. On a trailing 12-month basis, Japan Analytics calculates 5% upside to a no-growth valuation, which is in line with our forecast for this fiscal year. This suggests: buy either for the bounce or for the long term.
Japanese cosmetic companies showed a bit of concern in January when the inbound sales, which had been growing steadily over the past few years turned red all of a sudden.
Tourist arrivals kept their growth momentum going into January, However per capita spend by tourists has been on the decline for a couple of years
Chinese e-commerce legislation did have an impact on Japanese cosmetic companies, however, the impact wasn’t as significant for cosmetic companies as it was for some of the other retailers
Inbound and travel retail sales: back on track from February onwards
The semiconductor silicon wafer market saw continued growth in demand for all wafer diameters supported by applications for servers, data centers, automobiles and IoT applications.
While the demand for semiconductors, data centers and other IoT applications are declining, Sumco expects firm demand from power semiconductors, sensors and automotive uses. The management expects the demand from the 5G market also to aid in top-line growth.
Sumco has posted an extraordinary loss following the early termination of a long-term polysilicon purchasing agreement. The long-term contract with Osaka Titanium is expected to end in March 2019. We expect this move to help Sumco switch to cheaper polysilicon which in turn should help reduce costs. That being said, some of the long-term contracts for polysilicon are still continuing, and there is still significant inventory built-up so this impact could take four to five years to be fully realised.
Having visited the company recently, Sumco still has more potential brownfield capacity available, which we believe can be used in the event the demand picks up enabling the company to add new capacity faster than its competitors and enjoy the benefits from growing demand and increasing prices.
The global gaming market is transitioning towards mobile gaming, which currently captures around 50% of market share. This has resulted in Korean gaming company Nexon slowly shifting its focus towards mobile games.
Over the year’s Nexon’s mobile gaming segment has grown faster than the PC online segment. When looking at the five-year revenue CAGR between the two business segments, the PC online segment has grown at a CAGR of 9.4% over FY2013-18 while the mobile games segment has grown at a double digit CAGR of 14.1% over the same period.
For the mobile gaming segment, in the future, Nexon’s primary focus includes developing mobile games based on IPs of older PC games.
The company has a steady line up of mobile games planned for FY2019, with ten titles set to release in the first half.
On our estimates, Nexon seems over-valued, currently trading at a FY1 EV/OP of 9.6x compared to its five-year historical median of 7.7x.
This post looks at the tax situations that Nexon’s Kim may be facing for each of the two options and the signals that he may be sending with regard to his decision. Also, this post discusses how each option may impact on mandatory tender offer which is a crucial point for current massive short buildup on Nexon Japan shares.
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LIQUIDITY RULES – Despite the continuous stream of negative macroeconomic news from Japan and other economies, financial liquidity trends are the strongest in over two years, and much of this ‘boom’ is flowing into risk assets. Large-scale repatriation of offshore funds by US companies has also helped boost the US dollar against the yen. The Market Composite responded by rising 2.3% over the last two weeks, although only by 1% in US dollar terms.
WEAK MACRO – Net exports and higher inventories offset private investment and consumption during the fourth quarter, resulting in flat GDP growth year-on-year. January industrial production fell to the lowest level in 30 months, and, with the manufacturing PMI nearing 50, the prospect is for further weakness this quarter. Inventories continue to rise and, in North Asia, to levels last seen in 2005. Combined with the sharp fall in exports in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, export pricing in back in deflationary territory, putting further upward pressure on real interest rates. Meanwhile, January retail sales saw the largest month-on-month decline in over three years as department stores saw fewer Chinese tourists over the New Year. Equity markets are living on ‘borrowed time’.
Source: Japan Analytics
HOLD FOR NOW – This bear market rally is two months old and is maturing. The Value Traded ratio is below trend again, the RSI is neutral, and the Toraku is signalling caution. We expect another month of liquidity/weak Yen-driven strength before the economic realities begin to prevail.
MARKET/SECTOR STRATEGY- We continue to recommend an underweight position in Japan in global portfolios and favour undervalued domestically-orientated companies in the Information Technology, Internet, Media, Transportation, Healthcare and Telecommunications sectors. We would avoid or short the financial sectors Banks, Non-Bank Finance and Multi-Industry. We would underweight the Auto, Retail and Other Consumer Products sectors as consumer spending contracts further in the US, Europe, China and Japan.
Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)‘s offering and the buyback are strong symbols and practical examples of what the Corporate Governance Code wants to accomplish.
With the combination of increased hostility leading to a greater likelihood of eventual private takeout, shorts will cover and foreigners may buy, squeezing existing Descente Ltd (8114 JP) minorities up and out.
Nintendo announced (J) a Secondary Share Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding. Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the then-last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe. On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33bn worth (whichever is reached first) to be commenced the day after settlement of the Offering.
These banks (such as Bank of Kyoto) which have long-held policy cross-holdings in a Kyoto company with a diehard Kyoto cultural heritage (which can often include a diehard cross-holding culture) may have all succumbed to the new Corporate Governance Code. This is really important.
This deal is going to retail investors, quite specifically because Nintendo management and board view retail investors as both “sticky” investors and likely to largely follow management’s agenda in AGMs. Management might have misjudged how much this will get flipped.
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains. Given the size, it looks like the former though it will be difficult to get confirmation. Travis Lundy would want to be long Bank of Kyoto both outright and against the cross-holding portfolio.
NTT Docomo announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February. The buyback has already occurred. However, by the vagaries of TSE-calculated indices, they lead to index down-weightings (unless otherwise offset).
This is a very large cancellation for a very large company, so it means a selldown of – by Travis’ estimate – 21.5-22.8mm shares at the close of trading March 28th. Traders looking to tilt short NTT Docomo or tilt long NTT short NTT Docomo will have that as a tailwind.
Panalpina’s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation (EGF), made a formal request to hold an EGM prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted. The situation has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the EGF which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change.
EGF wants to pass this giving everyone their capital share percentage vote because the alternative is worse. Getting this passed would slightly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance but it would mean that the EGF could continue to block any deal it did not like. The thing is, there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants EGF that “grandfathered” exemption.
Cevian wants to block such this from going through, and to have the EGF capped at 5% like the Articles of Association suggest all should be. Cevian says that Panalpina has unlawfully maintained a grandfathering exemption from the 5% cap for the EGF. IF the EGF is capped, it means that effectively the EGF loses the ability to block deals they don’t like.
The situation is weird. It is possible that Panalpina is asking a convoluted and possibly unlawful voting structure with non-best-practice registration deadlines to vote on changing the vote structure. To Travis, this actually probably deserves a court challenge.
Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum with the announcement of a $48/share (51.7% premium to the undisturbed) acquisition proposal. Late last month Versum and Entegris announced a $9bn (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the remaining 52.5%.
It’s now in VSM’s court. Should it opt to ditch Entegris’ merger-of-equals proposal and side with Merck, it would incur a US$140mn termination fee or $1.28/share.
John DeMasi reckons Merck’s proposal is superior, however a pure cash offer vs. stock swap are not directly comparable. The prospect of Entegris substantially increasing the exchange ratio or adding a chunk of cash to the merger consideration seems remote. John expects we will see a bump in Merck’s offer to make it friendly, and a recommended deal, in short order.
Brake supplier, Wabco confirmed that it is in takeover talks with ZF Friedrichshafen, one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany. ZF and Wabco jointly develop the Evasive Manoeuvre Assist system for trucks, combining Wabco’s braking and vehicle dynamics control systems alongside ZF’s active steering technology.
The pushback is the Zeppelin Foundation, ZF’s controlling shareholder, and its aversion to taking on excess debt. Management and the foundation previously clashed over the €13.5bn TRW transaction in 2015.
Back in October last year, Hanergy Mobile Energy Holdings Group Limited (HMEH), Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s majority shareholder, announced an intention to privatise the company at “no less than HK$5/share” via cash or scrip. Hanergy has now announced the intention of HMEH to privatise the company by way of a Scheme. The ultimate intention of HMEH still remains the listing of Hanergy’s business in China. The key issue, putting aside the fact Hanergy has been suspended for near-on four years, is that the scrip consideration has no assigned value.
Long-suffering shareholders, who comprise 32.49% of shares out, have the dubious honour of holding SPV shares (with an as yet undermined jurisdiction), which may remain in A-share pre-listing purgatory; or should the Scheme fail/lapse, they will hold unlisted shares if Hanergy fails to resume trading by end-July 2019, as would be the case per recently introduced HKEx guidelines. Such an outcome affords HMEH the flexibility to potentially squeeze out minorities at a bargain price.
It is not clear why the SFC is okay with this takeover proposal, apart from simply being open to any idea to remove Hanergy from the Exchange. At a guess, the SPV consideration structure (as opposed to a straightforward cash offer) is possibly geared to reduce shareholder rights compared to those available under Bermuda Companies Act, Bermuda being where Hanergy is incorporated.
The Scheme doc, due out later this month, or early next, requires sign-off from the SFC. Presumably the SPV jurisdiction should at least be known by then. It is hard to believe an official takeover document would be dispatched boasting no determinate offer value in addition to unknown shareholder protection rights attached to the unlisted scrip.
Descente said will release its Mid-Term Plan early in an effort to encourage shareholders to not tender. For its part, Itochu has released an amendment to its original doc, saying Descente has been naughty (bad-mouthing Itochu to the press while in negotiations), and that it will wait until after the Tender Offer is completed to re-engage. Itochu effectively reserves the right to go full hostile.
ANTA’s CEO was quoted in an interview saying ANTA supports Itochu’s tender offer and management restructuring and governance initiatives because they say they believe it will lift corporate value. That means Itochu+ANTA have a functional majority if not absolute.
This should raise back end values. Descente management is quite stuck here. To Travis, there is likely some upside optionality. Some may decide to stick with the company, raising pro-ration rates.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May.
The Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years – the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down. The widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. Therefore, the IFA concluded the Offer is reasonable by referencing the premium to last close and historical pricing. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ). Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7.8%/45.4%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down.
Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer at VND 120,000 (3.5% premium to the previous close when the doc was prepared), this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG, lifting its stake to 56.69%.
The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) owns 43.31%. IF the SCIC tenders, the minimum proration is 33.38%. IF the SCIC does NOT tender their shares, this is effectively a full tender. All of your shares would be purchased.
The very recent performance has been most curious. The last 11 days – before the announcement – have seen the stock move 37.6% on 9x average volume, with little to no news to drive it as far as Travis can tell. Looks some leakage ahead of the partial offer announcement.
Travis thinks there is a non-negligible possibility that Taisho will have to bump their Tender Offer Price. And a non-negligible chance that SCIC tenders.
OYO, the largest budget hotel network in India, announced a JV with Yahoo Japan to expand its co-living rental service, “OYO Living”, to Japan. OYO will own 66.1% while YJ will own the remainder of the JV, named “Oyo Technology & Hospitality Japan”.
Rebranded as “OYO Life”, the service would be the first of its kind, in the virtually non-existent co-living market in Japan. In Japan, apartments are usually compact single-occupier units as opposed to shared spaces, which might pose a problem for OYO’s co-living model.
Assuming the model is a success and OYO Life could ramp up its capacity to around 150,000 beds in Tokyo, which is around 5% of the total apartment stock in central Tokyo, this would contribute around ¥3bn (2% of net income in FY03/18) to Yahoo Japan’s net income. There is potential for further gains, however, this would depend on how ready Tokyo is to move into a “Co-Living” culture en masse.
Ruralco has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.
Nutrien has first mover advantage, however a counter from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) is possible. The two companies have a history after Ruralco attempted to buy out Elders in 2012, but failed over a disagreement in pricing.
ACCC should not be issue to this transaction. A 2013 ruling did not oppose a Ruralco/Elders tie-up, and a similar conclusion is expected for Nutrien.
The gross/annualised spread of 0.2%/0.7% is unattractive. But at this deal price, Elders could still come over the top. Trading itself at 11.4x EV/EBITDA (according to CapIQ), upping the price by 10% would still be accretive to Elders.
Revealed in the release of notes about the Board approval of the Independent Review Committee’s review in late January was the news that Otis offered to buy the company for NT$63/share but it didn’t go anywhere. In addition, some directors – most likely the partisan ones installed in the failed board proxy fight last summer – objected to the lower minimum threshold, which is a sign they don’t want the deal to go through (because the lowering of that threshold is otherwise an unmitigated positive for minority investors).
Despite stories of a suit of breach of trust against six directors for not entertaining or pursuing offers at NT$63 by Otis and/or Schindler, the company had not received any notification from judicial authorities and has not updated the market about Tender-related matters in the last two weeks.
Travis thinks there is the small possibility of a bump to NT$63; but it is not a difficult deal to get done at the minimum threshold at NT$60.
Frasers Property (Thailand) Pcl (FPT TB)has announced a conditional voluntary tender offer for GOLD at Bt8.50/share, ~2.4% premium to last close. Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
This tender offer therefore has been initiated to consolidate the Sirivadhanabhakdi family’s holding into GOLD. Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. The tender offer will be unconditional.
The intention to delist GOLD is evident although it will be challenging for FPT to secure 90%+ in the tender offer process, given the single-digit premium to last close, and the fact GOLD traded above the current terms as recently as early December. Getting to 90% requires almost 50% of the minority to submit their shares.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 2.4%/5.9% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
Diageo announced it had approached the board of directors of Sichuan Swellfun with a proposal to increase its stake from 60% to 70% at RMB 45.00/share. This was a 19.33% premium to the last close and a 40.05% premium to the 30-day average.
On a trading basis, this is somewhat interesting. If you are quite bullish the stock, you have a partial put (and you own it already). If you are tentatively bullish A-shares, this offers you a partial put, but there is a possibility that the RMB 45.00 price creates a kind of short-term cap just because it is a sticky price in peoples’ minds.
Travis is not particularly bearish the stock despite the fact that the earnings forecasts have dropped a fair bit since he looked at this six months ago. The consensus EPS forecasts for Dec 2020 today are roughly the same as they were for Dec 2019 six months ago.
The new news on Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) is that the independent statutory auditor Nakatsuji-san has officially expressed his opposition to the Tender Offer. With the shares 19% through terms despite what appears to be no increase by the main activist in the last two weeks, the likelihood retail will tender at ¥610/share looks low, and this seems a situation where the deal may fail unless there is a bump. (link to Travis’ insight: Kosaido (7868 JP) TOB Extended)
On the 28 Feb, Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ)‘s shares went ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected, but Travis thinks they could fall further: there is no compelling reason to own the bank after it goes ex-rights to receive cash. (link to Travis’ insight: Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights)
FY18 results for PCCW, HKT, and PCPD are out. Plugging in the de-consolidated numbers, I estimate PCCW’s discount to NAV at ~37%, right on the 2 STD line. On a simple ratio (PCCW/HKT), it is again approaching an all-time low.
Still select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW’s stub ops, recording negative EBITDA in FY18, reversing the positive figure recorded in FY17. FY16’s stub EBITDA was also negative.
One positive takeaway is that the dividend pass through is holding at around 90%.
Douglas provided the one-year share price comparisons of 30 Korean holdcos and the opcos as well as changes to the foreign ownership stakes of these companies YTD. Significant changes to the foreign shareholdings of these companies sometimes lead to opportunities in the holdco/opco pair trades.
Sanghyun Park points out that Hyundai Motor Co (005380 KS)‘s Common vs. pref ratio is getting out of whack, possibly because of Elliott’s ₩4.5tn dividend demand. Both 1P and 2PB are sufficiently undervalued relative to the Common. The div yield difference to Common is also at the highest levels for both pref types. Sanghyun suggests shorting the Common and being long 1P or 2PB now. 1P is probably a safer bet, but 2PB is more liquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Hyundai Motor Share Class: Time to Short Common & Long Pref)
For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$12.3bn. This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component. A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal. The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.
Pioneer Corp (6773 JP)announced that the deal had received all relevant anti-trust approvals, and payment for shares by the Acquirer (BPAE) of the Third Party Placement was now expected to take place on March 8th.
Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)announced it has entered an S&P to sell Glow SPP1 to B. Grimm Power Service for Bt3.3bn. The P/B was not provided. This is equivalent to ~2.5% of Glow’s market cap.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
A visit in Jakarta to the Blue Bird (BIRD IJ) office was well-timed as the company is close to the conclusion of two corporate actions, as well as an interesting extension to its relationship with Go-Jek Indonesia (1379371D IJ).
Both acquisitions are synergistic with its existing business and represent long-term opportunities rather than an immediate significant boost to earnings.
The company’s underlying fundamentals continue to improve with fleet utilisation up versus last year in 4Q18, as was the average revenue per taxi.
The company continues to see the benefits of its tie-up with Go-Jek, which will soon morph into something even more significant.
Blue Bird (BIRD IJ) remains an interesting way to play the rising levels of affluence amongst the rising middle classes in Indonesia. the company is close to completing two corporate actions including a new venture into the car auction business with Mitsubishi UFJ and the acquisition of an intercity bus company. It is also close to signing an extension and expansion of its relationship with Go-Jek, which will help to cement its position in the online ride-hailing space. Underlying fundamentals continue to improve both in terms of fleet utilisation and average revenue per taxi. According to Capital IQ consensus, the company trades on 14.9x FY19E PER and 13.7x FY20E PER, with forecast EPS growth of +16.2% and +8.9% for FY19E and FY20E respectively. The near-term completion of two corporate actions and an extension of its agreement with Go-Jek Indonesia (1379371D IJ) should provide positive catalysts for the share price coupled with improving ridership, average revenue per taxi, and fleet utilisation.
In this report, we provide a valuation analysis of Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP). A key question is “How much are investors willing to pay for Nexon which would drive higher EV/EBIT multiples and inversely reduce the earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV)?”
In our view, we believe that investors would be comfortable with earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV) of about 7-9% given the risks of operating a global game franchise such as Nexon. This would suggest EV/EBIT of about 11x to 14x, using 2019 estimates. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that at the top end of the EV/EBIT valuation range of 14x, this would imply market cap of 1,905 billion yen, which would be 21% higher than current market cap. As such, despite Nexon’s share price rising 25% YTD, we think there could be further upside in the months ahead.
Having digested plethora of public information on this deal (but not privy to all the bankers’ discussions) in the past several days, we believe that the US based companies including Amazon and Comcast are better positioned to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon, rather than the consortium led by Tencent.
We believe there is an intense Chinese government pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. (This is just our guess based on public information).The game industry is not strategically important to China, unlike other industries such as semiconductors, energy, or financial. Depending on how much controlling stake Tencent wants to take, it is likely to involve several billions of dollars ($4 billion to $7 billion for Tencent, for example). This is a lot of money. Plus, China Inc’s balance sheet is not as strong as pre-GFC of 2008. Forking over $4 to $7 billion out of China into Japan/Korea would be meaningful. In short, although Tencent would like to do this deal, we think that behind the scenes, the Chinese government appears to be putting intense pressure on Tencent to not do this deal.
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Japanese cosmetic companies showed a bit of concern in January when the inbound sales, which had been growing steadily over the past few years turned red all of a sudden.
Tourist arrivals kept their growth momentum going into January, However per capita spend by tourists has been on the decline for a couple of years
Chinese e-commerce legislation did have an impact on Japanese cosmetic companies, however, the impact wasn’t as significant for cosmetic companies as it was for some of the other retailers
Inbound and travel retail sales: back on track from February onwards
The semiconductor silicon wafer market saw continued growth in demand for all wafer diameters supported by applications for servers, data centers, automobiles and IoT applications.
While the demand for semiconductors, data centers and other IoT applications are declining, Sumco expects firm demand from power semiconductors, sensors and automotive uses. The management expects the demand from the 5G market also to aid in top-line growth.
Sumco has posted an extraordinary loss following the early termination of a long-term polysilicon purchasing agreement. The long-term contract with Osaka Titanium is expected to end in March 2019. We expect this move to help Sumco switch to cheaper polysilicon which in turn should help reduce costs. That being said, some of the long-term contracts for polysilicon are still continuing, and there is still significant inventory built-up so this impact could take four to five years to be fully realised.
Having visited the company recently, Sumco still has more potential brownfield capacity available, which we believe can be used in the event the demand picks up enabling the company to add new capacity faster than its competitors and enjoy the benefits from growing demand and increasing prices.
The global gaming market is transitioning towards mobile gaming, which currently captures around 50% of market share. This has resulted in Korean gaming company Nexon slowly shifting its focus towards mobile games.
Over the year’s Nexon’s mobile gaming segment has grown faster than the PC online segment. When looking at the five-year revenue CAGR between the two business segments, the PC online segment has grown at a CAGR of 9.4% over FY2013-18 while the mobile games segment has grown at a double digit CAGR of 14.1% over the same period.
For the mobile gaming segment, in the future, Nexon’s primary focus includes developing mobile games based on IPs of older PC games.
The company has a steady line up of mobile games planned for FY2019, with ten titles set to release in the first half.
On our estimates, Nexon seems over-valued, currently trading at a FY1 EV/OP of 9.6x compared to its five-year historical median of 7.7x.
This post looks at the tax situations that Nexon’s Kim may be facing for each of the two options and the signals that he may be sending with regard to his decision. Also, this post discusses how each option may impact on mandatory tender offer which is a crucial point for current massive short buildup on Nexon Japan shares.
Global Liquidity bottoming out, but Central Banks not yet easing
US Fed only withdrew $30bn in Q1, versus $350 bn in Q4
PBoC still tightening through OMOs
ECB on ‘pause’
QE4 is coming in 2019, but no evidence it has started yet
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
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Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)‘s offering and the buyback are strong symbols and practical examples of what the Corporate Governance Code wants to accomplish.
With the combination of increased hostility leading to a greater likelihood of eventual private takeout, shorts will cover and foreigners may buy, squeezing existing Descente Ltd (8114 JP) minorities up and out.
Nintendo announced (J) a Secondary Share Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding. Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the then-last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe. On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33bn worth (whichever is reached first) to be commenced the day after settlement of the Offering.
These banks (such as Bank of Kyoto) which have long-held policy cross-holdings in a Kyoto company with a diehard Kyoto cultural heritage (which can often include a diehard cross-holding culture) may have all succumbed to the new Corporate Governance Code. This is really important.
This deal is going to retail investors, quite specifically because Nintendo management and board view retail investors as both “sticky” investors and likely to largely follow management’s agenda in AGMs. Management might have misjudged how much this will get flipped.
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains. Given the size, it looks like the former though it will be difficult to get confirmation. Travis Lundy would want to be long Bank of Kyoto both outright and against the cross-holding portfolio.
NTT Docomo announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February. The buyback has already occurred. However, by the vagaries of TSE-calculated indices, they lead to index down-weightings (unless otherwise offset).
This is a very large cancellation for a very large company, so it means a selldown of – by Travis’ estimate – 21.5-22.8mm shares at the close of trading March 28th. Traders looking to tilt short NTT Docomo or tilt long NTT short NTT Docomo will have that as a tailwind.
Panalpina’s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation (EGF), made a formal request to hold an EGM prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted. The situation has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the EGF which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change.
EGF wants to pass this giving everyone their capital share percentage vote because the alternative is worse. Getting this passed would slightly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance but it would mean that the EGF could continue to block any deal it did not like. The thing is, there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants EGF that “grandfathered” exemption.
Cevian wants to block such this from going through, and to have the EGF capped at 5% like the Articles of Association suggest all should be. Cevian says that Panalpina has unlawfully maintained a grandfathering exemption from the 5% cap for the EGF. IF the EGF is capped, it means that effectively the EGF loses the ability to block deals they don’t like.
The situation is weird. It is possible that Panalpina is asking a convoluted and possibly unlawful voting structure with non-best-practice registration deadlines to vote on changing the vote structure. To Travis, this actually probably deserves a court challenge.
Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum with the announcement of a $48/share (51.7% premium to the undisturbed) acquisition proposal. Late last month Versum and Entegris announced a $9bn (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the remaining 52.5%.
It’s now in VSM’s court. Should it opt to ditch Entegris’ merger-of-equals proposal and side with Merck, it would incur a US$140mn termination fee or $1.28/share.
John DeMasi reckons Merck’s proposal is superior, however a pure cash offer vs. stock swap are not directly comparable. The prospect of Entegris substantially increasing the exchange ratio or adding a chunk of cash to the merger consideration seems remote. John expects we will see a bump in Merck’s offer to make it friendly, and a recommended deal, in short order.
Brake supplier, Wabco confirmed that it is in takeover talks with ZF Friedrichshafen, one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany. ZF and Wabco jointly develop the Evasive Manoeuvre Assist system for trucks, combining Wabco’s braking and vehicle dynamics control systems alongside ZF’s active steering technology.
The pushback is the Zeppelin Foundation, ZF’s controlling shareholder, and its aversion to taking on excess debt. Management and the foundation previously clashed over the €13.5bn TRW transaction in 2015.
Back in October last year, Hanergy Mobile Energy Holdings Group Limited (HMEH), Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s majority shareholder, announced an intention to privatise the company at “no less than HK$5/share” via cash or scrip. Hanergy has now announced the intention of HMEH to privatise the company by way of a Scheme. The ultimate intention of HMEH still remains the listing of Hanergy’s business in China. The key issue, putting aside the fact Hanergy has been suspended for near-on four years, is that the scrip consideration has no assigned value.
Long-suffering shareholders, who comprise 32.49% of shares out, have the dubious honour of holding SPV shares (with an as yet undermined jurisdiction), which may remain in A-share pre-listing purgatory; or should the Scheme fail/lapse, they will hold unlisted shares if Hanergy fails to resume trading by end-July 2019, as would be the case per recently introduced HKEx guidelines. Such an outcome affords HMEH the flexibility to potentially squeeze out minorities at a bargain price.
It is not clear why the SFC is okay with this takeover proposal, apart from simply being open to any idea to remove Hanergy from the Exchange. At a guess, the SPV consideration structure (as opposed to a straightforward cash offer) is possibly geared to reduce shareholder rights compared to those available under Bermuda Companies Act, Bermuda being where Hanergy is incorporated.
The Scheme doc, due out later this month, or early next, requires sign-off from the SFC. Presumably the SPV jurisdiction should at least be known by then. It is hard to believe an official takeover document would be dispatched boasting no determinate offer value in addition to unknown shareholder protection rights attached to the unlisted scrip.
Descente said will release its Mid-Term Plan early in an effort to encourage shareholders to not tender. For its part, Itochu has released an amendment to its original doc, saying Descente has been naughty (bad-mouthing Itochu to the press while in negotiations), and that it will wait until after the Tender Offer is completed to re-engage. Itochu effectively reserves the right to go full hostile.
ANTA’s CEO was quoted in an interview saying ANTA supports Itochu’s tender offer and management restructuring and governance initiatives because they say they believe it will lift corporate value. That means Itochu+ANTA have a functional majority if not absolute.
This should raise back end values. Descente management is quite stuck here. To Travis, there is likely some upside optionality. Some may decide to stick with the company, raising pro-ration rates.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May.
The Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years – the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down. The widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. Therefore, the IFA concluded the Offer is reasonable by referencing the premium to last close and historical pricing. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ). Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7.8%/45.4%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down.
Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer at VND 120,000 (3.5% premium to the previous close when the doc was prepared), this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG, lifting its stake to 56.69%.
The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) owns 43.31%. IF the SCIC tenders, the minimum proration is 33.38%. IF the SCIC does NOT tender their shares, this is effectively a full tender. All of your shares would be purchased.
The very recent performance has been most curious. The last 11 days – before the announcement – have seen the stock move 37.6% on 9x average volume, with little to no news to drive it as far as Travis can tell. Looks some leakage ahead of the partial offer announcement.
Travis thinks there is a non-negligible possibility that Taisho will have to bump their Tender Offer Price. And a non-negligible chance that SCIC tenders.
OYO, the largest budget hotel network in India, announced a JV with Yahoo Japan to expand its co-living rental service, “OYO Living”, to Japan. OYO will own 66.1% while YJ will own the remainder of the JV, named “Oyo Technology & Hospitality Japan”.
Rebranded as “OYO Life”, the service would be the first of its kind, in the virtually non-existent co-living market in Japan. In Japan, apartments are usually compact single-occupier units as opposed to shared spaces, which might pose a problem for OYO’s co-living model.
Assuming the model is a success and OYO Life could ramp up its capacity to around 150,000 beds in Tokyo, which is around 5% of the total apartment stock in central Tokyo, this would contribute around ¥3bn (2% of net income in FY03/18) to Yahoo Japan’s net income. There is potential for further gains, however, this would depend on how ready Tokyo is to move into a “Co-Living” culture en masse.
Ruralco has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.
Nutrien has first mover advantage, however a counter from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) is possible. The two companies have a history after Ruralco attempted to buy out Elders in 2012, but failed over a disagreement in pricing.
ACCC should not be issue to this transaction. A 2013 ruling did not oppose a Ruralco/Elders tie-up, and a similar conclusion is expected for Nutrien.
The gross/annualised spread of 0.2%/0.7% is unattractive. But at this deal price, Elders could still come over the top. Trading itself at 11.4x EV/EBITDA (according to CapIQ), upping the price by 10% would still be accretive to Elders.
Revealed in the release of notes about the Board approval of the Independent Review Committee’s review in late January was the news that Otis offered to buy the company for NT$63/share but it didn’t go anywhere. In addition, some directors – most likely the partisan ones installed in the failed board proxy fight last summer – objected to the lower minimum threshold, which is a sign they don’t want the deal to go through (because the lowering of that threshold is otherwise an unmitigated positive for minority investors).
Despite stories of a suit of breach of trust against six directors for not entertaining or pursuing offers at NT$63 by Otis and/or Schindler, the company had not received any notification from judicial authorities and has not updated the market about Tender-related matters in the last two weeks.
Travis thinks there is the small possibility of a bump to NT$63; but it is not a difficult deal to get done at the minimum threshold at NT$60.
Frasers Property (Thailand) Pcl (FPT TB)has announced a conditional voluntary tender offer for GOLD at Bt8.50/share, ~2.4% premium to last close. Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
This tender offer therefore has been initiated to consolidate the Sirivadhanabhakdi family’s holding into GOLD. Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. The tender offer will be unconditional.
The intention to delist GOLD is evident although it will be challenging for FPT to secure 90%+ in the tender offer process, given the single-digit premium to last close, and the fact GOLD traded above the current terms as recently as early December. Getting to 90% requires almost 50% of the minority to submit their shares.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 2.4%/5.9% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
Diageo announced it had approached the board of directors of Sichuan Swellfun with a proposal to increase its stake from 60% to 70% at RMB 45.00/share. This was a 19.33% premium to the last close and a 40.05% premium to the 30-day average.
On a trading basis, this is somewhat interesting. If you are quite bullish the stock, you have a partial put (and you own it already). If you are tentatively bullish A-shares, this offers you a partial put, but there is a possibility that the RMB 45.00 price creates a kind of short-term cap just because it is a sticky price in peoples’ minds.
Travis is not particularly bearish the stock despite the fact that the earnings forecasts have dropped a fair bit since he looked at this six months ago. The consensus EPS forecasts for Dec 2020 today are roughly the same as they were for Dec 2019 six months ago.
The new news on Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) is that the independent statutory auditor Nakatsuji-san has officially expressed his opposition to the Tender Offer. With the shares 19% through terms despite what appears to be no increase by the main activist in the last two weeks, the likelihood retail will tender at ¥610/share looks low, and this seems a situation where the deal may fail unless there is a bump. (link to Travis’ insight: Kosaido (7868 JP) TOB Extended)
On the 28 Feb, Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ)‘s shares went ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected, but Travis thinks they could fall further: there is no compelling reason to own the bank after it goes ex-rights to receive cash. (link to Travis’ insight: Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights)
FY18 results for PCCW, HKT, and PCPD are out. Plugging in the de-consolidated numbers, I estimate PCCW’s discount to NAV at ~37%, right on the 2 STD line. On a simple ratio (PCCW/HKT), it is again approaching an all-time low.
Still select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW’s stub ops, recording negative EBITDA in FY18, reversing the positive figure recorded in FY17. FY16’s stub EBITDA was also negative.
One positive takeaway is that the dividend pass through is holding at around 90%.
Douglas provided the one-year share price comparisons of 30 Korean holdcos and the opcos as well as changes to the foreign ownership stakes of these companies YTD. Significant changes to the foreign shareholdings of these companies sometimes lead to opportunities in the holdco/opco pair trades.
Sanghyun Park points out that Hyundai Motor Co (005380 KS)‘s Common vs. pref ratio is getting out of whack, possibly because of Elliott’s ₩4.5tn dividend demand. Both 1P and 2PB are sufficiently undervalued relative to the Common. The div yield difference to Common is also at the highest levels for both pref types. Sanghyun suggests shorting the Common and being long 1P or 2PB now. 1P is probably a safer bet, but 2PB is more liquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Hyundai Motor Share Class: Time to Short Common & Long Pref)
For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$12.3bn. This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component. A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal. The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.
Pioneer Corp (6773 JP)announced that the deal had received all relevant anti-trust approvals, and payment for shares by the Acquirer (BPAE) of the Third Party Placement was now expected to take place on March 8th.
Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)announced it has entered an S&P to sell Glow SPP1 to B. Grimm Power Service for Bt3.3bn. The P/B was not provided. This is equivalent to ~2.5% of Glow’s market cap.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
A visit in Jakarta to the Blue Bird (BIRD IJ) office was well-timed as the company is close to the conclusion of two corporate actions, as well as an interesting extension to its relationship with Go-Jek Indonesia (1379371D IJ).
Both acquisitions are synergistic with its existing business and represent long-term opportunities rather than an immediate significant boost to earnings.
The company’s underlying fundamentals continue to improve with fleet utilisation up versus last year in 4Q18, as was the average revenue per taxi.
The company continues to see the benefits of its tie-up with Go-Jek, which will soon morph into something even more significant.
Blue Bird (BIRD IJ) remains an interesting way to play the rising levels of affluence amongst the rising middle classes in Indonesia. the company is close to completing two corporate actions including a new venture into the car auction business with Mitsubishi UFJ and the acquisition of an intercity bus company. It is also close to signing an extension and expansion of its relationship with Go-Jek, which will help to cement its position in the online ride-hailing space. Underlying fundamentals continue to improve both in terms of fleet utilisation and average revenue per taxi. According to Capital IQ consensus, the company trades on 14.9x FY19E PER and 13.7x FY20E PER, with forecast EPS growth of +16.2% and +8.9% for FY19E and FY20E respectively. The near-term completion of two corporate actions and an extension of its agreement with Go-Jek Indonesia (1379371D IJ) should provide positive catalysts for the share price coupled with improving ridership, average revenue per taxi, and fleet utilisation.
In this report, we provide a valuation analysis of Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP). A key question is “How much are investors willing to pay for Nexon which would drive higher EV/EBIT multiples and inversely reduce the earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV)?”
In our view, we believe that investors would be comfortable with earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV) of about 7-9% given the risks of operating a global game franchise such as Nexon. This would suggest EV/EBIT of about 11x to 14x, using 2019 estimates. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that at the top end of the EV/EBIT valuation range of 14x, this would imply market cap of 1,905 billion yen, which would be 21% higher than current market cap. As such, despite Nexon’s share price rising 25% YTD, we think there could be further upside in the months ahead.
Having digested plethora of public information on this deal (but not privy to all the bankers’ discussions) in the past several days, we believe that the US based companies including Amazon and Comcast are better positioned to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon, rather than the consortium led by Tencent.
We believe there is an intense Chinese government pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. (This is just our guess based on public information).The game industry is not strategically important to China, unlike other industries such as semiconductors, energy, or financial. Depending on how much controlling stake Tencent wants to take, it is likely to involve several billions of dollars ($4 billion to $7 billion for Tencent, for example). This is a lot of money. Plus, China Inc’s balance sheet is not as strong as pre-GFC of 2008. Forking over $4 to $7 billion out of China into Japan/Korea would be meaningful. In short, although Tencent would like to do this deal, we think that behind the scenes, the Chinese government appears to be putting intense pressure on Tencent to not do this deal.
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The semiconductor silicon wafer market saw continued growth in demand for all wafer diameters supported by applications for servers, data centers, automobiles and IoT applications.
While the demand for semiconductors, data centers and other IoT applications are declining, Sumco expects firm demand from power semiconductors, sensors and automotive uses. The management expects the demand from the 5G market also to aid in top-line growth.
Sumco has posted an extraordinary loss following the early termination of a long-term polysilicon purchasing agreement. The long-term contract with Osaka Titanium is expected to end in March 2019. We expect this move to help Sumco switch to cheaper polysilicon which in turn should help reduce costs. That being said, some of the long-term contracts for polysilicon are still continuing, and there is still significant inventory built-up so this impact could take four to five years to be fully realised.
Having visited the company recently, Sumco still has more potential brownfield capacity available, which we believe can be used in the event the demand picks up enabling the company to add new capacity faster than its competitors and enjoy the benefits from growing demand and increasing prices.
The global gaming market is transitioning towards mobile gaming, which currently captures around 50% of market share. This has resulted in Korean gaming company Nexon slowly shifting its focus towards mobile games.
Over the year’s Nexon’s mobile gaming segment has grown faster than the PC online segment. When looking at the five-year revenue CAGR between the two business segments, the PC online segment has grown at a CAGR of 9.4% over FY2013-18 while the mobile games segment has grown at a double digit CAGR of 14.1% over the same period.
For the mobile gaming segment, in the future, Nexon’s primary focus includes developing mobile games based on IPs of older PC games.
The company has a steady line up of mobile games planned for FY2019, with ten titles set to release in the first half.
On our estimates, Nexon seems over-valued, currently trading at a FY1 EV/OP of 9.6x compared to its five-year historical median of 7.7x.
This post looks at the tax situations that Nexon’s Kim may be facing for each of the two options and the signals that he may be sending with regard to his decision. Also, this post discusses how each option may impact on mandatory tender offer which is a crucial point for current massive short buildup on Nexon Japan shares.
The rapidly improving outlook in the LNG industry over the last few years, reinforced towards the end of 2017 by the unexpected growth of demand from China, has set off a proliferation of new LNG projects especially from the US (Exhibit 1).
In its latest LNG Outlook report, Royal Dutch Shell (RDSA LN) is projecting from 2023 onwards a significant gap between the future LNG demand and the existing supply including the capacity under construction that could require up to 100mtpa of new LNG project sanctions by 2023.
The race to gain market share in the projected LNG demand-supply gap has produced an aggregated capacity of proposed new projects of up to 475mtpa, a number larger than the total LNG traded volume in 2018 of 319mtpa and way above the capacity required to meet the future growth in LNG demand.
Exhibit 1: Funnel of proposed LNG projects getting bigger
Source: Energy Market Square, interpretation of data from Shell LNG Outlook 2019, public filings. Higher probability rating depending on oil majors backing, level of offtake agreements, positive news flow catalysts (e.g. regulatory approval, equity financing, EPC agreements). Demand projection assumes 90% capacity utilization. Bubble size proportional to project capacity. The position of the bubbles within the probability ranges is random.
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A visit in Jakarta to the Blue Bird (BIRD IJ) office was well-timed as the company is close to the conclusion of two corporate actions, as well as an interesting extension to its relationship with Go-Jek Indonesia (1379371D IJ).
Both acquisitions are synergistic with its existing business and represent long-term opportunities rather than an immediate significant boost to earnings.
The company’s underlying fundamentals continue to improve with fleet utilisation up versus last year in 4Q18, as was the average revenue per taxi.
The company continues to see the benefits of its tie-up with Go-Jek, which will soon morph into something even more significant.
Blue Bird (BIRD IJ) remains an interesting way to play the rising levels of affluence amongst the rising middle classes in Indonesia. the company is close to completing two corporate actions including a new venture into the car auction business with Mitsubishi UFJ and the acquisition of an intercity bus company. It is also close to signing an extension and expansion of its relationship with Go-Jek, which will help to cement its position in the online ride-hailing space. Underlying fundamentals continue to improve both in terms of fleet utilisation and average revenue per taxi. According to Capital IQ consensus, the company trades on 14.9x FY19E PER and 13.7x FY20E PER, with forecast EPS growth of +16.2% and +8.9% for FY19E and FY20E respectively. The near-term completion of two corporate actions and an extension of its agreement with Go-Jek Indonesia (1379371D IJ) should provide positive catalysts for the share price coupled with improving ridership, average revenue per taxi, and fleet utilisation.
In this report, we provide a valuation analysis of Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP). A key question is “How much are investors willing to pay for Nexon which would drive higher EV/EBIT multiples and inversely reduce the earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV)?”
In our view, we believe that investors would be comfortable with earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV) of about 7-9% given the risks of operating a global game franchise such as Nexon. This would suggest EV/EBIT of about 11x to 14x, using 2019 estimates. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that at the top end of the EV/EBIT valuation range of 14x, this would imply market cap of 1,905 billion yen, which would be 21% higher than current market cap. As such, despite Nexon’s share price rising 25% YTD, we think there could be further upside in the months ahead.
Having digested plethora of public information on this deal (but not privy to all the bankers’ discussions) in the past several days, we believe that the US based companies including Amazon and Comcast are better positioned to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon, rather than the consortium led by Tencent.
We believe there is an intense Chinese government pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. (This is just our guess based on public information).The game industry is not strategically important to China, unlike other industries such as semiconductors, energy, or financial. Depending on how much controlling stake Tencent wants to take, it is likely to involve several billions of dollars ($4 billion to $7 billion for Tencent, for example). This is a lot of money. Plus, China Inc’s balance sheet is not as strong as pre-GFC of 2008. Forking over $4 to $7 billion out of China into Japan/Korea would be meaningful. In short, although Tencent would like to do this deal, we think that behind the scenes, the Chinese government appears to be putting intense pressure on Tencent to not do this deal.
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A visit in Jakarta to the Blue Bird (BIRD IJ) office was well-timed as the company is close to the conclusion of two corporate actions, as well as an interesting extension to its relationship with Go-Jek Indonesia (1379371D IJ).
Both acquisitions are synergistic with its existing business and represent long-term opportunities rather than an immediate significant boost to earnings.
The company’s underlying fundamentals continue to improve with fleet utilisation up versus last year in 4Q18, as was the average revenue per taxi.
The company continues to see the benefits of its tie-up with Go-Jek, which will soon morph into something even more significant.
Blue Bird (BIRD IJ) remains an interesting way to play the rising levels of affluence amongst the rising middle classes in Indonesia. the company is close to completing two corporate actions including a new venture into the car auction business with Mitsubishi UFJ and the acquisition of an intercity bus company. It is also close to signing an extension and expansion of its relationship with Go-Jek, which will help to cement its position in the online ride-hailing space. Underlying fundamentals continue to improve both in terms of fleet utilisation and average revenue per taxi. According to Capital IQ consensus, the company trades on 14.9x FY19E PER and 13.7x FY20E PER, with forecast EPS growth of +16.2% and +8.9% for FY19E and FY20E respectively. The near-term completion of two corporate actions and an extension of its agreement with Go-Jek Indonesia (1379371D IJ) should provide positive catalysts for the share price coupled with improving ridership, average revenue per taxi, and fleet utilisation.
In this report, we provide a valuation analysis of Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP). A key question is “How much are investors willing to pay for Nexon which would drive higher EV/EBIT multiples and inversely reduce the earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV)?”
In our view, we believe that investors would be comfortable with earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV) of about 7-9% given the risks of operating a global game franchise such as Nexon. This would suggest EV/EBIT of about 11x to 14x, using 2019 estimates. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that at the top end of the EV/EBIT valuation range of 14x, this would imply market cap of 1,905 billion yen, which would be 21% higher than current market cap. As such, despite Nexon’s share price rising 25% YTD, we think there could be further upside in the months ahead.
Having digested plethora of public information on this deal (but not privy to all the bankers’ discussions) in the past several days, we believe that the US based companies including Amazon and Comcast are better positioned to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon, rather than the consortium led by Tencent.
We believe there is an intense Chinese government pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. (This is just our guess based on public information).The game industry is not strategically important to China, unlike other industries such as semiconductors, energy, or financial. Depending on how much controlling stake Tencent wants to take, it is likely to involve several billions of dollars ($4 billion to $7 billion for Tencent, for example). This is a lot of money. Plus, China Inc’s balance sheet is not as strong as pre-GFC of 2008. Forking over $4 to $7 billion out of China into Japan/Korea would be meaningful. In short, although Tencent would like to do this deal, we think that behind the scenes, the Chinese government appears to be putting intense pressure on Tencent to not do this deal.
Topcon’s FY Mar-19 guidance looks over-optimistic. Operating profit was up 8.5% year-on-year on a 1.4% increase in sales in the nine months to December, but down 10.1% on a 2.3% decrease in sales in 3Q. To make management’s full-year targets, it would have to increase by 41.0% on a 6.8% increase in sales in 4Q. The sales of all three major product segments – Smart Infrastructure, Positioning and Eye Care – have been slow. Intra-company eliminations have undercut segment profits.
At ¥1,561 (Friday, March 1, close), the shares are selling at 23.6x our EPS estimate for this fiscal year and 9.8x projected EV/EBITDA. These multiples compare with 5-year historical lows of 16.1x and 6.8x. Japan Analytics’ calculation of Annual No-Growth Valuation shows further downside risk (see chart below).
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