Industrials

In this briefing:

1. Komatsu, HCM and CAT Tactical Recovery Targets and Macro Pivot Support
2. Gold: Dovish Central Banks May Sustain Rally; Closing Our GLD Short
3. A Trading Strategy for EcoproBM Post IPO
4. Delta Thailand’s Tender Offer: Updated Timetable

1. Komatsu, HCM and CAT Tactical Recovery Targets and Macro Pivot Support

We thought a technical view on these counters would help clarify where tactical rally targets come into play as well as more important macro support levels where a basing process is expected to begin.

Key resistance points can be used as short zones with key pivots stops and limit levels that reign in risk.

All three stocks display varying degrees of a macro descending corrective wedge formations that have yet to fully mature. 

CAT stands out as the more buoyant of the group and faces its own set of upside pivot resistance points with solid macro support to work with on weakness.

We wanted to fold in a technical view with Mio Kato, CFA and his insight Komatsu, HCM, CAT: The Stock Punishment Does Not Match the Outlook Deterioration Crime . This group may be ahead of the earnings curve and why we may see more gas in a corrective bounce cycle (CB easy policy and the hunt for value may be part of the rally) before more pressure points are hit to re test macro support targets.

2. Gold: Dovish Central Banks May Sustain Rally; Closing Our GLD Short

Central banks around the world have signaled their willingness to return back to the Easy Money Playbook in their quest to re-stimulate economic growth and inflation. This significant shift in market expectations has been the key factor driving the recent rally in Gold (GOLD COMDTY) prices, and it appears to have legs.  As such, we are closing our Spdr Gold Shares (GLD US) short.

3. A Trading Strategy for EcoproBM Post IPO

• In this report, we provide a trading strategy for Ecopro BM Co Ltd (247540 KS) IPO, which is expected to start trading on March 5th. The IPO price has been determined at 48,000 won, which is 19% higher than the mid-point of the original IPO price range of 37,500 won to 42,900 won. The institutional investors’ demand for the Ecopro BM IPO was extremely strong at 988 to 1. 
• In our previous report Ecopro BM IPO: Valuation Analysis, we proposed the base case to high end of the company’s value to be between 56,000 won and 67,800 won. Given the enormous institutional demand for this IPO, it appears that our base case valuation (56,000 won), which is 17% higher than the IPO price, may be too conservative. 
• A more likely scenario now is that the stock reaches about 65,000 won to 70,000 won in the first few hours of trading on the first day, overshooting its intrinsic value and sells off a bit for a few days/weeks, enters a consolidation phase and then resumes its higher share price again. 

4. Delta Thailand’s Tender Offer: Updated Timetable

With Form 247-3 (Intention to Make a Tender Offer) and the FY18 dividend  (Bt2.30/share) for Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) having been announced, this insight briefly provides an updated indicative timetable for investors.

The next key date is the submission of Form 247-4, the Tender Offer for Securities, which will provide full details of the Offer.

This above indicative timetable assumes a conditional offer based on a minimum acceptance level of at least 50%. Payment under the offer may indeed be earlier, as explained below, which also ties in with a shareholders’ right to revoke shares tendered. 

In addition, investors should not tender once the offer opens – assuming the tender period commences on the 25 February – but wait until their shares are on the registry as at 4 March to receive the FY18 dividend.

Currently trading at a 2.2%/22% gross/annualised spread. Bear in mind the dividend is subject to 10% tax.

In this briefing:

1. Gold: Dovish Central Banks May Sustain Rally; Closing Our GLD Short
2. A Trading Strategy for EcoproBM Post IPO
3. Delta Thailand’s Tender Offer: Updated Timetable

1. Gold: Dovish Central Banks May Sustain Rally; Closing Our GLD Short

Central banks around the world have signaled their willingness to return back to the Easy Money Playbook in their quest to re-stimulate economic growth and inflation. This significant shift in market expectations has been the key factor driving the recent rally in Gold (GOLD COMDTY) prices, and it appears to have legs.  As such, we are closing our Spdr Gold Shares (GLD US) short.

2. A Trading Strategy for EcoproBM Post IPO

• In this report, we provide a trading strategy for Ecopro BM Co Ltd (247540 KS) IPO, which is expected to start trading on March 5th. The IPO price has been determined at 48,000 won, which is 19% higher than the mid-point of the original IPO price range of 37,500 won to 42,900 won. The institutional investors’ demand for the Ecopro BM IPO was extremely strong at 988 to 1. 
• In our previous report Ecopro BM IPO: Valuation Analysis, we proposed the base case to high end of the company’s value to be between 56,000 won and 67,800 won. Given the enormous institutional demand for this IPO, it appears that our base case valuation (56,000 won), which is 17% higher than the IPO price, may be too conservative. 
• A more likely scenario now is that the stock reaches about 65,000 won to 70,000 won in the first few hours of trading on the first day, overshooting its intrinsic value and sells off a bit for a few days/weeks, enters a consolidation phase and then resumes its higher share price again. 

3. Delta Thailand’s Tender Offer: Updated Timetable

With Form 247-3 (Intention to Make a Tender Offer) and the FY18 dividend  (Bt2.30/share) for Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) having been announced, this insight briefly provides an updated indicative timetable for investors.

The next key date is the submission of Form 247-4, the Tender Offer for Securities, which will provide full details of the Offer.

This above indicative timetable assumes a conditional offer based on a minimum acceptance level of at least 50%. Payment under the offer may indeed be earlier, as explained below, which also ties in with a shareholders’ right to revoke shares tendered. 

In addition, investors should not tender once the offer opens – assuming the tender period commences on the 25 February – but wait until their shares are on the registry as at 4 March to receive the FY18 dividend.

Currently trading at a 2.2%/22% gross/annualised spread. Bear in mind the dividend is subject to 10% tax.

In this briefing:

1. Gold: Dovish Central Banks May Sustain Rally; Closing Our GLD Short
2. A Trading Strategy for EcoproBM Post IPO
3. Delta Thailand’s Tender Offer: Updated Timetable
4. Glovis/Mobis Pair Trade: Glovis Being Overpriced Relative to Mobis on Unsubstantiated Speculation

1. Gold: Dovish Central Banks May Sustain Rally; Closing Our GLD Short

Central banks around the world have signaled their willingness to return back to the Easy Money Playbook in their quest to re-stimulate economic growth and inflation. This significant shift in market expectations has been the key factor driving the recent rally in Gold (GOLD COMDTY) prices, and it appears to have legs.  As such, we are closing our Spdr Gold Shares (GLD US) short.

2. A Trading Strategy for EcoproBM Post IPO

• In this report, we provide a trading strategy for Ecopro BM Co Ltd (247540 KS) IPO, which is expected to start trading on March 5th. The IPO price has been determined at 48,000 won, which is 19% higher than the mid-point of the original IPO price range of 37,500 won to 42,900 won. The institutional investors’ demand for the Ecopro BM IPO was extremely strong at 988 to 1. 
• In our previous report Ecopro BM IPO: Valuation Analysis, we proposed the base case to high end of the company’s value to be between 56,000 won and 67,800 won. Given the enormous institutional demand for this IPO, it appears that our base case valuation (56,000 won), which is 17% higher than the IPO price, may be too conservative. 
• A more likely scenario now is that the stock reaches about 65,000 won to 70,000 won in the first few hours of trading on the first day, overshooting its intrinsic value and sells off a bit for a few days/weeks, enters a consolidation phase and then resumes its higher share price again. 

3. Delta Thailand’s Tender Offer: Updated Timetable

With Form 247-3 (Intention to Make a Tender Offer) and the FY18 dividend  (Bt2.30/share) for Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) having been announced, this insight briefly provides an updated indicative timetable for investors.

The next key date is the submission of Form 247-4, the Tender Offer for Securities, which will provide full details of the Offer.

This above indicative timetable assumes a conditional offer based on a minimum acceptance level of at least 50%. Payment under the offer may indeed be earlier, as explained below, which also ties in with a shareholders’ right to revoke shares tendered. 

In addition, investors should not tender once the offer opens – assuming the tender period commences on the 25 February – but wait until their shares are on the registry as at 4 March to receive the FY18 dividend.

Currently trading at a 2.2%/22% gross/annualised spread. Bear in mind the dividend is subject to 10% tax.

4. Glovis/Mobis Pair Trade: Glovis Being Overpriced Relative to Mobis on Unsubstantiated Speculation

• There are still two schools of thought on the HMG restructuring. Glovis/Mobis merged entity as a holdco is the one. Only Glovis as a holdco with Mobis→HM→Kia below is the other. Since late 3Q last year, the local street started speculating on the latter.
• This has pushed up Glovis price relative to Mobis. They are now near 200% of σ in favor of Glovis on a 20D MA. Glovis made a 2+σ jump upwardly just in 4 trading days. On a 120D horizon, they are almost at the 120D high.
• At this point, neither is a hassle free way. In the latter, Glovis has to come up with nearly ₩2tril to buy Kia’s Mobis stake, highly likely through new debts. This financial burden wouldn’t be light on Glovis. Glovis may also be facing a risk of forceful holdco conversion. This will create a serious headache with Kia as a grand grand son subsidiary.
• The current speculation pushing up Glovis relative to Mobis has yet to be sufficiently substantiated/justified. This suggests Glovis is being overbought on a speculation that will very likely be short-lived. I expect there will soon be a mean reversion for Mobis. I’d go long Mobis and short Glovis at this point.

In this briefing:

1. Korean Stubs Spotlight: A Pair Trade Between Ecopro Co and Ecopro BM
2. Murakami-San Goes Hostile on Kosaido (7868 JP), Overbids Bain’s “Final” Offer
3. CEVA Logistics: Okay, Now You Can Tender
4. Jain Irrigation: From Up Close The Crop Doesn’t Look Healthy
5. Harbin Electric’s Offer: One For The Brave

1. Korean Stubs Spotlight: A Pair Trade Between Ecopro Co and Ecopro BM

In this report, we provide an analysis of our pair trade idea between Ecopro Co Ltd (086520 KS) and Ecopro BM Co Ltd (247540 KS). Our strategy will be to go long Ecopro Co and to go short on Ecopro BM. Our base case strategy is to achieve gains of 7-9% on this pair trade. 

Our SoTP valuation suggests a value per share of 52,004 won for Ecopro Co Ltd (086520 KS), representing 65% higher than current share price. Ecopro Co. currently has a market cap of 691 billion won. Ecopro Co’s 56% stake in Ecopro BM is worth 819 billion won, representing 119% of its market cap. Ecopro BM’s share price has jumped nearly 50% since its IPO on March 5th. We believe Ecopro Co has a much higher upside right now versus Ecopro BM over the next one to six months. 

Established in 1998, Ecopro Co started its business focusing on air pollution control related products. It also has major investments in companies such as Ecopro BM Co Ltd (247540 KS) and Ecopro Innovation (unlisted). Ecopro Co’s major customers include Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix, and Hyundai Heavy Industries. 

2. Murakami-San Goes Hostile on Kosaido (7868 JP), Overbids Bain’s “Final” Offer

I should have seen this coming. The asset is juicy enough, and they have a large enough stake, and the company is small enough, that this is an easy trade to do if you can get the funding. It makes eminent sense to be able to put the money down and go for it. 

I have covered this minor disaster of an MBO (Management BuyOut) of Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) since it was launched, with the original question of what one could do (other than refuse). Famed/notorious Japanese activist Yoshiaki Murakami and his associated companies started buying in and then the stock quickly cleared the Bain Capital Japan vehicle’s bid price. The deal was extended, then the Bain bid was raised to ¥700/share last week with the minimum threshold set at 50.01% not 66.67% but still the shares had not traded that low, and did not following the news. But Bain played chicken with Murakami and the market in its amended filing, including the words 「公開買付者は、本開買付条件の変更後の本公開買付価格を最終的なものとし、今後、本公開買付価格を一切変更しないことの決定をしております。」which roughly translates to “The Offeror, having changed the terms, has made This Tender Offer Price final, and from this point onward, has decided to absolutely not raise the Tender Offer Price.”

So now Murakami-san has launched a Tender Offer of his own. Murakami-affiliated entities Minami Aoyama Fudosan KK and Reno KK have launched a Tender Offer at ¥750/share to buy a minimum of 9,100,900 shares and a maximum of all remaining shares. The entities currently own 3,355,900 shares (13.47%) between them – up from 11.71% reported up through yesterday [as noted in yesterday’s insight, it looked likely from the volume and trading patterns prior to yesterday’s Large Shareholder Report that they had continued buying]. 

Buying a minimum of 9,100,900 shares at ¥750/share should be easier for Murakami-san’s bidding entity than buying a minimum of 12,456,800 shares (Bain Capital’s minimum threshold) at ¥700/share, but the Murakami TOB Tender Agent is Mita Securities, which is a lesser-known agent and it is possible that the main agent for the Bain tender (SMBC Securities) could make life difficult for its account holders.

The likelihood that Murakami-san doesn’t have his bid funded or won’t follow through is, in my eyes, effectively zero. Tender Offer announcements are vetted by both the Kanto Local Finance Bureau and the Stock Exchange. You know this has been in the works for a couple of weeks simply because of that aspect. But one of the two documents released today includes an explanation of the process Murakami-san’s companies have gone through to arrive at this bid, and that tells you it may have gone on longer.

So what next? The easy answer is there is now a put at ¥750/share. Unless there is not. Weirder things have happened.

Read on…

And now there is more below.

3. CEVA Logistics: Okay, Now You Can Tender

CMA CGM SA (144898Z FP) has 89.47% of Ceva Logistics AG (CEVA SW) and will now move to squeeze out and delist. The additional tender period will run from 20 March to 2 April.

After issuing the prospectus back in late January, CEVA’s board of directors recommended shareholders to not tender shares in the belief that shareholders could realise a higher value with their continuing investment.

Investors thought otherwise and have cashed out at CHF 30/share, a 62.8% premium to the undisturbed price. The massive share price under performance of CEVA subsequent to its listing on the 4 May 2018 – down 33% five months out from the IPO – would have crystallized that decision to tender.

CEVA’s board now recommend shareholders tender into the upcoming additional offer period. If delisting occurs, it is expected concurrently occur with a squeeze-out, which would be expected to take place in the third quarter of 2019 once all stock exchange and other legal conditions are fulfilled.

4. Jain Irrigation: From Up Close The Crop Doesn’t Look Healthy

Notwithstanding, the revenue growth Jain Irrigation Systems (JI IN) (JISL) seems to be lacking efficiency in utilization of fixed assets. The sale of stake in a subsidiary company raises eyebrow. Another bug that should bother JISL is the quality of its earnings. This impairs any positive forecast on operating profit. The situation becomes sticky when the issues of free cash flow, performance of subsidiaries and threat to goodwill are thrown in the matrix. 

5. Harbin Electric’s Offer: One For The Brave

Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK)‘s (“HE”) composite doc for its merger by absorption has been dispatched. HE’s major shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation (HEC), an SOE, is seeking to delist the company by way of a merger by absorption at HK$4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close. The offer has been declared final. The IFA (Somerley) considers the offer fair & reasonable.

As HE is PRC-incorporated with unlisted domestic shares, the transaction is executed as a hybrid scheme/tender offer. The proposal requires ≥ 75% for, ≤10% against, in a scheme-like vote from independent H-shareholders. HEC holds no H shares. A 10% blocking stake is equal to 67.5mn shares. Should the resolution pass, the tendering acceptance condition in this two-step Offer is 90% of H shares out. Those who do not tender will be left holding unlisted scrip.

Indicative Timetable

A Word on Harbin’s Net Cash

In my prior insight, I discussed how the offer was below Harbin’s net cash, using CapIQ 1H18 numbers. That conclusion was not correct. While CapIQ’s net cash exceeds the consideration, its number excludes notes payable, a material number.

Using FY18 figures provided in the composite document, I estimate net cash/share of $3.18, ~70% of the consideration payment. Bloomberg’s number is higher again, while my understanding is Eikon’s $1.73/share (as at 30 June 2018) net cash figure includes (I have not verified, nor drawn a conclusion whether this would indeed be correct) deposits from customers and banks.

What to Do?

The significant offer premium to last close, the material drop in FY18 profit and the zero possibility of a competitive bidder emerging, suggests this Offer falls over the line.

The blocking stake at the H-share meeting is a risk. Although no single shareholder has the requisite stake to block the deal, collectively it is achievable.

The 90% tendering also, prima facie, appears a risk; yet such an acceptance threshold is not uncommon (Shanghai Forte (2337 HK) also required a 90% acceptance condition in 2011; while Hunan Nonferrous Metals H (2626 HK)‘s 2015 merger by absorption required 85%) and once the EGM resolution has been approved, there is little incentive to hold onto shares as Harbin will be delisted. Shares cannot be compulsory acquired.

However, I still consider “fair” to be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers.

Dissension rights are available, although I am not aware of any precedents, nor the calculation methodology of a “fair price” under such a dissension, nor the timing of payment. 

Trading at a wide gross/annualised spread of 9.6%/61.4%, implying a >80% chance of completion. The current downside should this break is 40%. I don’t see an attractive risk/reward here.

In this briefing:

1. A Trading Strategy for EcoproBM Post IPO
2. Delta Thailand’s Tender Offer: Updated Timetable
3. Glovis/Mobis Pair Trade: Glovis Being Overpriced Relative to Mobis on Unsubstantiated Speculation
4. Komatsu, HCM, CAT: The Stock Punishment Does Not Match the Outlook Deterioration Crime

1. A Trading Strategy for EcoproBM Post IPO

• In this report, we provide a trading strategy for Ecopro BM Co Ltd (247540 KS) IPO, which is expected to start trading on March 5th. The IPO price has been determined at 48,000 won, which is 19% higher than the mid-point of the original IPO price range of 37,500 won to 42,900 won. The institutional investors’ demand for the Ecopro BM IPO was extremely strong at 988 to 1. 
• In our previous report Ecopro BM IPO: Valuation Analysis, we proposed the base case to high end of the company’s value to be between 56,000 won and 67,800 won. Given the enormous institutional demand for this IPO, it appears that our base case valuation (56,000 won), which is 17% higher than the IPO price, may be too conservative. 
• A more likely scenario now is that the stock reaches about 65,000 won to 70,000 won in the first few hours of trading on the first day, overshooting its intrinsic value and sells off a bit for a few days/weeks, enters a consolidation phase and then resumes its higher share price again. 

2. Delta Thailand’s Tender Offer: Updated Timetable

With Form 247-3 (Intention to Make a Tender Offer) and the FY18 dividend  (Bt2.30/share) for Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) having been announced, this insight briefly provides an updated indicative timetable for investors.

The next key date is the submission of Form 247-4, the Tender Offer for Securities, which will provide full details of the Offer.

This above indicative timetable assumes a conditional offer based on a minimum acceptance level of at least 50%. Payment under the offer may indeed be earlier, as explained below, which also ties in with a shareholders’ right to revoke shares tendered. 

In addition, investors should not tender once the offer opens – assuming the tender period commences on the 25 February – but wait until their shares are on the registry as at 4 March to receive the FY18 dividend.

Currently trading at a 2.2%/22% gross/annualised spread. Bear in mind the dividend is subject to 10% tax.

3. Glovis/Mobis Pair Trade: Glovis Being Overpriced Relative to Mobis on Unsubstantiated Speculation

• There are still two schools of thought on the HMG restructuring. Glovis/Mobis merged entity as a holdco is the one. Only Glovis as a holdco with Mobis→HM→Kia below is the other. Since late 3Q last year, the local street started speculating on the latter.
• This has pushed up Glovis price relative to Mobis. They are now near 200% of σ in favor of Glovis on a 20D MA. Glovis made a 2+σ jump upwardly just in 4 trading days. On a 120D horizon, they are almost at the 120D high.
• At this point, neither is a hassle free way. In the latter, Glovis has to come up with nearly ₩2tril to buy Kia’s Mobis stake, highly likely through new debts. This financial burden wouldn’t be light on Glovis. Glovis may also be facing a risk of forceful holdco conversion. This will create a serious headache with Kia as a grand grand son subsidiary.
• The current speculation pushing up Glovis relative to Mobis has yet to be sufficiently substantiated/justified. This suggests Glovis is being overbought on a speculation that will very likely be short-lived. I expect there will soon be a mean reversion for Mobis. I’d go long Mobis and short Glovis at this point.

4. Komatsu, HCM, CAT: The Stock Punishment Does Not Match the Outlook Deterioration Crime

We have been struck by the degree of underperformance of the construction machinery names despite strong earnings performance. While the cyclical nature of the names makes judging performance purely on earnings results (or even the outlook) hazardous, in this case we believe the market has been premature and excessive in its derating of these stocks which have sold off to similar levels as the WFE names such as Tokyo Electron (8035 JP)  and Robotics names such as Fanuc Corp (6954 JP).

While it is possible that Komatsu Ltd (6301 JP), Hitachi Construction Machinery (6305 JP) and Caterpillar Inc (CAT US) have sold off partly due to their China exposure, it needs to be emphasised that 1) these companies are no longer heavily dependent on China and revenue exposure is 12% for HCM, 10% for CAT and 7% for Komatsu, and 2) while the Chinese market at  about 60k excavators is probably close to the top of its cycle, it is not a bubble like in 2010 when it 111k units and thus a collapse in demand is unlikely (though a decline is).

As the table below notes, earnings estimates for the construction machinery companies have only tapered marginally from their peaks, and while find the forecasts for continued growth into 2020 somewhat optimistic the resilience of mining demand means we are disinclined to dismiss them out of hand. On the other hand estimates for WFE and Robot names have dropped significantly, but despite this, share price performance is similar for all three categories of stocks. We discuss this stark discrepancy further below.

In this briefing:

1. Hyundai Autoever IPO Pricing: Likely to Be a Dull Event Given No Growth Story & Glovis Merger
2. Kosaido TOB (7868 JP) Situation Gets Weird – Activists and Independent Opposition to an MBO.

1. Hyundai Autoever IPO Pricing: Likely to Be a Dull Event Given No Growth Story & Glovis Merger

• Hyundai Autoever offers a total 3,510,000 shares. Split is 9.9% primary and 90.1% secondary. Shares are preliminarily priced at ₩40,000~44,000. This puts the company value at ₩840~924bil. Bookbuilding will be Mar 13~14.
• Valuation is a bit aggressive. It is being heard that local institutions are not particularly excited about this IPO mainly because of Autoever’s 90% captive business. That is, growth story isn’t looking fancy. At a 17x PER on Autoever’s FY19 expected earnings, it is sitting in the middle of the indicative price band. There shouldn’t be much room to play around.
• The major shareholder was expected to sell as much as 50% of their shares through secondary distribution. Actual offering size is much smaller. This sparks the speculation that Autoever will soon be merged with Glovis. Much smaller offering size may be for facilitating the merger. It can pave a less controversial path for another merger attempt with Mobis.
• But this speculation can render this IPO meaningless though. I expect this IPO will be a dull event. I wouldn’t avoid it completely though. Stable income stream and connected car are are still something worthy. I’d buy them at the right price. Low end should be the right price.

2. Kosaido TOB (7868 JP) Situation Gets Weird – Activists and Independent Opposition to an MBO.

When the Tender Offer / MBO for Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) was announced last month, my first reaction was that this was wrong. It was couched as being management-supportive, had one large independent shareholder agreeing to tender, and the it was touted as an effort to improve the printing and other “info” businesses such as staffing, and similar.

There was no mention of the fact that 94+% of the profits the last few years came from a majority stake in an external company which conducted funeral rites and services across a well-known chain of six large funeral parlours in Tokyo. Neither that company’s name nor the business segment it operates in were mentioned in the document (Japanese only) announcing the intention to conduct the MBO and if you look on the Kosaido website, you have to dig somewhat deeply to figure out that it is even a thing. In the company’s quarterly statements and semi-annual presentations of earnings, there is one line with revenues. One has to go into the fine print of the yukashoken hokokusho to discover more, and if one does, one sees that it is the profitable funeral parlour business which is effectively being purchased at 0.5x book and the rest of the company is being purchased at 1x book. 

I published my original opinion in Smallcap Kosaido (7868 JP) Tender Offer: Wrong Price But Whaddya Gonna Do? suggesting that the only way this was likely to not get done is if some brave activist came forward. I concluded…

• This is a virtual asset strip in progress. It is the kind of thing which gives activist hedge funds a bad name, but when cloaked in the finery of “Private Equity”, it looks like renewal of a business.

• This company is an example of why investors should be spending more time on their stewardship and the governance of their portfolio companies.

• It is also why investors should be taking a very close look at the METI request for public comment on what constitutes “Fair M&A.”

  It is a decent premium but an underwhelming valuation. Because of the premium, and its smallcap nature, I expect this gets done. 

  If deals like this start to not get done, that would be a bullish sign. Investors will finally be taking the blinders off to unfair M&A practices.

Shortly afterwards, an activist did come forward. Long-time Japan activist Yoshiaki Murakami bought 5% through his entity Reno KK, and later lifted his stake (combined with affiliates) to 9.55%. I thought the stock had run too far at that point (¥775/share). While still cheap, I did not expect Bain to lift its price by 30+% and I did not expect a white knight to arrive quickly enough.  This was discussed in Kosaido: Activism Drives Price 30+% Through Terms. 

The New News

In the wee hours of Monday 18 February, with 11 days left to the Tender Offer, toyokeizai.net published an article (partially paywalled) suggesting that the longstanding external auditor Mr. Nakatsuji and lead shareholder Sakurai Mie (descendent of the founder of Kosaido, who originally founded a company called 桜井謄写堂 (Sakurai Transcription) in 1949, which later became Sakurai Kosaido, then just Kosaido) were against the takeover. 

THAT is interesting. And the backstory here is even more interesting. 

In this briefing:

1. Murakami-San Goes Hostile on Kosaido (7868 JP), Overbids Bain’s “Final” Offer
2. CEVA Logistics: Okay, Now You Can Tender
3. Jain Irrigation: From Up Close The Crop Doesn’t Look Healthy
4. Harbin Electric’s Offer: One For The Brave
5. Quick Update on ZTO Express: Results OK, but Guidance Unimpressive

1. Murakami-San Goes Hostile on Kosaido (7868 JP), Overbids Bain’s “Final” Offer

I should have seen this coming. The asset is juicy enough, and they have a large enough stake, and the company is small enough, that this is an easy trade to do if you can get the funding. It makes eminent sense to be able to put the money down and go for it. 

I have covered this minor disaster of an MBO (Management BuyOut) of Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) since it was launched, with the original question of what one could do (other than refuse). Famed/notorious Japanese activist Yoshiaki Murakami and his associated companies started buying in and then the stock quickly cleared the Bain Capital Japan vehicle’s bid price. The deal was extended, then the Bain bid was raised to ¥700/share last week with the minimum threshold set at 50.01% not 66.67% but still the shares had not traded that low, and did not following the news. But Bain played chicken with Murakami and the market in its amended filing, including the words 「公開買付者は、本開買付条件の変更後の本公開買付価格を最終的なものとし、今後、本公開買付価格を一切変更しないことの決定をしております。」which roughly translates to “The Offeror, having changed the terms, has made This Tender Offer Price final, and from this point onward, has decided to absolutely not raise the Tender Offer Price.”

So now Murakami-san has launched a Tender Offer of his own. Murakami-affiliated entities Minami Aoyama Fudosan KK and Reno KK have launched a Tender Offer at ¥750/share to buy a minimum of 9,100,900 shares and a maximum of all remaining shares. The entities currently own 3,355,900 shares (13.47%) between them – up from 11.71% reported up through yesterday [as noted in yesterday’s insight, it looked likely from the volume and trading patterns prior to yesterday’s Large Shareholder Report that they had continued buying]. 

Buying a minimum of 9,100,900 shares at ¥750/share should be easier for Murakami-san’s bidding entity than buying a minimum of 12,456,800 shares (Bain Capital’s minimum threshold) at ¥700/share, but the Murakami TOB Tender Agent is Mita Securities, which is a lesser-known agent and it is possible that the main agent for the Bain tender (SMBC Securities) could make life difficult for its account holders.

The likelihood that Murakami-san doesn’t have his bid funded or won’t follow through is, in my eyes, effectively zero. Tender Offer announcements are vetted by both the Kanto Local Finance Bureau and the Stock Exchange. You know this has been in the works for a couple of weeks simply because of that aspect. But one of the two documents released today includes an explanation of the process Murakami-san’s companies have gone through to arrive at this bid, and that tells you it may have gone on longer.

So what next? The easy answer is there is now a put at ¥750/share. Unless there is not. Weirder things have happened.

Read on…

And now there is more below.

2. CEVA Logistics: Okay, Now You Can Tender

CMA CGM SA (144898Z FP) has 89.47% of Ceva Logistics AG (CEVA SW) and will now move to squeeze out and delist. The additional tender period will run from 20 March to 2 April.

After issuing the prospectus back in late January, CEVA’s board of directors recommended shareholders to not tender shares in the belief that shareholders could realise a higher value with their continuing investment.

Investors thought otherwise and have cashed out at CHF 30/share, a 62.8% premium to the undisturbed price. The massive share price under performance of CEVA subsequent to its listing on the 4 May 2018 – down 33% five months out from the IPO – would have crystallized that decision to tender.

CEVA’s board now recommend shareholders tender into the upcoming additional offer period. If delisting occurs, it is expected concurrently occur with a squeeze-out, which would be expected to take place in the third quarter of 2019 once all stock exchange and other legal conditions are fulfilled.

3. Jain Irrigation: From Up Close The Crop Doesn’t Look Healthy

Notwithstanding, the revenue growth Jain Irrigation Systems (JI IN) (JISL) seems to be lacking efficiency in utilization of fixed assets. The sale of stake in a subsidiary company raises eyebrow. Another bug that should bother JISL is the quality of its earnings. This impairs any positive forecast on operating profit. The situation becomes sticky when the issues of free cash flow, performance of subsidiaries and threat to goodwill are thrown in the matrix. 

4. Harbin Electric’s Offer: One For The Brave

Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK)‘s (“HE”) composite doc for its merger by absorption has been dispatched. HE’s major shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation (HEC), an SOE, is seeking to delist the company by way of a merger by absorption at HK$4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close. The offer has been declared final. The IFA (Somerley) considers the offer fair & reasonable.

As HE is PRC-incorporated with unlisted domestic shares, the transaction is executed as a hybrid scheme/tender offer. The proposal requires ≥ 75% for, ≤10% against, in a scheme-like vote from independent H-shareholders. HEC holds no H shares. A 10% blocking stake is equal to 67.5mn shares. Should the resolution pass, the tendering acceptance condition in this two-step Offer is 90% of H shares out. Those who do not tender will be left holding unlisted scrip.

Indicative Timetable

A Word on Harbin’s Net Cash

In my prior insight, I discussed how the offer was below Harbin’s net cash, using CapIQ 1H18 numbers. That conclusion was not correct. While CapIQ’s net cash exceeds the consideration, its number excludes notes payable, a material number.

Using FY18 figures provided in the composite document, I estimate net cash/share of $3.18, ~70% of the consideration payment. Bloomberg’s number is higher again, while my understanding is Eikon’s $1.73/share (as at 30 June 2018) net cash figure includes (I have not verified, nor drawn a conclusion whether this would indeed be correct) deposits from customers and banks.

What to Do?

The significant offer premium to last close, the material drop in FY18 profit and the zero possibility of a competitive bidder emerging, suggests this Offer falls over the line.

The blocking stake at the H-share meeting is a risk. Although no single shareholder has the requisite stake to block the deal, collectively it is achievable.

The 90% tendering also, prima facie, appears a risk; yet such an acceptance threshold is not uncommon (Shanghai Forte (2337 HK) also required a 90% acceptance condition in 2011; while Hunan Nonferrous Metals H (2626 HK)‘s 2015 merger by absorption required 85%) and once the EGM resolution has been approved, there is little incentive to hold onto shares as Harbin will be delisted. Shares cannot be compulsory acquired.

However, I still consider “fair” to be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers.

Dissension rights are available, although I am not aware of any precedents, nor the calculation methodology of a “fair price” under such a dissension, nor the timing of payment. 

Trading at a wide gross/annualised spread of 9.6%/61.4%, implying a >80% chance of completion. The current downside should this break is 40%. I don’t see an attractive risk/reward here.

5. Quick Update on ZTO Express: Results OK, but Guidance Unimpressive

After reviewing 4Q18 results and guidance for 2019, we retain our negative view of ZTO. For 2019 and 2020, we continue to expect slower top-line growth, margin compression, and a sharp increase in CapEx requirements. Our 2019-20 EPS forecasts and target price of $13.31 remain unchanged.

With help from a sharp increase in non-operating income, ZTO’s 4Q18 Adjusted EPS met consensus expectations of $0.24per ADS. But FY19Adjusted Net Profit guidance fell short of expectations, and management’s decision to withdraw quarterly guidance altogether is also disappointing.

ZTO’s gross margin fell ~370 bps in 4Q18 due to cost pressures and the rapid growth of certain low-margin businesses. We believe the same factors will continue to put downward pressure on margins in 2019 and 2020.

ZTO stated during the earnings call that Capex this year would increase by 50-100% compared to the 4bn RMB the company spent in 2018. According to management, much of the increase will go into building out ‘last-mile’ and rural infrastructure and we suspect the initial returns on these investments will be poor

In this briefing:

1. Jain Irrigation: From Up Close The Crop Doesn’t Look Healthy
2. Harbin Electric’s Offer: One For The Brave
3. Quick Update on ZTO Express: Results OK, but Guidance Unimpressive
4. Descente Tamed, Itochu Delicacy Required And Investors Can Probably Wait
5. U.S. Equity Strategy: Positive Outlook Intact; Tech Leading

1. Jain Irrigation: From Up Close The Crop Doesn’t Look Healthy

Notwithstanding, the revenue growth Jain Irrigation Systems (JI IN) (JISL) seems to be lacking efficiency in utilization of fixed assets. The sale of stake in a subsidiary company raises eyebrow. Another bug that should bother JISL is the quality of its earnings. This impairs any positive forecast on operating profit. The situation becomes sticky when the issues of free cash flow, performance of subsidiaries and threat to goodwill are thrown in the matrix. 

2. Harbin Electric’s Offer: One For The Brave

Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK)‘s (“HE”) composite doc for its merger by absorption has been dispatched. HE’s major shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation (HEC), an SOE, is seeking to delist the company by way of a merger by absorption at HK$4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close. The offer has been declared final. The IFA (Somerley) considers the offer fair & reasonable.

As HE is PRC-incorporated with unlisted domestic shares, the transaction is executed as a hybrid scheme/tender offer. The proposal requires ≥ 75% for, ≤10% against, in a scheme-like vote from independent H-shareholders. HEC holds no H shares. A 10% blocking stake is equal to 67.5mn shares. Should the resolution pass, the tendering acceptance condition in this two-step Offer is 90% of H shares out. Those who do not tender will be left holding unlisted scrip.

Indicative Timetable

A Word on Harbin’s Net Cash

In my prior insight, I discussed how the offer was below Harbin’s net cash, using CapIQ 1H18 numbers. That conclusion was not correct. While CapIQ’s net cash exceeds the consideration, its number excludes notes payable, a material number.

Using FY18 figures provided in the composite document, I estimate net cash/share of $3.18, ~70% of the consideration payment. Bloomberg’s number is higher again, while my understanding is Eikon’s $1.73/share (as at 30 June 2018) net cash figure includes (I have not verified, nor drawn a conclusion whether this would indeed be correct) deposits from customers and banks.

What to Do?

The significant offer premium to last close, the material drop in FY18 profit and the zero possibility of a competitive bidder emerging, suggests this Offer falls over the line.

The blocking stake at the H-share meeting is a risk. Although no single shareholder has the requisite stake to block the deal, collectively it is achievable.

The 90% tendering also, prima facie, appears a risk; yet such an acceptance threshold is not uncommon (Shanghai Forte (2337 HK) also required a 90% acceptance condition in 2011; while Hunan Nonferrous Metals H (2626 HK)‘s 2015 merger by absorption required 85%) and once the EGM resolution has been approved, there is little incentive to hold onto shares as Harbin will be delisted. Shares cannot be compulsory acquired.

However, I still consider “fair” to be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers.

Dissension rights are available, although I am not aware of any precedents, nor the calculation methodology of a “fair price” under such a dissension, nor the timing of payment. 

Trading at a wide gross/annualised spread of 9.6%/61.4%, implying a >80% chance of completion. The current downside should this break is 40%. I don’t see an attractive risk/reward here.

3. Quick Update on ZTO Express: Results OK, but Guidance Unimpressive

After reviewing 4Q18 results and guidance for 2019, we retain our negative view of ZTO. For 2019 and 2020, we continue to expect slower top-line growth, margin compression, and a sharp increase in CapEx requirements. Our 2019-20 EPS forecasts and target price of $13.31 remain unchanged.

With help from a sharp increase in non-operating income, ZTO’s 4Q18 Adjusted EPS met consensus expectations of $0.24per ADS. But FY19Adjusted Net Profit guidance fell short of expectations, and management’s decision to withdraw quarterly guidance altogether is also disappointing.

ZTO’s gross margin fell ~370 bps in 4Q18 due to cost pressures and the rapid growth of certain low-margin businesses. We believe the same factors will continue to put downward pressure on margins in 2019 and 2020.

ZTO stated during the earnings call that Capex this year would increase by 50-100% compared to the 4bn RMB the company spent in 2018. According to management, much of the increase will go into building out ‘last-mile’ and rural infrastructure and we suspect the initial returns on these investments will be poor

4. Descente Tamed, Itochu Delicacy Required And Investors Can Probably Wait

I started writing this over the weekend after the results of the Itochu Corp (8001 JP) Tender Offer for 9.56% of Descente Ltd (8114 JP) were announced late Friday. 

Itochu planned on buying 7.21 million shares out of the 75.37mm shares which bear voting rights (as of the commencement of the Tender), and 15,115,148mm shares were tendered, which led to a pro-ration rate of 47.7% which was 0.3% below my the middle of my “wide range” expected pro-ration rate of 42-54% and 0.7% beyond the 44-47% tighter range discussed in Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile of 28 February.

Two more central ideas were discussed in that piece:

1. The hostility shown by Descente management during the Tender Offer had led Itochu to abandon discussions about post-tender management until after the Tender Offer was completed. Both sides indicated a willingness to pick up where things had left off – at Descente’s request – but Descente needed to stew a bit.
2. The revelation by ANTA Sports in an interview with the CEO in the Nikkei in late February that ANTA supported Itochu meant that the likelihood of Itochu NOT having enough votes to put through its own slate of directors was almost zero. At a combined 47.0% of post-Tender voting rights, if 94% or less of shares were to vote, it would mean Itochu could get the majority of over 50% and determine the entire slate of directors themselves. If there was another shareholder holding a couple of percent which supported Itochu, it would be a done deal even if everyone voted. And that 2-3% existed.

So… the threat that Itochu would hold an EGM to seat new directors to oblige a stronger course for management was a very strong probability. Management who was rabidly opposed to Itochu owning the stake could not very well bow down in front of Itochu post-tender just to save its own hide – not after the employee union and the OB group came out against. President Ishimoto had effectively put himself in an untenable position unless a miracle occurred because Itochu could not legally walk away from its offer, and Ishimoto-san was bad-mouthing Itochu even as they were negotiating during the Tender Offer Period. 

It was not, therefore, any surprise that President Ishimoto would step down. The surprise for me was that the news he would go came out as talks commenced over the weekend (but did not “bridge the gap” as the Nikkei reported), before we got to the first business day post-results. 

Talks apparently continue with no resolution, and the media reports offer no hint as to what the issues might be. 

5. U.S. Equity Strategy: Positive Outlook Intact; Tech Leading

The S&P 500 is working through 2,817 resistance and our technical work continues to support an overall positive outlook. As markets improve in Europe and in EM countries, U.S. markets in turn should get a tailwind of improved global equity market conditions.  In today’s report we highlight attractive Groups and stocks within Technology: Large- and Mid-Cap Semiconductors Large/Mid-Cap Semi Equip. (TE-04), Software, Enterprise Applications (TE-42), and Software, Design Solutions (TE-46). List of charts included: Intel Corp (INTC US) $TSM, Texas Instruments (TXN US), Analog Devices (ADI US)  Xilinx Inc (XLNX US)  Advanced Micro Devices (AMD US)  Microchip Technology (MCHP US)  Skyworks Solutions (SWKS US)  Marvell Technology Group Ltd (MRVL US)  On Semiconductor (ON US)  Monolithic Power Systems, Inc (MPWR US)  ASML Holding NV (ASML NA) , Applied Materials (AMAT US)Lam Research (LRCX US)  Teradyne Inc (TER US)Mks Instruments (MKSI US)Microsoft Corp (MSFT US)Oracle Corp (ORCL US)Sap Se Sponsored Adr (SAP US)Now Inc (DNOW US)Workday Inc Class A (WDAY US) .

In this briefing:

1. Komatsu, HCM, CAT: The Stock Punishment Does Not Match the Outlook Deterioration Crime
2. Hyundai Autoever IPO Preview
3. Hyundai Autoever IPO Pricing: Likely to Be a Dull Event Given No Growth Story & Glovis Merger
4. Kosaido TOB (7868 JP) Situation Gets Weird – Activists and Independent Opposition to an MBO.

1. Komatsu, HCM, CAT: The Stock Punishment Does Not Match the Outlook Deterioration Crime

We have been struck by the degree of underperformance of the construction machinery names despite strong earnings performance. While the cyclical nature of the names makes judging performance purely on earnings results (or even the outlook) hazardous, in this case we believe the market has been premature and excessive in its derating of these stocks which have sold off to similar levels as the WFE names such as Tokyo Electron (8035 JP)  and Robotics names such as Fanuc Corp (6954 JP).

While it is possible that Komatsu Ltd (6301 JP), Hitachi Construction Machinery (6305 JP) and Caterpillar Inc (CAT US) have sold off partly due to their China exposure, it needs to be emphasised that 1) these companies are no longer heavily dependent on China and revenue exposure is 12% for HCM, 10% for CAT and 7% for Komatsu, and 2) while the Chinese market at  about 60k excavators is probably close to the top of its cycle, it is not a bubble like in 2010 when it 111k units and thus a collapse in demand is unlikely (though a decline is).

As the table below notes, earnings estimates for the construction machinery companies have only tapered marginally from their peaks, and while find the forecasts for continued growth into 2020 somewhat optimistic the resilience of mining demand means we are disinclined to dismiss them out of hand. On the other hand estimates for WFE and Robot names have dropped significantly, but despite this, share price performance is similar for all three categories of stocks. We discuss this stark discrepancy further below.

2. Hyundai Autoever IPO Preview

• Hyundai Autoever is ready to complete its IPO in March 2019. Established in 2000, Hyundai Autoever is the IT service arm of the Hyundai Motor Group. Hyundai Autoever is expected to play a key role in the Hyundai Motor Group’s push to become a leading global player of autonomous driving in the coming decade. 
• The IPO price range is between 40,000 won and 44,000 won. The IPO base deal size is from $125 million to $138 million. According to the bankers’ valuation, the expected market cap is expected to range from 840 billion won to 924 billion won. 
• The bankers used four companies including Samsung SDS, POSCO ICT, Lotte Data Comm, and Shinsegae I&C to value Hyundai Autoever. Using the annualized net profit of the comps in 2018, the bankers derived an average P/E multiple of 24x for the peers. Then the bankers took the annualized net profit of Hyundai Autoever in 2018 (52.2 billion won) and applied the peers average P/E multiple of 24x to derive the implied market cap of 1.25 trillion won. After applying additional IPO discount of 26.4% – 33.1%, the bankers derived the IPO price range of 40,000 to 44,000 won. 

3. Hyundai Autoever IPO Pricing: Likely to Be a Dull Event Given No Growth Story & Glovis Merger

• Hyundai Autoever offers a total 3,510,000 shares. Split is 9.9% primary and 90.1% secondary. Shares are preliminarily priced at ₩40,000~44,000. This puts the company value at ₩840~924bil. Bookbuilding will be Mar 13~14.
• Valuation is a bit aggressive. It is being heard that local institutions are not particularly excited about this IPO mainly because of Autoever’s 90% captive business. That is, growth story isn’t looking fancy. At a 17x PER on Autoever’s FY19 expected earnings, it is sitting in the middle of the indicative price band. There shouldn’t be much room to play around.
• The major shareholder was expected to sell as much as 50% of their shares through secondary distribution. Actual offering size is much smaller. This sparks the speculation that Autoever will soon be merged with Glovis. Much smaller offering size may be for facilitating the merger. It can pave a less controversial path for another merger attempt with Mobis.
• But this speculation can render this IPO meaningless though. I expect this IPO will be a dull event. I wouldn’t avoid it completely though. Stable income stream and connected car are are still something worthy. I’d buy them at the right price. Low end should be the right price.

4. Kosaido TOB (7868 JP) Situation Gets Weird – Activists and Independent Opposition to an MBO.

When the Tender Offer / MBO for Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) was announced last month, my first reaction was that this was wrong. It was couched as being management-supportive, had one large independent shareholder agreeing to tender, and the it was touted as an effort to improve the printing and other “info” businesses such as staffing, and similar.

There was no mention of the fact that 94+% of the profits the last few years came from a majority stake in an external company which conducted funeral rites and services across a well-known chain of six large funeral parlours in Tokyo. Neither that company’s name nor the business segment it operates in were mentioned in the document (Japanese only) announcing the intention to conduct the MBO and if you look on the Kosaido website, you have to dig somewhat deeply to figure out that it is even a thing. In the company’s quarterly statements and semi-annual presentations of earnings, there is one line with revenues. One has to go into the fine print of the yukashoken hokokusho to discover more, and if one does, one sees that it is the profitable funeral parlour business which is effectively being purchased at 0.5x book and the rest of the company is being purchased at 1x book. 

I published my original opinion in Smallcap Kosaido (7868 JP) Tender Offer: Wrong Price But Whaddya Gonna Do? suggesting that the only way this was likely to not get done is if some brave activist came forward. I concluded…

• This is a virtual asset strip in progress. It is the kind of thing which gives activist hedge funds a bad name, but when cloaked in the finery of “Private Equity”, it looks like renewal of a business.

• This company is an example of why investors should be spending more time on their stewardship and the governance of their portfolio companies.

• It is also why investors should be taking a very close look at the METI request for public comment on what constitutes “Fair M&A.”

  It is a decent premium but an underwhelming valuation. Because of the premium, and its smallcap nature, I expect this gets done. 

  If deals like this start to not get done, that would be a bullish sign. Investors will finally be taking the blinders off to unfair M&A practices.

Shortly afterwards, an activist did come forward. Long-time Japan activist Yoshiaki Murakami bought 5% through his entity Reno KK, and later lifted his stake (combined with affiliates) to 9.55%. I thought the stock had run too far at that point (¥775/share). While still cheap, I did not expect Bain to lift its price by 30+% and I did not expect a white knight to arrive quickly enough.  This was discussed in Kosaido: Activism Drives Price 30+% Through Terms. 

The New News

In the wee hours of Monday 18 February, with 11 days left to the Tender Offer, toyokeizai.net published an article (partially paywalled) suggesting that the longstanding external auditor Mr. Nakatsuji and lead shareholder Sakurai Mie (descendent of the founder of Kosaido, who originally founded a company called 桜井謄写堂 (Sakurai Transcription) in 1949, which later became Sakurai Kosaido, then just Kosaido) were against the takeover. 

THAT is interesting. And the backstory here is even more interesting. 

In this briefing:

1. Harbin Electric’s Offer: One For The Brave
2. Quick Update on ZTO Express: Results OK, but Guidance Unimpressive
3. Descente Tamed, Itochu Delicacy Required And Investors Can Probably Wait
4. U.S. Equity Strategy: Positive Outlook Intact; Tech Leading
5. China Tower. How Far Will It Rally?

1. Harbin Electric’s Offer: One For The Brave

Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK)‘s (“HE”) composite doc for its merger by absorption has been dispatched. HE’s major shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation (HEC), an SOE, is seeking to delist the company by way of a merger by absorption at HK$4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close. The offer has been declared final. The IFA (Somerley) considers the offer fair & reasonable.

As HE is PRC-incorporated with unlisted domestic shares, the transaction is executed as a hybrid scheme/tender offer. The proposal requires ≥ 75% for, ≤10% against, in a scheme-like vote from independent H-shareholders. HEC holds no H shares. A 10% blocking stake is equal to 67.5mn shares. Should the resolution pass, the tendering acceptance condition in this two-step Offer is 90% of H shares out. Those who do not tender will be left holding unlisted scrip.

Indicative Timetable

A Word on Harbin’s Net Cash

In my prior insight, I discussed how the offer was below Harbin’s net cash, using CapIQ 1H18 numbers. That conclusion was not correct. While CapIQ’s net cash exceeds the consideration, its number excludes notes payable, a material number.

Using FY18 figures provided in the composite document, I estimate net cash/share of $3.18, ~70% of the consideration payment. Bloomberg’s number is higher again, while my understanding is Eikon’s $1.73/share (as at 30 June 2018) net cash figure includes (I have not verified, nor drawn a conclusion whether this would indeed be correct) deposits from customers and banks.

What to Do?

The significant offer premium to last close, the material drop in FY18 profit and the zero possibility of a competitive bidder emerging, suggests this Offer falls over the line.

The blocking stake at the H-share meeting is a risk. Although no single shareholder has the requisite stake to block the deal, collectively it is achievable.

The 90% tendering also, prima facie, appears a risk; yet such an acceptance threshold is not uncommon (Shanghai Forte (2337 HK) also required a 90% acceptance condition in 2011; while Hunan Nonferrous Metals H (2626 HK)‘s 2015 merger by absorption required 85%) and once the EGM resolution has been approved, there is little incentive to hold onto shares as Harbin will be delisted. Shares cannot be compulsory acquired.

However, I still consider “fair” to be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers.

Dissension rights are available, although I am not aware of any precedents, nor the calculation methodology of a “fair price” under such a dissension, nor the timing of payment. 

Trading at a wide gross/annualised spread of 9.6%/61.4%, implying a >80% chance of completion. The current downside should this break is 40%. I don’t see an attractive risk/reward here.

2. Quick Update on ZTO Express: Results OK, but Guidance Unimpressive

After reviewing 4Q18 results and guidance for 2019, we retain our negative view of ZTO. For 2019 and 2020, we continue to expect slower top-line growth, margin compression, and a sharp increase in CapEx requirements. Our 2019-20 EPS forecasts and target price of $13.31 remain unchanged.

With help from a sharp increase in non-operating income, ZTO’s 4Q18 Adjusted EPS met consensus expectations of $0.24per ADS. But FY19Adjusted Net Profit guidance fell short of expectations, and management’s decision to withdraw quarterly guidance altogether is also disappointing.

ZTO’s gross margin fell ~370 bps in 4Q18 due to cost pressures and the rapid growth of certain low-margin businesses. We believe the same factors will continue to put downward pressure on margins in 2019 and 2020.

ZTO stated during the earnings call that Capex this year would increase by 50-100% compared to the 4bn RMB the company spent in 2018. According to management, much of the increase will go into building out ‘last-mile’ and rural infrastructure and we suspect the initial returns on these investments will be poor

3. Descente Tamed, Itochu Delicacy Required And Investors Can Probably Wait

I started writing this over the weekend after the results of the Itochu Corp (8001 JP) Tender Offer for 9.56% of Descente Ltd (8114 JP) were announced late Friday. 

Itochu planned on buying 7.21 million shares out of the 75.37mm shares which bear voting rights (as of the commencement of the Tender), and 15,115,148mm shares were tendered, which led to a pro-ration rate of 47.7% which was 0.3% below my the middle of my “wide range” expected pro-ration rate of 42-54% and 0.7% beyond the 44-47% tighter range discussed in Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile of 28 February.

Two more central ideas were discussed in that piece:

1. The hostility shown by Descente management during the Tender Offer had led Itochu to abandon discussions about post-tender management until after the Tender Offer was completed. Both sides indicated a willingness to pick up where things had left off – at Descente’s request – but Descente needed to stew a bit.
2. The revelation by ANTA Sports in an interview with the CEO in the Nikkei in late February that ANTA supported Itochu meant that the likelihood of Itochu NOT having enough votes to put through its own slate of directors was almost zero. At a combined 47.0% of post-Tender voting rights, if 94% or less of shares were to vote, it would mean Itochu could get the majority of over 50% and determine the entire slate of directors themselves. If there was another shareholder holding a couple of percent which supported Itochu, it would be a done deal even if everyone voted. And that 2-3% existed.

So… the threat that Itochu would hold an EGM to seat new directors to oblige a stronger course for management was a very strong probability. Management who was rabidly opposed to Itochu owning the stake could not very well bow down in front of Itochu post-tender just to save its own hide – not after the employee union and the OB group came out against. President Ishimoto had effectively put himself in an untenable position unless a miracle occurred because Itochu could not legally walk away from its offer, and Ishimoto-san was bad-mouthing Itochu even as they were negotiating during the Tender Offer Period. 

It was not, therefore, any surprise that President Ishimoto would step down. The surprise for me was that the news he would go came out as talks commenced over the weekend (but did not “bridge the gap” as the Nikkei reported), before we got to the first business day post-results. 

Talks apparently continue with no resolution, and the media reports offer no hint as to what the issues might be. 

4. U.S. Equity Strategy: Positive Outlook Intact; Tech Leading

The S&P 500 is working through 2,817 resistance and our technical work continues to support an overall positive outlook. As markets improve in Europe and in EM countries, U.S. markets in turn should get a tailwind of improved global equity market conditions.  In today’s report we highlight attractive Groups and stocks within Technology: Large- and Mid-Cap Semiconductors Large/Mid-Cap Semi Equip. (TE-04), Software, Enterprise Applications (TE-42), and Software, Design Solutions (TE-46). List of charts included: Intel Corp (INTC US) $TSM, Texas Instruments (TXN US), Analog Devices (ADI US)  Xilinx Inc (XLNX US)  Advanced Micro Devices (AMD US)  Microchip Technology (MCHP US)  Skyworks Solutions (SWKS US)  Marvell Technology Group Ltd (MRVL US)  On Semiconductor (ON US)  Monolithic Power Systems, Inc (MPWR US)  ASML Holding NV (ASML NA) , Applied Materials (AMAT US)Lam Research (LRCX US)  Teradyne Inc (TER US)Mks Instruments (MKSI US)Microsoft Corp (MSFT US)Oracle Corp (ORCL US)Sap Se Sponsored Adr (SAP US)Now Inc (DNOW US)Workday Inc Class A (WDAY US) .

5. China Tower. How Far Will It Rally?

China Tower (788 HK) has rallied strongly in recent months and the question raised repeatedly in recent client meetings was “how much further is China Tower likely to rally?”. Chris Hoare sees China Tower’s position as unusual as the price moves are not driven by earnings upgrades or changed 5G expectations. Rather is is a sustained move post the IPO when the information in the market was incomplete and expectations were much lower. We were negative at the time of the IPO but changed our views as more information became available.  We remain positive on the scope for revaluation in China Tower given its rapid revenue growth and low valuations vs EM peers. While the recent results were somewhat disappointing, we see good upside as the market factors is lower capex and higher returns.