Event-Driven

In this briefing:

1. CEVA Logistics: Okay, Now You Can Tender
2. Harbin Electric’s Offer: One For The Brave
3. Descente Tamed, Itochu Delicacy Required And Investors Can Probably Wait
4. Linkbal (6046 JP) SmallCap Growth Stock: Offering This Morning, TOPIX Inclusion Late Summer 2019?
5. Ho Bee Ups Stake In Villa World After AVID Lobs An Offer

1. CEVA Logistics: Okay, Now You Can Tender

CMA CGM SA (144898Z FP) has 89.47% of Ceva Logistics AG (CEVA SW) and will now move to squeeze out and delist. The additional tender period will run from 20 March to 2 April.

After issuing the prospectus back in late January, CEVA’s board of directors recommended shareholders to not tender shares in the belief that shareholders could realise a higher value with their continuing investment.

Investors thought otherwise and have cashed out at CHF 30/share, a 62.8% premium to the undisturbed price. The massive share price under performance of CEVA subsequent to its listing on the 4 May 2018 – down 33% five months out from the IPO – would have crystallized that decision to tender.

CEVA’s board now recommend shareholders tender into the upcoming additional offer period. If delisting occurs, it is expected concurrently occur with a squeeze-out, which would be expected to take place in the third quarter of 2019 once all stock exchange and other legal conditions are fulfilled.

2. Harbin Electric’s Offer: One For The Brave

Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK)‘s (“HE”) composite doc for its merger by absorption has been dispatched. HE’s major shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation (HEC), an SOE, is seeking to delist the company by way of a merger by absorption at HK$4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close. The offer has been declared final. The IFA (Somerley) considers the offer fair & reasonable.

As HE is PRC-incorporated with unlisted domestic shares, the transaction is executed as a hybrid scheme/tender offer. The proposal requires ≥ 75% for, ≤10% against, in a scheme-like vote from independent H-shareholders. HEC holds no H shares. A 10% blocking stake is equal to 67.5mn shares. Should the resolution pass, the tendering acceptance condition in this two-step Offer is 90% of H shares out. Those who do not tender will be left holding unlisted scrip.

Indicative Timetable

A Word on Harbin’s Net Cash

In my prior insight, I discussed how the offer was below Harbin’s net cash, using CapIQ 1H18 numbers. That conclusion was not correct. While CapIQ’s net cash exceeds the consideration, its number excludes notes payable, a material number.

Using FY18 figures provided in the composite document, I estimate net cash/share of $3.18, ~70% of the consideration payment. Bloomberg’s number is higher again, while my understanding is Eikon’s $1.73/share (as at 30 June 2018) net cash figure includes (I have not verified, nor drawn a conclusion whether this would indeed be correct) deposits from customers and banks.

What to Do?

The significant offer premium to last close, the material drop in FY18 profit and the zero possibility of a competitive bidder emerging, suggests this Offer falls over the line.

The blocking stake at the H-share meeting is a risk. Although no single shareholder has the requisite stake to block the deal, collectively it is achievable.

The 90% tendering also, prima facie, appears a risk; yet such an acceptance threshold is not uncommon (Shanghai Forte (2337 HK) also required a 90% acceptance condition in 2011; while Hunan Nonferrous Metals H (2626 HK)‘s 2015 merger by absorption required 85%) and once the EGM resolution has been approved, there is little incentive to hold onto shares as Harbin will be delisted. Shares cannot be compulsory acquired.

However, I still consider “fair” to be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers.

Dissension rights are available, although I am not aware of any precedents, nor the calculation methodology of a “fair price” under such a dissension, nor the timing of payment. 

Trading at a wide gross/annualised spread of 9.6%/61.4%, implying a >80% chance of completion. The current downside should this break is 40%. I don’t see an attractive risk/reward here.

3. Descente Tamed, Itochu Delicacy Required And Investors Can Probably Wait

I started writing this over the weekend after the results of the Itochu Corp (8001 JP) Tender Offer for 9.56% of Descente Ltd (8114 JP) were announced late Friday. 

Itochu planned on buying 7.21 million shares out of the 75.37mm shares which bear voting rights (as of the commencement of the Tender), and 15,115,148mm shares were tendered, which led to a pro-ration rate of 47.7% which was 0.3% below my the middle of my “wide range” expected pro-ration rate of 42-54% and 0.7% beyond the 44-47% tighter range discussed in Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile of 28 February.

Two more central ideas were discussed in that piece:

1. The hostility shown by Descente management during the Tender Offer had led Itochu to abandon discussions about post-tender management until after the Tender Offer was completed. Both sides indicated a willingness to pick up where things had left off – at Descente’s request – but Descente needed to stew a bit.
2. The revelation by ANTA Sports in an interview with the CEO in the Nikkei in late February that ANTA supported Itochu meant that the likelihood of Itochu NOT having enough votes to put through its own slate of directors was almost zero. At a combined 47.0% of post-Tender voting rights, if 94% or less of shares were to vote, it would mean Itochu could get the majority of over 50% and determine the entire slate of directors themselves. If there was another shareholder holding a couple of percent which supported Itochu, it would be a done deal even if everyone voted. And that 2-3% existed.

So… the threat that Itochu would hold an EGM to seat new directors to oblige a stronger course for management was a very strong probability. Management who was rabidly opposed to Itochu owning the stake could not very well bow down in front of Itochu post-tender just to save its own hide – not after the employee union and the OB group came out against. President Ishimoto had effectively put himself in an untenable position unless a miracle occurred because Itochu could not legally walk away from its offer, and Ishimoto-san was bad-mouthing Itochu even as they were negotiating during the Tender Offer Period. 

It was not, therefore, any surprise that President Ishimoto would step down. The surprise for me was that the news he would go came out as talks commenced over the weekend (but did not “bridge the gap” as the Nikkei reported), before we got to the first business day post-results. 

Talks apparently continue with no resolution, and the media reports offer no hint as to what the issues might be. 

4. Linkbal (6046 JP) SmallCap Growth Stock: Offering This Morning, TOPIX Inclusion Late Summer 2019?

On November 13th last year, Linkbal Inc (6046 JP) announced it was looking to move from MOTHERS to the TSE First Section. The stock rallied. At the same time the company said that it was preparing to file an application for the move. 

On March 5th, the company announced a forthcoming tachiaigai bunbai offering designed to increase the float. That tachiaigai bunbai offering (designed for retail investors only) takes place this morning after an announcement the company would oversee the offer of 970,000 shares (about 5% of the company but about 180% of the float currently held by public retail investors) at a price of ¥905/share (1,000 shares max per buyer), which is a 3% discount to yesterday’s close of ¥933 yen. 

This will get it most of the way towards meeting the requirements, but likely not all the way. An inclusion is still months off. And there would likely be another sale to increase shareholder count by 800-1000 before then, whether in the form of a Public Offering/Uridashi or in the form of another tachiaigai bunbai.

Given where we are on timing, as shown in Historical TOPIX Inclusions:  How Do They Do Around Inclusion Date? this would seem an interesting bet. Given the company’s prodigious growth in sales and profits, even though it is small, more people will look at it.

5. Ho Bee Ups Stake In Villa World After AVID Lobs An Offer

On the 14th March 2019, Australian property developer, Villa World Ltd (VLW AU) announced that it had received an unsolicited proposal, by way of a scheme, from AVID Property Group Australia at an offer price A$2.23, or a 12% premium to last close. 

The offer is conditional on due diligence, unanimous approval of VLW’s board of directors and the receipt of FIRB and other regulatory approvals.

AVID’s indicative offer translates to an LTM PER and P/B of 6.4x and 0.9x, with the P/B metric roughly in line peers.

During 2018, VLW’s share price declined by 36% to A$1.76 from A$2.77, with a large chunk of that downward move occurring in December after VLW withdrew its FY19E earnings guidance. That forecast withdrawal was exacerbated by the fact VLW had maintained the 2019 forward guidance at its mid-November AGM.

Ho Bee Land Ltd (HOBEE SP), VLW’s largest shareholder and JV partner, responded to AVID’s proposal by buying 2.2mn shares (~1.8% of shares out) at an average of A$1.95/share – and a high of A$2.18/share – lifting its stake to 9.41%. Its stake in VLW accounts for only 1.5% of its market cap. I would not be surprised if Ho Bee is still buying in the market.

VLW announced a 1H19 NPAT of A$17.6mn ($17.3mn) last month – slightly above its $16mn to $17mn guidance – and declared a A$0.08/share franked dividend. Assuming FY19E profit of $27mn, VLW is trading at a not unreasonable 10x PER and an attractive 7.3% yield, one of the highest yields among its peer group, assuming the high-end of the 50-75% payout ratio policy. 

In this briefing:

1. China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption
2. Severgroup Puts in a Cheeky Bid for Lenta – TPG and EBRD Bail
3. Yinson Tenders a Lifeboat for Ezion
4. DSV Improves Bid and Göhner Foundation and Panalpina Agree
5. M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in March 2019

1. China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption

In my initial insight on China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK, “CPNED”)‘s privatisation by China Power New Energy Limited (the Offeror) by way of a Scheme, I concluded China Three Gorges, CPNED’s largest shareholder with 27.10%, will likely be required to abstain at the Court Meeting as it is presumed to be a connected party to the Offeror as per the Takeovers Code.

But the announcement states that CTG has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme and to elect the share alternative.

It seems illogical to mention in the irrevocable CTG will vote for the Scheme when in actuality it cannot vote. So, which one is it?

The short answer is: CTG cannot currently vote. 

But understanding this requires diving into the minutiae of Hong Kong’s Takeovers Code. So I do.

2. Severgroup Puts in a Cheeky Bid for Lenta – TPG and EBRD Bail

In the middle of last week, Russia’s largest chain of hypermarkets Lenta Ltd (LNTA LI)  announced that it was aware that there were ongoing discussions between Luna (TPG’s holding entity, which owns 34.13% of Lenta’s capital) and Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup, for Luna to sell its stake in Lenta to the Russian conglomerate. A day later, Lenta announced the company was aware of discussions between Severgroup and the EBRD (7.40% holder). 

Reuters reported last night that Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those two sellers, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company. 

Later last night, Lenta announced on its website (full press release here) a cash offer for all the shares had been proposed. The Offer has a pre-condition dealing with the above-mentioned transactions being approved by those who need to approve.

The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs. 

There may be something interesting to do here.

3. Yinson Tenders a Lifeboat for Ezion

Long-suffering lifeboat market play Ezion Holdings (EZI SP) has received a bail-out from Malaysia’s Yinson Holdings (YNS MK).

Yinson’s proposal is two-fold:

1. A conditional debt conversion agreement to capitalise all of the “relevant debt” of US$916mn via the allotment and issue of up to approximately 22,573,570,909 new ordinary shares of Ezion at an issue price of S$0.055/share (27.9% premium to last close).
2. A conditional option agreement for the proposed grant by Ezion of 3,360,495,867 non-listed and transferable share options to Yinson at the exercise price of S$0.0605 per option Share. 

This shareholder structure will take the following shape, with Yinson holding 85.9% of shares out after the conversion and 87.5% after both the conversion and the exercise of the share options.

However … as per the more detailed Bursa announcement:

It is the intention of YEPL (wholly-owned sub of Yinson) to acquire up to US$916mn of the Relevant Debts for a consideration to be agreed with the Designated Lenders. Tentatively, YHB (Yinson) expected its cash outlay shall be in the region of USD200mn and some EHL (Ezion) Shares that will give YEPL a shareholding of not less than 70% in EHL at the point of the completion of the Proposed Debt conversion and Subscription. In any event, assuming all convertible securities of EHL are converted, YHB expects its eventual shareholding in EHL shall be a controlling stake of at least 51%.

Ezion is also in negotiation with the major secured lenders to restructure its existing debts which would result in the conversion of certain debts to redeemable convertible preferences shares to be issued by Ezion.

As this is effectively a hybrid takeover, there exist a number of conditions required to complete this proposal. Of importance is the waiver from the Securities Industry Council of Singapore for Yinson not to make a mandatory general offer for Ezion under Rule 14.1 of the Takeover Code, as the share subscription takes Yinson’s stake >30%.

On Ezion

Ezion develops, owns, and charters offshore assets to support offshore energy markets, via three key segments:

• Lifeboats/liftboats – these are self-propelled rigs involved in the production and maintenance of the O&G and windfarm industry. This segment accounted for 57.9% of revenue in FY18.
• Jack-up rigs – engaged in non-self propelled rigs involved in the production and maintenance of the O&G and windfarm industry. The segment accounted for 34.1% of revenue in FY18.
• And offshore support logistic services, accounting for 7.5% of revenue in FYT18.

Ezion is primarily Asian focused with revenue split between Singapore, India, and the rest of Asia as to 8%, 5.3% and 54%. The Middle East and Africa account for 15.6% and 15.2% respectively.

Fundamentals

• Revenue declined by US$125mn in FY17 due to a reduction in charter rates and delays in re-deployment of the Ezion’s liftboats due to working capital constraints. The loss before tax was exacerbated by impairment losses totalling US$897mn.
• Revenue declined by US$74mn in FY17 due to a drop in the utilisation rates of liftboats and jack-up rigs. FY18 also saw an increase in impairments loses of US$84.5mn, while loses in associate and jointly controlled entities increased to US$39mn in FY18 from US$16mn in FY17.

Effect on NTA from the conversion/options

Assuming the subscription and options were completed on 31 December 2018, the effects of the Ezion’s NTL/NTA per share would be as follows: 

Peer Comparisons

Substantial Shareholders of Ezion

4. DSV Improves Bid and Göhner Foundation and Panalpina Agree

Late Sunday night Bloomberg reported that DSV A/S (DSV DC) had sweetened its offer for Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) from the previous CHF 180/share and that the new bid had won the support of the Foundation. 

This morning quite early we have an agreed deal and what had seemed a tough deal now seems easy.

According to a press release a short while ago.

DSV and Panalpina have reached an agreement on the terms and conditions of a combination by way of a Public Exchange Offer to all Panalpina shareholders. The board of directors of Panalpina recommends that Panalpina shareholders accept the Public Exchange Offer. The Public Exchange Offer already has the support of shareholders representing 69.9% of the registered shares of Panalpina, who have irrevocably agreed to tender their shares into the Public Exchange Offer. This includes Panalpina’s largest shareholder, Ernst Göhner Foundation and Cevian and Artisan*.

The deal is 2.375 shares of DSV for every share of Panalpina, which as of Friday’s close had a value of CHF 195.80/share which is a 43% premium to the CHF 137/share where Panalpina was trading the day before DSV’s first bid.

Exact terms of the Exchange Offer have not been disclosed but there will be an 80% acceptance condition (including the 69.9% who have already irrevocably agreed to accept the Offer), and other conditions will include “receipt of all necessary regulatory approvals, approval of a capital increase at an extraordinary general meeting in DSV, approval of a listing prospectus and admittance of the new DSV shares for trading at NASDAQ Copenhagen and effectiveness of a US Registration Statement.” (DSV press release)

In light of the Exchange Offer, the Ernst Göhner Foundation asked the board of Panalpina to postpone the April 5th EGM which was set to decide on the one-share one-vote.

5. M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in March 2019

For the month of March, ten new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with an overall deal size of US$22.3bn.

Clicking on the company name in the table below will take you to the entity page where you can see insight(s) written by Smartkarma contributors.

Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman made a proposal for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) in mid-January – which was rejected by the board – and subsequently returned with an improved offer which was then supported. The deal was first written on after the Tender Offer was officially launched in March.

The average premium to last close for the new deals announced in March was 18%, while the average for the first quarter of 2019 is 33%.

Brief Summary of News in March of Arb Situations On Smartkarma’s Radar

(again, click on the company names to take to you to the insights and/or discussion posts)

In this briefing:

1. Nexon Controlling Stake Sale: Tax Situation Assessment & Tender Implications
2. Last Week in Event SPACE: Nissan, Naspers, Lynas, Xenith, Versum, Scout24, PCCW
3. Hankook Tire Stub Trade: Sub Clearly Oversold Relative to Holdco on Hanon Takeover
4. China Power New Energy To Be Delisted After SOE Injection Abandoned
5. Scout24 Tender Offer Launched: Price Still Not Quite Full

1. Nexon Controlling Stake Sale: Tax Situation Assessment & Tender Implications

This post looks at the tax situations that Nexon’s Kim may be facing for each of the two options and the signals that he may be sending with regard to his decision. Also, this post discusses how each option may impact on mandatory tender offer which is a crucial point for current massive short buildup on Nexon Japan shares.

2. Last Week in Event SPACE: Nissan, Naspers, Lynas, Xenith, Versum, Scout24, PCCW

Last Week in Event SPACE …

• The fog lifts, slowly, on Nissan Motor (7201 JP), but merger talks will have to wait until the company gets its governance in order, and a full-on merger seems remote at best.
• The value enhancement to Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ) from spinning off and separately listing its stake in Tencent Holdings (700 HK) is not apparent.
• Trading around its “undisturbed” levels, Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) looks like a short after rejecting Wesfarmers Ltd (WES AU)‘s left-field unsolicited proposal.
• The gloves are off as Merck KGaA (MRK GR) announced an unsolicited $48/share cash tender offer for Versum Materials (VSM US). 
• With the ACCC’s blessing, now is a good time for Xenith Ip (XIP AU) to jettison Qantm Intellectual Property (QIP AU) and engage with IPH Ltd (IPH AU).
• While the deal for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) is likely to get up, someone else coming over the top at this late stage is not impossible.
• PCCW Ltd (8 HK) is “cheap” relative to HKT Ltd (6823 HK) – a catalyst to narrow the discount would be helpful.

• Plus other events, CCASS movements and upcoming key dates for M&A transactions.

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

Nissan Motor (7201 JP) (Mkt Cap: $32bn; Liquidity: $98mn)

Both Mio Kato, CFA and Travis Lundy tackled a report in the FT suggesting that Renault “aims to restart merger talks with Nissan within 12 months” and the long-awaited release of Nissan’s Special Committee for Improving Governance (SCIG) report.

• Governance weakness under Ghosn was inexcusably bad. Worse than previously reported. Ghosn unilaterally decided the compensation of directors, top management and himself, while Kelly held broad sway over essentially everyone else, acting as a gatekeeper even against auditors and the accounting department. And it appears that there is zero understanding at Renault that Renault itself is not blameless for bad governance at Nissan over the years. The SCIG recommendations to the board now are, on the whole, pretty decent.
• If France and Renault “push” for a merger, Nissan will continue to push back for the foreseeable future. As the governance report shows, the house is nowhere near being in order. All that has happened is that the steps which need to take place for it to be put in order have been identified.
  
• Where Mio and Travis diverge – click to both insights below – is that Mio thinks a breakup of the alliance is more likely than a merger near term, especially if Paris continues to ignore Nissan’s priorities and constantly push for a merger ASAP.  He does not feel scale is quite as necessary as people seem to assume, as long as you have access to a strong supply chain.
• Travis thinks an outright merger is also unlikely, as the trust is not there, but is a big fan of the existing single platform design to lower costs and reduce parts count. There would be no need to replicate the R&D for parts and platforms across multiple marks, so he thinks the production alliance stays in place even if the capital alliance does not move further.

Links to:
Mio’s insight: Nissan: Atrocious Governance Should Be Rectified Before Even Thinking of a Merger.
Travis’ insight: Nissan Governance Structure Report Out: Fog Dissipating Slowly. Sunny in Summer. Storms Next Winter?

Samsung Electronics (005930 KS) (Mkt Cap: $265bn; Liquidity: $464mn)

Sanghyun Park concluded the market had misinterpreted Amazon’s server DRAM demand cut in 4Q18. It wasn’t a sign of falling demand nor is there any convincing sign of server DRAM demand drop-off. It’s more a technical issue and by the time SamE gets the optimization issues right, server DRAM demand of Amazon and Google will return, stabilising DRAM prices.

• And that demand may come sooner, potentially by the end of 2Q. This will lead to a ₩4tn quarterly addition to the current street consensus, which backs out a current PER of ~9x.
• SamE is up since Micron announced it plans to reduce its output of DRAM and NAND by ~5% this year. From a Common-1P perspective, Sanghyun recommends going long the Common.

(link to Sanghyun’s insight: Samsung Electronics DRAM Economics: Adj. Valuation Shows Upside Potential at Current Price)

Briefly …

Aqila Ali discusses Denso Corp (6902 JP) investment in Airbiquity Inc, one of the leading companies in the connected vehicle services sector and one of the companies that has continuously developed automotive telematics technology. This proposal follows its investment in Quadric.io this year. Denso is in full swing in the development of its autonomous driving business and next-generation technologies development, and it wouldn’t be a surprise to see Denso emerge as the first mover in next-generation technologies such as AD and connectivity solutions. (link to Aqila’s insight: Denso Continues to Strengthen Its Investment CASE with Acquisitions)

Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) (Mkt Cap: $1bn; Liquidity: $7mn)

Wesfarmers Ltd (WES AU) surprised the market and announced a non-binding proposal to acquire Lynas at A$2.25/share (cash) by way of a scheme.  This is a 44.7% premium to the one-day price and a 36.4% premium to the 60-day price. However, it is a 0% premium to the price at which Lynas was trading on 3 December 2018, the day before the Malaysian government imposed two pre-conditions on the rolling over of the processing licence (later in 2019), and it is a 3.2% premium to the one-year average as of 4 December 2018. Lynas rejected the proposal the next day.

• Lynas shares have, since mid-December, been trading as if there is significant risk to the renewal of their operating license in Malaysia. 

• This is a long-term bet by Wesfarmers. But seeing it through would require that Lynas shareholders decide once Malaysia has approved the renewal of their license that this business won’t be able to see better margins ahead the way there was a dream to see them a year ago.  Travis did not think that the increased buying on the dip by Greencape Pty and FIL since the Dec 4th announcement are omens of a desire to sell at A$2.25. 
• A priori, the bid by Wesfarmers does not increase the likelihood of a good outcome on the Malaysian regulatory front. And it disappears if Lynas can’t sort its problems satisfactorily. Therefore, it is not clear what value the bid brings to Lynas shares today. If neither the outcome’s probabilities nor the outcome’s price levels change, the bid should have no material impact on Lynas shares.
• At the time of his report, Travis thought this would be a short if the stock pops to the very high A$1 range or A$2.00 area. One caveat to shorting too low: if you think WES would conceivably bid quite a bit higher to enable Lynas to have a processing plant and battery plant at WES in Australia and maintain processing in Malaysia, that might be a different story.
  

(link to Travis’ insight: Wesfarmers Puts Out A Bid for Lynas)

Xenith Ip (XIP AU) (Mkt Cap: $115mn; Liquidity: $1mn)

The ACCC said will not oppose a tie in between IPH Ltd (IPH AU) and Xenith. Xenith acknowledged the ACCC decision resolves a major uncertainty, but stops short of supporting IPH’s offer as there still exist a number of concerns as detailed in its 19 March announcement.

• None of these remaining concerns raised by Xenith appear deal-breakers, and Xenith’s general pushback fails to mention the benefits of leveraging off IPH’s Asia-based presence, IPH’s superior liquidity (versus QANTM limited liquidity), together with the certainty of value under IPH’s offer via the large cash portion.
• With IPH’s 19.9% blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme is a non-starter. Xenith still should engage with IPH, whose offer provides a gross/annualised spread of 7.5%/24.5% – a decent risk/reward – assuming late July completion. The scheme meeting to decide on the QANTM Offer, scheduled for the 3 April, has now been postponed.

(link to my insight: Xenith Is Running Out Of Excuses)

China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK) (Mkt Cap: $581mn; Liquidity: $1mn)

SOE State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) is seeking to privatise China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK) by way of a Scheme at $5.45/share, a 41.9% premium to last close and a 78.1% premium to the 30-day average. A scrip alternative (6 New shares for one Scheme shares) into an unlisted vehicle under SPIC is also available, but presumably just for SOE shareholders. China Three Gorges, CPNED’s largest shareholder with 27.10%, have given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme and to elect the share alternative.

• This looks like a pretty clean, straightforward privatization. It is priced above the highest close since its listing by way of introduction on the 18 July 2017, while the excitement over the potential injection of all nuclear power assets and businesses from State Nuclear Power Technology Company has been removed after the restructuring was cancelled in July last year.
• Clarity is required as to whether China Three Gorges can vote at the court meeting. Based on the Code, it appears evident they cannot. In addition, the final dividend is expected to be added to the offer price, but again, the announcement is not explicit on this.
• The stock is currently trading at an attractive gross/annualised spread of 7.5%/25.7% conservatively assuming a late July completion, and inclusive of the final dividend. 

(link to my insight: China Power New Energy To Be Delisted After SOE Injection Abandoned)

Versum Materials (VSM US) (Mkt Cap: $5.4bn; Liquidity: $79mn)

Merck KGaA (MRK GR) has launching an unsolicited, fully financed tender offer on VSM at $48/share cash, a 52% premium to VSM’s stock price on January 25, the day before it agreed to sell itself to Entegris Inc (ENTG US)‘s in an all-stock deal.

• Conditions include a minimum acceptance threshold (a majority of shares), the rejection of ENTG’s offer, HSR/CFIUS clearance, plus the usual MACs. Merck does not rule out an increase in the Offer price.
• The shareholder vote on the VSM/ENTG is scheduled for April 26^th, 2019. The record date to vote is April 2, 2019. This means the last day to buy and participate was this past Friday.
• Merck said “the Versum board’s hasty rejection of our proposal and unwillingness to engage in discussions with us has forced us to take this proposal directly to shareholders. … Tell the Versum board to start doing its job and put your interests first.”

(link to John DeMasi‘s: Versum Materials – Merck KGaA Dials Up the Pressure and Launches Unsolicited Tender Offer (Part III))

Scout24 AG (G24 GR) (Mkt Cap: $5.6bn; Liquidity: $20mn)

A combination of Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman LLC launched an non-LBO LBO for Scout24 in mid-January at €43.50/share (€4.7bn), which was about an 8% premium to the then-current market price, which had already been juiced because of speculation starting after the FT article in late December. Scout24’s Board rejected the Offer.  The two buyers came back in mid-February with a Takeover Offer priced at €46.00/share. Both Scout24’s Management Board and Supervisory Board agreed to support the offer. The BidCo has now officially launched its Tender Offer.

• The unusual thing about this deal is that the two PE firms are looking to buy a minimum of 50% plus one share, and leave the company listed. The stock has been trading above terms since the new €46 bid. It appears the idea is that another bidder might come in over the top. Travis tends to think the occasional trading at just above €46 is due to arbitrageurs looking at this as a put option. Plus, the lack of additional noise means another bid may not be forthcoming. 
• Because Scout24 is basically a pure play inline classifieds business, it gets a decent multiple (17x 2019e EV/EBITDA). That said, it is not overwhelmingly expensive for a business which has strong network effects and significant ability to create niche marketplaces using existing technology/IP.
• Travis would see nothing wrong with selling in the market here, but as an arb, he is still a buyer at €46.01/share.

(link to Travis’ insight: Scout24 Tender Offer Launched: Price Still Not Quite Full)

Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ) / Tencent Holdings (700 HK)

Naspers announced the intended listing of its international internet assets on Euronext Amsterdam “no earlier than H2 2019“, together with a secondary, inward listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The Newco spin-off will include Naspers’ holdings in listcos Tencent and Mail.Ru (MAIL LI), together with ex-South African internet assets. Naspers will maintain a 75% stake in Newco plus Takealot, Media24, and net cash.

• Newco’s discount is likely to be narrower than Naspers presently, on account of the smaller free float, and >$2.26bn of investment just from index funds. It will however, still be a Tencent holding vehicle, while Newco’s assets comprise ~94% of Nasper’s assets.
• The remaining Naspers, post-spin off could have a wider discount – or “discounts on discounts”.  It will be one layer removed from what investors are most interested in – the Tencent holding. As witnessed in other holdco restructurings, providing additional clarity on investments/holdings within a company via spin-offs does not necessarily translate to the parent company’s discount narrowing. 
• Assigning a 20-25% discount to the Newco and keeping the discount constant (optimistically) at Naspers, gives a negative ~7-13% return.  I simply don’t see the value enhancement here, while there is no change in governance and no monetisation at the parent level.

(link to my insight: StubWorld: Naspers Embeds Another Layer Into Tencent)

PCCW Ltd (8 HK) / HKT Ltd (6823 HK)

Using a Sum of the Parts analysis, Curtis Lehnert calculated the current discount to NAV to be 37%, the widest level it has been since at least 2015, and approaching the -2 standard deviation level relative to its 6 month average.

• The current dividend yield on PCCW was 6.62% vs. 5.55% for HKT. That 1% yield differential is also near the widest since HKT’s listing in 2011.
• As Curtis notes, a catalyst for re-rating is hard to find. Still, he argues that the discount has widened out so much that the statistical advantages of mean reversion are in your favor.

(link to Curtis’ insight: TRADE IDEA – PCCW (8 HK) Stub: The Li Legacy Lives On)

• Hong Kong International Construction Investment Management Group Co., (687 HK)‘s SPA has completed – you can see the movement in shares on CCASS – triggering the MGO.

  Separately – and as expected – the composite document issuance for HKCIM has been delayed until (on or before) the 18 April.

• Eclipx (ECX AU) has rallied after a market update confirming it will sell two divisions (Grays and Right2Drive) and use the proceeds to pay down corporate debt.

• Ophir Energy (OPHR LN)‘s shareholders approved Medco Energi Internasional T (MEDC IJ)‘s Offer. Completion of the Offer remains subject to the receipt of clearances from the relevant authorities in Tanzania and not losing all or substantially all of its Bualuang interests in Thailand.

• 9.12% of shares out have tendered into Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB)‘s Offer, bringing the Offeror’s total holding to 30.05%. 
• The Offer docs for Healthscope Ltd (HSO AU) have been pushed out to the 24 April so as to incorporate the Scheme and Takeover Documents into a single integrated booklet.

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

3. Hankook Tire Stub Trade: Sub Clearly Oversold Relative to Holdco on Hanon Takeover

• Hankook Tire Holdco/Sub are at +2σ for 5 consecutive days now. It was reported on Mar 25 that Sub (Hankook Tire) was on the verge of taking over Hanon Systems at a hefty 70% premium. Hankook Tire pays ₩5tril for Hahn & Co’s 50% stake.
• ₩5tril is really a lot for the Group. Holdco will also have to be heavily involved in funding. Whatever suffering Sub will have to endure should also be nearly equally applied to Holdco.
• Only long-term oriented local public offering funds had heavily dumped Sub shares. In contrast, highly short-term oriented local hedge funds (PEs) had rather shorted Holdco in the same time span. Sub disappoints and alienates a lot of long-term investors but it was Holdco who attracted the attention of short-term traders.
• Current +2σ divergence stayed for several days now. Considering where local short sellers are, I don’t think it will last much longer. I’d join local short-sellers. Just for a safer setup, I’d do pair trades, go long Sub and short Holdco.

4. China Power New Energy To Be Delisted After SOE Injection Abandoned

SOE State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) is seeking to privatise China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK) by way of a Scheme at $5.45/share, a 41.9% premium to last close and a 78.1% premium to the 30-day average.

A scrip alternative (6 New shares for one Scheme shares) into an unlisted vehicle under SPIC is also available.

China Three Gorges, CPNED’s largest shareholder with 27.10%, have given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme and to elect the share alternative.

However, China Three Gorges is presumably required to abstain from voting at the court meeting, as it is deemed to be acting in concert with the SPIC under class (1) of the definition of the acting in concert in the Takeovers Code. The announcement does not make this clear.

Assuming China Three Gorges does abstain, a 10% blocking stake at the court meeting is equivalent to 4.48% of shares out or 53mn shares.

This looks like a pretty clean deal. It is priced above the highest close since its listing by way of introduction on the 18 July 2017, while the excitement over the potential injection of all nuclear power assets and businesses from State Nuclear Power Technology Company has been removed after the restructuring was cancelled in July last year.

The stock is currently trading at an attractive gross/annualised spread of 8.3%/28.9% conservatively assuming a late July completion, and inclusive of the final dividend. 

5. Scout24 Tender Offer Launched: Price Still Not Quite Full

In December (13 Dec after trading hours), the FT had an article noting that Germany’s leading property classifieds firm Scout24 AG (G24 GR) (also known for auto classifieds across Europe) was possibly looking to sell itself and that PE firms were lining up to bid. Silver Lake, which had bought British player ZPG (which operates property portals Zoopla and PrimeLocation) for $2.8bn in July 2018, was mentioned as a bidder. Once owned by Deutsche Telekom, control of Scout24 was sold to Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman LLC in 2013-14 (H&F spent €1.5 billion to take a 70% stake in 2013, and Blackstone bought a stake of undisclosed size in 2014), and they listed the company in 2015 with an initial market cap of €3.2 billion. The IPO was €1.16 billion and both sold down, with H&F fully exiting in a placement in 2016.

The share price had been doing well until Q3 last year when German lawmakers, anxious with skyrocketing property prices, started looking at revamping the structure of real estate transaction costs so that they were borne by sellers rather than loaded onto buyers. The shares fell.

A combination of Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman LLC launched an non-LBO LBO for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) in mid-January at €43.50/share (€4.7 billion) which was about an 8% premium to the then-current market price, which had already been juiced because of speculation starting after the FT article in late December. The company rejected the Offer saying it was too low. 

The two buyers came back in mid-February with a Takeover Offer priced at €46.00/share, 5.7% higher than January’s foray and 27% higher than the level pre-FT article; that was about 25x earnings and 28x 2019e cashflow, which is a bit lower than Silver Lake’s ZPG buy multiple. Both Scout24’s Management Board and Supervisory Board agreed to support the offer and said they believed that the transaction is in the best interest of the Company, and an Investment Agreement was signed between the three companies.

The unusual thing about this deal is that the two PE firms are looking to buy a minimum of 50% plus one share, and leave the company listed. The shares jumped to €46 and have been trading at just below to slightly through, leaving many to think that this was a setup for a strategic buyer or possibly Silver Lake to come in over the top. 

The New News

Yesterday, the BidCo officially launched its Tender Offer at €46, due to run through 9th May.

More discussion below.

In this briefing:

1. Denso Continues to Strengthen Its Investment CASE with Acquisitions
2. Xenith Is Running Out Of Excuses
3. Nissan Governance Structure Report Out: Fog Dissipating Slowly. Sunny in Summer. Storms Next Winter?
4. DHICO Rights Offer: Arb Yields for Early Arb Traders & Trade Approach for Late Arb Traders
5. Nissan: Atrocious Governance Should Be Rectified Before Even Thinking of a Merger

1. Denso Continues to Strengthen Its Investment CASE with Acquisitions

Denso Corp (6902 JP) announced this month that it has invested in the Seattle-based connected vehicle services pioneer- Airbiquity Inc. Airbiquity is one of the leading companies in the connected vehicle services sector and has been one of the companies that has continuously developed automotive telematics technology. This investment made by Denso follows its investment made in Quadric.io this year ( Stake in Quadric.io Following Renesas; Denso Attempts to Keep Chip Makers Close to Achieve AD Aims). As we previously mentioned, Denso is in full swing in its development in the autonomous driving field and next-generation technologies development. Thus, it wouldn’t be a surprise to see Denso emerge as the first mover in next-generation technologies such as AD and connectivity solutions. According to Denso, its investment worth $5m in Airbiquity is expected to accelerate the development of over-the-air (OTA) systems for wirelessly updating automotive software from a remote location. OTA systems are methods of distributing new software, configuration settings, and providing updates to the electronic device in use, for instance, a car navigation system in a vehicle. These OTA systems which have been increasingly used to update the software of such multimedia products in a vehicle are now gaining more prominence given the emergence of next-generation technologies such as electrification, EV and connectivity. We also believe that Denso’s Stake in Airbiquity is likely to accelerate Denso’s transition in its business model to be a leading software solution provider. Thus, its series of investments such as in Tohoku Pioneer EG, JOLED, ThinCI, Quadric, and now Airbiquity are indicative of the decisiveness of its change in business model and moves towards achieving next-generation technology leadership.

2. Xenith Is Running Out Of Excuses

When IPH Ltd (IPH AU) gate-crashed Xenith Ip (XIP AU)/Qantm Intellectual Property (QIP AU)‘s marriage of equals, submitting a scheme proposal comprising cash (A$1.28) and IPH shares (0.1056 IPH shares) or A$1.97/share, versus QANTM’s all-cash offer (1.22 QANTM), the key risk to IPH’s Offer was ACCC opposing its Offer. As announced today, ACCC will not oppose.

This decision was largely expected and previously discussed here. Although IPH, QANTM, and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies, privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. The ACCC agrees and signed off on an IPH/XIP tie-up as it did on the 21 March, by not opposing the merger of XIP and QANTM.

XIP acknowledged the ACCC decision resolves a major uncertainty, but stops short of supporting IPH’s offer as there still exists a number of concerns as detailed in its 19 March announcement. IPH responded to those concerns on the 20 March. These include:

1. Shareholders of Xenith will hold an immaterial % of the merged IPH entity compared to QANTM.
   • IPH’s scrip portion accounted for (then) 35% of its Offer (now ~37%), shares which have superior liquidity versus QANTM given IPH’s position in the ASX200. 
   • The cash portion also provides added certainty on value into the Offer compared to QANTM’s all scrip offer.
2. The control premium as at 11 March is insufficient.
   • Probably the most contentious concern. QANTM’s all-scrip offer on the 27 November backed out an indicative offer price of $1.598/share or a 28.4% premium to last close.
   • IPH’s $1.97/share indicative offer (a 60% premium to XIP’s undisturbed price, and a 31% premium to the independent expert’s mid-point fair value (page 55)) compared to QANTM’s indicative offer of $2.03 immediately before IPH’s announcement.
   • Circumstances have changed materially since, with IPH’s cash/scrip offer now worth $2.02 as I type, versus $1.67 for QANTM.
     

     

     Source: CapIQ
3. The increased execution risk concerning ACCC. Now a non-issue.
4. It is questionable whether employees, controlling 40% of Xenith, would support the offer.
   • Employees are free to decide on what they consider to be the most compelling Offer. IPH has offered to hold discussions with XIP employees. 
5. CGT rollover will likely be lower via the large cash element under IPH’s offer vs. QANTM’s all scrip offer.
   • Maybe. Possibly. An all-scrip offer typically affords greater rollover relief. Nevertheless, Xenith is trading below its 2015 IPO price of $2.72/share.

With IPH’s 19.9% blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme is a non-starter. Xenith still should engage with IPH. The scheme meeting to decide on the QANTM Offer is scheduled for the 3 April.

3. Nissan Governance Structure Report Out: Fog Dissipating Slowly. Sunny in Summer. Storms Next Winter?

Six weeks ago I wrote that Nissan’s governance outlook was “Foggy Now, Sunny Later.” I said “Governance changes are afoot, with a steady flow of developments likely coming in March, April, May, and June.”

The last couple of months have seen numerous media articles about the process of Nissan Motor (7201 JP) and Renault SA (RNO FP) rebuilding their relationship. There have been visits to Tokyo by Renault’s new chairman of the board of directors Jean-Dominique Senard, and visits to Paris and Amsterdam by the CEOs of Nissan and Mitsubishi Motors (7211 JP). 

There have been many suggestions in French and European newspapers in the interim that Jean-Dominique Senard would be the obvious choice as a representative director of Nissan. There have been other articles out there in the Japanese press suggesting what conclusions the committee might come to as to what outcomes should result. The difference is notable. The French side still wants control. The Japanese/Nissan/committee side sees the need to fix governance.

Today there was a report in the FT suggesting that Renault “wants” to restart merger talks with Nissan and “aims to restart merger talks with Nissan within 12 months.” It should be noted that these two sentences are not exactly the same. It may still be that France wants Renault to do so, and therefore Renault aims to do so. The same article revealed past talks on Renault merging with FCA but France putting a stop to it and a current desire to acquire another automaker – perhaps FCA – after dealing with Nissan. 

Also today, the long-awaited Nissan Special Committee for Improving Governance (SCIG) report was released. It outlines some of the issues of governance which existed under Ghosn- both the ones which got him the boot, and the structural governance issues which were “discovered” after he got the boot. 

There are clear patches in the fog. Two things shine through immediately. 

1. Governance weaknesses under Ghosn were inexcusably bad. Worse than previously reported.
2. The recommendations to the board now are, on the whole, pretty decent. Some are sine qua non changes – formation of nomination and compensation committees, whistleblower reporting to the audit committee and not the CEO, and greater checks and balances. Some are stronger in terms of the independence of Nissan from Renault: the committee recommends a majority of independent board members, an independent chairman, and no representative directors from Renault, Mitsubishi, or principal shareholders.

There are, however, other issues which were not addressed, which for Nissan’s sake probably should be addressed. Yesterday was a first step on what will be a 3-month procession of news about the way Nissan will address the SCIG report’s recommendations, the process by which it will choose new directors when it does not have an official nomination committee, and the AGM in June to propose and confirm new directors. Then they will start their jobs in July. 

The fog looks to lift slowly. And one may anticipate some better weather beyond. But business concerns remain a threat, and while relations appear to be getting better after the departure of Carlos Ghosn and the arrival of Jean-Dominique Senard, it is not clear that a Franco-Japanese storm is not brewing in the distance.

More below.

4. DHICO Rights Offer: Arb Yields for Early Arb Traders & Trade Approach for Late Arb Traders

• As well expected, DHICO was heavily shorted yesterday, ex-rights day. We had a heavy buying movement by short-term arb traders at both local and foreign on DHICO right before ex-rights. As shown in the second table, yesterday’s shorting was mostly done by short-term traders again both local and foreign alike.
• These early arb traders had presumably bought DHICO shares at ₩8,076 on Mar 25~26. They then disposed shares at ₩6,974 yesterday. They then shorted the same amount of shares additionally at ₩6,983. As a result, at ceiling price ₩5,550 their yield is virtually fixed at 4.10%. If the offering price goes down to the bottom of ₩5,000 which is a very high possibility at this point, their yield will go up as high as 10.91%.
• For those who haven’t made early moves, there are now two options to play this event. You can either trade now and hope that subscription right price won’t hit breaking price level or wait until Apr 19~25 subscription rights period for a perfectly risk-free entry point. At the current price ₩6,800, breaking price for subscription rights is still at a comfortable level. That is, I’d make trades right now by shorting DHICO shares.

→ DHICO price just got down nearly 3%. At this reduced price, below are updated numbers for late arb traders’ arb yield. To me, it still seems we won’t be in a losing position if we make trades now. But we’d better hurry up.

5. Nissan: Atrocious Governance Should Be Rectified Before Even Thinking of a Merger

Today Nissan Motor (7201 JP) released its report from the Special Committee for Improving Governance. The FT also reported that Renault SA (RNO FP) (i.e. the French government) was keen to restart merger talks within twelve months with an eye towards then acquiring Fiat Chrysler Automobiles Nv (FCAU US).

The details of the former are unsurprising but disappointing, while Renault’s M&A ambitions just seem delusional at this point.

In this briefing:

1. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew
2. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update
3. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope
4. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer
5. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau

1. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew

On February 27th of this year, Altaba Inc (AABA US) held a “Strategic and Financial Update Conference Call.” In that call the company led by CEO Thomas McInerney said that effectively it was going to deal with its two major remaining assets (2.03bn shares of Yahoo Japan Corp (4689 JP) and 383.56mm shares of Alibaba Group Holding Ltd (BABA US)) in two stages, saying at the time they were “moving to an active monetization mode on [our] Yahoo Japan stake.”

That Yahoo Japan stake took longer, but the company worked to sell $20+bn of Alibaba last summer through a tender offer and selldown to generate cash for corporate liabilities and taxes, and then the company sold its Yahoo Japan stake in early September. 

Since then, there has been a period of watchful waiting. Some have been expecting a period with an acceptable amount of carry and then possible significant upside. I haven’t seen the upside but agree there has been some baseline carry. And if you can get lots of leverage on this and ride the volatility, it could produce an OK return from A to Z if you ignore the indignities and volatility of passing through stops B to Y.

The New News

Yesterday, Altaba and CEO McInerney held a conference call after filing a PRE 14A preliminary proxy statement related to the selldown/unwinding of its entire Alibaba stake and the proposed windup/dissolution of Altaba as an entity. 

The company will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which the Fund currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63 per Share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba Share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00 per Alibaba Share).”

As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear (and as discussed in the transcript linked above, which is short and worth reading), based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions. A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.

The figure of $76.72 – $79.72 represents a 5.44-9.56% premium to yesterday’s close of $72.76/share and represents the total of the Pre-Dissolution Liquidating Distribution in Q4 2019, a second distribution in Q4 2020, then residuals thereafter after the court-mandated holdback in the dissolution process pays its claims.

Fair value calculations, parameters, and risk discussion below.

Elaborate fair value calculations using different assumptions of appropriate discount rates for each payment, and exactly how much is in the last bit (and how long it takes to pay out) suggest a group of ranges of fair value, from about 3-4% below the last-traded price, to about 4-5% above. However, for a hedge fund to earn a 10% net return for investors from owning the trade at the close of yesterday, getting there requires a fair bit of leverage and the resulting information ratio may be lower than desirable.

Assuming the approximate time to payment as described in the proxy statement, and amount of payment in the first distribution as described, and a multi-year residual of US$5/share, current borrow rates and an assumption of slightly higher discount rate required for the portion of time the stock is unlisted and even higher when one is receiving residual claims, the current fair value of the stock ranges from about 2% below current price and 4% higher. If you assume a higher Holdback Amount, the range of outcomes shifts lower.

2. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update

This week in StubWorld …

• Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s discount to NAV narrows as it teases out more information on spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK).

Preceding my comments on Naspers are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.

These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.

3. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope

Back in September 2017, Lawrence Ho, Summit Ascent Holdings (102 HK)‘s major shareholder, reduced his stake to 18.75% from 27.06% (at between $1.13-$1.60/share, but mainly at the low end of this range), according to Hong Kong Exchange disclosure of interest filings. The share price of this Russian integrated gaming play declined 34% to $1.06/share in the following five trading days. Who bought those shares was not disclosed – CCASS shows these shares moving out of VC Brokerage into at least 10 different brokerage accounts.

Shortly after, Howard Klein quoted one insider in his insight Melco Resorts: A Gem Hiding in Plain Sight Offers an Entry Point After a Recent Dip that the sell-down wasn’t likely a sign “Ho has lost confidence in the area.“

On the 15 December, Ho announced a complete exit from Summit, selling 17.37% of shares out. Concurrently Ho resigned from his NED and chairman positions. Those shares moved from VC Brokerage to Sun Hung Kai Investments on the 20 December 2017. Shares traded unchanged on the news. 

At the same time, First Steamship (2601 TT) disclosed it held 12.67% on the 18 December 2017. Concurrently, Kuo Jen Hao was appointed as NED and Chairman of the Board, with effect from 28 December 2017.  Kuo is also the chairman and the general manager of First Steamship. First Steamship gradually increased its stake to 19.11% as at 24 October 2018.

The New News

Yesterday, Summit Ascent announced it has been informed that First Steamship and Kuo are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 24%.

With increased liquidity surrounding the news, this looks like a great opportunity to exit.

4. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer

Originally I had thought KKR’s offer could go higher. Instead, it came in lower at A$3.40 and KKR gave MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) management all of a couple of days to think about it.

The title to my subsequent piece was MYOB Caves And Agrees To KKR’s Reduced Offer.

Manikay Partners started buying up shares and by early March had reached a position of 11%. They made noise. The Scheme Booklet came out on the 14th of March. Four days later Manikay announced their position was now 13.61% and the following day Mawer announced re-upped its stake from the mid 8s to high 9% level.

The 20th saw a Scheme Update from MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them.

Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.

On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.

Today we have new news.

Manikay Caves and Agrees to KKR’s Reduced (Now Final) Offer

Earlier today a Reuters story about Manikay accepting the offer popped up and MYOB shares popped from A$3.34 to A$3.38-39 area where they closed. Partway through the day MYOB released a document on the ASX feed saying that Manikay had sent a letter saying…

In order avoid speculation regarding our voting intentions in respect of the Scheme, we are writing to inform you that we, Manikay Partners, intend to vote all the MYOB shares that we own or control FOR the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote.

We remain very disappointed that, despite our repeated efforts to convince you otherwise, you failed to change your recommendation in light of the material improvement in market conditions since announcement of the Scheme, among other factors. We are also disappointed that the disclosures to MYOB shareholders did not fully explain the impact of such improved market conditions on the value of MYOB.
excerpt of the letter.

5. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau

Visitors to Macao will notice the gaudy designs of new properties like Studio City and the City of Dreams owned by Melco. Few will know that the Melco of today traces its roots back almost 100 years when it was named The Macau Electric Lighting Company. Melco was listed in Hong Kong in 1927 when it was still managing the electricity supply service for the island of Macau, which it had done since 1906. After the CEM was established in 1972 to supply power in Macau, Melco changed its name to Melco International Development Limited and became a subsidiary of Stanley Ho’s real estate holding company, Shun Tak Holdings (242 HK). With the burden of supplying electricity off its shoulders, the company did what any logical Hong Kong firm would do when its business disappears, it bought real estate.

To this day, Melco International Development (200 HK) still maintains ownership of one of these classic Hong Kong destinations which I will take a closer look at in my note. In the rest of this insight I will:

• finish the historical overview of Melco
• present my trade idea and rationale
• give a detailed overview of the business units of Melco International
• recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each 

In this briefing:

1. Last Week in Event SPACE: Altaba, Nexon, MYOB, Panalpina, Ezion, Naspers, Melco
2. Kingboard Starts Voluntary Unconditional Offer for 88% Held Sub Kingboard Copper Foil
3. Everbright Mandatory Offer for Ying Li Intl Real Estate – Going Cheap
4. Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers
5. Newmark Group Inc (NMRK US): Valuation/Fundamentals Mismatch, Stock Trades At Bargain Levels

1. Last Week in Event SPACE: Altaba, Nexon, MYOB, Panalpina, Ezion, Naspers, Melco

Last Week in Event SPACE …

• Here it is. The end – the culmination of years of effort and high balance sheet usage by hedge funds. Altaba Inc (AABA US) is going out with a whimper plus a little upside.
• Reportedly plans for the sale of NHC have been abandoned with a focus on selling its Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)gaming unit.
• That’s a wrap, as Manikay blinks and concedes to KKR’s Offer for MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU).
• Ezion Holdings (EZI SP) is tendered a necessary lifeboat from Yinson Holdings (YNS MK).
• We now have an agreed deal for Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) supported by the Ernst Göhner Foundation, the major activist shareholders, and Panalpina management.
• Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s discount to NAV narrows as it teases out more information on spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK).
• Melco International Development (200 HK) is potentially mispriced against Melco Resorts & Entertainment (MLCO US) after the release of FY18 earnings.

• Plus other events, CCASS movements and upcoming key dates for M&A transactions.

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

Altaba Inc (AABA US) (Mkt Cap: $42bn; Liquidity: $452mn)

Altaba will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which Altaba currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63/share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00/Alibaba share).”

• As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear, based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions.
• A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.
• It looks like there is upside as the stock closed at US$72.76 (at the time of the insight). But there is less than you think simply because it will take time to get out of it. And discount rates of the first portion may be low, but discount rates applied to the later payments post-delisting and post court workout for the Holdback Amount could be higher.
• Travis Lundy has opinions on what to do once you start getting into the arb risks. Do read his insight.

(link to Travis’ insight: ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew)

Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP) (Mkt Cap: $14bn; Liquidity: $50mn)

Sanghyun Park discussed Nexon sale after the FT reported bankers has stopped plans to sell the holding company NXC. The sale of NXC is probably the simplest exit path for Kim Jung-ju as it would be a more attractive tax outcome than selling Nexon Japan outright.

• But there’s a lot of other stuff in NXC that suitors don’t want to, which ideally should be sold before selling NXC. There’s also the issue of whether a tender offer would be required whether the sale of NXC or Nexon – Travis concludes an offer would be required while Sanghyun does not.

• Korean local news outlet reported that Tencent Holdings (700 HK)‘s US$6bn bond issuance may be a fund raising for a Nexon takeover. Still, South Korea would prefer keep Nexon’s ownership domestic, which may favour Kakao Games (1404796D KS) or PE outfit MBK.

(link to Sanghun’s insight: Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers)

Summit Ascent Holdings (102 HK) (Mkt Cap: $270mn; Liquidity: $1mn)

Summit Ascent announced that First Steamship (the major shareholder) and Kuo Jen Hao (chairman) are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 35%.

• Summit is trading at a trailing PER of 267x. CapIQ forecasts point to a threefold increase in earnings in FY19, although I would advise caution on those numbers given the tight cluster of target prices; historically, target prices for Summit have been wide of the mark.
• First Steamship bought in at $1.06 in December 2017, around the same price when this announcement was made. Should this sale complete, this would result in the third time the shares of the major shareholder have changed hands. This looks like a great opportunity to exit.

(link to my insight: Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope)

MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) (Mkt Cap: $1.4bn; Liquidity: $10mn)

On the 20th March, MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them. Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.

• On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.
• Mid-week, Manikay caved and said intends to vote all its shares for the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote. This is now MUCH closer to being a done deal. It will trade tight.

• Travis is a trifle surprised Manikay did not wait a little longer. They were able to increase their stake in the low A$3.30s because of the uncertainty of their intentions, and they could probably have gone close to 20% in the low 3.30s before saying “Yes.” That would have been a welcome extra profit.

(link to Travis’ insight: Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer)

Ezion Holdings (EZI SP) (Mkt Cap: $219mn; Liquidity: $2mn)

Lifeboat market play Ezion has received a bail-out from Malaysia’s Yinson Holdings (YNS MK) via a capitalisation of debt and option agreement. Ezion remains suspended.

• On the surface, this looks like a bargain for Yinson which is ostensibly taking over Ezion for US$200mn. However, Yinson said that it is still negotiating with the designated lenders of the US$916mn debt on the terms and conditions..
• Yinson’s business risks include contact risk, oil price fluctuations and the level of activities in the O&G industry. These risks do not change should the Ezion proposal complete.
• And offshore support companies face a raft of challenges: Ezra Holdings (EZRA SP) entered bankruptcy in 2017, Pacific Radiance (PACRA SP) has been voluntarily suspended since 28 Feb 2018 as it seeks a way to complete its debt restructuring; while Swiber Holdings (SWIB SP)recently announced its own US$200mn injection from Seaspan Corp. (SSW US), after the company had laboured in judicial management for the past two years.

(link to my insight: Yinson Tenders a Lifeboat for Ezion)

Kingboard Copper Foil Hldgs (KCF SP) (Mkt Cap: $320mn; Liquidity: <$100k)

For the second time in two years parent Kingboard Laminates Holdings (1888 HK) (ultimate parent being Kingboard Holdings (148 HK)) has launched an Offer to fully privatize KCF. This time at SGD 0.60/share vs SGD 0.40 two years ago.

• The last time came on the heels of a long independent review by EY which found KCF had given up profit to the parent through a series of relatively unfair interested party transaction agreements.
• At the end, the Bermudan Court of Appeals went against a Supreme Court decision which had decided that a replacement counterparty decision was prejudiced against minorities, and despite the April 2017 deal being not fair and not reasonable according to the IFA, the parent acquired ~10% (of the 28% it did not own) bringing their stake to 82.3%. A year later the parent acquired another 5.5% bringing them to almost 88%.
• Now an offer at SGD 0.60/share (compared to the Revalued NTA of SGD 0.7086/share from the IFA report (p36) of two years ago gets closer to the mark, but crucially, it is designed to squeeze out minorities with the threat of delisting. Kingboard Laminates only needs 2.05% to oblige a delisting from the SGX. As far as Travis can tell, it would require more – at least 95% of shares – to oblige a mandatory squeezeout of minorities according to Section 102-103 of Bermuda Companies Act.
• Travis thinks this one gets through.

(link to Travis’ insight: Kingboard Starts Voluntary Unconditional Offer for 88% Held Sub Kingboard Copper Foil)

Ying Li International Real Estate Ltd (YINGLI SP) (Mkt Cap: $260mn; Liquidity: truly tiny)

China Everbright (165 HK) has launched an MGO at SGD 0.14/share for the rest of Ying Li International Real Estate Ltd (YINGLI SP) after last week purchasing the 30.00% stake formerly held by the CEO, bringing its stake to 58.9%.

• The deal is at a negligible premium and is far, far below Tangible Book Value Per Share (which is almost three times the offer price). Given that the acquirer bought a large stake in the company and offered perpetual capital of almost the current market cap at a significant premium to the MGO price, Travis thinks it an unattractive offer.
• It is puzzling as to why the CEO would sell his shares at such a discount, especially when the company and Everbright co-own some of the assets.
• While the stated intention of the Offeror is to keep the stock listed, and the MGO is presented almost as “technical”, it would be enormously to Everbright’s benefit to buy as many shares as they could down at this price level. It will go from being underwater on an equity affiliate stake purchase to having a huge writeup in value if Everbright consolidates the asset post MGO.
• For that, Travis thinks there is a possibility of a bump just to make it more attractive, though the IFA report could come out with a not fair and reasonable result which shows NTA or NAV far, far higher than the Offer Price, which is not yet declared final.

(link to Travis’ insight: Everbright Mandatory Offer for Ying Li Intl Real Estate – Going Cheap)

Briefly …

In a mainly technical piece, I explained why China Three Gorges, China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK)‘s largest shareholder with 27.1% is currently required to abstain from voting at the forthcoming court meeting, despite the misleading statement in the  announcement that China Three Gorges has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme. (link to my insight: China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption)

Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) (Mkt Cap: $4.8bn; Liquidity: $27mn)

What was once a tough deal is now an agreed deal. The deal is 2.375 shares of DSV for every share of Panalpina, which as of the previous Friday’s close had a value of CHF 195.80/share which is a 43% premium to the CHF 137/share, where Panalpina was trading the day before DSV’s first bid.

• Panalpina is getting taken out at 28.1x reported 2018 EV/EBITDA multiple (pre-IFRS 16) calculated at a CHF 195.8 price. Panalpina shareholders will own ~23% of DSV shares out if all shares are exchanged and the Ernst Göhner Foundation will be the largest shareholder at ~11%.
• 69.9% of shares have irrevocably agreed to support the Exchange Offer. The customary condition is 80% to make it go through, meaning DSV needs another 10.1% out of the 30% extant (or just over one-third).
• Travis expects there is another 10-15% held by arbitrageurs and 5-7% held by indexers already so this deal looks to me like it is done. He expects the Exchange Offer may settle as early as early-August. If it trades tight, he would get out because DSV is probably priced to a very good level. 

(link to Travis’ insight: DSV Improves Bid and Göhner Foundation and Panalpina Agree)

Lenta Ltd (LNTA LI) (Mkt Cap: $1.7bn; Liquidity: $2mn)

Reuters reported that Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those TPG and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company. This was followed by Lenta announced confirming the cash offer. The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs. 

• The first 41.9% are sold conditional on FAS Clearance (presumably Mordashov has cleared this transaction with “the right people”) expected in May 2019, a few easily achieved conditions, and the condition of no sanctions being in play for any of the selling or buying parties. 
• Once cleared – expected in May 2019 – this becomes a straightforward offer with no minimum acceptances meaning that investors can sell shares into the deal or decide not to do so.
• It’s not an attractive offer price, with the possibility of a bump if enough people complain.  If you want to buy and hold, this deal is a put option.

(link to Travis’ insight: Severgroup Puts in a Cheeky Bid for Lenta – TPG and EBRD Bail)

Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ) / Tencent Holdings (700 HK)

Since announcing the intended listing of its international internet assets on Euronext Amsterdam “no earlier than H2 2019” – together with a secondary, inward listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange – I calculate Naspers discount to NAV has narrowed to 34.4% from 37.1%, the day before the announcement, placing the current discount a shade below the 12-month average.

• The likelihood of NewCo trading at a tighter discount to where Naspers’ previously (& currently trades) is universally accepted. Naspers will benefit from that reduced discount via its 75% stake; but it is not known where Naspers’ own discount will trade after the spin-off.
• There are indications the management want to see the group discount narrow to 30%, possibly down to the 20% level, which implies a significantly lower discount for Naspers, potentially around 10%. That would seem optimistic as investors focus more on the directly-held Tencent vehicle, and the fact Naspers is a holding company, holding a stake in another holding company.
• Naspers’ discount may drift narrower on the expectation Naspers’ spin-off works its magic. Greater clarity on the option into Naspers or NewCo may provide an additional boost; but conversely, if such an option is limited, there is likely to be disappointment.

(link to my insight: StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update)

Melco International Development (200 HK) / Melco Resorts & Entertainment (MLCO US)

With Melco trading at a (then) 32% discount to NAV, Curtis Lehnert recommends a set-up trade on a dollar for dollar basis. The current level, as I write, is statistically the most attractive according to the Smartkarma Holdco Tool, sitting at -1.8 standard deviations from the 180 DMA.

• Stub assets are minimal – around 8% of GAV – if excluding gaming licenses, goodwill and trademarks. Net cash is $6.4bn or $4.27/share.
• Those stub assets are still loss-making, after deconsolidating out MLCO, to the tune of $386mn in EBITDA, but that was an improvement on (HK$682mn) figure in FY17.
• Still, Curtis thinks now is the time to enter the trade to take advantage of both the statistical and fundamental supports to the trade. 

(link to Curtis’ insight: TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau)

For the month of March, ten new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$22.3bn. This overall number includes Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman’s proposal for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) after the Tender Offer was officially launched in March. This deal was first proposed in mid-January – which was rejected by the board – and subsequently an improved offer was tabled, which was then supported.

The average premium to last close for the new deals announced in March was 18%, while the average for the first quarter of 2019 is 33%.

(link to my insight: M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in March 2019)

• Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB)‘s results of the CVTO have been announced.  42.85% of shares tendered, therefore the offeror held 63.78% of shares at the close of the offer. The MSCI downweight occurred at the close Thursday, however shares popped 17.5%.

• Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s Scheme document has been delayed until the 25 April, from the 2 April.

• The Dairy Crest (DCG LN) takeover by Saputo was approved at the Court Meeting and Scheme Meeting yesterday.

• Ap Eagers Ltd (APE AU), Automotive Holdings (AHG AU)‘s largest shareholder, has proposed an all-scrip merger offer. AHG recommends shareholders take no action at this time.

• Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)‘s IFA recommends shareholders tender into Global Power Synergy Company Ltd (GPSC TB)‘s offer.

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

2. Kingboard Starts Voluntary Unconditional Offer for 88% Held Sub Kingboard Copper Foil

April 4th after the close, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hong Kong-listed Kingboard Laminates Holdings (1888 HK) (which itself is 70.93% owned by Kingboard Holdings (148 HK) (formerly known as “Kingboard Chemical“)) launched a VOLUNTARY UNCONDITIONAL CASH OFFER for Kingboard Copper Foil Hldgs (KCF SP). 

This is a “clean-up” as Kingboard Laminates owns 87.96% of Kingboard Copper Foil already. 

It is unconditional in all respects and the Offeror owns 87.96%. The goal is delisting. If they get 17.03% of the minority, they will be able to engineer a delisting. Squeezeout is a bit further out but is far from impossible. 

This looks like a done deal. This one should trade at shouldn’t trade at a premium UNLESS…

Quiddity’s new Quiddity Singapore M&A Guide 2019 is now published with guidelines to the relevant rules, regulations, documentation, and pointers to the Singapore M&A landscape. Watch for more in the series to be published shortly.

3. Everbright Mandatory Offer for Ying Li Intl Real Estate – Going Cheap

On 3 April 2019, China Everbright (165 HK)‘s wholly owned subsidiary, State Alpha Limited, purchased 767,052,161 shares representing approximately 30.00% of the Shares in Singapore-listed property developer, Ying Li International Real Estate Ltd (YINGLI SP), from Newest Luck Holdings Limited (the vehicle of Executive Chairman and CEO Mr. Fang Ming) at a share price of SGD 0.140.

Following this transaction, the combined stake of China Everbright and parties acting in concert with it reached 58.91% triggering an obligation to make a mandatory offer for all the shares of Ying Li, a transaction which was announced after the close.

The offer price of SGD 0.140 translates to a premium of 5.9% and 10.9% to Ying Li’s 1-month and 3-month VWAP, respectively but less than a 1% premium to last trade – the company’s shares closed at SGD 0.139 on 3rd April before the announcement. The company asked for a trading halt the next morning and the shares have not traded yet as the large shareholder disclosures have come trickling in on the 4th and the 5th.

The acquirer has stated that it is their present intention to maintain the listing status of the company. However, the acquirer also reserves the right to reevaluate this position if the free float falls below the 10% requirement specified in the listing rules following the completion of the offer. 

This is something like a free put for investors and a very low-priced call option for Everbright. The situation raises obvious questions, and despite the “intention” to maintain the listing status, there are reasons why they would not want to. The details are worth a look.

Quiddity’s new Quiddity Singapore M&A Guide 2019 is now published with guidelines to the relevant rules, regulations, documentation, and pointers to the Singapore M&A landscape. Watch for more in the series to be published shortly.

4. Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers

This post discusses the key questions on Nexon sale at this point. It then provides the most realistic answers to these questions from various circumstantial aspects. This post is based on the recent news reports and also various local sources.

5. Newmark Group Inc (NMRK US): Valuation/Fundamentals Mismatch, Stock Trades At Bargain Levels

Having gained ~30% in a little more than two months following its full separation from BGC Partners (BGCP US) at the end of November 2018 after a dismal share price performance since coming to the market in a partial IPO at the end of December 2017,  the shares of commercial real estate services company, Newmark Group (NMRK US)  have experienced another slide over the past several weeks despite its cheap valuation which belies its positive fundanmental drivers and peer group comparisons.

Notwithstanding its robust fundamentals, notice of alterations it plans to make to its Non-GAAP earnings presentations to bring them more into line with many other US-listed companies, has brought the company into the headlights of the ongoing controversy caused by this topic,  and in particular with respect to the treatement of stock-based compensation in Non-GAAP earnings. While Newmark follows many other companies by excluding it from Adjusted Earnings, its heavy use of stock-based compensation, which it intends to lessen going forward, makes it an easy target for critique of its earnings presentations. Nevertheless, we assess that Newmark is at least 35%  undervalued relative to its peers after incorparting stock compensation expenses in its earnings-based valuation metrics. It is also noteworthy that Newmark is currently paying shareholders a yield of ~4% against barely any dividend being paid out by peers

In this briefing:

1. DHICO Rights Offer: Current Status & Trade Approach
2. Nexon Sale: Nexon Japan Tender Price Estimations
3. GrainCorp: Demerger Underpins the Share Price but a Second-Best Option
4. APE-AHG Merger: Value Accretive but AHG Shareholders Need Improved Terms
5. Japan Post Insurance – The ToSTNeT-3 Buyback

1. DHICO Rights Offer: Current Status & Trade Approach

This post looks at the current trading status of DHICO rights offer on each of the major movement days. It still seems that the share price should be kept high to give the Mar 25~26 arb traders an opportunity to short. This explains recent strong prices. It is presumed that shorting hasn’t been fully done. About half is still to be shorted. This suggests that strong prices should be kept a little longer. Once this is done, we will likely see a strong downward pressure until the price hits ₩6,250. This sets the floor price at ₩5,000. This will be good time to do one-way shorting.

2. Nexon Sale: Nexon Japan Tender Price Estimations

This post estimates Nexon Japan tender price. For this, I use the same approach that a local PE named “MBK Partners” would use based on EBITDA multiple and IRR on a 3 year exit. From their position, the only proven value-up path would be KOSPI moving. MBK must try to stay as conservative as possible. Whatever Netmarble value addition should be an extra when deciding on a tender price. So, I base my estimation solely based on KOSPI moving effect. For this, I use NCsoft as a sole valuation comp.

3. GrainCorp: Demerger Underpins the Share Price but a Second-Best Option

Graincorp Ltd A (GNC AU) said on Thursday it plans to spin off its malting and craft brewing distribution business (MaltCo). The proposed demerger, which will complete at the end of the year, would result in two independent ASX-listed companies – MaltCo and GrainCorp’s Grains and Oils businesses (New GrainCorp).

4. APE-AHG Merger: Value Accretive but AHG Shareholders Need Improved Terms

On 5 April, Ap Eagers Ltd (APE AU) announced that it had lobbed an unsolicited all-scrip takeover for Automotive Holdings (AHG AU)/AHG. Under the proposal, AHG’s shareholders would receive 1 AP Eagers share for every 3.8 AHG share. In a 100% acquisition scenario, AP Eagers shareholders would own 75.5% of the merged AP Eagers-AHG.

5. Japan Post Insurance – The ToSTNeT-3 Buyback

Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP)announced on April 4th after the close that Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) would offer 168.1mm shares of Japan Post Insurance to the public, with another 16.9mm shares offered in an over-allotment. This is big news as it is almost 31% of the shares outstanding of Japan Post Insurance and will dramatically increase its float. 

One can say it is a big deal – ¥450bn (~US$4bn) of stock and at announcement it was equivalent to the last 477 days of traded volume. More importantly, this ALMOST like an IPO in that the placement is almost 3x the original IPO size (66mm shares) and will get a lot of foreign investor attention. 

In addition, JPI announced it would conduct a buyback for up to 50 million shares (with a spending limit of ¥100 billion) on the ToSTNeT-3 off-hours auction-like trading system on days between April 8th and April 12th. 

In its announcement of the decision to sell shares, Japan Post Holdings said that if JPI did indeed conduct the buyback, it might participate, in which case the size of the offering “may decrease.”

The stock rallied very sharply Friday, rising 3% at the open and ending the morning session up 3% but rising much further in the afternoon to end up 9.9%. 

After the close Friday, JPI announced it would spend ¥100bn to buy up to 37.411mm shares pre-open on ToSTNeT-3 on Monday morning. That is 6.2% of shares outstanding. 

Understanding the dynamics and the rules here AND about the offering may tell you something about how this will work. 

In this briefing:

1. StubWorld: Amorepacific Is “Cheap”, Again; Kingboard Cleans House
2. Hanjin Kal Short Idea: Current Situation & Trade Approach
3. Wynn’s Whale Of A Deal For Crown Off the Hook
4. OUE Commercial REIT & Hospitality Trust Merger Proposed
5. Lynas Investor Briefing – Looks Like More Capex Ahead

1. StubWorld: Amorepacific Is “Cheap”, Again; Kingboard Cleans House

This week in StubWorld …

• Amorepacific Group (002790 KS)‘s discount to NAV veers towards its one-year wide level, however newsflow, liquidity and financial performance side with Amorepacific Corp (090430 KS).
• Kingboard Laminates Holdings (1888 HK)‘s more reasonable tilt for Kingboard Copper Foil Hldgs (KCF SP) has minimal bearing on the group, but one wonders when Elec & Eltek Int (ELEC SP) will similarly be taken out.

Preceding my comments on Amorepacific, Kingboard and other stubs, are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.

These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.

2. Hanjin Kal Short Idea: Current Situation & Trade Approach

This post examines the current price pushing factors being laid on Hanjin Group holdco Hanjin Kal after the second generation owner’s sudden death. It then discusses the limitations of these price pushing factors.

3. Wynn’s Whale Of A Deal For Crown Off the Hook

After a brief pause in trading yesterday morning, Crown Resorts (CWN AU) announced it is in confidential discussions with Wynn Resorts (WYNN US) concerning an acquisition of Crown by way of a Scheme. The announcement states that Wynn has approached Crown on more than one occasion.

But it does not remove the reason for a deal. The Crown commentary clearly indicated that they were not averse to doing a deal. That would suggest James Packer is not either.

The proposal arrived at a unique time for both companies after the CEOs and major shareholders of both companies relinquished their roles in 2018: Packer for health reasons, and Steve Wynn after allegations of sexual harassment.

If Wynn wants to expand its footprint into the hemisphere and James Packer wants to arrange his affairs, a deal somewhere should be in the offing. This deal may just get pushed to the back burner before coming back to the fore. Several years ago, ADM launched a proposal at Graincorp. Months later there had been no apparent communication and the shares drifted off and then, all of a sudden, there was an agreed deal.

Or perhaps this opens up Crown to other suitors.

4. OUE Commercial REIT & Hospitality Trust Merger Proposed

After a WSJ article on Sunday suggesting as much, Monday morning 8 April 2018 saw the announcement of a Proposed Merger between OUE Commercial Real Estate Investment Tr (OUECT SP) and OUE Hospitality Trust (OUEHT SP) whereby OUEHT unitholders would receive a combination of cash and OUECT shares (S$0.04075 + 1.3853 shares of OUECT) for every share of OUEHT held. Investors in each would receive any “permitted distributions” (dividends, etc) declared by the respective managers in respect of the period from 1 Jan 2019 up to the day immediately before the date on which Trust Scheme becomes effective.

This would create a REIT with S$6.8bn of assets, a pro-forma market cap of ~S$2.9bn, and a free-float of S$1.1bn (up by 57%). OUE Group would continue to own 48.3% of the total. 

The benefits to investors would be increased scale (2.2mm square feet of commercial net lettable area, + 1,640 hotel rooms), more borrowing capacity, increased diversification as asset concentration would be lowered, and because the scope of NewREIT would be broader, it would allow REIT managers more flexibility. The above-mentioned points are advertised as being the fodder for a re-rating. The idea of possible index inclusion is mooted as well. 

The OUECT presentation says that the merger is “DPU accretive to unitholders” (+2.1% on a 2018 pro-forma basis) while the OUEHT presentation says that the merger is “value accretive to stapled securityholders” (+18.7% NAV uplift per stapled security). 

Details of how this all works below.

Separately, two other Singapore deals announced at the end of last week include:

• Kingboard Laminates Hldgs (1888 HK) buying out Kingboard Copper Foil (KCF SP) discussed in Kingboard Starts Voluntary Unconditional Offer for 88% Held Sub Kingboard Copper Foil

• China Everbright (165 HK) announces an MGO for Ying Li International Real Estate Ltd (YINGLI SP) as discussed in Everbright Mandatory Offer for Ying Li Intl Real Estate – Going Cheap

• To accompany these, there is a Quiddity Singapore M&A Guide 2019.

5. Lynas Investor Briefing – Looks Like More Capex Ahead

At noon Sydney time Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) held an investor briefing by webcast regarding comments made by the Malaysian Prime Minister in his first cabinet press conference on Friday 5 April 2019. Those comments were noted in the ASX regulatory update. 

In this briefing:

1. Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders
2. IPH Goes Hostile on Xenith
3. Korean Stubs Spotlight: A Pair Trade Between Hyosung Corp and Hyosung TNC
4. Nongshim Stub Trade: Sub Moving Up on New Hit Product, Now at Near -2σ

1. Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders

The key point of interest for investors regarding Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) continues to be details surrounding its upcoming capital raise. The company has, since early November when it incurred these losses, offered scant details regarding the structure of the capital raise, except to note that the components would include additional loans and equity from industrial partners and most likely, main shareholder Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP).

We visited the company to gather as much information as possible on the potential structure of the capital increase and to update the order outlook and reasons for further cost overruns.

2. IPH Goes Hostile on Xenith

Iph Ltd (IPH AU) has gate crashed Xenith Ip (XIP AU)/Qantm Intellectual Property (QIP AU)‘s marriage of equals, submitting a proposal (by way of a Scheme) for Xenith comprising cash (A$1.28) and IPH shares (0.1056 IPH shares) or A$1.97/share, 23.3% above the implied QANTM merger consideration.

Last November, Xenith and QANTM , both leading providers of IP origination services in Australia, announced a merger via an all-scrip scheme of arrangement, whereby Xenith shareholders will receive 1.22 QANTM shares for every Xenith share, or an implied value of A$1.598/share. QANTM and Xenith shareholders would own 55% and 45% of the merged group with a then pro-forma capitalisation of A$285mn. Pre-cost synergies are estimated at A$7mn/annum at the end of  year three.

Xenith’s board unanimously recommended the merger to its shareholders.

IPH did not blink and on the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, lobbed an unsolicited, indicative, preliminary, conditional and non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close.

QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. IPH countered those claims, spurring QANTM to counter those countered claims.

On the 13 February 2019, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support the QANTM scheme and intends to vote against it. In response, both Xenith and QANTM announced that neither had received a proposal from IPH. Xenith’s shares increased 20.3% to close at A$1.69/share.

The provisional date for ACCC s clearance of the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March. The provisional date for IPH/Xenith is the 2 May. The QANTM/Xenith Scheme meeting is scheduled for 3 April with a 24 April implementation date. IPH’s proposal has an indicative implementation date of mid-July.

IPH’s proposal currently offers an implied value of $1.98 (65% in cash) against $1.85 for QANTM’s all-scrip offer.

The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies. IPH is the oldest, and the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.

With IPH’s blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme will fail. Xenith should engage with IPH.

3. Korean Stubs Spotlight: A Pair Trade Between Hyosung Corp and Hyosung TNC

In this report, we provide an analysis of our pair trade idea between Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) (market cap of 1,612 billion won) and Hyosung TNC Co Ltd (298020 KS) (market cap of 712 billion won). Our strategy will be to be long Hyosung TNC and be short Hyosung Corp. 

In the past six months, Hyosung Corp is up 62% while Hyosung TNC is down 12%. We believe this price divergence has been excessive. The four major reasons why Hyosung Corp’s share price has surged in the past six months are mentioned below. There is a case to be made that the market has already factored into Hyosung Corp’s share price many of the positive factors mentioned below. 

• Excellent dividends 
• Corporate activism related stock 
• Strong financial results 
• Timing of the increased insider ownerships/Completion of tender offers

Hyosung TNC has underperformed the market as well as Hyosung Corp in the past six months. However, Hyosung TNC appears to be a turnaround story driven by the following factors: 

• Decline in raw material prices 
• Aggressive spandex investment in India 
• Stabilization of spandex prices in 2H19 
• Consolidation of the global spandex industry

4. Nongshim Stub Trade: Sub Moving Up on New Hit Product, Now at Near -2σ

• Shin Ramyun non-frying noodle dramatically reversed Sub’s fortune. Local street starts believing Sub will hit a ₩100bil OP milestone this year. Local institutions began to scoop up Sub shares since a week ago. Yesterday, local pension/foreign money came in. This led to the largest Sub pushing in many weeks. Holdco/Sub are not at near -2σ.
• Street consensus on Sub’s FY19e OP is already upwardly adjusted to ₩106bil. On this, Sub is already at a 17x earnings. ₩106bil OP is immaturely aggressive. 17x isn’t particularly cheap given Sub’s FY18 year-end PER (18.4x).
• Valuation wise, Sub price should be pressed down at this level until more dramatic and tangible sales data come out. Holdco discount is still hovering at 50% to NAV. I’d make a stub trade here. Holdco liquidity can be an issue.

In this briefing:

1. Smartkarma’s Week that Was in 🇯🇵/🇰🇷 : Korea’s NPS, Samsung, Toshiba, Hitachi Hi-Tech, Payments
2. Last Week in Event SPACE: Chiyoda, Shin Etsu Chemical, GLOW, HNA, Hyosung, Wheelock
3. BGF Stub Trade: Sub Price Diverged Further than Usual, I’d Make Trade on Reversion
4. Samsung Electronics Share Class Trade: Common at +2σ, Expect Reversion After AGM This Week
5. MYOB (MYO AU): Manikay’s Valuation Requires Flawless Execution

1. Smartkarma’s Week that Was in 🇯🇵/🇰🇷 : Korea’s NPS, Samsung, Toshiba, Hitachi Hi-Tech, Payments

Something of a slower week on Smartkarma this week (I contributed to that slowness by being away and under the weather when back) with about 120 insights published. A list of the insights to do with Japan and Korea this week are listed below.

There will be a couple more shortly. 

For more detail, read on below the fold…

For me, the MUST READS of this weak are the cashless payment-related pieces by Kirk Boodry and Michael Causton shown at the bottom. 

2. Last Week in Event SPACE: Chiyoda, Shin Etsu Chemical, GLOW, HNA, Hyosung, Wheelock

Last Week in Event SPACE …

• One interpretation on how Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) may source additional loans and equity.
• Shin Etsu Chemical (4063 JP)‘s chunky buyback, but who is the seller?
• Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)‘s plain vanilla arb as the SPA completes.
• HNA cashes in its Hong Kong International Construction Investment Management Group Co., (687 HK) stake after the Kai Tak property buy/sell roller coaster.
• Both Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) and Hyosung TNC Co Ltd (298020 KS) have under performed the broader market, however TNC is the turnaround story.
• Non-PRC exposed Wheelock (20 HK) companies in favour as cooling measures challenge Wharf Holdings (4 HK)‘s property sales forecasts.
• Plus other events, CCASS movements and upcoming key dates for M&A transactions.

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) (Mkt Cap: $649mn; Liquidity: $13mn)

Since early November, when Chiyoda incurred substantial losses, scant details regarding the structure of the likely capital raise have emerged, except that the components would include additional loans and equity from industrial partners and most likely, main shareholder Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP).

• LightStream Research‘s conversations with the company suggest a high likelihood a deal would not be in place by the end of Mar, though in a one-on-one meeting they said they were in the final stages of discussions. Lightstream believes a deal is almost certain to be in place by the time of the company’s fiscal year earnings announcement which should be in mid May.
• Getting injections of debt capital from banks (likely Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)) and equity capital from Mitsubishi are unlikely to be stumbling blocks. It is plausible that Mitsubishi would be keen to retain its current 33.39% stake in the company, so if the capital is in the form of prefs, Lightstream would expect them to be convertible.
• As for the industrial partner, Chiyoda noted that there was significant interest due to their long track record as the leading LNG EPC player in the world, and that it was not so much a matter of being able to secure the financing, as it was a matter of finding a partner where there would be mutual benefits without constraining Chiyoda in terms of its business operations. But that implies the stake would be so large as to imply a controlling or heavily influential stake.
• In terms of numbers, Lightstream speculates about ¥30bn in debt from banks with MUFG a likely lead candidate given the keiretsu ties. Perhaps ¥75bn in equity (prefs and common) split between Mitsubishi and an industrial partner. More likely, if Mitsubishi opted for pref shares, the industrial partner would end up with a stake of around 20% in Chiyoda, which could mean a ¥25bn injection, with Mitsubishi buying ¥50bn in prefs.

(link to Lightstream’s insight: Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders)

Shin Etsu Chemical (4063 JP) (Mkt Cap: $33bn; Liquidity: $122mn)

Shin Etsu announced a share buyback program to buy up to 14mn shares for up to ¥100bn. If it were to have bought all 14mn shares, that would be 3.3% of shares outstanding. Simultaneously, it announced a ToSTNeT-3 buyback of 11,001,100 shares at today’s closing price of ¥9,090/share which if all bought would complete the buyback program. 

• There was some speculation across the Street there would be a buyback because of slowing earnings expectations and a surfeit of capital, which was itself important because of the company’s lack of recent history of buybacks (the last and only time the company has bought back shares (to date) was a repurchase of 3 million shares for ¥13.6 billion in late October 2008 when things were hairy (and cheap))
• It was a decent-sized buyback. That by itself is worthwhile. But it is not enormous. And with ¥1tn in net cash, buying back ¥100bn is not huge enough. It reduces the dividend out a little, and lifts EPS a little. But…
• The BIG trade here is to identify the seller as quickly as possible – if it is a corporate seller. If it is Hachijuni Bank, buy Hachijuni Bank. If it is another small listed financial for whom the position is meaningful portion of market cap, Travis Lundy would be inclined to buy that one.
• As a follow-up…
  • the result of the ToSTNeT-3 transaction was that the company bought back 9.84mm shares using 89.5% of the funds. The remaining ¥10.5bn to buy will likely be bought on market. It represents less than one day of volume.
  • Travis notes that there have been no announcements on TDNET which indicate who the seller might have been. If it had been a life insurer, it would not have made the news because it was portfolio gains, not corporate gains. It is also possible that corporate or bank holders in question would have other sales to offset the gains. We may not know until the yuho.
  • Nonetheless, the selldown of cross-holding has continued since the Nintendo situation discussed here (Nintendo Offering & Buyback: The Import & The Dynamics) as well-known cross-holders Tokyo Broadcasting System (9401 JP) and Ibiden Co Ltd (4062 JP) have also sold large single cross-holdings in the last two weeks.

(link to Travis’ insight: Shinetsu Buyback – Maybe More Than It Appears)

Omron Corp (6645 JP) (Mkt Cap: $9.7bn; Liquidity: $69mn)

The previous Friday, the Nikkei announced that because the third party share sale of Pioneer Corp (6773 JP) had been completed, it would be deleted from the Nikkei 225 Average (and the Nikkei 500 Index). Omron will replace Pioneer in the Nikkei 225, with a deemed par value of ¥50 per share. The date for this index deletion and inclusion event was the 15th of March.

• The Pioneer exclusion has been known/certain since the deal was approved. The Omron inclusion was less well-flagged. There is a lot of Pioneer stock to come out this week. Because it is so much, and because many people will not want to hold more than 5% of the company, Travis expects there is room for several people to increase their stake for an OK size.
• There is a possibility that Sharp Corp (6753 JP) and possibly Japan Display (6740 JP) and Murata Manufacturing (6981 JP) get hit on this because they were also in the “maybe this will be selected” group of tech shares. 
• Because of the path of Omron over the past year, Travis expected there would be many foreign holders unwilling to sell their shares at the current price. And they would be ill-prepared to sell large quantities in the market on Friday just because there was a Nikkei 225 inclusion. Travis expected the shares to squeeze. It is not easy to dislodge 25% of the float.
• THE HINDSIGHT:  As Travis notes in a discussion point appended to his piece, it appears every single buyer post-announcement was down-money by the inclusion, which happened at the lowest price of any traded post-announcement. This indicates substantially more pre-positioning than he thought, and the low volume on the print itself suggests substantially more shorting than might be healthy.

(link to Travis’ insight: Omron into the Nikkei 225, Pioneer Out)

Hyundai Heavy Industries (009540 KS) (Mkt Cap: $7.8bn; Liquidity: $39mn)

The Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (042660 KS) deal between HHI and KDB is now officially finalised, and it will take the following four-step process:  the HHI (to be renamed Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering, or KSOE) spin-off of the opco (HHI opco); the KDB PIK into HHI; the KSOE rights issue; followed by the DSME rights issue. These details were further elaborated upon in Sanghyun Park‘s prior insight: Hyundai Heavy/DSME Event – Comprehensive Summary.

• HHI declined 4% when the deal was finalized while DSME stayed flat. Apparently HHI and Korea Eximbank agreed that the ₩2.3tril CBs wouldn’t be converted into DSME shares and disposed any time soon. Plus, there will be a downward interest adjustment to help ease DSME’s financial burden.
• This sparked a speculation that HHI must have pledged Korea Eximbank with some sort of DSME expected valuation. Sanghyun would close the current HHI long/DSME short position. Short-term, he expects DSME will outperform HHI. Longer term, he’d rather stay away from both.

(link to Sanghyun Park‘s insight: HHI – DSME Acquisition: Current Situation & Trade Approach)

Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) (Mkt Cap: $4.2bn; Liquidity: $5mn)

The revised SPA between Engie SA (ENGI FP) and Global Power Synergy Company Ltd (GPSC TB) closed this week – i.e. Engie crossed its 69.11% holding in GLOW to GPSC – triggering a mandatory Tender offer for GLOW.

• The revision – the divestment on the SPP1 co-generation plant – was a remedial requirement by the ERC regulator. The sale of SPP1 to B Grimm Power (BGRIM TB) for Bt3.3bn was announced on the 22 February and was completed mid-week. 
• Subsequent to the SPP1 sale, the purchase price under the SPA was adjusted to Bt91.9906/share, a ~3% decline from the initial Bt94.892/share price under the original SPA.
• My discussions with GLOW indicate that the 247-4 Tender Offer form may be submitted to the SEC & SEC by GPSC as early as next week, with the Offer open to acceptances shortly after. The ERC signed off on the SPA the previous Friday. Assuming mid-May payment, this is currently trading at a gross/annualised spread of 1.6%/10.8%.

(link to my insight: GLOW’s Done Deal As SPA (Almost) Completes)

Hong Kong International Construction Investment Management Group Co., (687 HK) (“HKICM”) (Mkt Cap: $1.3bn; Liquidity: $2mn)

HKICIM announced HNA Finance had entered into a SPA in which Times Holdings, a Blackstone-controlled vehicle, had conditionally agreed to buy 69.54% of HKICIM’s issued shares for HK$3/share in an HK$7bn transaction. Should the SPA complete, Times will make a mandatory unconditional offer – also at $3.00/share (14.5% premium to last close) – for the remaining 30.46% of shares out. This proposal arrives nearly three years after HNA bought a 66% in Tysan Holdings  – as HKICIM was previously known – from Blackstone for HK$4.53 per share, triggering an MGO.

• After a rapid-fire acquisition spree – at record prices, oddly motivated to “snatch land and pricing power from the city’s real estate cartel” – and similar disposal pace of Kai Tak properties,   HNA is presumably recycling these sales proceeds to offset its debt obligations.
• This will continue to trade tight to, if not through terms, with an anticipated completion late April. There will be no bump to the Offer. Times does not intend to avail itself to compulsory acquisition and intends to maintain HKICIM’s listing; while both Times and HKICIM will take appropriate steps to maintain a sufficient public float after the close of the Offer.

(link to my insight: Another MGO For HKICIM As HNA Sells Stake Back To Blackstone)

Xenith Ip (XIP AU) (Mkt Cap: $115mn; Liquidity: $1mn)

Iph Ltd (IPH AU) has gate crashed Xenith/Qantm Intellectual Property (QIP AU)‘s marriage of equals, submitting a proposal (by way of a Scheme) for Xenith comprising cash (A$1.28) and IPH shares (0.1056 IPH shares) or A$1.97/share, 23.3% above the implied QANTM all-scrip merger consideration, based on QANTM’s 26 Nov 2016 closing price.

• On the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, IPH lobbed a non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close. QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. So, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support QANTM’s merger and intends to vote against it at the forthcoming scheme meeting on the 3 April.
• The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent – the provisional clearance date for the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March; while IPH/Xenith‘s is the 2 May. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies, and IPH is the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.
• With a 19.9% blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme is toast. 19.9% of institutional investors have already cashed out at $1.85/share. Xenith should engage with IPH.

(link to my insight: IPH Goes Hostile on Xenith)

Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) / Hyosung TNC Co Ltd (298020 KS) 

In the past six months, Hyosung Corp is up 62% while Hyosung TNC is down 12%. Corp’s share price has surged in the past six months on account of excellent dividends, strong financial results and the timing of the increased insider ownerships/completion of tender offers. Douglas Kim believes the market has already factored into Corp’s share price many of these positive factors.

• Both TNC and Corp have underperformed the market. However, TNC appears to be a turnaround story driven by a decline in raw material prices, aggressive spandex investment in India, the stabilization of spandex prices in 2H19 and the consolidation of the global spandex industry
• Douglas would be long TNC and short Corp on a dollar-for-dollar basis. His base case strategy is to achieve gains of 7-9% on this pair trade. Plugging in Douglas’s numbers results in the discount to NAV at extreme levels. One pushback is that TNC accounts for just 16% of Corps’ NAV. Five other listco holdings total 40% of NAV.

(link to Douglas’ insight: Korean Stubs Spotlight: A Pair Trade Between Hyosung Corp and Hyosung TNC)

Hang Lung (10 HK) / Hang Lung Properties (101 HK)

Curtis Lehnert flags this simple holdco structure wherein the bifurcation between the two counters is in excess of 2 STDs. I also touched on this pair last month (StubWorld: Hang Lung’s Implied Stub At Extreme Levels) and this unreasonably wide discount which is made more than unreasonable by the fact that there is very little to distinguish between the two stocks.

• Curtis proposes one avenue for narrowing the discount – by HLG divesting its stake in HLP. Maybe. Over a decade ago, HLG’s stake dipped below 50% in HLP, but it still consolidated the accounts.
• However the last few years has seen HLG gradually increasing its stake in HLP; and in one instance selling property to HLP (at book), then buying shares in HLP at 0.6x P/B. HLG is cheap, but a catalyst for narrowing the discount remains elusive.

(link to Curtis’ insight: TRADE IDEA – Hang Lung (10 HK) Stub: A Timeless Arb) 

Wheelock & (20 HK) / Wharf Holdings (4 HK) / Wharf Real Estate Investment (1997 HK)

Inputting the latest of Wheelock’s, Wharf’s and WREIC’s FY18’s numbers backs out a discount to NAV of 37.5%, bang in line with its 12-month average. Wheelock is coming up “expensive” vs. Wharf, but Wharf accounts for only 25% and 22% of NAV & GAV respectively. 

• Wharf’s net profit decreased by 11% in FY18. While the company said cooling measures in China have had minimal impact on demand, it added “the timing of sales launch continued to be dictated by local government approval to sell at full or close to full market price“.
• Chairman & MD Stephen Ng said it will sell/reduce its mainland property investments, ruling out any possibility of returning. This suggests the momentum is with non-PRC asset portfolio companies under the Wheelock group, favouring both Wheelock and WREIC.

(link to my insight: StubWorld: Wharf Under Pressure As Cooling Measures Bite)

Briefly …

• Sanghyun flagged the Street’s FY19 net profit for Nongshim Co Ltd (004370 KS) will touch ₩100bn or a ~16% increase yoy. He sees the Holdco/Sub at -2σ and recommends a set-up trade. Plugging in Sanghyun’s numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of ~47% vs. the 12-month average of 42.5% and one-year range of 34%-53%. The pushback: Nong Shim Holdings Co (072710 KS) is illiquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Nongshim Stub Trade: Sub Moving Up on New Hit Product, Now at Near -2σ)

• First Pacific Co (142 HK) exits from the Goodman Fielder JV for US$300mn. First Pac will incur a US$280mn non-cash loss on the sale. Not an ideal return on a five-year investment. Shares closed marginally up suggesting this announcement was largely expected.

Samsung Electronics (005930 KS)‘s Common/1P has reached a +2σ level and on a 120D horizon, the price ratio is currently at the peak. The div yield difference on FY19E is 0.87%p, even higher than last year which was a record high in 3 years. Sanghyun favours SamE’s 1P over Common here. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Samsung Electronics Share Class Trade: Common at +2σ, Expect Reversion After AGM This Week)

• MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU)‘s scheme doc is out.  The Scheme meeting is scheduled for 17 April, with an expected implementation date of the 8 May. The independent expert, Grant Samuels, considers the Scheme consideration to be fair & reasonable, with an assessed value range of $3.19-$3.69 vs KKR’s Offer of $3.40.

• Trade Me (TME NZ)‘s scheme book is out. The vote will take place on the 3 April. The Independent Adviser concluded that the Scheme consideration of NZ$6.45 is above its valuation range for the shares of NZ$5.93 – NZ$6.39. OIO consent has also been received.
• The IFA believes Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) shareholders should accept the Tender Offer of Bt71/share as it is above its fair value range of Bt62.33-Bt67.80/share. 

• Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU) has rejected  Australian Pharma Industries (API AU)’s non-binding indicative offer and terminated discussions in relation to the merger. Sigma believes its future potential is on a standalone basis. Sigma also cited API’s share price decline of >15% since the 11 October announcement, implying a 12% decline in value for its shareholders; and also flagged the potential execution risk in regards to ACCC consent. (link to Arun George‘s insight: Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU): Rejecting the API Bid Is the Difficult but Right Choice)

• Restaurant Brands Nz (RBD NZ)‘s takeover is now unconditional after Finaccess waived the 75% condition.  The offer has been extended until 26 March.

• Mastercard’s offer has now lapsed, leaving Visa as the sole bidder for Earthport plc (EPO LN). Visa’s 37 pence offer has been extended for two weeks until the 25 March. 

• The IFA (UOB) considers the $3.10/share Offer for Kian Joo Can Factory (KJC MK) is “not fair” but “reasonable”. (Best to open the link in Chrome not Edge). UOB considers the Offer price represents a 25 sen or 7.46% discount to the estimated fair value of RM3.35/share. The Offer will be open for acceptances until the 22 March – unless extended.

• Australian property developer, Villa World Ltd (VLW AU) announced that it had received an unsolicited proposal from AVID Property Group Australia to acquire all of the company’s shares for A$231/share (a 12% premium to last close) by way of a scheme of arrangement. 

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

3. BGF Stub Trade: Sub Price Diverged Further than Usual, I’d Make Trade on Reversion

• BGF Holdco/Sub have been oscillating within ±1σ since early Feb. Last Friday, Sub again made a move. This time it diverted a little further. They are now close to -2σ. Holdco is now at a 46% discount to NAV.
• Overall sector outlook is still unpromising. Local street sentiments are still divided. BGF Retail is showing interest in Korea’s third internet bank. This may become a price divergence factor. But this issue is still too early to have real impact.
• Shorting is still going pretty heavy on Sub. Sub price divergence shouldn’t last any further from this point. I’d make my trade here.

4. Samsung Electronics Share Class Trade: Common at +2σ, Expect Reversion After AGM This Week

• SamE Common/1P reached a +2σ level. On a 120D horizon, price ratio is currently at the peak. Pref discount is at 21.04%. This of course is a 120D high. We are now right at the AGM phase (Mar 20). Common gets boosted around this time. It seems true that the recent M&A stories also helped Common move over 1P.
• I don’t expect to see a continued upwardly divergence in favor of Common from this point. AGM factor should be gone this week. We still have M&A factor. This will likely be offset by shorter-term fundamentals factors such as further falling profits and DRAM design flaws.
• Div yield difference on FY19e is 0.87%p. This is even higher than last year which was a record high in 3 years. I expect SamE 1P to make a move over Common from this point.

5. MYOB (MYO AU): Manikay’s Valuation Requires Flawless Execution

On Thursday, MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) released its Scheme Booklet in which the Independent Expert, Grant Samuel, valued MYOB between A$3.19 and A$3.69 per share. Consequently, Grant Samuel concluded that KKR & Co Inc (KKR US)‘s revised proposal of A$3.40 cash per share is fair and reasonable. However, Manikay Partners continues to voice concerns about the KKR proposal as it believes MYOB is worth well in excess of A$4.00 per share.