Navitas Ltd (NVT AU), an Australian-listed education company, entered into a binding agreement to be acquired by the BGH Consortium. As a reminder on 15 January 2019, the BGH Consortium bid against itself by offering a revised proposal of A$5.825 cash per share, 6% higher than its previous rejected offer.
Navitas’ board have unanimously recommended the scheme. We believe that BGH Consortium’s proposal is attractive and shareholders should accept the offer.
All other details of the scheme remain unchanged. The court meeting is to take place on the 25 March, while the long stop is the 20 June – unless both companies agree to an extension.
On Petrus
Petrus has yet to respond to the Offer increase; however, it would be surprising if its stance against the takeover has altered.
In its prior letter to Ophir on the 14 January, Petrus recommended selling the South-East Asian (SEA) assets to Medco – excluding the Tanzanian and Mexican investments – with a low-end fair value, before synergies, of £0.64/share, through to £1.42/share on a blue sky basis.
Shortly before the increase, Petrus was quoted (paywalled) it would vote its 3.95% against the takeover, while adding “Our satisfaction with the value our board deems as satisfactory has decreased further“, with reference to the release of Ophir’s full-year results on the 12 March.
On Sand Grove/Coro
Subsequent to the bump, Coro Energy PLC (CORO LN), which had previously submitted a non-binding cash/scrip reverse takeover offer on the 8 March, declared it has no intention to bid.
Sand Grove has also announced it has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote its 18.73% in favour of the scheme. Coro held discussions with Sand Grove before abandoning its bid.
Trading Tight – Upside Less Assured
Medco’s Offer is conditional on 75%+ approval from Ophir’s shareholders, which appears less tenuous following the 4.5% bump and Sand Grove’s irrevocable undertaking. While I consider the offer for Ophir sub-optimal – and shares have closed above terms on 30% of the trading days since Medco’s initial offer – Petrus alone cannot disrupt the vote. Of note, the next three largest shareholders behind Sand Grove have reduced their holdings since end-December 2018.
The gross/annualised spread is tight at 0.7%/2.6%, assuming early-July payment. The risk/reward in punting at or just below terms is now less attractive following this Offer Price increase and the irrevocable undertaking.
The return on this pair trade was 8.2%. (Thisassumes no commission costs, pricing spreads, taxes, or borrowing cost) using closing share price as of March 12th to March 21st, 2019. This trade was made over a period of 9 days so the annualized returns would be 332%.
We believe that Hyosung TNC is up so much in the past 9 days mainly because it appears that a few investors saw this stock as an undervalued stock that was being ignored by the market. In our report, Korean Stubs Spotlight: A Pair Trade Between Hyosung Corp and Hyosung TNC, we mentioned that Hyosung TNC appears to be a turnaround story driven by the following four key factors:
In this report, we provide an analysis of our pair trade idea between Ecopro Co Ltd (086520 KS) and Ecopro BM Co Ltd (247540 KS). Our strategy will be to go long Ecopro Co and to go short on Ecopro BM. Our base case strategy is to achieve gains of 7-9% on this pair trade.
Our SoTP valuation suggests a value per share of 52,004 won for Ecopro Co Ltd (086520 KS), representing 65% higher than current share price. Ecopro Co. currently has a market cap of 691 billion won. Ecopro Co’s 56% stake in Ecopro BM is worth 819 billion won, representing 119% of its market cap. Ecopro BM’s share price has jumped nearly 50% since its IPO on March 5th. We believe Ecopro Co has a much higher upside right now versus Ecopro BM over the next one to six months.
Established in 1998, Ecopro Co started its business focusing on air pollution control related products. It also has major investments in companies such as Ecopro BM Co Ltd (247540 KS) and Ecopro Innovation (unlisted). Ecopro Co’s major customers include Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix, and Hyundai Heavy Industries.
In my original insight on January 15, 2019 TRADE IDEA: Amorepacific (002790 KS) Stub: A Beautiful Opportunity, I proposed setting up a stub trade to profit from the mis-priced stub business of Amorepacific that was trading at its widest discount to NAV in at least three years. During the 65 calendar days that followed, Amorepacific Group (002790 KS) has gained 7.3% and the outperformed Amorepacific Corp (090430 KS) by 2.84%. The trade has reverted to average levels in a period of about two months and in this insight I will outline why I think the trade is over.
In this insight I will discuss:
Performance of ALL my recommended stub trades
a post-trade analysis on the Amorepacific stub
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On Monday the 18th of March, Yoshiaki Murakami-associated companies announced they had raised their stake in Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) above 10%. That stake raise happened at a price ABOVE where Bain Capital Japan’s bidding entity had set its “final” Tender Offer Price of ¥700/share beforehand, indicating there was no way Murakami-associated companies would accept Bain’s price.
On the 20th, Minami Aoyama Fudosan – another Murakami-associated company heretofore uninvolved – announced a Tender Offer for a minimum of 50.00% of Kosaido (and up to 100% of the shares out) at ¥750/share (and announced they had bought more bringing their stake to 13.47% in total).
The shares reacted strongly Friday the 22nd after a market holiday Thursday, rising 16.6% to close 14.5% through the Murakami-fund terms.
After the close on Friday, the Murakami-affiliated company Reno KK which has been the lead entity to date in the effort – announced a larger position (as I noted on the 19th was likely). Also after the close, Kosaido itself made three public releases.
It is worth reading them, and it is worth thinking about what the company’s options are.
For Recent Insights on the Kosaido Situation Published on Smartkarma…
This was the basis of the trade. Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) has been susceptible to pressure for a bump since even before the Tender Offer was announced because of the proxy fight at last year’s board meeting for management rights. Hitachi supported the incumbent who consequently retired as chairman, but kept the continuity. The board was split 6:3.
Since late January or early February when it became clear that board support for the deal was still split 6:3 and one of the points in a couple of the independent directors’ comments as reasons why the deal was not supported was that Hitachi’s bid at NT$60/share did not match an informal offer from Otis at $63/share, it has been clear that one way to extinguish that criticism was to bid NT$63 or higher.
And now Hitachi has. After the close on Friday, a release from Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) hit the mops system saying that Hitachi had amended the Public Purchase statement by raising the Purchase Price to NT$65/share. This is closer to the high end of the original valuations provided by the law firm and public accountancy firms of NT$40.27-68.31 and NT$55.15-67.83. Taiwan Hitachi Elevator released a press release carried by the ChinaTimes here.
After 6 months of haggling and due diligence, debt negotiation, and structuring, global education company Navitas has now signed a Scheme Implementation Deed with a consortium led by Australian Private Equity firm BGH Capital consortium, which includes Navitas Founder Rod Jones (also the largest holder at 13%) and AustralianSuper. The Scheme Price of A$5.825 is a 6% uplift from the original A$5.50 offered in the preliminary, indicative, non-binding offer announced on 10 October 2018 and a 34% premium to the undisturbed price of 9 October 2018 of A$4.35/share.
At an equity valuation of A$2.1bn, this is being done at a TTM EV/EBITDA of ~15.5x (and probably around 0.8 turns less for FY19 forecast, which is healthy, but the company spins off prodigious cashflow, which makes it doable for private equity with leverage.
Given the lack of any real news or rumour of competing offer in the last five months, or in the period since the lockup, Travis Lundy doesn’t think it likely we will see one. Because he thinks this deal has very few hurdles, expect it to trade tight.
Harbin Electric’s (“HE”) composite doc for its merger by absorption has been dispatched. HE’s major shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation, an SOE, is seeking to delist the company by way of a merger by absorption at HK$4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close. The offer has been declared final and the IFA considers the offer fair & reasonable. The significant offer premium to last close, the material drop in FY18 profit, and the lack of possibility of a competitive bidder emerging suggests this Offer falls over the line.
Seeing it blocked at the H-share meeting is a risk, although no single shareholder has the requisite stake to block the deal. The tendering acceptance condition in this two-step hybrid Offer of 90% of H shares out, has been seen in prior PRC-incorporated takeovers.
However, I still consider a “fair” price to be something like the distribution of net cash (~$3.48/share by my calcs) to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers. Dissension rights are available, although I am not aware of any precedents from discussions with both the PRC and HK tribunals, nor the calculation methodology of a “fair price” under such a dissension, nor the timing of payment.
Trading at a wide gross/annualised spread of 8.3%/54.5%, implying a >80% chance of completion. The current downside should this break is 45%. Not an attractive risk/reward.
On March 6th, a day before Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)‘s Tender Offer for a minimum of just over a third of Yungtay was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, as Taiwan regulators (MEIC and FTC) had not signed off. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60.
An EGM called by independent director Chen – who has been against the deal – was expected to take place on the 18 April. It was not clear the underlying purpose of the EGM other than to change the directors in place and gain management rights for the Baojia Group and Hsu Tso-Ming. Perhaps IF the board were to be renewed with less support for Hitachi, then the board could change its support/opinion and that might affect retail investor support for the deal. Retail tends to vote with management. In any event Hitachi filed an injunction to stop the EGM.
IF Hitachi is unlikely to get the required number of shares, then it could easily be the case that they lose board and management control. If they do get the support, they will effectively control the board and management for the foreseeable future.
Travis’ expectation was that this deal was still “Safe” and would get done, most likely at NT$60 but with the option of a “kiss” to NT$63 or so in the case of more public awareness and castigation of Hitachi and the board for ignoring competing indications at higher prices.
Helpfully, after the close on Friday, Hitachi gave it a kiss, raising the Tender Offer price to NT$65/share.
Travis has opinions on what to do here. Read the insights.
On the 8th of March, Bain Capital raised the Tender Offer Price by 14.8% to ¥700/share and extended the Tender Offer by almost two weeks to the 25th of March. It also lowered the amount which needs to be bought to 50.1% from 66.67%. So, on the 21 March, Murakami-san launched a Tender Offer of his own.
Murakami-affiliated entities Minami Aoyama Fudosan KK and Reno KK’s Tender Offer at ¥750/share is to buy a minimum of 9,100,900 shares and a maximum of all remaining shares. The entities currently own 3,355,900 shares (13.47%). That minimum should be easier than buying a minimum of 12,456,800 shares at ¥700/share under Bain Capital’s offer.
There is a theoretical possibility that Japanese retail investors decide to tender their shares into Bain’s bid because it is supported by management rather than sell to a higher bid which is not. Travis doubted it will go this way but stranger things have happened. Bain should be willing to walk.
After Travis wrote the first two insights listed below with the content above, the stock soared 16.5% on Friday and ended at a 14.5% premium to the Murakami tender of ¥750/share (i.e. closed at ¥859/share). The company maintained its support for the Bain Capital bid at ¥700/share, but withdrew its recommendation that investors tender into it. The company did not yet offer a real opinion on Murakami-san’s offer. That must come in the next 9 business days.
Travis has opinions on what to do here. Read the insights below.
Australian property developer, Villa World Ltd (VLW AU)announced that it had received an unsolicited proposal, by way of a scheme, from AVID Property Group Australia at an offer price A$2.23, or a 12% premium to last close. AVID’s indicative offer translates to an LTM PER and P/B of 6.4x and 0.9x, with the P/B metric roughly in line peers.
During 2018, VLW’s share price declined by 36% to A$1.76 from A$2.77, with a large chunk of that downward move occurring in December after VLW withdrew its FY19E earnings guidance. That forecast withdrawal was exacerbated by the fact VLW had maintained the 2019 forward guidance at its mid-November AGM.
Ho Bee Land Ltd (HOBEE SP), VLW’s largest shareholder and JV partner, responded to AVID’s proposal by buying 2.2mn shares (~1.8% of shares out) at an average of A$1.95/share – and a high of A$2.18/share – lifting its stake to 9.41%. VLW has also recently bought back and cancelled 1.76mn shares or ~1.4% of shares out. The highest price paid was $2.09.
AVID’s offer looks opportunistic and it’s doubtful VLW will want to engage. VLW is trading below its book, paying out one of the highest yields among its peers, and with ~21% of the share register potentially defending their position- the largest shareholder actively buying – there’s likely upside from here. Shares closed Friday at $2.24.
Aveo announced in early February a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction” with the AFR reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star had joined the bidding. Other interested parties are believed to include Blackstone and Cerberus Capital. Aveo’s share price is up ~11% since announcing the receipt of the indicative bids – and closing at $1.97 on Friday – having drifted down from a (recent) closing peak of $2.14 earlier this month.
Aveo is currently trading at an attractive 0.52x P/B vs. 1.8x for its peer group, with the next closest peer valuation at 0.7x P/B. An offer of >0.7x, a level last traded as recently as June 2018, appears reasonable with ~92% of assets in investment property.
The partial offer has successfully closed, with no major surprise in the expected pro-ration and the back end traded higher than one’s purchase price – not down. Some of this may be due to lack of stock borrow, and conversely, some of the strength may be due to those who had shorted their borrow buying back their short.
That left us with a question – do we want to own a residual here? Or instantiate a new position? The current post-tender price was 35.7% higher than the undisturbed price.
Travis could not recommend an outright buy on fundamental reasons. He thinks the Itochu story is reasonably compelling, or will be, but the lack of near-term observable fundamental turnaround may disappoint some. There may not be a lot of IR or analyst coverage of the situation either. For that, if you have a residual trade, he would sell it here.
This is not a short recommendation. This is a “It was a good arb trade and now the arb trade is over so don’t become a long-term investor just because it is doing better than you thought.”
CATL which grabbed Panasonic Corp (6752 JP)’s leading position in the battery supplier industry last year now seems to be grabbing the latter’s key customer as well. The news circulating states that CATL could power Tesla Motors (TSLA US)’s Model 3 cars which Tesla is planning to start assembling at Tesla’s new factory near Shanghai.
However, the news lacks credibility as neither company has commented on the matter, while Tesla has already agreed with Tianjin Lishen to supply batteries for its Chinese Plant.
But if true, Tesla would be the key one to benefit, while CATL could be taking up a considerable share of risk in terms of stable future orders.
The boards of Medco Energi Internasional T (MEDC IJ) and Ophir have agreed to increase the Offer price to £0.575 from £0.55, representing a 73.2% premium to the undisturbed price. All other details of the scheme remain unchanged. The court meeting is to take place on the 25 March, while the long stop is the 20 June – unless both companies agree to an extension.
Subsequent to the bump, Coro Energy PLC (CORO LN), which had previously submitted a non-binding cash/scrip reverse takeover offer, declared it has no intention to bid. Sand Grove has also announced it has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote its 18.73% in favour of the scheme. Coro held discussions with Sand Grove before abandoning its bid.
Petrus, which previously estimated a £0.64 – £1.42/share range – just for Ophir’s SEA investments, has yet to respond to the Offer increase; but it’s wholly doubtful their position has altered. Shortly before the bump, it said it would vote its 3.95% stake against the scheme.
While I consider the offer for Ophir sub-optimal – and shares have closed above terms on 30% of the trading days since Medco’s initial offer – Petrus alone cannot disrupt the vote. Medco’s Offer is conditional on 75%+ approval from Ophir’s shareholders, which appears less tenuous following the 4.5% bump and Sand Grove’s irrevocable undertaking. Shares closed at £0.569 on Friday.
CMA CGM SA (144898Z FP)has 89.47% of CEVA and will now move to squeeze out and delist. The additional tender period will run from 20 March to 2 April. CEVA’s board of directors have reversed their earlier opinion and recommend shareholders to tender.
If delisting occurs, it is expected concurrently occur with a squeeze-out, which would be expected to take place in the third quarter of 2019 once all stock exchange and other legal conditions are fulfilled.
Depending on the final tendered %, the squeeze-out will occur via the simpler market squeeze-out process if CMA gets 98%+; or the more complex off-market merger/squeeze out route if the % tendered is between 90%-98%.
Ecopro BM is up 48% since its IPO on March 5th. Ecopro, which holds 56% in Ecopro BN is up just 1%. That stake is now worth 115% of its market cap.
The stub assets primarily comprise a 100% stake in Ecopro Innovation, which is involved in the processing of lithium for lithium ion batteries. Innovation’s net profit increased to ₩26.3bn in the 1Q-3Q18 from ₩10.4bn in 2017. Innovation’s book value also increased to ₩35.3bn at the end of 3Q18 from ₩7.4bn at end of 2017.
Douglas Kim recommended going long Ecopro Co and shorting Ecopro BM. Plugging in his numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of 55%. Both legs are pretty liquid.
Curtis Lehnert closes this set-up trade as levels have reverted to the average. Both companies recently reported so-so results, suggesting the core business continues to face declining revenue from “roadshop” brands aimed at the lower-end of the market.
More surprising was the stock buyback announced at both companies 20 days after the earnings announcement, which spurred a 15% rally in the Group’s share price while Corp rallied nearly 11%. The buyback announcement seems to have caught the market by surprise and also caused the stub to revert to its 6-month average level of ~16% discount to NAV.
Douglas recommended closing the Hyosung unwind trade, which has returned ~8.2% before comms and borrowing cos.
The reason for Hyosung TNC’s recent move upwards? Right place, right time it would seem, as its trading value substantially increased, touching ₩8.9bn on the 19 March, the highest level this year, and the highest level since August 22nd, 2018.
On November 13th last year, Linkbal announced it was looking to move from MOTHERS to the TSE First Section. The stock rallied. Then it fell a lot. On March 5th, the company announced a forthcoming tachiaigai bunbai offering designed to increase the float. This would get it most of the way towards meeting the requirements, but likely not all the way.
An inclusion is still months off. And there would likely be another sale to increase shareholder count by 800-1000 before then, whether in the form of a Public Offering/Uridashi or in the form of another tachiaigai bunbai.
The company’s market cap is not large enough to warrant analyst coverage, and float will remain relatively small. I expect the stock to get re-evaluated by small-cap managers. There are some. There probably should be more.
Travis recommended investors buy the stock – which traded over 2% of shares outstanding at -2% in the first five minutes, and 3% of outstanding in the first 20 minutes, before rising to close +13.6% on Wednesday. The stock fell 6% on Friday.
Hopewell Holdings (54 HK)‘s “Egregiously Bad” scheme has passed with 96.27% of disinterested shareholders approving the resolution. Shares will now be suspended at the close of trading on the 17 April. Cheques are expected to be dispatched on the 14 April. Seems like I’m not the only one as David Webb was also unimpressed with the Offer.
After Eclipx (ECX AU) announced a 42.4% decline in NPATA in the first five months vs. FY18, and other significant issues in the Right2Drive and Grays divisions, Mcmillan Shakespeare (MMS AU)said it did “not believe it will be possible to complete the proposed scheme“. Eclipx closed down 60% on the week.
Brookfield has received FIRB approval in its tilt for Healthscope Ltd (HSO AU). The AFR is reporting (paywalled) that BGH is now out of the running for Healthscope. Which leaves Brookfield’s twin bids ($2.50 via a scheme or $2.40 via an off-market takeover) as the expected winner. Norges Bank announced it now holds 5.08%.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
The news released on the 11th of March, about Tesla Motors (TSLA US) choosing CATL (A) (300750 CH) as battery supplier has focused much attention on the two companies and other battery suppliers. CATL which grabbed Panasonic Corp (6752 JP)’s leading position in the industry last year now seems to be grabbing the latter’s key customer as well. The news circulating states that, CATL could power Tesla’s Model 3 cars which Tesla is planning to start assembling at Tesla’s new factory near Shanghai. Following the release of this supposed deal, the stocks of the two companies moved positively, with CATL surging by almost 6.7% while Tesla rose by almost 2.4% during the day. However, both parties have not commented on this news yet or made any formal announcement regarding such a potential deal. In our Insight, Tesla Drifting Away Could Leave Panasonic Struggling to Gain Traction in China, we mentioned that Tesla was looking to locally source its batteries in China and that CATL could potentially be one such supplier. However, in January this year, it was reported that Tesla had signed a preliminary agreement with China’s Tianjin Lishen to supply batteries for its new Shanghai car factory, making the current news look less believable. Although it seems like the ongoing news about a Tesla-CATL pair up lacks integrity, with CATL sort of denying its intend to work with Tesla (according to an updated news release), the news does look interesting and its effect upon the related companies seems noteworthy.
After 6 months of haggling and due diligence, debt negotiation, and structuring, global education company Navitas Ltd (NVT AU) has now signed a Board-recommended Scheme Implementation Deed with a consortium led by Australian Private Equity firm BGH Capital consortium which includes Navitas Founder Rod Jones (also the largest holder at 13%) and AustralianSuper.
The agreed Scheme Price of A$5.825 is a 6% uplift from the original A$5.50 offered in the preliminary, indicative, non-binding offer announced on 10 October 2018 and a 34% premium to the undisturbed price of 9 October 2018 of A$4.35/share.
This history is that the consortium came in at A$5.50 (plus another cash+RollCo scrip offer), a month or so later the company effectively rejected it by not allowing the consortium to do due diligence after management lifted earnings guidance. This upset a number of shareholders. In November the share price ranged from A$4.95-5.25 or so and Chairman Tracey Horton got only 51% support at the AGM that month. The shares fell briefly below A$4.70 in early January this year before BGH came back in mid-January with a “revised indicative offer” of A$5.825 whereupon the shares bounced from about A$4.90 to about A$5.50 then climbed to A$5.60+ on 10mm shares volume in 3 days.
The shares hovered around A$5.58-5.62 for 6-7 weeks until the beginning of March, briefly traded into the A$5.70s, and then traded back down the last few days this week to the A$5.59-5.63 area.
On Thursday 21 March the shares were halted for the day, StreetTalk had an article about the deal being imminent, and late in the afternoon, the BGH SID was announced.
Now we start the official process. The Scheme document is expected to be dispatched in May 2019 with a deal completed by end-June or early July. I expect this deal gets up.
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There is no apparent value enhancement to Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK), while there is no change in governance and no monetisation at the parent level.
Preceding my comments on Naspers are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.
These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.
This morning, Wesfarmers Ltd (WES AU) announced an indicative, non-binding proposal to the Board of Directors of Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) to acquire Lynas at A$2.25/share, payable in cash in the form of a Scheme of Arrangement.
This is a 44.7% premium to the one-day price and a 36.4% premium to the 60-day price.
It is, however, a 0% premium to the price at which Lynas was trading on 3 December 2018, the day before the Malaysian Minister for Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate imposed two pre-conditions on the rolling over of the processing licence (later in 2019), and it is a 3.2% premium to the one-year average as of 4 December 2018. On December 5th, the shares fell to A$1.65 and they have not recovered.
This is very early, non-binding, conditional in the extreme, and conditional non-binding offers are a graveyard of Australian arbitrageurs. The Offer is not all that attractive to boot. But I expect the stock will go up anyway, and that may make for some interesting trading opportunities.
DHICO rights offer 1st round pricing was fixed at ₩5,550. This ₩5,550 will serve as the ceiling. It is nearly guaranteed that the final offer price will be fixed somewhere between ₩5,000 and ₩5,550. It can not go lower than the face value ₩5,000.
Today (Mar 26) is the last day to get subscription rights. Subscription rights will be then tradable on Apr 19~25. The 4 bookrunners will buy all forfeited shares at a 15% discount to final offering price. There is no cancellation risk.
Local arb traders made their move yesterday. Foreign arb traders entered as well. Past tendency shows buying earlier would pay off more handsomely than waiting longer. DHICO’s fundamentals isn’t showing any positive sign yet. Deal structure isn’t helping improve street sentiments either. This event needs a lot of arb traders to hit the target. This is another relief point for those making early trades.
The market misinterpreted Amazon’s server DRAM demand cut in 4Q18. It wasn’t a sign of falling demand. There isn’t still any convincing sign of server DRAM falling demand. By the time SamE gets the optimization issue right, server DRAM demand of Amazon and Google will come. This will stabilize DRAM price as well. Micron’s production reduction will help it.
There seem to be several signs that it will be over much sooner than initially feared. I expect it to be over by the end of 2Q. This will lead to a ₩4tril addition quarterly to the current street consensus. At this, current PER falls to 9x.
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In December (13 Dec after trading hours), the FT had an article noting that Germany’s leading property classifieds firm Scout24 AG (G24 GR) (also known for auto classifieds across Europe) was possibly looking to sell itself and that PE firms were lining up to bid. Silver Lake, which had bought British player ZPG (which operates property portals Zoopla and PrimeLocation) for $2.8bn in July 2018, was mentioned as a bidder. Once owned by Deutsche Telekom, control of Scout24 was sold to Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman LLC in 2013-14 (H&F spent €1.5 billion to take a 70% stake in 2013, and Blackstone bought a stake of undisclosed size in 2014), and they listed the company in 2015 with an initial market cap of €3.2 billion. The IPO was €1.16 billion and both sold down, with H&F fully exiting in a placement in 2016.
The share price had been doing well until Q3 last year when German lawmakers, anxious with skyrocketing property prices, started looking at revamping the structure of real estate transaction costs so that they were borne by sellers rather than loaded onto buyers. The shares fell.
source: investing.com
A combination of Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman LLC launched an non-LBO LBO for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) in mid-January at €43.50/share (€4.7 billion) which was about an 8% premium to the then-current market price, which had already been juiced because of speculation starting after the FT article in late December. The company rejected the Offer saying it was too low.
The two buyers came back in mid-February with a Takeover Offer priced at €46.00/share, 5.7% higher than January’s foray and 27% higher than the level pre-FT article; that was about 25x earnings and 28x 2019e cashflow, which is a bit lower than Silver Lake’s ZPG buy multiple. Both Scout24’s Management Board and Supervisory Board agreed to support the offer and said they believed that the transaction is in the best interest of the Company, and an Investment Agreement was signed between the three companies.
The unusual thing about this deal is that the two PE firms are looking to buy a minimum of 50% plus one share, and leave the company listed. The shares jumped to €46 and have been trading at just below to slightly through, leaving many to think that this was a setup for a strategic buyer or possibly Silver Lake to come in over the top.
The New News
Yesterday, the BidCo officially launched its Tender Offer at €46, due to run through 9th May.
Denso Corp (6902 JP) announced this month that it has invested in the Seattle-based connected vehicle services pioneer- Airbiquity Inc. Airbiquity is one of the leading companies in the connected vehicle services sector and has been one of the companies that has continuously developed automotive telematics technology. This investment made by Denso follows its investment made in Quadric.io this year ( Stake in Quadric.io Following Renesas; Denso Attempts to Keep Chip Makers Close to Achieve AD Aims). As we previously mentioned, Denso is in full swing in its development in the autonomous driving field and next-generation technologies development. Thus, it wouldn’t be a surprise to see Denso emerge as the first mover in next-generation technologies such as AD and connectivity solutions. According to Denso, its investment worth $5m in Airbiquity is expected to accelerate the development of over-the-air (OTA) systems for wirelessly updating automotive software from a remote location. OTA systems are methods of distributing new software, configuration settings, and providing updates to the electronic device in use, for instance, a car navigation system in a vehicle. These OTA systems which have been increasingly used to update the software of such multimedia products in a vehicle are now gaining more prominence given the emergence of next-generation technologies such as electrification, EV and connectivity. We also believe that Denso’s Stake in Airbiquity is likely to accelerate Denso’s transition in its business model to be a leading software solution provider. Thus, its series of investments such as in Tohoku Pioneer EG, JOLED, ThinCI, Quadric, and now Airbiquity are indicative of the decisiveness of its change in business model and moves towards achieving next-generation technology leadership.
When IPH Ltd (IPH AU) gate-crashed Xenith Ip (XIP AU)/Qantm Intellectual Property (QIP AU)‘s marriage of equals, submitting a scheme proposal comprising cash (A$1.28) and IPH shares (0.1056 IPH shares) or A$1.97/share, versus QANTM’s all-cash offer (1.22 QANTM), the key risk to IPH’s Offer was ACCC opposing its Offer. As announced today, ACCC will not oppose.
This decision was largely expected and previously discussed here. Although IPH, QANTM, and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies, privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. The ACCC agrees and signed off on an IPH/XIP tie-up as it did on the 21 March, by not opposing the merger of XIP and QANTM.
XIP acknowledged the ACCC decision resolves a major uncertainty, but stops short of supporting IPH’s offer as there still exists a number of concerns as detailed in its 19 March announcement. IPH responded to those concerns on the 20 March. These include:
Shareholders of Xenith will hold an immaterial % of the merged IPH entity compared to QANTM.
IPH’s scrip portion accounted for (then) 35% of its Offer (now ~37%), shares which have superior liquidity versus QANTM given IPH’s position in the ASX200.
The cash portion also provides added certainty on value into the Offer compared to QANTM’s all scrip offer.
The control premium as at 11 March is insufficient.
Probably the most contentious concern. QANTM’s all-scrip offer on the 27 November backed out an indicative offer price of $1.598/share or a 28.4% premium to last close.
IPH’s $1.97/share indicative offer (a 60% premium to XIP’s undisturbed price, and a 31% premium to the independent expert’s mid-point fair value (page 55)) compared to QANTM’s indicative offer of $2.03 immediately before IPH’s announcement.
Circumstances have changed materially since, with IPH’s cash/scrip offer now worth $2.02 as I type, versus $1.67 for QANTM.
Source: CapIQ
The increased execution risk concerning ACCC. Now a non-issue.
It is questionable whether employees, controlling 40% of Xenith, would support the offer.
Employees are free to decide on what they consider to be the most compelling Offer. IPH has offered to hold discussions with XIP employees.
CGT rollover will likely be lower via the large cash element under IPH’s offer vs. QANTM’s all scrip offer.
Maybe. Possibly. An all-scrip offer typically affords greater rollover relief. Nevertheless, Xenith is trading below its 2015 IPO price of $2.72/share.
With IPH’s 19.9% blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme is a non-starter. Xenith still should engage with IPH. The scheme meeting to decide on the QANTM Offer is scheduled for the 3 April.
Six weeks ago I wrote that Nissan’s governance outlook was “Foggy Now, Sunny Later.” I said “Governance changes are afoot, with a steady flow of developments likely coming in March, April, May, and June.”
The last couple of months have seen numerous media articles about the process of Nissan Motor (7201 JP) and Renault SA (RNO FP) rebuilding their relationship. There have been visits to Tokyo by Renault’s new chairman of the board of directors Jean-Dominique Senard, and visits to Paris and Amsterdam by the CEOs of Nissan and Mitsubishi Motors (7211 JP).
There have been many suggestions in French and European newspapers in the interim that Jean-Dominique Senard would be the obvious choice as a representative director of Nissan. There have been other articles out there in the Japanese press suggesting what conclusions the committee might come to as to what outcomes should result. The difference is notable. The French side still wants control. The Japanese/Nissan/committee side sees the need to fix governance.
Today there was a report in the FT suggesting that Renault “wants” to restart merger talks with Nissan and “aims to restart merger talks with Nissan within 12 months.” It should be noted that these two sentences are not exactly the same. It may still be that France wants Renault to do so, and therefore Renault aims to do so. The same article revealed past talks on Renault merging with FCA but France putting a stop to it and a current desire to acquire another automaker – perhaps FCA – after dealing with Nissan.
Also today, the long-awaited Nissan Special Committee for Improving Governance (SCIG) report was released. It outlines some of the issues of governance which existed under Ghosn- both the ones which got him the boot, and the structural governance issues which were “discovered” after he got the boot.
There are clear patches in the fog. Two things shine through immediately.
Governance weaknesses under Ghosn were inexcusably bad. Worse than previously reported.
The recommendations to the board now are, on the whole, pretty decent. Some are sine qua non changes – formation of nomination and compensation committees, whistleblower reporting to the audit committee and not the CEO, and greater checks and balances. Some are stronger in terms of the independence of Nissan from Renault: the committee recommends a majority of independent board members, an independent chairman, and no representative directors from Renault, Mitsubishi, or principal shareholders.
There are, however, other issues which were not addressed, which for Nissan’s sake probably should be addressed. Yesterday was a first step on what will be a 3-month procession of news about the way Nissan will address the SCIG report’s recommendations, the process by which it will choose new directors when it does not have an official nomination committee, and the AGM in June to propose and confirm new directors. Then they will start their jobs in July.
The fog looks to lift slowly. And one may anticipate some better weather beyond. But business concerns remain a threat, and while relations appear to be getting better after the departure of Carlos Ghosn and the arrival of Jean-Dominique Senard, it is not clear that a Franco-Japanese storm is not brewing in the distance.
As well expected, DHICO was heavily shorted yesterday, ex-rights day. We had a heavy buying movement by short-term arb traders at both local and foreign on DHICO right before ex-rights. As shown in the second table, yesterday’s shorting was mostly done by short-term traders again both local and foreign alike.
These early arb traders had presumably bought DHICO shares at ₩8,076 on Mar 25~26. They then disposed shares at ₩6,974 yesterday. They then shorted the same amount of shares additionally at ₩6,983. As a result, at ceiling price ₩5,550 their yield is virtually fixed at 4.10%. If the offering price goes down to the bottom of ₩5,000 which is a very high possibility at this point, their yield will go up as high as 10.91%.
For those who haven’t made early moves, there are now two options to play this event. You can either trade now and hope that subscription right price won’t hit breaking price level or wait until Apr 19~25 subscription rights period for a perfectly risk-free entry point. At the current price ₩6,800, breaking price for subscription rights is still at a comfortable level. That is, I’d make trades right now by shorting DHICO shares.
→ DHICO price just got down nearly 3%. At this reduced price, below are updated numbers for late arb traders’ arb yield. To me, it still seems we won’t be in a losing position if we make trades now. But we’d better hurry up.
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Visitors to Macao will notice the gaudy designs of new properties like Studio City and the City of Dreams owned by Melco. Few will know that the Melco of today traces its roots back almost 100 years when it was named The Macau Electric Lighting Company. Melco was listed in Hong Kong in 1927 when it was still managing the electricity supply service for the island of Macau, which it had done since 1906. After the CEM was established in 1972 to supply power in Macau, Melco changed its name to Melco International Development Limited and became a subsidiary of Stanley Ho’s real estate holding company, Shun Tak Holdings (242 HK). With the burden of supplying electricity off its shoulders, the company did what any logical Hong Kong firm would do when its business disappears, it bought real estate.
To this day, Melco International Development (200 HK) still maintains ownership of one of these classic Hong Kong destinations which I will take a closer look at in my note. In the rest of this insight I will:
finish the historical overview of Melco
present my trade idea and rationale
give a detailed overview of the business units of Melco International
recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each
In my initial insight on China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK, “CPNED”)‘s privatisation by China Power New Energy Limited (the Offeror) by way of a Scheme, I concluded China Three Gorges, CPNED’s largest shareholder with 27.10%, will likely be required to abstain at the Court Meeting as it is presumed to be a connected party to the Offeror as per the Takeovers Code.
But the announcement states that CTG has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme and to elect the share alternative.
It seems illogical to mention in the irrevocable CTG will vote for the Scheme when in actuality it cannot vote. So, which one is it?
The short answer is: CTG cannot currently vote.
But understanding this requires diving into the minutiae of Hong Kong’s Takeovers Code. So I do.
In the middle of last week, Russia’s largest chain of hypermarkets Lenta Ltd (LNTA LI)announced that it was aware that there were ongoing discussions between Luna (TPG’s holding entity, which owns 34.13% of Lenta’s capital) and Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup, for Luna to sell its stake in Lenta to the Russian conglomerate. A day later, Lenta announced the company was aware of discussions between Severgroup and the EBRD (7.40% holder).
Reuters reported last night that Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those two sellers, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company.
Later last night, Lenta announced on its website (full press release here) a cash offer for all the shares had been proposed. The Offer has a pre-condition dealing with the above-mentioned transactions being approved by those who need to approve.
The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs.
A conditional debt conversion agreement to capitalise all of the “relevant debt” of US$916mn via the allotment and issue of up to approximately 22,573,570,909 new ordinary shares of Ezion at an issue price of S$0.055/share (27.9% premium to last close).
A conditional option agreement for the proposed grant by Ezion of 3,360,495,867 non-listed and transferable share options to Yinson at the exercise price of S$0.0605 per option Share.
This shareholder structure will take the following shape, with Yinson holding 85.9% of shares out after the conversion and 87.5% after both the conversion and the exercise of the share options.
Current Holding
After Conversion
After Conversion & Options
Current shares out
3,728
100%
3,728
14%
3,728
13%
Debt conversion
0%
22,574
86%
22,574
76%
Option shares
0%
0%
3,360
11%
Total shares (mn)
3,728
26,302
29,662
However … as per the more detailed Bursa announcement:
It is the intention of YEPL (wholly-owned sub of Yinson) to acquire up to US$916mn of the Relevant Debts for a consideration to be agreed with the Designated Lenders. Tentatively, YHB (Yinson) expected its cash outlay shall be in the region of USD200mn and some EHL (Ezion) Shares that will give YEPL a shareholding of not less than 70% in EHL at the point of the completion of the Proposed Debt conversion and Subscription. In any event, assuming all convertible securities of EHL are converted, YHB expects its eventual shareholding in EHL shall be a controlling stake of at least 51%.
Ezion is also in negotiation with the major secured lenders to restructure its existing debts which would result in the conversion of certain debts to redeemable convertible preferences shares to be issued by Ezion.
As this is effectively a hybrid takeover, there exist a number of conditions required to complete this proposal. Of importance is the waiver from the Securities Industry Council of Singapore for Yinson not to make a mandatory general offer for Ezion under Rule 14.1 of the Takeover Code, as the share subscription takes Yinson’s stake >30%.
Conditions of the Debt Conversion/Proposed Subscription and Share Options
For the Debt Conversion & Subscription
Conditions
Satisfactory due diligence by Yinson.
Waiver from SIC not to make a MGO.
Independent shareholders of Ezion approving the whitewash waiver. Simple majority vote.
The approval by Ezion shareholders for the allotment and issue of the subscription shares. Simple majority vote.
Other
The long stop date is 6 months from the conditional debt conversion agreement (31 March 2019).
For the Share Options
Conditions
The approval by Ezion shareholders for the option shares. Simple majority vote.
Other
The long stop date is 6 months from the conditional option agreement (31 March 2019).
The exercise period is five years from the issuance of the options.
Gross proceeds will be S$203mn assuming full exercise. To be applied to business expansion or new business opportunities
Inter-conditionality
The grant of options is conditional upon and shall take place simultaneously with the debt conversion and subscription
On Ezion
Ezion develops, owns, and charters offshore assets to support offshore energy markets, via three key segments:
Lifeboats/liftboats – these are self-propelled rigs involved in the production and maintenance of the O&G and windfarm industry. This segment accounted for 57.9% of revenue in FY18.
Jack-up rigs – engaged in non-self propelled rigs involved in the production and maintenance of the O&G and windfarm industry. The segment accounted for 34.1% of revenue in FY18.
And offshore support logistic services, accounting for 7.5% of revenue in FYT18.
Ezion is primarily Asian focused with revenue split between Singapore, India, and the rest of Asia as to 8%, 5.3% and 54%. The Middle East and Africa account for 15.6% and 15.2% respectively.
Fundamentals
US$mn
FY16
FY17
FY18
Revenues
Liftboats
127
96
69
Jack-Up Rigs
158
76
41
Offshore Support Logistic Services
33
20
9
Others
1
1
1
Total Revenue
318
193
119
EBITDA
Liftboats
77
68
21
Jack-Up Rigs
112
60
16
Offshore Support Logistic Services
22
16
(1)
Others
1
1
1
Total EBITDA
212
144
37
NPBT
Liftboats
62
(16)
(54)
Jack-Up Rigs
(54)
(745)
(297)
Offshore Support Logistic Services
(13)
(156)
(53)
Others
1
1
7
Unallocated Expenses
(24)
(82)
94
Total NPBT
(29)
(999)
(303)
Assets
Liftboats
811
772
807
Jack-Up Rigs
1,382
556
226
Offshore Support Logistic Services
415
315
119
Others
79
81
32
Unallocated Assets
165
70
108
Total assets
2,851
1,794
1,291
Total equity
1,315
305
(255)
Net debt
1,282
1,358
1,358
Source: CapIQ
Revenue declined by US$125mn in FY17 due to a reduction in charter rates and delays in re-deployment of the Ezion’s liftboats due to working capital constraints. The loss before tax was exacerbated by impairment losses totalling US$897mn.
Revenue declined by US$74mn in FY17 due to a drop in the utilisation rates of liftboats and jack-up rigs. FY18 also saw an increase in impairments loses of US$84.5mn, while loses in associate and jointly controlled entities increased to US$39mn in FY18 from US$16mn in FY17.
Effect on NTA from the conversion/options
Assuming the subscription and options were completed on 31 December 2018, the effects of the Ezion’s NTL/NTA per share would be as follows:
This morning quite early we have an agreed deal and what had seemed a tough deal now seems easy.
According to a press release a short while ago.
DSV and Panalpina have reached an agreement on the terms and conditions of a combination by way of a Public Exchange Offer to all Panalpina shareholders. The board of directors of Panalpina recommends that Panalpina shareholders accept the Public Exchange Offer. The Public Exchange Offer already has the support of shareholders representing 69.9% of the registered shares of Panalpina, who have irrevocably agreed to tender their shares into the Public Exchange Offer. This includes Panalpina’s largest shareholder, Ernst Göhner Foundation and Cevian and Artisan*.
The deal is 2.375 shares of DSV for every share of Panalpina, which as of Friday’s close had a value of CHF 195.80/share which is a 43% premium to the CHF 137/share where Panalpina was trading the day before DSV’s first bid.
Exact terms of the Exchange Offer have not been disclosed but there will be an 80% acceptance condition (including the 69.9% who have already irrevocably agreed to accept the Offer), and other conditions will include “receipt of all necessary regulatory approvals, approval of a capital increase at an extraordinary general meeting in DSV, approval of a listing prospectus and admittance of the new DSV shares for trading at NASDAQ Copenhagen and effectiveness of a US Registration Statement.” (DSV press release)
In light of the Exchange Offer, the Ernst Göhner Foundation asked the board of Panalpina to postpone the April 5th EGM which was set to decide on the one-share one-vote.
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Merck KGaA (MRK GR) took off the gloves yesterday in its pursuit of Versum Materials (VSM US) , announcing and launching an unsolicited, fully financed $48 per share cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of VSM. Merck also announced the filing of its definitive proxy materials with the SEC for solicitation of proxies of VSM shareholder against the VSM/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger, which is scheduled to be voted on at a special shareholder meeting on April 26th, 2019.
Along with its press release announcing the offer yesterday, Merck also published its second open letter to Versum shareholders underscoring its commitment to complete the acquisition of the Company. This follows Merck’s presentation to VSM shareholders published on March 14, 2019.
The tender offer is scheduled to expire on 5pm, New York City time on June 7, 2019.
Have you ever wondered how a company secures the Chinese lucky number “8” as their ticker in Hong Kong? I’ll explain later on, but let’s just say that being the son of Li Ka Shing helps.
Li Ka Shing is a name that hardly needs introduction in Hong Kong and Richard Li, Li Ka Shing’s youngest son and Chairman of PCCW Ltd (8 HK), follows suit. After being born into Hong Kong’s richest family, Richard Li was educated in the US where he worked various odd jobs at McDonald’s and as a caddy at a local golf course before enrolling at Menlo College and eventually withdrawing without a degree. As fate would have it, Mr. Li went on to set up STAR TV, Asia’s satellite-delivered cable TV service, at the tender age of 24. Three years after starting STAR TV, Richard Li sold the venture, which had amassed a viewer base of 45 million people, to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp (NWS AU) for USD 1 billion in 1993. During the same year, Mr. Li founded the Pacific Century Group and began a streak of noteworthy acquisitions.
You may be starting to wonder what all of this has to do with a trade on PCCW Ltd (8 HK) and I don’t blame you. In the rest of this insight I will:
finish the historical overview of the Li family and PCCW
present my trade idea and rationale
give a detailed overview of the business units of PCCW and the associated performance of each
recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each
It was announced on March 26th after market close that the Korea National Pension Service (NPS) will vote against the re-election of the Cho Yang-Ho as a Director of Korean Air Lines (003490 KS). The final results will become available today when the AGM of Korean Air is completed (AGM starts at 9AM). This has been one of the most anticipated AGMs in Korea, since there is a good chance that Chairman Cho will not be re-elected. Chairman Cho needs at least 2/3 of the participating shareholders’ approval in order to be re-elected.
Foreigners currently own a 24.77% stake in Korean Air, up significantly from 20.61% as of end of 2018. This increase of 4.1% stake represents $128 million. The increase in ownership by the foreigners is a good sign since it suggests that many hedge funds and long-only institutional investors think that finally the tides have turned and Chairman Cho may need to step down from his position in the BOD.
In our view, if Chairman Cho is finally defeated in this AGM, this should have a definite positive impact on Korean Air’s share price. In the near term, we think Korean Air Lines (003490 KS)‘s share price could shoot up by nearly 20% and retest the previous resistance level at around 39,000 won.
Wesfarmers Ltd (WES AU) launched a conditional, non-binding indicative proposal for Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU), one of the world’s only rare earths suppliers based outside China. Wesfarmers’ proposal of A$2.25 cash per share values Lynas at A$1.5 billion. Lynas’ share price jumped 35% to A$2.10 before going into a trading halt.
The bid comes at a turbulent time for Lynas, which is caught in a regulatory dispute with authorities in Malaysia. While Wesfarmers proposal could be viewed as a lifeline for Lynas, we believe that Wesfarmers’s proposal is opportunistic and unattractive.
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Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman made a proposal for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) in mid-January – which was rejected by the board – and subsequently returned with an improved offer which was then supported. The deal was first written on after the Tender Offer was officially launched in March.
The average premium to last close for the new deals announced in March was 18%, while the average for the first quarter of 2019 is 33%.
Brief Summary of News in March of Arb Situations On Smartkarma’s Radar
(again, click on the company names to take to you to the insights and/or discussion posts)
McMillan announced on 20th March 2019, that they will not be able to complete the proposed scheme. Eclipx said it would sell two divisions (Grays and Right2Drive) and use the proceeds to pay down corporate debt.
On 19th March 2019, Healthscope announced that they had received FIRB approval for the scheme. The Offer docs have been pushed out to the 24 April so as to incorporate the Scheme and Takeover Documents into a single integrated booklet
On 4th March 2019, Manikay Partners LLC and its affiliates filed a notice that they had increased their holding in MYOB to 9.99%, and submitted a letter that asserted that the board should reconsider their recommendation of the KKR offer. However, on 6th March MYOB’s Board, mentioned in their announcement, that they continue to recommend the offer. MYOB’s shareholders will be able to vote for the proposal at the Scheme meeting which will be held on 17th April 2019, as set out in the announcement on 14th March 2019. A Scheme Update on 20th March, stated that the all cash consideration of A$3.40/share, was KKR’s best and final offer.
On 8th March 2019, a letter was released to Ruralco’s shareholders that confirmed the details of the offer, and that the Board of Ruralco unanimously recommends the Scheme.
On 13th March 2019, the Board of Sigma announced that following their review of the proposal submitted by API, they conclude that it is not in the best interest of the shareholders.
It was announced on 5th March 2019, that permission has been granted to extend the time for the despatch of the Composite Document to 2nd April 2019, in order for the offeror to consider the 2018 annual results of Xingfa.
Faurecia announced on 1st March 2019, that they were able to successfully complete their Tender Offer for Clarion. 95.28% of Clarion shareholders had tendered their shares.
On 8th March 2019, Descente released an opinion on the Tender offer, which said they continue to oppose the offer. The results of the tender offer was released on 15th March 2019 – Itochu planned on buying 7.21million shares out of the 75.37mm shares which bear voting rights (as of the commencement of the Tender), and 15,115,148 shares were tendered, which led to a pro-ration rate of 47.7%. The president will be replaced with the president of Itochu Textile.
On 8th March 2019, an announcement was released, which stated that the offer was bumped up to ¥ 700/share, from ¥ 610/share, and the offer close date was extended to 25th March 2019, with the commencement of settlement being 29th March 2019. On 18th March, Yoshiaki Murakami-associated companies announced they had raised their stake above 10%, at a price higher than the ¥ 700/share final tender offer price. On 20th March, Minami Aoyama Fudosan – another Murakami-associated company – announced a Tender Offer for a minimum of 50.00% of Kosaido (and up to 100% of the shares out) at ¥750/share (and announced they had bought more bringing their stake to 13.47% in total). On 25th March 2019, Bain extended their tender offer from 25th March to April 8th.
A Reuters article on 3rd March 2019, mentioned that Tencent, Kakao Corp, Bain Capital, MBK Partners, and an unidentified private equity firm are the five bidders that have been shortlisted by Nexon, as reported by the Korea Economic Daily newspaper. Netmarble Corp was not offered a position among the bidders, but is said to have formed a consortium MBK Partners.
SCSK Corp announced on 19th March 2019, that they gained 94.76% of the shares of Veriserve Corp in the tender, which will mean an immediate push to squeeze out minorities.
On 7th March 2019, Trade Me announced that the high court had approved the special meeting for shareholders to vote on the Apax proposal. The Independent Advisers’ assessed a fair value between NZ$5.93 and NZ$6.39 per share, below Apax’s offer of NZ$6.45 per share. On 11th March the company announced that the special meeting for the shareholders to vote will be held on 3rd April 2019. The scheme booklet was released on the Trade Me website on 13th March 2019, which was ciculated among shareholders on 19th March.
The offer closed on 15th March 2019, with 95.83% of the issued share capital of Courts Asia. The remaining shares will be acquired through a compulsory acquisition at the final offer price of S$0.205/share. It was also announced that the last day of trading of the stock would be 15th March 2019, with the stock being suspended from 18th March 2019.
On 6th March 2019, it was announced that the offeror had acquired 72.89% of the total number of shares, and held 92.20% of the shares of M1 Ltd, and that Konnectivity launched an offer to acquire the remaining shares not tendered in by 18th March 2019. On 18th March 2019 at the close of the offer they had managed to acquire an aggregate of 94.55% of shares.
On 6th March 2019, Hitachi announced that they had decided to extend the period of the public tender offer (originally from January 17, 2019 to March 7, 2019) to April 22, 2019. There was news that there would be an EGM (called by a dissenting director) on April 18th designed to renew the board of directors. On 22nd March 2019, Hitachi had amended the Public Purchase statement by raising the Purchase Price to NT$65/share.
Delta published a document which included amendments to the Conditional Voluntary Tender Offer on 1st March 2019, which confirmed that the Bt 71.0/share, will be the final offer, and that the offer is expected to close on 1st April 2019. The independent financial advisers opinion was published on 14th March 2019, recommending the offer. 9.12% of shares out have tendered into Delta’s Offer, bringing the Offeror’s total holding to 30.05% as at 26 March.
The Mastercard offer for Earthport lapsed on 8th March 2019, as the acceptance condition was not satisfied. On 13th March 2019 Visa’s offer had been extended to 30th April 2019. As at 12th March 2019 Visa had 41.02% of the issued ordinary share capital of Earthport, which counted towards satisfaction of the acceptance condition to the Offer.
On 8th March 2019, the Bidder announced that the Competition Commission of South Africa had granted unconditional approval for the acquisition, thus satisfying one of the conditions of the Scheme.
The final results of the Tender Offer, which closed on 7th March 2019, was released on 12th March 2019, according to which the offeror had managed to acquire 94.98% of all the shares. The offeror then opened a subsequent offer from 13th to 27th March in order to allow the remaining shareholders to tender in their shares. On 28th March 2019, the offeror announced that according to the preliminary results of the Subsequent Offer Period, the shares tendered represent approximately 3.13% of all the shares in Amer Sports. Together with the shares tendered during the Offer Period, the total shares acquired represent approximately 98.10% of all the shares. The consideration for the shares tendered during the Subsequent Offer Period, will be paid on or about 2nd April 2019.
On 4th March 2019, Nasdaq raised their offer to NOK 158/share (from NOK 152/share) to match the Euronext offer, reduced the minimum acceptance requirement to at least two-thirds of the shares of Oslo Børs (from more than 90%), and extended the offer period expiry to 29th March 2019 (from 4th March 2019), as well as the drop dead date to the date which is the later of: (i) March 4, 2020; and (ii) the date which is sixty days after the Euronext Offer lapses, closes or is withdrawn. It was also announced that shareholders representing more than 1/3 if the shares in Oslo Børs have reaffirmed their support for Nasdaq’s offer.
On 14th March 2019, the provisional interim results of the tender offer was released. It stated that 78.69% of the CEVA Shares to which the Tender Offer relates were tendered in, which results in CMA CGA holding 89.47% of share capital. A subsequent offer was made to acquire the remaining shares, running from 20th March to 2nd April 2019.
On 5th March 2019, Panalpina announced that an extraordinary general meeting will be held on 5th April 2019 to vote on a “one share one vote” scheme to replace the current cap on holdings over 5%. All major shareholders who would see their voting rights increase have come out against it because they want to see the Ernst Gohner Foundation have their voting rights come down. ISS and Glass Lewis have both come out against the proposal. A couple of minor European proxy solicitors and agents have come out in favor.
Late Sunday night it was reported by Bloomberg that DSV had improved its offer once again and that the Foundation had agreed to the sweetened bid of 2.375 DSV shares per Panalpina share, worth CHF 195.8
This post looks at the tax situations that Nexon’s Kim may be facing for each of the two options and the signals that he may be sending with regard to his decision. Also, this post discusses how each option may impact on mandatory tender offer which is a crucial point for current massive short buildup on Nexon Japan shares.
The fog lifts, slowly, on Nissan Motor (7201 JP), but merger talks will have to wait until the company gets its governance in order, and a full-on merger seems remote at best.
Both Mio Kato, CFA and Travis Lundy tackled a report in the FT suggesting that Renault “aims to restart merger talks with Nissan within 12 months” and the long-awaited release of Nissan’s Special Committee for Improving Governance (SCIG) report.
Governance weakness under Ghosn was inexcusably bad. Worse than previously reported. Ghosn unilaterally decided the compensation of directors, top management and himself, while Kelly held broad sway over essentially everyone else, acting as a gatekeeper even against auditors and the accounting department. And it appears that there is zero understanding at Renault that Renault itself is not blameless for bad governance at Nissan over the years. The SCIG recommendations to the board now are, on the whole, pretty decent.
If France and Renault “push” for a merger, Nissan will continue to push back for the foreseeable future. As the governance report shows, the house is nowhere near being in order. All that has happened is that the steps which need to take place for it to be put in order have been identified.
Where Mio and Travis diverge – click to both insights below – is that Mio thinks a breakup of the alliance is more likely than a merger near term, especially if Paris continues to ignore Nissan’s priorities and constantly push for a merger ASAP. He does not feel scale is quite as necessary as people seem to assume, as long as you have access to a strong supply chain.
Travis thinks an outright merger is also unlikely, as the trust is not there, but is a big fan of the existing single platform design to lower costs and reduce parts count. There would be no need to replicate the R&D for parts and platforms across multiple marks, so he thinks the production alliance stays in place even if the capital alliance does not move further.
Sanghyun Park concluded the market had misinterpreted Amazon’s server DRAM demand cut in 4Q18. It wasn’t a sign of falling demand nor is there any convincing sign of server DRAM demand drop-off. It’s more a technical issue and by the time SamE gets the optimization issues right, server DRAM demand of Amazon and Google will return, stabilising DRAM prices.
And that demand may come sooner, potentially by the end of 2Q. This will lead to a ₩4tn quarterly addition to the current street consensus, which backs out a current PER of ~9x.
SamE is up since Micron announced it plans to reduce its output of DRAM and NAND by ~5% this year. From a Common-1P perspective, Sanghyun recommends going long the Common.
Aqila Ali discusses Denso Corp (6902 JP) investment in Airbiquity Inc, one of the leading companies in the connected vehicle services sector and one of the companies that has continuously developed automotive telematics technology. This proposal follows its investment in Quadric.io this year. Denso is in full swing in the development of its autonomous driving business and next-generation technologies development, and it wouldn’t be a surprise to see Denso emerge as the first mover in next-generation technologies such as AD and connectivity solutions. (link to Aqila’s insight: Denso Continues to Strengthen Its Investment CASE with Acquisitions)
Wesfarmers Ltd (WES AU) surprised the market and announced a non-binding proposal to acquire Lynas at A$2.25/share (cash) by way of a scheme. This is a 44.7% premium to the one-day price and a 36.4% premium to the 60-day price. However, it is a 0% premium to the price at which Lynas was trading on 3 December 2018, the day before the Malaysian government imposed two pre-conditions on the rolling over of the processing licence (later in 2019), and it is a 3.2% premium to the one-year average as of 4 December 2018. Lynas rejected the proposal the next day.
Lynas shares have, since mid-December, been trading as if there is significant risk to the renewal of their operating license in Malaysia.
This is a long-term bet by Wesfarmers. But seeing it through would require that Lynas shareholders decide once Malaysia has approved the renewal of their license that this business won’t be able to see better margins ahead the way there was a dream to see them a year ago. Travis did not think that the increased buying on the dip by Greencape Pty and FIL since the Dec 4th announcement are omens of a desire to sell at A$2.25.
A priori, the bid by Wesfarmers does not increase the likelihood of a good outcome on the Malaysian regulatory front. And it disappears if Lynas can’t sort its problems satisfactorily. Therefore, it is not clear what value the bid brings to Lynas shares today. If neither the outcome’s probabilities nor the outcome’s price levels change, the bid should have no material impact on Lynas shares.
At the time of his report, Travis thought this would be a short if the stock pops to the very high A$1 range or A$2.00 area. One caveat to shorting too low: if you think WES would conceivably bid quite a bit higher to enable Lynas to have a processing plant and battery plant at WES in Australia and maintain processing in Malaysia, that might be a different story.
The ACCC said will not oppose a tie in between IPH Ltd (IPH AU) and Xenith. Xenith acknowledged the ACCC decision resolves a major uncertainty, but stops short of supporting IPH’s offer as there still exist a number of concerns as detailed in its 19 March announcement.
None of these remaining concerns raised by Xenith appear deal-breakers, and Xenith’s general pushback fails to mention the benefits of leveraging off IPH’s Asia-based presence, IPH’s superior liquidity (versus QANTM limited liquidity), together with the certainty of value under IPH’s offer via the large cash portion.
With IPH’s 19.9% blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme is a non-starter. Xenith still should engage with IPH, whose offer provides a gross/annualised spread of 7.5%/24.5% – a decent risk/reward – assuming late July completion. The scheme meeting to decide on the QANTM Offer, scheduled for the 3 April, has now been postponed.
SOE State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) is seeking to privatise China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK) by way of a Scheme at $5.45/share, a 41.9% premium to last close and a 78.1% premium to the 30-day average. A scrip alternative (6 New shares for one Scheme shares) into an unlisted vehicle under SPIC is also available, but presumably just for SOE shareholders. China Three Gorges, CPNED’s largest shareholder with 27.10%, have given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme and to elect the share alternative.
This looks like a pretty clean, straightforward privatization. It is priced above the highest close since its listing by way of introduction on the 18 July 2017, while the excitement over the potential injection of all nuclear power assets and businesses from State Nuclear Power Technology Company has been removed after the restructuring was cancelled in July last year.
Clarity is required as to whether China Three Gorges can vote at the court meeting. Based on the Code, it appears evident they cannot. In addition, the final dividend is expected to be added to the offer price, but again, the announcement is not explicit on this.
The stock is currently trading at an attractive gross/annualised spread of 7.5%/25.7% conservatively assuming a late July completion, and inclusive of the final dividend.
Merck KGaA (MRK GR) has launching an unsolicited, fully financed tender offer on VSM at $48/share cash, a 52% premium to VSM’s stock price on January 25, the day before it agreed to sell itself to Entegris Inc (ENTG US)‘s in an all-stock deal.
Conditions include a minimum acceptance threshold (a majority of shares), the rejection of ENTG’s offer, HSR/CFIUS clearance, plus the usual MACs. Merck does not rule out an increase in the Offer price.
The shareholder vote on the VSM/ENTG is scheduled for April 26th, 2019. The record date to vote is April 2, 2019. This means the last day to buy and participate was this past Friday.
Merck said “the Versum board’s hasty rejection of our proposal and unwillingness to engage in discussions with us has forced us to take this proposal directly to shareholders. … Tell the Versum board to start doing its job and put your interests first.”
A combination of Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman LLC launched an non-LBO LBO for Scout24 in mid-January at €43.50/share (€4.7bn), which was about an 8% premium to the then-current market price, which had already been juiced because of speculation starting after the FT article in late December. Scout24’s Board rejected the Offer. The two buyers came back in mid-February with a Takeover Offer priced at €46.00/share. Both Scout24’s Management Board and Supervisory Board agreed to support the offer. The BidCo has now officially launched its Tender Offer.
The unusual thing about this deal is that the two PE firms are looking to buy a minimum of 50% plus one share, and leave the company listed. The stock has been trading above terms since the new €46 bid. It appears the idea is that another bidder might come in over the top. Travis tends to think the occasional trading at just above €46 is due to arbitrageurs looking at this as a put option. Plus, the lack of additional noise means another bid may not be forthcoming.
Because Scout24 is basically a pure play inline classifieds business, it gets a decent multiple (17x 2019e EV/EBITDA). That said, it is not overwhelmingly expensive for a business which has strong network effects and significant ability to create niche marketplaces using existing technology/IP.
Travis would see nothing wrong with selling in the market here, but as an arb, he is still a buyer at €46.01/share.
Naspers announced the intended listing of its international internet assets on Euronext Amsterdam “no earlier than H2 2019“, together with a secondary, inward listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The Newco spin-off will include Naspers’ holdings in listcos Tencent and Mail.Ru (MAIL LI), together with ex-South African internet assets. Naspers will maintain a 75% stake in Newco plus Takealot, Media24, and net cash.
Newco’s discount is likely to be narrower than Naspers presently, on account of the smaller free float, and >$2.26bn of investment just from index funds. It will however, still be a Tencent holding vehicle, while Newco’s assets comprise ~94% of Nasper’s assets.
The remaining Naspers, post-spin off could have a wider discount – or “discounts on discounts”. It will be one layer removed from what investors are most interested in – the Tencent holding. As witnessed in other holdco restructurings, providing additional clarity on investments/holdings within a company via spin-offs does not necessarily translate to the parent company’s discount narrowing.
Assigning a 20-25% discount to the Newco and keeping the discount constant (optimistically) at Naspers, gives a negative ~7-13% return. I simply don’t see the value enhancement here, while there is no change in governance and no monetisation at the parent level.
Using a Sum of the Parts analysis, Curtis Lehnert calculated the current discount to NAV to be 37%, the widest level it has been since at least 2015, and approaching the -2 standard deviation level relative to its 6 month average.
The current dividend yield on PCCW was 6.62% vs. 5.55% for HKT. That 1% yield differential is also near the widest since HKT’s listing in 2011.
As Curtis notes, a catalyst for re-rating is hard to find. Still, he argues that the discount has widened out so much that the statistical advantages of mean reversion are in your favor.
Separately – and as expected – the composite document issuance for HKCIM has been delayed until (on or before) the 18 April.
Eclipx (ECX AU) has rallied after a market update confirming it will sell two divisions (Grays and Right2Drive) and use the proceeds to pay down corporate debt.
Ophir Energy (OPHR LN)‘s shareholders approvedMedco Energi Internasional T (MEDC IJ)‘s Offer. Completion of the Offer remains subject to the receipt of clearances from the relevant authorities in Tanzania and not losing all or substantially all of its Bualuang interests in Thailand.
The Offer docs for Healthscope Ltd (HSO AU) have been pushed out to the 24 April so as to incorporate the Scheme and Takeover Documents into a single integrated booklet.
CCASS
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Hankook Tire Holdco/Sub are at +2σ for 5 consecutive days now. It was reported on Mar 25 that Sub (Hankook Tire) was on the verge of taking over Hanon Systems at a hefty 70% premium. Hankook Tire pays ₩5tril for Hahn & Co’s 50% stake.
₩5tril is really a lot for the Group. Holdco will also have to be heavily involved in funding. Whatever suffering Sub will have to endure should also be nearly equally applied to Holdco.
Only long-term oriented local public offering funds had heavily dumped Sub shares. In contrast, highly short-term oriented local hedge funds (PEs) had rather shorted Holdco in the same time span. Sub disappoints and alienates a lot of long-term investors but it was Holdco who attracted the attention of short-term traders.
Current +2σ divergence stayed for several days now. Considering where local short sellers are, I don’t think it will last much longer. I’d join local short-sellers. Just for a safer setup, I’d do pair trades, go long Sub and short Holdco.
SOE State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) is seeking to privatise China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK) by way of a Scheme at $5.45/share, a 41.9% premium to last close and a 78.1% premium to the 30-day average.
A scrip alternative (6 New shares for one Scheme shares) into an unlisted vehicle under SPIC is also available.
China Three Gorges, CPNED’s largest shareholder with 27.10%, have given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme and to elect the share alternative.
However, China Three Gorges is presumably required to abstain from voting at the court meeting, as it is deemed to be acting in concert with the SPIC under class (1) of the definition of the acting in concert in the Takeovers Code. The announcement does not make this clear.
Assuming China Three Gorges does abstain, a 10% blocking stake at the court meeting is equivalent to 4.48% of shares out or 53mn shares.
This looks like a pretty clean deal. It is priced above the highest close since its listing by way of introduction on the 18 July 2017, while the excitement over the potential injection of all nuclear power assets and businesses from State Nuclear Power Technology Company has been removed after the restructuring was cancelled in July last year.
The stock is currently trading at an attractive gross/annualised spread of 8.3%/28.9% conservatively assuming a late July completion, and inclusive of the final dividend.
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Having gained ~30% in a little more than two months following its full separation from BGC Partners (BGCP US) at the end of November 2018 after a dismal share price performance since coming to the market in a partial IPO at the end of December 2017, the shares of commercial real estate services company, Newmark Group (NMRK US) have experienced another slide over the past several weeks despite its cheap valuation which belies its positive fundanmental drivers and peer group comparisons.
Notwithstanding its robust fundamentals, notice of alterations it plans to make to its Non-GAAP earnings presentations to bring them more into line with many other US-listed companies, has brought the company into the headlights of the ongoing controversy caused by this topic, and in particular with respect to the treatement of stock-based compensation in Non-GAAP earnings. While Newmark follows many other companies by excluding it from Adjusted Earnings, its heavy use of stock-based compensation, which it intends to lessen going forward, makes it an easy target for critique of its earnings presentations. Nevertheless, we assess that Newmark is at least 35% undervalued relative to its peers after incorparting stock compensation expenses in its earnings-based valuation metrics. It is also noteworthy that Newmark is currently paying shareholders a yield of ~4% against barely any dividend being paid out by peers
On February 27th of this year, Altaba Inc (AABA US) held a “Strategic and Financial Update Conference Call.” In that call the company led by CEO Thomas McInerney said that effectively it was going to deal with its two major remaining assets (2.03bn shares of Yahoo Japan Corp (4689 JP) and 383.56mm shares of Alibaba Group Holding Ltd (BABA US)) in two stages, saying at the time they were “moving to an active monetization mode on [our] Yahoo Japan stake.”
That Yahoo Japan stake took longer, but the company worked to sell $20+bn of Alibaba last summer through a tender offer and selldown to generate cash for corporate liabilities and taxes, and then the company sold its Yahoo Japan stake in early September.
Since then, there has been a period of watchful waiting. Some have been expecting a period with an acceptable amount of carry and then possible significant upside. I haven’t seen the upside but agree there has been some baseline carry. And if you can get lots of leverage on this and ride the volatility, it could produce an OK return from A to Z if you ignore the indignities and volatility of passing through stops B to Y.
The New News
Yesterday, Altaba and CEO McInerney held a conference call after filing a PRE 14A preliminary proxy statement related to the selldown/unwinding of its entire Alibaba stake and the proposed windup/dissolution of Altaba as an entity.
The company will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which the Fund currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63 per Share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba Share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00 per Alibaba Share).”
As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear (and as discussed in the transcript linked above, which is short and worth reading), based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions. A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.
The figure of $76.72 – $79.72 represents a 5.44-9.56% premium to yesterday’s close of $72.76/share and represents the total of the Pre-Dissolution Liquidating Distribution in Q4 2019, a second distribution in Q4 2020, then residuals thereafter after the court-mandated holdback in the dissolution process pays its claims.
Fair value calculations, parameters, and risk discussion below.
Elaborate fair value calculations using different assumptions of appropriate discount rates for each payment, and exactly how much is in the last bit (and how long it takes to pay out) suggest a group of ranges of fair value, from about 3-4% below the last-traded price, to about 4-5% above. However, for a hedge fund to earn a 10% net return for investors from owning the trade at the close of yesterday, getting there requires a fair bit of leverage and the resulting information ratio may be lower than desirable.
Assuming the approximate time to payment as described in the proxy statement, and amount of payment in the first distribution as described, and a multi-year residual of US$5/share, current borrow rates and an assumption of slightly higher discount rate required for the portion of time the stock is unlisted and even higher when one is receiving residual claims, the current fair value of the stock ranges from about 2% below current price and 4% higher. If you assume a higher Holdback Amount, the range of outcomes shifts lower.
Preceding my comments on Naspers are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.
These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.
Back in September 2017, Lawrence Ho, Summit Ascent Holdings (102 HK)‘s major shareholder, reduced his stake to 18.75% from 27.06% (at between $1.13-$1.60/share, but mainly at the low end of this range), according to Hong Kong Exchange disclosure of interest filings. The share price of this Russian integrated gaming play declined 34% to $1.06/share in the following five trading days. Who bought those shares was not disclosed – CCASS shows these shares moving out of VC Brokerage into at least 10 different brokerage accounts.
On the 15 December, Ho announced a complete exit from Summit, selling 17.37% of shares out. Concurrently Ho resigned from his NED and chairman positions. Those shares moved from VC Brokerage to Sun Hung Kai Investments on the 20 December 2017. Shares traded unchanged on the news.
At the same time, First Steamship (2601 TT)disclosed it held 12.67% on the 18 December 2017. Concurrently, Kuo Jen Hao was appointed as NED and Chairman of the Board, with effect from 28 December 2017. Kuo is also the chairman and the general manager of First Steamship. First Steamship gradually increased its stake to 19.11% as at 24 October 2018.
The New News
Yesterday, Summit Ascent announced it has been informed that First Steamship and Kuo are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 24%.
With increased liquidity surrounding the news, this looks like a great opportunity to exit.
Originally I had thought KKR’s offer could go higher. Instead, it came in lower at A$3.40 and KKR gave MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) management all of a couple of days to think about it.
Manikay Partners started buying up shares and by early March had reached a position of 11%. They made noise. The Scheme Booklet came out on the 14th of March. Four days later Manikay announced their position was now 13.61% and the following day Mawer announced re-upped its stake from the mid 8s to high 9% level.
The 20th saw a Scheme Update from MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them.
Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.
On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.
Today we have new news.
Manikay Caves and Agrees to KKR’s Reduced (Now Final) Offer
Earlier today a Reuters story about Manikay accepting the offer popped up and MYOB shares popped from A$3.34 to A$3.38-39 area where they closed. Partway through the day MYOB released a document on the ASX feed saying that Manikay had sent a letter saying…
In order avoid speculation regarding our voting intentions in respect of the Scheme, we are writing to inform you that we, Manikay Partners, intend to vote all the MYOB shares that we own or control FOR the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote.
We remain very disappointed that, despite our repeated efforts to convince you otherwise, you failed to change your recommendation in light of the material improvement in market conditions since announcement of the Scheme, among other factors. We are also disappointed that the disclosures to MYOB shareholders did not fully explain the impact of such improved market conditions on the value of MYOB. excerpt of the letter.
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Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP)announced on April 4th after the close that Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) would offer 168.1mm shares of Japan Post Insurance to the public, with another 16.9mm shares offered in an over-allotment. This is big news as it is almost 31% of the shares outstanding of Japan Post Insurance and will dramatically increase its float.
One can say it is a big deal – ¥450bn (~US$4bn) of stock and at announcement it was equivalent to the last 477 days of traded volume. More importantly, this ALMOST like an IPO in that the placement is almost 3x the original IPO size (66mm shares) and will get a lot of foreign investor attention.
In addition, JPI announced it would conduct a buyback for up to 50 million shares (with a spending limit of ¥100 billion) on the ToSTNeT-3 off-hours auction-like trading system on days between April 8th and April 12th.
In its announcement of the decision to sell shares, Japan Post Holdings said that if JPI did indeed conduct the buyback, it might participate, in which case the size of the offering “may decrease.”
The stock rallied very sharply Friday, rising 3% at the open and ending the morning session up 3% but rising much further in the afternoon to end up 9.9%.
After the close Friday, JPI announced it would spend ¥100bn to buy up to 37.411mm shares pre-open on ToSTNeT-3 on Monday morning. That is 6.2% of shares outstanding.
Understanding the dynamics and the rules here AND about the offering may tell you something about how this will work.
Here it is. The end – the culmination of years of effort and high balance sheet usage by hedge funds. Altaba Inc (AABA US) is going out with a whimper plus a little upside.
Reportedly plans for the sale of NHC have been abandoned with a focus on selling its Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)gaming unit.
We now have an agreed deal for Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) supported by the Ernst Göhner Foundation, the major activist shareholders, and Panalpina management.
Altaba will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which Altaba currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63/share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00/Alibaba share).”
As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear, based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions.
A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.
It looks like there is upside as the stock closed at US$72.76 (at the time of the insight). But there is less than you think simply because it will take time to get out of it. And discount rates of the first portion may be low, but discount rates applied to the later payments post-delisting and post court workout for the Holdback Amount could be higher.
Travis Lundy has opinions on what to do once you start getting into the arb risks. Do read his insight.
Sanghyun Park discussed Nexon sale after the FT reported bankers has stopped plans to sell the holding company NXC. The sale of NXC is probably the simplest exit path for Kim Jung-ju as it would be a more attractive tax outcome than selling Nexon Japan outright.
But there’s a lot of other stuff in NXC that suitors don’t want to, which ideally should be sold before selling NXC. There’s also the issue of whether a tender offer would be required whether the sale of NXC or Nexon – Travis concludes an offer would be required while Sanghyun does not.
Korean local news outlet reported thatTencent Holdings (700 HK)‘s US$6bn bond issuance may be a fund raising for a Nexon takeover. Still, South Korea would prefer keep Nexon’s ownership domestic, which may favour Kakao Games (1404796D KS) or PE outfit MBK.
Summit Ascent announced that First Steamship (the major shareholder) and Kuo Jen Hao (chairman) are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 35%.
Summit is trading at a trailing PER of 267x. CapIQ forecasts point to a threefold increase in earnings in FY19, although I would advise caution on those numbers given the tight cluster of target prices; historically, target prices for Summit have been wide of the mark.
First Steamship bought in at $1.06 in December 2017, around the same price when this announcement was made. Should this sale complete, this would result in the third time the shares of the major shareholder have changed hands. This looks like a great opportunity to exit.
On the 20th March, MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them. Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.
On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.
Mid-week, Manikay caved and said intends to vote all its shares for the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote. This is now MUCH closer to being a done deal. It will trade tight.
Travis is a trifle surprised Manikay did not wait a little longer. They were able to increase their stake in the low A$3.30s because of the uncertainty of their intentions, and they could probably have gone close to 20% in the low 3.30s before saying “Yes.” That would have been a welcome extra profit.
Lifeboat market play Ezion has received a bail-out from Malaysia’sYinson Holdings (YNS MK) via a capitalisation of debt and option agreement. Ezion remains suspended.
On the surface, this looks like a bargain for Yinson which is ostensibly taking over Ezion for US$200mn. However, Yinson said that it is still negotiating with the designated lenders of the US$916mn debt on the terms and conditions..
Yinson’s business risks include contact risk, oil price fluctuations and the level of activities in the O&G industry. These risks do not change should the Ezion proposal complete.
The last time came on the heels of a long independent review by EY which found KCF had given up profit to the parent through a series of relatively unfair interested party transaction agreements.
At the end, the Bermudan Court of Appeals went against a Supreme Court decision which had decided that a replacement counterparty decision was prejudiced against minorities, and despite the April 2017 deal being not fair and not reasonable according to the IFA, the parent acquired ~10% (of the 28% it did not own) bringing their stake to 82.3%. A year later the parent acquired another 5.5% bringing them to almost 88%.
Now an offer at SGD 0.60/share (compared to the Revalued NTA of SGD 0.7086/share from the IFA report (p36) of two years ago gets closer to the mark, but crucially, it is designed to squeeze out minorities with the threat of delisting. Kingboard Laminates only needs 2.05% to oblige a delisting from the SGX. As far as Travis can tell, it would require more – at least 95% of shares – to oblige a mandatory squeezeout of minorities according to Section 102-103 of Bermuda Companies Act.
The deal is at a negligible premium and is far, far below Tangible Book Value Per Share (which is almost three times the offer price). Given that the acquirer bought a large stake in the company and offered perpetual capital of almost the current market cap at a significant premium to the MGO price, Travis thinks it an unattractive offer.
It is puzzling as to why the CEO would sell his shares at such a discount, especially when the company and Everbright co-own some of the assets.
While the stated intention of the Offeror is to keep the stock listed, and the MGO is presented almost as “technical”, it would be enormously to Everbright’s benefit to buy as many shares as they could down at this price level. It will go from being underwater on an equity affiliate stake purchase to having a huge writeup in value if Everbright consolidates the asset post MGO.
For that, Travis thinks there is a possibility of a bump just to make it more attractive, though the IFA report could come out with a not fair and reasonable result which shows NTA or NAV far, far higher than the Offer Price, which is not yet declared final.
In a mainly technical piece, I explained why China Three Gorges, China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK)‘s largest shareholder with 27.1% is currently required to abstain from voting at the forthcoming court meeting, despite the misleading statement in the announcement that China Three Gorges has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme. (link to my insight: China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption)
What was once a tough deal is now an agreed deal. The deal is 2.375 shares of DSV for every share of Panalpina, which as of the previous Friday’s close had a value of CHF 195.80/share which is a 43% premium to the CHF 137/share, where Panalpina was trading the day before DSV’s first bid.
Panalpina is getting taken out at 28.1x reported 2018 EV/EBITDA multiple (pre-IFRS 16) calculated at a CHF 195.8 price. Panalpina shareholders will own ~23% of DSV shares out if all shares are exchanged and the Ernst Göhner Foundation will be the largest shareholder at ~11%.
69.9% of shares have irrevocably agreed to support the Exchange Offer. The customary condition is 80% to make it go through, meaning DSV needs another 10.1% out of the 30% extant (or just over one-third).
Travis expects there is another 10-15% held by arbitrageurs and 5-7% held by indexers already so this deal looks to me like it is done. He expects the Exchange Offer may settle as early as early-August. If it trades tight, he would get out because DSV is probably priced to a very good level.
Reuters reported that Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those TPG and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company. This was followed by Lenta announced confirming the cash offer. The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs.
The first 41.9% are sold conditional on FAS Clearance (presumably Mordashov has cleared this transaction with “the right people”) expected in May 2019, a few easily achieved conditions, and the condition of no sanctions being in play for any of the selling or buying parties.
Once cleared – expected in May 2019 – this becomes a straightforward offer with no minimum acceptances meaning that investors can sell shares into the deal or decide not to do so.
It’s not an attractive offer price, with the possibility of a bump if enough people complain. If you want to buy and hold, this deal is a put option.
Since announcing the intended listing of its international internet assets on Euronext Amsterdam “no earlier than H2 2019” – together with a secondary, inward listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange – I calculate Naspers discount to NAV has narrowed to 34.4% from 37.1%, the day before the announcement, placing the current discount a shade below the 12-month average.
The likelihood of NewCo trading at a tighter discount to where Naspers’ previously (& currently trades) is universally accepted. Naspers will benefit from that reduced discount via its 75% stake; but it is not known where Naspers’ own discount will trade after the spin-off.
There are indications the management want to see the group discount narrow to 30%, possibly down to the 20% level, which implies a significantly lower discount for Naspers, potentially around 10%. That would seem optimistic as investors focus more on the directly-held Tencent vehicle, and the fact Naspers is a holding company, holding a stake in another holding company.
Naspers’ discount may drift narrower on the expectation Naspers’ spin-off works its magic. Greater clarity on the option into Naspers or NewCo may provide an additional boost; but conversely, if such an option is limited, there is likely to be disappointment.
With Melco trading at a (then) 32% discount to NAV, Curtis Lehnert recommends a set-up trade on a dollar for dollar basis. The current level, as I write, is statistically the most attractive according to the Smartkarma Holdco Tool, sitting at -1.8 standard deviations from the 180 DMA.
Stub assets are minimal – around 8% of GAV – if excluding gaming licenses, goodwill and trademarks. Net cash is $6.4bn or $4.27/share.
Those stub assets are still loss-making, after deconsolidating out MLCO, to the tune of $386mn in EBITDA, but that was an improvement on (HK$682mn) figure in FY17.
Still, Curtis thinks now is the time to enter the trade to take advantage of both the statistical and fundamental supports to the trade.
For the month of March, ten new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$22.3bn. This overall number includes Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman’s proposal for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) after the Tender Offer was officially launched in March. This deal was first proposed in mid-January – which was rejected by the board – and subsequently an improved offer was tabled, which was then supported.
The average premium to last close for the new deals announced in March was 18%, while the average for the first quarter of 2019 is 33%.
Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB)‘s results of the CVTO have been announced. 42.85% of shares tendered, therefore the offeror held 63.78% of shares at the close of the offer. The MSCI downweight occurred at the close Thursday, however shares popped 17.5%.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
This is a “clean-up” as Kingboard Laminates owns 87.96% of Kingboard Copper Foil already.
It is unconditional in all respects and the Offeror owns 87.96%. The goal is delisting. If they get 17.03% of the minority, they will be able to engineer a delisting. Squeezeout is a bit further out but is far from impossible.
This looks like a done deal. This one should trade at shouldn’t trade at a premium UNLESS…
Quiddity’s new Quiddity Singapore M&A Guide 2019 is now published with guidelines to the relevant rules, regulations, documentation, and pointers to the Singapore M&A landscape. Watch for more in the series to be published shortly.
On 3 April 2019, China Everbright (165 HK)‘s wholly owned subsidiary, State Alpha Limited, purchased 767,052,161 shares representing approximately 30.00% of the Shares in Singapore-listed property developer, Ying Li International Real Estate Ltd (YINGLI SP), from Newest Luck Holdings Limited (the vehicle of Executive Chairman and CEO Mr. Fang Ming) at a share price of SGD 0.140.
Following this transaction, the combined stake of China Everbright and parties acting in concert with it reached 58.91% triggering an obligation to make a mandatory offer for all the shares of Ying Li, a transaction which was announced after the close.
The offer price of SGD 0.140 translates to a premium of 5.9% and 10.9% to Ying Li’s 1-month and 3-month VWAP, respectively but less than a 1% premium to last trade – the company’s shares closed at SGD 0.139 on 3rd April before the announcement. The company asked for a trading halt the next morning and the shares have not traded yet as the large shareholder disclosures have come trickling in on the 4th and the 5th.
The acquirer has stated that it is their present intention to maintain the listing status of the company. However, the acquirer also reserves the right to reevaluate this position if the free float falls below the 10% requirement specified in the listing rules following the completion of the offer.
This is something like a free put for investors and a very low-priced call option for Everbright. The situation raises obvious questions, and despite the “intention” to maintain the listing status, there are reasons why they would not want to. The details are worth a look.
Quiddity’s new Quiddity Singapore M&A Guide 2019is now published with guidelines to the relevant rules, regulations, documentation, and pointers to the Singapore M&A landscape. Watch for more in the series to be published shortly.
This post discusses the key questions on Nexon sale at this point. It then provides the most realistic answers to these questions from various circumstantial aspects. This post is based on the recent news reports and also various local sources.
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At noon Sydney time Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) held an investor briefing by webcast regarding comments made by the Malaysian Prime Minister in his first cabinet press conference on Friday 5 April 2019. Those comments were noted in the ASX regulatory update.
This post looks at the current trading status of DHICO rights offer on each of the major movement days. It still seems that the share price should be kept high to give the Mar 25~26 arb traders an opportunity to short. This explains recent strong prices. It is presumed that shorting hasn’t been fully done. About half is still to be shorted. This suggests that strong prices should be kept a little longer. Once this is done, we will likely see a strong downward pressure until the price hits ₩6,250. This sets the floor price at ₩5,000. This will be good time to do one-way shorting.
This post estimates Nexon Japan tender price. For this, I use the same approach that a local PE named “MBK Partners” would use based on EBITDA multiple and IRR on a 3 year exit. From their position, the only proven value-up path would be KOSPI moving. MBK must try to stay as conservative as possible. Whatever Netmarble value addition should be an extra when deciding on a tender price. So, I base my estimation solely based on KOSPI moving effect. For this, I use NCsoft as a sole valuation comp.
Graincorp Ltd A (GNC AU) said on Thursday it plans to spin off its malting and craft brewing distribution business (MaltCo). The proposed demerger, which will complete at the end of the year, would result in two independent ASX-listed companies – MaltCo and GrainCorp’s Grains and Oils businesses (New GrainCorp).
In the absence of an LTAP binding proposal, the GrainCorp Board to their credit has proposed an alternative way to create shareholder value or at least minimise a share price fall. Unfortunately, the proposed demerger is unlikely to be superior to the LTAP proposal, in our view.
On 5 April, Ap Eagers Ltd (APE AU) announced that it had lobbed an unsolicited all-scrip takeover for Automotive Holdings (AHG AU)/AHG. Under the proposal, AHG’s shareholders would receive 1 AP Eagers share for every 3.8 AHG share. In a 100% acquisition scenario, AP Eagers shareholders would own 75.5% of the merged AP Eagers-AHG.
Presumably, AP Eagers believes its proposal delivers fair value to both AP Eagers and AHG shareholders. While AP Eagers’ bid provides some relief for AHG shareholders, our analysis suggests that AP Eagers’ bid requires a bump to cross the finish line.
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