Select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW Ltd (8 HK)‘s stub ops.
Preceding my comments on PCCW and other stubs are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.
These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.
Yesterday, Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW)‘s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation, made a formal request to the directors of Panalpina to hold an Extraordinary General Meeting to be held prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights enshrined in Article 5 be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted.
The directors complied with this request.
The limit to now has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the Ernst Göhner Foundation which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change. The directors have the right to grant exceptions to this 5% rule, as discussed in The Panalpina Conundrum a bit over a week ago, but have not, leaving the combined 24+% total held by Cevian and Artisan Partners with only ~11.6% of the vote.
This move by the EGF is both “sneaky” AND interesting (and bullish) news. Given the current shareholder vote structure, it wouldn’t be impossible for the EGF to vote it down in the EGM, but I think EGF very specifically do not want to vote it down because the alternative is worse. But getting this passed would suddenly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance.
Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. There were no specific minimum acceptance conditions attached to the tender offer mentioned in the announcement.
Should FPP secure 90% of GOLD in the tender offer, it may proceed with its delisting. A voluntary delisting is still achievable with ~80% in the bag, but that is conditional on <10% of shareholders not voting against.
Preconditions to the commencement of the tender offer include the approval from disinterested shareholders in FPP, approval from “relevant contractual parties of GOLD and GOLD’s subsidiaries” and the approval from the Office of Trade Competition Commission.
The fact the Sirivadhanabhakdi family already holds, directly/indirectly ~80% in GOLD, such regulatory approvals should be forthcoming.
This appears a done deal. The only apparent risk is the expected shareholder vote of Univentures wherein Panote will likely need to abstain.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 1.8%/4.3% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
DSME has this ₩2.3tril worth of CBs that carry a 30 year maturity. Korea Eximbank is the holder. HHI wants no change. Eximbank wants out as soon as possible. Current price of ₩32,600 is nearly a 20% discount to the conversion price of ₩40,350. It’d be still better for Eximbank to do conversion/sale even at this price. This is 27.54%. It will create huge overhang.
HHI should be given much higher priority than DSME even when they are under the same roof. DSME acquisition is supposed to help HHI first, not the other way around. HHI shouldn’t be much incentivized to help turn around DSME in the short-term. Not only that, pressing down DSME price would probably be the only way for HHI to prevent Eximbank’s stake dumping.
In a longer time horizon, things would depend on the outlook of the entire shipbuilding sector. To minimize risks, I’d go for long/short with HHI. What should be at least clear at this point is that HHI should be outperforming DSME in whatever fundamentals situations we are dealing with.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May. The IFA (China Tonghai Capital) considers the $38.80/share Offer to be fair & reasonable. The Scheme is conditional on ≥75% for, ≤10% against from disinterested shareholders. As Hopewell is HK-incorporated, there is no “head count ” test. The full timetable is as follows:
Date
Data in the Date
6-Dec-18
Announcement
24-Feb-19
Scheme document
13-Mar-19
Last time for lodging shares to qualify to vote
15-Mar-19
Meeting record date
19-Mar-19
Court/EGM meeting
2-May-19
Effective date
14-May-19
Cheques dispatched
Source: Hopewell
Substantial Shareholders
Mn
%
The Wu family & concert parties
320.7
36.93
Non-consortium Offeror concert parties
31.7
3.65
Total
352.5
40.48
Disinterested Shareholders
516.1
59.42
After hearing conflicting opinions on what constitutes a blocking stake, a chat with the banker confirmed the blocking stake, as per the Companies Ordinance, is tied to 63.07% of shares out (i.e. Scheme shareholders – see page 95); whereas the Takeovers Code is tied to 59.42% of shares out. Effectively there are two assessments on the blocking stake and the more stringent (the 59.42% out in this case) prevails.
With the Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years (the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down), the IFA creatively argues that extenuating factors such as the premium to historical price needs to also be taken into account. Hardly original, but that is where investors must decide whether this is as good as it’s going to get – given the Wu family’s control, there will not be a competing offer – or to hold out for a superior price longer term. This is a final offer and it will not be increased.
What the IFA fails to discuss is that the widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. And that is the disingenuous conclusion from the IFA that the premium to last close and with reference to historical pricing, is in effect the overriding reason to conclude the Offer is reasonable. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ).
Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7%/37.5%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down. Tough one – the premium to last close and with reference to the 10-year price performance, should be sufficient to get it over the line, and the basis for this “bullish” insight. But only for the brave.
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Yesterday, Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW)‘s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation, made a formal request to the directors of Panalpina to hold an Extraordinary General Meeting to be held prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights enshrined in Article 5 be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted.
The directors complied with this request.
The limit to now has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the Ernst Göhner Foundation which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change. The directors have the right to grant exceptions to this 5% rule, as discussed in The Panalpina Conundrum a bit over a week ago, but have not, leaving the combined 24+% total held by Cevian and Artisan Partners with only ~11.6% of the vote.
This move by the EGF is both “sneaky” AND interesting (and bullish) news. Given the current shareholder vote structure, it wouldn’t be impossible for the EGF to vote it down in the EGM, but I think EGF very specifically do not want to vote it down because the alternative is worse. But getting this passed would suddenly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance.
Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. There were no specific minimum acceptance conditions attached to the tender offer mentioned in the announcement.
Should FPP secure 90% of GOLD in the tender offer, it may proceed with its delisting. A voluntary delisting is still achievable with ~80% in the bag, but that is conditional on <10% of shareholders not voting against.
Preconditions to the commencement of the tender offer include the approval from disinterested shareholders in FPP, approval from “relevant contractual parties of GOLD and GOLD’s subsidiaries” and the approval from the Office of Trade Competition Commission.
The fact the Sirivadhanabhakdi family already holds, directly/indirectly ~80% in GOLD, such regulatory approvals should be forthcoming.
This appears a done deal. The only apparent risk is the expected shareholder vote of Univentures wherein Panote will likely need to abstain.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 1.8%/4.3% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
DSME has this ₩2.3tril worth of CBs that carry a 30 year maturity. Korea Eximbank is the holder. HHI wants no change. Eximbank wants out as soon as possible. Current price of ₩32,600 is nearly a 20% discount to the conversion price of ₩40,350. It’d be still better for Eximbank to do conversion/sale even at this price. This is 27.54%. It will create huge overhang.
HHI should be given much higher priority than DSME even when they are under the same roof. DSME acquisition is supposed to help HHI first, not the other way around. HHI shouldn’t be much incentivized to help turn around DSME in the short-term. Not only that, pressing down DSME price would probably be the only way for HHI to prevent Eximbank’s stake dumping.
In a longer time horizon, things would depend on the outlook of the entire shipbuilding sector. To minimize risks, I’d go for long/short with HHI. What should be at least clear at this point is that HHI should be outperforming DSME in whatever fundamentals situations we are dealing with.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May. The IFA (China Tonghai Capital) considers the $38.80/share Offer to be fair & reasonable. The Scheme is conditional on ≥75% for, ≤10% against from disinterested shareholders. As Hopewell is HK-incorporated, there is no “head count ” test. The full timetable is as follows:
Date
Data in the Date
6-Dec-18
Announcement
24-Feb-19
Scheme document
13-Mar-19
Last time for lodging shares to qualify to vote
15-Mar-19
Meeting record date
19-Mar-19
Court/EGM meeting
2-May-19
Effective date
14-May-19
Cheques dispatched
Source: Hopewell
Substantial Shareholders
Mn
%
The Wu family & concert parties
320.7
36.93
Non-consortium Offeror concert parties
31.7
3.65
Total
352.5
40.48
Disinterested Shareholders
516.1
59.42
After hearing conflicting opinions on what constitutes a blocking stake, a chat with the banker confirmed the blocking stake, as per the Companies Ordinance, is tied to 63.07% of shares out (i.e. Scheme shareholders – see page 95); whereas the Takeovers Code is tied to 59.42% of shares out. Effectively there are two assessments on the blocking stake and the more stringent (the 59.42% out in this case) prevails.
With the Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years (the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down), the IFA creatively argues that extenuating factors such as the premium to historical price needs to also be taken into account. Hardly original, but that is where investors must decide whether this is as good as it’s going to get – given the Wu family’s control, there will not be a competing offer – or to hold out for a superior price longer term. This is a final offer and it will not be increased.
What the IFA fails to discuss is that the widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. And that is the disingenuous conclusion from the IFA that the premium to last close and with reference to historical pricing, is in effect the overriding reason to conclude the Offer is reasonable. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ).
Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7%/37.5%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down. Tough one – the premium to last close and with reference to the 10-year price performance, should be sufficient to get it over the line, and the basis for this “bullish” insight. But only for the brave.
On Friday 22 February after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP) announced a buyback (E, J), a share cancellation (E, J), and a public equity offering of secondary shares (J-only). This kind of event is not abnormal in a year when profits are weaker and share prices are down. Cross-holders often sell shares into the end of the year in order to realise profits and let unrealised gains from the balance sheet filter into the income statement.
This time it is five sellers from four banks which all hail from the area: Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP), Nomura Trust (which holds shares in a trust account for the MUFJ Bank pension fund as a beneficiary), Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s MUFJ Bank, Resona Holdings (8308 JP), and Shiga Bank (8366 JP). The MUFJ Bank holdings likely originate from Sanwa Bank which was Osaka-based before merging with BOT-Mitsubishi almost 15 years ago, and Resona is also from Osaka – next door to Kyoto where Nintendo was founded – and Shiga Bank is the prefecture next door.
This would look like a normal sell-down… except for one thing.
There was a note in the announcement to the effect that “in the context of how companies deal with their policy cross-holdings becoming the subject of greater focus, we confirmed that several shareholders desired to sell shares, and as a company subject to such cross-holdings, we are conducting the above-mentioned Offering.”
In the TSE crossholding of SGX situation, the sale was not the most important part. The explanation of how the Board came to its decision and what they decided to do about it was important.
On the other hand, Japan’s Corporate Governance Code (the Code), which was introduced in 2015, requires listed companies to examine and explain the economic rationale and future outlook of holding shares of other listed companies for reasons other than pure investment purposes. Following a review of the requirements under the Code, JPX reached the conclusion that the existing cooperative relationship with SGX would continue even without holding the shares of SGX. [my bold]
The Japan Exchange Group had now provided the example for why even companies with cooperative business relationships should not own cross-holdings. And it is, if active stewards of capital choose to make it so, more subtle. Shareholders have even an even better pressure point. IF a company’s cooperative relationship with another company would not survive the unwinding of cross-holdings to improve capital efficiency for both sides, is that company truly independent? Is that company beholden to the company whose shares it holds? Is the cross-holding board doing its job?
And the Japan Exchange Group had said it would unwind its holdings of SGX over three years, so as not to overly impact the market for SGX shares. This provided an example of HOW to unwind, in addition to the WHY to unwind announced above.
The BIG QUESTION (And Nothing Else Matters)
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains.
An analysis of the Bank of Kyoto-specific situation is discussed below.
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Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. There were no specific minimum acceptance conditions attached to the tender offer mentioned in the announcement.
Should FPP secure 90% of GOLD in the tender offer, it may proceed with its delisting. A voluntary delisting is still achievable with ~80% in the bag, but that is conditional on <10% of shareholders not voting against.
Preconditions to the commencement of the tender offer include the approval from disinterested shareholders in FPP, approval from “relevant contractual parties of GOLD and GOLD’s subsidiaries” and the approval from the Office of Trade Competition Commission.
The fact the Sirivadhanabhakdi family already holds, directly/indirectly ~80% in GOLD, such regulatory approvals should be forthcoming.
This appears a done deal. The only apparent risk is the expected shareholder vote of Univentures wherein Panote will likely need to abstain.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 1.8%/4.3% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
DSME has this ₩2.3tril worth of CBs that carry a 30 year maturity. Korea Eximbank is the holder. HHI wants no change. Eximbank wants out as soon as possible. Current price of ₩32,600 is nearly a 20% discount to the conversion price of ₩40,350. It’d be still better for Eximbank to do conversion/sale even at this price. This is 27.54%. It will create huge overhang.
HHI should be given much higher priority than DSME even when they are under the same roof. DSME acquisition is supposed to help HHI first, not the other way around. HHI shouldn’t be much incentivized to help turn around DSME in the short-term. Not only that, pressing down DSME price would probably be the only way for HHI to prevent Eximbank’s stake dumping.
In a longer time horizon, things would depend on the outlook of the entire shipbuilding sector. To minimize risks, I’d go for long/short with HHI. What should be at least clear at this point is that HHI should be outperforming DSME in whatever fundamentals situations we are dealing with.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May. The IFA (China Tonghai Capital) considers the $38.80/share Offer to be fair & reasonable. The Scheme is conditional on ≥75% for, ≤10% against from disinterested shareholders. As Hopewell is HK-incorporated, there is no “head count ” test. The full timetable is as follows:
Date
Data in the Date
6-Dec-18
Announcement
24-Feb-19
Scheme document
13-Mar-19
Last time for lodging shares to qualify to vote
15-Mar-19
Meeting record date
19-Mar-19
Court/EGM meeting
2-May-19
Effective date
14-May-19
Cheques dispatched
Source: Hopewell
Substantial Shareholders
Mn
%
The Wu family & concert parties
320.7
36.93
Non-consortium Offeror concert parties
31.7
3.65
Total
352.5
40.48
Disinterested Shareholders
516.1
59.42
After hearing conflicting opinions on what constitutes a blocking stake, a chat with the banker confirmed the blocking stake, as per the Companies Ordinance, is tied to 63.07% of shares out (i.e. Scheme shareholders – see page 95); whereas the Takeovers Code is tied to 59.42% of shares out. Effectively there are two assessments on the blocking stake and the more stringent (the 59.42% out in this case) prevails.
With the Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years (the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down), the IFA creatively argues that extenuating factors such as the premium to historical price needs to also be taken into account. Hardly original, but that is where investors must decide whether this is as good as it’s going to get – given the Wu family’s control, there will not be a competing offer – or to hold out for a superior price longer term. This is a final offer and it will not be increased.
What the IFA fails to discuss is that the widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. And that is the disingenuous conclusion from the IFA that the premium to last close and with reference to historical pricing, is in effect the overriding reason to conclude the Offer is reasonable. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ).
Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7%/37.5%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down. Tough one – the premium to last close and with reference to the 10-year price performance, should be sufficient to get it over the line, and the basis for this “bullish” insight. But only for the brave.
On Friday 22 February after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP) announced a buyback (E, J), a share cancellation (E, J), and a public equity offering of secondary shares (J-only). This kind of event is not abnormal in a year when profits are weaker and share prices are down. Cross-holders often sell shares into the end of the year in order to realise profits and let unrealised gains from the balance sheet filter into the income statement.
This time it is five sellers from four banks which all hail from the area: Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP), Nomura Trust (which holds shares in a trust account for the MUFJ Bank pension fund as a beneficiary), Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s MUFJ Bank, Resona Holdings (8308 JP), and Shiga Bank (8366 JP). The MUFJ Bank holdings likely originate from Sanwa Bank which was Osaka-based before merging with BOT-Mitsubishi almost 15 years ago, and Resona is also from Osaka – next door to Kyoto where Nintendo was founded – and Shiga Bank is the prefecture next door.
This would look like a normal sell-down… except for one thing.
There was a note in the announcement to the effect that “in the context of how companies deal with their policy cross-holdings becoming the subject of greater focus, we confirmed that several shareholders desired to sell shares, and as a company subject to such cross-holdings, we are conducting the above-mentioned Offering.”
In the TSE crossholding of SGX situation, the sale was not the most important part. The explanation of how the Board came to its decision and what they decided to do about it was important.
On the other hand, Japan’s Corporate Governance Code (the Code), which was introduced in 2015, requires listed companies to examine and explain the economic rationale and future outlook of holding shares of other listed companies for reasons other than pure investment purposes. Following a review of the requirements under the Code, JPX reached the conclusion that the existing cooperative relationship with SGX would continue even without holding the shares of SGX. [my bold]
The Japan Exchange Group had now provided the example for why even companies with cooperative business relationships should not own cross-holdings. And it is, if active stewards of capital choose to make it so, more subtle. Shareholders have even an even better pressure point. IF a company’s cooperative relationship with another company would not survive the unwinding of cross-holdings to improve capital efficiency for both sides, is that company truly independent? Is that company beholden to the company whose shares it holds? Is the cross-holding board doing its job?
And the Japan Exchange Group had said it would unwind its holdings of SGX over three years, so as not to overly impact the market for SGX shares. This provided an example of HOW to unwind, in addition to the WHY to unwind announced above.
The BIG QUESTION (And Nothing Else Matters)
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains.
In this version of the GER weekly research wrap, we assess the controversy surrounding potentially inflated revenue concerns for Best World International (BEST SP) . Secondly, we dig into the latest M&A situation for Graincorp Ltd A (GNC AU) amidst a testy AGM and a slow resolution to a binding bid which may limit a bump. In addition, we update on the KKR bid for MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) which Arun contends is unlikely to receive a counter bid due to KKR’s blocking stake. Finally, we initiate on the IPO of hotelier Zhejiang New Century Hotel Management Group (ZHEKAIH HK). A calendar of upcoming catalysts is also attached.
More details can be found below.
Best of luck for the new week – Rickin, Venkat and Arun
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DSME has this ₩2.3tril worth of CBs that carry a 30 year maturity. Korea Eximbank is the holder. HHI wants no change. Eximbank wants out as soon as possible. Current price of ₩32,600 is nearly a 20% discount to the conversion price of ₩40,350. It’d be still better for Eximbank to do conversion/sale even at this price. This is 27.54%. It will create huge overhang.
HHI should be given much higher priority than DSME even when they are under the same roof. DSME acquisition is supposed to help HHI first, not the other way around. HHI shouldn’t be much incentivized to help turn around DSME in the short-term. Not only that, pressing down DSME price would probably be the only way for HHI to prevent Eximbank’s stake dumping.
In a longer time horizon, things would depend on the outlook of the entire shipbuilding sector. To minimize risks, I’d go for long/short with HHI. What should be at least clear at this point is that HHI should be outperforming DSME in whatever fundamentals situations we are dealing with.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May. The IFA (China Tonghai Capital) considers the $38.80/share Offer to be fair & reasonable. The Scheme is conditional on ≥75% for, ≤10% against from disinterested shareholders. As Hopewell is HK-incorporated, there is no “head count ” test. The full timetable is as follows:
Date
Data in the Date
6-Dec-18
Announcement
24-Feb-19
Scheme document
13-Mar-19
Last time for lodging shares to qualify to vote
15-Mar-19
Meeting record date
19-Mar-19
Court/EGM meeting
2-May-19
Effective date
14-May-19
Cheques dispatched
Source: Hopewell
Substantial Shareholders
Mn
%
The Wu family & concert parties
320.7
36.93
Non-consortium Offeror concert parties
31.7
3.65
Total
352.5
40.48
Disinterested Shareholders
516.1
59.42
After hearing conflicting opinions on what constitutes a blocking stake, a chat with the banker confirmed the blocking stake, as per the Companies Ordinance, is tied to 63.07% of shares out (i.e. Scheme shareholders – see page 95); whereas the Takeovers Code is tied to 59.42% of shares out. Effectively there are two assessments on the blocking stake and the more stringent (the 59.42% out in this case) prevails.
With the Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years (the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down), the IFA creatively argues that extenuating factors such as the premium to historical price needs to also be taken into account. Hardly original, but that is where investors must decide whether this is as good as it’s going to get – given the Wu family’s control, there will not be a competing offer – or to hold out for a superior price longer term. This is a final offer and it will not be increased.
What the IFA fails to discuss is that the widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. And that is the disingenuous conclusion from the IFA that the premium to last close and with reference to historical pricing, is in effect the overriding reason to conclude the Offer is reasonable. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ).
Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7%/37.5%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down. Tough one – the premium to last close and with reference to the 10-year price performance, should be sufficient to get it over the line, and the basis for this “bullish” insight. But only for the brave.
On Friday 22 February after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP) announced a buyback (E, J), a share cancellation (E, J), and a public equity offering of secondary shares (J-only). This kind of event is not abnormal in a year when profits are weaker and share prices are down. Cross-holders often sell shares into the end of the year in order to realise profits and let unrealised gains from the balance sheet filter into the income statement.
This time it is five sellers from four banks which all hail from the area: Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP), Nomura Trust (which holds shares in a trust account for the MUFJ Bank pension fund as a beneficiary), Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s MUFJ Bank, Resona Holdings (8308 JP), and Shiga Bank (8366 JP). The MUFJ Bank holdings likely originate from Sanwa Bank which was Osaka-based before merging with BOT-Mitsubishi almost 15 years ago, and Resona is also from Osaka – next door to Kyoto where Nintendo was founded – and Shiga Bank is the prefecture next door.
This would look like a normal sell-down… except for one thing.
There was a note in the announcement to the effect that “in the context of how companies deal with their policy cross-holdings becoming the subject of greater focus, we confirmed that several shareholders desired to sell shares, and as a company subject to such cross-holdings, we are conducting the above-mentioned Offering.”
In the TSE crossholding of SGX situation, the sale was not the most important part. The explanation of how the Board came to its decision and what they decided to do about it was important.
On the other hand, Japan’s Corporate Governance Code (the Code), which was introduced in 2015, requires listed companies to examine and explain the economic rationale and future outlook of holding shares of other listed companies for reasons other than pure investment purposes. Following a review of the requirements under the Code, JPX reached the conclusion that the existing cooperative relationship with SGX would continue even without holding the shares of SGX. [my bold]
The Japan Exchange Group had now provided the example for why even companies with cooperative business relationships should not own cross-holdings. And it is, if active stewards of capital choose to make it so, more subtle. Shareholders have even an even better pressure point. IF a company’s cooperative relationship with another company would not survive the unwinding of cross-holdings to improve capital efficiency for both sides, is that company truly independent? Is that company beholden to the company whose shares it holds? Is the cross-holding board doing its job?
And the Japan Exchange Group had said it would unwind its holdings of SGX over three years, so as not to overly impact the market for SGX shares. This provided an example of HOW to unwind, in addition to the WHY to unwind announced above.
The BIG QUESTION (And Nothing Else Matters)
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains.
In this version of the GER weekly research wrap, we assess the controversy surrounding potentially inflated revenue concerns for Best World International (BEST SP) . Secondly, we dig into the latest M&A situation for Graincorp Ltd A (GNC AU) amidst a testy AGM and a slow resolution to a binding bid which may limit a bump. In addition, we update on the KKR bid for MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) which Arun contends is unlikely to receive a counter bid due to KKR’s blocking stake. Finally, we initiate on the IPO of hotelier Zhejiang New Century Hotel Management Group (ZHEKAIH HK). A calendar of upcoming catalysts is also attached.
More details can be found below.
Best of luck for the new week – Rickin, Venkat and Arun
Aveo Group (AOG AU), an Australian retirement village operator, is amid a strategic review to sell itself. At its 1H19 results on 13 February, Aveo said it had received several non-binding bids from parties interested in acquiring the entire company.
Scepticism on a successful sale remains high as Aveo’s discount to NTA has increased from 44% on 14 August 2018 (the day before the announcement of strategic review) to the current 46%. However, we believe that the widening NTA discount is an opportunity to capitalise on an emerging bidding battle.
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The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May. The IFA (China Tonghai Capital) considers the $38.80/share Offer to be fair & reasonable. The Scheme is conditional on ≥75% for, ≤10% against from disinterested shareholders. As Hopewell is HK-incorporated, there is no “head count ” test. The full timetable is as follows:
Date
Data in the Date
6-Dec-18
Announcement
24-Feb-19
Scheme document
13-Mar-19
Last time for lodging shares to qualify to vote
15-Mar-19
Meeting record date
19-Mar-19
Court/EGM meeting
2-May-19
Effective date
14-May-19
Cheques dispatched
Source: Hopewell
Substantial Shareholders
Mn
%
The Wu family & concert parties
320.7
36.93
Non-consortium Offeror concert parties
31.7
3.65
Total
352.5
40.48
Disinterested Shareholders
516.1
59.42
After hearing conflicting opinions on what constitutes a blocking stake, a chat with the banker confirmed the blocking stake, as per the Companies Ordinance, is tied to 63.07% of shares out (i.e. Scheme shareholders – see page 95); whereas the Takeovers Code is tied to 59.42% of shares out. Effectively there are two assessments on the blocking stake and the more stringent (the 59.42% out in this case) prevails.
With the Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years (the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down), the IFA creatively argues that extenuating factors such as the premium to historical price needs to also be taken into account. Hardly original, but that is where investors must decide whether this is as good as it’s going to get – given the Wu family’s control, there will not be a competing offer – or to hold out for a superior price longer term. This is a final offer and it will not be increased.
What the IFA fails to discuss is that the widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. And that is the disingenuous conclusion from the IFA that the premium to last close and with reference to historical pricing, is in effect the overriding reason to conclude the Offer is reasonable. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ).
Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7%/37.5%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down. Tough one – the premium to last close and with reference to the 10-year price performance, should be sufficient to get it over the line, and the basis for this “bullish” insight. But only for the brave.
On Friday 22 February after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP) announced a buyback (E, J), a share cancellation (E, J), and a public equity offering of secondary shares (J-only). This kind of event is not abnormal in a year when profits are weaker and share prices are down. Cross-holders often sell shares into the end of the year in order to realise profits and let unrealised gains from the balance sheet filter into the income statement.
This time it is five sellers from four banks which all hail from the area: Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP), Nomura Trust (which holds shares in a trust account for the MUFJ Bank pension fund as a beneficiary), Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s MUFJ Bank, Resona Holdings (8308 JP), and Shiga Bank (8366 JP). The MUFJ Bank holdings likely originate from Sanwa Bank which was Osaka-based before merging with BOT-Mitsubishi almost 15 years ago, and Resona is also from Osaka – next door to Kyoto where Nintendo was founded – and Shiga Bank is the prefecture next door.
This would look like a normal sell-down… except for one thing.
There was a note in the announcement to the effect that “in the context of how companies deal with their policy cross-holdings becoming the subject of greater focus, we confirmed that several shareholders desired to sell shares, and as a company subject to such cross-holdings, we are conducting the above-mentioned Offering.”
In the TSE crossholding of SGX situation, the sale was not the most important part. The explanation of how the Board came to its decision and what they decided to do about it was important.
On the other hand, Japan’s Corporate Governance Code (the Code), which was introduced in 2015, requires listed companies to examine and explain the economic rationale and future outlook of holding shares of other listed companies for reasons other than pure investment purposes. Following a review of the requirements under the Code, JPX reached the conclusion that the existing cooperative relationship with SGX would continue even without holding the shares of SGX. [my bold]
The Japan Exchange Group had now provided the example for why even companies with cooperative business relationships should not own cross-holdings. And it is, if active stewards of capital choose to make it so, more subtle. Shareholders have even an even better pressure point. IF a company’s cooperative relationship with another company would not survive the unwinding of cross-holdings to improve capital efficiency for both sides, is that company truly independent? Is that company beholden to the company whose shares it holds? Is the cross-holding board doing its job?
And the Japan Exchange Group had said it would unwind its holdings of SGX over three years, so as not to overly impact the market for SGX shares. This provided an example of HOW to unwind, in addition to the WHY to unwind announced above.
The BIG QUESTION (And Nothing Else Matters)
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains.
In this version of the GER weekly research wrap, we assess the controversy surrounding potentially inflated revenue concerns for Best World International (BEST SP) . Secondly, we dig into the latest M&A situation for Graincorp Ltd A (GNC AU) amidst a testy AGM and a slow resolution to a binding bid which may limit a bump. In addition, we update on the KKR bid for MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) which Arun contends is unlikely to receive a counter bid due to KKR’s blocking stake. Finally, we initiate on the IPO of hotelier Zhejiang New Century Hotel Management Group (ZHEKAIH HK). A calendar of upcoming catalysts is also attached.
More details can be found below.
Best of luck for the new week – Rickin, Venkat and Arun
Aveo Group (AOG AU), an Australian retirement village operator, is amid a strategic review to sell itself. At its 1H19 results on 13 February, Aveo said it had received several non-binding bids from parties interested in acquiring the entire company.
Scepticism on a successful sale remains high as Aveo’s discount to NTA has increased from 44% on 14 August 2018 (the day before the announcement of strategic review) to the current 46%. However, we believe that the widening NTA discount is an opportunity to capitalise on an emerging bidding battle.
On Friday 22 February 2019 after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)announced (J) a Secondary Shares Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding.
Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe.
On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33 billion worth (whichever is reached first) to last from the business day immediately following the delivery date of the Offering shares (practically speaking, a day on or between 13 March and 18 March 2019) to 12 April 2019. Based on an average daily volume traded of 2.2mm shares, 10% participation would mean the buyback would take 5 days to complete. 5% would take 9 days. The company also announced (E) it would cancel 10 million shares on 29 March 2019. That may only be 45% of the post-buyback treasury share position, but it leads to another event investors should watch.
This is the first buyback Nintendo has announced in five years. The Nikkei article discussing the situation suggests that the possibility of supply/demand being weak is the reason for the buyback. The stated reason for the Offering as proposed by Nintendo in its Offering announcement, suggested a goal of increasing and diversifying the shareholder base.
The fact that JPX was selling the shares was not important. The reasoning was. And JPX provided an example of how it should be done (as explained in the insight).
My words then still stand.
And JPX provided an example of how it should be done (as explained in the insight). The ramifications are significant.
The ramifications of this Offering are significant too. This is a lot more than just an offering by entities looking to take profits.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
On Friday 22 February after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP) announced a buyback (E, J), a share cancellation (E, J), and a public equity offering of secondary shares (J-only). This kind of event is not abnormal in a year when profits are weaker and share prices are down. Cross-holders often sell shares into the end of the year in order to realise profits and let unrealised gains from the balance sheet filter into the income statement.
This time it is five sellers from four banks which all hail from the area: Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP), Nomura Trust (which holds shares in a trust account for the MUFJ Bank pension fund as a beneficiary), Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s MUFJ Bank, Resona Holdings (8308 JP), and Shiga Bank (8366 JP). The MUFJ Bank holdings likely originate from Sanwa Bank which was Osaka-based before merging with BOT-Mitsubishi almost 15 years ago, and Resona is also from Osaka – next door to Kyoto where Nintendo was founded – and Shiga Bank is the prefecture next door.
This would look like a normal sell-down… except for one thing.
There was a note in the announcement to the effect that “in the context of how companies deal with their policy cross-holdings becoming the subject of greater focus, we confirmed that several shareholders desired to sell shares, and as a company subject to such cross-holdings, we are conducting the above-mentioned Offering.”
In the TSE crossholding of SGX situation, the sale was not the most important part. The explanation of how the Board came to its decision and what they decided to do about it was important.
On the other hand, Japan’s Corporate Governance Code (the Code), which was introduced in 2015, requires listed companies to examine and explain the economic rationale and future outlook of holding shares of other listed companies for reasons other than pure investment purposes. Following a review of the requirements under the Code, JPX reached the conclusion that the existing cooperative relationship with SGX would continue even without holding the shares of SGX. [my bold]
The Japan Exchange Group had now provided the example for why even companies with cooperative business relationships should not own cross-holdings. And it is, if active stewards of capital choose to make it so, more subtle. Shareholders have even an even better pressure point. IF a company’s cooperative relationship with another company would not survive the unwinding of cross-holdings to improve capital efficiency for both sides, is that company truly independent? Is that company beholden to the company whose shares it holds? Is the cross-holding board doing its job?
And the Japan Exchange Group had said it would unwind its holdings of SGX over three years, so as not to overly impact the market for SGX shares. This provided an example of HOW to unwind, in addition to the WHY to unwind announced above.
The BIG QUESTION (And Nothing Else Matters)
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains.
In this version of the GER weekly research wrap, we assess the controversy surrounding potentially inflated revenue concerns for Best World International (BEST SP) . Secondly, we dig into the latest M&A situation for Graincorp Ltd A (GNC AU) amidst a testy AGM and a slow resolution to a binding bid which may limit a bump. In addition, we update on the KKR bid for MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) which Arun contends is unlikely to receive a counter bid due to KKR’s blocking stake. Finally, we initiate on the IPO of hotelier Zhejiang New Century Hotel Management Group (ZHEKAIH HK). A calendar of upcoming catalysts is also attached.
More details can be found below.
Best of luck for the new week – Rickin, Venkat and Arun
Aveo Group (AOG AU), an Australian retirement village operator, is amid a strategic review to sell itself. At its 1H19 results on 13 February, Aveo said it had received several non-binding bids from parties interested in acquiring the entire company.
Scepticism on a successful sale remains high as Aveo’s discount to NTA has increased from 44% on 14 August 2018 (the day before the announcement of strategic review) to the current 46%. However, we believe that the widening NTA discount is an opportunity to capitalise on an emerging bidding battle.
On Friday 22 February 2019 after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)announced (J) a Secondary Shares Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding.
Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe.
On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33 billion worth (whichever is reached first) to last from the business day immediately following the delivery date of the Offering shares (practically speaking, a day on or between 13 March and 18 March 2019) to 12 April 2019. Based on an average daily volume traded of 2.2mm shares, 10% participation would mean the buyback would take 5 days to complete. 5% would take 9 days. The company also announced (E) it would cancel 10 million shares on 29 March 2019. That may only be 45% of the post-buyback treasury share position, but it leads to another event investors should watch.
This is the first buyback Nintendo has announced in five years. The Nikkei article discussing the situation suggests that the possibility of supply/demand being weak is the reason for the buyback. The stated reason for the Offering as proposed by Nintendo in its Offering announcement, suggested a goal of increasing and diversifying the shareholder base.
The fact that JPX was selling the shares was not important. The reasoning was. And JPX provided an example of how it should be done (as explained in the insight).
My words then still stand.
And JPX provided an example of how it should be done (as explained in the insight). The ramifications are significant.
The ramifications of this Offering are significant too. This is a lot more than just an offering by entities looking to take profits.
On Friday 22 February after the close, NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP)announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February.
The buyback has already occurred. This is largely technical. But it has an interesting side effect.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
In this version of the GER weekly research wrap, we assess the controversy surrounding potentially inflated revenue concerns for Best World International (BEST SP) . Secondly, we dig into the latest M&A situation for Graincorp Ltd A (GNC AU) amidst a testy AGM and a slow resolution to a binding bid which may limit a bump. In addition, we update on the KKR bid for MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) which Arun contends is unlikely to receive a counter bid due to KKR’s blocking stake. Finally, we initiate on the IPO of hotelier Zhejiang New Century Hotel Management Group (ZHEKAIH HK). A calendar of upcoming catalysts is also attached.
More details can be found below.
Best of luck for the new week – Rickin, Venkat and Arun
Aveo Group (AOG AU), an Australian retirement village operator, is amid a strategic review to sell itself. At its 1H19 results on 13 February, Aveo said it had received several non-binding bids from parties interested in acquiring the entire company.
Scepticism on a successful sale remains high as Aveo’s discount to NTA has increased from 44% on 14 August 2018 (the day before the announcement of strategic review) to the current 46%. However, we believe that the widening NTA discount is an opportunity to capitalise on an emerging bidding battle.
On Friday 22 February 2019 after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)announced (J) a Secondary Shares Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding.
Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe.
On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33 billion worth (whichever is reached first) to last from the business day immediately following the delivery date of the Offering shares (practically speaking, a day on or between 13 March and 18 March 2019) to 12 April 2019. Based on an average daily volume traded of 2.2mm shares, 10% participation would mean the buyback would take 5 days to complete. 5% would take 9 days. The company also announced (E) it would cancel 10 million shares on 29 March 2019. That may only be 45% of the post-buyback treasury share position, but it leads to another event investors should watch.
This is the first buyback Nintendo has announced in five years. The Nikkei article discussing the situation suggests that the possibility of supply/demand being weak is the reason for the buyback. The stated reason for the Offering as proposed by Nintendo in its Offering announcement, suggested a goal of increasing and diversifying the shareholder base.
The fact that JPX was selling the shares was not important. The reasoning was. And JPX provided an example of how it should be done (as explained in the insight).
My words then still stand.
And JPX provided an example of how it should be done (as explained in the insight). The ramifications are significant.
The ramifications of this Offering are significant too. This is a lot more than just an offering by entities looking to take profits.
On Friday 22 February after the close, NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP)announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February.
The buyback has already occurred. This is largely technical. But it has an interesting side effect.
An activist has come forward, and the external statutory auditor and lead shareholder (wife of founder) are against the offer, but Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) situation still fits pretty cleanly in the “Too Hard” bucket for now.
Since announcing its foray into the deeper waters of being the fourth Type I Mobile Network Operator in Japan, Rakuten’s shares have taken a mighty hit. But the focus in this insight is on ride-sharing company Lyft. In March 2015, Rakuten CEO Hiroshi Mikitani announced that Rakuten had invested US$300mn in Lyft, giving it a 11.9% stake after Series E round in May 2015. Recent articles suggest that Rakuten remains the top investor.
As best as Travis Lundy can tell, from sources who track this, Rakuten is the single largest shareholder in Lyft, with a holding in the 10.4-12.0% range. That would suggest a position value of US$900mn-$1.2bn based on the last funding round in June 2018. At a $25bn pre-money IPO valuation, that would be worth US$1.5-2.0bn for a likely pre-tax IPO uplift of US$590-800mn.
A report late Thursday Asia time suggested the Lyft roadshow would start the week of March 18th, which would mean the S-1 will be available two weeks before that. Investors will know more about Rakuten’s ownership of Lyft by the end of next week or very early the following week. Travis would want to be long for now.
DHICO announced a larger-than-expected ₩608.4bn rights offer. ₩543bn is expected to be raised through common shares at a preliminary price of ₩6,390; and ₩65bn via RCPS at a preliminary price of ₩6,970. This is a combined 72.56% capital increase a 42.05% share dilution. Concurrently, Doosan E&C announced a ₩420bn rights offer at a preliminary price of ₩1,255, a 15% discount to last close.
For DHICO, Mar 27 is the ex-rights day for both Common and RCPS. Subscription rights (for the Common) will be listed and trade on Apr 19~25. May 2 is final pricing. May 8 is subscription and May 16 is payment. New Common shares will be listed on May 29.
For E&C, the final price will be fixed on Apr 30. Whichever is higher – ₩1,255 or Apr 26~30 VWAP at a 40% discount – will be the final offering price. Mar 27 will be the ex-rights day. Subscription rights will be listed and traded on Apr 18~24. New shares will be listed on May 24.
₩1,255 is a lot more aggressive than generally viewed. DHICO owns nearly two thirds of E&C. With a 20% oversubscription, nearly ₩300bn will likely come from DHICO, essentially buttressing E&C at an even heftier price. Which is probably why the market is being less harsh on E&C relative to DHICO.
The 247-4 Form is out with a tender offer period between 26 Feb-1 April, and payment on the 4th April. The frustrating part is how Delta’s FY18 dividend of Bt2.30 is treated. On one hand, it says the Bt71 Offer price is final unless there is a MAC. Further into the Offer doc, it mentions the Offeror “reserves the right” to reduce the offer price if a dividend is paid. DELTA’s IR believes the dividend will be added, but it is not crystal clear.
Furthermore, there is no minimum acceptance condition, as potentially flagged earlier, which means there is no possibility of fast-tracking payment. Some precedent voluntary offers included a minimum acceptance, which provides an expedited payment should investors who tender shares AND revoke their right to withdraw – provided that minimum is fulfilled.
Shares traded up after the document came out, shrugging off the ambiguity in the document. Currently trading at a gross/annualised return of 1.1%/11%. The dividend is subject to a 10% tax for non-residents.
The previous Friday, the Offerors for M1 announced that their Offer had been declared Unconditional In All Respects as the tendered amount was 57.04% and the total held by concert parties was 76.35%. Axiata Group (AXIATA MK)made an announcement to the Bursa Malaysia that it had accepted the Offer as required because it was a significant asset disposal. Going unconditional has triggered an extension of the Closing Date to 4 March 2019.
If you want to fight this with an appraisal, you can. Travis doesn’t see the point. If you want to hold on to the stock in order to block full squeezeout and play chicken with the big boys, you can, but it requires a relatively big ticket (roughly 6.73% of the shares out).
So Travis recommends taking the money. It was better to take the money in early January and re-deploy, rather than wait for the close of the offer. He would accept now and sees no upside from waiting.
When the Tender Offer / MBO for Kosaido was announced last month, Travis’ first reaction was that this was wrong, concluding this was a virtual asset strip in progress, and suggested that the only way this was likely to not get done is if some brave activist came forward.
Shortly afterwards, an activist did come forward. Yoshiaki Murakami’s bought 5% through his entity Reno KK, and later lifted his stake (combined with affiliates) to 9.55%. Travis thought the stock had run too far at that point (¥775/share). While still cheap, he did not expect Bain to lift its price by 30+%, nor a white knight to arrive quickly enough.
This week a media article suggested longstanding external statutory auditor Mr. Nakatsuji and lead shareholder Sakurai Mie were against the takeover.
The possibility this deal fails because the “put protection” of the deal price at ¥610 is no longer solid has gone up. Conversely, the probability that Bain and the MBO have to come in with a price adjustment higher has gone up. Travis is inclined to remain bearish in the medium-term as there is a significant likelihood there is no alternative solution during the Tender Offer period itself.
After announcing earlier this month a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction”, the AFR is now reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star has also joined the battle for Aveo Group (AOG AU). (A Case for Privatising Aveo)
Saputo Inc (SAP CN) and Dairy Crest announced an all-cash deal where Saputo will buy Dairy Crest for 620p/share, to be implemented through a Scheme of Arrangement with an expected close in Q2 2019. This appears to tick all the necessary boxes. Friendly, horizontal integration, and limited job losses. Shares are trading through terms early (he published at 628.5p), perhaps on expectations the wide open register means shareholders can try to hold out for a higher price.
At almost 14x EV/EBITDA on a TTM basis and a bit lower on a March 2019 FY-end basis, it is a high enough multiple to not be insulting for a dairy company, and may keep other suitors away.
Dairy Crest’s directors have given irrevocable notice to accept, and the directors’ advisors (Greenhill & Co) have deemed the Offer “fair and reasonable.”
One extra turn of EV/EBITDA would lift the takeover price just under 10%. That would clear out most of the naysayers who bought in the frothier “we’re going to be an asset-light branded goods company” days of 2015-2017. Doable, but as it is an agreed deal, Travis doesn’t see the need to push it.
In its prior letter to Ophir on the 14 January, Petrus recommended selling the South-East Asian (SEA) assets to Medco, with a low-end fair value, before synergies, of £0.64/share, through to £1.42/share on a blue sky basis. It also argued that Ophir should negotiate with the Equatorial Guinea ministry (the regulator that terminated the Fortuna license, resulting in write-offs of US$610mn) to be compensated for its $700mn investment and the unfair seizure of the license, otherwise it would set a precedent for other international operators doing business in EG.
Petrus has now rounded on Schrader over perceived mismanagement of the EG licence, and a lack of professionalism in not soliciting and considering offers for Ophir from other buyers. Petrus’ beef is not an outlier – alternative hedge fund Sand Grove has increased its exposure, via cash-settled derivatives, to 17.28% (as at 13 February); while Ian Hannam, who advised Ophir’s board on its 2013 right issue, is understood to have also written to Ophir’s interim CEO Alan Booth and the board saying Medco’s offer is too low.
Overall, Petrus’ assertions that Ophir is being sold at “sub optimal terms” appear valid, most notably on the EG compensation and the illogical operations update earlier this month. The alternative push to sell the SEA assets separately, as that has been Medco’s core focus, not international operations, also makes sense.
Last month, DSV A/S (DSV DC) made a public proposal of a takeover for cash and scrip valued at CHF 170/share, which came at a 24% premium to last and +31% vs 1-month VWAP. The #2, #3, and long-time #4 shareholders are firmly and publicly in the camp of trying to get something done. 45.9%-shareholder Ernst Göhner Foundation is sending mixed signals – do they want a higher price? Or do they want to wait and let Panalpina grow by its own consolidator strategy?
Panalpina has now confirmed that it in preliminary talks with Kuwait-listed logistics company Agility Public Warehouse. A Bloomberg report suggested a deal could be reached as early as this past week for Agility’s logistics business. The same article suggested the Göhner Foundation is supportive of the new talks. Agility’s press release was much more non-committal.
DSV has also announced a new all cash CHF 180/share offer for Panalpina; although the original cash and scrip offer was then worth CHF 184.5/share, which is an even better premium to pre-offer terms. One wonders whether cash-only would suit the Foundation; the DSV press release seemed to respond to that.
It is not clear what would drive the Foundation to give up its control. And Panalpina’s measly share price reaction to the all-cash offer suggest there is considerable skepticism out there. But at some price, Panalpina’s board looks pretty stupid to not accept the cash.
If you do not think a deal with DSV has any chance of getting up, Panalpina shares are a sell here. If they overpay for Agility and cannot improve their own margins well past historical highs in a market trending weaker, then the shares could drop.
Using Curtis’ figures, the implied stub is at its lowest level since a brief downward spike in February 2015, and you would have to go back to April 2014 to find a lower level.
The push back on this setup is that the auto operations have recorded marginally, yet sequential profit declines in FY16 and FY17; while recording three sequential quarterly declines up to December 2018. The big question is whether Mahindra can regain market share as it kick-starts a new model cycle.
In contrast, Sanghyun believes the Holdco is still undervalued relative to the Sub by about 10%. Plugging in Sanghyun’s numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of 45% against a one-year average of 30%, with a 12-month range of -51.5% to 15.5% (premium).
Back on the 13 December 2018, Can One announced a proposed MGO for Kian Joo at RM3.10/share, a 52.7% premium to last close. This required Can One shareholders’ approval which was received on the 14 February. Can One’s current 33% stake in Kian Joo accounts for ~86% of its market cap. The offer doc should be out, on or before the 7 March, with payment either late March (along with the first close of the Offer), or early April, depending on when the offer turns unconditional. The offer is conditional on 50% acceptance. Both sides are illiquid.
This looks like a decent exit for Kian Joo shareholders. Apart from EPF with 10.1%, former NED Teow China See is the only other shareholder with >5% with 8.9%.
For Can One, this is an aggressive pitch to make Kian Joo a subsidiary amidst an uncertain economic backdrop, while potential synergies may be offset via higher interest costs.
There are still two schools of thought on the HMG restructuring. One is that Glovis/Mobis are merged into a holdco entity. Or Glovis becomes the holdco with Mobis→ HM→ Kia Motors Corp (000270 KS) below. Since late 3Q18, there has been increased speculation on the latter. This has pushed up Glovis’ price relative to Mobis.
Each outcome is beset with its own set of issues. For Glovis to be the sole holdco, it has to come up with nearly ₩2tn to buy Kia’s Mobis stake, probably through new, and burdensome, debt. Glovis may also face the risk of forced holdco conversion, creating an issue with Kia as a “great grandson” subsidiary.
This speculation pushing up Glovis relative to Mobis has yet to be substantiated/justified, suggesting Glovis is overbought. Sanghyun expects a mean reversion, and recommends a long Mobis and short Glovis.
Navitas Ltd (NVT AU) has agreed to extend the exclusivity period granted to the BGH consortium to 1 March (from 18 Feb), in order to allow additional time for BGH to complete a limited set of remaining due diligence investigations.
Netcomm Wireless (NTC AU) has received $1.10 cash offer (53% premium to last close) from Casa Systems (CASA US) via a Scheme. The deal values Netcomm at ~US$114m. The scheme is subject to FIRB and shareholder approval. Stewart David Paul James, a NED, holds 12.3% and is the major shareholder. The announcement states that each Netcomm director intends to vote the Netcomm shares held by them in favour of the scheme – subject to a +ve IFA opinion and in the absence of a competing offer. This includes Stewart’s stake.
MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU)announced no superior proposal emerged after concluding its ’go shop’ period for rival offers to KKR’s takeover proposal. At a gross/annualised spread of 0.9%/4.8%, assuming early May payment, this looks to be trading a bit tight.
CCASS
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Issuance of the new shares and common stock to be delisted from the Tokyo Stock Exchange
C
Japan
Descente
Off-Mkt
14-Mar
Tender Offer Close Date
C
Japan
JIEC
Off-Mkt
18-Mar
Tender Offer Close Date
C
Japan
Veriserve
Off-Mkt
18-Mar
Tender Offer Close Date
C
Japan
ND Software
Off-Mkt
25-Mar
Tender Offer Close Date
C
Japan
Showa Shell
Scheme
1-Apr
Close of merger
E
Japan
U-Shin
Off-Market
17-Apr
Tender Offer Close Date
C
NZ
Trade Me Group
Scheme
5-Mar
First Court Date
C
Singapore
Courts Asia Limited
Scheme
15-Mar
Offer Close Date
C
Singapore
M1 Limited
Off Mkt
4-Mar
Closing date of offer
C
Singapore
PCI Limited
Scheme
February
Release of Scheme Booklet
E
Taiwan
Yungtay Engineering
Off Mkt
17-Mar
Closing date of offer
C
Thailand
Delta Electronics
Off Mkt
26-Feb
Tender Offer Open
C
Finland
Amer Sports
Off Mkt
7-Mar
Offer Period Expires
C
Norway
Oslo Børs VPS
Off Mkt
4-Mar
Nasdaq Offer Close Date
C
Switzerland
Panalpina Welttransport
Off Mkt
27-Feb
Binding offer to be announced
E
US
Red Hat, Inc.
Scheme
March/April
Deal lodged for approval with EU Regulators
C
Source: Company announcements. E = our estimates; C =confirmed
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Aveo Group (AOG AU), an Australian retirement village operator, is amid a strategic review to sell itself. At its 1H19 results on 13 February, Aveo said it had received several non-binding bids from parties interested in acquiring the entire company.
Scepticism on a successful sale remains high as Aveo’s discount to NTA has increased from 44% on 14 August 2018 (the day before the announcement of strategic review) to the current 46%. However, we believe that the widening NTA discount is an opportunity to capitalise on an emerging bidding battle.
On Friday 22 February 2019 after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)announced (J) a Secondary Shares Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding.
Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe.
On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33 billion worth (whichever is reached first) to last from the business day immediately following the delivery date of the Offering shares (practically speaking, a day on or between 13 March and 18 March 2019) to 12 April 2019. Based on an average daily volume traded of 2.2mm shares, 10% participation would mean the buyback would take 5 days to complete. 5% would take 9 days. The company also announced (E) it would cancel 10 million shares on 29 March 2019. That may only be 45% of the post-buyback treasury share position, but it leads to another event investors should watch.
This is the first buyback Nintendo has announced in five years. The Nikkei article discussing the situation suggests that the possibility of supply/demand being weak is the reason for the buyback. The stated reason for the Offering as proposed by Nintendo in its Offering announcement, suggested a goal of increasing and diversifying the shareholder base.
The fact that JPX was selling the shares was not important. The reasoning was. And JPX provided an example of how it should be done (as explained in the insight).
My words then still stand.
And JPX provided an example of how it should be done (as explained in the insight). The ramifications are significant.
The ramifications of this Offering are significant too. This is a lot more than just an offering by entities looking to take profits.
On Friday 22 February after the close, NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP)announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February.
The buyback has already occurred. This is largely technical. But it has an interesting side effect.
An activist has come forward, and the external statutory auditor and lead shareholder (wife of founder) are against the offer, but Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) situation still fits pretty cleanly in the “Too Hard” bucket for now.
Since announcing its foray into the deeper waters of being the fourth Type I Mobile Network Operator in Japan, Rakuten’s shares have taken a mighty hit. But the focus in this insight is on ride-sharing company Lyft. In March 2015, Rakuten CEO Hiroshi Mikitani announced that Rakuten had invested US$300mn in Lyft, giving it a 11.9% stake after Series E round in May 2015. Recent articles suggest that Rakuten remains the top investor.
As best as Travis Lundy can tell, from sources who track this, Rakuten is the single largest shareholder in Lyft, with a holding in the 10.4-12.0% range. That would suggest a position value of US$900mn-$1.2bn based on the last funding round in June 2018. At a $25bn pre-money IPO valuation, that would be worth US$1.5-2.0bn for a likely pre-tax IPO uplift of US$590-800mn.
A report late Thursday Asia time suggested the Lyft roadshow would start the week of March 18th, which would mean the S-1 will be available two weeks before that. Investors will know more about Rakuten’s ownership of Lyft by the end of next week or very early the following week. Travis would want to be long for now.
DHICO announced a larger-than-expected ₩608.4bn rights offer. ₩543bn is expected to be raised through common shares at a preliminary price of ₩6,390; and ₩65bn via RCPS at a preliminary price of ₩6,970. This is a combined 72.56% capital increase a 42.05% share dilution. Concurrently, Doosan E&C announced a ₩420bn rights offer at a preliminary price of ₩1,255, a 15% discount to last close.
For DHICO, Mar 27 is the ex-rights day for both Common and RCPS. Subscription rights (for the Common) will be listed and trade on Apr 19~25. May 2 is final pricing. May 8 is subscription and May 16 is payment. New Common shares will be listed on May 29.
For E&C, the final price will be fixed on Apr 30. Whichever is higher – ₩1,255 or Apr 26~30 VWAP at a 40% discount – will be the final offering price. Mar 27 will be the ex-rights day. Subscription rights will be listed and traded on Apr 18~24. New shares will be listed on May 24.
₩1,255 is a lot more aggressive than generally viewed. DHICO owns nearly two thirds of E&C. With a 20% oversubscription, nearly ₩300bn will likely come from DHICO, essentially buttressing E&C at an even heftier price. Which is probably why the market is being less harsh on E&C relative to DHICO.
The 247-4 Form is out with a tender offer period between 26 Feb-1 April, and payment on the 4th April. The frustrating part is how Delta’s FY18 dividend of Bt2.30 is treated. On one hand, it says the Bt71 Offer price is final unless there is a MAC. Further into the Offer doc, it mentions the Offeror “reserves the right” to reduce the offer price if a dividend is paid. DELTA’s IR believes the dividend will be added, but it is not crystal clear.
Furthermore, there is no minimum acceptance condition, as potentially flagged earlier, which means there is no possibility of fast-tracking payment. Some precedent voluntary offers included a minimum acceptance, which provides an expedited payment should investors who tender shares AND revoke their right to withdraw – provided that minimum is fulfilled.
Shares traded up after the document came out, shrugging off the ambiguity in the document. Currently trading at a gross/annualised return of 1.1%/11%. The dividend is subject to a 10% tax for non-residents.
The previous Friday, the Offerors for M1 announced that their Offer had been declared Unconditional In All Respects as the tendered amount was 57.04% and the total held by concert parties was 76.35%. Axiata Group (AXIATA MK)made an announcement to the Bursa Malaysia that it had accepted the Offer as required because it was a significant asset disposal. Going unconditional has triggered an extension of the Closing Date to 4 March 2019.
If you want to fight this with an appraisal, you can. Travis doesn’t see the point. If you want to hold on to the stock in order to block full squeezeout and play chicken with the big boys, you can, but it requires a relatively big ticket (roughly 6.73% of the shares out).
So Travis recommends taking the money. It was better to take the money in early January and re-deploy, rather than wait for the close of the offer. He would accept now and sees no upside from waiting.
When the Tender Offer / MBO for Kosaido was announced last month, Travis’ first reaction was that this was wrong, concluding this was a virtual asset strip in progress, and suggested that the only way this was likely to not get done is if some brave activist came forward.
Shortly afterwards, an activist did come forward. Yoshiaki Murakami’s bought 5% through his entity Reno KK, and later lifted his stake (combined with affiliates) to 9.55%. Travis thought the stock had run too far at that point (¥775/share). While still cheap, he did not expect Bain to lift its price by 30+%, nor a white knight to arrive quickly enough.
This week a media article suggested longstanding external statutory auditor Mr. Nakatsuji and lead shareholder Sakurai Mie were against the takeover.
The possibility this deal fails because the “put protection” of the deal price at ¥610 is no longer solid has gone up. Conversely, the probability that Bain and the MBO have to come in with a price adjustment higher has gone up. Travis is inclined to remain bearish in the medium-term as there is a significant likelihood there is no alternative solution during the Tender Offer period itself.
After announcing earlier this month a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction”, the AFR is now reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star has also joined the battle for Aveo Group (AOG AU). (A Case for Privatising Aveo)
Saputo Inc (SAP CN) and Dairy Crest announced an all-cash deal where Saputo will buy Dairy Crest for 620p/share, to be implemented through a Scheme of Arrangement with an expected close in Q2 2019. This appears to tick all the necessary boxes. Friendly, horizontal integration, and limited job losses. Shares are trading through terms early (he published at 628.5p), perhaps on expectations the wide open register means shareholders can try to hold out for a higher price.
At almost 14x EV/EBITDA on a TTM basis and a bit lower on a March 2019 FY-end basis, it is a high enough multiple to not be insulting for a dairy company, and may keep other suitors away.
Dairy Crest’s directors have given irrevocable notice to accept, and the directors’ advisors (Greenhill & Co) have deemed the Offer “fair and reasonable.”
One extra turn of EV/EBITDA would lift the takeover price just under 10%. That would clear out most of the naysayers who bought in the frothier “we’re going to be an asset-light branded goods company” days of 2015-2017. Doable, but as it is an agreed deal, Travis doesn’t see the need to push it.
In its prior letter to Ophir on the 14 January, Petrus recommended selling the South-East Asian (SEA) assets to Medco, with a low-end fair value, before synergies, of £0.64/share, through to £1.42/share on a blue sky basis. It also argued that Ophir should negotiate with the Equatorial Guinea ministry (the regulator that terminated the Fortuna license, resulting in write-offs of US$610mn) to be compensated for its $700mn investment and the unfair seizure of the license, otherwise it would set a precedent for other international operators doing business in EG.
Petrus has now rounded on Schrader over perceived mismanagement of the EG licence, and a lack of professionalism in not soliciting and considering offers for Ophir from other buyers. Petrus’ beef is not an outlier – alternative hedge fund Sand Grove has increased its exposure, via cash-settled derivatives, to 17.28% (as at 13 February); while Ian Hannam, who advised Ophir’s board on its 2013 right issue, is understood to have also written to Ophir’s interim CEO Alan Booth and the board saying Medco’s offer is too low.
Overall, Petrus’ assertions that Ophir is being sold at “sub optimal terms” appear valid, most notably on the EG compensation and the illogical operations update earlier this month. The alternative push to sell the SEA assets separately, as that has been Medco’s core focus, not international operations, also makes sense.
Last month, DSV A/S (DSV DC) made a public proposal of a takeover for cash and scrip valued at CHF 170/share, which came at a 24% premium to last and +31% vs 1-month VWAP. The #2, #3, and long-time #4 shareholders are firmly and publicly in the camp of trying to get something done. 45.9%-shareholder Ernst Göhner Foundation is sending mixed signals – do they want a higher price? Or do they want to wait and let Panalpina grow by its own consolidator strategy?
Panalpina has now confirmed that it in preliminary talks with Kuwait-listed logistics company Agility Public Warehouse. A Bloomberg report suggested a deal could be reached as early as this past week for Agility’s logistics business. The same article suggested the Göhner Foundation is supportive of the new talks. Agility’s press release was much more non-committal.
DSV has also announced a new all cash CHF 180/share offer for Panalpina; although the original cash and scrip offer was then worth CHF 184.5/share, which is an even better premium to pre-offer terms. One wonders whether cash-only would suit the Foundation; the DSV press release seemed to respond to that.
It is not clear what would drive the Foundation to give up its control. And Panalpina’s measly share price reaction to the all-cash offer suggest there is considerable skepticism out there. But at some price, Panalpina’s board looks pretty stupid to not accept the cash.
If you do not think a deal with DSV has any chance of getting up, Panalpina shares are a sell here. If they overpay for Agility and cannot improve their own margins well past historical highs in a market trending weaker, then the shares could drop.
Using Curtis’ figures, the implied stub is at its lowest level since a brief downward spike in February 2015, and you would have to go back to April 2014 to find a lower level.
The push back on this setup is that the auto operations have recorded marginally, yet sequential profit declines in FY16 and FY17; while recording three sequential quarterly declines up to December 2018. The big question is whether Mahindra can regain market share as it kick-starts a new model cycle.
In contrast, Sanghyun believes the Holdco is still undervalued relative to the Sub by about 10%. Plugging in Sanghyun’s numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of 45% against a one-year average of 30%, with a 12-month range of -51.5% to 15.5% (premium).
Back on the 13 December 2018, Can One announced a proposed MGO for Kian Joo at RM3.10/share, a 52.7% premium to last close. This required Can One shareholders’ approval which was received on the 14 February. Can One’s current 33% stake in Kian Joo accounts for ~86% of its market cap. The offer doc should be out, on or before the 7 March, with payment either late March (along with the first close of the Offer), or early April, depending on when the offer turns unconditional. The offer is conditional on 50% acceptance. Both sides are illiquid.
This looks like a decent exit for Kian Joo shareholders. Apart from EPF with 10.1%, former NED Teow China See is the only other shareholder with >5% with 8.9%.
For Can One, this is an aggressive pitch to make Kian Joo a subsidiary amidst an uncertain economic backdrop, while potential synergies may be offset via higher interest costs.
There are still two schools of thought on the HMG restructuring. One is that Glovis/Mobis are merged into a holdco entity. Or Glovis becomes the holdco with Mobis→ HM→ Kia Motors Corp (000270 KS) below. Since late 3Q18, there has been increased speculation on the latter. This has pushed up Glovis’ price relative to Mobis.
Each outcome is beset with its own set of issues. For Glovis to be the sole holdco, it has to come up with nearly ₩2tn to buy Kia’s Mobis stake, probably through new, and burdensome, debt. Glovis may also face the risk of forced holdco conversion, creating an issue with Kia as a “great grandson” subsidiary.
This speculation pushing up Glovis relative to Mobis has yet to be substantiated/justified, suggesting Glovis is overbought. Sanghyun expects a mean reversion, and recommends a long Mobis and short Glovis.
Navitas Ltd (NVT AU) has agreed to extend the exclusivity period granted to the BGH consortium to 1 March (from 18 Feb), in order to allow additional time for BGH to complete a limited set of remaining due diligence investigations.
Netcomm Wireless (NTC AU) has received $1.10 cash offer (53% premium to last close) from Casa Systems (CASA US) via a Scheme. The deal values Netcomm at ~US$114m. The scheme is subject to FIRB and shareholder approval. Stewart David Paul James, a NED, holds 12.3% and is the major shareholder. The announcement states that each Netcomm director intends to vote the Netcomm shares held by them in favour of the scheme – subject to a +ve IFA opinion and in the absence of a competing offer. This includes Stewart’s stake.
MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU)announced no superior proposal emerged after concluding its ’go shop’ period for rival offers to KKR’s takeover proposal. At a gross/annualised spread of 0.9%/4.8%, assuming early May payment, this looks to be trading a bit tight.
CCASS
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Saputo Inc (SAP CN) and Dairy Crest (DCG LN) today announced an all-cash deal where Saputo will buy Dairy Crest for 620p/share, to be implemented through a Scheme of Arrangement which the two parties say is likely to close in Q2 2019.
Saputo is a Canada-listed dairy company which has grown through serial acquisition – more than 30 acquisitions in the last twenty years – but curiously none of the acquisitions have left it with any operations in the UK. Dairy Crest is a leading UK-based dairy and cooking staples company whose best-known products are Cathedral City Cheddar Cheese, Clover margarine, Country Life butter, and Frylight cooking oil as well as other minor butter-similars and butter-replacement spreads.
This would be Saputo’s largest purchase in ten years – by a factor of three over their second largest – the purchase of Warrnambool Cheese & Butter Factory in Q1 2014.
Shares are trading through terms early, perhaps on expectations the wide open register means shareholders can try to hold out for a higher price.
At a decent premium (13.9x TTM EV/EBITDA at 620p) to where the rest of the smaller-cap dairy products sector trades (below 10x on a median basis), and the highest EV/Revenue or EV/EBITDA multiple that I can find Saputo having paid, asking for more may not get you more, but investors clearly think it worth a try.
An extra 10% would clear out most of the naysayers who bought in the frothier “we’re going to be an asset-light branded goods company” days of 2015-2017. It would put March 2019 PER at just under 20x and just under 13.9x March 2019 expected EV/EBITDA.
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On Friday 22 February 2019 after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)announced (J) a Secondary Shares Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding.
Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe.
On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33 billion worth (whichever is reached first) to last from the business day immediately following the delivery date of the Offering shares (practically speaking, a day on or between 13 March and 18 March 2019) to 12 April 2019. Based on an average daily volume traded of 2.2mm shares, 10% participation would mean the buyback would take 5 days to complete. 5% would take 9 days. The company also announced (E) it would cancel 10 million shares on 29 March 2019. That may only be 45% of the post-buyback treasury share position, but it leads to another event investors should watch.
This is the first buyback Nintendo has announced in five years. The Nikkei article discussing the situation suggests that the possibility of supply/demand being weak is the reason for the buyback. The stated reason for the Offering as proposed by Nintendo in its Offering announcement, suggested a goal of increasing and diversifying the shareholder base.
The fact that JPX was selling the shares was not important. The reasoning was. And JPX provided an example of how it should be done (as explained in the insight).
My words then still stand.
And JPX provided an example of how it should be done (as explained in the insight). The ramifications are significant.
The ramifications of this Offering are significant too. This is a lot more than just an offering by entities looking to take profits.
On Friday 22 February after the close, NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP)announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February.
The buyback has already occurred. This is largely technical. But it has an interesting side effect.
An activist has come forward, and the external statutory auditor and lead shareholder (wife of founder) are against the offer, but Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) situation still fits pretty cleanly in the “Too Hard” bucket for now.
Since announcing its foray into the deeper waters of being the fourth Type I Mobile Network Operator in Japan, Rakuten’s shares have taken a mighty hit. But the focus in this insight is on ride-sharing company Lyft. In March 2015, Rakuten CEO Hiroshi Mikitani announced that Rakuten had invested US$300mn in Lyft, giving it a 11.9% stake after Series E round in May 2015. Recent articles suggest that Rakuten remains the top investor.
As best as Travis Lundy can tell, from sources who track this, Rakuten is the single largest shareholder in Lyft, with a holding in the 10.4-12.0% range. That would suggest a position value of US$900mn-$1.2bn based on the last funding round in June 2018. At a $25bn pre-money IPO valuation, that would be worth US$1.5-2.0bn for a likely pre-tax IPO uplift of US$590-800mn.
A report late Thursday Asia time suggested the Lyft roadshow would start the week of March 18th, which would mean the S-1 will be available two weeks before that. Investors will know more about Rakuten’s ownership of Lyft by the end of next week or very early the following week. Travis would want to be long for now.
DHICO announced a larger-than-expected ₩608.4bn rights offer. ₩543bn is expected to be raised through common shares at a preliminary price of ₩6,390; and ₩65bn via RCPS at a preliminary price of ₩6,970. This is a combined 72.56% capital increase a 42.05% share dilution. Concurrently, Doosan E&C announced a ₩420bn rights offer at a preliminary price of ₩1,255, a 15% discount to last close.
For DHICO, Mar 27 is the ex-rights day for both Common and RCPS. Subscription rights (for the Common) will be listed and trade on Apr 19~25. May 2 is final pricing. May 8 is subscription and May 16 is payment. New Common shares will be listed on May 29.
For E&C, the final price will be fixed on Apr 30. Whichever is higher – ₩1,255 or Apr 26~30 VWAP at a 40% discount – will be the final offering price. Mar 27 will be the ex-rights day. Subscription rights will be listed and traded on Apr 18~24. New shares will be listed on May 24.
₩1,255 is a lot more aggressive than generally viewed. DHICO owns nearly two thirds of E&C. With a 20% oversubscription, nearly ₩300bn will likely come from DHICO, essentially buttressing E&C at an even heftier price. Which is probably why the market is being less harsh on E&C relative to DHICO.
The 247-4 Form is out with a tender offer period between 26 Feb-1 April, and payment on the 4th April. The frustrating part is how Delta’s FY18 dividend of Bt2.30 is treated. On one hand, it says the Bt71 Offer price is final unless there is a MAC. Further into the Offer doc, it mentions the Offeror “reserves the right” to reduce the offer price if a dividend is paid. DELTA’s IR believes the dividend will be added, but it is not crystal clear.
Furthermore, there is no minimum acceptance condition, as potentially flagged earlier, which means there is no possibility of fast-tracking payment. Some precedent voluntary offers included a minimum acceptance, which provides an expedited payment should investors who tender shares AND revoke their right to withdraw – provided that minimum is fulfilled.
Shares traded up after the document came out, shrugging off the ambiguity in the document. Currently trading at a gross/annualised return of 1.1%/11%. The dividend is subject to a 10% tax for non-residents.
The previous Friday, the Offerors for M1 announced that their Offer had been declared Unconditional In All Respects as the tendered amount was 57.04% and the total held by concert parties was 76.35%. Axiata Group (AXIATA MK)made an announcement to the Bursa Malaysia that it had accepted the Offer as required because it was a significant asset disposal. Going unconditional has triggered an extension of the Closing Date to 4 March 2019.
If you want to fight this with an appraisal, you can. Travis doesn’t see the point. If you want to hold on to the stock in order to block full squeezeout and play chicken with the big boys, you can, but it requires a relatively big ticket (roughly 6.73% of the shares out).
So Travis recommends taking the money. It was better to take the money in early January and re-deploy, rather than wait for the close of the offer. He would accept now and sees no upside from waiting.
When the Tender Offer / MBO for Kosaido was announced last month, Travis’ first reaction was that this was wrong, concluding this was a virtual asset strip in progress, and suggested that the only way this was likely to not get done is if some brave activist came forward.
Shortly afterwards, an activist did come forward. Yoshiaki Murakami’s bought 5% through his entity Reno KK, and later lifted his stake (combined with affiliates) to 9.55%. Travis thought the stock had run too far at that point (¥775/share). While still cheap, he did not expect Bain to lift its price by 30+%, nor a white knight to arrive quickly enough.
This week a media article suggested longstanding external statutory auditor Mr. Nakatsuji and lead shareholder Sakurai Mie were against the takeover.
The possibility this deal fails because the “put protection” of the deal price at ¥610 is no longer solid has gone up. Conversely, the probability that Bain and the MBO have to come in with a price adjustment higher has gone up. Travis is inclined to remain bearish in the medium-term as there is a significant likelihood there is no alternative solution during the Tender Offer period itself.
After announcing earlier this month a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction”, the AFR is now reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star has also joined the battle for Aveo Group (AOG AU). (A Case for Privatising Aveo)
Saputo Inc (SAP CN) and Dairy Crest announced an all-cash deal where Saputo will buy Dairy Crest for 620p/share, to be implemented through a Scheme of Arrangement with an expected close in Q2 2019. This appears to tick all the necessary boxes. Friendly, horizontal integration, and limited job losses. Shares are trading through terms early (he published at 628.5p), perhaps on expectations the wide open register means shareholders can try to hold out for a higher price.
At almost 14x EV/EBITDA on a TTM basis and a bit lower on a March 2019 FY-end basis, it is a high enough multiple to not be insulting for a dairy company, and may keep other suitors away.
Dairy Crest’s directors have given irrevocable notice to accept, and the directors’ advisors (Greenhill & Co) have deemed the Offer “fair and reasonable.”
One extra turn of EV/EBITDA would lift the takeover price just under 10%. That would clear out most of the naysayers who bought in the frothier “we’re going to be an asset-light branded goods company” days of 2015-2017. Doable, but as it is an agreed deal, Travis doesn’t see the need to push it.
In its prior letter to Ophir on the 14 January, Petrus recommended selling the South-East Asian (SEA) assets to Medco, with a low-end fair value, before synergies, of £0.64/share, through to £1.42/share on a blue sky basis. It also argued that Ophir should negotiate with the Equatorial Guinea ministry (the regulator that terminated the Fortuna license, resulting in write-offs of US$610mn) to be compensated for its $700mn investment and the unfair seizure of the license, otherwise it would set a precedent for other international operators doing business in EG.
Petrus has now rounded on Schrader over perceived mismanagement of the EG licence, and a lack of professionalism in not soliciting and considering offers for Ophir from other buyers. Petrus’ beef is not an outlier – alternative hedge fund Sand Grove has increased its exposure, via cash-settled derivatives, to 17.28% (as at 13 February); while Ian Hannam, who advised Ophir’s board on its 2013 right issue, is understood to have also written to Ophir’s interim CEO Alan Booth and the board saying Medco’s offer is too low.
Overall, Petrus’ assertions that Ophir is being sold at “sub optimal terms” appear valid, most notably on the EG compensation and the illogical operations update earlier this month. The alternative push to sell the SEA assets separately, as that has been Medco’s core focus, not international operations, also makes sense.
Last month, DSV A/S (DSV DC) made a public proposal of a takeover for cash and scrip valued at CHF 170/share, which came at a 24% premium to last and +31% vs 1-month VWAP. The #2, #3, and long-time #4 shareholders are firmly and publicly in the camp of trying to get something done. 45.9%-shareholder Ernst Göhner Foundation is sending mixed signals – do they want a higher price? Or do they want to wait and let Panalpina grow by its own consolidator strategy?
Panalpina has now confirmed that it in preliminary talks with Kuwait-listed logistics company Agility Public Warehouse. A Bloomberg report suggested a deal could be reached as early as this past week for Agility’s logistics business. The same article suggested the Göhner Foundation is supportive of the new talks. Agility’s press release was much more non-committal.
DSV has also announced a new all cash CHF 180/share offer for Panalpina; although the original cash and scrip offer was then worth CHF 184.5/share, which is an even better premium to pre-offer terms. One wonders whether cash-only would suit the Foundation; the DSV press release seemed to respond to that.
It is not clear what would drive the Foundation to give up its control. And Panalpina’s measly share price reaction to the all-cash offer suggest there is considerable skepticism out there. But at some price, Panalpina’s board looks pretty stupid to not accept the cash.
If you do not think a deal with DSV has any chance of getting up, Panalpina shares are a sell here. If they overpay for Agility and cannot improve their own margins well past historical highs in a market trending weaker, then the shares could drop.
Using Curtis’ figures, the implied stub is at its lowest level since a brief downward spike in February 2015, and you would have to go back to April 2014 to find a lower level.
The push back on this setup is that the auto operations have recorded marginally, yet sequential profit declines in FY16 and FY17; while recording three sequential quarterly declines up to December 2018. The big question is whether Mahindra can regain market share as it kick-starts a new model cycle.
In contrast, Sanghyun believes the Holdco is still undervalued relative to the Sub by about 10%. Plugging in Sanghyun’s numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of 45% against a one-year average of 30%, with a 12-month range of -51.5% to 15.5% (premium).
Back on the 13 December 2018, Can One announced a proposed MGO for Kian Joo at RM3.10/share, a 52.7% premium to last close. This required Can One shareholders’ approval which was received on the 14 February. Can One’s current 33% stake in Kian Joo accounts for ~86% of its market cap. The offer doc should be out, on or before the 7 March, with payment either late March (along with the first close of the Offer), or early April, depending on when the offer turns unconditional. The offer is conditional on 50% acceptance. Both sides are illiquid.
This looks like a decent exit for Kian Joo shareholders. Apart from EPF with 10.1%, former NED Teow China See is the only other shareholder with >5% with 8.9%.
For Can One, this is an aggressive pitch to make Kian Joo a subsidiary amidst an uncertain economic backdrop, while potential synergies may be offset via higher interest costs.
There are still two schools of thought on the HMG restructuring. One is that Glovis/Mobis are merged into a holdco entity. Or Glovis becomes the holdco with Mobis→ HM→ Kia Motors Corp (000270 KS) below. Since late 3Q18, there has been increased speculation on the latter. This has pushed up Glovis’ price relative to Mobis.
Each outcome is beset with its own set of issues. For Glovis to be the sole holdco, it has to come up with nearly ₩2tn to buy Kia’s Mobis stake, probably through new, and burdensome, debt. Glovis may also face the risk of forced holdco conversion, creating an issue with Kia as a “great grandson” subsidiary.
This speculation pushing up Glovis relative to Mobis has yet to be substantiated/justified, suggesting Glovis is overbought. Sanghyun expects a mean reversion, and recommends a long Mobis and short Glovis.
Navitas Ltd (NVT AU) has agreed to extend the exclusivity period granted to the BGH consortium to 1 March (from 18 Feb), in order to allow additional time for BGH to complete a limited set of remaining due diligence investigations.
Netcomm Wireless (NTC AU) has received $1.10 cash offer (53% premium to last close) from Casa Systems (CASA US) via a Scheme. The deal values Netcomm at ~US$114m. The scheme is subject to FIRB and shareholder approval. Stewart David Paul James, a NED, holds 12.3% and is the major shareholder. The announcement states that each Netcomm director intends to vote the Netcomm shares held by them in favour of the scheme – subject to a +ve IFA opinion and in the absence of a competing offer. This includes Stewart’s stake.
MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU)announced no superior proposal emerged after concluding its ’go shop’ period for rival offers to KKR’s takeover proposal. At a gross/annualised spread of 0.9%/4.8%, assuming early May payment, this looks to be trading a bit tight.
CCASS
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Saputo Inc (SAP CN) and Dairy Crest (DCG LN) today announced an all-cash deal where Saputo will buy Dairy Crest for 620p/share, to be implemented through a Scheme of Arrangement which the two parties say is likely to close in Q2 2019.
Saputo is a Canada-listed dairy company which has grown through serial acquisition – more than 30 acquisitions in the last twenty years – but curiously none of the acquisitions have left it with any operations in the UK. Dairy Crest is a leading UK-based dairy and cooking staples company whose best-known products are Cathedral City Cheddar Cheese, Clover margarine, Country Life butter, and Frylight cooking oil as well as other minor butter-similars and butter-replacement spreads.
This would be Saputo’s largest purchase in ten years – by a factor of three over their second largest – the purchase of Warrnambool Cheese & Butter Factory in Q1 2014.
Shares are trading through terms early, perhaps on expectations the wide open register means shareholders can try to hold out for a higher price.
At a decent premium (13.9x TTM EV/EBITDA at 620p) to where the rest of the smaller-cap dairy products sector trades (below 10x on a median basis), and the highest EV/Revenue or EV/EBITDA multiple that I can find Saputo having paid, asking for more may not get you more, but investors clearly think it worth a try.
An extra 10% would clear out most of the naysayers who bought in the frothier “we’re going to be an asset-light branded goods company” days of 2015-2017. It would put March 2019 PER at just under 20x and just under 13.9x March 2019 expected EV/EBITDA.
Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) is much in the news for many reasons – one of which being a plunge into the deeper waters of being the fourth Type I Mobile Network Operator in Japan, having officially applied for the license in February 2018 and seeing it approved in April. – the license for which it applied a year ago, with approval received in April 2018. The goal has been to use its initial foray into the MVNO business where it has more than 1.5 million users, and increase its footprint to attract some of its 100+mm Rakuten IDs, 7mm Rakuten Bank accountholders, 3mm Rakuten Securities accountholders, so that it can increase the LTV (LifeTimeValue) of its existing customer base.
The goal is to introduce service this year (also a requirement of the terms of its license), growing steadily to have 15mm subs in 10 years. The estimated hardware spend is said to be ¥600-700bn on base stations and equipment, initially concentrating on areas in and around mass transit stations in urban areas such as Tokyo and Osaka, and then expand outward. The company has signed deals with numerous partners in electricity distribution such as Tokyo Electric Power Co (9501 JP), Chubu Electric Power Co (9502 JP), and Kansai Electric Power Co (9503 JP) to install transmission equipment on these companies’ power poles and other infrastructure.
The shares have suffered mightily since the plan came to light in mid-December 2015, underperforming the TOPIX Info & Communications Sector Index by more than 20% in the fourteen months through yesterday. The sharp drop on the left hand side of the chart was a two-day sell-a-thon by investors convinced the company was about to waste billions of dollars. The Info & Communications Sector Index also dropped sharply on that day on fears that a fourth entrant with a declared goal of dropping monthly charges by 40% would increase churn at the existing Big Three (NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP), Softbank Corp (9434 JP), and KDDI Corp (9433 JP)) and possibly cause a price war. The shares dropped from about ¥1140 to ¥1020/share, and then slid another 30-odd percent in the next six months to ¥700/share.
The shares have rebounded, fell back in autumn general market weakness, rebounded a tie-up on payments with KDDI announced Nov1 and decent Q3 numbes announced less than 2 weeks later, got crushed in the sharp global selloff in November and December, then had a v-shaped rebound at the start of 2019.
At the end of January Rakuten Mobile Network received blanket licenses to transmit on 1.7Ghz in the major regions covering Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Nagoya and Yokohama from the local Bureaus of Communication, and expects to receive others soon. Last week, Rakuten reported full-year earnings through end-December with revenues up 16.6%yoy to just over ¥1.1 trillion, OP (IFRS) at ¥170.4bn, and Net Income at ¥142bn and on the same day announced Nokia had been granted the contract to deploy a turnkey solution as had been previously tested and speculated.
There are numerous telecom and retailing experts publishing on Smartkarma who have more expertise on Rakuten’s telecom plans and their plans to compete harder against Amazon Japan and Yahoo Japan and others in the e-tailing space.
I am not going to pretend to their level of knowledge on telecom or retailing (I found Kirk Boodry’s piece on the upcoming 5G allocations in March to be particularly informative) but I will note that Rakuten has a) the ability to borrow against the hardware and licenses, b) can roll out hardware quarter-by-quarter, and c) the KDDI/Rakuten deal is important. In it, KDDI will give Rakuten access to its nationwide roaming network, and Rakuten will provide KDDI with expertise on mobile payments – especially relevant as KDDI is now building out au Financial as briefly discussed here.
But There is More NewsFlow To Come, And THAT is Interesting
In March 2015, Rakuten CEO Hiroshi Mikitani announced that Rakuten had invested US$300mm in a then just-become-unicorn ride-sharing company called Lyft Inc (0812823D US), which at the end of the Series E round in May 2015 would leave it with ~11.9% of the company at a ~US$2.4-2.5bn post-money valuation. Recent articles suggest that Rakuten remains the top investor (though a WSJ article 2 weeks ago noted there would be golden shares. Hiroshi Mikitani remains a board member of Lyft.
That becomes important as by all accounts I can find (much more detail below), Rakuten continued investing in the four subsequent funding rounds through last summer, leaving the company as the largest single shareholder in Lyft as it prepares for its IPO later this spring. Lyft confidentially filed its IPO paperwork (a “draft S-1”) with the SEC in early December 2018, leaping ahead of Uber in the race to IPO first so the much larger Uber valuation doesn’t block Lyft’s chances for raising funds.
Reuters carried an article Thursday night Asia time saying Lyft planned to start its roadshow the week of March 18th, with an expected valuation of US$20-25 billion, and the first-mover advantage would allow Lyft to set the metrics it wants to use upon which to be judged and priced (if it waited, it would have to be compared to Uber). That could mean more emphasis on the company’s strong suite of self-driving partnerships (drive.ai, Ford, GM, Jaguar, Nutonomy, Waymo, others). A March 18th roadshow would require a full S-1 filing two weeks prior to that.
A successful IPO story based on picking up market share (reportedly doubled to 28% by end-2018 vs end-2016) might make Rakuten’s other investments look good too (Rakuten led Series B, C, D, and E funding for Spanish-language ride-hailing app cabify from 2014-2018 (and reportedly pushed cabify to merge with Lyft last year) and has invested in multiple rounds in SE Asian version GoJek.
The runup to this IPO and the clarity a filing could provide on ownership could provide a near-term fillip to Rakuten’s share price.
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On Friday 22 February after the close, NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP)announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February.
The buyback has already occurred. This is largely technical. But it has an interesting side effect.
An activist has come forward, and the external statutory auditor and lead shareholder (wife of founder) are against the offer, but Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) situation still fits pretty cleanly in the “Too Hard” bucket for now.
Since announcing its foray into the deeper waters of being the fourth Type I Mobile Network Operator in Japan, Rakuten’s shares have taken a mighty hit. But the focus in this insight is on ride-sharing company Lyft. In March 2015, Rakuten CEO Hiroshi Mikitani announced that Rakuten had invested US$300mn in Lyft, giving it a 11.9% stake after Series E round in May 2015. Recent articles suggest that Rakuten remains the top investor.
As best as Travis Lundy can tell, from sources who track this, Rakuten is the single largest shareholder in Lyft, with a holding in the 10.4-12.0% range. That would suggest a position value of US$900mn-$1.2bn based on the last funding round in June 2018. At a $25bn pre-money IPO valuation, that would be worth US$1.5-2.0bn for a likely pre-tax IPO uplift of US$590-800mn.
A report late Thursday Asia time suggested the Lyft roadshow would start the week of March 18th, which would mean the S-1 will be available two weeks before that. Investors will know more about Rakuten’s ownership of Lyft by the end of next week or very early the following week. Travis would want to be long for now.
DHICO announced a larger-than-expected ₩608.4bn rights offer. ₩543bn is expected to be raised through common shares at a preliminary price of ₩6,390; and ₩65bn via RCPS at a preliminary price of ₩6,970. This is a combined 72.56% capital increase a 42.05% share dilution. Concurrently, Doosan E&C announced a ₩420bn rights offer at a preliminary price of ₩1,255, a 15% discount to last close.
For DHICO, Mar 27 is the ex-rights day for both Common and RCPS. Subscription rights (for the Common) will be listed and trade on Apr 19~25. May 2 is final pricing. May 8 is subscription and May 16 is payment. New Common shares will be listed on May 29.
For E&C, the final price will be fixed on Apr 30. Whichever is higher – ₩1,255 or Apr 26~30 VWAP at a 40% discount – will be the final offering price. Mar 27 will be the ex-rights day. Subscription rights will be listed and traded on Apr 18~24. New shares will be listed on May 24.
₩1,255 is a lot more aggressive than generally viewed. DHICO owns nearly two thirds of E&C. With a 20% oversubscription, nearly ₩300bn will likely come from DHICO, essentially buttressing E&C at an even heftier price. Which is probably why the market is being less harsh on E&C relative to DHICO.
The 247-4 Form is out with a tender offer period between 26 Feb-1 April, and payment on the 4th April. The frustrating part is how Delta’s FY18 dividend of Bt2.30 is treated. On one hand, it says the Bt71 Offer price is final unless there is a MAC. Further into the Offer doc, it mentions the Offeror “reserves the right” to reduce the offer price if a dividend is paid. DELTA’s IR believes the dividend will be added, but it is not crystal clear.
Furthermore, there is no minimum acceptance condition, as potentially flagged earlier, which means there is no possibility of fast-tracking payment. Some precedent voluntary offers included a minimum acceptance, which provides an expedited payment should investors who tender shares AND revoke their right to withdraw – provided that minimum is fulfilled.
Shares traded up after the document came out, shrugging off the ambiguity in the document. Currently trading at a gross/annualised return of 1.1%/11%. The dividend is subject to a 10% tax for non-residents.
The previous Friday, the Offerors for M1 announced that their Offer had been declared Unconditional In All Respects as the tendered amount was 57.04% and the total held by concert parties was 76.35%. Axiata Group (AXIATA MK)made an announcement to the Bursa Malaysia that it had accepted the Offer as required because it was a significant asset disposal. Going unconditional has triggered an extension of the Closing Date to 4 March 2019.
If you want to fight this with an appraisal, you can. Travis doesn’t see the point. If you want to hold on to the stock in order to block full squeezeout and play chicken with the big boys, you can, but it requires a relatively big ticket (roughly 6.73% of the shares out).
So Travis recommends taking the money. It was better to take the money in early January and re-deploy, rather than wait for the close of the offer. He would accept now and sees no upside from waiting.
When the Tender Offer / MBO for Kosaido was announced last month, Travis’ first reaction was that this was wrong, concluding this was a virtual asset strip in progress, and suggested that the only way this was likely to not get done is if some brave activist came forward.
Shortly afterwards, an activist did come forward. Yoshiaki Murakami’s bought 5% through his entity Reno KK, and later lifted his stake (combined with affiliates) to 9.55%. Travis thought the stock had run too far at that point (¥775/share). While still cheap, he did not expect Bain to lift its price by 30+%, nor a white knight to arrive quickly enough.
This week a media article suggested longstanding external statutory auditor Mr. Nakatsuji and lead shareholder Sakurai Mie were against the takeover.
The possibility this deal fails because the “put protection” of the deal price at ¥610 is no longer solid has gone up. Conversely, the probability that Bain and the MBO have to come in with a price adjustment higher has gone up. Travis is inclined to remain bearish in the medium-term as there is a significant likelihood there is no alternative solution during the Tender Offer period itself.
After announcing earlier this month a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction”, the AFR is now reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star has also joined the battle for Aveo Group (AOG AU). (A Case for Privatising Aveo)
Saputo Inc (SAP CN) and Dairy Crest announced an all-cash deal where Saputo will buy Dairy Crest for 620p/share, to be implemented through a Scheme of Arrangement with an expected close in Q2 2019. This appears to tick all the necessary boxes. Friendly, horizontal integration, and limited job losses. Shares are trading through terms early (he published at 628.5p), perhaps on expectations the wide open register means shareholders can try to hold out for a higher price.
At almost 14x EV/EBITDA on a TTM basis and a bit lower on a March 2019 FY-end basis, it is a high enough multiple to not be insulting for a dairy company, and may keep other suitors away.
Dairy Crest’s directors have given irrevocable notice to accept, and the directors’ advisors (Greenhill & Co) have deemed the Offer “fair and reasonable.”
One extra turn of EV/EBITDA would lift the takeover price just under 10%. That would clear out most of the naysayers who bought in the frothier “we’re going to be an asset-light branded goods company” days of 2015-2017. Doable, but as it is an agreed deal, Travis doesn’t see the need to push it.
In its prior letter to Ophir on the 14 January, Petrus recommended selling the South-East Asian (SEA) assets to Medco, with a low-end fair value, before synergies, of £0.64/share, through to £1.42/share on a blue sky basis. It also argued that Ophir should negotiate with the Equatorial Guinea ministry (the regulator that terminated the Fortuna license, resulting in write-offs of US$610mn) to be compensated for its $700mn investment and the unfair seizure of the license, otherwise it would set a precedent for other international operators doing business in EG.
Petrus has now rounded on Schrader over perceived mismanagement of the EG licence, and a lack of professionalism in not soliciting and considering offers for Ophir from other buyers. Petrus’ beef is not an outlier – alternative hedge fund Sand Grove has increased its exposure, via cash-settled derivatives, to 17.28% (as at 13 February); while Ian Hannam, who advised Ophir’s board on its 2013 right issue, is understood to have also written to Ophir’s interim CEO Alan Booth and the board saying Medco’s offer is too low.
Overall, Petrus’ assertions that Ophir is being sold at “sub optimal terms” appear valid, most notably on the EG compensation and the illogical operations update earlier this month. The alternative push to sell the SEA assets separately, as that has been Medco’s core focus, not international operations, also makes sense.
Last month, DSV A/S (DSV DC) made a public proposal of a takeover for cash and scrip valued at CHF 170/share, which came at a 24% premium to last and +31% vs 1-month VWAP. The #2, #3, and long-time #4 shareholders are firmly and publicly in the camp of trying to get something done. 45.9%-shareholder Ernst Göhner Foundation is sending mixed signals – do they want a higher price? Or do they want to wait and let Panalpina grow by its own consolidator strategy?
Panalpina has now confirmed that it in preliminary talks with Kuwait-listed logistics company Agility Public Warehouse. A Bloomberg report suggested a deal could be reached as early as this past week for Agility’s logistics business. The same article suggested the Göhner Foundation is supportive of the new talks. Agility’s press release was much more non-committal.
DSV has also announced a new all cash CHF 180/share offer for Panalpina; although the original cash and scrip offer was then worth CHF 184.5/share, which is an even better premium to pre-offer terms. One wonders whether cash-only would suit the Foundation; the DSV press release seemed to respond to that.
It is not clear what would drive the Foundation to give up its control. And Panalpina’s measly share price reaction to the all-cash offer suggest there is considerable skepticism out there. But at some price, Panalpina’s board looks pretty stupid to not accept the cash.
If you do not think a deal with DSV has any chance of getting up, Panalpina shares are a sell here. If they overpay for Agility and cannot improve their own margins well past historical highs in a market trending weaker, then the shares could drop.
Using Curtis’ figures, the implied stub is at its lowest level since a brief downward spike in February 2015, and you would have to go back to April 2014 to find a lower level.
The push back on this setup is that the auto operations have recorded marginally, yet sequential profit declines in FY16 and FY17; while recording three sequential quarterly declines up to December 2018. The big question is whether Mahindra can regain market share as it kick-starts a new model cycle.
In contrast, Sanghyun believes the Holdco is still undervalued relative to the Sub by about 10%. Plugging in Sanghyun’s numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of 45% against a one-year average of 30%, with a 12-month range of -51.5% to 15.5% (premium).
Back on the 13 December 2018, Can One announced a proposed MGO for Kian Joo at RM3.10/share, a 52.7% premium to last close. This required Can One shareholders’ approval which was received on the 14 February. Can One’s current 33% stake in Kian Joo accounts for ~86% of its market cap. The offer doc should be out, on or before the 7 March, with payment either late March (along with the first close of the Offer), or early April, depending on when the offer turns unconditional. The offer is conditional on 50% acceptance. Both sides are illiquid.
This looks like a decent exit for Kian Joo shareholders. Apart from EPF with 10.1%, former NED Teow China See is the only other shareholder with >5% with 8.9%.
For Can One, this is an aggressive pitch to make Kian Joo a subsidiary amidst an uncertain economic backdrop, while potential synergies may be offset via higher interest costs.
There are still two schools of thought on the HMG restructuring. One is that Glovis/Mobis are merged into a holdco entity. Or Glovis becomes the holdco with Mobis→ HM→ Kia Motors Corp (000270 KS) below. Since late 3Q18, there has been increased speculation on the latter. This has pushed up Glovis’ price relative to Mobis.
Each outcome is beset with its own set of issues. For Glovis to be the sole holdco, it has to come up with nearly ₩2tn to buy Kia’s Mobis stake, probably through new, and burdensome, debt. Glovis may also face the risk of forced holdco conversion, creating an issue with Kia as a “great grandson” subsidiary.
This speculation pushing up Glovis relative to Mobis has yet to be substantiated/justified, suggesting Glovis is overbought. Sanghyun expects a mean reversion, and recommends a long Mobis and short Glovis.
Navitas Ltd (NVT AU) has agreed to extend the exclusivity period granted to the BGH consortium to 1 March (from 18 Feb), in order to allow additional time for BGH to complete a limited set of remaining due diligence investigations.
Netcomm Wireless (NTC AU) has received $1.10 cash offer (53% premium to last close) from Casa Systems (CASA US) via a Scheme. The deal values Netcomm at ~US$114m. The scheme is subject to FIRB and shareholder approval. Stewart David Paul James, a NED, holds 12.3% and is the major shareholder. The announcement states that each Netcomm director intends to vote the Netcomm shares held by them in favour of the scheme – subject to a +ve IFA opinion and in the absence of a competing offer. This includes Stewart’s stake.
MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU)announced no superior proposal emerged after concluding its ’go shop’ period for rival offers to KKR’s takeover proposal. At a gross/annualised spread of 0.9%/4.8%, assuming early May payment, this looks to be trading a bit tight.
CCASS
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Saputo Inc (SAP CN) and Dairy Crest (DCG LN) today announced an all-cash deal where Saputo will buy Dairy Crest for 620p/share, to be implemented through a Scheme of Arrangement which the two parties say is likely to close in Q2 2019.
Saputo is a Canada-listed dairy company which has grown through serial acquisition – more than 30 acquisitions in the last twenty years – but curiously none of the acquisitions have left it with any operations in the UK. Dairy Crest is a leading UK-based dairy and cooking staples company whose best-known products are Cathedral City Cheddar Cheese, Clover margarine, Country Life butter, and Frylight cooking oil as well as other minor butter-similars and butter-replacement spreads.
This would be Saputo’s largest purchase in ten years – by a factor of three over their second largest – the purchase of Warrnambool Cheese & Butter Factory in Q1 2014.
Shares are trading through terms early, perhaps on expectations the wide open register means shareholders can try to hold out for a higher price.
At a decent premium (13.9x TTM EV/EBITDA at 620p) to where the rest of the smaller-cap dairy products sector trades (below 10x on a median basis), and the highest EV/Revenue or EV/EBITDA multiple that I can find Saputo having paid, asking for more may not get you more, but investors clearly think it worth a try.
An extra 10% would clear out most of the naysayers who bought in the frothier “we’re going to be an asset-light branded goods company” days of 2015-2017. It would put March 2019 PER at just under 20x and just under 13.9x March 2019 expected EV/EBITDA.
Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) is much in the news for many reasons – one of which being a plunge into the deeper waters of being the fourth Type I Mobile Network Operator in Japan, having officially applied for the license in February 2018 and seeing it approved in April. – the license for which it applied a year ago, with approval received in April 2018. The goal has been to use its initial foray into the MVNO business where it has more than 1.5 million users, and increase its footprint to attract some of its 100+mm Rakuten IDs, 7mm Rakuten Bank accountholders, 3mm Rakuten Securities accountholders, so that it can increase the LTV (LifeTimeValue) of its existing customer base.
The goal is to introduce service this year (also a requirement of the terms of its license), growing steadily to have 15mm subs in 10 years. The estimated hardware spend is said to be ¥600-700bn on base stations and equipment, initially concentrating on areas in and around mass transit stations in urban areas such as Tokyo and Osaka, and then expand outward. The company has signed deals with numerous partners in electricity distribution such as Tokyo Electric Power Co (9501 JP), Chubu Electric Power Co (9502 JP), and Kansai Electric Power Co (9503 JP) to install transmission equipment on these companies’ power poles and other infrastructure.
The shares have suffered mightily since the plan came to light in mid-December 2015, underperforming the TOPIX Info & Communications Sector Index by more than 20% in the fourteen months through yesterday. The sharp drop on the left hand side of the chart was a two-day sell-a-thon by investors convinced the company was about to waste billions of dollars. The Info & Communications Sector Index also dropped sharply on that day on fears that a fourth entrant with a declared goal of dropping monthly charges by 40% would increase churn at the existing Big Three (NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP), Softbank Corp (9434 JP), and KDDI Corp (9433 JP)) and possibly cause a price war. The shares dropped from about ¥1140 to ¥1020/share, and then slid another 30-odd percent in the next six months to ¥700/share.
The shares have rebounded, fell back in autumn general market weakness, rebounded a tie-up on payments with KDDI announced Nov1 and decent Q3 numbes announced less than 2 weeks later, got crushed in the sharp global selloff in November and December, then had a v-shaped rebound at the start of 2019.
At the end of January Rakuten Mobile Network received blanket licenses to transmit on 1.7Ghz in the major regions covering Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Nagoya and Yokohama from the local Bureaus of Communication, and expects to receive others soon. Last week, Rakuten reported full-year earnings through end-December with revenues up 16.6%yoy to just over ¥1.1 trillion, OP (IFRS) at ¥170.4bn, and Net Income at ¥142bn and on the same day announced Nokia had been granted the contract to deploy a turnkey solution as had been previously tested and speculated.
There are numerous telecom and retailing experts publishing on Smartkarma who have more expertise on Rakuten’s telecom plans and their plans to compete harder against Amazon Japan and Yahoo Japan and others in the e-tailing space.
I am not going to pretend to their level of knowledge on telecom or retailing (I found Kirk Boodry’s piece on the upcoming 5G allocations in March to be particularly informative) but I will note that Rakuten has a) the ability to borrow against the hardware and licenses, b) can roll out hardware quarter-by-quarter, and c) the KDDI/Rakuten deal is important. In it, KDDI will give Rakuten access to its nationwide roaming network, and Rakuten will provide KDDI with expertise on mobile payments – especially relevant as KDDI is now building out au Financial as briefly discussed here.
But There is More NewsFlow To Come, And THAT is Interesting
In March 2015, Rakuten CEO Hiroshi Mikitani announced that Rakuten had invested US$300mm in a then just-become-unicorn ride-sharing company called Lyft Inc (0812823D US), which at the end of the Series E round in May 2015 would leave it with ~11.9% of the company at a ~US$2.4-2.5bn post-money valuation. Recent articles suggest that Rakuten remains the top investor (though a WSJ article 2 weeks ago noted there would be golden shares. Hiroshi Mikitani remains a board member of Lyft.
That becomes important as by all accounts I can find (much more detail below), Rakuten continued investing in the four subsequent funding rounds through last summer, leaving the company as the largest single shareholder in Lyft as it prepares for its IPO later this spring. Lyft confidentially filed its IPO paperwork (a “draft S-1”) with the SEC in early December 2018, leaping ahead of Uber in the race to IPO first so the much larger Uber valuation doesn’t block Lyft’s chances for raising funds.
Reuters carried an article Thursday night Asia time saying Lyft planned to start its roadshow the week of March 18th, with an expected valuation of US$20-25 billion, and the first-mover advantage would allow Lyft to set the metrics it wants to use upon which to be judged and priced (if it waited, it would have to be compared to Uber). That could mean more emphasis on the company’s strong suite of self-driving partnerships (drive.ai, Ford, GM, Jaguar, Nutonomy, Waymo, others). A March 18th roadshow would require a full S-1 filing two weeks prior to that.
A successful IPO story based on picking up market share (reportedly doubled to 28% by end-2018 vs end-2016) might make Rakuten’s other investments look good too (Rakuten led Series B, C, D, and E funding for Spanish-language ride-hailing app cabify from 2014-2018 (and reportedly pushed cabify to merge with Lyft last year) and has invested in multiple rounds in SE Asian version GoJek.
The runup to this IPO and the clarity a filing could provide on ownership could provide a near-term fillip to Rakuten’s share price.
Doosan E&C’s rights offer is pretty much in line with the street’s initial expectation. They raise an estimated ₩420bil at an offer price of ₩1,255. The recently amended KRX rule allows an issuer to freely set an offer price. They set it at ₩1,255 based on the Feb 13~20 prices with a 15% discount.
Final price will be fixed on Apr 30. Whichever higher of ₩1,255 or Apr 26~30 VWAP at a 40% discount will be a final offering price. So, offering price must be at least ₩1,255. Mar 27 will be the ex-rights day. Subscription rights will be listed and traded on Apr 18~24. New shares will be listed on May 24.
₩1,255 is a lot more aggressive than generally viewed. DHICO owns nearly two thirds of E&C stake. With a 20% oversubscription, nearly ₩300bil will likely come from DHICO. This is like DHICO is helping E&C at an even heftier price. This is why the market is being much softer on E&C relative to DHICO.
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