Event-Driven

In this briefing:

1. HDC Holdco Trade: Holdco Re-Rating Should Be Transferred to Sub, Time to Long Sub/Short Holdco
2. Last Week in Event SPACE: Nintendo, Panalpina, Versum, Hanergy, Descente, Hopewell
3. Nexon Valuation Analysis
4. WABCO Confirms Being a Takeover Target of The Private German Auto Parts Maker, ZF
5. Taisho To Launch Another DHG Pharma Tender

1. HDC Holdco Trade: Holdco Re-Rating Should Be Transferred to Sub, Time to Long Sub/Short Holdco

• HDC Holdco and its major Sub HDC-OP are now at 247% of σ on a 20D MA for the first time since mid Nov last year. On a 120D, their current price ratio is substantially higher than the mean. Holdco discount is now 40% to NAV. This is nearly a 10%p drop since early Jan.
• My previous stub trade on the HDC duo again paid off very nicely. I went long Holdco and short Sub on Jan 11. This trade is now delivering a 15% return. During this period, Holdco climbed 23%. Sub went up 8%. They created a 15%p gap in price performance. Holdco’s 23% running was mainly attributable to re-rating of some of its major unlisted holdings.
• Sub also has several key assets that could equally be re-rated. Much of Holdco’s assets that have presumably undergone re-ratings lately are business wise closely correlated with Sub. A 15%p price yield gap should be too harsh on Sub. I expect their price ratio will be challenged downwardly at this level on a short term time horizon.
• I’d close my previous position. I’d initiate a new trade. I’d go long Sub and short Holdco. I’d close this trade at < 50% of σ. Given the fluctuation level of this duo, this’d give nearly a 8% yield. 

2. Last Week in Event SPACE: Nintendo, Panalpina, Versum, Hanergy, Descente, Hopewell

Last Week in Event SPACE …

• Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)‘s offering and the buyback are strong symbols and practical examples of what the Corporate Governance Code wants to accomplish.
• Calling an EGM by the Ernst Göhner Foundation is both “sneaky” AND interesting (and bullish) news for the Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) offer by DSV A/S (DSV DC). 

• Merck KGaA (MRK GY) gatecrashes Versum Materials (VSM US)/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) friendly merger.

• Shareholders in Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) face a “Hobson’s Choice” ahead of its forced delisting.

• With the combination of increased hostility leading to a greater likelihood of eventual private takeout, shorts will cover and foreigners may buy, squeezing existing Descente Ltd (8114 JP) minorities up and out.

• The IFA conclusion is flawed on Hopewell Holdings (54 HK)‘s low-ball Offer.

• Plus other events, CCASS movements and expected upcoming events for key M&A transactions.

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP) (Mkt Cap: $33.3bn; Liquidity: $615mn)
Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP) (Mkt Cap: $3.4bn; Liquidity: $7mn)

Nintendo announced (J) a Secondary Share Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding. Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the then-last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe. On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33bn worth (whichever is reached first) to be commenced the day after settlement of the Offering.

• These banks (such as Bank of Kyoto) which have long-held policy cross-holdings in a Kyoto company with a diehard Kyoto cultural heritage (which can often include a diehard cross-holding culture) may have all succumbed to the new Corporate Governance Code. This is really important. 
• This deal is going to retail investors, quite specifically because Nintendo management and board view retail investors as both “sticky” investors and likely to largely follow management’s agenda in AGMs. Management might have misjudged how much this will get flipped.
  
• The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains. Given the size, it looks like the former though it will be difficult to get confirmation. Travis Lundy would want to be long Bank of Kyoto both outright and against the cross-holding portfolio.

link to Travis’ insight:
Nintendo Offering & Buyback: The Import & The Dynamics
Bank of Kyoto – Nintendo Sale A Portent of Changes To Come?

NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP) (Mkt Cap: $72.4bn; Liquidity: $92mn)

NTT Docomo announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February. The buyback has already occurred. However, by the vagaries of TSE-calculated indices, they lead to index down-weightings (unless otherwise offset).

• This is a very large cancellation for a very large company, so it means a selldown of – by Travis’ estimate – 21.5-22.8mm shares at the close of trading March 28th. Traders looking to tilt short NTT Docomo or tilt long NTT short NTT Docomo will have that as a tailwind.

(link to Travis’ insight: NTT Docomo Share Cancellation)

Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) (Mkt Cap: $3.7bn; Liquidity: $21mn)

Panalpina’s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation (EGF), made a formal request to hold an EGM prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted. The situation has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the EGF which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change. 

• EGF wants to pass this giving everyone their capital share percentage vote because the alternative is worse. Getting this passed would slightly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance but it would mean that the EGF could continue to block any deal it did not like.  The thing is, there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants EGF that “grandfathered” exemption.
• Cevian wants to block such this from going through, and to have the EGF capped at 5% like the Articles of Association suggest all should be. Cevian says that Panalpina has unlawfully maintained a grandfathering exemption from the 5% cap for the EGF. IF the EGF is capped, it means that effectively the EGF loses the ability to block deals they don’t like. 
• The situation is weird. It is possible that Panalpina is asking a convoluted and possibly unlawful voting structure with non-best-practice registration deadlines to vote on changing the vote structure. To Travis, this actually probably deserves a court challenge.

links to Travis’ insight:
Panalpina To Have EGM to Approve One Share One Vote.
The Mechanics of the Panalpina Vote

Versum Materials (VSM US) (Mkt Cap: $5.4bn; Liquidity: $60mn)

Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum with the announcement of a $48/share (51.7% premium to the undisturbed) acquisition proposal. Late last month Versum and Entegris announced a $9bn (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the remaining 52.5%.

• It’s now in VSM’s court. Should it opt to ditch Entegris’ merger-of-equals proposal and side with Merck, it would incur a US$140mn termination fee or $1.28/share.
• John DeMasi reckons Merck’s proposal is superior, however a pure cash offer vs. stock swap are not directly comparable. The prospect of Entegris substantially increasing the exchange ratio or adding a chunk of cash to the merger consideration seems remote. John expects we will see a bump in Merck’s offer to make it friendly, and a recommended deal, in short order.

(link to John’s insight: Versum Materials – Entegris Beaten to the Punch by Merck KGaA)

Wabco Holdings (WBC US) (Mkt Cap: $7.1bn; Liquidity: $56mn)

Brake supplier, Wabco confirmed that it is in takeover talks with ZF Friedrichshafen, one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany.   ZF and Wabco jointly develop the Evasive Manoeuvre Assist system for trucks, combining Wabco’s braking and vehicle dynamics control systems alongside ZF’s active steering technology.

• The pushback is the Zeppelin Foundation, ZF’s controlling shareholder, and its aversion to taking on excess debt. Management and the foundation previously clashed over the €13.5bn TRW transaction in 2015.

(link to Lightstream’s insight: WABCO Confirms Being a Takeover Target of The Private German Auto Parts Maker, ZF)

Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) (Mkt Cap/Liquidity: n.a) 

Back in October last year, Hanergy Mobile Energy Holdings Group Limited (HMEH), Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s majority shareholder, announced an intention to privatise the company at “no less than HK$5/share” via cash or scrip. Hanergy has now announced the intention of HMEH to privatise the company by way of a Scheme. The ultimate intention of HMEH still remains the listing of Hanergy’s business in China. The key issue, putting aside the fact Hanergy has been suspended for near-on four years, is that the scrip consideration has no assigned value.

• Long-suffering shareholders, who comprise 32.49% of shares out, have the dubious honour of holding SPV shares (with an as yet undermined jurisdiction), which may remain in A-share pre-listing purgatory; or should the Scheme fail/lapse, they will hold unlisted shares if Hanergy fails to resume trading by end-July 2019, as would be the case per recently introduced HKEx guidelines. Such an outcome affords HMEH the flexibility to potentially squeeze out minorities at a bargain price.
• It is not clear why the SFC is okay with this takeover proposal, apart from simply being open to any idea to remove Hanergy from the Exchange. At a guess, the SPV consideration structure (as opposed to a straightforward cash offer) is possibly geared to reduce shareholder rights compared to those available under Bermuda Companies Act, Bermuda being where Hanergy is incorporated.
• The Scheme doc, due out later this month, or early next, requires sign-off from the SFC. Presumably the SPV jurisdiction should at least be known by then. It is hard to believe an official takeover document would be dispatched boasting no determinate offer value in addition to unknown shareholder protection rights attached to the unlisted scrip.

(link to my insight: Hanergy’s Hobson’s Choice)

Descente Ltd (8114 JP) (Mkt Cap: $1.7bn; Liquidity: $5mn) 

Descente said will release its Mid-Term Plan early in an effort to encourage shareholders to not tender. For its part, Itochu has released an amendment to its original doc, saying Descente has been naughty (bad-mouthing Itochu to the press while in negotiations), and that it will wait until after the Tender Offer is completed to re-engage. Itochu effectively reserves the right to go full hostile.

• ANTA’s CEO was quoted in an interview saying ANTA supports Itochu’s tender offer and management restructuring and governance initiatives because they say they believe it will lift corporate value.  That means Itochu+ANTA have a functional majority if not absolute.
• This should raise back end values. Descente management is quite stuck here. To Travis, there is likely some upside optionality. Some may decide to stick with the company, raising pro-ration rates.

(link to Travis’ insight: Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile)

Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) (Mkt Cap: $4bn; Liquidity: $11mn) 

The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May.  

• The Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years – the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down. The widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK) in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
• Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. Therefore, the IFA concluded the Offer is reasonable by referencing the premium to last close and historical pricing. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
• A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK) privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ). Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7.8%/45.4%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down.

(link to my insight: Hopewell’s Egregiously Bad Offer, But What Can You Do?) 

DHG Pharmaceutical Jsc (DHG VN) (Mkt Cap: $668mn; Liquidity: $1.5mn) 

Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer at VND 120,000 (3.5% premium to the previous close when the doc was prepared), this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG, lifting its stake to 56.69%.

• The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) owns 43.31%. IF the SCIC tenders, the minimum proration is 33.38%.  IF the SCIC does NOT tender their shares, this is effectively a full tender. All of your shares would be purchased.
• The very recent performance has been most curious. The last 11 days – before the announcement – have seen the stock move 37.6% on 9x average volume, with little to no news to drive it as far as Travis can tell. Looks some leakage ahead of the partial offer announcement.

• Travis thinks there is a non-negligible possibility that Taisho will have to bump their Tender Offer Price. And a non-negligible chance that SCIC tenders.

(link to Travis’ insight: Taisho To Launch Another DHG Pharma Tender)

Yahoo Japan (4689 JP) (Mkt Cap: $13.5bn; Liquidity: $53mn) 

OYO, the largest budget hotel network in India, announced a JV with Yahoo Japan to expand its co-living rental service, “OYO Living”, to Japan. OYO will own 66.1% while YJ will own the remainder of the JV, named “Oyo Technology & Hospitality Japan”. 

• Rebranded as “OYO Life”, the service would be the first of its kind, in the virtually non-existent co-living market in Japan. In Japan, apartments are usually compact single-occupier units as opposed to shared spaces, which might pose a problem for OYO’s co-living model. 

• Assuming the model is a success and OYO Life could ramp up its capacity to around 150,000 beds in Tokyo, which is around 5% of the total apartment stock in central Tokyo, this would contribute around ¥3bn (2% of net income in FY03/18) to Yahoo Japan’s net income. There is potential for further gains, however, this would depend on how ready Tokyo is to move into a “Co-Living” culture en masse.

(link to LightStream Research ‘s insight: Yahoo Japan’s JV with OYO Could Be Big, If Tokyo Is Ready to “Co-Live”)

Ruralco Holdings (RHL AU) (Mkt Cap: $335mn; Liquidity: $0.5mn)

Ruralco has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.

• Nutrien has first mover advantage, however a counter from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) is possible. The two companies have a history after Ruralco attempted to buy out Elders in 2012, but failed over a disagreement in pricing.
• ACCC should not be issue to this transaction. A 2013 ruling did not oppose a Ruralco/Elders tie-up, and a similar conclusion is expected for Nutrien.
• The gross/annualised spread of 0.2%/0.7% is unattractive. But at this deal price, Elders could still come over the top. Trading itself at 11.4x EV/EBITDA (according to CapIQ), upping the price by 10% would still be accretive to Elders.

(link to my insight: Nutrien’s Move On Ruralco Makes Agronomic Sense)

Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) (Mkt Cap: $792mn; Liquidity: $1mn) 

Revealed in the release of notes about the Board approval of the Independent Review Committee’s review in late January was the news that Otis offered to buy the company for NT$63/share but it didn’t go anywhere. In addition, some directors – most likely the partisan ones installed in the failed board proxy fight last summer – objected to the lower minimum threshold, which is a sign they don’t want the deal to go through (because the lowering of that threshold is otherwise an unmitigated positive for minority investors).

• Despite stories of a suit of breach of trust against six directors for not entertaining or pursuing offers at NT$63 by Otis and/or Schindler, the company had not received any notification from judicial authorities and has not updated the market about Tender-related matters in the last two weeks.
• Travis thinks there is the small possibility of a bump to NT$63; but it is not a difficult deal to get done at the minimum threshold at NT$60.

(link to Travis’ insight: Yungtay Noises Haven’t Produced a Result Yet) 

Golden Land Prop Dvlp (GOLD TB) (Mkt Cap: $611mn; Liquidity: $1mn) 

Frasers Property (Thailand) Pcl (FPT TB) has announced a conditional voluntary tender offer for GOLD at Bt8.50/share, ~2.4% premium to last close. Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP) owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicle Univentures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.

• This tender offer therefore has been initiated to consolidate the Sirivadhanabhakdi family’s holding into GOLD. Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. The tender offer will be unconditional.
• The intention to delist GOLD is evident although it will be challenging for FPT to secure 90%+ in the tender offer process, given the single-digit premium to last close, and the fact GOLD traded above the current terms as recently as early December. Getting to 90% requires almost 50% of the minority to submit their shares.
• Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 2.4%/5.9% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.

(link to my insight: Golden Land: Less An Offer, More A Consolidation Of Interests) 

Sichuan Swellfun Co Ltd A (600779 CH)(Mkt Cap: $3.1bn; Liquidity: $28mn) 

Diageo announced it had approached the board of directors of Sichuan Swellfun with a proposal to increase its stake from 60% to 70% at RMB 45.00/share. This was a 19.33% premium to the last close and a 40.05% premium to the 30-day average.

• On a trading basis, this is somewhat interesting. If you are quite bullish the stock, you have a partial put (and you own it already). If you are tentatively bullish A-shares, this offers you a partial put, but there is a possibility that the RMB 45.00 price creates a kind of short-term cap just because it is a sticky price in peoples’ minds.
• Travis is not particularly bearish the stock despite the fact that the earnings forecasts have dropped a fair bit since he looked at this six months ago. The consensus EPS forecasts for Dec 2020 today are roughly the same as they were for Dec 2019 six months ago.

(link to Travis’ insight: Diageo Proposes Another Partial Tender for Sichuan Swellfun)

Briefly …

• Douglas Kim reported that Amazon.com Inc (AMZN US) and Comcast Corp Class A (CMCSA US) may enter the race and have submitted initial bids to acquire Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)/NXC Corp. (link to Douglas’s insight:  Nexon M&A: Amazon & Comcast Enter the Race – It Ain’t Over Till Its Over!)
• The new news on Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) is that the independent statutory auditor Nakatsuji-san has officially expressed his opposition to the Tender Offer. With the shares 19% through terms despite what appears to be no increase by the main activist in the last two weeks, the likelihood retail will tender at ¥610/share looks low, and this seems a situation where the deal may fail unless there is a bump. (link to Travis’ insight: Kosaido (7868 JP) TOB Extended)
• On the 28 Feb, Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ)‘s shares went ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected, but Travis thinks they could fall further: there is no compelling reason to own the bank after it goes ex-rights to receive cash. (link to Travis’ insight: Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights)

PCCW Ltd (8 HK) / HKT Ltd (6823 HK)

FY18 results for PCCW, HKT, and PCPD are out. Plugging in the de-consolidated numbers, I estimate PCCW’s discount to NAV at ~37%, right on the 2 STD line. On a simple ratio (PCCW/HKT), it is again approaching an all-time low. 

• Still select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW’s stub ops, recording negative EBITDA in FY18, reversing the positive figure recorded in FY17. FY16’s stub EBITDA was also negative.
• One positive takeaway is that the dividend pass through is holding at around 90%.

(link to my insight: StubWorld: PCCW Is “Cheap” but Stub Ops Are Deteriorating)

Korean Stubs Spotlight

Douglas provided the one-year share price comparisons of 30 Korean holdcos and the opcos as well as changes to the foreign ownership stakes of these companies YTD. Significant changes to the foreign shareholdings of these companies sometimes lead to opportunities in the holdco/opco pair trades. 

• Among these 30 pair, five recorded significant share prices divergence in the past year (by 30% or more): Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) vs. Hyosung Advanced Materials C (298050 KS), BGF Retail (282330 KS) vs. BGF Co Ltd (027410 KS), Doosan Corp (000150 KS) vs. Doosan Heavy Industries (034020 KS), Cuckoo Holdings (192400 KS) vs. Cuckoo Homesys (284740 KS) and Orion Holdings (001800 KS) vs. Orion Corp (271560 KS).
• Among these 30 pairs, five experienced 2.0% or more changes in the difference of the holdco and opco’s foreign shareholding percentages: Doosan Corp (000150 KS) vs.Doosan Heavy Industries (034020 KS),  Halla Corp (014790 KS) vs.Mando Corp (204320 KS), Lotte Holdings (004990 KS) vs. Lotte Shopping Co (023530 KS), LS Corp (006260 KS) vs. Ls Industrial Systems (010120 KS) and SK Telecom (017670 KS) vs. SK Hynix Inc (000660 KS).

(link to Douglas insight: Korean Stubs Spotlight: Focus on Diverging Share Prices and Changes to Foreign Ownership)

• Sanghyun Park points out that Hyundai Motor Co (005380 KS)‘s Common vs. pref ratio is getting out of whack, possibly because of Elliott’s ₩4.5tn dividend demand. Both 1P and 2PB are sufficiently undervalued relative to the Common. The div yield difference to Common is also at the highest levels for both pref types. Sanghyun suggests shorting the Common and being long 1P or 2PB now. 1P is probably a safer bet, but 2PB is more liquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Hyundai Motor Share Class: Time to Short Common & Long Pref)
• Sanghyun also points out Samsung Electronics (005930 KS) Common/1P price ratio gap is again above +100% of σ on a 20D MA in favour of Common. He recommends going long 1P and short Common for now. (link to Samsung Electronics Share Class: Long 1P / Short Common on Falling Memory Prices)

For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$12.3bn. This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component. A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal. The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.

(link to my insight: M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in February 2019)

• Pioneer Corp (6773 JP) announced that the deal had received all relevant anti-trust approvals, and payment for shares by the Acquirer (BPAE) of the Third Party Placement was now expected to take place on March 8th. 

• Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) announced it has entered an S&P to sell Glow SPP1 to B. Grimm Power Service for Bt3.3bn. The P/B was not provided. This is equivalent to ~2.5% of Glow’s market cap.

• Propertylink Group (PLG AU)‘s Offer has been extended to 8th March as they look to get to 90% and move to compulsory.

• Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) has now clarified that the dividend will be added to the offer.

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

3. Nexon Valuation Analysis

In this report, we provide a valuation analysis of Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP). A key question is “How much are investors willing to pay for Nexon which would drive higher EV/EBIT multiples and inversely reduce the earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV)?” 

In our view, we believe that investors would be comfortable with earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV) of about 7-9% given the risks of operating a global game franchise such as Nexon. This would suggest EV/EBIT of about 11x to 14x, using 2019 estimates. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that at the top end of the EV/EBIT valuation range of 14x, this would imply market cap of 1,905 billion yen, which would be 21% higher than current market cap. As such, despite Nexon’s share price rising 25% YTD, we think there could be further upside in the months ahead. 

Having digested plethora of public information on this deal (but not privy to all the bankers’ discussions) in the past several days, we believe that the US based companies including Amazon and Comcast are better positioned to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon, rather than the consortium led by Tencent. 

We believe there is an intense Chinese government pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. (This is just our guess based on public information). The game industry is not strategically important to China, unlike other industries such as semiconductors, energy, or financial. Depending on how much controlling stake Tencent wants to take, it is likely to involve several billions of dollars ($4 billion to $7 billion for Tencent, for example). This is a lot of money. Plus, China Inc’s balance sheet is not as strong as pre-GFC of 2008. Forking over $4 to $7 billion out of China into Japan/Korea would be meaningful. In short, although Tencent would like to do this deal, we think that behind the scenes, the Chinese government appears to be putting intense pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. 

4. WABCO Confirms Being a Takeover Target of The Private German Auto Parts Maker, ZF

Last morning the listed brake supplier, Wabco Holdings (WBC US) confirmed that it is in takeover talks with one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany, ZF Friedrichshafen AG. Following the news of being possibly bought by a private company, WABCO’s stock surged almost 10% during the day, reaching USD130.5 by the day’s close.  This positive market reaction for WABCO was purely based on its confirmation about having preliminary takeover discussions with its rival company, ZF. There were no further details released on the possible deal price or about the plans that either company has after the takeover. Further, ZF in a news report stated that no decision has been taken yet and that it was the preliminary discussions that were being done. However, we do note the following:

• ZF is known to have made such strategic acquisitions in aiding the long-term development of the company. A similar strategic move was made by ZF back in 2015, when it took over TRW Automotive Holding to expand its exposure to sensors and electronic components.
• In June last year, ZF stated in a news report that it is not prioritising interest in brake suppliers, as its focus is to pursue investments in developing components to support next generation technologies and reported its plan to further invest more than EUR12bn into e-mobility and the autonomous driving field. This could indicate that WABCO takeover discussions may involve reasonable price discipline from ZF, and we would note that ZF had previously desired to acquire Wabco for about €6-8bn. However, we believe that the buyout does look attractive for both companies, especially for ZF, given the possible synergistic effects that could support ZF’s next gen technologies.
• In the last go around, ZF had just completed its acquisition of TRW and the balance sheet made a further large acquisition difficult. Now, much of the additional debt from the TRW has been digested and although levering up again could place considerable financial pressure on ZF in the short term, the company’s history makes up believe that it has the capability to handle any such pressure once synergies kick-in and restore its balance sheet in short order.

5. Taisho To Launch Another DHG Pharma Tender

After the close on 28 February 2019, Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer, this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG Pharmaceutical Jsc (DHG VN) a.k.a. Duoc Hau Giang Pharmaceutical JSC.

On 3 July 2018, the company announced that it had received approval from the State Securities Commission (SSC) to raise the foreign ownership limit to 100%, with official disclosure of it going into effect 4 July. Shortly afterwards, Taisho launched a Tender Offer to purchase 7.06% of the shares outstanding of DHG, with the intention to get to 32.00%. Taisho registered to buy more shares last autumn, and bought a further 925,200 shares on 20 February to bring their stake to 34.99%, and now they intend to move to 56.69%.

This next one threatens a much higher minimum pro-ration, BUT it is at the same price as the last one, and while this is at a significant premium to a one-month or three-month average trading price, it is less than a 3.5% premium to Wednesday’s close of VND 116,000/share.

More below the fold.

In this briefing:

1. Last Week in Event SPACE: Nintendo, Panalpina, Versum, Hanergy, Descente, Hopewell
2. Nexon Valuation Analysis
3. WABCO Confirms Being a Takeover Target of The Private German Auto Parts Maker, ZF
4. Taisho To Launch Another DHG Pharma Tender
5. Samsung Electronics Share Class: Long 1P / Short Common on Falling Memory Prices

1. Last Week in Event SPACE: Nintendo, Panalpina, Versum, Hanergy, Descente, Hopewell

Last Week in Event SPACE …

• Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)‘s offering and the buyback are strong symbols and practical examples of what the Corporate Governance Code wants to accomplish.
• Calling an EGM by the Ernst Göhner Foundation is both “sneaky” AND interesting (and bullish) news for the Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) offer by DSV A/S (DSV DC). 

• Merck KGaA (MRK GY) gatecrashes Versum Materials (VSM US)/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) friendly merger.

• Shareholders in Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) face a “Hobson’s Choice” ahead of its forced delisting.

• With the combination of increased hostility leading to a greater likelihood of eventual private takeout, shorts will cover and foreigners may buy, squeezing existing Descente Ltd (8114 JP) minorities up and out.

• The IFA conclusion is flawed on Hopewell Holdings (54 HK)‘s low-ball Offer.

• Plus other events, CCASS movements and expected upcoming events for key M&A transactions.

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP) (Mkt Cap: $33.3bn; Liquidity: $615mn)
Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP) (Mkt Cap: $3.4bn; Liquidity: $7mn)

Nintendo announced (J) a Secondary Share Uridashi Offering of 2,428,700 shares by five shareholder banks, with an overallotment of 364,300 shares. This will be a little bit over 2% of shares outstanding. Applying a hypothetical 4% discount to the then-last traded price of ¥30,030/share, this is an ¥80bn Offering including greenshoe. On the same day, Nintendo announced (E) a share buyback program to buy up to 1 million shares or up to ¥33bn worth (whichever is reached first) to be commenced the day after settlement of the Offering.

• These banks (such as Bank of Kyoto) which have long-held policy cross-holdings in a Kyoto company with a diehard Kyoto cultural heritage (which can often include a diehard cross-holding culture) may have all succumbed to the new Corporate Governance Code. This is really important. 
• This deal is going to retail investors, quite specifically because Nintendo management and board view retail investors as both “sticky” investors and likely to largely follow management’s agenda in AGMs. Management might have misjudged how much this will get flipped.
  
• The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains. Given the size, it looks like the former though it will be difficult to get confirmation. Travis Lundy would want to be long Bank of Kyoto both outright and against the cross-holding portfolio.

link to Travis’ insight:
Nintendo Offering & Buyback: The Import & The Dynamics
Bank of Kyoto – Nintendo Sale A Portent of Changes To Come?

NTT Docomo Inc (9437 JP) (Mkt Cap: $72.4bn; Liquidity: $92mn)

NTT Docomo announced (E) that it would cancel 447,067,906 shares (11.82% of issued shares before the cancellation) of Treasury shares on the 28th of February. The buyback has already occurred. However, by the vagaries of TSE-calculated indices, they lead to index down-weightings (unless otherwise offset).

• This is a very large cancellation for a very large company, so it means a selldown of – by Travis’ estimate – 21.5-22.8mm shares at the close of trading March 28th. Traders looking to tilt short NTT Docomo or tilt long NTT short NTT Docomo will have that as a tailwind.

(link to Travis’ insight: NTT Docomo Share Cancellation)

Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) (Mkt Cap: $3.7bn; Liquidity: $21mn)

Panalpina’s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation (EGF), made a formal request to hold an EGM prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted. The situation has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the EGF which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change. 

• EGF wants to pass this giving everyone their capital share percentage vote because the alternative is worse. Getting this passed would slightly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance but it would mean that the EGF could continue to block any deal it did not like.  The thing is, there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants EGF that “grandfathered” exemption.
• Cevian wants to block such this from going through, and to have the EGF capped at 5% like the Articles of Association suggest all should be. Cevian says that Panalpina has unlawfully maintained a grandfathering exemption from the 5% cap for the EGF. IF the EGF is capped, it means that effectively the EGF loses the ability to block deals they don’t like. 
• The situation is weird. It is possible that Panalpina is asking a convoluted and possibly unlawful voting structure with non-best-practice registration deadlines to vote on changing the vote structure. To Travis, this actually probably deserves a court challenge.

links to Travis’ insight:
Panalpina To Have EGM to Approve One Share One Vote.
The Mechanics of the Panalpina Vote

Versum Materials (VSM US) (Mkt Cap: $5.4bn; Liquidity: $60mn)

Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum with the announcement of a $48/share (51.7% premium to the undisturbed) acquisition proposal. Late last month Versum and Entegris announced a $9bn (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the remaining 52.5%.

• It’s now in VSM’s court. Should it opt to ditch Entegris’ merger-of-equals proposal and side with Merck, it would incur a US$140mn termination fee or $1.28/share.
• John DeMasi reckons Merck’s proposal is superior, however a pure cash offer vs. stock swap are not directly comparable. The prospect of Entegris substantially increasing the exchange ratio or adding a chunk of cash to the merger consideration seems remote. John expects we will see a bump in Merck’s offer to make it friendly, and a recommended deal, in short order.

(link to John’s insight: Versum Materials – Entegris Beaten to the Punch by Merck KGaA)

Wabco Holdings (WBC US) (Mkt Cap: $7.1bn; Liquidity: $56mn)

Brake supplier, Wabco confirmed that it is in takeover talks with ZF Friedrichshafen, one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany.   ZF and Wabco jointly develop the Evasive Manoeuvre Assist system for trucks, combining Wabco’s braking and vehicle dynamics control systems alongside ZF’s active steering technology.

• The pushback is the Zeppelin Foundation, ZF’s controlling shareholder, and its aversion to taking on excess debt. Management and the foundation previously clashed over the €13.5bn TRW transaction in 2015.

(link to Lightstream’s insight: WABCO Confirms Being a Takeover Target of The Private German Auto Parts Maker, ZF)

Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) (Mkt Cap/Liquidity: n.a) 

Back in October last year, Hanergy Mobile Energy Holdings Group Limited (HMEH), Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s majority shareholder, announced an intention to privatise the company at “no less than HK$5/share” via cash or scrip. Hanergy has now announced the intention of HMEH to privatise the company by way of a Scheme. The ultimate intention of HMEH still remains the listing of Hanergy’s business in China. The key issue, putting aside the fact Hanergy has been suspended for near-on four years, is that the scrip consideration has no assigned value.

• Long-suffering shareholders, who comprise 32.49% of shares out, have the dubious honour of holding SPV shares (with an as yet undermined jurisdiction), which may remain in A-share pre-listing purgatory; or should the Scheme fail/lapse, they will hold unlisted shares if Hanergy fails to resume trading by end-July 2019, as would be the case per recently introduced HKEx guidelines. Such an outcome affords HMEH the flexibility to potentially squeeze out minorities at a bargain price.
• It is not clear why the SFC is okay with this takeover proposal, apart from simply being open to any idea to remove Hanergy from the Exchange. At a guess, the SPV consideration structure (as opposed to a straightforward cash offer) is possibly geared to reduce shareholder rights compared to those available under Bermuda Companies Act, Bermuda being where Hanergy is incorporated.
• The Scheme doc, due out later this month, or early next, requires sign-off from the SFC. Presumably the SPV jurisdiction should at least be known by then. It is hard to believe an official takeover document would be dispatched boasting no determinate offer value in addition to unknown shareholder protection rights attached to the unlisted scrip.

(link to my insight: Hanergy’s Hobson’s Choice)

Descente Ltd (8114 JP) (Mkt Cap: $1.7bn; Liquidity: $5mn) 

Descente said will release its Mid-Term Plan early in an effort to encourage shareholders to not tender. For its part, Itochu has released an amendment to its original doc, saying Descente has been naughty (bad-mouthing Itochu to the press while in negotiations), and that it will wait until after the Tender Offer is completed to re-engage. Itochu effectively reserves the right to go full hostile.

• ANTA’s CEO was quoted in an interview saying ANTA supports Itochu’s tender offer and management restructuring and governance initiatives because they say they believe it will lift corporate value.  That means Itochu+ANTA have a functional majority if not absolute.
• This should raise back end values. Descente management is quite stuck here. To Travis, there is likely some upside optionality. Some may decide to stick with the company, raising pro-ration rates.

(link to Travis’ insight: Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile)

Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) (Mkt Cap: $4bn; Liquidity: $11mn) 

The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May.  

• The Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years – the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down. The widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK) in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
• Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. Therefore, the IFA concluded the Offer is reasonable by referencing the premium to last close and historical pricing. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
• A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK) privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ). Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7.8%/45.4%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down.

(link to my insight: Hopewell’s Egregiously Bad Offer, But What Can You Do?) 

DHG Pharmaceutical Jsc (DHG VN) (Mkt Cap: $668mn; Liquidity: $1.5mn) 

Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer at VND 120,000 (3.5% premium to the previous close when the doc was prepared), this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG, lifting its stake to 56.69%.

• The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) owns 43.31%. IF the SCIC tenders, the minimum proration is 33.38%.  IF the SCIC does NOT tender their shares, this is effectively a full tender. All of your shares would be purchased.
• The very recent performance has been most curious. The last 11 days – before the announcement – have seen the stock move 37.6% on 9x average volume, with little to no news to drive it as far as Travis can tell. Looks some leakage ahead of the partial offer announcement.

• Travis thinks there is a non-negligible possibility that Taisho will have to bump their Tender Offer Price. And a non-negligible chance that SCIC tenders.

(link to Travis’ insight: Taisho To Launch Another DHG Pharma Tender)

Yahoo Japan (4689 JP) (Mkt Cap: $13.5bn; Liquidity: $53mn) 

OYO, the largest budget hotel network in India, announced a JV with Yahoo Japan to expand its co-living rental service, “OYO Living”, to Japan. OYO will own 66.1% while YJ will own the remainder of the JV, named “Oyo Technology & Hospitality Japan”. 

• Rebranded as “OYO Life”, the service would be the first of its kind, in the virtually non-existent co-living market in Japan. In Japan, apartments are usually compact single-occupier units as opposed to shared spaces, which might pose a problem for OYO’s co-living model. 

• Assuming the model is a success and OYO Life could ramp up its capacity to around 150,000 beds in Tokyo, which is around 5% of the total apartment stock in central Tokyo, this would contribute around ¥3bn (2% of net income in FY03/18) to Yahoo Japan’s net income. There is potential for further gains, however, this would depend on how ready Tokyo is to move into a “Co-Living” culture en masse.

(link to LightStream Research ‘s insight: Yahoo Japan’s JV with OYO Could Be Big, If Tokyo Is Ready to “Co-Live”)

Ruralco Holdings (RHL AU) (Mkt Cap: $335mn; Liquidity: $0.5mn)

Ruralco has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.

• Nutrien has first mover advantage, however a counter from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) is possible. The two companies have a history after Ruralco attempted to buy out Elders in 2012, but failed over a disagreement in pricing.
• ACCC should not be issue to this transaction. A 2013 ruling did not oppose a Ruralco/Elders tie-up, and a similar conclusion is expected for Nutrien.
• The gross/annualised spread of 0.2%/0.7% is unattractive. But at this deal price, Elders could still come over the top. Trading itself at 11.4x EV/EBITDA (according to CapIQ), upping the price by 10% would still be accretive to Elders.

(link to my insight: Nutrien’s Move On Ruralco Makes Agronomic Sense)

Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) (Mkt Cap: $792mn; Liquidity: $1mn) 

Revealed in the release of notes about the Board approval of the Independent Review Committee’s review in late January was the news that Otis offered to buy the company for NT$63/share but it didn’t go anywhere. In addition, some directors – most likely the partisan ones installed in the failed board proxy fight last summer – objected to the lower minimum threshold, which is a sign they don’t want the deal to go through (because the lowering of that threshold is otherwise an unmitigated positive for minority investors).

• Despite stories of a suit of breach of trust against six directors for not entertaining or pursuing offers at NT$63 by Otis and/or Schindler, the company had not received any notification from judicial authorities and has not updated the market about Tender-related matters in the last two weeks.
• Travis thinks there is the small possibility of a bump to NT$63; but it is not a difficult deal to get done at the minimum threshold at NT$60.

(link to Travis’ insight: Yungtay Noises Haven’t Produced a Result Yet) 

Golden Land Prop Dvlp (GOLD TB) (Mkt Cap: $611mn; Liquidity: $1mn) 

Frasers Property (Thailand) Pcl (FPT TB) has announced a conditional voluntary tender offer for GOLD at Bt8.50/share, ~2.4% premium to last close. Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP) owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicle Univentures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.

• This tender offer therefore has been initiated to consolidate the Sirivadhanabhakdi family’s holding into GOLD. Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. The tender offer will be unconditional.
• The intention to delist GOLD is evident although it will be challenging for FPT to secure 90%+ in the tender offer process, given the single-digit premium to last close, and the fact GOLD traded above the current terms as recently as early December. Getting to 90% requires almost 50% of the minority to submit their shares.
• Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 2.4%/5.9% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.

(link to my insight: Golden Land: Less An Offer, More A Consolidation Of Interests) 

Sichuan Swellfun Co Ltd A (600779 CH)(Mkt Cap: $3.1bn; Liquidity: $28mn) 

Diageo announced it had approached the board of directors of Sichuan Swellfun with a proposal to increase its stake from 60% to 70% at RMB 45.00/share. This was a 19.33% premium to the last close and a 40.05% premium to the 30-day average.

• On a trading basis, this is somewhat interesting. If you are quite bullish the stock, you have a partial put (and you own it already). If you are tentatively bullish A-shares, this offers you a partial put, but there is a possibility that the RMB 45.00 price creates a kind of short-term cap just because it is a sticky price in peoples’ minds.
• Travis is not particularly bearish the stock despite the fact that the earnings forecasts have dropped a fair bit since he looked at this six months ago. The consensus EPS forecasts for Dec 2020 today are roughly the same as they were for Dec 2019 six months ago.

(link to Travis’ insight: Diageo Proposes Another Partial Tender for Sichuan Swellfun)

Briefly …

• Douglas Kim reported that Amazon.com Inc (AMZN US) and Comcast Corp Class A (CMCSA US) may enter the race and have submitted initial bids to acquire Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)/NXC Corp. (link to Douglas’s insight:  Nexon M&A: Amazon & Comcast Enter the Race – It Ain’t Over Till Its Over!)
• The new news on Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) is that the independent statutory auditor Nakatsuji-san has officially expressed his opposition to the Tender Offer. With the shares 19% through terms despite what appears to be no increase by the main activist in the last two weeks, the likelihood retail will tender at ¥610/share looks low, and this seems a situation where the deal may fail unless there is a bump. (link to Travis’ insight: Kosaido (7868 JP) TOB Extended)
• On the 28 Feb, Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ)‘s shares went ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected, but Travis thinks they could fall further: there is no compelling reason to own the bank after it goes ex-rights to receive cash. (link to Travis’ insight: Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights)

PCCW Ltd (8 HK) / HKT Ltd (6823 HK)

FY18 results for PCCW, HKT, and PCPD are out. Plugging in the de-consolidated numbers, I estimate PCCW’s discount to NAV at ~37%, right on the 2 STD line. On a simple ratio (PCCW/HKT), it is again approaching an all-time low. 

• Still select media ops (Free TV and OTT), together with substantial losses booked to other businesses and eliminations, continue to weigh heavily on PCCW’s stub ops, recording negative EBITDA in FY18, reversing the positive figure recorded in FY17. FY16’s stub EBITDA was also negative.
• One positive takeaway is that the dividend pass through is holding at around 90%.

(link to my insight: StubWorld: PCCW Is “Cheap” but Stub Ops Are Deteriorating)

Korean Stubs Spotlight

Douglas provided the one-year share price comparisons of 30 Korean holdcos and the opcos as well as changes to the foreign ownership stakes of these companies YTD. Significant changes to the foreign shareholdings of these companies sometimes lead to opportunities in the holdco/opco pair trades. 

• Among these 30 pair, five recorded significant share prices divergence in the past year (by 30% or more): Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) vs. Hyosung Advanced Materials C (298050 KS), BGF Retail (282330 KS) vs. BGF Co Ltd (027410 KS), Doosan Corp (000150 KS) vs. Doosan Heavy Industries (034020 KS), Cuckoo Holdings (192400 KS) vs. Cuckoo Homesys (284740 KS) and Orion Holdings (001800 KS) vs. Orion Corp (271560 KS).
• Among these 30 pairs, five experienced 2.0% or more changes in the difference of the holdco and opco’s foreign shareholding percentages: Doosan Corp (000150 KS) vs.Doosan Heavy Industries (034020 KS),  Halla Corp (014790 KS) vs.Mando Corp (204320 KS), Lotte Holdings (004990 KS) vs. Lotte Shopping Co (023530 KS), LS Corp (006260 KS) vs. Ls Industrial Systems (010120 KS) and SK Telecom (017670 KS) vs. SK Hynix Inc (000660 KS).

(link to Douglas insight: Korean Stubs Spotlight: Focus on Diverging Share Prices and Changes to Foreign Ownership)

• Sanghyun Park points out that Hyundai Motor Co (005380 KS)‘s Common vs. pref ratio is getting out of whack, possibly because of Elliott’s ₩4.5tn dividend demand. Both 1P and 2PB are sufficiently undervalued relative to the Common. The div yield difference to Common is also at the highest levels for both pref types. Sanghyun suggests shorting the Common and being long 1P or 2PB now. 1P is probably a safer bet, but 2PB is more liquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Hyundai Motor Share Class: Time to Short Common & Long Pref)
• Sanghyun also points out Samsung Electronics (005930 KS) Common/1P price ratio gap is again above +100% of σ on a 20D MA in favour of Common. He recommends going long 1P and short Common for now. (link to Samsung Electronics Share Class: Long 1P / Short Common on Falling Memory Prices)

For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$12.3bn. This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component. A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal. The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.

(link to my insight: M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in February 2019)

• Pioneer Corp (6773 JP) announced that the deal had received all relevant anti-trust approvals, and payment for shares by the Acquirer (BPAE) of the Third Party Placement was now expected to take place on March 8th. 

• Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) announced it has entered an S&P to sell Glow SPP1 to B. Grimm Power Service for Bt3.3bn. The P/B was not provided. This is equivalent to ~2.5% of Glow’s market cap.

• Propertylink Group (PLG AU)‘s Offer has been extended to 8th March as they look to get to 90% and move to compulsory.

• Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) has now clarified that the dividend will be added to the offer.

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

2. Nexon Valuation Analysis

In this report, we provide a valuation analysis of Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP). A key question is “How much are investors willing to pay for Nexon which would drive higher EV/EBIT multiples and inversely reduce the earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV)?” 

In our view, we believe that investors would be comfortable with earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV) of about 7-9% given the risks of operating a global game franchise such as Nexon. This would suggest EV/EBIT of about 11x to 14x, using 2019 estimates. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that at the top end of the EV/EBIT valuation range of 14x, this would imply market cap of 1,905 billion yen, which would be 21% higher than current market cap. As such, despite Nexon’s share price rising 25% YTD, we think there could be further upside in the months ahead. 

Having digested plethora of public information on this deal (but not privy to all the bankers’ discussions) in the past several days, we believe that the US based companies including Amazon and Comcast are better positioned to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon, rather than the consortium led by Tencent. 

We believe there is an intense Chinese government pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. (This is just our guess based on public information). The game industry is not strategically important to China, unlike other industries such as semiconductors, energy, or financial. Depending on how much controlling stake Tencent wants to take, it is likely to involve several billions of dollars ($4 billion to $7 billion for Tencent, for example). This is a lot of money. Plus, China Inc’s balance sheet is not as strong as pre-GFC of 2008. Forking over $4 to $7 billion out of China into Japan/Korea would be meaningful. In short, although Tencent would like to do this deal, we think that behind the scenes, the Chinese government appears to be putting intense pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. 

3. WABCO Confirms Being a Takeover Target of The Private German Auto Parts Maker, ZF

Last morning the listed brake supplier, Wabco Holdings (WBC US) confirmed that it is in takeover talks with one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany, ZF Friedrichshafen AG. Following the news of being possibly bought by a private company, WABCO’s stock surged almost 10% during the day, reaching USD130.5 by the day’s close.  This positive market reaction for WABCO was purely based on its confirmation about having preliminary takeover discussions with its rival company, ZF. There were no further details released on the possible deal price or about the plans that either company has after the takeover. Further, ZF in a news report stated that no decision has been taken yet and that it was the preliminary discussions that were being done. However, we do note the following:

• ZF is known to have made such strategic acquisitions in aiding the long-term development of the company. A similar strategic move was made by ZF back in 2015, when it took over TRW Automotive Holding to expand its exposure to sensors and electronic components.
• In June last year, ZF stated in a news report that it is not prioritising interest in brake suppliers, as its focus is to pursue investments in developing components to support next generation technologies and reported its plan to further invest more than EUR12bn into e-mobility and the autonomous driving field. This could indicate that WABCO takeover discussions may involve reasonable price discipline from ZF, and we would note that ZF had previously desired to acquire Wabco for about €6-8bn. However, we believe that the buyout does look attractive for both companies, especially for ZF, given the possible synergistic effects that could support ZF’s next gen technologies.
• In the last go around, ZF had just completed its acquisition of TRW and the balance sheet made a further large acquisition difficult. Now, much of the additional debt from the TRW has been digested and although levering up again could place considerable financial pressure on ZF in the short term, the company’s history makes up believe that it has the capability to handle any such pressure once synergies kick-in and restore its balance sheet in short order.

4. Taisho To Launch Another DHG Pharma Tender

After the close on 28 February 2019, Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer, this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG Pharmaceutical Jsc (DHG VN) a.k.a. Duoc Hau Giang Pharmaceutical JSC.

On 3 July 2018, the company announced that it had received approval from the State Securities Commission (SSC) to raise the foreign ownership limit to 100%, with official disclosure of it going into effect 4 July. Shortly afterwards, Taisho launched a Tender Offer to purchase 7.06% of the shares outstanding of DHG, with the intention to get to 32.00%. Taisho registered to buy more shares last autumn, and bought a further 925,200 shares on 20 February to bring their stake to 34.99%, and now they intend to move to 56.69%.

This next one threatens a much higher minimum pro-ration, BUT it is at the same price as the last one, and while this is at a significant premium to a one-month or three-month average trading price, it is less than a 3.5% premium to Wednesday’s close of VND 116,000/share.

More below the fold.

5. Samsung Electronics Share Class: Long 1P / Short Common on Falling Memory Prices

• SamE Common/1P price ratio gap is again above +100% of σ on a 20D MA in favor of Common. Deepening concerns about memory chip price hammered both SamE and Hynix yesterday. But SamE 1P couldn’t capitalize. 1P fell even further, almost reaching 120D high in Common/1P price ratio in favor of Common.
• We’ve recently heard rebounding demand for memory chips. This has pushed up both SamE and Hynix lately. Improving fundamentals coupled with the March AGM cycle factor have consistently supported SamE Common/1P price ratio above +0.5σ on a 20D MA since late Jan. This optimism is now facing a serious challenge probably for the first time since late last year.
• Opinions are still heavily divided on memory chip business outlook. The concerns reignited by the falling price news would be here with us in the coming few weeks at least. This’d outweigh even the March AGM factor. 1P starts placing itself ahead of Common. I’d go long 1P and short Common now. I’d hold onto the position until -150~200% of σ. This is a 5~6% yield.

In this briefing:

1. Nexon Valuation Analysis
2. WABCO Confirms Being a Takeover Target of The Private German Auto Parts Maker, ZF
3. Taisho To Launch Another DHG Pharma Tender
4. Samsung Electronics Share Class: Long 1P / Short Common on Falling Memory Prices
5. Versum Materials – Entegris Beaten to the Punch by Merck KGaA

1. Nexon Valuation Analysis

In this report, we provide a valuation analysis of Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP). A key question is “How much are investors willing to pay for Nexon which would drive higher EV/EBIT multiples and inversely reduce the earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV)?” 

In our view, we believe that investors would be comfortable with earnings yield (measured by EBIT/EV) of about 7-9% given the risks of operating a global game franchise such as Nexon. This would suggest EV/EBIT of about 11x to 14x, using 2019 estimates. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that at the top end of the EV/EBIT valuation range of 14x, this would imply market cap of 1,905 billion yen, which would be 21% higher than current market cap. As such, despite Nexon’s share price rising 25% YTD, we think there could be further upside in the months ahead. 

Having digested plethora of public information on this deal (but not privy to all the bankers’ discussions) in the past several days, we believe that the US based companies including Amazon and Comcast are better positioned to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon, rather than the consortium led by Tencent. 

We believe there is an intense Chinese government pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. (This is just our guess based on public information). The game industry is not strategically important to China, unlike other industries such as semiconductors, energy, or financial. Depending on how much controlling stake Tencent wants to take, it is likely to involve several billions of dollars ($4 billion to $7 billion for Tencent, for example). This is a lot of money. Plus, China Inc’s balance sheet is not as strong as pre-GFC of 2008. Forking over $4 to $7 billion out of China into Japan/Korea would be meaningful. In short, although Tencent would like to do this deal, we think that behind the scenes, the Chinese government appears to be putting intense pressure on Tencent to not do this deal. 

2. WABCO Confirms Being a Takeover Target of The Private German Auto Parts Maker, ZF

Last morning the listed brake supplier, Wabco Holdings (WBC US) confirmed that it is in takeover talks with one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany, ZF Friedrichshafen AG. Following the news of being possibly bought by a private company, WABCO’s stock surged almost 10% during the day, reaching USD130.5 by the day’s close.  This positive market reaction for WABCO was purely based on its confirmation about having preliminary takeover discussions with its rival company, ZF. There were no further details released on the possible deal price or about the plans that either company has after the takeover. Further, ZF in a news report stated that no decision has been taken yet and that it was the preliminary discussions that were being done. However, we do note the following:

• ZF is known to have made such strategic acquisitions in aiding the long-term development of the company. A similar strategic move was made by ZF back in 2015, when it took over TRW Automotive Holding to expand its exposure to sensors and electronic components.
• In June last year, ZF stated in a news report that it is not prioritising interest in brake suppliers, as its focus is to pursue investments in developing components to support next generation technologies and reported its plan to further invest more than EUR12bn into e-mobility and the autonomous driving field. This could indicate that WABCO takeover discussions may involve reasonable price discipline from ZF, and we would note that ZF had previously desired to acquire Wabco for about €6-8bn. However, we believe that the buyout does look attractive for both companies, especially for ZF, given the possible synergistic effects that could support ZF’s next gen technologies.
• In the last go around, ZF had just completed its acquisition of TRW and the balance sheet made a further large acquisition difficult. Now, much of the additional debt from the TRW has been digested and although levering up again could place considerable financial pressure on ZF in the short term, the company’s history makes up believe that it has the capability to handle any such pressure once synergies kick-in and restore its balance sheet in short order.

3. Taisho To Launch Another DHG Pharma Tender

After the close on 28 February 2019, Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer, this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG Pharmaceutical Jsc (DHG VN) a.k.a. Duoc Hau Giang Pharmaceutical JSC.

On 3 July 2018, the company announced that it had received approval from the State Securities Commission (SSC) to raise the foreign ownership limit to 100%, with official disclosure of it going into effect 4 July. Shortly afterwards, Taisho launched a Tender Offer to purchase 7.06% of the shares outstanding of DHG, with the intention to get to 32.00%. Taisho registered to buy more shares last autumn, and bought a further 925,200 shares on 20 February to bring their stake to 34.99%, and now they intend to move to 56.69%.

This next one threatens a much higher minimum pro-ration, BUT it is at the same price as the last one, and while this is at a significant premium to a one-month or three-month average trading price, it is less than a 3.5% premium to Wednesday’s close of VND 116,000/share.

More below the fold.

4. Samsung Electronics Share Class: Long 1P / Short Common on Falling Memory Prices

• SamE Common/1P price ratio gap is again above +100% of σ on a 20D MA in favor of Common. Deepening concerns about memory chip price hammered both SamE and Hynix yesterday. But SamE 1P couldn’t capitalize. 1P fell even further, almost reaching 120D high in Common/1P price ratio in favor of Common.
• We’ve recently heard rebounding demand for memory chips. This has pushed up both SamE and Hynix lately. Improving fundamentals coupled with the March AGM cycle factor have consistently supported SamE Common/1P price ratio above +0.5σ on a 20D MA since late Jan. This optimism is now facing a serious challenge probably for the first time since late last year.
• Opinions are still heavily divided on memory chip business outlook. The concerns reignited by the falling price news would be here with us in the coming few weeks at least. This’d outweigh even the March AGM factor. 1P starts placing itself ahead of Common. I’d go long 1P and short Common now. I’d hold onto the position until -150~200% of σ. This is a 5~6% yield.

5. Versum Materials – Entegris Beaten to the Punch by Merck KGaA

Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum Materials (VSM US) the morning of February 27, 2019, with the announcement of a $48 per share cash acquisition proposal that was presented to Versum’s board of directors that same day. Versum, which was spun out of Air Products & Chemicals, Inc (APD US) in 2016, is a global provider of solutions (Materials and Delivery Systems and Services) to the semiconductor and display industries.

On January 28, 2019, a day after the WSJ broke the story that Versum and Entegris were in talks, the companies announced a $9 billion (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the other 52.5%. The deal was well received with both companies’ shares climbing steadily since the announcement.

However, these best laid plans took a Teutonic turn when the other Merck (Merck KGaA, the German pharmaceuticals and chemicals group unaffiliated with Merck & Co Inc. (MRK US) of the USA) threw its hat in the ring.

According to Merck, its Executive Board unanimously approved its proposal and is fully committed to pursuing the transaction. Merck said it is prepared to proceed immediately to due diligence and negotiations and to quickly agree to a merger agreement. It further stated the completion of the offer will be subject to customary closing conditions, including the receipt of necessary regulatory clearances.

The $48 per share proposed price is a 51.7% premium over VSM’s January 25, 2019 share price just prior to the announcement of the Versum/Entegris merger and a 15.9% premium over VSM’s closing price on February 26, 2019.

The ball is now in the VSM board of directors’ court and below we’ll look at how the board might react and where the chips may fall.

In this briefing:

1. WABCO Confirms Being a Takeover Target of The Private German Auto Parts Maker, ZF
2. Taisho To Launch Another DHG Pharma Tender
3. Samsung Electronics Share Class: Long 1P / Short Common on Falling Memory Prices
4. Versum Materials – Entegris Beaten to the Punch by Merck KGaA
5. The Mechanics of the Panalpina Vote

1. WABCO Confirms Being a Takeover Target of The Private German Auto Parts Maker, ZF

Last morning the listed brake supplier, Wabco Holdings (WBC US) confirmed that it is in takeover talks with one of the leading auto parts suppliers in Germany, ZF Friedrichshafen AG. Following the news of being possibly bought by a private company, WABCO’s stock surged almost 10% during the day, reaching USD130.5 by the day’s close.  This positive market reaction for WABCO was purely based on its confirmation about having preliminary takeover discussions with its rival company, ZF. There were no further details released on the possible deal price or about the plans that either company has after the takeover. Further, ZF in a news report stated that no decision has been taken yet and that it was the preliminary discussions that were being done. However, we do note the following:

• ZF is known to have made such strategic acquisitions in aiding the long-term development of the company. A similar strategic move was made by ZF back in 2015, when it took over TRW Automotive Holding to expand its exposure to sensors and electronic components.
• In June last year, ZF stated in a news report that it is not prioritising interest in brake suppliers, as its focus is to pursue investments in developing components to support next generation technologies and reported its plan to further invest more than EUR12bn into e-mobility and the autonomous driving field. This could indicate that WABCO takeover discussions may involve reasonable price discipline from ZF, and we would note that ZF had previously desired to acquire Wabco for about €6-8bn. However, we believe that the buyout does look attractive for both companies, especially for ZF, given the possible synergistic effects that could support ZF’s next gen technologies.
• In the last go around, ZF had just completed its acquisition of TRW and the balance sheet made a further large acquisition difficult. Now, much of the additional debt from the TRW has been digested and although levering up again could place considerable financial pressure on ZF in the short term, the company’s history makes up believe that it has the capability to handle any such pressure once synergies kick-in and restore its balance sheet in short order.

2. Taisho To Launch Another DHG Pharma Tender

After the close on 28 February 2019, Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer, this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG Pharmaceutical Jsc (DHG VN) a.k.a. Duoc Hau Giang Pharmaceutical JSC.

On 3 July 2018, the company announced that it had received approval from the State Securities Commission (SSC) to raise the foreign ownership limit to 100%, with official disclosure of it going into effect 4 July. Shortly afterwards, Taisho launched a Tender Offer to purchase 7.06% of the shares outstanding of DHG, with the intention to get to 32.00%. Taisho registered to buy more shares last autumn, and bought a further 925,200 shares on 20 February to bring their stake to 34.99%, and now they intend to move to 56.69%.

This next one threatens a much higher minimum pro-ration, BUT it is at the same price as the last one, and while this is at a significant premium to a one-month or three-month average trading price, it is less than a 3.5% premium to Wednesday’s close of VND 116,000/share.

More below the fold.

3. Samsung Electronics Share Class: Long 1P / Short Common on Falling Memory Prices

• SamE Common/1P price ratio gap is again above +100% of σ on a 20D MA in favor of Common. Deepening concerns about memory chip price hammered both SamE and Hynix yesterday. But SamE 1P couldn’t capitalize. 1P fell even further, almost reaching 120D high in Common/1P price ratio in favor of Common.
• We’ve recently heard rebounding demand for memory chips. This has pushed up both SamE and Hynix lately. Improving fundamentals coupled with the March AGM cycle factor have consistently supported SamE Common/1P price ratio above +0.5σ on a 20D MA since late Jan. This optimism is now facing a serious challenge probably for the first time since late last year.
• Opinions are still heavily divided on memory chip business outlook. The concerns reignited by the falling price news would be here with us in the coming few weeks at least. This’d outweigh even the March AGM factor. 1P starts placing itself ahead of Common. I’d go long 1P and short Common now. I’d hold onto the position until -150~200% of σ. This is a 5~6% yield.

4. Versum Materials – Entegris Beaten to the Punch by Merck KGaA

Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum Materials (VSM US) the morning of February 27, 2019, with the announcement of a $48 per share cash acquisition proposal that was presented to Versum’s board of directors that same day. Versum, which was spun out of Air Products & Chemicals, Inc (APD US) in 2016, is a global provider of solutions (Materials and Delivery Systems and Services) to the semiconductor and display industries.

On January 28, 2019, a day after the WSJ broke the story that Versum and Entegris were in talks, the companies announced a $9 billion (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the other 52.5%. The deal was well received with both companies’ shares climbing steadily since the announcement.

However, these best laid plans took a Teutonic turn when the other Merck (Merck KGaA, the German pharmaceuticals and chemicals group unaffiliated with Merck & Co Inc. (MRK US) of the USA) threw its hat in the ring.

According to Merck, its Executive Board unanimously approved its proposal and is fully committed to pursuing the transaction. Merck said it is prepared to proceed immediately to due diligence and negotiations and to quickly agree to a merger agreement. It further stated the completion of the offer will be subject to customary closing conditions, including the receipt of necessary regulatory clearances.

The $48 per share proposed price is a 51.7% premium over VSM’s January 25, 2019 share price just prior to the announcement of the Versum/Entegris merger and a 15.9% premium over VSM’s closing price on February 26, 2019.

The ball is now in the VSM board of directors’ court and below we’ll look at how the board might react and where the chips may fall.

5. The Mechanics of the Panalpina Vote

This insight is a kind of public service announcement for investors looking at the Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) situation as it might affect the likely upcoming Extraordinary General Meeting that the Ernst Göhner Foundation requested of Panalpina, and to which Panalpina has acquiesced. The agenda item of the EGM requested is to implement a “One Share One Vote” system. 

Activist Cevian has come out against the proposal by the Ernst Göhner Foundation. This sounds counterintuitive except for one odd legal angle.

The Foundation’s ostensible goal is to ensure that the vote is “fair” so that Cevian and Artisan Partners can vote their full stake after having been capped at 5% for many years because of Article 5 in the Panalpina Articles of Association. The more cunning aspect of this is that, as per the Panalpina announcement…

In a letter addressed to Panalpina’s Board of Directors, minority shareholder Cevian had recently questioned the practice to fully admit EGF with all its voting rights at the Company’s shareholders’ meetings. Cevian took the position that the voting restriction of 5% must be applied to all shareholders and, hence the voting power of EGF must be reduced to 5%. An ad hoc board of independent directors (BoiD) consisting of five directors (without representatives of EGF and Cevian) and chaired by Thomas E. Kern, is currently evaluating the situation based on expert opinions submitted by each of EGF and Cevian and based on independent expert advice obtained by the BoiD.

The Foundation knows that their position may be legally weak, and their position could be capped at 5% rather than grandfathered. Indeed, the “independent expert advice” obtained by Cevian includes the opinions of “four leading Swiss stockbrokers” who had come to the conclusion that the Foundation had been unlawfully excluded from the 5% cap, according to this Reuters article on the 26th. The company states that the Ernst Göhner Foundation is and has been exempted from this rule because of “grandfathering” because it owned the shares before the implementation of the rule, but there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants the EGF that exemption. The full Cevian press releases in English and German are available through their spokesperson and are attached below (at the bottom of the insight).

Another Reuters article discussed the situation, with quotes from Cevian, and added this tidbit at the end.

An ad hoc board of independent directors consisting of five directors, without representatives of EGF and Cevian…will review the proposal and decide how the voting on it will take place at the extraordinary general meeting,” spokeswoman Edna Ayme-Yahil said.

Investors should note…..

The last paragraph of Article 5 of the Panalpina Articles of Association says “No entries shall be made in the register of shareholders following the dispatch of the convocation to the Shareholders’ Meeting until the day after the Shareholders’ Meeting.” This is a little different than is the case for many large Swiss companies where they give the convocation and investors may subsequently register their shares.

In Panalpina’s case, if you are not registered by the time the company sends out the convocation, there is no requirement for the company to admit your shares to the register even if there is plenty of time to do so (though the Board can make exceptions to the entry restriction).

For investors interested in or concerned about the situation, there are measures which may be advisable to implement ASAP to ensure you can vote.

In this briefing:

1. Taisho To Launch Another DHG Pharma Tender
2. Samsung Electronics Share Class: Long 1P / Short Common on Falling Memory Prices
3. Versum Materials – Entegris Beaten to the Punch by Merck KGaA
4. The Mechanics of the Panalpina Vote
5. Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile

1. Taisho To Launch Another DHG Pharma Tender

After the close on 28 February 2019, Taisho Pharmaceutical Holdings (4581 JP)announced it would launch another Tender Offer, this time to purchase up to 21.7% of the Vietnam-listed DHG Pharmaceutical Jsc (DHG VN) a.k.a. Duoc Hau Giang Pharmaceutical JSC.

On 3 July 2018, the company announced that it had received approval from the State Securities Commission (SSC) to raise the foreign ownership limit to 100%, with official disclosure of it going into effect 4 July. Shortly afterwards, Taisho launched a Tender Offer to purchase 7.06% of the shares outstanding of DHG, with the intention to get to 32.00%. Taisho registered to buy more shares last autumn, and bought a further 925,200 shares on 20 February to bring their stake to 34.99%, and now they intend to move to 56.69%.

This next one threatens a much higher minimum pro-ration, BUT it is at the same price as the last one, and while this is at a significant premium to a one-month or three-month average trading price, it is less than a 3.5% premium to Wednesday’s close of VND 116,000/share.

More below the fold.

2. Samsung Electronics Share Class: Long 1P / Short Common on Falling Memory Prices

• SamE Common/1P price ratio gap is again above +100% of σ on a 20D MA in favor of Common. Deepening concerns about memory chip price hammered both SamE and Hynix yesterday. But SamE 1P couldn’t capitalize. 1P fell even further, almost reaching 120D high in Common/1P price ratio in favor of Common.
• We’ve recently heard rebounding demand for memory chips. This has pushed up both SamE and Hynix lately. Improving fundamentals coupled with the March AGM cycle factor have consistently supported SamE Common/1P price ratio above +0.5σ on a 20D MA since late Jan. This optimism is now facing a serious challenge probably for the first time since late last year.
• Opinions are still heavily divided on memory chip business outlook. The concerns reignited by the falling price news would be here with us in the coming few weeks at least. This’d outweigh even the March AGM factor. 1P starts placing itself ahead of Common. I’d go long 1P and short Common now. I’d hold onto the position until -150~200% of σ. This is a 5~6% yield.

3. Versum Materials – Entegris Beaten to the Punch by Merck KGaA

Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum Materials (VSM US) the morning of February 27, 2019, with the announcement of a $48 per share cash acquisition proposal that was presented to Versum’s board of directors that same day. Versum, which was spun out of Air Products & Chemicals, Inc (APD US) in 2016, is a global provider of solutions (Materials and Delivery Systems and Services) to the semiconductor and display industries.

On January 28, 2019, a day after the WSJ broke the story that Versum and Entegris were in talks, the companies announced a $9 billion (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the other 52.5%. The deal was well received with both companies’ shares climbing steadily since the announcement.

However, these best laid plans took a Teutonic turn when the other Merck (Merck KGaA, the German pharmaceuticals and chemicals group unaffiliated with Merck & Co Inc. (MRK US) of the USA) threw its hat in the ring.

According to Merck, its Executive Board unanimously approved its proposal and is fully committed to pursuing the transaction. Merck said it is prepared to proceed immediately to due diligence and negotiations and to quickly agree to a merger agreement. It further stated the completion of the offer will be subject to customary closing conditions, including the receipt of necessary regulatory clearances.

The $48 per share proposed price is a 51.7% premium over VSM’s January 25, 2019 share price just prior to the announcement of the Versum/Entegris merger and a 15.9% premium over VSM’s closing price on February 26, 2019.

The ball is now in the VSM board of directors’ court and below we’ll look at how the board might react and where the chips may fall.

4. The Mechanics of the Panalpina Vote

This insight is a kind of public service announcement for investors looking at the Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) situation as it might affect the likely upcoming Extraordinary General Meeting that the Ernst Göhner Foundation requested of Panalpina, and to which Panalpina has acquiesced. The agenda item of the EGM requested is to implement a “One Share One Vote” system. 

Activist Cevian has come out against the proposal by the Ernst Göhner Foundation. This sounds counterintuitive except for one odd legal angle.

The Foundation’s ostensible goal is to ensure that the vote is “fair” so that Cevian and Artisan Partners can vote their full stake after having been capped at 5% for many years because of Article 5 in the Panalpina Articles of Association. The more cunning aspect of this is that, as per the Panalpina announcement…

In a letter addressed to Panalpina’s Board of Directors, minority shareholder Cevian had recently questioned the practice to fully admit EGF with all its voting rights at the Company’s shareholders’ meetings. Cevian took the position that the voting restriction of 5% must be applied to all shareholders and, hence the voting power of EGF must be reduced to 5%. An ad hoc board of independent directors (BoiD) consisting of five directors (without representatives of EGF and Cevian) and chaired by Thomas E. Kern, is currently evaluating the situation based on expert opinions submitted by each of EGF and Cevian and based on independent expert advice obtained by the BoiD.

The Foundation knows that their position may be legally weak, and their position could be capped at 5% rather than grandfathered. Indeed, the “independent expert advice” obtained by Cevian includes the opinions of “four leading Swiss stockbrokers” who had come to the conclusion that the Foundation had been unlawfully excluded from the 5% cap, according to this Reuters article on the 26th. The company states that the Ernst Göhner Foundation is and has been exempted from this rule because of “grandfathering” because it owned the shares before the implementation of the rule, but there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants the EGF that exemption. The full Cevian press releases in English and German are available through their spokesperson and are attached below (at the bottom of the insight).

Another Reuters article discussed the situation, with quotes from Cevian, and added this tidbit at the end.

An ad hoc board of independent directors consisting of five directors, without representatives of EGF and Cevian…will review the proposal and decide how the voting on it will take place at the extraordinary general meeting,” spokeswoman Edna Ayme-Yahil said.

Investors should note…..

The last paragraph of Article 5 of the Panalpina Articles of Association says “No entries shall be made in the register of shareholders following the dispatch of the convocation to the Shareholders’ Meeting until the day after the Shareholders’ Meeting.” This is a little different than is the case for many large Swiss companies where they give the convocation and investors may subsequently register their shares.

In Panalpina’s case, if you are not registered by the time the company sends out the convocation, there is no requirement for the company to admit your shares to the register even if there is plenty of time to do so (though the Board can make exceptions to the entry restriction).

For investors interested in or concerned about the situation, there are measures which may be advisable to implement ASAP to ensure you can vote.

5. Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile

Descente Ltd (8114 JP) has been in the press quite a bit in recent days with management commentary about how the company and directors disagree with the Tender Offer launched by Itochu Corp (8001 JP) to raise their stake from 30% to 40% and how it could lead to conflict of interest and worsening management, lower morale for employees, and a loss of independence.

Management, former management, and former employees have all joined the party. Wednesday saw a significant sell-down of shares to a post-Tender Offer low, but it was not clear why.

Descente had, on the 26th, noted in a puff piece in the Nikkei that it would move up the release of its next Mid-Term (Three Year) Plan (normally due in May this year), and it would focus on growing direct sales in China through more stores, growing sales in the US through adding products to the list (currently the major product in North America is skiwear), selling LeCoq Sportif in Indonesia and Munsingwear in Vietnam. WHEN is unknown, but the explicit goal is to encourage shareholders to keep their shares rather than tender them to Itochu.

Today saw a new filing from Itochu in which it amended its original announcement, claimed Descente’s activity in the media was additional and additive to the Target Company Position Statement filed on 7 February, and for that reason, their activity had not been appropriately disclosed to shareholders. Furthermore, Itochu noted that while the jibber-jabber had been going on the last two-plus weeks, Descente had asked Itochu to negotiate post-Tender management structure plans, and Itochu had agreed. Itochu and Descente talked for 9 days from 11-20 Feb but Descente was bad-mouthing Itochu in the press at the same time. That induced Itochu to stop talks. And late today, the Nikkei has released a 27 February interview with the CEO of ANTA, Itochu’s longtime textile partner in China and a 6.86% holder of Descente shares, where he says that he supports Itochu’s tender offer, will not sell their shares in Descente, and would support Itochu efforts to restructure management. 

These three new developments change things in interesting ways, in my opinion pushing Descente’s own plans closer to Itochu’s, and introducing the possibility of significantly more hostility to come, with a much higher likelihood Itochu can win the proxy wars to come. 

In-depth analysis below the fold.

Previous insights on the situation and its runup are listed below.

In this briefing:

1. Samsung Electronics Share Class: Long 1P / Short Common on Falling Memory Prices
2. Versum Materials – Entegris Beaten to the Punch by Merck KGaA
3. The Mechanics of the Panalpina Vote
4. Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile
5. M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in February 2019

1. Samsung Electronics Share Class: Long 1P / Short Common on Falling Memory Prices

• SamE Common/1P price ratio gap is again above +100% of σ on a 20D MA in favor of Common. Deepening concerns about memory chip price hammered both SamE and Hynix yesterday. But SamE 1P couldn’t capitalize. 1P fell even further, almost reaching 120D high in Common/1P price ratio in favor of Common.
• We’ve recently heard rebounding demand for memory chips. This has pushed up both SamE and Hynix lately. Improving fundamentals coupled with the March AGM cycle factor have consistently supported SamE Common/1P price ratio above +0.5σ on a 20D MA since late Jan. This optimism is now facing a serious challenge probably for the first time since late last year.
• Opinions are still heavily divided on memory chip business outlook. The concerns reignited by the falling price news would be here with us in the coming few weeks at least. This’d outweigh even the March AGM factor. 1P starts placing itself ahead of Common. I’d go long 1P and short Common now. I’d hold onto the position until -150~200% of σ. This is a 5~6% yield.

2. Versum Materials – Entegris Beaten to the Punch by Merck KGaA

Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum Materials (VSM US) the morning of February 27, 2019, with the announcement of a $48 per share cash acquisition proposal that was presented to Versum’s board of directors that same day. Versum, which was spun out of Air Products & Chemicals, Inc (APD US) in 2016, is a global provider of solutions (Materials and Delivery Systems and Services) to the semiconductor and display industries.

On January 28, 2019, a day after the WSJ broke the story that Versum and Entegris were in talks, the companies announced a $9 billion (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the other 52.5%. The deal was well received with both companies’ shares climbing steadily since the announcement.

However, these best laid plans took a Teutonic turn when the other Merck (Merck KGaA, the German pharmaceuticals and chemicals group unaffiliated with Merck & Co Inc. (MRK US) of the USA) threw its hat in the ring.

According to Merck, its Executive Board unanimously approved its proposal and is fully committed to pursuing the transaction. Merck said it is prepared to proceed immediately to due diligence and negotiations and to quickly agree to a merger agreement. It further stated the completion of the offer will be subject to customary closing conditions, including the receipt of necessary regulatory clearances.

The $48 per share proposed price is a 51.7% premium over VSM’s January 25, 2019 share price just prior to the announcement of the Versum/Entegris merger and a 15.9% premium over VSM’s closing price on February 26, 2019.

The ball is now in the VSM board of directors’ court and below we’ll look at how the board might react and where the chips may fall.

3. The Mechanics of the Panalpina Vote

This insight is a kind of public service announcement for investors looking at the Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) situation as it might affect the likely upcoming Extraordinary General Meeting that the Ernst Göhner Foundation requested of Panalpina, and to which Panalpina has acquiesced. The agenda item of the EGM requested is to implement a “One Share One Vote” system. 

Activist Cevian has come out against the proposal by the Ernst Göhner Foundation. This sounds counterintuitive except for one odd legal angle.

The Foundation’s ostensible goal is to ensure that the vote is “fair” so that Cevian and Artisan Partners can vote their full stake after having been capped at 5% for many years because of Article 5 in the Panalpina Articles of Association. The more cunning aspect of this is that, as per the Panalpina announcement…

In a letter addressed to Panalpina’s Board of Directors, minority shareholder Cevian had recently questioned the practice to fully admit EGF with all its voting rights at the Company’s shareholders’ meetings. Cevian took the position that the voting restriction of 5% must be applied to all shareholders and, hence the voting power of EGF must be reduced to 5%. An ad hoc board of independent directors (BoiD) consisting of five directors (without representatives of EGF and Cevian) and chaired by Thomas E. Kern, is currently evaluating the situation based on expert opinions submitted by each of EGF and Cevian and based on independent expert advice obtained by the BoiD.

The Foundation knows that their position may be legally weak, and their position could be capped at 5% rather than grandfathered. Indeed, the “independent expert advice” obtained by Cevian includes the opinions of “four leading Swiss stockbrokers” who had come to the conclusion that the Foundation had been unlawfully excluded from the 5% cap, according to this Reuters article on the 26th. The company states that the Ernst Göhner Foundation is and has been exempted from this rule because of “grandfathering” because it owned the shares before the implementation of the rule, but there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants the EGF that exemption. The full Cevian press releases in English and German are available through their spokesperson and are attached below (at the bottom of the insight).

Another Reuters article discussed the situation, with quotes from Cevian, and added this tidbit at the end.

An ad hoc board of independent directors consisting of five directors, without representatives of EGF and Cevian…will review the proposal and decide how the voting on it will take place at the extraordinary general meeting,” spokeswoman Edna Ayme-Yahil said.

Investors should note…..

The last paragraph of Article 5 of the Panalpina Articles of Association says “No entries shall be made in the register of shareholders following the dispatch of the convocation to the Shareholders’ Meeting until the day after the Shareholders’ Meeting.” This is a little different than is the case for many large Swiss companies where they give the convocation and investors may subsequently register their shares.

In Panalpina’s case, if you are not registered by the time the company sends out the convocation, there is no requirement for the company to admit your shares to the register even if there is plenty of time to do so (though the Board can make exceptions to the entry restriction).

For investors interested in or concerned about the situation, there are measures which may be advisable to implement ASAP to ensure you can vote.

4. Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile

Descente Ltd (8114 JP) has been in the press quite a bit in recent days with management commentary about how the company and directors disagree with the Tender Offer launched by Itochu Corp (8001 JP) to raise their stake from 30% to 40% and how it could lead to conflict of interest and worsening management, lower morale for employees, and a loss of independence.

Management, former management, and former employees have all joined the party. Wednesday saw a significant sell-down of shares to a post-Tender Offer low, but it was not clear why.

Descente had, on the 26th, noted in a puff piece in the Nikkei that it would move up the release of its next Mid-Term (Three Year) Plan (normally due in May this year), and it would focus on growing direct sales in China through more stores, growing sales in the US through adding products to the list (currently the major product in North America is skiwear), selling LeCoq Sportif in Indonesia and Munsingwear in Vietnam. WHEN is unknown, but the explicit goal is to encourage shareholders to keep their shares rather than tender them to Itochu.

Today saw a new filing from Itochu in which it amended its original announcement, claimed Descente’s activity in the media was additional and additive to the Target Company Position Statement filed on 7 February, and for that reason, their activity had not been appropriately disclosed to shareholders. Furthermore, Itochu noted that while the jibber-jabber had been going on the last two-plus weeks, Descente had asked Itochu to negotiate post-Tender management structure plans, and Itochu had agreed. Itochu and Descente talked for 9 days from 11-20 Feb but Descente was bad-mouthing Itochu in the press at the same time. That induced Itochu to stop talks. And late today, the Nikkei has released a 27 February interview with the CEO of ANTA, Itochu’s longtime textile partner in China and a 6.86% holder of Descente shares, where he says that he supports Itochu’s tender offer, will not sell their shares in Descente, and would support Itochu efforts to restructure management. 

These three new developments change things in interesting ways, in my opinion pushing Descente’s own plans closer to Itochu’s, and introducing the possibility of significantly more hostility to come, with a much higher likelihood Itochu can win the proxy wars to come. 

In-depth analysis below the fold.

Previous insights on the situation and its runup are listed below.

5. M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in February 2019

For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with an overall deal size of US$12.3bn.

This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component.

A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal.

The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.

Brief Summary of News in February of Arb Situations On Our Radar

In this briefing:

1. Versum Materials – Entegris Beaten to the Punch by Merck KGaA
2. The Mechanics of the Panalpina Vote
3. Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile
4. M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in February 2019
5. Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights

1. Versum Materials – Entegris Beaten to the Punch by Merck KGaA

Merck KGaA (MRK GY), the German pharmaceutical and chemical company, gatecrashed the Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger with Versum Materials (VSM US) the morning of February 27, 2019, with the announcement of a $48 per share cash acquisition proposal that was presented to Versum’s board of directors that same day. Versum, which was spun out of Air Products & Chemicals, Inc (APD US) in 2016, is a global provider of solutions (Materials and Delivery Systems and Services) to the semiconductor and display industries.

On January 28, 2019, a day after the WSJ broke the story that Versum and Entegris were in talks, the companies announced a $9 billion (combined value) merger of equals whereby each VSM share would receive a fixed exchange ratio of 1.12 ENTG shares, resulting in VSM holders owning 47.5% of the combined company and ENTG holders owning the other 52.5%. The deal was well received with both companies’ shares climbing steadily since the announcement.

However, these best laid plans took a Teutonic turn when the other Merck (Merck KGaA, the German pharmaceuticals and chemicals group unaffiliated with Merck & Co Inc. (MRK US) of the USA) threw its hat in the ring.

According to Merck, its Executive Board unanimously approved its proposal and is fully committed to pursuing the transaction. Merck said it is prepared to proceed immediately to due diligence and negotiations and to quickly agree to a merger agreement. It further stated the completion of the offer will be subject to customary closing conditions, including the receipt of necessary regulatory clearances.

The $48 per share proposed price is a 51.7% premium over VSM’s January 25, 2019 share price just prior to the announcement of the Versum/Entegris merger and a 15.9% premium over VSM’s closing price on February 26, 2019.

The ball is now in the VSM board of directors’ court and below we’ll look at how the board might react and where the chips may fall.

2. The Mechanics of the Panalpina Vote

This insight is a kind of public service announcement for investors looking at the Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) situation as it might affect the likely upcoming Extraordinary General Meeting that the Ernst Göhner Foundation requested of Panalpina, and to which Panalpina has acquiesced. The agenda item of the EGM requested is to implement a “One Share One Vote” system. 

Activist Cevian has come out against the proposal by the Ernst Göhner Foundation. This sounds counterintuitive except for one odd legal angle.

The Foundation’s ostensible goal is to ensure that the vote is “fair” so that Cevian and Artisan Partners can vote their full stake after having been capped at 5% for many years because of Article 5 in the Panalpina Articles of Association. The more cunning aspect of this is that, as per the Panalpina announcement…

In a letter addressed to Panalpina’s Board of Directors, minority shareholder Cevian had recently questioned the practice to fully admit EGF with all its voting rights at the Company’s shareholders’ meetings. Cevian took the position that the voting restriction of 5% must be applied to all shareholders and, hence the voting power of EGF must be reduced to 5%. An ad hoc board of independent directors (BoiD) consisting of five directors (without representatives of EGF and Cevian) and chaired by Thomas E. Kern, is currently evaluating the situation based on expert opinions submitted by each of EGF and Cevian and based on independent expert advice obtained by the BoiD.

The Foundation knows that their position may be legally weak, and their position could be capped at 5% rather than grandfathered. Indeed, the “independent expert advice” obtained by Cevian includes the opinions of “four leading Swiss stockbrokers” who had come to the conclusion that the Foundation had been unlawfully excluded from the 5% cap, according to this Reuters article on the 26th. The company states that the Ernst Göhner Foundation is and has been exempted from this rule because of “grandfathering” because it owned the shares before the implementation of the rule, but there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants the EGF that exemption. The full Cevian press releases in English and German are available through their spokesperson and are attached below (at the bottom of the insight).

Another Reuters article discussed the situation, with quotes from Cevian, and added this tidbit at the end.

An ad hoc board of independent directors consisting of five directors, without representatives of EGF and Cevian…will review the proposal and decide how the voting on it will take place at the extraordinary general meeting,” spokeswoman Edna Ayme-Yahil said.

Investors should note…..

The last paragraph of Article 5 of the Panalpina Articles of Association says “No entries shall be made in the register of shareholders following the dispatch of the convocation to the Shareholders’ Meeting until the day after the Shareholders’ Meeting.” This is a little different than is the case for many large Swiss companies where they give the convocation and investors may subsequently register their shares.

In Panalpina’s case, if you are not registered by the time the company sends out the convocation, there is no requirement for the company to admit your shares to the register even if there is plenty of time to do so (though the Board can make exceptions to the entry restriction).

For investors interested in or concerned about the situation, there are measures which may be advisable to implement ASAP to ensure you can vote.

3. Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile

Descente Ltd (8114 JP) has been in the press quite a bit in recent days with management commentary about how the company and directors disagree with the Tender Offer launched by Itochu Corp (8001 JP) to raise their stake from 30% to 40% and how it could lead to conflict of interest and worsening management, lower morale for employees, and a loss of independence.

Management, former management, and former employees have all joined the party. Wednesday saw a significant sell-down of shares to a post-Tender Offer low, but it was not clear why.

Descente had, on the 26th, noted in a puff piece in the Nikkei that it would move up the release of its next Mid-Term (Three Year) Plan (normally due in May this year), and it would focus on growing direct sales in China through more stores, growing sales in the US through adding products to the list (currently the major product in North America is skiwear), selling LeCoq Sportif in Indonesia and Munsingwear in Vietnam. WHEN is unknown, but the explicit goal is to encourage shareholders to keep their shares rather than tender them to Itochu.

Today saw a new filing from Itochu in which it amended its original announcement, claimed Descente’s activity in the media was additional and additive to the Target Company Position Statement filed on 7 February, and for that reason, their activity had not been appropriately disclosed to shareholders. Furthermore, Itochu noted that while the jibber-jabber had been going on the last two-plus weeks, Descente had asked Itochu to negotiate post-Tender management structure plans, and Itochu had agreed. Itochu and Descente talked for 9 days from 11-20 Feb but Descente was bad-mouthing Itochu in the press at the same time. That induced Itochu to stop talks. And late today, the Nikkei has released a 27 February interview with the CEO of ANTA, Itochu’s longtime textile partner in China and a 6.86% holder of Descente shares, where he says that he supports Itochu’s tender offer, will not sell their shares in Descente, and would support Itochu efforts to restructure management. 

These three new developments change things in interesting ways, in my opinion pushing Descente’s own plans closer to Itochu’s, and introducing the possibility of significantly more hostility to come, with a much higher likelihood Itochu can win the proxy wars to come. 

In-depth analysis below the fold.

Previous insights on the situation and its runup are listed below.

4. M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in February 2019

For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with an overall deal size of US$12.3bn.

This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component.

A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal.

The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.

Brief Summary of News in February of Arb Situations On Our Radar

5. Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights

The process of the merger between Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ) and Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s local unit Bank Nusantara Parahyangan (BBNP IJ) is proceeding apace.

Today, the shares go ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected. 

In this briefing:

1. The Mechanics of the Panalpina Vote
2. Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile
3. M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in February 2019
4. Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights
5. Nutrien’s Move On Ruralco Makes Agronomic Sense

1. The Mechanics of the Panalpina Vote

This insight is a kind of public service announcement for investors looking at the Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) situation as it might affect the likely upcoming Extraordinary General Meeting that the Ernst Göhner Foundation requested of Panalpina, and to which Panalpina has acquiesced. The agenda item of the EGM requested is to implement a “One Share One Vote” system. 

Activist Cevian has come out against the proposal by the Ernst Göhner Foundation. This sounds counterintuitive except for one odd legal angle.

The Foundation’s ostensible goal is to ensure that the vote is “fair” so that Cevian and Artisan Partners can vote their full stake after having been capped at 5% for many years because of Article 5 in the Panalpina Articles of Association. The more cunning aspect of this is that, as per the Panalpina announcement…

In a letter addressed to Panalpina’s Board of Directors, minority shareholder Cevian had recently questioned the practice to fully admit EGF with all its voting rights at the Company’s shareholders’ meetings. Cevian took the position that the voting restriction of 5% must be applied to all shareholders and, hence the voting power of EGF must be reduced to 5%. An ad hoc board of independent directors (BoiD) consisting of five directors (without representatives of EGF and Cevian) and chaired by Thomas E. Kern, is currently evaluating the situation based on expert opinions submitted by each of EGF and Cevian and based on independent expert advice obtained by the BoiD.

The Foundation knows that their position may be legally weak, and their position could be capped at 5% rather than grandfathered. Indeed, the “independent expert advice” obtained by Cevian includes the opinions of “four leading Swiss stockbrokers” who had come to the conclusion that the Foundation had been unlawfully excluded from the 5% cap, according to this Reuters article on the 26th. The company states that the Ernst Göhner Foundation is and has been exempted from this rule because of “grandfathering” because it owned the shares before the implementation of the rule, but there is nothing in the Articles of Association which grants the EGF that exemption. The full Cevian press releases in English and German are available through their spokesperson and are attached below (at the bottom of the insight).

Another Reuters article discussed the situation, with quotes from Cevian, and added this tidbit at the end.

An ad hoc board of independent directors consisting of five directors, without representatives of EGF and Cevian…will review the proposal and decide how the voting on it will take place at the extraordinary general meeting,” spokeswoman Edna Ayme-Yahil said.

Investors should note…..

The last paragraph of Article 5 of the Panalpina Articles of Association says “No entries shall be made in the register of shareholders following the dispatch of the convocation to the Shareholders’ Meeting until the day after the Shareholders’ Meeting.” This is a little different than is the case for many large Swiss companies where they give the convocation and investors may subsequently register their shares.

In Panalpina’s case, if you are not registered by the time the company sends out the convocation, there is no requirement for the company to admit your shares to the register even if there is plenty of time to do so (though the Board can make exceptions to the entry restriction).

For investors interested in or concerned about the situation, there are measures which may be advisable to implement ASAP to ensure you can vote.

2. Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile

Descente Ltd (8114 JP) has been in the press quite a bit in recent days with management commentary about how the company and directors disagree with the Tender Offer launched by Itochu Corp (8001 JP) to raise their stake from 30% to 40% and how it could lead to conflict of interest and worsening management, lower morale for employees, and a loss of independence.

Management, former management, and former employees have all joined the party. Wednesday saw a significant sell-down of shares to a post-Tender Offer low, but it was not clear why.

Descente had, on the 26th, noted in a puff piece in the Nikkei that it would move up the release of its next Mid-Term (Three Year) Plan (normally due in May this year), and it would focus on growing direct sales in China through more stores, growing sales in the US through adding products to the list (currently the major product in North America is skiwear), selling LeCoq Sportif in Indonesia and Munsingwear in Vietnam. WHEN is unknown, but the explicit goal is to encourage shareholders to keep their shares rather than tender them to Itochu.

Today saw a new filing from Itochu in which it amended its original announcement, claimed Descente’s activity in the media was additional and additive to the Target Company Position Statement filed on 7 February, and for that reason, their activity had not been appropriately disclosed to shareholders. Furthermore, Itochu noted that while the jibber-jabber had been going on the last two-plus weeks, Descente had asked Itochu to negotiate post-Tender management structure plans, and Itochu had agreed. Itochu and Descente talked for 9 days from 11-20 Feb but Descente was bad-mouthing Itochu in the press at the same time. That induced Itochu to stop talks. And late today, the Nikkei has released a 27 February interview with the CEO of ANTA, Itochu’s longtime textile partner in China and a 6.86% holder of Descente shares, where he says that he supports Itochu’s tender offer, will not sell their shares in Descente, and would support Itochu efforts to restructure management. 

These three new developments change things in interesting ways, in my opinion pushing Descente’s own plans closer to Itochu’s, and introducing the possibility of significantly more hostility to come, with a much higher likelihood Itochu can win the proxy wars to come. 

In-depth analysis below the fold.

Previous insights on the situation and its runup are listed below.

3. M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in February 2019

For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with an overall deal size of US$12.3bn.

This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component.

A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal.

The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.

Brief Summary of News in February of Arb Situations On Our Radar

4. Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights

The process of the merger between Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ) and Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s local unit Bank Nusantara Parahyangan (BBNP IJ) is proceeding apace.

Today, the shares go ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected. 

5. Nutrien’s Move On Ruralco Makes Agronomic Sense

Ruralco Holdings (RHL AU) has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. The Offer values Ruralco at A$469mn and an enterprise value of $615mn.

A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.

The Scheme is subject to shareholder approval, and approval from the ACCC and FIRB. Previous commentary bv ACCC’s Rod Sims would indicate this regulatory approval will not be an issue.

Ruralco’s directors unanimously recommend the Offer in the absence of a superior proposal and a favourable independent expert opinion.

Concerning shareholder reception to the Scheme, Ruralco’s CEO Travis Dillon said “The feedback we’ve had … with all stakeholders, but including our shareholders (has been) overwhelmingly positive.“

This is a pretty clean deal and the gross/annualised spread of 1.4%/4.1%, assuming late June completion, reflects this.

A counter offer from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) cannot be ruled out. But given its comparative size, Nutrien would be the likely winner in such a scrap, potentially reducing the likelihood of Elders making an offer.

In this briefing:

1. Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile
2. M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in February 2019
3. Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights
4. Nutrien’s Move On Ruralco Makes Agronomic Sense
5. Nexon M&A: Amazon & Comcast Enter the Race – It Ain’t Over Till Its Over!

1. Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile

Descente Ltd (8114 JP) has been in the press quite a bit in recent days with management commentary about how the company and directors disagree with the Tender Offer launched by Itochu Corp (8001 JP) to raise their stake from 30% to 40% and how it could lead to conflict of interest and worsening management, lower morale for employees, and a loss of independence.

Management, former management, and former employees have all joined the party. Wednesday saw a significant sell-down of shares to a post-Tender Offer low, but it was not clear why.

Descente had, on the 26th, noted in a puff piece in the Nikkei that it would move up the release of its next Mid-Term (Three Year) Plan (normally due in May this year), and it would focus on growing direct sales in China through more stores, growing sales in the US through adding products to the list (currently the major product in North America is skiwear), selling LeCoq Sportif in Indonesia and Munsingwear in Vietnam. WHEN is unknown, but the explicit goal is to encourage shareholders to keep their shares rather than tender them to Itochu.

Today saw a new filing from Itochu in which it amended its original announcement, claimed Descente’s activity in the media was additional and additive to the Target Company Position Statement filed on 7 February, and for that reason, their activity had not been appropriately disclosed to shareholders. Furthermore, Itochu noted that while the jibber-jabber had been going on the last two-plus weeks, Descente had asked Itochu to negotiate post-Tender management structure plans, and Itochu had agreed. Itochu and Descente talked for 9 days from 11-20 Feb but Descente was bad-mouthing Itochu in the press at the same time. That induced Itochu to stop talks. And late today, the Nikkei has released a 27 February interview with the CEO of ANTA, Itochu’s longtime textile partner in China and a 6.86% holder of Descente shares, where he says that he supports Itochu’s tender offer, will not sell their shares in Descente, and would support Itochu efforts to restructure management. 

These three new developments change things in interesting ways, in my opinion pushing Descente’s own plans closer to Itochu’s, and introducing the possibility of significantly more hostility to come, with a much higher likelihood Itochu can win the proxy wars to come. 

In-depth analysis below the fold.

Previous insights on the situation and its runup are listed below.

2. M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in February 2019

For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with an overall deal size of US$12.3bn.

This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component.

A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal.

The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.

Brief Summary of News in February of Arb Situations On Our Radar

3. Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights

The process of the merger between Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ) and Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s local unit Bank Nusantara Parahyangan (BBNP IJ) is proceeding apace.

Today, the shares go ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected. 

4. Nutrien’s Move On Ruralco Makes Agronomic Sense

Ruralco Holdings (RHL AU) has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. The Offer values Ruralco at A$469mn and an enterprise value of $615mn.

A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.

The Scheme is subject to shareholder approval, and approval from the ACCC and FIRB. Previous commentary bv ACCC’s Rod Sims would indicate this regulatory approval will not be an issue.

Ruralco’s directors unanimously recommend the Offer in the absence of a superior proposal and a favourable independent expert opinion.

Concerning shareholder reception to the Scheme, Ruralco’s CEO Travis Dillon said “The feedback we’ve had … with all stakeholders, but including our shareholders (has been) overwhelmingly positive.“

This is a pretty clean deal and the gross/annualised spread of 1.4%/4.1%, assuming late June completion, reflects this.

A counter offer from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) cannot be ruled out. But given its comparative size, Nutrien would be the likely winner in such a scrap, potentially reducing the likelihood of Elders making an offer.

5. Nexon M&A: Amazon & Comcast Enter the Race – It Ain’t Over Till Its Over!

In a surprising move, it was reported after the market close today that Amazon.com Inc (AMZN US) (market cap of US$804 billion) and Comcast (US$176 billion) will enter the race and have submitted initial bids to acquire Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)/NXC Corp. 

The entrance of Amazon and Comcast is a major positive surprise and it should have a strong positive impact on Nexon’s share price. Prior to the entrance of Amazon and Comcast in this M&A battle, the market was firmly leaning towards the consortium including Tencent, Netmarble Games, and MBK Partners to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon.

Now, Amazon and Comcast’s entrance into this M&A battle has made it a lot more exciting and uncertain. Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)‘s share price is up 19% YTD but its share price trend has been flattening out in February. In the next few weeks, we expect further boost to Nexon’s share price (15%+), mainly because a lot more investors will think that the Tencent consortium, Amazon, and Comcast will try to pay higher price to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon. Kudos to Nexon shareholders!

In this briefing:

1. M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in February 2019
2. Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights
3. Nutrien’s Move On Ruralco Makes Agronomic Sense
4. Nexon M&A: Amazon & Comcast Enter the Race – It Ain’t Over Till Its Over!
5. Korean Stubs Spotlight: Focus on Diverging Share Prices and Changes to Foreign Ownership

1. M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in February 2019

For the month of February, thirteen new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with an overall deal size of US$12.3bn.

This overall number includes the “offer” for Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK) which has no value, as yet, attached to the scrip component.

A firm number for Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) has yet to be announced, which could result in a US$4bn+ deal.

The average premium to last close for the new deals was 27.5%.

Brief Summary of News in February of Arb Situations On Our Radar

2. Bank Danamon Goes Ex-Rights

The process of the merger between Bank Danamon Indonesia (BDMN IJ) and Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s local unit Bank Nusantara Parahyangan (BBNP IJ) is proceeding apace.

Today, the shares go ex-rights for shareholders looking to both vote on March 26th and, assuming the vote goes through, to elect to receive cash of IDR 9,590 instead of continuing to hold shares. BDMN shares are trading down, as expected. 

3. Nutrien’s Move On Ruralco Makes Agronomic Sense

Ruralco Holdings (RHL AU) has announced it has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed in which Nutrien Ltd (NTR CN) has agreed to take Ruralco private at $4.40/share – a 44% premium to last close and the one-month VWAP. The Offer values Ruralco at A$469mn and an enterprise value of $615mn.

A fully franked special dividend of A$0.90 will reduce the Scheme consideration. An interim dividend of A$0.10 will be added.

The Scheme is subject to shareholder approval, and approval from the ACCC and FIRB. Previous commentary bv ACCC’s Rod Sims would indicate this regulatory approval will not be an issue.

Ruralco’s directors unanimously recommend the Offer in the absence of a superior proposal and a favourable independent expert opinion.

Concerning shareholder reception to the Scheme, Ruralco’s CEO Travis Dillon said “The feedback we’ve had … with all stakeholders, but including our shareholders (has been) overwhelmingly positive.“

This is a pretty clean deal and the gross/annualised spread of 1.4%/4.1%, assuming late June completion, reflects this.

A counter offer from Elders Ltd (ELD AU) cannot be ruled out. But given its comparative size, Nutrien would be the likely winner in such a scrap, potentially reducing the likelihood of Elders making an offer.

4. Nexon M&A: Amazon & Comcast Enter the Race – It Ain’t Over Till Its Over!

In a surprising move, it was reported after the market close today that Amazon.com Inc (AMZN US) (market cap of US$804 billion) and Comcast (US$176 billion) will enter the race and have submitted initial bids to acquire Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)/NXC Corp. 

The entrance of Amazon and Comcast is a major positive surprise and it should have a strong positive impact on Nexon’s share price. Prior to the entrance of Amazon and Comcast in this M&A battle, the market was firmly leaning towards the consortium including Tencent, Netmarble Games, and MBK Partners to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon.

Now, Amazon and Comcast’s entrance into this M&A battle has made it a lot more exciting and uncertain. Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)‘s share price is up 19% YTD but its share price trend has been flattening out in February. In the next few weeks, we expect further boost to Nexon’s share price (15%+), mainly because a lot more investors will think that the Tencent consortium, Amazon, and Comcast will try to pay higher price to acquire NXC Corp/Nexon. Kudos to Nexon shareholders!

5. Korean Stubs Spotlight: Focus on Diverging Share Prices and Changes to Foreign Ownership

In this report, we provide the one year share price comparisons of the holdcos and the opcos in both table and chart formats as well as changes to the foreign ownership stakes of these companies YTD. Significant, rapid changes to the foreign shareholdings of these companies sometimes lead to opportunities in the holdco/opco pair trades. 

Among these 30 pair of companies, five pairs in particular are interesting where the difference in their share prices have diverged significantly in the past year (by 30% or more). These five pairs of companies include the following:  

• Hyosung Corp vs. Hyosung Advanced Materials  
• BGF Retail vs. BGF Co.  
• Doosan Corp vs. Doosan Heavy Industries Corp.  
• Cuckoo Holdings vs. Cuckoo Homesys  
• Orion Holdings vs. Orion Corp