On Wednesday, Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU) rejected an indicative takeover offer from rival Australian Pharma Industries (API AU). Shareholders were disappointed with the news, with Sigma’s shares closing 12.3% lower at A$0.54 per share. API shares fared better and fell 3.6% to A$1.35 each.
We believe Sigma’s board were left with the tough choice of accepting a lowball offer or improving the existing business and riding out the inevitable share price fall. By rejecting the API bid, the Sigma board made the difficult but right choice, in our view. While further downside risk to the share price is limited, we caution that shareholders require patience as the road to share price recovery will be long.
Wheelock & (20 HK) is coming up “expensive”, but it’s Wharf Holdings (4 HK) which is under-performing after PRC property sales targets are lowered amid Beijing’s cooling measures.
Preceding my comments on Wheelock and other stubs are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.
These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.
On 12 March 2019 after the close, Shin Etsu Chemical (4063 JP)announced a share buyback program to buy up to 14 million shares for up to ¥100 billion. If it bought all 14 million shares, that would be 3.3% of shares outstanding. Simultaneously, it announced a ToSTNeT-3 buyback of 11,001,100 shares at today’s closing price of ¥9,090/share which if all bought would complete the buyback program.
As I write, the shares are up 4-6% in thin trading in the ADRs.
There was some speculation across the Street there would be a buyback because of slowing earnings expectations and a surfeit of capital, which was itself important because of the company’s lack of recent history of buybacks (the last and only time the company has bought back shares (to date) was a repurchase of 3 million shares for ¥13.6 billion in late October 2008 when things were hairy (and cheap)).
The shares are down over the past year, but the price in the past few days is not dramatically at the low end of the range of the past six months or so.
There may be some information in the context and structure of this buyback which tells you something different than people’s first reaction.
The key point of interest for investors regarding Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) continues to be details surrounding its upcoming capital raise. The company has, since early November when it incurred these losses, offered scant details regarding the structure of the capital raise, except to note that the components would include additional loans and equity from industrial partners and most likely, main shareholder Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP).
We visited the company to gather as much information as possible on the potential structure of the capital increase and to update the order outlook and reasons for further cost overruns.
Last November, Xenith and QANTM , both leading providers of IP origination services in Australia, announced a merger via an all-scrip scheme of arrangement, whereby Xenith shareholders will receive 1.22 QANTM shares for every Xenith share, or an implied value of A$1.598/share. QANTM and Xenith shareholders would own 55% and 45% of the merged group with a then pro-forma capitalisation of A$285mn. Pre-cost synergies are estimated at A$7mn/annum at the end of year three.
Xenith’s board unanimously recommended the merger to its shareholders.
IPH did not blink and on the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, lobbed an unsolicited, indicative, preliminary, conditional and non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close.
QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. IPH countered those claims, spurring QANTM to counter those countered claims.
On the 13 February 2019, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support the QANTM scheme and intends to vote against it. In response, both Xenith and QANTM announced that neither had received a proposal from IPH. Xenith’s shares increased 20.3% to close at A$1.69/share.
The provisional date for ACCC s clearance of the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March. The provisional date for IPH/Xenith is the 2 May. The QANTM/Xenith Scheme meeting is scheduled for 3 April with a 24 April implementation date. IPH’s proposal has an indicative implementation date of mid-July.
IPH’s proposal currently offers an implied value of $1.98 (65% in cash) against $1.85 for QANTM’s all-scrip offer.
The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies. IPH is the oldest, and the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.
With IPH’s blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme will fail. Xenith should engage with IPH.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Wheelock & (20 HK) is coming up “expensive”, but it’s Wharf Holdings (4 HK) which is under-performing after PRC property sales targets are lowered amid Beijing’s cooling measures.
Preceding my comments on Wheelock and other stubs are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.
These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.
On 12 March 2019 after the close, Shin Etsu Chemical (4063 JP)announced a share buyback program to buy up to 14 million shares for up to ¥100 billion. If it bought all 14 million shares, that would be 3.3% of shares outstanding. Simultaneously, it announced a ToSTNeT-3 buyback of 11,001,100 shares at today’s closing price of ¥9,090/share which if all bought would complete the buyback program.
As I write, the shares are up 4-6% in thin trading in the ADRs.
There was some speculation across the Street there would be a buyback because of slowing earnings expectations and a surfeit of capital, which was itself important because of the company’s lack of recent history of buybacks (the last and only time the company has bought back shares (to date) was a repurchase of 3 million shares for ¥13.6 billion in late October 2008 when things were hairy (and cheap)).
The shares are down over the past year, but the price in the past few days is not dramatically at the low end of the range of the past six months or so.
There may be some information in the context and structure of this buyback which tells you something different than people’s first reaction.
The key point of interest for investors regarding Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) continues to be details surrounding its upcoming capital raise. The company has, since early November when it incurred these losses, offered scant details regarding the structure of the capital raise, except to note that the components would include additional loans and equity from industrial partners and most likely, main shareholder Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP).
We visited the company to gather as much information as possible on the potential structure of the capital increase and to update the order outlook and reasons for further cost overruns.
Last November, Xenith and QANTM , both leading providers of IP origination services in Australia, announced a merger via an all-scrip scheme of arrangement, whereby Xenith shareholders will receive 1.22 QANTM shares for every Xenith share, or an implied value of A$1.598/share. QANTM and Xenith shareholders would own 55% and 45% of the merged group with a then pro-forma capitalisation of A$285mn. Pre-cost synergies are estimated at A$7mn/annum at the end of year three.
Xenith’s board unanimously recommended the merger to its shareholders.
IPH did not blink and on the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, lobbed an unsolicited, indicative, preliminary, conditional and non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close.
QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. IPH countered those claims, spurring QANTM to counter those countered claims.
On the 13 February 2019, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support the QANTM scheme and intends to vote against it. In response, both Xenith and QANTM announced that neither had received a proposal from IPH. Xenith’s shares increased 20.3% to close at A$1.69/share.
The provisional date for ACCC s clearance of the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March. The provisional date for IPH/Xenith is the 2 May. The QANTM/Xenith Scheme meeting is scheduled for 3 April with a 24 April implementation date. IPH’s proposal has an indicative implementation date of mid-July.
IPH’s proposal currently offers an implied value of $1.98 (65% in cash) against $1.85 for QANTM’s all-scrip offer.
The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies. IPH is the oldest, and the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.
With IPH’s blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme will fail. Xenith should engage with IPH.
In this report, we provide an analysis of our pair trade idea between Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) (market cap of 1,612 billion won) and Hyosung TNC Co Ltd (298020 KS) (market cap of 712 billion won). Our strategy will be to be long Hyosung TNC and be short Hyosung Corp.
In the past six months, Hyosung Corp is up 62% while Hyosung TNC is down 12%. We believe this price divergence has been excessive. The four major reasons why Hyosung Corp’s share price has surged in the past six months are mentioned below. There is a case to be made that the market has already factored into Hyosung Corp’s share price many of the positive factors mentioned below.
Excellent dividends
Corporate activism related stock
Strong financial results
Timing of the increased insider ownerships/Completion of tender offers
Hyosung TNC has underperformed the market as well as Hyosung Corp in the past six months. However, Hyosung TNC appears to be a turnaround story driven by the following factors:
Decline in raw material prices
Aggressive spandex investment in India
Stabilization of spandex prices in 2H19
Consolidation of the global spandex industry
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
On 12 March 2019 after the close, Shin Etsu Chemical (4063 JP)announced a share buyback program to buy up to 14 million shares for up to ¥100 billion. If it bought all 14 million shares, that would be 3.3% of shares outstanding. Simultaneously, it announced a ToSTNeT-3 buyback of 11,001,100 shares at today’s closing price of ¥9,090/share which if all bought would complete the buyback program.
As I write, the shares are up 4-6% in thin trading in the ADRs.
There was some speculation across the Street there would be a buyback because of slowing earnings expectations and a surfeit of capital, which was itself important because of the company’s lack of recent history of buybacks (the last and only time the company has bought back shares (to date) was a repurchase of 3 million shares for ¥13.6 billion in late October 2008 when things were hairy (and cheap)).
The shares are down over the past year, but the price in the past few days is not dramatically at the low end of the range of the past six months or so.
There may be some information in the context and structure of this buyback which tells you something different than people’s first reaction.
The key point of interest for investors regarding Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) continues to be details surrounding its upcoming capital raise. The company has, since early November when it incurred these losses, offered scant details regarding the structure of the capital raise, except to note that the components would include additional loans and equity from industrial partners and most likely, main shareholder Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP).
We visited the company to gather as much information as possible on the potential structure of the capital increase and to update the order outlook and reasons for further cost overruns.
Last November, Xenith and QANTM , both leading providers of IP origination services in Australia, announced a merger via an all-scrip scheme of arrangement, whereby Xenith shareholders will receive 1.22 QANTM shares for every Xenith share, or an implied value of A$1.598/share. QANTM and Xenith shareholders would own 55% and 45% of the merged group with a then pro-forma capitalisation of A$285mn. Pre-cost synergies are estimated at A$7mn/annum at the end of year three.
Xenith’s board unanimously recommended the merger to its shareholders.
IPH did not blink and on the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, lobbed an unsolicited, indicative, preliminary, conditional and non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close.
QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. IPH countered those claims, spurring QANTM to counter those countered claims.
On the 13 February 2019, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support the QANTM scheme and intends to vote against it. In response, both Xenith and QANTM announced that neither had received a proposal from IPH. Xenith’s shares increased 20.3% to close at A$1.69/share.
The provisional date for ACCC s clearance of the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March. The provisional date for IPH/Xenith is the 2 May. The QANTM/Xenith Scheme meeting is scheduled for 3 April with a 24 April implementation date. IPH’s proposal has an indicative implementation date of mid-July.
IPH’s proposal currently offers an implied value of $1.98 (65% in cash) against $1.85 for QANTM’s all-scrip offer.
The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies. IPH is the oldest, and the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.
With IPH’s blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme will fail. Xenith should engage with IPH.
In this report, we provide an analysis of our pair trade idea between Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) (market cap of 1,612 billion won) and Hyosung TNC Co Ltd (298020 KS) (market cap of 712 billion won). Our strategy will be to be long Hyosung TNC and be short Hyosung Corp.
In the past six months, Hyosung Corp is up 62% while Hyosung TNC is down 12%. We believe this price divergence has been excessive. The four major reasons why Hyosung Corp’s share price has surged in the past six months are mentioned below. There is a case to be made that the market has already factored into Hyosung Corp’s share price many of the positive factors mentioned below.
Excellent dividends
Corporate activism related stock
Strong financial results
Timing of the increased insider ownerships/Completion of tender offers
Hyosung TNC has underperformed the market as well as Hyosung Corp in the past six months. However, Hyosung TNC appears to be a turnaround story driven by the following factors:
Shin Ramyun non-frying noodle dramatically reversed Sub’s fortune. Local street starts believing Sub will hit a ₩100bil OP milestone this year. Local institutions began to scoop up Sub shares since a week ago. Yesterday, local pension/foreign money came in. This led to the largest Sub pushing in many weeks. Holdco/Sub are not at near -2σ.
Street consensus on Sub’s FY19e OP is already upwardly adjusted to ₩106bil. On this, Sub is already at a 17x earnings. ₩106bil OP is immaturely aggressive. 17x isn’t particularly cheap given Sub’s FY18 year-end PER (18.4x).
Valuation wise, Sub price should be pressed down at this level until more dramatic and tangible sales data come out. Holdco discount is still hovering at 50% to NAV. I’d make a stub trade here. Holdco liquidity can be an issue.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
The key point of interest for investors regarding Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) continues to be details surrounding its upcoming capital raise. The company has, since early November when it incurred these losses, offered scant details regarding the structure of the capital raise, except to note that the components would include additional loans and equity from industrial partners and most likely, main shareholder Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP).
We visited the company to gather as much information as possible on the potential structure of the capital increase and to update the order outlook and reasons for further cost overruns.
Last November, Xenith and QANTM , both leading providers of IP origination services in Australia, announced a merger via an all-scrip scheme of arrangement, whereby Xenith shareholders will receive 1.22 QANTM shares for every Xenith share, or an implied value of A$1.598/share. QANTM and Xenith shareholders would own 55% and 45% of the merged group with a then pro-forma capitalisation of A$285mn. Pre-cost synergies are estimated at A$7mn/annum at the end of year three.
Xenith’s board unanimously recommended the merger to its shareholders.
IPH did not blink and on the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, lobbed an unsolicited, indicative, preliminary, conditional and non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close.
QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. IPH countered those claims, spurring QANTM to counter those countered claims.
On the 13 February 2019, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support the QANTM scheme and intends to vote against it. In response, both Xenith and QANTM announced that neither had received a proposal from IPH. Xenith’s shares increased 20.3% to close at A$1.69/share.
The provisional date for ACCC s clearance of the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March. The provisional date for IPH/Xenith is the 2 May. The QANTM/Xenith Scheme meeting is scheduled for 3 April with a 24 April implementation date. IPH’s proposal has an indicative implementation date of mid-July.
IPH’s proposal currently offers an implied value of $1.98 (65% in cash) against $1.85 for QANTM’s all-scrip offer.
The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies. IPH is the oldest, and the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.
With IPH’s blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme will fail. Xenith should engage with IPH.
In this report, we provide an analysis of our pair trade idea between Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) (market cap of 1,612 billion won) and Hyosung TNC Co Ltd (298020 KS) (market cap of 712 billion won). Our strategy will be to be long Hyosung TNC and be short Hyosung Corp.
In the past six months, Hyosung Corp is up 62% while Hyosung TNC is down 12%. We believe this price divergence has been excessive. The four major reasons why Hyosung Corp’s share price has surged in the past six months are mentioned below. There is a case to be made that the market has already factored into Hyosung Corp’s share price many of the positive factors mentioned below.
Excellent dividends
Corporate activism related stock
Strong financial results
Timing of the increased insider ownerships/Completion of tender offers
Hyosung TNC has underperformed the market as well as Hyosung Corp in the past six months. However, Hyosung TNC appears to be a turnaround story driven by the following factors:
Shin Ramyun non-frying noodle dramatically reversed Sub’s fortune. Local street starts believing Sub will hit a ₩100bil OP milestone this year. Local institutions began to scoop up Sub shares since a week ago. Yesterday, local pension/foreign money came in. This led to the largest Sub pushing in many weeks. Holdco/Sub are not at near -2σ.
Street consensus on Sub’s FY19e OP is already upwardly adjusted to ₩106bil. On this, Sub is already at a 17x earnings. ₩106bil OP is immaturely aggressive. 17x isn’t particularly cheap given Sub’s FY18 year-end PER (18.4x).
Valuation wise, Sub price should be pressed down at this level until more dramatic and tangible sales data come out. Holdco discount is still hovering at 50% to NAV. I’d make a stub trade here. Holdco liquidity can be an issue.
Best of luck for the new week – Rickin, Venkat and Arun
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Last November, Xenith and QANTM , both leading providers of IP origination services in Australia, announced a merger via an all-scrip scheme of arrangement, whereby Xenith shareholders will receive 1.22 QANTM shares for every Xenith share, or an implied value of A$1.598/share. QANTM and Xenith shareholders would own 55% and 45% of the merged group with a then pro-forma capitalisation of A$285mn. Pre-cost synergies are estimated at A$7mn/annum at the end of year three.
Xenith’s board unanimously recommended the merger to its shareholders.
IPH did not blink and on the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, lobbed an unsolicited, indicative, preliminary, conditional and non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close.
QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. IPH countered those claims, spurring QANTM to counter those countered claims.
On the 13 February 2019, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support the QANTM scheme and intends to vote against it. In response, both Xenith and QANTM announced that neither had received a proposal from IPH. Xenith’s shares increased 20.3% to close at A$1.69/share.
The provisional date for ACCC s clearance of the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March. The provisional date for IPH/Xenith is the 2 May. The QANTM/Xenith Scheme meeting is scheduled for 3 April with a 24 April implementation date. IPH’s proposal has an indicative implementation date of mid-July.
IPH’s proposal currently offers an implied value of $1.98 (65% in cash) against $1.85 for QANTM’s all-scrip offer.
The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies. IPH is the oldest, and the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.
With IPH’s blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme will fail. Xenith should engage with IPH.
In this report, we provide an analysis of our pair trade idea between Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) (market cap of 1,612 billion won) and Hyosung TNC Co Ltd (298020 KS) (market cap of 712 billion won). Our strategy will be to be long Hyosung TNC and be short Hyosung Corp.
In the past six months, Hyosung Corp is up 62% while Hyosung TNC is down 12%. We believe this price divergence has been excessive. The four major reasons why Hyosung Corp’s share price has surged in the past six months are mentioned below. There is a case to be made that the market has already factored into Hyosung Corp’s share price many of the positive factors mentioned below.
Excellent dividends
Corporate activism related stock
Strong financial results
Timing of the increased insider ownerships/Completion of tender offers
Hyosung TNC has underperformed the market as well as Hyosung Corp in the past six months. However, Hyosung TNC appears to be a turnaround story driven by the following factors:
Shin Ramyun non-frying noodle dramatically reversed Sub’s fortune. Local street starts believing Sub will hit a ₩100bil OP milestone this year. Local institutions began to scoop up Sub shares since a week ago. Yesterday, local pension/foreign money came in. This led to the largest Sub pushing in many weeks. Holdco/Sub are not at near -2σ.
Street consensus on Sub’s FY19e OP is already upwardly adjusted to ₩106bil. On this, Sub is already at a 17x earnings. ₩106bil OP is immaturely aggressive. 17x isn’t particularly cheap given Sub’s FY18 year-end PER (18.4x).
Valuation wise, Sub price should be pressed down at this level until more dramatic and tangible sales data come out. Holdco discount is still hovering at 50% to NAV. I’d make a stub trade here. Holdco liquidity can be an issue.
Meituan Dianping (3690 HK)‘s shares currently trade 18% below its IPO price of HK$69.00 per share. Meituan will announce its 4Q18 results on Monday, 11 March 2019, after market close. Notably, Meituan’s six-month lock-up period expires on 19 March 2019.
We believe that should Meituan deliver a strong 4Q18; it will likely not experience Xiaomi Corp (1810 HK)’s share price collapse after the end of its six-month lock-up period.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
In this report, we provide an analysis of our pair trade idea between Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) (market cap of 1,612 billion won) and Hyosung TNC Co Ltd (298020 KS) (market cap of 712 billion won). Our strategy will be to be long Hyosung TNC and be short Hyosung Corp.
In the past six months, Hyosung Corp is up 62% while Hyosung TNC is down 12%. We believe this price divergence has been excessive. The four major reasons why Hyosung Corp’s share price has surged in the past six months are mentioned below. There is a case to be made that the market has already factored into Hyosung Corp’s share price many of the positive factors mentioned below.
Excellent dividends
Corporate activism related stock
Strong financial results
Timing of the increased insider ownerships/Completion of tender offers
Hyosung TNC has underperformed the market as well as Hyosung Corp in the past six months. However, Hyosung TNC appears to be a turnaround story driven by the following factors:
Shin Ramyun non-frying noodle dramatically reversed Sub’s fortune. Local street starts believing Sub will hit a ₩100bil OP milestone this year. Local institutions began to scoop up Sub shares since a week ago. Yesterday, local pension/foreign money came in. This led to the largest Sub pushing in many weeks. Holdco/Sub are not at near -2σ.
Street consensus on Sub’s FY19e OP is already upwardly adjusted to ₩106bil. On this, Sub is already at a 17x earnings. ₩106bil OP is immaturely aggressive. 17x isn’t particularly cheap given Sub’s FY18 year-end PER (18.4x).
Valuation wise, Sub price should be pressed down at this level until more dramatic and tangible sales data come out. Holdco discount is still hovering at 50% to NAV. I’d make a stub trade here. Holdco liquidity can be an issue.
Meituan Dianping (3690 HK)‘s shares currently trade 18% below its IPO price of HK$69.00 per share. Meituan will announce its 4Q18 results on Monday, 11 March 2019, after market close. Notably, Meituan’s six-month lock-up period expires on 19 March 2019.
We believe that should Meituan deliver a strong 4Q18; it will likely not experience Xiaomi Corp (1810 HK)’s share price collapse after the end of its six-month lock-up period.
The DSME deal between HHI and KDB was officially finalized last Friday. We will then have the following four step process. Schedule detail is yet to come out. HHI intermediate holdco is named Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering, or KSOE.
HHI went south by nearly 4% last Friday when the deal was finalized. DSME stayed flat. Why did this happen? There was another story we heard last Friday. HHI and Korea Eximbank agreed that the ₩2.3tril CBs wouldn’t be converted into DSME shares and disposed any time soon. Not only that, there will be a downwardly interest adjustment to help ease DSME’s financial burden.
This agreement immediately sparked a speculation that HHI must have pledged Korea Eximbank some sort of DSME valuation pushings. This is like a value transfer rather from HHI to DSME. I’d wrap the current HHI long/DSEM short position at this point. Short-term, I expect DSME outperforming HHI. Longer term, I still doubt what value transfer from who to who. I’d rather stay away from both.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Shin Ramyun non-frying noodle dramatically reversed Sub’s fortune. Local street starts believing Sub will hit a ₩100bil OP milestone this year. Local institutions began to scoop up Sub shares since a week ago. Yesterday, local pension/foreign money came in. This led to the largest Sub pushing in many weeks. Holdco/Sub are not at near -2σ.
Street consensus on Sub’s FY19e OP is already upwardly adjusted to ₩106bil. On this, Sub is already at a 17x earnings. ₩106bil OP is immaturely aggressive. 17x isn’t particularly cheap given Sub’s FY18 year-end PER (18.4x).
Valuation wise, Sub price should be pressed down at this level until more dramatic and tangible sales data come out. Holdco discount is still hovering at 50% to NAV. I’d make a stub trade here. Holdco liquidity can be an issue.
Meituan Dianping (3690 HK)‘s shares currently trade 18% below its IPO price of HK$69.00 per share. Meituan will announce its 4Q18 results on Monday, 11 March 2019, after market close. Notably, Meituan’s six-month lock-up period expires on 19 March 2019.
We believe that should Meituan deliver a strong 4Q18; it will likely not experience Xiaomi Corp (1810 HK)’s share price collapse after the end of its six-month lock-up period.
The DSME deal between HHI and KDB was officially finalized last Friday. We will then have the following four step process. Schedule detail is yet to come out. HHI intermediate holdco is named Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering, or KSOE.
HHI went south by nearly 4% last Friday when the deal was finalized. DSME stayed flat. Why did this happen? There was another story we heard last Friday. HHI and Korea Eximbank agreed that the ₩2.3tril CBs wouldn’t be converted into DSME shares and disposed any time soon. Not only that, there will be a downwardly interest adjustment to help ease DSME’s financial burden.
This agreement immediately sparked a speculation that HHI must have pledged Korea Eximbank some sort of DSME valuation pushings. This is like a value transfer rather from HHI to DSME. I’d wrap the current HHI long/DSEM short position at this point. Short-term, I expect DSME outperforming HHI. Longer term, I still doubt what value transfer from who to who. I’d rather stay away from both.
Friday 8 March after the close, the Nikkei announced that because the third party share sale of Pioneer Corp (6773 JP) had been completed, it would be deleted from the Nikkei 225 Average (and the Nikkei 500 Index). Omron Corp (6645 JP) will replace Pioneer in the Nikkei 225 Average, with a deemed par value of 50 yen per share.
The date for this index deletion and inclusion event is the 15th of March, as per the schedule of the February 19th announcement as to how the Pioneer event would be treated.
This affords special sits/events followers a couple of different events to look at.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Meituan Dianping (3690 HK)‘s shares currently trade 18% below its IPO price of HK$69.00 per share. Meituan will announce its 4Q18 results on Monday, 11 March 2019, after market close. Notably, Meituan’s six-month lock-up period expires on 19 March 2019.
We believe that should Meituan deliver a strong 4Q18; it will likely not experience Xiaomi Corp (1810 HK)’s share price collapse after the end of its six-month lock-up period.
The DSME deal between HHI and KDB was officially finalized last Friday. We will then have the following four step process. Schedule detail is yet to come out. HHI intermediate holdco is named Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering, or KSOE.
HHI went south by nearly 4% last Friday when the deal was finalized. DSME stayed flat. Why did this happen? There was another story we heard last Friday. HHI and Korea Eximbank agreed that the ₩2.3tril CBs wouldn’t be converted into DSME shares and disposed any time soon. Not only that, there will be a downwardly interest adjustment to help ease DSME’s financial burden.
This agreement immediately sparked a speculation that HHI must have pledged Korea Eximbank some sort of DSME valuation pushings. This is like a value transfer rather from HHI to DSME. I’d wrap the current HHI long/DSEM short position at this point. Short-term, I expect DSME outperforming HHI. Longer term, I still doubt what value transfer from who to who. I’d rather stay away from both.
Friday 8 March after the close, the Nikkei announced that because the third party share sale of Pioneer Corp (6773 JP) had been completed, it would be deleted from the Nikkei 225 Average (and the Nikkei 500 Index). Omron Corp (6645 JP) will replace Pioneer in the Nikkei 225 Average, with a deemed par value of 50 yen per share.
The date for this index deletion and inclusion event is the 15th of March, as per the schedule of the February 19th announcement as to how the Pioneer event would be treated.
This affords special sits/events followers a couple of different events to look at.
Late Friday night,Hong Kong International Construction Investment Management Group Co., (687 HK) (“HKICIM”) announced HNA Finance had entered into a SPA in which Times Holdings, a Blackstone-controlled vehicle, had conditionally agreed to buy 69.54% of HKICIM’s issued shares for HK$3/share in an HK$7bn transaction. Should the SPA complete, Times will make a mandatory unconditional offer – also at $3.00/share (14.5% premium to last close) – for the remaining 30.46% of shares out.
This proposal arrives nearly three years after HNA bought a 66% in Tysan Holdings – as HKICIM was previously known – from Blackstone for HK$4.53 per share, triggering an MGO.
This share sale underlines HNA Group’s ongoing strategy to ease its debt burden and align its core business focus towards aviation, not construction and property.
HKICIM made headlines in the past not just for its eye-watering property acquisitions at Kai Tak (up to HK$13.5k/sqft in March 2017), the former site of Hong Kong’s international airport; but that HNA was also oddly motivated to acquire these parcels of land at record breaking prices to “snatch land and pricing power from the city’s real estate cartel“.
HKICIM sold its last Kai Tak site to Wheelock & (20 HK) last month (for a loss of $740mn), leaving the company with an estimated net cash position of ~$6.0bn (using FY18 interim numbers) or ~$1.80/share, it’s foundation piling operations, a development site in Hong Kong and a residential and commercial property development project in Shenyang.
The closing of the SPA is subject to the satisfaction or waiver of various conditions. However, the short time frame (13 business days from this announcement) in which to secure, fulfill or waive these conditions suggest minimal deal risk.
This will trade tight to, if not through terms, with an anticipated completion late April. There will be no bump to the Offer. Times does not intend to avail itself to compulsory acquisition and intends to maintain HKICIM’s listing; while both Times and HKICIM will take appropriate steps to maintain a sufficient public float after the close of the Offer.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Meituan Dianping (3690 HK)‘s shares currently trade 18% below its IPO price of HK$69.00 per share. Meituan will announce its 4Q18 results on Monday, 11 March 2019, after market close. Notably, Meituan’s six-month lock-up period expires on 19 March 2019.
We believe that should Meituan deliver a strong 4Q18; it will likely not experience Xiaomi Corp (1810 HK)’s share price collapse after the end of its six-month lock-up period.
The DSME deal between HHI and KDB was officially finalized last Friday. We will then have the following four step process. Schedule detail is yet to come out. HHI intermediate holdco is named Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering, or KSOE.
HHI went south by nearly 4% last Friday when the deal was finalized. DSME stayed flat. Why did this happen? There was another story we heard last Friday. HHI and Korea Eximbank agreed that the ₩2.3tril CBs wouldn’t be converted into DSME shares and disposed any time soon. Not only that, there will be a downwardly interest adjustment to help ease DSME’s financial burden.
This agreement immediately sparked a speculation that HHI must have pledged Korea Eximbank some sort of DSME valuation pushings. This is like a value transfer rather from HHI to DSME. I’d wrap the current HHI long/DSEM short position at this point. Short-term, I expect DSME outperforming HHI. Longer term, I still doubt what value transfer from who to who. I’d rather stay away from both.
Friday 8 March after the close, the Nikkei announced that because the third party share sale of Pioneer Corp (6773 JP) had been completed, it would be deleted from the Nikkei 225 Average (and the Nikkei 500 Index). Omron Corp (6645 JP) will replace Pioneer in the Nikkei 225 Average, with a deemed par value of 50 yen per share.
The date for this index deletion and inclusion event is the 15th of March, as per the schedule of the February 19th announcement as to how the Pioneer event would be treated.
This affords special sits/events followers a couple of different events to look at.
Late Friday night,Hong Kong International Construction Investment Management Group Co., (687 HK) (“HKICIM”) announced HNA Finance had entered into a SPA in which Times Holdings, a Blackstone-controlled vehicle, had conditionally agreed to buy 69.54% of HKICIM’s issued shares for HK$3/share in an HK$7bn transaction. Should the SPA complete, Times will make a mandatory unconditional offer – also at $3.00/share (14.5% premium to last close) – for the remaining 30.46% of shares out.
This proposal arrives nearly three years after HNA bought a 66% in Tysan Holdings – as HKICIM was previously known – from Blackstone for HK$4.53 per share, triggering an MGO.
This share sale underlines HNA Group’s ongoing strategy to ease its debt burden and align its core business focus towards aviation, not construction and property.
HKICIM made headlines in the past not just for its eye-watering property acquisitions at Kai Tak (up to HK$13.5k/sqft in March 2017), the former site of Hong Kong’s international airport; but that HNA was also oddly motivated to acquire these parcels of land at record breaking prices to “snatch land and pricing power from the city’s real estate cartel“.
HKICIM sold its last Kai Tak site to Wheelock & (20 HK) last month (for a loss of $740mn), leaving the company with an estimated net cash position of ~$6.0bn (using FY18 interim numbers) or ~$1.80/share, it’s foundation piling operations, a development site in Hong Kong and a residential and commercial property development project in Shenyang.
The closing of the SPA is subject to the satisfaction or waiver of various conditions. However, the short time frame (13 business days from this announcement) in which to secure, fulfill or waive these conditions suggest minimal deal risk.
This will trade tight to, if not through terms, with an anticipated completion late April. There will be no bump to the Offer. Times does not intend to avail itself to compulsory acquisition and intends to maintain HKICIM’s listing; while both Times and HKICIM will take appropriate steps to maintain a sufficient public float after the close of the Offer.
While not new news, US-based hedge fund – somewhat well-known for being involved in M&A situations – started accumulating a position in MYOB in January and has now reached a stake of 11%. The last chunks purchased appear to have been done at (or around) A$3.40/share, which is equal to terms. The Manikay letter to the Board asks the Board to consider the market movements since December and posits a fair value in excess of A$4.00/share.
Manikay says that it is interested in becoming a long-term shareholder. But the letter seems to level its criticism of the deal price most pointedly at the fact that the deal was offered and agreed to just a few days off a two-year low in the S&P/ASX200 Index and since then the index has rebounded to within 1.5% of an 11-year high.
A “market context” bump is not a bad case in and of itself because of where peers have moved and where the market has moved, and we won’t know whether that point is taken up by the IER in the Scheme Document.
This strikes Travis Lundy as not a bad reward/risk to buy up to 1-2% through terms. The back end “undisturbed price” has risen and the recent earnings release shows online penetration continues to grow.
Irrespective of whether the Malaysian rare earth processing licence provided to Lynas was without adequate due process (as has been speculated) or whether the facility is indeed an environmental concern; the fact remains the Malaysian government has reneged on the previously agreed-upon three-step licence process – imposing unachievable pre-conditions by the licence renewal date this September – and that is wrong.
Ongoing negotiation with the Malaysian government is the only course of action by which Lynas will achieve the renewal of its operating licence (unencumbered or with “acceptable” caveats). The agreed management pathway for NUF provides scope for a positive outcome from extensive consultation.
But even if a viable resolution is reached, it would only serve to temporarily manage Lynas out of its current predicament – given the vocal domestic opposition, the long-term prognosis is likely the shuttering and removal of the LAMP.
Shares are down 45% from the pre-general election (for Malaysia) peak and ~24% down from when the Review Committee was first mooted in September 2018, and roughly a similar % compared to the 3 December closing price, the day before the pre-conditions were introduced. That still appears too optimistic. Resolving the Malaysian government roadblock will quite likely be a stop-gap measure, at best.
Posco Chemtech is to merge with POSCO ESM through a stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. The merger will be effective as of April 1. The merged company is planning to move from KOSDAQ to KOSPI. These proposals will be put to the vote at the upcoming AGM scheduled for March 18.
KOSPI 200’s re-balancing reference date is after the close of the last trading day in April and the change takes effect on the next trading day after the 2nd Thursday of June. If the KRX approves it before the end of April, Chemtech’s KOSPI inclusion will happen this June. If not, it will have to wait until next year.
New passive money flowing into Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bn. This represents 1.69% of market cap and 4.82% of float market cap. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
In a follow-up note John DeMasi provides an update of events, looking into VSM’s corporate governance documents, reviewing relevant landmark Delaware takeover case law, and elaborating on a possible path to control of Versum for Merck KGaA (MRK GR).
Merck has now filed form DFAN14A filed with the SEC. The talking points/Q&A confirm that the VSM/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) deal caught Merck by surprise as they had not been contacted by Versum as part of any market check.
Other important takeaways include number 7, where Merck stress (yet again) they are fully committed to pursuing their proposal; number 11, where they don’t rule out raising their price; and number 21, where they answer whether they have purchased any VSM shares with “The number of shares of Versum common stock held by Merck … does not exceed a level that would require disclosure.”
Merck continues to speak and act like a bidder who is not going away, and its upcoming roadshow in New York with shareholders underscores its commitment to the deal, adding to the pressure on the Versum Board.
JM has bought 662k shares in JS since the beginning of March, averaging 47.5% of daily volume, narrowing the simple ratio (JM/JS). JM has consistently bought back shares in JS over the years. Since December 2011, buybacks have taken place at an average price/book (for JS) of 0.75x (it is currently at 0.70x according to CapIQ) and at an average JM/JS ratio of 1.75x. The current ratio is 1.70x, bang in line with its 7+ year average. The 20-year average is 1.82x.
Presumably the Keswick family’s long-term plan is collapsing the circularity. But given the significant costs involved – either JM privatizing JS or vice versa – for now, the family will likely opt for the circularity creep, by continuing to chip away at minority ownership as JS takes its dividends in-specie, JM acquires JS, gradually increasing the inter holdings of the two entities.
JS is also trading “cheap”, at a 42% discount to NAV, adjusted for cross-holdings. JS is now around 25% points “cheaper” than JM (which has a discount to NAV of 17%), compared to a one-year average of ~24%. A year ago, the % difference was 6%.
JM has bought 1.8mn shares YTD compared to 2.5mn for the same period last year, while 4.9mn shares were acquired in 2018, compared to 7.6mn, 8.2mn, and 2.1mn in 2015-2017 respectively. The very long-term ratio is marginally in favour of JM, yet the more recent yearly average suggests it is line. JS looks cheap on a discount to NAV basis and it makes sense for JM to continue to acquire shares, favouring JS near-term. I also tilt in favour of this outcome.
Youngone Holdings (009970 KS)‘s 50.5%-held sub Youngone Corp (111770 KS) accounts for 70% of NAV. On a 20D MA, they are now at 312% of σ while the current price ratio is at a 120D high. Sanghyun recommended a set-up. The parent is up 9% this week vs 12% down for the sub. The NAV discount is now out of whack – plugging Sanghyun’s numbers I get a discount to NAV of 35% vs. an average of 48%. The parent is very illiquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide)
Restaurant Brands Nz (RBD NZ) has announced “Consent has now been granted in respect of the Partial Takeover by certain subsidiaries of Yum! Brands“. The remaining condition is receipt of acceptance from 75% of shareholders. Acceptances currently total 40.68%.
NASDAQ raised its bid for Oslo Bors VPS Holding ASA (OSLO NS) to NOK 158 and lowered its minimum acceptance condition from 90% to two-thirds. The offer period is extended to 29 March. The Long Stop is extended to 4 Mar 2020.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Source: Company announcements. E = our estimates; C =confirmed
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
The DSME deal between HHI and KDB was officially finalized last Friday. We will then have the following four step process. Schedule detail is yet to come out. HHI intermediate holdco is named Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering, or KSOE.
HHI went south by nearly 4% last Friday when the deal was finalized. DSME stayed flat. Why did this happen? There was another story we heard last Friday. HHI and Korea Eximbank agreed that the ₩2.3tril CBs wouldn’t be converted into DSME shares and disposed any time soon. Not only that, there will be a downwardly interest adjustment to help ease DSME’s financial burden.
This agreement immediately sparked a speculation that HHI must have pledged Korea Eximbank some sort of DSME valuation pushings. This is like a value transfer rather from HHI to DSME. I’d wrap the current HHI long/DSEM short position at this point. Short-term, I expect DSME outperforming HHI. Longer term, I still doubt what value transfer from who to who. I’d rather stay away from both.
Friday 8 March after the close, the Nikkei announced that because the third party share sale of Pioneer Corp (6773 JP) had been completed, it would be deleted from the Nikkei 225 Average (and the Nikkei 500 Index). Omron Corp (6645 JP) will replace Pioneer in the Nikkei 225 Average, with a deemed par value of 50 yen per share.
The date for this index deletion and inclusion event is the 15th of March, as per the schedule of the February 19th announcement as to how the Pioneer event would be treated.
This affords special sits/events followers a couple of different events to look at.
Late Friday night,Hong Kong International Construction Investment Management Group Co., (687 HK) (“HKICIM”) announced HNA Finance had entered into a SPA in which Times Holdings, a Blackstone-controlled vehicle, had conditionally agreed to buy 69.54% of HKICIM’s issued shares for HK$3/share in an HK$7bn transaction. Should the SPA complete, Times will make a mandatory unconditional offer – also at $3.00/share (14.5% premium to last close) – for the remaining 30.46% of shares out.
This proposal arrives nearly three years after HNA bought a 66% in Tysan Holdings – as HKICIM was previously known – from Blackstone for HK$4.53 per share, triggering an MGO.
This share sale underlines HNA Group’s ongoing strategy to ease its debt burden and align its core business focus towards aviation, not construction and property.
HKICIM made headlines in the past not just for its eye-watering property acquisitions at Kai Tak (up to HK$13.5k/sqft in March 2017), the former site of Hong Kong’s international airport; but that HNA was also oddly motivated to acquire these parcels of land at record breaking prices to “snatch land and pricing power from the city’s real estate cartel“.
HKICIM sold its last Kai Tak site to Wheelock & (20 HK) last month (for a loss of $740mn), leaving the company with an estimated net cash position of ~$6.0bn (using FY18 interim numbers) or ~$1.80/share, it’s foundation piling operations, a development site in Hong Kong and a residential and commercial property development project in Shenyang.
The closing of the SPA is subject to the satisfaction or waiver of various conditions. However, the short time frame (13 business days from this announcement) in which to secure, fulfill or waive these conditions suggest minimal deal risk.
This will trade tight to, if not through terms, with an anticipated completion late April. There will be no bump to the Offer. Times does not intend to avail itself to compulsory acquisition and intends to maintain HKICIM’s listing; while both Times and HKICIM will take appropriate steps to maintain a sufficient public float after the close of the Offer.
While not new news, US-based hedge fund – somewhat well-known for being involved in M&A situations – started accumulating a position in MYOB in January and has now reached a stake of 11%. The last chunks purchased appear to have been done at (or around) A$3.40/share, which is equal to terms. The Manikay letter to the Board asks the Board to consider the market movements since December and posits a fair value in excess of A$4.00/share.
Manikay says that it is interested in becoming a long-term shareholder. But the letter seems to level its criticism of the deal price most pointedly at the fact that the deal was offered and agreed to just a few days off a two-year low in the S&P/ASX200 Index and since then the index has rebounded to within 1.5% of an 11-year high.
A “market context” bump is not a bad case in and of itself because of where peers have moved and where the market has moved, and we won’t know whether that point is taken up by the IER in the Scheme Document.
This strikes Travis Lundy as not a bad reward/risk to buy up to 1-2% through terms. The back end “undisturbed price” has risen and the recent earnings release shows online penetration continues to grow.
Irrespective of whether the Malaysian rare earth processing licence provided to Lynas was without adequate due process (as has been speculated) or whether the facility is indeed an environmental concern; the fact remains the Malaysian government has reneged on the previously agreed-upon three-step licence process – imposing unachievable pre-conditions by the licence renewal date this September – and that is wrong.
Ongoing negotiation with the Malaysian government is the only course of action by which Lynas will achieve the renewal of its operating licence (unencumbered or with “acceptable” caveats). The agreed management pathway for NUF provides scope for a positive outcome from extensive consultation.
But even if a viable resolution is reached, it would only serve to temporarily manage Lynas out of its current predicament – given the vocal domestic opposition, the long-term prognosis is likely the shuttering and removal of the LAMP.
Shares are down 45% from the pre-general election (for Malaysia) peak and ~24% down from when the Review Committee was first mooted in September 2018, and roughly a similar % compared to the 3 December closing price, the day before the pre-conditions were introduced. That still appears too optimistic. Resolving the Malaysian government roadblock will quite likely be a stop-gap measure, at best.
Posco Chemtech is to merge with POSCO ESM through a stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. The merger will be effective as of April 1. The merged company is planning to move from KOSDAQ to KOSPI. These proposals will be put to the vote at the upcoming AGM scheduled for March 18.
KOSPI 200’s re-balancing reference date is after the close of the last trading day in April and the change takes effect on the next trading day after the 2nd Thursday of June. If the KRX approves it before the end of April, Chemtech’s KOSPI inclusion will happen this June. If not, it will have to wait until next year.
New passive money flowing into Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bn. This represents 1.69% of market cap and 4.82% of float market cap. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
In a follow-up note John DeMasi provides an update of events, looking into VSM’s corporate governance documents, reviewing relevant landmark Delaware takeover case law, and elaborating on a possible path to control of Versum for Merck KGaA (MRK GR).
Merck has now filed form DFAN14A filed with the SEC. The talking points/Q&A confirm that the VSM/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) deal caught Merck by surprise as they had not been contacted by Versum as part of any market check.
Other important takeaways include number 7, where Merck stress (yet again) they are fully committed to pursuing their proposal; number 11, where they don’t rule out raising their price; and number 21, where they answer whether they have purchased any VSM shares with “The number of shares of Versum common stock held by Merck … does not exceed a level that would require disclosure.”
Merck continues to speak and act like a bidder who is not going away, and its upcoming roadshow in New York with shareholders underscores its commitment to the deal, adding to the pressure on the Versum Board.
JM has bought 662k shares in JS since the beginning of March, averaging 47.5% of daily volume, narrowing the simple ratio (JM/JS). JM has consistently bought back shares in JS over the years. Since December 2011, buybacks have taken place at an average price/book (for JS) of 0.75x (it is currently at 0.70x according to CapIQ) and at an average JM/JS ratio of 1.75x. The current ratio is 1.70x, bang in line with its 7+ year average. The 20-year average is 1.82x.
Presumably the Keswick family’s long-term plan is collapsing the circularity. But given the significant costs involved – either JM privatizing JS or vice versa – for now, the family will likely opt for the circularity creep, by continuing to chip away at minority ownership as JS takes its dividends in-specie, JM acquires JS, gradually increasing the inter holdings of the two entities.
JS is also trading “cheap”, at a 42% discount to NAV, adjusted for cross-holdings. JS is now around 25% points “cheaper” than JM (which has a discount to NAV of 17%), compared to a one-year average of ~24%. A year ago, the % difference was 6%.
JM has bought 1.8mn shares YTD compared to 2.5mn for the same period last year, while 4.9mn shares were acquired in 2018, compared to 7.6mn, 8.2mn, and 2.1mn in 2015-2017 respectively. The very long-term ratio is marginally in favour of JM, yet the more recent yearly average suggests it is line. JS looks cheap on a discount to NAV basis and it makes sense for JM to continue to acquire shares, favouring JS near-term. I also tilt in favour of this outcome.
Youngone Holdings (009970 KS)‘s 50.5%-held sub Youngone Corp (111770 KS) accounts for 70% of NAV. On a 20D MA, they are now at 312% of σ while the current price ratio is at a 120D high. Sanghyun recommended a set-up. The parent is up 9% this week vs 12% down for the sub. The NAV discount is now out of whack – plugging Sanghyun’s numbers I get a discount to NAV of 35% vs. an average of 48%. The parent is very illiquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide)
Restaurant Brands Nz (RBD NZ) has announced “Consent has now been granted in respect of the Partial Takeover by certain subsidiaries of Yum! Brands“. The remaining condition is receipt of acceptance from 75% of shareholders. Acceptances currently total 40.68%.
NASDAQ raised its bid for Oslo Bors VPS Holding ASA (OSLO NS) to NOK 158 and lowered its minimum acceptance condition from 90% to two-thirds. The offer period is extended to 29 March. The Long Stop is extended to 4 Mar 2020.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
In this follow-up note I provide an update of events since last week, look at VSM’s corporate governance documents, review relevant landmark Delaware takeover case law, and elaborate on a possible path to control of Versum for Merck KGaA.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
