Best World International (BEST SP) is a direct-selling company that distributes premium skincare and wellness products. On Monday, The Business Times claimed that it is difficult to verify Best World’s strong sales in China based on “an unimpressive online and offline footprint.” On the back of the Business Times article, Best World shares slid 17% before the company was granted a trading halt pending a clarification announcement.
Checking the accuracy of the Business Times’ facts and figures is beyond the scope of this note. Instead, the aim is to analyse alternative financial metrics to judge if Business Times’ allegations have some substance. Overall, our analysis suggests that Business Times’ claims have some substance and investors should not be so quick to dismiss it.
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Best World International (BEST SP) is a direct-selling company that distributes premium skincare and wellness products. On Monday, The Business Times claimed that it is difficult to verify Best World’s strong sales in China based on “an unimpressive online and offline footprint.” On the back of the Business Times article, Best World shares slid 17% before the company was granted a trading halt pending a clarification announcement.
Checking the accuracy of the Business Times’ facts and figures is beyond the scope of this note. Instead, the aim is to analyse alternative financial metrics to judge if Business Times’ allegations have some substance. Overall, our analysis suggests that Business Times’ claims have some substance and investors should not be so quick to dismiss it.
Friday 15 February after the close, the Offerors for M1 Ltd (M1 SP)announced that their Offer had been declared Unconditional In All Respects as the tendered amount was 57.04% and the total held by concert parties was 76.35%.
Axiata Group (AXIATA MK) made an announcement to the Bursa Malaysia that it had accepted the Offer as required because it was a significant asset disposal. The reasoning for the disposal was that given the long-term view required because of changes in the Singaporean telecom market structure and the inability of Axiata to exert management control, the disposal fit within Axiata’s portfolio rebalancing strategy and would serve to mitigate short- to medium-term risks associated with the changes in the Singaporean market.
Going unconditional has triggered an extension of the Closing Date to 4 March 2019 at 5:30pm Singapore time (our estimate pre-Offer Despatch was closing of 7 March).
If you are going to tender, you might as well do it now. Consideration (the offer price) will be despatched to those Shareholders who have already tendered within 7 business days, and those who accept the Offer starting now will get their funds within 7 business days of the Offer acceptance being validated.
Hansae Holdco/Sub duo is giving a very wide price divergence right now. They are now at -227% of σ. This is a 120D low. Holdco discount is 50% to NAV. Sub is 55% of the sub holdings and 60% of Holdco NAV. Sub has made a run lately mainly on improving outlook. Local long-term funds have led the recent Sub buying. They like Sub’s 4Q results. They also expect this trend to continue at least for this year.
Valuation wise, Sub price is at a little over 17x PER on already adjusted FY19 earnings. This is pretty much in line with the yearly average in the past 3 years. Sub price rally should be resisted at this point. Holdco/Sub price ratio is at the lowest in 120D on a 20D MA. It has also fallen to near 2 year low.
Local short-term money managers do not seem to be joining the current Sub buying. Shorting on Sub is still at a significant level (nearly 10%). I’d make a trade at this point. I’d go long Holdco and short Sub for a short-term mean reversion. Again, Holdco liquidity can be an issue to some of us.
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Best World International (BEST SP) is a direct-selling company that distributes premium skincare and wellness products. On Monday, The Business Times claimed that it is difficult to verify Best World’s strong sales in China based on “an unimpressive online and offline footprint.” On the back of the Business Times article, Best World shares slid 17% before the company was granted a trading halt pending a clarification announcement.
Checking the accuracy of the Business Times’ facts and figures is beyond the scope of this note. Instead, the aim is to analyse alternative financial metrics to judge if Business Times’ allegations have some substance. Overall, our analysis suggests that Business Times’ claims have some substance and investors should not be so quick to dismiss it.
Friday 15 February after the close, the Offerors for M1 Ltd (M1 SP)announced that their Offer had been declared Unconditional In All Respects as the tendered amount was 57.04% and the total held by concert parties was 76.35%.
Axiata Group (AXIATA MK) made an announcement to the Bursa Malaysia that it had accepted the Offer as required because it was a significant asset disposal. The reasoning for the disposal was that given the long-term view required because of changes in the Singaporean telecom market structure and the inability of Axiata to exert management control, the disposal fit within Axiata’s portfolio rebalancing strategy and would serve to mitigate short- to medium-term risks associated with the changes in the Singaporean market.
Going unconditional has triggered an extension of the Closing Date to 4 March 2019 at 5:30pm Singapore time (our estimate pre-Offer Despatch was closing of 7 March).
If you are going to tender, you might as well do it now. Consideration (the offer price) will be despatched to those Shareholders who have already tendered within 7 business days, and those who accept the Offer starting now will get their funds within 7 business days of the Offer acceptance being validated.
Hansae Holdco/Sub duo is giving a very wide price divergence right now. They are now at -227% of σ. This is a 120D low. Holdco discount is 50% to NAV. Sub is 55% of the sub holdings and 60% of Holdco NAV. Sub has made a run lately mainly on improving outlook. Local long-term funds have led the recent Sub buying. They like Sub’s 4Q results. They also expect this trend to continue at least for this year.
Valuation wise, Sub price is at a little over 17x PER on already adjusted FY19 earnings. This is pretty much in line with the yearly average in the past 3 years. Sub price rally should be resisted at this point. Holdco/Sub price ratio is at the lowest in 120D on a 20D MA. It has also fallen to near 2 year low.
Local short-term money managers do not seem to be joining the current Sub buying. Shorting on Sub is still at a significant level (nearly 10%). I’d make a trade at this point. I’d go long Holdco and short Sub for a short-term mean reversion. Again, Holdco liquidity can be an issue to some of us.
For years, Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) has underperformed expectations, and investors such as Artisan and Franklin Templeton have held stakes of a few percent to more (Artisan now owns 12%) and have complained more or less publicly. Swedish activist investor Cevian has also owned shares for years (now at 12.3% approximately) and complained quite publicly last October about the governance structure and management and suggested that management be open to a takeover. The company pooh-poohed that, but a week later announced that Chairman Peter Ulber – one of Cevian’s governance targets – would not stand for re-election in May 2019 at the AGM.
A week after that, Kuehne + Nagel International A (KNIN VX) CEO Detlef Trefzger said in Swiss finance magazine Finanz und Wirtschaft (German) it would be happy to open talks with Panalpina but would not pursue a hostile merger. Fast forward less than 8 weeks and DSV A/S (DSV DC) made a public proposal of a takeover for cash and scrip valued at CHF 170/share, which came at a 24% premium to last and +31% vs 1-month VWAP but was even better by day end and by Friday’s close was 8.5% higher.
A couple of weeks after Panalpina shares spiked, the Chairman of K&N Klaus-Michael Kühne was quoted in the press saying Panalpina was “hopelessly overvalued” and the company did not want to either overpay, or undertake a “megafusion” (large M&A) because of the difficulty in integrating companies. He IS chairman, AND his name is on the door, AND he indirectly controls 53% of the stock so his word carries weight.
A body of Panalpina workers came out against the idea of a DSV acquisition, and the board of major shareholder The Ernst Göhner Foundation apparently told Panalpina it supported Panalpina management’s model of growing by its own consolidator strategy, which Panalpina CEO Stefan Karlen said on the 13th in a phone interview with Bloomberg could involve taking on debt.
A day later, interviews with the Thomas Gutzwiller, chairman of the Göhner Foundation’s Panalpina committee, said the Foundation doesn’t fundamentally oppose a takeover of Panalpina and would be prepared to reduce its stake in “any transactions within the scope of implementing the strategy,” (Luzerner Zeitung). He also said that the foundation had supported the company’s major investments (in IT) in recent years and wanted to reap the benefits.
It wasn’t clear whether which approach takes priority. Does the foundation want to wait? Is it just looking for a higher price? I think the two are not incompatible.
Frustrated by the lack of transparency on whether Panalpina was considering DSV’s approach or not, major shareholder Artisan Partners earlier this week wrote an open letter to Panalpina’s board explicitly asking Panalpina to entertain the bid and open negotiations, and to ensure that conflicted members of the board recuse themselves.
This puts the #2, #3, and long-time #4 shareholders (Franklin Templeton was a long-time #4) firmly and publicly in the camp of trying to get something done. In fact, a fund manager at Franklin Templeton was quoted in a Bloomberg article recently saying the Foundation was perhaps the only shareholder against the deal. There is an enormous amount of frustration at these holders who have held for years (9, 10+, and several) have not seen margins improve. Since the deal was announced, two major risk arb funds have purchased a combined 5+%, and others appear to be in as well.
The New News
On Friday, Panalpina confirmed media scuttlebutt that it was in preliminary talks with Kuwait-listed logistics company Agility Public Warehouse which has a market cap of about US$3.7bn. A Bloomberg report suggested a deal could be reached as early as this week for its logistics business (presumably leaving the infrastructure business in Agility’s hands. The same article suggested the Göhner Foundation is supportive of the new talks.
Also on Friday, DSV announced a new all cash CHF 180/share offer for Panalpina, and Panalpina shares rebounded from CHF 149.00 to CHF 156.10/share that day. That leaves 15.3% to the cash offer, though the original cash and scrip offer is now worth CHF 184.5/share, which is an even better premium to pre-offer terms.
It’s all still in play, but for the moment, EVERYTHING comes down to the Foundation – for one simple reason embedded in the Panalpina Articles of Association.
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Itochu planned on buying 7.21 million shares out of the 75.37mm shares which bear voting rights (as of the commencement of the Tender), and 15,115,148mm shares were tendered, which led to a pro-ration rate of 47.7% which was 0.3% below my the middle of my “wide range” expected pro-ration rate of 42-54% and 0.7% beyond the 44-47% tighter range discussed in Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile of 28 February.
Two more central ideas were discussed in that piece:
The hostility shown by Descente management during the Tender Offer had led Itochu to abandon discussions about post-tender management until after the Tender Offer was completed. Both sides indicated a willingness to pick up where things had left off – at Descente’s request – but Descente needed to stew a bit.
The revelation by ANTA Sports in an interview with the CEO in the Nikkei in late February that ANTA supported Itochu meant that the likelihood of Itochu NOT having enough votes to put through its own slate of directors was almost zero. At a combined 47.0% of post-Tender voting rights, if 94% or less of shares were to vote, it would mean Itochu could get the majority of over 50% and determine the entire slate of directors themselves. If there was another shareholder holding a couple of percent which supported Itochu, it would be a done deal even if everyone voted. And that 2-3% existed.
So… the threat that Itochu would hold an EGM to seat new directors to oblige a stronger course for management was a very strong probability. Management who was rabidly opposed to Itochu owning the stake could not very well bow down in front of Itochu post-tender just to save its own hide – not after the employee union and the OB group came out against. President Ishimoto had effectively put himself in an untenable position unless a miracle occurred because Itochu could not legally walk away from its offer, and Ishimoto-san was bad-mouthing Itochu even as they were negotiating during the Tender Offer Period.
It was not, therefore, any surprise that President Ishimoto would step down. The surprise for me was that the news he would go came out as talks commenced over the weekend (but did not “bridge the gap” as the Nikkei reported), before we got to the first business day post-results.
Talks apparently continue with no resolution, and the media reports offer no hint as to what the issues might be.
Recent Insights on the Descente/Wacoal and Itochu/Descente Situations on Smartkarma
On November 13th last year, Linkbal Inc (6046 JP) announced it was looking to move from MOTHERS to the TSE First Section. The stock rallied. At the same time the company said that it was preparing to file an application for the move.
On March 5th, the company announced a forthcoming tachiaigai bunbai offering designed to increase the float. That tachiaigai bunbai offering (designed for retail investors only) takes place this morning after an announcement the company would oversee the offer of 970,000 shares (about 5% of the company but about 180% of the float currently held by public retail investors) at a price of ¥905/share (1,000 shares max per buyer), which is a 3% discount to yesterday’s close of ¥933 yen.
This will get it most of the way towards meeting the requirements, but likely not all the way. An inclusion is still months off. And there would likely be another sale to increase shareholder count by 800-1000 before then, whether in the form of a Public Offering/Uridashi or in the form of another tachiaigai bunbai.
On the 14th March 2019, Australian property developer, Villa World Ltd (VLW AU)announced that it had received an unsolicited proposal, by way of a scheme, from AVID Property Group Australia at an offer price A$2.23, or a 12% premium to last close.
The offer is conditional on due diligence, unanimous approval of VLW’s board of directors and the receipt of FIRB and other regulatory approvals.
AVID’s indicative offer translates to an LTM PER and P/B of 6.4x and 0.9x, with the P/B metric roughly in line peers.
During 2018, VLW’s share price declined by 36% to A$1.76 from A$2.77, with a large chunk of that downward move occurring in December after VLW withdrew its FY19E earnings guidance. That forecast withdrawal was exacerbated by the fact VLW had maintained the 2019 forward guidance at its mid-November AGM.
Ho Bee Land Ltd (HOBEE SP), VLW’s largest shareholder and JV partner, responded to AVID’s proposal by buying 2.2mn shares (~1.8% of shares out) at an average of A$1.95/share – and a high of A$2.18/share – lifting its stake to 9.41%. Its stake in VLW accounts for only 1.5% of its market cap. I would not be surprised if Ho Bee is still buying in the market.
VLW announced a 1H19 NPAT of A$17.6mn ($17.3mn) last month – slightly above its $16mn to $17mn guidance – and declared a A$0.08/share franked dividend. Assuming FY19E profit of $27mn, VLW is trading at a not unreasonable 10x PER and an attractive 7.3% yield, one of the highest yields among its peer group, assuming the high-end of the 50-75% payout ratio policy.
Late Monday evening, Larsen & Toubro (LT IN) launched India’s first ever hostile takeover in the tech sector. L&T is seeking to acquire a 20.3-66.3% stake in Mindtree Ltd (MTCL IN) through a three-step transaction. Mindtree’s founders/promoters together have a 13.3% stake and staunchly oppose the takeover. L&T’s open offer presents an opportunity for longstanding large shareholders to partially or fully exit their stakes at a reasonable price.
L&T’s open offer is less enticing for minority shareholders due to the small premium. Minority shareholders hope that a bidding battle will drive up bid premiums. However, we believe that minority shareholders should stick with their holdings as Mindtree’s fundamentals remain solid, but a chance of a material bump to L&T’s open offer is low.
Originally scheduled to close March 1st, near the end of February 2019, Bain Capital Japan’s acquisition vehicle (BCJ-34) extended the ¥610/share Tender Offer MBO deadline by 11 days from March 1st to March 11th. Of course, that was something of a moot point – by that time, the shares hadn’t traded at less than a 15% premium to terms for a week after well-known local activist Yoshiaki Murakami’s vehicle Reno KK and affiliates had taken a stake of just below 10%.
On the 8th of March, BCJ-34 raised its Tender Offer Price by 14.8% to ¥700/share and extended the Tender Offer by almost two weeks to the 25th of March. It also lowered the amount which needs to be bought to 50.1% from 66.67%. In that amended filing the buyer included words 「公開買付者は、本開買付条件の変更後の本公開買付価格を最終的なものとし、今後、本公開買付価格を一切変更しないことの決定をしております。」which roughly translates to “The Offeror, having changed the terms, has made This Tender Offer Price final, and from this point onward, has decided to absolutely not raise the Tender Offer Price.”
That’s that, but since then, the shares have not traded as low as the newly raised Tender Offer Price.
With one week to go, Aoyama Fudosan yesterdat announced it had lifted its stake to 747,800 shares or 3.00% of shares out, which brings the combined Reno KK/Aoyama Fudosan stake to 11.71%.
Given the 1.1mm shares traded since the 11th (i.e. shares which if Murakami-san had bought he would not have to report until the 19th (today)) and that the share price was up sharply in decent volume this afternoon, it would not be difficult to imagine a higher stake being reported in the days ahead.
Murakami-san is not going away. This is starting to look a bit like another Murakami situation of recent. And that one turned out well.
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Back in August, I argued a case for the privatisation of Aveo Group (AOG AU), which at the time was trading at a P/B of 0.6x versus ~2x for peers. Also in late August, Aveo announced a strategic review to examine all options to close the gap between Aveo’s market capitalisation and the value of the underlying retirement properties.
Aveo’s steep discount to peers was/is ostensibly due to the presence of Mulpha International (MIT MK)‘s large stake (22.5%), crowding out institutional ownership; Mulpha and Aveo sharing the same chairman, inferring (yet categorically denied) Aveo’s absence of independence; and the ongoing class action lawsuit.
That was a brutal recommendation, and lacking a hard catalyst, shares declined to $1.55 in January, recovering to $2.05 today, still ~12% shy of the price at the time of my last note.
This time is different.
Aveo announced in early February a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction” with AFR reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star had joined the fray. Other interested parties are believed to include Blackstone and Cerberus Capital Management.
Aveo’s share price is up ~20% since announcing the receipt of the indicative bids, having drifted down from a (recent) closing peak of $2.14 earlier this month.
Aveo is currently trading at an attractive 0.52x P/B vs. 1.8x for its peer group, with the next closest peer valuation at 0.7x P/B. An offer of >0.7x, a level last traded as recently as June 2018, appears reasonable with ~92% of assets in investment property.
Further afield, Mulpha trades at a P/B of 0.25x, while the stake in Aveo accounts for 104% of its market cap, and around 25% of NAV. It’s discount to NAV has significantly narrowed since February, but Mulpha continues to trade at a discount to 76%.
Timeline of Events
Date
Data in the Date
End-2005
Mulpha’s stake in Aveo (then called FKP) was acquired after a share swap with Mulpha Norwest
On March 6th, a day before the Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) Taiwan elevator business Tender Offer for just over a third of Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, notably because the acquiring entity had not yet received Taiwan Ministry of Economy Investment Commission approval for the foreign investment, and the Fair Trading Commission had not yet given the green light, so there was no hope of getting it done by the next day in accordance with Taiwan’s Public Acquisition of Public Company Shares Administrative Law Article 18 Para 2. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60.
While there have been noises in the market that both Otis and Schindler, which are reported to hold roughly 5-6% each (last year’s shareholder list included UT Park View which United Technologies (UTX US)‘s 10-K showed was a wholly-owned sub) were willing to offer more than Hitachi’s offered NT$60 (and MOPS filings indicate the board approval meeting in end-January referenced a NT$63 potential bid), there was no competitive bid made public and to the authorities by five business days prior to the first bid close (which would have been 26 Feb) as per the same law Article 7 Para 2.
Since then, there have also been other ructions. While terms remain unchanged, it is worthwhile looking into what has been going on. This is still interesting and because of its various inputs, slightly disconcerting to some, and the modalities continue to surprise me.
We write this note to provide P G & E Corp (PCG US) current state of affairs. First and foremost, we believe that the equity value is zero as the company restructures under chapter 11 bankruptcy code. Most companies that enter chapter 11 bankruptcy either face operational or financial headwinds. PG&E problems are compounded by complications of litigation and regulatory risk along with operational and financial risks.
Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) (Delta) released its opinion (Form 250-2) and the opinion of the Independent Financial Advisor (IFA) on the tender offer. Delta Electronics (2308 TT) (DEI) launched the conditional voluntary tender offer for Delta, an electronics contract manufacturer, on 26 February 2019. The tender offer of THB71.00 cash per share values Delta at an EV of THB72 billion ($2.2 billion).
The IFA valued Delta at THB62.33-67.80 per share. Unsurprisingly, both the Delta Board and the IFA concluded that the shareholders should accept the tender offer. While the tender offer’s premium to underlying value is unlikely to set the pulse racing for minority shareholders, we continue to recommend minority shareholders to accept the tender offer.
Something of a slower week on Smartkarma this week (I contributed to that slowness by being away and under the weather when back) with about 120 insights published. A list of the insights to do with Japan and Korea this week are listed below.
For me, the MUST READS of this weak are the cashless payment-related pieces by Kirk Boodry and Michael Causton shown at the bottom.
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Best of luck for the new week – Rickin, Venkat and Arun
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For years, Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) has underperformed expectations, and investors such as Artisan and Franklin Templeton have held stakes of a few percent to more (Artisan now owns 12%) and have complained more or less publicly. Swedish activist investor Cevian has also owned shares for years (now at 12.3% approximately) and complained quite publicly last October about the governance structure and management and suggested that management be open to a takeover. The company pooh-poohed that, but a week later announced that Chairman Peter Ulber – one of Cevian’s governance targets – would not stand for re-election in May 2019 at the AGM.
A week after that, Kuehne + Nagel International A (KNIN VX) CEO Detlef Trefzger said in Swiss finance magazine Finanz und Wirtschaft (German) it would be happy to open talks with Panalpina but would not pursue a hostile merger. Fast forward less than 8 weeks and DSV A/S (DSV DC) made a public proposal of a takeover for cash and scrip valued at CHF 170/share, which came at a 24% premium to last and +31% vs 1-month VWAP but was even better by day end and by Friday’s close was 8.5% higher.
A couple of weeks after Panalpina shares spiked, the Chairman of K&N Klaus-Michael Kühne was quoted in the press saying Panalpina was “hopelessly overvalued” and the company did not want to either overpay, or undertake a “megafusion” (large M&A) because of the difficulty in integrating companies. He IS chairman, AND his name is on the door, AND he indirectly controls 53% of the stock so his word carries weight.
A body of Panalpina workers came out against the idea of a DSV acquisition, and the board of major shareholder The Ernst Göhner Foundation apparently told Panalpina it supported Panalpina management’s model of growing by its own consolidator strategy, which Panalpina CEO Stefan Karlen said on the 13th in a phone interview with Bloomberg could involve taking on debt.
A day later, interviews with the Thomas Gutzwiller, chairman of the Göhner Foundation’s Panalpina committee, said the Foundation doesn’t fundamentally oppose a takeover of Panalpina and would be prepared to reduce its stake in “any transactions within the scope of implementing the strategy,” (Luzerner Zeitung). He also said that the foundation had supported the company’s major investments (in IT) in recent years and wanted to reap the benefits.
It wasn’t clear whether which approach takes priority. Does the foundation want to wait? Is it just looking for a higher price? I think the two are not incompatible.
Frustrated by the lack of transparency on whether Panalpina was considering DSV’s approach or not, major shareholder Artisan Partners earlier this week wrote an open letter to Panalpina’s board explicitly asking Panalpina to entertain the bid and open negotiations, and to ensure that conflicted members of the board recuse themselves.
This puts the #2, #3, and long-time #4 shareholders (Franklin Templeton was a long-time #4) firmly and publicly in the camp of trying to get something done. In fact, a fund manager at Franklin Templeton was quoted in a Bloomberg article recently saying the Foundation was perhaps the only shareholder against the deal. There is an enormous amount of frustration at these holders who have held for years (9, 10+, and several) have not seen margins improve. Since the deal was announced, two major risk arb funds have purchased a combined 5+%, and others appear to be in as well.
The New News
On Friday, Panalpina confirmed media scuttlebutt that it was in preliminary talks with Kuwait-listed logistics company Agility Public Warehouse which has a market cap of about US$3.7bn. A Bloomberg report suggested a deal could be reached as early as this week for its logistics business (presumably leaving the infrastructure business in Agility’s hands. The same article suggested the Göhner Foundation is supportive of the new talks.
Also on Friday, DSV announced a new all cash CHF 180/share offer for Panalpina, and Panalpina shares rebounded from CHF 149.00 to CHF 156.10/share that day. That leaves 15.3% to the cash offer, though the original cash and scrip offer is now worth CHF 184.5/share, which is an even better premium to pre-offer terms.
It’s all still in play, but for the moment, EVERYTHING comes down to the Foundation – for one simple reason embedded in the Panalpina Articles of Association.
MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU)‘s shares are trading A$3.42, marginally above KKR & Co Inc (KKR US)‘s revised lower offer of A$3.40 cash per share, due to the expectation of a bidder trumping KKR. The optimism has also been stoked by the sharp market rally since MYOB agreed to recommend KKR’s revised lower offer on 24 December 2018. The ASX 200 and ASX 300 Information Technology Index has rallied 10% and 20% respectively from 24 December 2018 to 15 February 2019.
While shareholders may feel like KKR is acquiring MYOB at a knockdown price, the market could quickly revert to a downward trend. We believe that shareholders hoping for a white knight to ride to the rescue will be disappointed.
Best of luck for the new week – Rickin, Venkat and Arun
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For years, Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) has underperformed expectations, and investors such as Artisan and Franklin Templeton have held stakes of a few percent to more (Artisan now owns 12%) and have complained more or less publicly. Swedish activist investor Cevian has also owned shares for years (now at 12.3% approximately) and complained quite publicly last October about the governance structure and management and suggested that management be open to a takeover. The company pooh-poohed that, but a week later announced that Chairman Peter Ulber – one of Cevian’s governance targets – would not stand for re-election in May 2019 at the AGM.
A week after that, Kuehne + Nagel International A (KNIN VX) CEO Detlef Trefzger said in Swiss finance magazine Finanz und Wirtschaft (German) it would be happy to open talks with Panalpina but would not pursue a hostile merger. Fast forward less than 8 weeks and DSV A/S (DSV DC) made a public proposal of a takeover for cash and scrip valued at CHF 170/share, which came at a 24% premium to last and +31% vs 1-month VWAP but was even better by day end and by Friday’s close was 8.5% higher.
A couple of weeks after Panalpina shares spiked, the Chairman of K&N Klaus-Michael Kühne was quoted in the press saying Panalpina was “hopelessly overvalued” and the company did not want to either overpay, or undertake a “megafusion” (large M&A) because of the difficulty in integrating companies. He IS chairman, AND his name is on the door, AND he indirectly controls 53% of the stock so his word carries weight.
A body of Panalpina workers came out against the idea of a DSV acquisition, and the board of major shareholder The Ernst Göhner Foundation apparently told Panalpina it supported Panalpina management’s model of growing by its own consolidator strategy, which Panalpina CEO Stefan Karlen said on the 13th in a phone interview with Bloomberg could involve taking on debt.
A day later, interviews with the Thomas Gutzwiller, chairman of the Göhner Foundation’s Panalpina committee, said the Foundation doesn’t fundamentally oppose a takeover of Panalpina and would be prepared to reduce its stake in “any transactions within the scope of implementing the strategy,” (Luzerner Zeitung). He also said that the foundation had supported the company’s major investments (in IT) in recent years and wanted to reap the benefits.
It wasn’t clear whether which approach takes priority. Does the foundation want to wait? Is it just looking for a higher price? I think the two are not incompatible.
Frustrated by the lack of transparency on whether Panalpina was considering DSV’s approach or not, major shareholder Artisan Partners earlier this week wrote an open letter to Panalpina’s board explicitly asking Panalpina to entertain the bid and open negotiations, and to ensure that conflicted members of the board recuse themselves.
This puts the #2, #3, and long-time #4 shareholders (Franklin Templeton was a long-time #4) firmly and publicly in the camp of trying to get something done. In fact, a fund manager at Franklin Templeton was quoted in a Bloomberg article recently saying the Foundation was perhaps the only shareholder against the deal. There is an enormous amount of frustration at these holders who have held for years (9, 10+, and several) have not seen margins improve. Since the deal was announced, two major risk arb funds have purchased a combined 5+%, and others appear to be in as well.
The New News
On Friday, Panalpina confirmed media scuttlebutt that it was in preliminary talks with Kuwait-listed logistics company Agility Public Warehouse which has a market cap of about US$3.7bn. A Bloomberg report suggested a deal could be reached as early as this week for its logistics business (presumably leaving the infrastructure business in Agility’s hands. The same article suggested the Göhner Foundation is supportive of the new talks.
Also on Friday, DSV announced a new all cash CHF 180/share offer for Panalpina, and Panalpina shares rebounded from CHF 149.00 to CHF 156.10/share that day. That leaves 15.3% to the cash offer, though the original cash and scrip offer is now worth CHF 184.5/share, which is an even better premium to pre-offer terms.
It’s all still in play, but for the moment, EVERYTHING comes down to the Foundation – for one simple reason embedded in the Panalpina Articles of Association.
MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU)‘s shares are trading A$3.42, marginally above KKR & Co Inc (KKR US)‘s revised lower offer of A$3.40 cash per share, due to the expectation of a bidder trumping KKR. The optimism has also been stoked by the sharp market rally since MYOB agreed to recommend KKR’s revised lower offer on 24 December 2018. The ASX 200 and ASX 300 Information Technology Index has rallied 10% and 20% respectively from 24 December 2018 to 15 February 2019.
While shareholders may feel like KKR is acquiring MYOB at a knockdown price, the market could quickly revert to a downward trend. We believe that shareholders hoping for a white knight to ride to the rescue will be disappointed.
KCL-SPH again extended the closing date of the offer from 18 February to 4 March 2019. M1’s shares are trading at S$2.04 per share, marginally below the VGO price of S$2.06 per share. We believe that the KCL-SPH should get the valid acceptances to complete the delisting and wholly own M1.
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Late Monday evening, Larsen & Toubro (LT IN) launched India’s first ever hostile takeover in the tech sector. L&T is seeking to acquire a 20.3-66.3% stake in Mindtree Ltd (MTCL IN) through a three-step transaction. Mindtree’s founders/promoters together have a 13.3% stake and staunchly oppose the takeover. L&T’s open offer presents an opportunity for longstanding large shareholders to partially or fully exit their stakes at a reasonable price.
L&T’s open offer is less enticing for minority shareholders due to the small premium. Minority shareholders hope that a bidding battle will drive up bid premiums. However, we believe that minority shareholders should stick with their holdings as Mindtree’s fundamentals remain solid, but a chance of a material bump to L&T’s open offer is low.
Originally scheduled to close March 1st, near the end of February 2019, Bain Capital Japan’s acquisition vehicle (BCJ-34) extended the ¥610/share Tender Offer MBO deadline by 11 days from March 1st to March 11th. Of course, that was something of a moot point – by that time, the shares hadn’t traded at less than a 15% premium to terms for a week after well-known local activist Yoshiaki Murakami’s vehicle Reno KK and affiliates had taken a stake of just below 10%.
On the 8th of March, BCJ-34 raised its Tender Offer Price by 14.8% to ¥700/share and extended the Tender Offer by almost two weeks to the 25th of March. It also lowered the amount which needs to be bought to 50.1% from 66.67%. In that amended filing the buyer included words 「公開買付者は、本開買付条件の変更後の本公開買付価格を最終的なものとし、今後、本公開買付価格を一切変更しないことの決定をしております。」which roughly translates to “The Offeror, having changed the terms, has made This Tender Offer Price final, and from this point onward, has decided to absolutely not raise the Tender Offer Price.”
That’s that, but since then, the shares have not traded as low as the newly raised Tender Offer Price.
With one week to go, Aoyama Fudosan yesterdat announced it had lifted its stake to 747,800 shares or 3.00% of shares out, which brings the combined Reno KK/Aoyama Fudosan stake to 11.71%.
Given the 1.1mm shares traded since the 11th (i.e. shares which if Murakami-san had bought he would not have to report until the 19th (today)) and that the share price was up sharply in decent volume this afternoon, it would not be difficult to imagine a higher stake being reported in the days ahead.
Murakami-san is not going away. This is starting to look a bit like another Murakami situation of recent. And that one turned out well.
Back in August, I argued a case for the privatisation of Aveo Group (AOG AU), which at the time was trading at a P/B of 0.6x versus ~2x for peers. Also in late August, Aveo announced a strategic review to examine all options to close the gap between Aveo’s market capitalisation and the value of the underlying retirement properties.
Aveo’s steep discount to peers was/is ostensibly due to the presence of Mulpha International (MIT MK)‘s large stake (22.5%), crowding out institutional ownership; Mulpha and Aveo sharing the same chairman, inferring (yet categorically denied) Aveo’s absence of independence; and the ongoing class action lawsuit.
That was a brutal recommendation, and lacking a hard catalyst, shares declined to $1.55 in January, recovering to $2.05 today, still ~12% shy of the price at the time of my last note.
This time is different.
Aveo announced in early February a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction” with AFR reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star had joined the fray. Other interested parties are believed to include Blackstone and Cerberus Capital Management.
Aveo’s share price is up ~20% since announcing the receipt of the indicative bids, having drifted down from a (recent) closing peak of $2.14 earlier this month.
Aveo is currently trading at an attractive 0.52x P/B vs. 1.8x for its peer group, with the next closest peer valuation at 0.7x P/B. An offer of >0.7x, a level last traded as recently as June 2018, appears reasonable with ~92% of assets in investment property.
Further afield, Mulpha trades at a P/B of 0.25x, while the stake in Aveo accounts for 104% of its market cap, and around 25% of NAV. It’s discount to NAV has significantly narrowed since February, but Mulpha continues to trade at a discount to 76%.
Timeline of Events
Date
Data in the Date
End-2005
Mulpha’s stake in Aveo (then called FKP) was acquired after a share swap with Mulpha Norwest
On March 6th, a day before the Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) Taiwan elevator business Tender Offer for just over a third of Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, notably because the acquiring entity had not yet received Taiwan Ministry of Economy Investment Commission approval for the foreign investment, and the Fair Trading Commission had not yet given the green light, so there was no hope of getting it done by the next day in accordance with Taiwan’s Public Acquisition of Public Company Shares Administrative Law Article 18 Para 2. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60.
While there have been noises in the market that both Otis and Schindler, which are reported to hold roughly 5-6% each (last year’s shareholder list included UT Park View which United Technologies (UTX US)‘s 10-K showed was a wholly-owned sub) were willing to offer more than Hitachi’s offered NT$60 (and MOPS filings indicate the board approval meeting in end-January referenced a NT$63 potential bid), there was no competitive bid made public and to the authorities by five business days prior to the first bid close (which would have been 26 Feb) as per the same law Article 7 Para 2.
Since then, there have also been other ructions. While terms remain unchanged, it is worthwhile looking into what has been going on. This is still interesting and because of its various inputs, slightly disconcerting to some, and the modalities continue to surprise me.
We write this note to provide P G & E Corp (PCG US) current state of affairs. First and foremost, we believe that the equity value is zero as the company restructures under chapter 11 bankruptcy code. Most companies that enter chapter 11 bankruptcy either face operational or financial headwinds. PG&E problems are compounded by complications of litigation and regulatory risk along with operational and financial risks.
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Originally scheduled to close March 1st, near the end of February 2019, Bain Capital Japan’s acquisition vehicle (BCJ-34) extended the ¥610/share Tender Offer MBO deadline by 11 days from March 1st to March 11th. Of course, that was something of a moot point – by that time, the shares hadn’t traded at less than a 15% premium to terms for a week after well-known local activist Yoshiaki Murakami’s vehicle Reno KK and affiliates had taken a stake of just below 10%.
On the 8th of March, BCJ-34 raised its Tender Offer Price by 14.8% to ¥700/share and extended the Tender Offer by almost two weeks to the 25th of March. It also lowered the amount which needs to be bought to 50.1% from 66.67%. In that amended filing the buyer included words 「公開買付者は、本開買付条件の変更後の本公開買付価格を最終的なものとし、今後、本公開買付価格を一切変更しないことの決定をしております。」which roughly translates to “The Offeror, having changed the terms, has made This Tender Offer Price final, and from this point onward, has decided to absolutely not raise the Tender Offer Price.”
That’s that, but since then, the shares have not traded as low as the newly raised Tender Offer Price.
With one week to go, Aoyama Fudosan yesterdat announced it had lifted its stake to 747,800 shares or 3.00% of shares out, which brings the combined Reno KK/Aoyama Fudosan stake to 11.71%.
Given the 1.1mm shares traded since the 11th (i.e. shares which if Murakami-san had bought he would not have to report until the 19th (today)) and that the share price was up sharply in decent volume this afternoon, it would not be difficult to imagine a higher stake being reported in the days ahead.
Murakami-san is not going away. This is starting to look a bit like another Murakami situation of recent. And that one turned out well.
Back in August, I argued a case for the privatisation of Aveo Group (AOG AU), which at the time was trading at a P/B of 0.6x versus ~2x for peers. Also in late August, Aveo announced a strategic review to examine all options to close the gap between Aveo’s market capitalisation and the value of the underlying retirement properties.
Aveo’s steep discount to peers was/is ostensibly due to the presence of Mulpha International (MIT MK)‘s large stake (22.5%), crowding out institutional ownership; Mulpha and Aveo sharing the same chairman, inferring (yet categorically denied) Aveo’s absence of independence; and the ongoing class action lawsuit.
That was a brutal recommendation, and lacking a hard catalyst, shares declined to $1.55 in January, recovering to $2.05 today, still ~12% shy of the price at the time of my last note.
This time is different.
Aveo announced in early February a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction” with AFR reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star had joined the fray. Other interested parties are believed to include Blackstone and Cerberus Capital Management.
Aveo’s share price is up ~20% since announcing the receipt of the indicative bids, having drifted down from a (recent) closing peak of $2.14 earlier this month.
Aveo is currently trading at an attractive 0.52x P/B vs. 1.8x for its peer group, with the next closest peer valuation at 0.7x P/B. An offer of >0.7x, a level last traded as recently as June 2018, appears reasonable with ~92% of assets in investment property.
Further afield, Mulpha trades at a P/B of 0.25x, while the stake in Aveo accounts for 104% of its market cap, and around 25% of NAV. It’s discount to NAV has significantly narrowed since February, but Mulpha continues to trade at a discount to 76%.
Timeline of Events
Date
Data in the Date
End-2005
Mulpha’s stake in Aveo (then called FKP) was acquired after a share swap with Mulpha Norwest
On March 6th, a day before the Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) Taiwan elevator business Tender Offer for just over a third of Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, notably because the acquiring entity had not yet received Taiwan Ministry of Economy Investment Commission approval for the foreign investment, and the Fair Trading Commission had not yet given the green light, so there was no hope of getting it done by the next day in accordance with Taiwan’s Public Acquisition of Public Company Shares Administrative Law Article 18 Para 2. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60.
While there have been noises in the market that both Otis and Schindler, which are reported to hold roughly 5-6% each (last year’s shareholder list included UT Park View which United Technologies (UTX US)‘s 10-K showed was a wholly-owned sub) were willing to offer more than Hitachi’s offered NT$60 (and MOPS filings indicate the board approval meeting in end-January referenced a NT$63 potential bid), there was no competitive bid made public and to the authorities by five business days prior to the first bid close (which would have been 26 Feb) as per the same law Article 7 Para 2.
Since then, there have also been other ructions. While terms remain unchanged, it is worthwhile looking into what has been going on. This is still interesting and because of its various inputs, slightly disconcerting to some, and the modalities continue to surprise me.
We write this note to provide P G & E Corp (PCG US) current state of affairs. First and foremost, we believe that the equity value is zero as the company restructures under chapter 11 bankruptcy code. Most companies that enter chapter 11 bankruptcy either face operational or financial headwinds. PG&E problems are compounded by complications of litigation and regulatory risk along with operational and financial risks.
Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) (Delta) released its opinion (Form 250-2) and the opinion of the Independent Financial Advisor (IFA) on the tender offer. Delta Electronics (2308 TT) (DEI) launched the conditional voluntary tender offer for Delta, an electronics contract manufacturer, on 26 February 2019. The tender offer of THB71.00 cash per share values Delta at an EV of THB72 billion ($2.2 billion).
The IFA valued Delta at THB62.33-67.80 per share. Unsurprisingly, both the Delta Board and the IFA concluded that the shareholders should accept the tender offer. While the tender offer’s premium to underlying value is unlikely to set the pulse racing for minority shareholders, we continue to recommend minority shareholders to accept the tender offer.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.