Yesterday, Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW)‘s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation, made a formal request to the directors of Panalpina to hold an Extraordinary General Meeting to be held prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights enshrined in Article 5 be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted.
The directors complied with this request.
The limit to now has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the Ernst Göhner Foundation which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change. The directors have the right to grant exceptions to this 5% rule, as discussed in The Panalpina Conundrum a bit over a week ago, but have not, leaving the combined 24+% total held by Cevian and Artisan Partners with only ~11.6% of the vote.
This move by the EGF is both “sneaky” AND interesting (and bullish) news. Given the current shareholder vote structure, it wouldn’t be impossible for the EGF to vote it down in the EGM, but I think EGF very specifically do not want to vote it down because the alternative is worse. But getting this passed would suddenly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance.
Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. There were no specific minimum acceptance conditions attached to the tender offer mentioned in the announcement.
Should FPP secure 90% of GOLD in the tender offer, it may proceed with its delisting. A voluntary delisting is still achievable with ~80% in the bag, but that is conditional on <10% of shareholders not voting against.
Preconditions to the commencement of the tender offer include the approval from disinterested shareholders in FPP, approval from “relevant contractual parties of GOLD and GOLD’s subsidiaries” and the approval from the Office of Trade Competition Commission.
The fact the Sirivadhanabhakdi family already holds, directly/indirectly ~80% in GOLD, such regulatory approvals should be forthcoming.
This appears a done deal. The only apparent risk is the expected shareholder vote of Univentures wherein Panote will likely need to abstain.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 1.8%/4.3% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Yesterday, Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW)‘s largest shareholder with 45.9% of shares out, the Ernst Göhner Foundation, made a formal request to the directors of Panalpina to hold an Extraordinary General Meeting to be held prior to the Annual General Meeting scheduled for early May 2019 so that the Articles of Association be changed – specifically Article 5 – such that the limit on transfer rights and voting rights enshrined in Article 5 be abolished and a “One Share One Vote” structure be adopted.
The directors complied with this request.
The limit to now has been that Shareholders have their votes capped at 5% of shares outstanding EXCEPT FOR the votes of the Ernst Göhner Foundation which were deemed “grandfathered” prior to the change. The directors have the right to grant exceptions to this 5% rule, as discussed in The Panalpina Conundrum a bit over a week ago, but have not, leaving the combined 24+% total held by Cevian and Artisan Partners with only ~11.6% of the vote.
This move by the EGF is both “sneaky” AND interesting (and bullish) news. Given the current shareholder vote structure, it wouldn’t be impossible for the EGF to vote it down in the EGM, but I think EGF very specifically do not want to vote it down because the alternative is worse. But getting this passed would suddenly change the outlook for a Panalpina/Agility deal or any deal which required significant issuance.
Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. There were no specific minimum acceptance conditions attached to the tender offer mentioned in the announcement.
Should FPP secure 90% of GOLD in the tender offer, it may proceed with its delisting. A voluntary delisting is still achievable with ~80% in the bag, but that is conditional on <10% of shareholders not voting against.
Preconditions to the commencement of the tender offer include the approval from disinterested shareholders in FPP, approval from “relevant contractual parties of GOLD and GOLD’s subsidiaries” and the approval from the Office of Trade Competition Commission.
The fact the Sirivadhanabhakdi family already holds, directly/indirectly ~80% in GOLD, such regulatory approvals should be forthcoming.
This appears a done deal. The only apparent risk is the expected shareholder vote of Univentures wherein Panote will likely need to abstain.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 1.8%/4.3% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
DSME has this ₩2.3tril worth of CBs that carry a 30 year maturity. Korea Eximbank is the holder. HHI wants no change. Eximbank wants out as soon as possible. Current price of ₩32,600 is nearly a 20% discount to the conversion price of ₩40,350. It’d be still better for Eximbank to do conversion/sale even at this price. This is 27.54%. It will create huge overhang.
HHI should be given much higher priority than DSME even when they are under the same roof. DSME acquisition is supposed to help HHI first, not the other way around. HHI shouldn’t be much incentivized to help turn around DSME in the short-term. Not only that, pressing down DSME price would probably be the only way for HHI to prevent Eximbank’s stake dumping.
In a longer time horizon, things would depend on the outlook of the entire shipbuilding sector. To minimize risks, I’d go for long/short with HHI. What should be at least clear at this point is that HHI should be outperforming DSME in whatever fundamentals situations we are dealing with.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Merck KGaA (MRK GR) took off the gloves yesterday in its pursuit of Versum Materials (VSM US) , announcing and launching an unsolicited, fully financed $48 per share cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of VSM. Merck also announced the filing of its definitive proxy materials with the SEC for solicitation of proxies of VSM shareholder against the VSM/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger, which is scheduled to be voted on at a special shareholder meeting on April 26th, 2019.
Along with its press release announcing the offer yesterday, Merck also published its second open letter to Versum shareholders underscoring its commitment to complete the acquisition of the Company. This follows Merck’s presentation to VSM shareholders published on March 14, 2019.
The tender offer is scheduled to expire on 5pm, New York City time on June 7, 2019.
Have you ever wondered how a company secures the Chinese lucky number “8” as their ticker in Hong Kong? I’ll explain later on, but let’s just say that being the son of Li Ka Shing helps.
Li Ka Shing is a name that hardly needs introduction in Hong Kong and Richard Li, Li Ka Shing’s youngest son and Chairman of PCCW Ltd (8 HK), follows suit. After being born into Hong Kong’s richest family, Richard Li was educated in the US where he worked various odd jobs at McDonald’s and as a caddy at a local golf course before enrolling at Menlo College and eventually withdrawing without a degree. As fate would have it, Mr. Li went on to set up STAR TV, Asia’s satellite-delivered cable TV service, at the tender age of 24. Three years after starting STAR TV, Richard Li sold the venture, which had amassed a viewer base of 45 million people, to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp (NWS AU) for USD 1 billion in 1993. During the same year, Mr. Li founded the Pacific Century Group and began a streak of noteworthy acquisitions.
You may be starting to wonder what all of this has to do with a trade on PCCW Ltd (8 HK) and I don’t blame you. In the rest of this insight I will:
finish the historical overview of the Li family and PCCW
present my trade idea and rationale
give a detailed overview of the business units of PCCW and the associated performance of each
recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each
It was announced on March 26th after market close that the Korea National Pension Service (NPS) will vote against the re-election of the Cho Yang-Ho as a Director of Korean Air Lines (003490 KS). The final results will become available today when the AGM of Korean Air is completed (AGM starts at 9AM). This has been one of the most anticipated AGMs in Korea, since there is a good chance that Chairman Cho will not be re-elected. Chairman Cho needs at least 2/3 of the participating shareholders’ approval in order to be re-elected.
Foreigners currently own a 24.77% stake in Korean Air, up significantly from 20.61% as of end of 2018. This increase of 4.1% stake represents $128 million. The increase in ownership by the foreigners is a good sign since it suggests that many hedge funds and long-only institutional investors think that finally the tides have turned and Chairman Cho may need to step down from his position in the BOD.
In our view, if Chairman Cho is finally defeated in this AGM, this should have a definite positive impact on Korean Air’s share price. In the near term, we think Korean Air Lines (003490 KS)‘s share price could shoot up by nearly 20% and retest the previous resistance level at around 39,000 won.
Wesfarmers Ltd (WES AU) launched a conditional, non-binding indicative proposal for Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU), one of the world’s only rare earths suppliers based outside China. Wesfarmers’ proposal of A$2.25 cash per share values Lynas at A$1.5 billion. Lynas’ share price jumped 35% to A$2.10 before going into a trading halt.
The bid comes at a turbulent time for Lynas, which is caught in a regulatory dispute with authorities in Malaysia. While Wesfarmers proposal could be viewed as a lifeline for Lynas, we believe that Wesfarmers’s proposal is opportunistic and unattractive.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Frasers Property Ltd (FPL SP)owns 40.95% in FPT and also 39.92% in GOLD. FPT’s director Panote Sirivadhanabhakdi (the son of Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi), via his majority-controlled vehicleUniventures Public (UV TB), holds 39.28% in GOLD. Panote is also the vice-chairman of GOLD.
Presumably, both FPL and Univentures will tender into the Offer giving FPT a minimum holding of 80.2%. There were no specific minimum acceptance conditions attached to the tender offer mentioned in the announcement.
Should FPP secure 90% of GOLD in the tender offer, it may proceed with its delisting. A voluntary delisting is still achievable with ~80% in the bag, but that is conditional on <10% of shareholders not voting against.
Preconditions to the commencement of the tender offer include the approval from disinterested shareholders in FPP, approval from “relevant contractual parties of GOLD and GOLD’s subsidiaries” and the approval from the Office of Trade Competition Commission.
The fact the Sirivadhanabhakdi family already holds, directly/indirectly ~80% in GOLD, such regulatory approvals should be forthcoming.
This appears a done deal. The only apparent risk is the expected shareholder vote of Univentures wherein Panote will likely need to abstain.
Currently trading at a gross/annualized spread of 1.8%/4.3% assuming early August payment. Very tight, suggesting investors are more likely angling for the back-end.
DSME has this ₩2.3tril worth of CBs that carry a 30 year maturity. Korea Eximbank is the holder. HHI wants no change. Eximbank wants out as soon as possible. Current price of ₩32,600 is nearly a 20% discount to the conversion price of ₩40,350. It’d be still better for Eximbank to do conversion/sale even at this price. This is 27.54%. It will create huge overhang.
HHI should be given much higher priority than DSME even when they are under the same roof. DSME acquisition is supposed to help HHI first, not the other way around. HHI shouldn’t be much incentivized to help turn around DSME in the short-term. Not only that, pressing down DSME price would probably be the only way for HHI to prevent Eximbank’s stake dumping.
In a longer time horizon, things would depend on the outlook of the entire shipbuilding sector. To minimize risks, I’d go for long/short with HHI. What should be at least clear at this point is that HHI should be outperforming DSME in whatever fundamentals situations we are dealing with.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Merck KGaA (MRK GR) took off the gloves yesterday in its pursuit of Versum Materials (VSM US) , announcing and launching an unsolicited, fully financed $48 per share cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of VSM. Merck also announced the filing of its definitive proxy materials with the SEC for solicitation of proxies of VSM shareholder against the VSM/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) merger, which is scheduled to be voted on at a special shareholder meeting on April 26th, 2019.
Along with its press release announcing the offer yesterday, Merck also published its second open letter to Versum shareholders underscoring its commitment to complete the acquisition of the Company. This follows Merck’s presentation to VSM shareholders published on March 14, 2019.
The tender offer is scheduled to expire on 5pm, New York City time on June 7, 2019.
Have you ever wondered how a company secures the Chinese lucky number “8” as their ticker in Hong Kong? I’ll explain later on, but let’s just say that being the son of Li Ka Shing helps.
Li Ka Shing is a name that hardly needs introduction in Hong Kong and Richard Li, Li Ka Shing’s youngest son and Chairman of PCCW Ltd (8 HK), follows suit. After being born into Hong Kong’s richest family, Richard Li was educated in the US where he worked various odd jobs at McDonald’s and as a caddy at a local golf course before enrolling at Menlo College and eventually withdrawing without a degree. As fate would have it, Mr. Li went on to set up STAR TV, Asia’s satellite-delivered cable TV service, at the tender age of 24. Three years after starting STAR TV, Richard Li sold the venture, which had amassed a viewer base of 45 million people, to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp (NWS AU) for USD 1 billion in 1993. During the same year, Mr. Li founded the Pacific Century Group and began a streak of noteworthy acquisitions.
You may be starting to wonder what all of this has to do with a trade on PCCW Ltd (8 HK) and I don’t blame you. In the rest of this insight I will:
finish the historical overview of the Li family and PCCW
present my trade idea and rationale
give a detailed overview of the business units of PCCW and the associated performance of each
recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each
It was announced on March 26th after market close that the Korea National Pension Service (NPS) will vote against the re-election of the Cho Yang-Ho as a Director of Korean Air Lines (003490 KS). The final results will become available today when the AGM of Korean Air is completed (AGM starts at 9AM). This has been one of the most anticipated AGMs in Korea, since there is a good chance that Chairman Cho will not be re-elected. Chairman Cho needs at least 2/3 of the participating shareholders’ approval in order to be re-elected.
Foreigners currently own a 24.77% stake in Korean Air, up significantly from 20.61% as of end of 2018. This increase of 4.1% stake represents $128 million. The increase in ownership by the foreigners is a good sign since it suggests that many hedge funds and long-only institutional investors think that finally the tides have turned and Chairman Cho may need to step down from his position in the BOD.
In our view, if Chairman Cho is finally defeated in this AGM, this should have a definite positive impact on Korean Air’s share price. In the near term, we think Korean Air Lines (003490 KS)‘s share price could shoot up by nearly 20% and retest the previous resistance level at around 39,000 won.
Wesfarmers Ltd (WES AU) launched a conditional, non-binding indicative proposal for Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU), one of the world’s only rare earths suppliers based outside China. Wesfarmers’ proposal of A$2.25 cash per share values Lynas at A$1.5 billion. Lynas’ share price jumped 35% to A$2.10 before going into a trading halt.
The bid comes at a turbulent time for Lynas, which is caught in a regulatory dispute with authorities in Malaysia. While Wesfarmers proposal could be viewed as a lifeline for Lynas, we believe that Wesfarmers’s proposal is opportunistic and unattractive.
There is no apparent value enhancement to Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK), while there is no change in governance and no monetisation at the parent level.
Preceding my comments on Naspers are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.
These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
DSME has this ₩2.3tril worth of CBs that carry a 30 year maturity. Korea Eximbank is the holder. HHI wants no change. Eximbank wants out as soon as possible. Current price of ₩32,600 is nearly a 20% discount to the conversion price of ₩40,350. It’d be still better for Eximbank to do conversion/sale even at this price. This is 27.54%. It will create huge overhang.
HHI should be given much higher priority than DSME even when they are under the same roof. DSME acquisition is supposed to help HHI first, not the other way around. HHI shouldn’t be much incentivized to help turn around DSME in the short-term. Not only that, pressing down DSME price would probably be the only way for HHI to prevent Eximbank’s stake dumping.
In a longer time horizon, things would depend on the outlook of the entire shipbuilding sector. To minimize risks, I’d go for long/short with HHI. What should be at least clear at this point is that HHI should be outperforming DSME in whatever fundamentals situations we are dealing with.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
DSME has this ₩2.3tril worth of CBs that carry a 30 year maturity. Korea Eximbank is the holder. HHI wants no change. Eximbank wants out as soon as possible. Current price of ₩32,600 is nearly a 20% discount to the conversion price of ₩40,350. It’d be still better for Eximbank to do conversion/sale even at this price. This is 27.54%. It will create huge overhang.
HHI should be given much higher priority than DSME even when they are under the same roof. DSME acquisition is supposed to help HHI first, not the other way around. HHI shouldn’t be much incentivized to help turn around DSME in the short-term. Not only that, pressing down DSME price would probably be the only way for HHI to prevent Eximbank’s stake dumping.
In a longer time horizon, things would depend on the outlook of the entire shipbuilding sector. To minimize risks, I’d go for long/short with HHI. What should be at least clear at this point is that HHI should be outperforming DSME in whatever fundamentals situations we are dealing with.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May. The IFA (China Tonghai Capital) considers the $38.80/share Offer to be fair & reasonable. The Scheme is conditional on ≥75% for, ≤10% against from disinterested shareholders. As Hopewell is HK-incorporated, there is no “head count ” test. The full timetable is as follows:
Date
Data in the Date
6-Dec-18
Announcement
24-Feb-19
Scheme document
13-Mar-19
Last time for lodging shares to qualify to vote
15-Mar-19
Meeting record date
19-Mar-19
Court/EGM meeting
2-May-19
Effective date
14-May-19
Cheques dispatched
Source: Hopewell
Substantial Shareholders
Mn
%
The Wu family & concert parties
320.7
36.93
Non-consortium Offeror concert parties
31.7
3.65
Total
352.5
40.48
Disinterested Shareholders
516.1
59.42
After hearing conflicting opinions on what constitutes a blocking stake, a chat with the banker confirmed the blocking stake, as per the Companies Ordinance, is tied to 63.07% of shares out (i.e. Scheme shareholders – see page 95); whereas the Takeovers Code is tied to 59.42% of shares out. Effectively there are two assessments on the blocking stake and the more stringent (the 59.42% out in this case) prevails.
With the Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years (the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down), the IFA creatively argues that extenuating factors such as the premium to historical price needs to also be taken into account. Hardly original, but that is where investors must decide whether this is as good as it’s going to get – given the Wu family’s control, there will not be a competing offer – or to hold out for a superior price longer term. This is a final offer and it will not be increased.
What the IFA fails to discuss is that the widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. And that is the disingenuous conclusion from the IFA that the premium to last close and with reference to historical pricing, is in effect the overriding reason to conclude the Offer is reasonable. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ).
Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7%/37.5%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down. Tough one – the premium to last close and with reference to the 10-year price performance, should be sufficient to get it over the line, and the basis for this “bullish” insight. But only for the brave.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Have you ever wondered how a company secures the Chinese lucky number “8” as their ticker in Hong Kong? I’ll explain later on, but let’s just say that being the son of Li Ka Shing helps.
Li Ka Shing is a name that hardly needs introduction in Hong Kong and Richard Li, Li Ka Shing’s youngest son and Chairman of PCCW Ltd (8 HK), follows suit. After being born into Hong Kong’s richest family, Richard Li was educated in the US where he worked various odd jobs at McDonald’s and as a caddy at a local golf course before enrolling at Menlo College and eventually withdrawing without a degree. As fate would have it, Mr. Li went on to set up STAR TV, Asia’s satellite-delivered cable TV service, at the tender age of 24. Three years after starting STAR TV, Richard Li sold the venture, which had amassed a viewer base of 45 million people, to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp (NWS AU) for USD 1 billion in 1993. During the same year, Mr. Li founded the Pacific Century Group and began a streak of noteworthy acquisitions.
You may be starting to wonder what all of this has to do with a trade on PCCW Ltd (8 HK) and I don’t blame you. In the rest of this insight I will:
finish the historical overview of the Li family and PCCW
present my trade idea and rationale
give a detailed overview of the business units of PCCW and the associated performance of each
recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each
It was announced on March 26th after market close that the Korea National Pension Service (NPS) will vote against the re-election of the Cho Yang-Ho as a Director of Korean Air Lines (003490 KS). The final results will become available today when the AGM of Korean Air is completed (AGM starts at 9AM). This has been one of the most anticipated AGMs in Korea, since there is a good chance that Chairman Cho will not be re-elected. Chairman Cho needs at least 2/3 of the participating shareholders’ approval in order to be re-elected.
Foreigners currently own a 24.77% stake in Korean Air, up significantly from 20.61% as of end of 2018. This increase of 4.1% stake represents $128 million. The increase in ownership by the foreigners is a good sign since it suggests that many hedge funds and long-only institutional investors think that finally the tides have turned and Chairman Cho may need to step down from his position in the BOD.
In our view, if Chairman Cho is finally defeated in this AGM, this should have a definite positive impact on Korean Air’s share price. In the near term, we think Korean Air Lines (003490 KS)‘s share price could shoot up by nearly 20% and retest the previous resistance level at around 39,000 won.
Wesfarmers Ltd (WES AU) launched a conditional, non-binding indicative proposal for Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU), one of the world’s only rare earths suppliers based outside China. Wesfarmers’ proposal of A$2.25 cash per share values Lynas at A$1.5 billion. Lynas’ share price jumped 35% to A$2.10 before going into a trading halt.
The bid comes at a turbulent time for Lynas, which is caught in a regulatory dispute with authorities in Malaysia. While Wesfarmers proposal could be viewed as a lifeline for Lynas, we believe that Wesfarmers’s proposal is opportunistic and unattractive.
There is no apparent value enhancement to Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK), while there is no change in governance and no monetisation at the parent level.
Preceding my comments on Naspers are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.
These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.
This morning, Wesfarmers Ltd (WES AU) announced an indicative, non-binding proposal to the Board of Directors of Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) to acquire Lynas at A$2.25/share, payable in cash in the form of a Scheme of Arrangement.
This is a 44.7% premium to the one-day price and a 36.4% premium to the 60-day price.
It is, however, a 0% premium to the price at which Lynas was trading on 3 December 2018, the day before the Malaysian Minister for Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate imposed two pre-conditions on the rolling over of the processing licence (later in 2019), and it is a 3.2% premium to the one-year average as of 4 December 2018. On December 5th, the shares fell to A$1.65 and they have not recovered.
This is very early, non-binding, conditional in the extreme, and conditional non-binding offers are a graveyard of Australian arbitrageurs. The Offer is not all that attractive to boot. But I expect the stock will go up anyway, and that may make for some interesting trading opportunities.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May. The IFA (China Tonghai Capital) considers the $38.80/share Offer to be fair & reasonable. The Scheme is conditional on ≥75% for, ≤10% against from disinterested shareholders. As Hopewell is HK-incorporated, there is no “head count ” test. The full timetable is as follows:
Date
Data in the Date
6-Dec-18
Announcement
24-Feb-19
Scheme document
13-Mar-19
Last time for lodging shares to qualify to vote
15-Mar-19
Meeting record date
19-Mar-19
Court/EGM meeting
2-May-19
Effective date
14-May-19
Cheques dispatched
Source: Hopewell
Substantial Shareholders
Mn
%
The Wu family & concert parties
320.7
36.93
Non-consortium Offeror concert parties
31.7
3.65
Total
352.5
40.48
Disinterested Shareholders
516.1
59.42
After hearing conflicting opinions on what constitutes a blocking stake, a chat with the banker confirmed the blocking stake, as per the Companies Ordinance, is tied to 63.07% of shares out (i.e. Scheme shareholders – see page 95); whereas the Takeovers Code is tied to 59.42% of shares out. Effectively there are two assessments on the blocking stake and the more stringent (the 59.42% out in this case) prevails.
With the Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years (the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down), the IFA creatively argues that extenuating factors such as the premium to historical price needs to also be taken into account. Hardly original, but that is where investors must decide whether this is as good as it’s going to get – given the Wu family’s control, there will not be a competing offer – or to hold out for a superior price longer term. This is a final offer and it will not be increased.
What the IFA fails to discuss is that the widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. And that is the disingenuous conclusion from the IFA that the premium to last close and with reference to historical pricing, is in effect the overriding reason to conclude the Offer is reasonable. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ).
Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7%/37.5%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down. Tough one – the premium to last close and with reference to the 10-year price performance, should be sufficient to get it over the line, and the basis for this “bullish” insight. But only for the brave.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
The Scheme Document for the privatisation of Hopewell Holdings (54 HK) has been dispatched. The court meeting will be held on the 21 March. The consideration will be paid (on or before) the 14 May. The IFA (China Tonghai Capital) considers the $38.80/share Offer to be fair & reasonable. The Scheme is conditional on ≥75% for, ≤10% against from disinterested shareholders. As Hopewell is HK-incorporated, there is no “head count ” test. The full timetable is as follows:
Date
Data in the Date
6-Dec-18
Announcement
24-Feb-19
Scheme document
13-Mar-19
Last time for lodging shares to qualify to vote
15-Mar-19
Meeting record date
19-Mar-19
Court/EGM meeting
2-May-19
Effective date
14-May-19
Cheques dispatched
Source: Hopewell
Substantial Shareholders
Mn
%
The Wu family & concert parties
320.7
36.93
Non-consortium Offeror concert parties
31.7
3.65
Total
352.5
40.48
Disinterested Shareholders
516.1
59.42
After hearing conflicting opinions on what constitutes a blocking stake, a chat with the banker confirmed the blocking stake, as per the Companies Ordinance, is tied to 63.07% of shares out (i.e. Scheme shareholders – see page 95); whereas the Takeovers Code is tied to 59.42% of shares out. Effectively there are two assessments on the blocking stake and the more stringent (the 59.42% out in this case) prevails.
With the Offer Price representing a 43% discount to NAV, wider than the largest discount precedent in past nine years (the Glorious Property (845 HK) offer, which incidentally was voted down), the IFA creatively argues that extenuating factors such as the premium to historical price needs to also be taken into account. Hardly original, but that is where investors must decide whether this is as good as it’s going to get – given the Wu family’s control, there will not be a competing offer – or to hold out for a superior price longer term. This is a final offer and it will not be increased.
What the IFA fails to discuss is that the widest successful discount to NAV privatisation was 29.4% for New World China Land (917 HK)in 2016. And all precedent transactions (successful or otherwise) are PRC (mainly) property development related; except for Wheelock which operated property in Hong Kong (like Hopewell) and in Singapore, which was privatised at a 12.1% discount to NAV.
Therein lies the dilemma – what is a fair and reasonable discount to NAV for a Hong Kong investment property play? With limited precedents, it is challenging to categorically reach an opinion. And that is the disingenuous conclusion from the IFA that the premium to last close and with reference to historical pricing, is in effect the overriding reason to conclude the Offer is reasonable. I would argue the Wu family has made a low-ball offer for what is essentially an investment property play with quantifiable asset value.
A blocking sake is 5.9% or 51.6mn shares. First Eagle, which recently voted down the Guoco Group Ltd (53 HK)privatisation that was pitched at a ~25% discount to NAV, holds 2.7% (according to CapIQ).
Trading at a wide gross/annualised return of 7%/37.5%, reflecting the risk to completion, and the significant downside should the scheme be voted down. Tough one – the premium to last close and with reference to the 10-year price performance, should be sufficient to get it over the line, and the basis for this “bullish” insight. But only for the brave.
On Friday 22 February after the close, Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP) announced a buyback (E, J), a share cancellation (E, J), and a public equity offering of secondary shares (J-only). This kind of event is not abnormal in a year when profits are weaker and share prices are down. Cross-holders often sell shares into the end of the year in order to realise profits and let unrealised gains from the balance sheet filter into the income statement.
This time it is five sellers from four banks which all hail from the area: Bank Of Kyoto (8369 JP), Nomura Trust (which holds shares in a trust account for the MUFJ Bank pension fund as a beneficiary), Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)‘s MUFJ Bank, Resona Holdings (8308 JP), and Shiga Bank (8366 JP). The MUFJ Bank holdings likely originate from Sanwa Bank which was Osaka-based before merging with BOT-Mitsubishi almost 15 years ago, and Resona is also from Osaka – next door to Kyoto where Nintendo was founded – and Shiga Bank is the prefecture next door.
This would look like a normal sell-down… except for one thing.
There was a note in the announcement to the effect that “in the context of how companies deal with their policy cross-holdings becoming the subject of greater focus, we confirmed that several shareholders desired to sell shares, and as a company subject to such cross-holdings, we are conducting the above-mentioned Offering.”
In the TSE crossholding of SGX situation, the sale was not the most important part. The explanation of how the Board came to its decision and what they decided to do about it was important.
On the other hand, Japan’s Corporate Governance Code (the Code), which was introduced in 2015, requires listed companies to examine and explain the economic rationale and future outlook of holding shares of other listed companies for reasons other than pure investment purposes. Following a review of the requirements under the Code, JPX reached the conclusion that the existing cooperative relationship with SGX would continue even without holding the shares of SGX. [my bold]
The Japan Exchange Group had now provided the example for why even companies with cooperative business relationships should not own cross-holdings. And it is, if active stewards of capital choose to make it so, more subtle. Shareholders have even an even better pressure point. IF a company’s cooperative relationship with another company would not survive the unwinding of cross-holdings to improve capital efficiency for both sides, is that company truly independent? Is that company beholden to the company whose shares it holds? Is the cross-holding board doing its job?
And the Japan Exchange Group had said it would unwind its holdings of SGX over three years, so as not to overly impact the market for SGX shares. This provided an example of HOW to unwind, in addition to the WHY to unwind announced above.
The BIG QUESTION (And Nothing Else Matters)
The big question here is whether the reasoning for selling is really because of the new focus on policy cross-holdings, or it is just Bank of Kyoto and other banks trying to top up profit before the end of the fiscal year, using heretofore unrealised gains.
An analysis of the Bank of Kyoto-specific situation is discussed below.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
