Event-Driven

In this briefing:

1. Newmark Group Inc (NMRK US): Valuation/Fundamentals Mismatch, Stock Trades At Bargain Levels
2. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew
3. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update
4. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope
5. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer

1. Newmark Group Inc (NMRK US): Valuation/Fundamentals Mismatch, Stock Trades At Bargain Levels

Having gained ~30% in a little more than two months following its full separation from BGC Partners (BGCP US) at the end of November 2018 after a dismal share price performance since coming to the market in a partial IPO at the end of December 2017,  the shares of commercial real estate services company, Newmark Group (NMRK US)  have experienced another slide over the past several weeks despite its cheap valuation which belies its positive fundanmental drivers and peer group comparisons.

Notwithstanding its robust fundamentals, notice of alterations it plans to make to its Non-GAAP earnings presentations to bring them more into line with many other US-listed companies, has brought the company into the headlights of the ongoing controversy caused by this topic,  and in particular with respect to the treatement of stock-based compensation in Non-GAAP earnings. While Newmark follows many other companies by excluding it from Adjusted Earnings, its heavy use of stock-based compensation, which it intends to lessen going forward, makes it an easy target for critique of its earnings presentations. Nevertheless, we assess that Newmark is at least 35%  undervalued relative to its peers after incorparting stock compensation expenses in its earnings-based valuation metrics. It is also noteworthy that Newmark is currently paying shareholders a yield of ~4% against barely any dividend being paid out by peers

2. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew

On February 27th of this year, Altaba Inc (AABA US) held a “Strategic and Financial Update Conference Call.” In that call the company led by CEO Thomas McInerney said that effectively it was going to deal with its two major remaining assets (2.03bn shares of Yahoo Japan Corp (4689 JP) and 383.56mm shares of Alibaba Group Holding Ltd (BABA US)) in two stages, saying at the time they were “moving to an active monetization mode on [our] Yahoo Japan stake.”

That Yahoo Japan stake took longer, but the company worked to sell $20+bn of Alibaba last summer through a tender offer and selldown to generate cash for corporate liabilities and taxes, and then the company sold its Yahoo Japan stake in early September. 

Since then, there has been a period of watchful waiting. Some have been expecting a period with an acceptable amount of carry and then possible significant upside. I haven’t seen the upside but agree there has been some baseline carry. And if you can get lots of leverage on this and ride the volatility, it could produce an OK return from A to Z if you ignore the indignities and volatility of passing through stops B to Y.

The New News

Yesterday, Altaba and CEO McInerney held a conference call after filing a PRE 14A preliminary proxy statement related to the selldown/unwinding of its entire Alibaba stake and the proposed windup/dissolution of Altaba as an entity. 

The company will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which the Fund currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63 per Share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba Share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00 per Alibaba Share).”

As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear (and as discussed in the transcript linked above, which is short and worth reading), based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions. A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.

The figure of $76.72 – $79.72 represents a 5.44-9.56% premium to yesterday’s close of $72.76/share and represents the total of the Pre-Dissolution Liquidating Distribution in Q4 2019, a second distribution in Q4 2020, then residuals thereafter after the court-mandated holdback in the dissolution process pays its claims.

Fair value calculations, parameters, and risk discussion below.

Elaborate fair value calculations using different assumptions of appropriate discount rates for each payment, and exactly how much is in the last bit (and how long it takes to pay out) suggest a group of ranges of fair value, from about 3-4% below the last-traded price, to about 4-5% above. However, for a hedge fund to earn a 10% net return for investors from owning the trade at the close of yesterday, getting there requires a fair bit of leverage and the resulting information ratio may be lower than desirable.

Assuming the approximate time to payment as described in the proxy statement, and amount of payment in the first distribution as described, and a multi-year residual of US$5/share, current borrow rates and an assumption of slightly higher discount rate required for the portion of time the stock is unlisted and even higher when one is receiving residual claims, the current fair value of the stock ranges from about 2% below current price and 4% higher. If you assume a higher Holdback Amount, the range of outcomes shifts lower.

3. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update

This week in StubWorld …

• Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s discount to NAV narrows as it teases out more information on spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK).

Preceding my comments on Naspers are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.

These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.

4. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope

Back in September 2017, Lawrence Ho, Summit Ascent Holdings (102 HK)‘s major shareholder, reduced his stake to 18.75% from 27.06% (at between $1.13-$1.60/share, but mainly at the low end of this range), according to Hong Kong Exchange disclosure of interest filings. The share price of this Russian integrated gaming play declined 34% to $1.06/share in the following five trading days. Who bought those shares was not disclosed – CCASS shows these shares moving out of VC Brokerage into at least 10 different brokerage accounts.

Shortly after, Howard Klein quoted one insider in his insight Melco Resorts: A Gem Hiding in Plain Sight Offers an Entry Point After a Recent Dip that the sell-down wasn’t likely a sign “Ho has lost confidence in the area.“

On the 15 December, Ho announced a complete exit from Summit, selling 17.37% of shares out. Concurrently Ho resigned from his NED and chairman positions. Those shares moved from VC Brokerage to Sun Hung Kai Investments on the 20 December 2017. Shares traded unchanged on the news. 

At the same time, First Steamship (2601 TT) disclosed it held 12.67% on the 18 December 2017. Concurrently, Kuo Jen Hao was appointed as NED and Chairman of the Board, with effect from 28 December 2017.  Kuo is also the chairman and the general manager of First Steamship. First Steamship gradually increased its stake to 19.11% as at 24 October 2018.

The New News

Yesterday, Summit Ascent announced it has been informed that First Steamship and Kuo are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 24%.

With increased liquidity surrounding the news, this looks like a great opportunity to exit.

5. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer

Originally I had thought KKR’s offer could go higher. Instead, it came in lower at A$3.40 and KKR gave MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) management all of a couple of days to think about it.

The title to my subsequent piece was MYOB Caves And Agrees To KKR’s Reduced Offer.

Manikay Partners started buying up shares and by early March had reached a position of 11%. They made noise. The Scheme Booklet came out on the 14th of March. Four days later Manikay announced their position was now 13.61% and the following day Mawer announced re-upped its stake from the mid 8s to high 9% level.

The 20th saw a Scheme Update from MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them.

Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.

On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.

Today we have new news.

Manikay Caves and Agrees to KKR’s Reduced (Now Final) Offer

Earlier today a Reuters story about Manikay accepting the offer popped up and MYOB shares popped from A$3.34 to A$3.38-39 area where they closed. Partway through the day MYOB released a document on the ASX feed saying that Manikay had sent a letter saying…

In order avoid speculation regarding our voting intentions in respect of the Scheme, we are writing to inform you that we, Manikay Partners, intend to vote all the MYOB shares that we own or control FOR the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote.

We remain very disappointed that, despite our repeated efforts to convince you otherwise, you failed to change your recommendation in light of the material improvement in market conditions since announcement of the Scheme, among other factors. We are also disappointed that the disclosures to MYOB shareholders did not fully explain the impact of such improved market conditions on the value of MYOB.
excerpt of the letter.

In this briefing:

1. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew
2. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update
3. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope
4. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer
5. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau

1. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew

On February 27th of this year, Altaba Inc (AABA US) held a “Strategic and Financial Update Conference Call.” In that call the company led by CEO Thomas McInerney said that effectively it was going to deal with its two major remaining assets (2.03bn shares of Yahoo Japan Corp (4689 JP) and 383.56mm shares of Alibaba Group Holding Ltd (BABA US)) in two stages, saying at the time they were “moving to an active monetization mode on [our] Yahoo Japan stake.”

That Yahoo Japan stake took longer, but the company worked to sell $20+bn of Alibaba last summer through a tender offer and selldown to generate cash for corporate liabilities and taxes, and then the company sold its Yahoo Japan stake in early September. 

Since then, there has been a period of watchful waiting. Some have been expecting a period with an acceptable amount of carry and then possible significant upside. I haven’t seen the upside but agree there has been some baseline carry. And if you can get lots of leverage on this and ride the volatility, it could produce an OK return from A to Z if you ignore the indignities and volatility of passing through stops B to Y.

The New News

Yesterday, Altaba and CEO McInerney held a conference call after filing a PRE 14A preliminary proxy statement related to the selldown/unwinding of its entire Alibaba stake and the proposed windup/dissolution of Altaba as an entity. 

The company will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which the Fund currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63 per Share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba Share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00 per Alibaba Share).”

As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear (and as discussed in the transcript linked above, which is short and worth reading), based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions. A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.

The figure of $76.72 – $79.72 represents a 5.44-9.56% premium to yesterday’s close of $72.76/share and represents the total of the Pre-Dissolution Liquidating Distribution in Q4 2019, a second distribution in Q4 2020, then residuals thereafter after the court-mandated holdback in the dissolution process pays its claims.

Fair value calculations, parameters, and risk discussion below.

Elaborate fair value calculations using different assumptions of appropriate discount rates for each payment, and exactly how much is in the last bit (and how long it takes to pay out) suggest a group of ranges of fair value, from about 3-4% below the last-traded price, to about 4-5% above. However, for a hedge fund to earn a 10% net return for investors from owning the trade at the close of yesterday, getting there requires a fair bit of leverage and the resulting information ratio may be lower than desirable.

Assuming the approximate time to payment as described in the proxy statement, and amount of payment in the first distribution as described, and a multi-year residual of US$5/share, current borrow rates and an assumption of slightly higher discount rate required for the portion of time the stock is unlisted and even higher when one is receiving residual claims, the current fair value of the stock ranges from about 2% below current price and 4% higher. If you assume a higher Holdback Amount, the range of outcomes shifts lower.

2. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update

This week in StubWorld …

• Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s discount to NAV narrows as it teases out more information on spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK).

Preceding my comments on Naspers are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.

These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.

3. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope

Back in September 2017, Lawrence Ho, Summit Ascent Holdings (102 HK)‘s major shareholder, reduced his stake to 18.75% from 27.06% (at between $1.13-$1.60/share, but mainly at the low end of this range), according to Hong Kong Exchange disclosure of interest filings. The share price of this Russian integrated gaming play declined 34% to $1.06/share in the following five trading days. Who bought those shares was not disclosed – CCASS shows these shares moving out of VC Brokerage into at least 10 different brokerage accounts.

Shortly after, Howard Klein quoted one insider in his insight Melco Resorts: A Gem Hiding in Plain Sight Offers an Entry Point After a Recent Dip that the sell-down wasn’t likely a sign “Ho has lost confidence in the area.“

On the 15 December, Ho announced a complete exit from Summit, selling 17.37% of shares out. Concurrently Ho resigned from his NED and chairman positions. Those shares moved from VC Brokerage to Sun Hung Kai Investments on the 20 December 2017. Shares traded unchanged on the news. 

At the same time, First Steamship (2601 TT) disclosed it held 12.67% on the 18 December 2017. Concurrently, Kuo Jen Hao was appointed as NED and Chairman of the Board, with effect from 28 December 2017.  Kuo is also the chairman and the general manager of First Steamship. First Steamship gradually increased its stake to 19.11% as at 24 October 2018.

The New News

Yesterday, Summit Ascent announced it has been informed that First Steamship and Kuo are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 24%.

With increased liquidity surrounding the news, this looks like a great opportunity to exit.

4. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer

Originally I had thought KKR’s offer could go higher. Instead, it came in lower at A$3.40 and KKR gave MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) management all of a couple of days to think about it.

The title to my subsequent piece was MYOB Caves And Agrees To KKR’s Reduced Offer.

Manikay Partners started buying up shares and by early March had reached a position of 11%. They made noise. The Scheme Booklet came out on the 14th of March. Four days later Manikay announced their position was now 13.61% and the following day Mawer announced re-upped its stake from the mid 8s to high 9% level.

The 20th saw a Scheme Update from MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them.

Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.

On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.

Today we have new news.

Manikay Caves and Agrees to KKR’s Reduced (Now Final) Offer

Earlier today a Reuters story about Manikay accepting the offer popped up and MYOB shares popped from A$3.34 to A$3.38-39 area where they closed. Partway through the day MYOB released a document on the ASX feed saying that Manikay had sent a letter saying…

In order avoid speculation regarding our voting intentions in respect of the Scheme, we are writing to inform you that we, Manikay Partners, intend to vote all the MYOB shares that we own or control FOR the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote.

We remain very disappointed that, despite our repeated efforts to convince you otherwise, you failed to change your recommendation in light of the material improvement in market conditions since announcement of the Scheme, among other factors. We are also disappointed that the disclosures to MYOB shareholders did not fully explain the impact of such improved market conditions on the value of MYOB.
excerpt of the letter.

5. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau

Visitors to Macao will notice the gaudy designs of new properties like Studio City and the City of Dreams owned by Melco. Few will know that the Melco of today traces its roots back almost 100 years when it was named The Macau Electric Lighting Company. Melco was listed in Hong Kong in 1927 when it was still managing the electricity supply service for the island of Macau, which it had done since 1906. After the CEM was established in 1972 to supply power in Macau, Melco changed its name to Melco International Development Limited and became a subsidiary of Stanley Ho’s real estate holding company, Shun Tak Holdings (242 HK). With the burden of supplying electricity off its shoulders, the company did what any logical Hong Kong firm would do when its business disappears, it bought real estate.

To this day, Melco International Development (200 HK) still maintains ownership of one of these classic Hong Kong destinations which I will take a closer look at in my note. In the rest of this insight I will:

• finish the historical overview of Melco
• present my trade idea and rationale
• give a detailed overview of the business units of Melco International
• recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each 

In this briefing:

1. Delta Electronics (DELTA TB): Little Option but to Accept the Tender Offer

1. Delta Electronics (DELTA TB): Little Option but to Accept the Tender Offer

Delta Electronics (2308 TT) (DEI) launched the conditional voluntary tender offer for Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) (Delta), an electronics contract manufacturer, on 26 February 2019. The tender offer of THB71.00 cash per share values Delta at an EV of THB72 billion ($2.2 billion).

In this briefing:

1. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update
2. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope
3. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer
4. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau
5. China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption

1. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update

This week in StubWorld …

• Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s discount to NAV narrows as it teases out more information on spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK).

Preceding my comments on Naspers are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.

These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.

2. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope

Back in September 2017, Lawrence Ho, Summit Ascent Holdings (102 HK)‘s major shareholder, reduced his stake to 18.75% from 27.06% (at between $1.13-$1.60/share, but mainly at the low end of this range), according to Hong Kong Exchange disclosure of interest filings. The share price of this Russian integrated gaming play declined 34% to $1.06/share in the following five trading days. Who bought those shares was not disclosed – CCASS shows these shares moving out of VC Brokerage into at least 10 different brokerage accounts.

Shortly after, Howard Klein quoted one insider in his insight Melco Resorts: A Gem Hiding in Plain Sight Offers an Entry Point After a Recent Dip that the sell-down wasn’t likely a sign “Ho has lost confidence in the area.“

On the 15 December, Ho announced a complete exit from Summit, selling 17.37% of shares out. Concurrently Ho resigned from his NED and chairman positions. Those shares moved from VC Brokerage to Sun Hung Kai Investments on the 20 December 2017. Shares traded unchanged on the news. 

At the same time, First Steamship (2601 TT) disclosed it held 12.67% on the 18 December 2017. Concurrently, Kuo Jen Hao was appointed as NED and Chairman of the Board, with effect from 28 December 2017.  Kuo is also the chairman and the general manager of First Steamship. First Steamship gradually increased its stake to 19.11% as at 24 October 2018.

The New News

Yesterday, Summit Ascent announced it has been informed that First Steamship and Kuo are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 24%.

With increased liquidity surrounding the news, this looks like a great opportunity to exit.

3. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer

Originally I had thought KKR’s offer could go higher. Instead, it came in lower at A$3.40 and KKR gave MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) management all of a couple of days to think about it.

The title to my subsequent piece was MYOB Caves And Agrees To KKR’s Reduced Offer.

Manikay Partners started buying up shares and by early March had reached a position of 11%. They made noise. The Scheme Booklet came out on the 14th of March. Four days later Manikay announced their position was now 13.61% and the following day Mawer announced re-upped its stake from the mid 8s to high 9% level.

The 20th saw a Scheme Update from MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them.

Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.

On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.

Today we have new news.

Manikay Caves and Agrees to KKR’s Reduced (Now Final) Offer

Earlier today a Reuters story about Manikay accepting the offer popped up and MYOB shares popped from A$3.34 to A$3.38-39 area where they closed. Partway through the day MYOB released a document on the ASX feed saying that Manikay had sent a letter saying…

In order avoid speculation regarding our voting intentions in respect of the Scheme, we are writing to inform you that we, Manikay Partners, intend to vote all the MYOB shares that we own or control FOR the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote.

We remain very disappointed that, despite our repeated efforts to convince you otherwise, you failed to change your recommendation in light of the material improvement in market conditions since announcement of the Scheme, among other factors. We are also disappointed that the disclosures to MYOB shareholders did not fully explain the impact of such improved market conditions on the value of MYOB.
excerpt of the letter.

4. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau

Visitors to Macao will notice the gaudy designs of new properties like Studio City and the City of Dreams owned by Melco. Few will know that the Melco of today traces its roots back almost 100 years when it was named The Macau Electric Lighting Company. Melco was listed in Hong Kong in 1927 when it was still managing the electricity supply service for the island of Macau, which it had done since 1906. After the CEM was established in 1972 to supply power in Macau, Melco changed its name to Melco International Development Limited and became a subsidiary of Stanley Ho’s real estate holding company, Shun Tak Holdings (242 HK). With the burden of supplying electricity off its shoulders, the company did what any logical Hong Kong firm would do when its business disappears, it bought real estate.

To this day, Melco International Development (200 HK) still maintains ownership of one of these classic Hong Kong destinations which I will take a closer look at in my note. In the rest of this insight I will:

• finish the historical overview of Melco
• present my trade idea and rationale
• give a detailed overview of the business units of Melco International
• recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each 

5. China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption

In my initial insight on China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK, “CPNED”)‘s privatisation by China Power New Energy Limited (the Offeror) by way of a Scheme, I concluded China Three Gorges, CPNED’s largest shareholder with 27.10%, will likely be required to abstain at the Court Meeting as it is presumed to be a connected party to the Offeror as per the Takeovers Code.

But the announcement states that CTG has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme and to elect the share alternative.

It seems illogical to mention in the irrevocable CTG will vote for the Scheme when in actuality it cannot vote. So, which one is it?

The short answer is: CTG cannot currently vote. 

But understanding this requires diving into the minutiae of Hong Kong’s Takeovers Code. So I do.

In this briefing:

1. StubWorld: Matheson’s Strategic Buying of Strategic

1. StubWorld: Matheson’s Strategic Buying of Strategic

This week in StubWorld …

• Jardine Matheson Hldgs (JM SP)‘s recent buying of Jardine Strategic Hldgs (JS SP) is nothing new and follows a long-term plan to fortify the cross-holding structure.

Preceding my comments on Jardine and other stubs are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.

These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.

In this briefing:

1. Orion Holdco/Sub Trade: Holdco’s Price Catching up Was Overworked, Time for Sub to Catch Up

1. Orion Holdco/Sub Trade: Holdco’s Price Catching up Was Overworked, Time for Sub to Catch Up

• Orion Holdco/Sub duo is now above +2σ on a 20D MA. They made nearly 2σ jump in just two trading days. Price ratio is currently at a 120D high. Holdco discount to NAV dropped 4%p from 50% to 46% since last time we checked on Jan 24.
• China easing wind began to blow into Korea since late last year. This China expectation had pushed up both Holdco and Sub. Sub had reacted more sensitively to it. Sub has undergone a price correction lately. Holdco has done a lot of catching up during this period. Now, Holdco surpassed Sub in terms of price return. Holdco climbed 32% from its 52W low. Sub went up 30% from its 52W low.
• Holdco is preparing its own business operation, water purifier, in China. This may act as a divergence factor. But at this point, Holdco’s own business in China has no meaningful substance that can shake its NAV radically. They must be reverted back to mean. Their price return got reversed in favor of Holdco. Holdco’s price catching up should be done now. It is time to go long Sub and short Holdco.

In this briefing:

1. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope
2. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer
3. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau
4. China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption
5. Severgroup Puts in a Cheeky Bid for Lenta – TPG and EBRD Bail

1. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope

Back in September 2017, Lawrence Ho, Summit Ascent Holdings (102 HK)‘s major shareholder, reduced his stake to 18.75% from 27.06% (at between $1.13-$1.60/share, but mainly at the low end of this range), according to Hong Kong Exchange disclosure of interest filings. The share price of this Russian integrated gaming play declined 34% to $1.06/share in the following five trading days. Who bought those shares was not disclosed – CCASS shows these shares moving out of VC Brokerage into at least 10 different brokerage accounts.

Shortly after, Howard Klein quoted one insider in his insight Melco Resorts: A Gem Hiding in Plain Sight Offers an Entry Point After a Recent Dip that the sell-down wasn’t likely a sign “Ho has lost confidence in the area.“

On the 15 December, Ho announced a complete exit from Summit, selling 17.37% of shares out. Concurrently Ho resigned from his NED and chairman positions. Those shares moved from VC Brokerage to Sun Hung Kai Investments on the 20 December 2017. Shares traded unchanged on the news. 

At the same time, First Steamship (2601 TT) disclosed it held 12.67% on the 18 December 2017. Concurrently, Kuo Jen Hao was appointed as NED and Chairman of the Board, with effect from 28 December 2017.  Kuo is also the chairman and the general manager of First Steamship. First Steamship gradually increased its stake to 19.11% as at 24 October 2018.

The New News

Yesterday, Summit Ascent announced it has been informed that First Steamship and Kuo are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 24%.

With increased liquidity surrounding the news, this looks like a great opportunity to exit.

2. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer

Originally I had thought KKR’s offer could go higher. Instead, it came in lower at A$3.40 and KKR gave MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) management all of a couple of days to think about it.

The title to my subsequent piece was MYOB Caves And Agrees To KKR’s Reduced Offer.

Manikay Partners started buying up shares and by early March had reached a position of 11%. They made noise. The Scheme Booklet came out on the 14th of March. Four days later Manikay announced their position was now 13.61% and the following day Mawer announced re-upped its stake from the mid 8s to high 9% level.

The 20th saw a Scheme Update from MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them.

Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.

On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.

Today we have new news.

Manikay Caves and Agrees to KKR’s Reduced (Now Final) Offer

Earlier today a Reuters story about Manikay accepting the offer popped up and MYOB shares popped from A$3.34 to A$3.38-39 area where they closed. Partway through the day MYOB released a document on the ASX feed saying that Manikay had sent a letter saying…

In order avoid speculation regarding our voting intentions in respect of the Scheme, we are writing to inform you that we, Manikay Partners, intend to vote all the MYOB shares that we own or control FOR the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote.

We remain very disappointed that, despite our repeated efforts to convince you otherwise, you failed to change your recommendation in light of the material improvement in market conditions since announcement of the Scheme, among other factors. We are also disappointed that the disclosures to MYOB shareholders did not fully explain the impact of such improved market conditions on the value of MYOB.
excerpt of the letter.

3. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau

Visitors to Macao will notice the gaudy designs of new properties like Studio City and the City of Dreams owned by Melco. Few will know that the Melco of today traces its roots back almost 100 years when it was named The Macau Electric Lighting Company. Melco was listed in Hong Kong in 1927 when it was still managing the electricity supply service for the island of Macau, which it had done since 1906. After the CEM was established in 1972 to supply power in Macau, Melco changed its name to Melco International Development Limited and became a subsidiary of Stanley Ho’s real estate holding company, Shun Tak Holdings (242 HK). With the burden of supplying electricity off its shoulders, the company did what any logical Hong Kong firm would do when its business disappears, it bought real estate.

To this day, Melco International Development (200 HK) still maintains ownership of one of these classic Hong Kong destinations which I will take a closer look at in my note. In the rest of this insight I will:

• finish the historical overview of Melco
• present my trade idea and rationale
• give a detailed overview of the business units of Melco International
• recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each 

4. China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption

In my initial insight on China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK, “CPNED”)‘s privatisation by China Power New Energy Limited (the Offeror) by way of a Scheme, I concluded China Three Gorges, CPNED’s largest shareholder with 27.10%, will likely be required to abstain at the Court Meeting as it is presumed to be a connected party to the Offeror as per the Takeovers Code.

But the announcement states that CTG has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme and to elect the share alternative.

It seems illogical to mention in the irrevocable CTG will vote for the Scheme when in actuality it cannot vote. So, which one is it?

The short answer is: CTG cannot currently vote. 

But understanding this requires diving into the minutiae of Hong Kong’s Takeovers Code. So I do.

5. Severgroup Puts in a Cheeky Bid for Lenta – TPG and EBRD Bail

In the middle of last week, Russia’s largest chain of hypermarkets Lenta Ltd (LNTA LI)  announced that it was aware that there were ongoing discussions between Luna (TPG’s holding entity, which owns 34.13% of Lenta’s capital) and Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup, for Luna to sell its stake in Lenta to the Russian conglomerate. A day later, Lenta announced the company was aware of discussions between Severgroup and the EBRD (7.40% holder). 

Reuters reported last night that Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those two sellers, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company. 

Later last night, Lenta announced on its website (full press release here) a cash offer for all the shares had been proposed. The Offer has a pre-condition dealing with the above-mentioned transactions being approved by those who need to approve.

The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs. 

There may be something interesting to do here.

In this briefing:

1. Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide
2. Delta Electronics (DELTA TB): Little Option but to Accept the Tender Offer
3. StubWorld: Matheson’s Strategic Buying of Strategic
4. Orion Holdco/Sub Trade: Holdco’s Price Catching up Was Overworked, Time for Sub to Catch Up

1. Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide

• Youngone Holdings (009970 KS) is another single-sub holdco. Youngone Corp (111770 KS) is the largest sub that accounts for 70% of Holdco NAV. Youngone is one of Korea’s two largest OEM apparel manufacturers. On a 20D MA, they are now at 312% of σ. Current price ratio is at a 120D high. Holdco discount is 27.5% to NAV.
• I am not seeing any substantial factor that can explain this much price divergence in the last two days. There is a growing concern over Sub’s labor cost. This may explain Sub’s price plunge. But this isn’t enough to explain the current huge price divergence.
• In the last 120 days, we’ve had a couple of radical divergences. All of these got quickly reverted to mean. I expect the same to happen this time. At this much divergence, there is a little chance of further widening. I’d go short Holdco and long Sub. Just, Holdco liquidity can be an issue here.

2. Delta Electronics (DELTA TB): Little Option but to Accept the Tender Offer

Delta Electronics (2308 TT) (DEI) launched the conditional voluntary tender offer for Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) (Delta), an electronics contract manufacturer, on 26 February 2019. The tender offer of THB71.00 cash per share values Delta at an EV of THB72 billion ($2.2 billion).

3. StubWorld: Matheson’s Strategic Buying of Strategic

This week in StubWorld …

• Jardine Matheson Hldgs (JM SP)‘s recent buying of Jardine Strategic Hldgs (JS SP) is nothing new and follows a long-term plan to fortify the cross-holding structure.

Preceding my comments on Jardine and other stubs are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.

These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.

4. Orion Holdco/Sub Trade: Holdco’s Price Catching up Was Overworked, Time for Sub to Catch Up

• Orion Holdco/Sub duo is now above +2σ on a 20D MA. They made nearly 2σ jump in just two trading days. Price ratio is currently at a 120D high. Holdco discount to NAV dropped 4%p from 50% to 46% since last time we checked on Jan 24.
• China easing wind began to blow into Korea since late last year. This China expectation had pushed up both Holdco and Sub. Sub had reacted more sensitively to it. Sub has undergone a price correction lately. Holdco has done a lot of catching up during this period. Now, Holdco surpassed Sub in terms of price return. Holdco climbed 32% from its 52W low. Sub went up 30% from its 52W low.
• Holdco is preparing its own business operation, water purifier, in China. This may act as a divergence factor. But at this point, Holdco’s own business in China has no meaningful substance that can shake its NAV radically. They must be reverted back to mean. Their price return got reversed in favor of Holdco. Holdco’s price catching up should be done now. It is time to go long Sub and short Holdco.

In this briefing:

1. POSCO Chemtech: Merger, Renaming, KOSPI Move & Joining KOSPI 200

1. POSCO Chemtech: Merger, Renaming, KOSPI Move & Joining KOSPI 200

• POSCO Chemtech (003670 KS) is to merge with one of the affiliated companies, POSCO ESM through stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. It will change its corporate name from POSCO Chemtech to POSCO Chemical. It is also planning KOSPI move.
• KOSPI 200 inclusion is a done deal. Just, timing is in question. New passive money flowing into POSCO Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bil. This represents 1.69% of MC and 4.82% of float MC. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
• If KOSPI 200 inclusion happens for this annual rebalancing cycle, it will be June. If not, we will have to wait another year. This explains current ‘dull’ price movement. I’d keep an eye on this event. ₩68bil passive money would still become a price shaker.

In this briefing:

1. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau
2. China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption
3. Severgroup Puts in a Cheeky Bid for Lenta – TPG and EBRD Bail
4. Yinson Tenders a Lifeboat for Ezion
5. DSV Improves Bid and Göhner Foundation and Panalpina Agree

1. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau

Visitors to Macao will notice the gaudy designs of new properties like Studio City and the City of Dreams owned by Melco. Few will know that the Melco of today traces its roots back almost 100 years when it was named The Macau Electric Lighting Company. Melco was listed in Hong Kong in 1927 when it was still managing the electricity supply service for the island of Macau, which it had done since 1906. After the CEM was established in 1972 to supply power in Macau, Melco changed its name to Melco International Development Limited and became a subsidiary of Stanley Ho’s real estate holding company, Shun Tak Holdings (242 HK). With the burden of supplying electricity off its shoulders, the company did what any logical Hong Kong firm would do when its business disappears, it bought real estate.

To this day, Melco International Development (200 HK) still maintains ownership of one of these classic Hong Kong destinations which I will take a closer look at in my note. In the rest of this insight I will:

• finish the historical overview of Melco
• present my trade idea and rationale
• give a detailed overview of the business units of Melco International
• recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each 

2. China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption

In my initial insight on China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK, “CPNED”)‘s privatisation by China Power New Energy Limited (the Offeror) by way of a Scheme, I concluded China Three Gorges, CPNED’s largest shareholder with 27.10%, will likely be required to abstain at the Court Meeting as it is presumed to be a connected party to the Offeror as per the Takeovers Code.

But the announcement states that CTG has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme and to elect the share alternative.

It seems illogical to mention in the irrevocable CTG will vote for the Scheme when in actuality it cannot vote. So, which one is it?

The short answer is: CTG cannot currently vote. 

But understanding this requires diving into the minutiae of Hong Kong’s Takeovers Code. So I do.

3. Severgroup Puts in a Cheeky Bid for Lenta – TPG and EBRD Bail

In the middle of last week, Russia’s largest chain of hypermarkets Lenta Ltd (LNTA LI)  announced that it was aware that there were ongoing discussions between Luna (TPG’s holding entity, which owns 34.13% of Lenta’s capital) and Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup, for Luna to sell its stake in Lenta to the Russian conglomerate. A day later, Lenta announced the company was aware of discussions between Severgroup and the EBRD (7.40% holder). 

Reuters reported last night that Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those two sellers, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company. 

Later last night, Lenta announced on its website (full press release here) a cash offer for all the shares had been proposed. The Offer has a pre-condition dealing with the above-mentioned transactions being approved by those who need to approve.

The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs. 

There may be something interesting to do here.

4. Yinson Tenders a Lifeboat for Ezion

Long-suffering lifeboat market play Ezion Holdings (EZI SP) has received a bail-out from Malaysia’s Yinson Holdings (YNS MK).

Yinson’s proposal is two-fold:

1. A conditional debt conversion agreement to capitalise all of the “relevant debt” of US$916mn via the allotment and issue of up to approximately 22,573,570,909 new ordinary shares of Ezion at an issue price of S$0.055/share (27.9% premium to last close).
2. A conditional option agreement for the proposed grant by Ezion of 3,360,495,867 non-listed and transferable share options to Yinson at the exercise price of S$0.0605 per option Share. 

This shareholder structure will take the following shape, with Yinson holding 85.9% of shares out after the conversion and 87.5% after both the conversion and the exercise of the share options.

However … as per the more detailed Bursa announcement:

It is the intention of YEPL (wholly-owned sub of Yinson) to acquire up to US$916mn of the Relevant Debts for a consideration to be agreed with the Designated Lenders. Tentatively, YHB (Yinson) expected its cash outlay shall be in the region of USD200mn and some EHL (Ezion) Shares that will give YEPL a shareholding of not less than 70% in EHL at the point of the completion of the Proposed Debt conversion and Subscription. In any event, assuming all convertible securities of EHL are converted, YHB expects its eventual shareholding in EHL shall be a controlling stake of at least 51%.

Ezion is also in negotiation with the major secured lenders to restructure its existing debts which would result in the conversion of certain debts to redeemable convertible preferences shares to be issued by Ezion.

As this is effectively a hybrid takeover, there exist a number of conditions required to complete this proposal. Of importance is the waiver from the Securities Industry Council of Singapore for Yinson not to make a mandatory general offer for Ezion under Rule 14.1 of the Takeover Code, as the share subscription takes Yinson’s stake >30%.

On Ezion

Ezion develops, owns, and charters offshore assets to support offshore energy markets, via three key segments:

• Lifeboats/liftboats – these are self-propelled rigs involved in the production and maintenance of the O&G and windfarm industry. This segment accounted for 57.9% of revenue in FY18.
• Jack-up rigs – engaged in non-self propelled rigs involved in the production and maintenance of the O&G and windfarm industry. The segment accounted for 34.1% of revenue in FY18.
• And offshore support logistic services, accounting for 7.5% of revenue in FYT18.

Ezion is primarily Asian focused with revenue split between Singapore, India, and the rest of Asia as to 8%, 5.3% and 54%. The Middle East and Africa account for 15.6% and 15.2% respectively.

Fundamentals

• Revenue declined by US$125mn in FY17 due to a reduction in charter rates and delays in re-deployment of the Ezion’s liftboats due to working capital constraints. The loss before tax was exacerbated by impairment losses totalling US$897mn.
• Revenue declined by US$74mn in FY17 due to a drop in the utilisation rates of liftboats and jack-up rigs. FY18 also saw an increase in impairments loses of US$84.5mn, while loses in associate and jointly controlled entities increased to US$39mn in FY18 from US$16mn in FY17.

Effect on NTA from the conversion/options

Assuming the subscription and options were completed on 31 December 2018, the effects of the Ezion’s NTL/NTA per share would be as follows: 

Peer Comparisons

Substantial Shareholders of Ezion

5. DSV Improves Bid and Göhner Foundation and Panalpina Agree

Late Sunday night Bloomberg reported that DSV A/S (DSV DC) had sweetened its offer for Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) from the previous CHF 180/share and that the new bid had won the support of the Foundation. 

This morning quite early we have an agreed deal and what had seemed a tough deal now seems easy.

According to a press release a short while ago.

DSV and Panalpina have reached an agreement on the terms and conditions of a combination by way of a Public Exchange Offer to all Panalpina shareholders. The board of directors of Panalpina recommends that Panalpina shareholders accept the Public Exchange Offer. The Public Exchange Offer already has the support of shareholders representing 69.9% of the registered shares of Panalpina, who have irrevocably agreed to tender their shares into the Public Exchange Offer. This includes Panalpina’s largest shareholder, Ernst Göhner Foundation and Cevian and Artisan*.

The deal is 2.375 shares of DSV for every share of Panalpina, which as of Friday’s close had a value of CHF 195.80/share which is a 43% premium to the CHF 137/share where Panalpina was trading the day before DSV’s first bid.

Exact terms of the Exchange Offer have not been disclosed but there will be an 80% acceptance condition (including the 69.9% who have already irrevocably agreed to accept the Offer), and other conditions will include “receipt of all necessary regulatory approvals, approval of a capital increase at an extraordinary general meeting in DSV, approval of a listing prospectus and admittance of the new DSV shares for trading at NASDAQ Copenhagen and effectiveness of a US Registration Statement.” (DSV press release)

In light of the Exchange Offer, the Ernst Göhner Foundation asked the board of Panalpina to postpone the April 5th EGM which was set to decide on the one-share one-vote.