Event-Driven

In this briefing:

1. Everbright Mandatory Offer for Ying Li Intl Real Estate – Going Cheap
2. Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers
3. Newmark Group Inc (NMRK US): Valuation/Fundamentals Mismatch, Stock Trades At Bargain Levels
4. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew
5. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update

1. Everbright Mandatory Offer for Ying Li Intl Real Estate – Going Cheap

On 3 April 2019, China Everbright (165 HK)‘s wholly owned subsidiary, State Alpha Limited, purchased 767,052,161 shares representing approximately 30.00% of the Shares in Singapore-listed property developer, Ying Li International Real Estate Ltd (YINGLI SP), from Newest Luck Holdings Limited (the vehicle of Executive Chairman and CEO Mr. Fang Ming) at a share price of SGD 0.140.

Following this transaction, the combined stake of China Everbright and parties acting in concert with it reached 58.91% triggering an obligation to make a mandatory offer for all the shares of Ying Li, a transaction which was announced after the close.

The offer price of SGD 0.140 translates to a premium of 5.9% and 10.9% to Ying Li’s 1-month and 3-month VWAP, respectively but less than a 1% premium to last trade – the company’s shares closed at SGD 0.139 on 3rd April before the announcement. The company asked for a trading halt the next morning and the shares have not traded yet as the large shareholder disclosures have come trickling in on the 4th and the 5th.

The acquirer has stated that it is their present intention to maintain the listing status of the company. However, the acquirer also reserves the right to reevaluate this position if the free float falls below the 10% requirement specified in the listing rules following the completion of the offer. 

This is something like a free put for investors and a very low-priced call option for Everbright. The situation raises obvious questions, and despite the “intention” to maintain the listing status, there are reasons why they would not want to. The details are worth a look.

Quiddity’s new Quiddity Singapore M&A Guide 2019 is now published with guidelines to the relevant rules, regulations, documentation, and pointers to the Singapore M&A landscape. Watch for more in the series to be published shortly.

2. Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers

This post discusses the key questions on Nexon sale at this point. It then provides the most realistic answers to these questions from various circumstantial aspects. This post is based on the recent news reports and also various local sources.

3. Newmark Group Inc (NMRK US): Valuation/Fundamentals Mismatch, Stock Trades At Bargain Levels

Having gained ~30% in a little more than two months following its full separation from BGC Partners (BGCP US) at the end of November 2018 after a dismal share price performance since coming to the market in a partial IPO at the end of December 2017,  the shares of commercial real estate services company, Newmark Group (NMRK US)  have experienced another slide over the past several weeks despite its cheap valuation which belies its positive fundanmental drivers and peer group comparisons.

Notwithstanding its robust fundamentals, notice of alterations it plans to make to its Non-GAAP earnings presentations to bring them more into line with many other US-listed companies, has brought the company into the headlights of the ongoing controversy caused by this topic,  and in particular with respect to the treatement of stock-based compensation in Non-GAAP earnings. While Newmark follows many other companies by excluding it from Adjusted Earnings, its heavy use of stock-based compensation, which it intends to lessen going forward, makes it an easy target for critique of its earnings presentations. Nevertheless, we assess that Newmark is at least 35%  undervalued relative to its peers after incorparting stock compensation expenses in its earnings-based valuation metrics. It is also noteworthy that Newmark is currently paying shareholders a yield of ~4% against barely any dividend being paid out by peers

4. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew

On February 27th of this year, Altaba Inc (AABA US) held a “Strategic and Financial Update Conference Call.” In that call the company led by CEO Thomas McInerney said that effectively it was going to deal with its two major remaining assets (2.03bn shares of Yahoo Japan Corp (4689 JP) and 383.56mm shares of Alibaba Group Holding Ltd (BABA US)) in two stages, saying at the time they were “moving to an active monetization mode on [our] Yahoo Japan stake.”

That Yahoo Japan stake took longer, but the company worked to sell $20+bn of Alibaba last summer through a tender offer and selldown to generate cash for corporate liabilities and taxes, and then the company sold its Yahoo Japan stake in early September. 

Since then, there has been a period of watchful waiting. Some have been expecting a period with an acceptable amount of carry and then possible significant upside. I haven’t seen the upside but agree there has been some baseline carry. And if you can get lots of leverage on this and ride the volatility, it could produce an OK return from A to Z if you ignore the indignities and volatility of passing through stops B to Y.

The New News

Yesterday, Altaba and CEO McInerney held a conference call after filing a PRE 14A preliminary proxy statement related to the selldown/unwinding of its entire Alibaba stake and the proposed windup/dissolution of Altaba as an entity. 

The company will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which the Fund currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63 per Share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba Share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00 per Alibaba Share).”

As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear (and as discussed in the transcript linked above, which is short and worth reading), based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions. A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.

The figure of $76.72 – $79.72 represents a 5.44-9.56% premium to yesterday’s close of $72.76/share and represents the total of the Pre-Dissolution Liquidating Distribution in Q4 2019, a second distribution in Q4 2020, then residuals thereafter after the court-mandated holdback in the dissolution process pays its claims.

Fair value calculations, parameters, and risk discussion below.

Elaborate fair value calculations using different assumptions of appropriate discount rates for each payment, and exactly how much is in the last bit (and how long it takes to pay out) suggest a group of ranges of fair value, from about 3-4% below the last-traded price, to about 4-5% above. However, for a hedge fund to earn a 10% net return for investors from owning the trade at the close of yesterday, getting there requires a fair bit of leverage and the resulting information ratio may be lower than desirable.

Assuming the approximate time to payment as described in the proxy statement, and amount of payment in the first distribution as described, and a multi-year residual of US$5/share, current borrow rates and an assumption of slightly higher discount rate required for the portion of time the stock is unlisted and even higher when one is receiving residual claims, the current fair value of the stock ranges from about 2% below current price and 4% higher. If you assume a higher Holdback Amount, the range of outcomes shifts lower.

5. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update

This week in StubWorld …

• Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s discount to NAV narrows as it teases out more information on spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK).

Preceding my comments on Naspers are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.

These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.

In this briefing:

1. MYOB (MYO AU): Head for the Exit

1. MYOB (MYO AU): Head for the Exit

On 5 March 2019, Manikay Partners, an 11% shareholder, wrote to MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) chairman Justin Milne to reveal that it believed that KKR & Co Inc (KKR US)’s recommended offer of $3.40 cash per share was too low due to the significant market rally and normalisation of financing markets.

In this briefing:

1. MYOB (MYO AU): Head for the Exit
2. Lynas: Between a Hard Place and Just Rock

1. MYOB (MYO AU): Head for the Exit

On 5 March 2019, Manikay Partners, an 11% shareholder, wrote to MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) chairman Justin Milne to reveal that it believed that KKR & Co Inc (KKR US)’s recommended offer of $3.40 cash per share was too low due to the significant market rally and normalisation of financing markets.

2. Lynas: Between a Hard Place and Just Rock

Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) has been in the news of late for all the wrong reasons.

The change in Malaysia’s government last May appears to have caught up with Lynas’ rare earth processing plant in Kuantan – or Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (LAMP) – a facility that has faced persistent environmental opposition since its initial proposal in 2006.

The LAMP’s licence stipulates that residue/waste should be recycled, and if that does not occur, then stored in a permanent disposal facility (PDF). Removing/Exporting the residue was the last resort. Lynas is still in the first phase of the licensing guidelines, having submitted a plan to build the PDF but Lynas has not received specific instructions where to build this facility. 

Events reached a head on the 4th December 2018 with two pre-conditions imposed by the Minister for Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate to rolling over the processing licence by September this year:

By some accounts, there is 500k+ tonnes of WLP, conceivably requiring in excess of three years to export. This resulted in Ernst & Young concluding (page 15) in the interim results (released last week) there is a material uncertainty for Lynas to continue to operate on a going concern basis.

Irrespective of whether the licence was provided to Lynas without adequate due process (as has been speculated) or whether the LAMP is indeed an environmental concern; the fact remains the Malaysian government has reneged on the previously agreed-upon three-step licence process, and that is wrong.

This is a binary outcome: either Lynas re-negotiates on the residue management and LAMP’s ongoing operations; or Lynas ceases operation in Malaysia and its rare earth deposit is just a bunch of rocks – until an alternative processing facility is established.

A Brief Timeline of Events

The Residues of LAMP

The LAMP produces two solid residues, the Neutralization Underflow Residue (NUF) and the Water Leached Purification Residue (WLP). 

• The NUF is a magnesium-rich gypsum and is non-toxic, non-carcinogenic, non-ecotoxic, and non-radioactive.  NUF can be used to “condition poor agricultural soil, and to rejuvenate and rehabilitate unproductive and depleted land“.
• The WLP residue is classified as a radioactive material and has the same radioactivity level as the feedstock material used in the LAMP process (about 6 Bq/g of Th). This material is classified as low-level radioactive material. The LAMP operation does not enhance or alter this natural radioactivity. 

The Terms of the Licence

WLP is managed under the terms of the Full Operating Stage Licence (FOSL), first granted in 2014. The terms of FOSL state that WLP residue should be recycled, and if that fails, then it should be stored in a Permanent Disposal Facility (PDF). Exporting WLP is only to be considered in the event neither recycling nor PDF are possible.

• The WLP is currently stored in temporary storage facilities on site (temporary residue storage facility (RSF)) and in accordance with the current licence. The RSF is designed and constructed and is managed to meet the requirement of a PDF within the LAMP.
• Lynas’ PDF Planning Framework and Site Protection Plan were approved by the Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB) on February 25, 2014. The Pahang State Government has given its consent to the location of the PDF in Pahang, should it be required. AELB is holding a US$34mn bond on behalf of Lynas to build the PDF. 
• Occupational and health exposures monitored since 2012 have shown that risks to employees from radiation and chemicals are well within the permissible limits.

The Details of the 4th December Reports

Both reports are in bahasa Malaysia. 

• The Review Committee Report found Lynas’ operations are low risk and compliant with applicable laws. However, on page 94 it does state:

  • The Executive Committee found that there was an increase in heavy metal concentrations for nickel, chromium, lead and mercury in-ground waste. Nickel and chromium are carcinogenic substances for human beings.

  • One recommendation by the Committee was to determine the location and build a PDF for the WLP residue, including identifying sites for PDF construction before the renewal of the next licence.
  • The report said to “Be prepared to export WLP residues from Malaysia if the PDF location is not identified or approved.“
  • The review committee comprises six members according to this link.  

• The Minister for Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate Change (MESTECC) reported two new pre-conditions for its licence renewal on 2 September 2019 and future permission renewals in relation to residue management, those being:
  • The export of WLP residue before 2 September 2019; and the submission of an action plan on the disposal of NUF (current approval valid until 15 February 2019).
    • Following consultation with the government and regulators, an agreed pathway for the management of NUF was reached on the 14 Feb.
  • This pre-condition is inconsistent with the Review Committee’s recommendation on the PDF facility for WLP residue. The Review Committee said that Lynas should be prepared to export WLP residues from Malaysia only if the PDF location is not identified or approved.
  • All senior management of MESTECC were appointed following the 2018 general election. The AELB is an agency/department under MESTECC.

On the Political Front

After being elected as a Member of Parliament for Kuantan in 2008, Fusiah Salleh spearheaded the “Stop Lynas Rare earth Refinery” campaign.

• This campaign cause was buoyed by the Mitsubishi  Chemical Corporations incident in Ipoh in the 80s and 90s, together with the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster – although the latter is not wholly pertinent.
• Bowing to pressure the AELB conducted a review of LAMP in 2011 and ultimately claimed they were not able to identify any non-compliance with international radiation safety standards at the plant. Environmentalist pointed out this report did not address the long-term waste management nor the possible contamination of surface water and atmosphere by radioactive waste material.
• Despite extensive and ongoing opposition, Lynas was offered a 12-year tax holiday at the onset, and was issued a 2-year full operating licence in 2014. 
• The re-election of Mohammad Mahathir in 2018 provided a more sympathetic ear to the campaign’s voice compared to that under Najib Razak (PM from Apr-09 to May-18), resulting in the Review Committee to conduct the environmental impact assessment of LAMP. 
  • Indeed, projects and investments made by Najib are being reviewed such as LAMP and Belt & Road proposals.
• Fusiah Salleh was appointed the chair of this Committee, although she withdrew her position in October to “prevent Lynas from shifting the focus from the real issue“.  She is currently the deputy minister in the PM’s department.

Just How Radioactive?

It’s low but it’s not nothing – there is no such thing as zero harm. One issue, to me, is a decent layman’s overview of the radiation. In previous slides issued by Lynas it mentioned the limits for members of the public to be 1.0 mSv (milisievert) per year, while Lynas’ residue radioactive content is 6 Bq (becquerels)/g Th-232. 

Converting becquerels to sieverts is easier said than done. Conversions in the table via this link provide some context; it also shows Thorium 232 to have the second highest half-life, and the highest inhalation dose.

Arguably the radiation of this waste is low – and further backed up in this IAEA report (page 20) – but the reality is, if so low, why not process in Australia in the first place? And why are rare metal processing plants generally thin on ground worldwide?

Where Can It Be Exported?

Lynas has an estimated 500,000+ tonnes of WLP stored on site. Even filling one FEU (40-foot container, carrying 40 tonnes) every two hours around the clock, would take at least three years to clear the backlog – not factoring into account new residue being created. A price tag for the export of the residue has been estimated at A$60mn.

But who would (or can) accept this waste?

• This report is a little over two years old, but on page 18, to the exception of Malaysia, rare metal processing only incurs in China (the world leader), Estonia, and India (marginal production). There appears to be some purification/separation/refining in Kazakhstan and Russia, but there is limited data. 
• Australia’s Arafura Resources (ARU AU) is expected to build its own rare earth separation plant in Australia, having previously touted the idea of building such a plant in South Korea. 
  • Sending the waste back to Australia appears to be the go-to response from various quarters in Malaysia. But this is a heavily regulated space.
  • Legislation should not be captured under this Nuclear Waste Storage and Transportation (Prohibition) Act 1999 as the residue is not derived from a nuclear plant. 
  • It may be captured under the Hazardous Waste Act, based on the definitions under the Basel Convention. Here is also a list of Basel Convention members. 
  • A 7-year old article mentions that “National legislation stipulates that Australia will not accept responsibility for any waste product produced from offshore processing of resources purchased in Australia such as iron ore, mineral sands and the rare earth produced by Lynas Corporation.” I have yet to sight this legislation.
  • According to the AFR (paywalled), Robin Chapple, a Greens member in the Western Australian Legislative Council, said the safest place for the radioactive waste would be Western Australia, where it was originally located. Which makes a degree of sense, assuming the waste is in dry form, not liquid, which could then potentially leach into the water table. Of interest, Chapple has been a vocal critic of Lynas in the past.
  • The Australian government may make an exception to such an import in that the radiation is understood to be exactly the same as when it left Australia. And the expected approval of the Arafura plant may suggest an openness to importing this waste. 
• China won’t accept this waste – it has its own environmental issues to deal with after years of rare earth production. 

Establishing a Plant in Australia

Arafuna has secured Northern Territory (NT) and Australian government environmental approvals for its project in Australia. However, mining regulations in Australia are state/territory based – what is approved in NT does not necessarily translate to approval in WA, where Mt Weld is located; but it should help.

CEO Amanda Lacaze was quoted (paywalled) in the FT saying: 

We could reorganise our assets with time in a way that would allow us to continue to serve our customers. Short term we may need to partner in China; longer term we would re-establish our operations outside of China. Australia is a pretty good place.

“Re-establish” potentially includes disassembling/re-assembling LAMP, but this is not stipulated. Lynas’ PPE has a net book value of ~A$600mn, including rotary kilns, centrifuges, solvent extractors and pumps, most of which presumably could be shipped and railed to Mt Weld, or in close proximity, fast tracking the construction time. Assuming necessary approvals are in place. 

A Show of Support

Since rumours of the Review Committee surfaced, Greencape Capital has increased its stake in Lynas to 9.27% from 6.13%; while FIL has increased its holding to 7.32% from 5.01%. Both shareholders increased their stake after the 4th December reports.

In this briefing:

1. MYOB (MYO AU): Head for the Exit
2. Lynas: Between a Hard Place and Just Rock
3. Bristol Myers Squib & Celgene–Starboard Objections Addressed Today- Successful Deal Closure Probable

1. MYOB (MYO AU): Head for the Exit

On 5 March 2019, Manikay Partners, an 11% shareholder, wrote to MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) chairman Justin Milne to reveal that it believed that KKR & Co Inc (KKR US)’s recommended offer of $3.40 cash per share was too low due to the significant market rally and normalisation of financing markets.

2. Lynas: Between a Hard Place and Just Rock

Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) has been in the news of late for all the wrong reasons.

The change in Malaysia’s government last May appears to have caught up with Lynas’ rare earth processing plant in Kuantan – or Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (LAMP) – a facility that has faced persistent environmental opposition since its initial proposal in 2006.

The LAMP’s licence stipulates that residue/waste should be recycled, and if that does not occur, then stored in a permanent disposal facility (PDF). Removing/Exporting the residue was the last resort. Lynas is still in the first phase of the licensing guidelines, having submitted a plan to build the PDF but Lynas has not received specific instructions where to build this facility. 

Events reached a head on the 4th December 2018 with two pre-conditions imposed by the Minister for Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate to rolling over the processing licence by September this year:

By some accounts, there is 500k+ tonnes of WLP, conceivably requiring in excess of three years to export. This resulted in Ernst & Young concluding (page 15) in the interim results (released last week) there is a material uncertainty for Lynas to continue to operate on a going concern basis.

Irrespective of whether the licence was provided to Lynas without adequate due process (as has been speculated) or whether the LAMP is indeed an environmental concern; the fact remains the Malaysian government has reneged on the previously agreed-upon three-step licence process, and that is wrong.

This is a binary outcome: either Lynas re-negotiates on the residue management and LAMP’s ongoing operations; or Lynas ceases operation in Malaysia and its rare earth deposit is just a bunch of rocks – until an alternative processing facility is established.

A Brief Timeline of Events

The Residues of LAMP

The LAMP produces two solid residues, the Neutralization Underflow Residue (NUF) and the Water Leached Purification Residue (WLP). 

• The NUF is a magnesium-rich gypsum and is non-toxic, non-carcinogenic, non-ecotoxic, and non-radioactive.  NUF can be used to “condition poor agricultural soil, and to rejuvenate and rehabilitate unproductive and depleted land“.
• The WLP residue is classified as a radioactive material and has the same radioactivity level as the feedstock material used in the LAMP process (about 6 Bq/g of Th). This material is classified as low-level radioactive material. The LAMP operation does not enhance or alter this natural radioactivity. 

The Terms of the Licence

WLP is managed under the terms of the Full Operating Stage Licence (FOSL), first granted in 2014. The terms of FOSL state that WLP residue should be recycled, and if that fails, then it should be stored in a Permanent Disposal Facility (PDF). Exporting WLP is only to be considered in the event neither recycling nor PDF are possible.

• The WLP is currently stored in temporary storage facilities on site (temporary residue storage facility (RSF)) and in accordance with the current licence. The RSF is designed and constructed and is managed to meet the requirement of a PDF within the LAMP.
• Lynas’ PDF Planning Framework and Site Protection Plan were approved by the Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB) on February 25, 2014. The Pahang State Government has given its consent to the location of the PDF in Pahang, should it be required. AELB is holding a US$34mn bond on behalf of Lynas to build the PDF. 
• Occupational and health exposures monitored since 2012 have shown that risks to employees from radiation and chemicals are well within the permissible limits.

The Details of the 4th December Reports

Both reports are in bahasa Malaysia. 

• The Review Committee Report found Lynas’ operations are low risk and compliant with applicable laws. However, on page 94 it does state:

  • The Executive Committee found that there was an increase in heavy metal concentrations for nickel, chromium, lead and mercury in-ground waste. Nickel and chromium are carcinogenic substances for human beings.

  • One recommendation by the Committee was to determine the location and build a PDF for the WLP residue, including identifying sites for PDF construction before the renewal of the next licence.
  • The report said to “Be prepared to export WLP residues from Malaysia if the PDF location is not identified or approved.“
  • The review committee comprises six members according to this link.  

• The Minister for Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate Change (MESTECC) reported two new pre-conditions for its licence renewal on 2 September 2019 and future permission renewals in relation to residue management, those being:
  • The export of WLP residue before 2 September 2019; and the submission of an action plan on the disposal of NUF (current approval valid until 15 February 2019).
    • Following consultation with the government and regulators, an agreed pathway for the management of NUF was reached on the 14 Feb.
  • This pre-condition is inconsistent with the Review Committee’s recommendation on the PDF facility for WLP residue. The Review Committee said that Lynas should be prepared to export WLP residues from Malaysia only if the PDF location is not identified or approved.
  • All senior management of MESTECC were appointed following the 2018 general election. The AELB is an agency/department under MESTECC.

On the Political Front

After being elected as a Member of Parliament for Kuantan in 2008, Fusiah Salleh spearheaded the “Stop Lynas Rare earth Refinery” campaign.

• This campaign cause was buoyed by the Mitsubishi  Chemical Corporations incident in Ipoh in the 80s and 90s, together with the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster – although the latter is not wholly pertinent.
• Bowing to pressure the AELB conducted a review of LAMP in 2011 and ultimately claimed they were not able to identify any non-compliance with international radiation safety standards at the plant. Environmentalist pointed out this report did not address the long-term waste management nor the possible contamination of surface water and atmosphere by radioactive waste material.
• Despite extensive and ongoing opposition, Lynas was offered a 12-year tax holiday at the onset, and was issued a 2-year full operating licence in 2014. 
• The re-election of Mohammad Mahathir in 2018 provided a more sympathetic ear to the campaign’s voice compared to that under Najib Razak (PM from Apr-09 to May-18), resulting in the Review Committee to conduct the environmental impact assessment of LAMP. 
  • Indeed, projects and investments made by Najib are being reviewed such as LAMP and Belt & Road proposals.
• Fusiah Salleh was appointed the chair of this Committee, although she withdrew her position in October to “prevent Lynas from shifting the focus from the real issue“.  She is currently the deputy minister in the PM’s department.

Just How Radioactive?

It’s low but it’s not nothing – there is no such thing as zero harm. One issue, to me, is a decent layman’s overview of the radiation. In previous slides issued by Lynas it mentioned the limits for members of the public to be 1.0 mSv (milisievert) per year, while Lynas’ residue radioactive content is 6 Bq (becquerels)/g Th-232. 

Converting becquerels to sieverts is easier said than done. Conversions in the table via this link provide some context; it also shows Thorium 232 to have the second highest half-life, and the highest inhalation dose.

Arguably the radiation of this waste is low – and further backed up in this IAEA report (page 20) – but the reality is, if so low, why not process in Australia in the first place? And why are rare metal processing plants generally thin on ground worldwide?

Where Can It Be Exported?

Lynas has an estimated 500,000+ tonnes of WLP stored on site. Even filling one FEU (40-foot container, carrying 40 tonnes) every two hours around the clock, would take at least three years to clear the backlog – not factoring into account new residue being created. A price tag for the export of the residue has been estimated at A$60mn.

But who would (or can) accept this waste?

• This report is a little over two years old, but on page 18, to the exception of Malaysia, rare metal processing only incurs in China (the world leader), Estonia, and India (marginal production). There appears to be some purification/separation/refining in Kazakhstan and Russia, but there is limited data. 
• Australia’s Arafura Resources (ARU AU) is expected to build its own rare earth separation plant in Australia, having previously touted the idea of building such a plant in South Korea. 
  • Sending the waste back to Australia appears to be the go-to response from various quarters in Malaysia. But this is a heavily regulated space.
  • Legislation should not be captured under this Nuclear Waste Storage and Transportation (Prohibition) Act 1999 as the residue is not derived from a nuclear plant. 
  • It may be captured under the Hazardous Waste Act, based on the definitions under the Basel Convention. Here is also a list of Basel Convention members. 
  • A 7-year old article mentions that “National legislation stipulates that Australia will not accept responsibility for any waste product produced from offshore processing of resources purchased in Australia such as iron ore, mineral sands and the rare earth produced by Lynas Corporation.” I have yet to sight this legislation.
  • According to the AFR (paywalled), Robin Chapple, a Greens member in the Western Australian Legislative Council, said the safest place for the radioactive waste would be Western Australia, where it was originally located. Which makes a degree of sense, assuming the waste is in dry form, not liquid, which could then potentially leach into the water table. Of interest, Chapple has been a vocal critic of Lynas in the past.
  • The Australian government may make an exception to such an import in that the radiation is understood to be exactly the same as when it left Australia. And the expected approval of the Arafura plant may suggest an openness to importing this waste. 
• China won’t accept this waste – it has its own environmental issues to deal with after years of rare earth production. 

Establishing a Plant in Australia

Arafuna has secured Northern Territory (NT) and Australian government environmental approvals for its project in Australia. However, mining regulations in Australia are state/territory based – what is approved in NT does not necessarily translate to approval in WA, where Mt Weld is located; but it should help.

CEO Amanda Lacaze was quoted (paywalled) in the FT saying: 

We could reorganise our assets with time in a way that would allow us to continue to serve our customers. Short term we may need to partner in China; longer term we would re-establish our operations outside of China. Australia is a pretty good place.

“Re-establish” potentially includes disassembling/re-assembling LAMP, but this is not stipulated. Lynas’ PPE has a net book value of ~A$600mn, including rotary kilns, centrifuges, solvent extractors and pumps, most of which presumably could be shipped and railed to Mt Weld, or in close proximity, fast tracking the construction time. Assuming necessary approvals are in place. 

A Show of Support

Since rumours of the Review Committee surfaced, Greencape Capital has increased its stake in Lynas to 9.27% from 6.13%; while FIL has increased its holding to 7.32% from 5.01%. Both shareholders increased their stake after the 4th December reports.

3. Bristol Myers Squib & Celgene–Starboard Objections Addressed Today- Successful Deal Closure Probable

The proposed Bristol Myers Squibb Co (BMY US) & Celgene Corp (CELG US) transaction announced in the first week of 2019, garnered many sceptical comments. Starboard Value jumped in the fray by writing a letter denouncing the transaction while one of the largest holders of BMY, Wellington Management Group, holding about 7.7% of the stock expressed a desire to vote against the transaction. BMY’s response to Starboard’s half-baked objections is credible, and in our view, increases the likelihood of a successful closure manifold. We are bullish on the transaction.

In this briefing:

1. MYOB (MYO AU): Head for the Exit
2. Lynas: Between a Hard Place and Just Rock
3. Bristol Myers Squib & Celgene–Starboard Objections Addressed Today- Successful Deal Closure Probable
4. Samsung’s NXP Acquisition: Story Again Resurfaces, Trade Approach on SamE Common/1P

1. MYOB (MYO AU): Head for the Exit

On 5 March 2019, Manikay Partners, an 11% shareholder, wrote to MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) chairman Justin Milne to reveal that it believed that KKR & Co Inc (KKR US)’s recommended offer of $3.40 cash per share was too low due to the significant market rally and normalisation of financing markets.

2. Lynas: Between a Hard Place and Just Rock

Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) has been in the news of late for all the wrong reasons.

The change in Malaysia’s government last May appears to have caught up with Lynas’ rare earth processing plant in Kuantan – or Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (LAMP) – a facility that has faced persistent environmental opposition since its initial proposal in 2006.

The LAMP’s licence stipulates that residue/waste should be recycled, and if that does not occur, then stored in a permanent disposal facility (PDF). Removing/Exporting the residue was the last resort. Lynas is still in the first phase of the licensing guidelines, having submitted a plan to build the PDF but Lynas has not received specific instructions where to build this facility. 

Events reached a head on the 4th December 2018 with two pre-conditions imposed by the Minister for Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate to rolling over the processing licence by September this year:

By some accounts, there is 500k+ tonnes of WLP, conceivably requiring in excess of three years to export. This resulted in Ernst & Young concluding (page 15) in the interim results (released last week) there is a material uncertainty for Lynas to continue to operate on a going concern basis.

Irrespective of whether the licence was provided to Lynas without adequate due process (as has been speculated) or whether the LAMP is indeed an environmental concern; the fact remains the Malaysian government has reneged on the previously agreed-upon three-step licence process, and that is wrong.

This is a binary outcome: either Lynas re-negotiates on the residue management and LAMP’s ongoing operations; or Lynas ceases operation in Malaysia and its rare earth deposit is just a bunch of rocks – until an alternative processing facility is established.

A Brief Timeline of Events

The Residues of LAMP

The LAMP produces two solid residues, the Neutralization Underflow Residue (NUF) and the Water Leached Purification Residue (WLP). 

• The NUF is a magnesium-rich gypsum and is non-toxic, non-carcinogenic, non-ecotoxic, and non-radioactive.  NUF can be used to “condition poor agricultural soil, and to rejuvenate and rehabilitate unproductive and depleted land“.
• The WLP residue is classified as a radioactive material and has the same radioactivity level as the feedstock material used in the LAMP process (about 6 Bq/g of Th). This material is classified as low-level radioactive material. The LAMP operation does not enhance or alter this natural radioactivity. 

The Terms of the Licence

WLP is managed under the terms of the Full Operating Stage Licence (FOSL), first granted in 2014. The terms of FOSL state that WLP residue should be recycled, and if that fails, then it should be stored in a Permanent Disposal Facility (PDF). Exporting WLP is only to be considered in the event neither recycling nor PDF are possible.

• The WLP is currently stored in temporary storage facilities on site (temporary residue storage facility (RSF)) and in accordance with the current licence. The RSF is designed and constructed and is managed to meet the requirement of a PDF within the LAMP.
• Lynas’ PDF Planning Framework and Site Protection Plan were approved by the Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB) on February 25, 2014. The Pahang State Government has given its consent to the location of the PDF in Pahang, should it be required. AELB is holding a US$34mn bond on behalf of Lynas to build the PDF. 
• Occupational and health exposures monitored since 2012 have shown that risks to employees from radiation and chemicals are well within the permissible limits.

The Details of the 4th December Reports

Both reports are in bahasa Malaysia. 

• The Review Committee Report found Lynas’ operations are low risk and compliant with applicable laws. However, on page 94 it does state:

  • The Executive Committee found that there was an increase in heavy metal concentrations for nickel, chromium, lead and mercury in-ground waste. Nickel and chromium are carcinogenic substances for human beings.

  • One recommendation by the Committee was to determine the location and build a PDF for the WLP residue, including identifying sites for PDF construction before the renewal of the next licence.
  • The report said to “Be prepared to export WLP residues from Malaysia if the PDF location is not identified or approved.“
  • The review committee comprises six members according to this link.  

• The Minister for Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate Change (MESTECC) reported two new pre-conditions for its licence renewal on 2 September 2019 and future permission renewals in relation to residue management, those being:
  • The export of WLP residue before 2 September 2019; and the submission of an action plan on the disposal of NUF (current approval valid until 15 February 2019).
    • Following consultation with the government and regulators, an agreed pathway for the management of NUF was reached on the 14 Feb.
  • This pre-condition is inconsistent with the Review Committee’s recommendation on the PDF facility for WLP residue. The Review Committee said that Lynas should be prepared to export WLP residues from Malaysia only if the PDF location is not identified or approved.
  • All senior management of MESTECC were appointed following the 2018 general election. The AELB is an agency/department under MESTECC.

On the Political Front

After being elected as a Member of Parliament for Kuantan in 2008, Fusiah Salleh spearheaded the “Stop Lynas Rare earth Refinery” campaign.

• This campaign cause was buoyed by the Mitsubishi  Chemical Corporations incident in Ipoh in the 80s and 90s, together with the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster – although the latter is not wholly pertinent.
• Bowing to pressure the AELB conducted a review of LAMP in 2011 and ultimately claimed they were not able to identify any non-compliance with international radiation safety standards at the plant. Environmentalist pointed out this report did not address the long-term waste management nor the possible contamination of surface water and atmosphere by radioactive waste material.
• Despite extensive and ongoing opposition, Lynas was offered a 12-year tax holiday at the onset, and was issued a 2-year full operating licence in 2014. 
• The re-election of Mohammad Mahathir in 2018 provided a more sympathetic ear to the campaign’s voice compared to that under Najib Razak (PM from Apr-09 to May-18), resulting in the Review Committee to conduct the environmental impact assessment of LAMP. 
  • Indeed, projects and investments made by Najib are being reviewed such as LAMP and Belt & Road proposals.
• Fusiah Salleh was appointed the chair of this Committee, although she withdrew her position in October to “prevent Lynas from shifting the focus from the real issue“.  She is currently the deputy minister in the PM’s department.

Just How Radioactive?

It’s low but it’s not nothing – there is no such thing as zero harm. One issue, to me, is a decent layman’s overview of the radiation. In previous slides issued by Lynas it mentioned the limits for members of the public to be 1.0 mSv (milisievert) per year, while Lynas’ residue radioactive content is 6 Bq (becquerels)/g Th-232. 

Converting becquerels to sieverts is easier said than done. Conversions in the table via this link provide some context; it also shows Thorium 232 to have the second highest half-life, and the highest inhalation dose.

Arguably the radiation of this waste is low – and further backed up in this IAEA report (page 20) – but the reality is, if so low, why not process in Australia in the first place? And why are rare metal processing plants generally thin on ground worldwide?

Where Can It Be Exported?

Lynas has an estimated 500,000+ tonnes of WLP stored on site. Even filling one FEU (40-foot container, carrying 40 tonnes) every two hours around the clock, would take at least three years to clear the backlog – not factoring into account new residue being created. A price tag for the export of the residue has been estimated at A$60mn.

But who would (or can) accept this waste?

• This report is a little over two years old, but on page 18, to the exception of Malaysia, rare metal processing only incurs in China (the world leader), Estonia, and India (marginal production). There appears to be some purification/separation/refining in Kazakhstan and Russia, but there is limited data. 
• Australia’s Arafura Resources (ARU AU) is expected to build its own rare earth separation plant in Australia, having previously touted the idea of building such a plant in South Korea. 
  • Sending the waste back to Australia appears to be the go-to response from various quarters in Malaysia. But this is a heavily regulated space.
  • Legislation should not be captured under this Nuclear Waste Storage and Transportation (Prohibition) Act 1999 as the residue is not derived from a nuclear plant. 
  • It may be captured under the Hazardous Waste Act, based on the definitions under the Basel Convention. Here is also a list of Basel Convention members. 
  • A 7-year old article mentions that “National legislation stipulates that Australia will not accept responsibility for any waste product produced from offshore processing of resources purchased in Australia such as iron ore, mineral sands and the rare earth produced by Lynas Corporation.” I have yet to sight this legislation.
  • According to the AFR (paywalled), Robin Chapple, a Greens member in the Western Australian Legislative Council, said the safest place for the radioactive waste would be Western Australia, where it was originally located. Which makes a degree of sense, assuming the waste is in dry form, not liquid, which could then potentially leach into the water table. Of interest, Chapple has been a vocal critic of Lynas in the past.
  • The Australian government may make an exception to such an import in that the radiation is understood to be exactly the same as when it left Australia. And the expected approval of the Arafura plant may suggest an openness to importing this waste. 
• China won’t accept this waste – it has its own environmental issues to deal with after years of rare earth production. 

Establishing a Plant in Australia

Arafuna has secured Northern Territory (NT) and Australian government environmental approvals for its project in Australia. However, mining regulations in Australia are state/territory based – what is approved in NT does not necessarily translate to approval in WA, where Mt Weld is located; but it should help.

CEO Amanda Lacaze was quoted (paywalled) in the FT saying: 

We could reorganise our assets with time in a way that would allow us to continue to serve our customers. Short term we may need to partner in China; longer term we would re-establish our operations outside of China. Australia is a pretty good place.

“Re-establish” potentially includes disassembling/re-assembling LAMP, but this is not stipulated. Lynas’ PPE has a net book value of ~A$600mn, including rotary kilns, centrifuges, solvent extractors and pumps, most of which presumably could be shipped and railed to Mt Weld, or in close proximity, fast tracking the construction time. Assuming necessary approvals are in place. 

A Show of Support

Since rumours of the Review Committee surfaced, Greencape Capital has increased its stake in Lynas to 9.27% from 6.13%; while FIL has increased its holding to 7.32% from 5.01%. Both shareholders increased their stake after the 4th December reports.

3. Bristol Myers Squib & Celgene–Starboard Objections Addressed Today- Successful Deal Closure Probable

The proposed Bristol Myers Squibb Co (BMY US) & Celgene Corp (CELG US) transaction announced in the first week of 2019, garnered many sceptical comments. Starboard Value jumped in the fray by writing a letter denouncing the transaction while one of the largest holders of BMY, Wellington Management Group, holding about 7.7% of the stock expressed a desire to vote against the transaction. BMY’s response to Starboard’s half-baked objections is credible, and in our view, increases the likelihood of a successful closure manifold. We are bullish on the transaction.

4. Samsung’s NXP Acquisition: Story Again Resurfaces, Trade Approach on SamE Common/1P

• Local street began to speculate on this story since early last year when Lee Jae-yong got released from prison. NXP was widely considered as Lee’s first M&A attempt since his release. This could make sense both symbolically and business fundamentally. He needed something big to justify to general public about him being back in Samsung’s top position. Business wise, NXP would be a home-run in terms of fulfilling the three goals for non-memory business.
• Korea’s local street began to speculate on this since early last year when Lee Jae-yong got released from prison. This story was reignited earlier this year when the news broke that Samsung’s M&A head Sohn Young-kwon privately met NXP CEO Rick Clemmer. This morning Invest Chosun reported that Samsung may make a big announcement in the pretty near future.
• I suggested going long 1P/short Common last week on the grounds that falling memory prices would be pressing down Common more harshly. Now we are hearing a more elaborate story about NXP acquisition. Circumstantially, I don’t think this NXP takeover story will go unnoticed by the market. This should be more of a Common price pusher than Pref. I’d wrap my current position at this point.

In this briefing:

1. MYOB Setting Up As A Riskier Trade

1. MYOB Setting Up As A Riskier Trade

When I wrote about KKR’s purchase of 17.6% of MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) from Bain in October – a trade which got KKR to a 19.9% holding, my take on it was that the deal was probably a bit light. It was not outrageously bad because a) Bain agreed to sell their 17.6% at A$3.15 vs the A$3.65 IPO , and b) something like 93% of volume traded since the IPO in May 2015 had taken place below the proposed indicative offer price, but it was still one of the few platforms on which someone could take a stand to compete against the likes of Xero Ltd (XRO AU) and Intuit Inc (INTU US), it was not overly expensive as SaaS platforms went, and its online presence was growing rapidly.

The full write-up is MYOB: KKR Launches a Proposal. Lightish?

About three weeks later, KKR bumped their indicative offer to A$3.77/share, and MYOB opened its books to allow KKR due diligence. That suggested the price was in the range of the acceptable to MYOB’s board (but that A$3.70 was borderline). 

Then KKR did its due diligence, global equities continued to fall out of bed (down 10+% in two months for many major indices including Australia’s S&P/ASX200), KKR’s due diligence process came down to the wire, and the final bid presented came in at A$3.40, with a very short “take-it-or-leave-it” deadline. The immediate reaction of MYOB’s board was, as David Blennerhassett wrote in Friday Deadline Looms As MYOB Snubs KKR’s Reduced Offer,

Following completion of due diligence and finalisation of debt funding commitments, KKR has revised the offer price to $3.40 per share. …  The board has informed KKR that it is not in a position to recommend the revised proposal, however it remains in discussions with KKR regarding its proposal. (David Blennerhassett ‘s emphasis)

Four days later, KKR and MYOB entered into a Scheme Implementation Agreement (SIA) at A$3.40/share, putting MYOB at a A$2bn market cap.

David Blennerhassett discussed the SIA and the upcoming schedule of events in some detail in MYOB Caves And Agrees To KKR’s Reduced Offer. MYOB’s board unanimously recommended shareholders vote in favour of the Offer in the absence of a superior proposal and subject to an independent expert concluding the Offer was in the best interest of shareholders. There was a specific “go-shop” provision through the 22nd of February – when MYOB was expected to release FY results. No offer was forthcoming. KKR had matching rights but if they did not match an offer which was 5% higher and all-cash, then KKR would be obliged to sell its shares into the higher offer.

The New News

While not new new, US-based hedge fund – somewhat well-known for being involved in M&A situations – started accumulating a position in MYOB in January and has reached a stake of 9.99%. This was declared on Monday. On Tuesday Manikay sent a letter to MYOB (discussed below). This morning MYOB responded saying “The MYOB Board continues to unanimously recommend the Proposal subject to no Superior Proposal being forthcoming, and the receipt of an IER [Independent Experts’ Report] concluding that the Proposal is in the best interests of MYOB Shareholders.”

The Scheme Booklet is currently with ASIC and is expected to be despatched “in coming weeks” (original schedule was for mid-March with Scheme Meeting April 19). The wording in the MYOB release suggests that might get pushed back a little, meanwhile Manikay is likely to make more noise.

In this briefing:

1. MYOB Setting Up As A Riskier Trade
2. Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide

1. MYOB Setting Up As A Riskier Trade

When I wrote about KKR’s purchase of 17.6% of MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) from Bain in October – a trade which got KKR to a 19.9% holding, my take on it was that the deal was probably a bit light. It was not outrageously bad because a) Bain agreed to sell their 17.6% at A$3.15 vs the A$3.65 IPO , and b) something like 93% of volume traded since the IPO in May 2015 had taken place below the proposed indicative offer price, but it was still one of the few platforms on which someone could take a stand to compete against the likes of Xero Ltd (XRO AU) and Intuit Inc (INTU US), it was not overly expensive as SaaS platforms went, and its online presence was growing rapidly.

The full write-up is MYOB: KKR Launches a Proposal. Lightish?

About three weeks later, KKR bumped their indicative offer to A$3.77/share, and MYOB opened its books to allow KKR due diligence. That suggested the price was in the range of the acceptable to MYOB’s board (but that A$3.70 was borderline). 

Then KKR did its due diligence, global equities continued to fall out of bed (down 10+% in two months for many major indices including Australia’s S&P/ASX200), KKR’s due diligence process came down to the wire, and the final bid presented came in at A$3.40, with a very short “take-it-or-leave-it” deadline. The immediate reaction of MYOB’s board was, as David Blennerhassett wrote in Friday Deadline Looms As MYOB Snubs KKR’s Reduced Offer,

Following completion of due diligence and finalisation of debt funding commitments, KKR has revised the offer price to $3.40 per share. …  The board has informed KKR that it is not in a position to recommend the revised proposal, however it remains in discussions with KKR regarding its proposal. (David Blennerhassett ‘s emphasis)

Four days later, KKR and MYOB entered into a Scheme Implementation Agreement (SIA) at A$3.40/share, putting MYOB at a A$2bn market cap.

David Blennerhassett discussed the SIA and the upcoming schedule of events in some detail in MYOB Caves And Agrees To KKR’s Reduced Offer. MYOB’s board unanimously recommended shareholders vote in favour of the Offer in the absence of a superior proposal and subject to an independent expert concluding the Offer was in the best interest of shareholders. There was a specific “go-shop” provision through the 22nd of February – when MYOB was expected to release FY results. No offer was forthcoming. KKR had matching rights but if they did not match an offer which was 5% higher and all-cash, then KKR would be obliged to sell its shares into the higher offer.

The New News

While not new new, US-based hedge fund – somewhat well-known for being involved in M&A situations – started accumulating a position in MYOB in January and has reached a stake of 9.99%. This was declared on Monday. On Tuesday Manikay sent a letter to MYOB (discussed below). This morning MYOB responded saying “The MYOB Board continues to unanimously recommend the Proposal subject to no Superior Proposal being forthcoming, and the receipt of an IER [Independent Experts’ Report] concluding that the Proposal is in the best interests of MYOB Shareholders.”

The Scheme Booklet is currently with ASIC and is expected to be despatched “in coming weeks” (original schedule was for mid-March with Scheme Meeting April 19). The wording in the MYOB release suggests that might get pushed back a little, meanwhile Manikay is likely to make more noise.

2. Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide

• Youngone Holdings (009970 KS) is another single-sub holdco. Youngone Corp (111770 KS) is the largest sub that accounts for 70% of Holdco NAV. Youngone is one of Korea’s two largest OEM apparel manufacturers. On a 20D MA, they are now at 312% of σ. Current price ratio is at a 120D high. Holdco discount is 27.5% to NAV.
• I am not seeing any substantial factor that can explain this much price divergence in the last two days. There is a growing concern over Sub’s labor cost. This may explain Sub’s price plunge. But this isn’t enough to explain the current huge price divergence.
• In the last 120 days, we’ve had a couple of radical divergences. All of these got quickly reverted to mean. I expect the same to happen this time. At this much divergence, there is a little chance of further widening. I’d go short Holdco and long Sub. Just, Holdco liquidity can be an issue here.

In this briefing:

1. Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers
2. Newmark Group Inc (NMRK US): Valuation/Fundamentals Mismatch, Stock Trades At Bargain Levels
3. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew
4. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update
5. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope

1. Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers

This post discusses the key questions on Nexon sale at this point. It then provides the most realistic answers to these questions from various circumstantial aspects. This post is based on the recent news reports and also various local sources.

2. Newmark Group Inc (NMRK US): Valuation/Fundamentals Mismatch, Stock Trades At Bargain Levels

Having gained ~30% in a little more than two months following its full separation from BGC Partners (BGCP US) at the end of November 2018 after a dismal share price performance since coming to the market in a partial IPO at the end of December 2017,  the shares of commercial real estate services company, Newmark Group (NMRK US)  have experienced another slide over the past several weeks despite its cheap valuation which belies its positive fundanmental drivers and peer group comparisons.

Notwithstanding its robust fundamentals, notice of alterations it plans to make to its Non-GAAP earnings presentations to bring them more into line with many other US-listed companies, has brought the company into the headlights of the ongoing controversy caused by this topic,  and in particular with respect to the treatement of stock-based compensation in Non-GAAP earnings. While Newmark follows many other companies by excluding it from Adjusted Earnings, its heavy use of stock-based compensation, which it intends to lessen going forward, makes it an easy target for critique of its earnings presentations. Nevertheless, we assess that Newmark is at least 35%  undervalued relative to its peers after incorparting stock compensation expenses in its earnings-based valuation metrics. It is also noteworthy that Newmark is currently paying shareholders a yield of ~4% against barely any dividend being paid out by peers

3. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew

On February 27th of this year, Altaba Inc (AABA US) held a “Strategic and Financial Update Conference Call.” In that call the company led by CEO Thomas McInerney said that effectively it was going to deal with its two major remaining assets (2.03bn shares of Yahoo Japan Corp (4689 JP) and 383.56mm shares of Alibaba Group Holding Ltd (BABA US)) in two stages, saying at the time they were “moving to an active monetization mode on [our] Yahoo Japan stake.”

That Yahoo Japan stake took longer, but the company worked to sell $20+bn of Alibaba last summer through a tender offer and selldown to generate cash for corporate liabilities and taxes, and then the company sold its Yahoo Japan stake in early September. 

Since then, there has been a period of watchful waiting. Some have been expecting a period with an acceptable amount of carry and then possible significant upside. I haven’t seen the upside but agree there has been some baseline carry. And if you can get lots of leverage on this and ride the volatility, it could produce an OK return from A to Z if you ignore the indignities and volatility of passing through stops B to Y.

The New News

Yesterday, Altaba and CEO McInerney held a conference call after filing a PRE 14A preliminary proxy statement related to the selldown/unwinding of its entire Alibaba stake and the proposed windup/dissolution of Altaba as an entity. 

The company will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which the Fund currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63 per Share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba Share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00 per Alibaba Share).”

As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear (and as discussed in the transcript linked above, which is short and worth reading), based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions. A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.

The figure of $76.72 – $79.72 represents a 5.44-9.56% premium to yesterday’s close of $72.76/share and represents the total of the Pre-Dissolution Liquidating Distribution in Q4 2019, a second distribution in Q4 2020, then residuals thereafter after the court-mandated holdback in the dissolution process pays its claims.

Fair value calculations, parameters, and risk discussion below.

Elaborate fair value calculations using different assumptions of appropriate discount rates for each payment, and exactly how much is in the last bit (and how long it takes to pay out) suggest a group of ranges of fair value, from about 3-4% below the last-traded price, to about 4-5% above. However, for a hedge fund to earn a 10% net return for investors from owning the trade at the close of yesterday, getting there requires a fair bit of leverage and the resulting information ratio may be lower than desirable.

Assuming the approximate time to payment as described in the proxy statement, and amount of payment in the first distribution as described, and a multi-year residual of US$5/share, current borrow rates and an assumption of slightly higher discount rate required for the portion of time the stock is unlisted and even higher when one is receiving residual claims, the current fair value of the stock ranges from about 2% below current price and 4% higher. If you assume a higher Holdback Amount, the range of outcomes shifts lower.

4. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update

This week in StubWorld …

• Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s discount to NAV narrows as it teases out more information on spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK).

Preceding my comments on Naspers are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.

These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.

5. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope

Back in September 2017, Lawrence Ho, Summit Ascent Holdings (102 HK)‘s major shareholder, reduced his stake to 18.75% from 27.06% (at between $1.13-$1.60/share, but mainly at the low end of this range), according to Hong Kong Exchange disclosure of interest filings. The share price of this Russian integrated gaming play declined 34% to $1.06/share in the following five trading days. Who bought those shares was not disclosed – CCASS shows these shares moving out of VC Brokerage into at least 10 different brokerage accounts.

Shortly after, Howard Klein quoted one insider in his insight Melco Resorts: A Gem Hiding in Plain Sight Offers an Entry Point After a Recent Dip that the sell-down wasn’t likely a sign “Ho has lost confidence in the area.“

On the 15 December, Ho announced a complete exit from Summit, selling 17.37% of shares out. Concurrently Ho resigned from his NED and chairman positions. Those shares moved from VC Brokerage to Sun Hung Kai Investments on the 20 December 2017. Shares traded unchanged on the news. 

At the same time, First Steamship (2601 TT) disclosed it held 12.67% on the 18 December 2017. Concurrently, Kuo Jen Hao was appointed as NED and Chairman of the Board, with effect from 28 December 2017.  Kuo is also the chairman and the general manager of First Steamship. First Steamship gradually increased its stake to 19.11% as at 24 October 2018.

The New News

Yesterday, Summit Ascent announced it has been informed that First Steamship and Kuo are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 24%.

With increased liquidity surrounding the news, this looks like a great opportunity to exit.

In this briefing:

1. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer
2. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau
3. China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption
4. Severgroup Puts in a Cheeky Bid for Lenta – TPG and EBRD Bail
5. Yinson Tenders a Lifeboat for Ezion

1. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer

Originally I had thought KKR’s offer could go higher. Instead, it came in lower at A$3.40 and KKR gave MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) management all of a couple of days to think about it.

The title to my subsequent piece was MYOB Caves And Agrees To KKR’s Reduced Offer.

Manikay Partners started buying up shares and by early March had reached a position of 11%. They made noise. The Scheme Booklet came out on the 14th of March. Four days later Manikay announced their position was now 13.61% and the following day Mawer announced re-upped its stake from the mid 8s to high 9% level.

The 20th saw a Scheme Update from MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them.

Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.

On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.

Today we have new news.

Manikay Caves and Agrees to KKR’s Reduced (Now Final) Offer

Earlier today a Reuters story about Manikay accepting the offer popped up and MYOB shares popped from A$3.34 to A$3.38-39 area where they closed. Partway through the day MYOB released a document on the ASX feed saying that Manikay had sent a letter saying…

In order avoid speculation regarding our voting intentions in respect of the Scheme, we are writing to inform you that we, Manikay Partners, intend to vote all the MYOB shares that we own or control FOR the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote.

We remain very disappointed that, despite our repeated efforts to convince you otherwise, you failed to change your recommendation in light of the material improvement in market conditions since announcement of the Scheme, among other factors. We are also disappointed that the disclosures to MYOB shareholders did not fully explain the impact of such improved market conditions on the value of MYOB.
excerpt of the letter.

2. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau

Visitors to Macao will notice the gaudy designs of new properties like Studio City and the City of Dreams owned by Melco. Few will know that the Melco of today traces its roots back almost 100 years when it was named The Macau Electric Lighting Company. Melco was listed in Hong Kong in 1927 when it was still managing the electricity supply service for the island of Macau, which it had done since 1906. After the CEM was established in 1972 to supply power in Macau, Melco changed its name to Melco International Development Limited and became a subsidiary of Stanley Ho’s real estate holding company, Shun Tak Holdings (242 HK). With the burden of supplying electricity off its shoulders, the company did what any logical Hong Kong firm would do when its business disappears, it bought real estate.

To this day, Melco International Development (200 HK) still maintains ownership of one of these classic Hong Kong destinations which I will take a closer look at in my note. In the rest of this insight I will:

• finish the historical overview of Melco
• present my trade idea and rationale
• give a detailed overview of the business units of Melco International
• recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each 

3. China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption

In my initial insight on China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK, “CPNED”)‘s privatisation by China Power New Energy Limited (the Offeror) by way of a Scheme, I concluded China Three Gorges, CPNED’s largest shareholder with 27.10%, will likely be required to abstain at the Court Meeting as it is presumed to be a connected party to the Offeror as per the Takeovers Code.

But the announcement states that CTG has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme and to elect the share alternative.

It seems illogical to mention in the irrevocable CTG will vote for the Scheme when in actuality it cannot vote. So, which one is it?

The short answer is: CTG cannot currently vote. 

But understanding this requires diving into the minutiae of Hong Kong’s Takeovers Code. So I do.

4. Severgroup Puts in a Cheeky Bid for Lenta – TPG and EBRD Bail

In the middle of last week, Russia’s largest chain of hypermarkets Lenta Ltd (LNTA LI)  announced that it was aware that there were ongoing discussions between Luna (TPG’s holding entity, which owns 34.13% of Lenta’s capital) and Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup, for Luna to sell its stake in Lenta to the Russian conglomerate. A day later, Lenta announced the company was aware of discussions between Severgroup and the EBRD (7.40% holder). 

Reuters reported last night that Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those two sellers, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company. 

Later last night, Lenta announced on its website (full press release here) a cash offer for all the shares had been proposed. The Offer has a pre-condition dealing with the above-mentioned transactions being approved by those who need to approve.

The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs. 

There may be something interesting to do here.

5. Yinson Tenders a Lifeboat for Ezion

Long-suffering lifeboat market play Ezion Holdings (EZI SP) has received a bail-out from Malaysia’s Yinson Holdings (YNS MK).

Yinson’s proposal is two-fold:

1. A conditional debt conversion agreement to capitalise all of the “relevant debt” of US$916mn via the allotment and issue of up to approximately 22,573,570,909 new ordinary shares of Ezion at an issue price of S$0.055/share (27.9% premium to last close).
2. A conditional option agreement for the proposed grant by Ezion of 3,360,495,867 non-listed and transferable share options to Yinson at the exercise price of S$0.0605 per option Share. 

This shareholder structure will take the following shape, with Yinson holding 85.9% of shares out after the conversion and 87.5% after both the conversion and the exercise of the share options.

However … as per the more detailed Bursa announcement:

It is the intention of YEPL (wholly-owned sub of Yinson) to acquire up to US$916mn of the Relevant Debts for a consideration to be agreed with the Designated Lenders. Tentatively, YHB (Yinson) expected its cash outlay shall be in the region of USD200mn and some EHL (Ezion) Shares that will give YEPL a shareholding of not less than 70% in EHL at the point of the completion of the Proposed Debt conversion and Subscription. In any event, assuming all convertible securities of EHL are converted, YHB expects its eventual shareholding in EHL shall be a controlling stake of at least 51%.

Ezion is also in negotiation with the major secured lenders to restructure its existing debts which would result in the conversion of certain debts to redeemable convertible preferences shares to be issued by Ezion.

As this is effectively a hybrid takeover, there exist a number of conditions required to complete this proposal. Of importance is the waiver from the Securities Industry Council of Singapore for Yinson not to make a mandatory general offer for Ezion under Rule 14.1 of the Takeover Code, as the share subscription takes Yinson’s stake >30%.

On Ezion

Ezion develops, owns, and charters offshore assets to support offshore energy markets, via three key segments:

• Lifeboats/liftboats – these are self-propelled rigs involved in the production and maintenance of the O&G and windfarm industry. This segment accounted for 57.9% of revenue in FY18.
• Jack-up rigs – engaged in non-self propelled rigs involved in the production and maintenance of the O&G and windfarm industry. The segment accounted for 34.1% of revenue in FY18.
• And offshore support logistic services, accounting for 7.5% of revenue in FYT18.

Ezion is primarily Asian focused with revenue split between Singapore, India, and the rest of Asia as to 8%, 5.3% and 54%. The Middle East and Africa account for 15.6% and 15.2% respectively.

Fundamentals

• Revenue declined by US$125mn in FY17 due to a reduction in charter rates and delays in re-deployment of the Ezion’s liftboats due to working capital constraints. The loss before tax was exacerbated by impairment losses totalling US$897mn.
• Revenue declined by US$74mn in FY17 due to a drop in the utilisation rates of liftboats and jack-up rigs. FY18 also saw an increase in impairments loses of US$84.5mn, while loses in associate and jointly controlled entities increased to US$39mn in FY18 from US$16mn in FY17.

Effect on NTA from the conversion/options

Assuming the subscription and options were completed on 31 December 2018, the effects of the Ezion’s NTL/NTA per share would be as follows: 

Peer Comparisons

Substantial Shareholders of Ezion

In this briefing:

1. Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide

1. Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide

• Youngone Holdings (009970 KS) is another single-sub holdco. Youngone Corp (111770 KS) is the largest sub that accounts for 70% of Holdco NAV. Youngone is one of Korea’s two largest OEM apparel manufacturers. On a 20D MA, they are now at 312% of σ. Current price ratio is at a 120D high. Holdco discount is 27.5% to NAV.
• I am not seeing any substantial factor that can explain this much price divergence in the last two days. There is a growing concern over Sub’s labor cost. This may explain Sub’s price plunge. But this isn’t enough to explain the current huge price divergence.
• In the last 120 days, we’ve had a couple of radical divergences. All of these got quickly reverted to mean. I expect the same to happen this time. At this much divergence, there is a little chance of further widening. I’d go short Holdco and long Sub. Just, Holdco liquidity can be an issue here.