Event-Driven

In this briefing:

1. Nexon Sale: Nexon Japan Tender Price Estimations
2. GrainCorp: Demerger Underpins the Share Price but a Second-Best Option
3. APE-AHG Merger: Value Accretive but AHG Shareholders Need Improved Terms
4. Japan Post Insurance – The ToSTNeT-3 Buyback
5. Last Week in Event SPACE: Altaba, Nexon, MYOB, Panalpina, Ezion, Naspers, Melco

1. Nexon Sale: Nexon Japan Tender Price Estimations

This post estimates Nexon Japan tender price. For this, I use the same approach that a local PE named “MBK Partners” would use based on EBITDA multiple and IRR on a 3 year exit. From their position, the only proven value-up path would be KOSPI moving. MBK must try to stay as conservative as possible. Whatever Netmarble value addition should be an extra when deciding on a tender price. So, I base my estimation solely based on KOSPI moving effect. For this, I use NCsoft as a sole valuation comp.

2. GrainCorp: Demerger Underpins the Share Price but a Second-Best Option

Graincorp Ltd A (GNC AU) said on Thursday it plans to spin off its malting and craft brewing distribution business (MaltCo). The proposed demerger, which will complete at the end of the year, would result in two independent ASX-listed companies – MaltCo and GrainCorp’s Grains and Oils businesses (New GrainCorp).

3. APE-AHG Merger: Value Accretive but AHG Shareholders Need Improved Terms

On 5 April, Ap Eagers Ltd (APE AU) announced that it had lobbed an unsolicited all-scrip takeover for Automotive Holdings (AHG AU)/AHG. Under the proposal, AHG’s shareholders would receive 1 AP Eagers share for every 3.8 AHG share. In a 100% acquisition scenario, AP Eagers shareholders would own 75.5% of the merged AP Eagers-AHG.

4. Japan Post Insurance – The ToSTNeT-3 Buyback

Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP)announced on April 4th after the close that Japan Post Holdings (6178 JP) would offer 168.1mm shares of Japan Post Insurance to the public, with another 16.9mm shares offered in an over-allotment. This is big news as it is almost 31% of the shares outstanding of Japan Post Insurance and will dramatically increase its float. 

One can say it is a big deal – ¥450bn (~US$4bn) of stock and at announcement it was equivalent to the last 477 days of traded volume. More importantly, this ALMOST like an IPO in that the placement is almost 3x the original IPO size (66mm shares) and will get a lot of foreign investor attention. 

In addition, JPI announced it would conduct a buyback for up to 50 million shares (with a spending limit of ¥100 billion) on the ToSTNeT-3 off-hours auction-like trading system on days between April 8th and April 12th. 

In its announcement of the decision to sell shares, Japan Post Holdings said that if JPI did indeed conduct the buyback, it might participate, in which case the size of the offering “may decrease.”

The stock rallied very sharply Friday, rising 3% at the open and ending the morning session up 3% but rising much further in the afternoon to end up 9.9%. 

After the close Friday, JPI announced it would spend ¥100bn to buy up to 37.411mm shares pre-open on ToSTNeT-3 on Monday morning. That is 6.2% of shares outstanding. 

Understanding the dynamics and the rules here AND about the offering may tell you something about how this will work. 

5. Last Week in Event SPACE: Altaba, Nexon, MYOB, Panalpina, Ezion, Naspers, Melco

Last Week in Event SPACE …

• Here it is. The end – the culmination of years of effort and high balance sheet usage by hedge funds. Altaba Inc (AABA US) is going out with a whimper plus a little upside.
• Reportedly plans for the sale of NHC have been abandoned with a focus on selling its Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP)gaming unit.
• That’s a wrap, as Manikay blinks and concedes to KKR’s Offer for MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU).
• Ezion Holdings (EZI SP) is tendered a necessary lifeboat from Yinson Holdings (YNS MK).
• We now have an agreed deal for Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) supported by the Ernst Göhner Foundation, the major activist shareholders, and Panalpina management.
• Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s discount to NAV narrows as it teases out more information on spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK).
• Melco International Development (200 HK) is potentially mispriced against Melco Resorts & Entertainment (MLCO US) after the release of FY18 earnings.

• Plus other events, CCASS movements and upcoming key dates for M&A transactions.

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

Altaba Inc (AABA US) (Mkt Cap: $42bn; Liquidity: $452mn)

Altaba will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which Altaba currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63/share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00/Alibaba share).”

• As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear, based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions.
• A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.
• It looks like there is upside as the stock closed at US$72.76 (at the time of the insight). But there is less than you think simply because it will take time to get out of it. And discount rates of the first portion may be low, but discount rates applied to the later payments post-delisting and post court workout for the Holdback Amount could be higher.
• Travis Lundy has opinions on what to do once you start getting into the arb risks. Do read his insight.

(link to Travis’ insight: ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew)

Nexon Co Ltd (3659 JP) (Mkt Cap: $14bn; Liquidity: $50mn)

Sanghyun Park discussed Nexon sale after the FT reported bankers has stopped plans to sell the holding company NXC. The sale of NXC is probably the simplest exit path for Kim Jung-ju as it would be a more attractive tax outcome than selling Nexon Japan outright.

• But there’s a lot of other stuff in NXC that suitors don’t want to, which ideally should be sold before selling NXC. There’s also the issue of whether a tender offer would be required whether the sale of NXC or Nexon – Travis concludes an offer would be required while Sanghyun does not.

• Korean local news outlet reported that Tencent Holdings (700 HK)‘s US$6bn bond issuance may be a fund raising for a Nexon takeover. Still, South Korea would prefer keep Nexon’s ownership domestic, which may favour Kakao Games (1404796D KS) or PE outfit MBK.

(link to Sanghun’s insight: Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers)

Summit Ascent Holdings (102 HK) (Mkt Cap: $270mn; Liquidity: $1mn)

Summit Ascent announced that First Steamship (the major shareholder) and Kuo Jen Hao (chairman) are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 35%.

• Summit is trading at a trailing PER of 267x. CapIQ forecasts point to a threefold increase in earnings in FY19, although I would advise caution on those numbers given the tight cluster of target prices; historically, target prices for Summit have been wide of the mark.
• First Steamship bought in at $1.06 in December 2017, around the same price when this announcement was made. Should this sale complete, this would result in the third time the shares of the major shareholder have changed hands. This looks like a great opportunity to exit.

(link to my insight: Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope)

MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) (Mkt Cap: $1.4bn; Liquidity: $10mn)

On the 20th March, MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them. Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.

• On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.
• Mid-week, Manikay caved and said intends to vote all its shares for the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote. This is now MUCH closer to being a done deal. It will trade tight.

• Travis is a trifle surprised Manikay did not wait a little longer. They were able to increase their stake in the low A$3.30s because of the uncertainty of their intentions, and they could probably have gone close to 20% in the low 3.30s before saying “Yes.” That would have been a welcome extra profit.

(link to Travis’ insight: Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer)

Ezion Holdings (EZI SP) (Mkt Cap: $219mn; Liquidity: $2mn)

Lifeboat market play Ezion has received a bail-out from Malaysia’s Yinson Holdings (YNS MK) via a capitalisation of debt and option agreement. Ezion remains suspended.

• On the surface, this looks like a bargain for Yinson which is ostensibly taking over Ezion for US$200mn. However, Yinson said that it is still negotiating with the designated lenders of the US$916mn debt on the terms and conditions..
• Yinson’s business risks include contact risk, oil price fluctuations and the level of activities in the O&G industry. These risks do not change should the Ezion proposal complete.
• And offshore support companies face a raft of challenges: Ezra Holdings (EZRA SP) entered bankruptcy in 2017, Pacific Radiance (PACRA SP) has been voluntarily suspended since 28 Feb 2018 as it seeks a way to complete its debt restructuring; while Swiber Holdings (SWIB SP)recently announced its own US$200mn injection from Seaspan Corp. (SSW US), after the company had laboured in judicial management for the past two years.

(link to my insight: Yinson Tenders a Lifeboat for Ezion)

Kingboard Copper Foil Hldgs (KCF SP) (Mkt Cap: $320mn; Liquidity: <$100k)

For the second time in two years parent Kingboard Laminates Holdings (1888 HK) (ultimate parent being Kingboard Holdings (148 HK)) has launched an Offer to fully privatize KCF. This time at SGD 0.60/share vs SGD 0.40 two years ago.

• The last time came on the heels of a long independent review by EY which found KCF had given up profit to the parent through a series of relatively unfair interested party transaction agreements.
• At the end, the Bermudan Court of Appeals went against a Supreme Court decision which had decided that a replacement counterparty decision was prejudiced against minorities, and despite the April 2017 deal being not fair and not reasonable according to the IFA, the parent acquired ~10% (of the 28% it did not own) bringing their stake to 82.3%. A year later the parent acquired another 5.5% bringing them to almost 88%.
• Now an offer at SGD 0.60/share (compared to the Revalued NTA of SGD 0.7086/share from the IFA report (p36) of two years ago gets closer to the mark, but crucially, it is designed to squeeze out minorities with the threat of delisting. Kingboard Laminates only needs 2.05% to oblige a delisting from the SGX. As far as Travis can tell, it would require more – at least 95% of shares – to oblige a mandatory squeezeout of minorities according to Section 102-103 of Bermuda Companies Act.
• Travis thinks this one gets through.

(link to Travis’ insight: Kingboard Starts Voluntary Unconditional Offer for 88% Held Sub Kingboard Copper Foil)

Ying Li International Real Estate Ltd (YINGLI SP) (Mkt Cap: $260mn; Liquidity: truly tiny)

China Everbright (165 HK) has launched an MGO at SGD 0.14/share for the rest of Ying Li International Real Estate Ltd (YINGLI SP) after last week purchasing the 30.00% stake formerly held by the CEO, bringing its stake to 58.9%.

• The deal is at a negligible premium and is far, far below Tangible Book Value Per Share (which is almost three times the offer price). Given that the acquirer bought a large stake in the company and offered perpetual capital of almost the current market cap at a significant premium to the MGO price, Travis thinks it an unattractive offer.
• It is puzzling as to why the CEO would sell his shares at such a discount, especially when the company and Everbright co-own some of the assets.
• While the stated intention of the Offeror is to keep the stock listed, and the MGO is presented almost as “technical”, it would be enormously to Everbright’s benefit to buy as many shares as they could down at this price level. It will go from being underwater on an equity affiliate stake purchase to having a huge writeup in value if Everbright consolidates the asset post MGO.
• For that, Travis thinks there is a possibility of a bump just to make it more attractive, though the IFA report could come out with a not fair and reasonable result which shows NTA or NAV far, far higher than the Offer Price, which is not yet declared final.

(link to Travis’ insight: Everbright Mandatory Offer for Ying Li Intl Real Estate – Going Cheap)

Briefly …

In a mainly technical piece, I explained why China Three Gorges, China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK)‘s largest shareholder with 27.1% is currently required to abstain from voting at the forthcoming court meeting, despite the misleading statement in the  announcement that China Three Gorges has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme. (link to my insight: China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption)

Panalpina Welttransport Holding (PWTN SW) (Mkt Cap: $4.8bn; Liquidity: $27mn)

What was once a tough deal is now an agreed deal. The deal is 2.375 shares of DSV for every share of Panalpina, which as of the previous Friday’s close had a value of CHF 195.80/share which is a 43% premium to the CHF 137/share, where Panalpina was trading the day before DSV’s first bid.

• Panalpina is getting taken out at 28.1x reported 2018 EV/EBITDA multiple (pre-IFRS 16) calculated at a CHF 195.8 price. Panalpina shareholders will own ~23% of DSV shares out if all shares are exchanged and the Ernst Göhner Foundation will be the largest shareholder at ~11%.
• 69.9% of shares have irrevocably agreed to support the Exchange Offer. The customary condition is 80% to make it go through, meaning DSV needs another 10.1% out of the 30% extant (or just over one-third).
• Travis expects there is another 10-15% held by arbitrageurs and 5-7% held by indexers already so this deal looks to me like it is done. He expects the Exchange Offer may settle as early as early-August. If it trades tight, he would get out because DSV is probably priced to a very good level. 

(link to Travis’ insight: DSV Improves Bid and Göhner Foundation and Panalpina Agree)

Lenta Ltd (LNTA LI) (Mkt Cap: $1.7bn; Liquidity: $2mn)

Reuters reported that Alexey Mordashov’s Severgroup had reached an agreement to buy a 41.9% stake, excluding treasury shares, in Lenta from those TPG and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for a total of US$721mm, or US$18 per share or US$3.60 per GDR. That implies a price of US$1.75bn for the whole company. This was followed by Lenta announced confirming the cash offer. The Offer Price is an 8.11% premium to the last trade on 26 March – the undisturbed price, and a premium of 9.76% to the 6mo average price of US$3.28 for the GDRs. 

• The first 41.9% are sold conditional on FAS Clearance (presumably Mordashov has cleared this transaction with “the right people”) expected in May 2019, a few easily achieved conditions, and the condition of no sanctions being in play for any of the selling or buying parties. 
• Once cleared – expected in May 2019 – this becomes a straightforward offer with no minimum acceptances meaning that investors can sell shares into the deal or decide not to do so.
• It’s not an attractive offer price, with the possibility of a bump if enough people complain.  If you want to buy and hold, this deal is a put option.

(link to Travis’ insight: Severgroup Puts in a Cheeky Bid for Lenta – TPG and EBRD Bail)

Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ) / Tencent Holdings (700 HK)

Since announcing the intended listing of its international internet assets on Euronext Amsterdam “no earlier than H2 2019” – together with a secondary, inward listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange – I calculate Naspers discount to NAV has narrowed to 34.4% from 37.1%, the day before the announcement, placing the current discount a shade below the 12-month average.

• The likelihood of NewCo trading at a tighter discount to where Naspers’ previously (& currently trades) is universally accepted. Naspers will benefit from that reduced discount via its 75% stake; but it is not known where Naspers’ own discount will trade after the spin-off.
• There are indications the management want to see the group discount narrow to 30%, possibly down to the 20% level, which implies a significantly lower discount for Naspers, potentially around 10%. That would seem optimistic as investors focus more on the directly-held Tencent vehicle, and the fact Naspers is a holding company, holding a stake in another holding company.
• Naspers’ discount may drift narrower on the expectation Naspers’ spin-off works its magic. Greater clarity on the option into Naspers or NewCo may provide an additional boost; but conversely, if such an option is limited, there is likely to be disappointment.

(link to my insight: StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update)

Melco International Development (200 HK) / Melco Resorts & Entertainment (MLCO US)

With Melco trading at a (then) 32% discount to NAV, Curtis Lehnert recommends a set-up trade on a dollar for dollar basis. The current level, as I write, is statistically the most attractive according to the Smartkarma Holdco Tool, sitting at -1.8 standard deviations from the 180 DMA.

• Stub assets are minimal – around 8% of GAV – if excluding gaming licenses, goodwill and trademarks. Net cash is $6.4bn or $4.27/share.
• Those stub assets are still loss-making, after deconsolidating out MLCO, to the tune of $386mn in EBITDA, but that was an improvement on (HK$682mn) figure in FY17.
• Still, Curtis thinks now is the time to enter the trade to take advantage of both the statistical and fundamental supports to the trade. 

(link to Curtis’ insight: TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau)

For the month of March, ten new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with a cumulative deal size of US$22.3bn. This overall number includes Blackstone and Hellman & Friedman’s proposal for Scout24 AG (G24 GR) after the Tender Offer was officially launched in March. This deal was first proposed in mid-January – which was rejected by the board – and subsequently an improved offer was tabled, which was then supported.

The average premium to last close for the new deals announced in March was 18%, while the average for the first quarter of 2019 is 33%.

(link to my insight: M&A: A Round-Up of Deals in March 2019)

• Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB)‘s results of the CVTO have been announced.  42.85% of shares tendered, therefore the offeror held 63.78% of shares at the close of the offer. The MSCI downweight occurred at the close Thursday, however shares popped 17.5%.

• Hanergy Thin Film Power (566 HK)‘s Scheme document has been delayed until the 25 April, from the 2 April.

• The Dairy Crest (DCG LN) takeover by Saputo was approved at the Court Meeting and Scheme Meeting yesterday.

• Ap Eagers Ltd (APE AU), Automotive Holdings (AHG AU)‘s largest shareholder, has proposed an all-scrip merger offer. AHG recommends shareholders take no action at this time.

• Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)‘s IFA recommends shareholders tender into Global Power Synergy Company Ltd (GPSC TB)‘s offer.

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

In this briefing:

1. Kingboard Starts Voluntary Unconditional Offer for 88% Held Sub Kingboard Copper Foil
2. Everbright Mandatory Offer for Ying Li Intl Real Estate – Going Cheap
3. Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers
4. Newmark Group Inc (NMRK US): Valuation/Fundamentals Mismatch, Stock Trades At Bargain Levels
5. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew

1. Kingboard Starts Voluntary Unconditional Offer for 88% Held Sub Kingboard Copper Foil

April 4th after the close, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hong Kong-listed Kingboard Laminates Holdings (1888 HK) (which itself is 70.93% owned by Kingboard Holdings (148 HK) (formerly known as “Kingboard Chemical“)) launched a VOLUNTARY UNCONDITIONAL CASH OFFER for Kingboard Copper Foil Hldgs (KCF SP). 

This is a “clean-up” as Kingboard Laminates owns 87.96% of Kingboard Copper Foil already. 

It is unconditional in all respects and the Offeror owns 87.96%. The goal is delisting. If they get 17.03% of the minority, they will be able to engineer a delisting. Squeezeout is a bit further out but is far from impossible. 

This looks like a done deal. This one should trade at shouldn’t trade at a premium UNLESS…

Quiddity’s new Quiddity Singapore M&A Guide 2019 is now published with guidelines to the relevant rules, regulations, documentation, and pointers to the Singapore M&A landscape. Watch for more in the series to be published shortly.

2. Everbright Mandatory Offer for Ying Li Intl Real Estate – Going Cheap

On 3 April 2019, China Everbright (165 HK)‘s wholly owned subsidiary, State Alpha Limited, purchased 767,052,161 shares representing approximately 30.00% of the Shares in Singapore-listed property developer, Ying Li International Real Estate Ltd (YINGLI SP), from Newest Luck Holdings Limited (the vehicle of Executive Chairman and CEO Mr. Fang Ming) at a share price of SGD 0.140.

Following this transaction, the combined stake of China Everbright and parties acting in concert with it reached 58.91% triggering an obligation to make a mandatory offer for all the shares of Ying Li, a transaction which was announced after the close.

The offer price of SGD 0.140 translates to a premium of 5.9% and 10.9% to Ying Li’s 1-month and 3-month VWAP, respectively but less than a 1% premium to last trade – the company’s shares closed at SGD 0.139 on 3rd April before the announcement. The company asked for a trading halt the next morning and the shares have not traded yet as the large shareholder disclosures have come trickling in on the 4th and the 5th.

The acquirer has stated that it is their present intention to maintain the listing status of the company. However, the acquirer also reserves the right to reevaluate this position if the free float falls below the 10% requirement specified in the listing rules following the completion of the offer. 

This is something like a free put for investors and a very low-priced call option for Everbright. The situation raises obvious questions, and despite the “intention” to maintain the listing status, there are reasons why they would not want to. The details are worth a look.

Quiddity’s new Quiddity Singapore M&A Guide 2019 is now published with guidelines to the relevant rules, regulations, documentation, and pointers to the Singapore M&A landscape. Watch for more in the series to be published shortly.

3. Nexon Sale: Key Questions at This Point & Most Realistic Answers

This post discusses the key questions on Nexon sale at this point. It then provides the most realistic answers to these questions from various circumstantial aspects. This post is based on the recent news reports and also various local sources.

4. Newmark Group Inc (NMRK US): Valuation/Fundamentals Mismatch, Stock Trades At Bargain Levels

Having gained ~30% in a little more than two months following its full separation from BGC Partners (BGCP US) at the end of November 2018 after a dismal share price performance since coming to the market in a partial IPO at the end of December 2017,  the shares of commercial real estate services company, Newmark Group (NMRK US)  have experienced another slide over the past several weeks despite its cheap valuation which belies its positive fundanmental drivers and peer group comparisons.

Notwithstanding its robust fundamentals, notice of alterations it plans to make to its Non-GAAP earnings presentations to bring them more into line with many other US-listed companies, has brought the company into the headlights of the ongoing controversy caused by this topic,  and in particular with respect to the treatement of stock-based compensation in Non-GAAP earnings. While Newmark follows many other companies by excluding it from Adjusted Earnings, its heavy use of stock-based compensation, which it intends to lessen going forward, makes it an easy target for critique of its earnings presentations. Nevertheless, we assess that Newmark is at least 35%  undervalued relative to its peers after incorparting stock compensation expenses in its earnings-based valuation metrics. It is also noteworthy that Newmark is currently paying shareholders a yield of ~4% against barely any dividend being paid out by peers

5. ALTABA UNWINDING – Not Much Juice, and Considerably Different Skew

On February 27th of this year, Altaba Inc (AABA US) held a “Strategic and Financial Update Conference Call.” In that call the company led by CEO Thomas McInerney said that effectively it was going to deal with its two major remaining assets (2.03bn shares of Yahoo Japan Corp (4689 JP) and 383.56mm shares of Alibaba Group Holding Ltd (BABA US)) in two stages, saying at the time they were “moving to an active monetization mode on [our] Yahoo Japan stake.”

That Yahoo Japan stake took longer, but the company worked to sell $20+bn of Alibaba last summer through a tender offer and selldown to generate cash for corporate liabilities and taxes, and then the company sold its Yahoo Japan stake in early September. 

Since then, there has been a period of watchful waiting. Some have been expecting a period with an acceptable amount of carry and then possible significant upside. I haven’t seen the upside but agree there has been some baseline carry. And if you can get lots of leverage on this and ride the volatility, it could produce an OK return from A to Z if you ignore the indignities and volatility of passing through stops B to Y.

The New News

Yesterday, Altaba and CEO McInerney held a conference call after filing a PRE 14A preliminary proxy statement related to the selldown/unwinding of its entire Alibaba stake and the proposed windup/dissolution of Altaba as an entity. 

The company will sell or distribute, in stages, its remaining net assets to shareholders, with a “pre-dissolution liquidating distribution to stockholders (in cash, Alibaba ADSs or a combination thereof), which the Fund currently expects will be made in the fourth quarter of 2019 and estimates will be in an amount between $52.12 and $59.63 per Share in cash and/or Alibaba ADSs (which estimates assume, among other things, an Alibaba Share price realized on sale and, if applicable, an Alibaba Share value at the time of distribution, of $177.00 per Alibaba Share).”

As p55 of the preliminary proxy makes clear (and as discussed in the transcript linked above, which is short and worth reading), based on the same US$177/share assumption of value realized or distributed per Alibaba share held, the total distributed would be in a range of $76.72 and $79.72 based on some other assumptions. A larger portion of the remaining amount could take 12 months to arrive, and there could be other residual portions which will take longer (years), as discussed in the proxy and call transcript.

The figure of $76.72 – $79.72 represents a 5.44-9.56% premium to yesterday’s close of $72.76/share and represents the total of the Pre-Dissolution Liquidating Distribution in Q4 2019, a second distribution in Q4 2020, then residuals thereafter after the court-mandated holdback in the dissolution process pays its claims.

Fair value calculations, parameters, and risk discussion below.

Elaborate fair value calculations using different assumptions of appropriate discount rates for each payment, and exactly how much is in the last bit (and how long it takes to pay out) suggest a group of ranges of fair value, from about 3-4% below the last-traded price, to about 4-5% above. However, for a hedge fund to earn a 10% net return for investors from owning the trade at the close of yesterday, getting there requires a fair bit of leverage and the resulting information ratio may be lower than desirable.

Assuming the approximate time to payment as described in the proxy statement, and amount of payment in the first distribution as described, and a multi-year residual of US$5/share, current borrow rates and an assumption of slightly higher discount rate required for the portion of time the stock is unlisted and even higher when one is receiving residual claims, the current fair value of the stock ranges from about 2% below current price and 4% higher. If you assume a higher Holdback Amount, the range of outcomes shifts lower.

In this briefing:

1. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update
2. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope
3. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer
4. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau
5. China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption

1. StubWorld: Naspers’ Restructuring Update

This week in StubWorld …

• Naspers Ltd (NPN SJ)‘s discount to NAV narrows as it teases out more information on spinning-off and separately listing Tencent Holdings (700 HK).

Preceding my comments on Naspers are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.

These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.

2. Summit Ascent’s Slippery Slope

Back in September 2017, Lawrence Ho, Summit Ascent Holdings (102 HK)‘s major shareholder, reduced his stake to 18.75% from 27.06% (at between $1.13-$1.60/share, but mainly at the low end of this range), according to Hong Kong Exchange disclosure of interest filings. The share price of this Russian integrated gaming play declined 34% to $1.06/share in the following five trading days. Who bought those shares was not disclosed – CCASS shows these shares moving out of VC Brokerage into at least 10 different brokerage accounts.

Shortly after, Howard Klein quoted one insider in his insight Melco Resorts: A Gem Hiding in Plain Sight Offers an Entry Point After a Recent Dip that the sell-down wasn’t likely a sign “Ho has lost confidence in the area.“

On the 15 December, Ho announced a complete exit from Summit, selling 17.37% of shares out. Concurrently Ho resigned from his NED and chairman positions. Those shares moved from VC Brokerage to Sun Hung Kai Investments on the 20 December 2017. Shares traded unchanged on the news. 

At the same time, First Steamship (2601 TT) disclosed it held 12.67% on the 18 December 2017. Concurrently, Kuo Jen Hao was appointed as NED and Chairman of the Board, with effect from 28 December 2017.  Kuo is also the chairman and the general manager of First Steamship. First Steamship gradually increased its stake to 19.11% as at 24 October 2018.

The New News

Yesterday, Summit Ascent announced it has been informed that First Steamship and Kuo are in talks to sell their entire shareholdings. No numbers were disclosed. This stake sale would not trigger an MGO and there was no reference to the release of an announcement pursuant to the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buy-Backs in Hong Kong. Shares are up 24%.

With increased liquidity surrounding the news, this looks like a great opportunity to exit.

3. Manikay Caves and Accepts KKR’s Reduced (And Now Final) Offer

Originally I had thought KKR’s offer could go higher. Instead, it came in lower at A$3.40 and KKR gave MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) management all of a couple of days to think about it.

The title to my subsequent piece was MYOB Caves And Agrees To KKR’s Reduced Offer.

Manikay Partners started buying up shares and by early March had reached a position of 11%. They made noise. The Scheme Booklet came out on the 14th of March. Four days later Manikay announced their position was now 13.61% and the following day Mawer announced re-upped its stake from the mid 8s to high 9% level.

The 20th saw a Scheme Update from MYO announcing receipt of a letter from KKR saying that the A$3.40 price was their “best and final offer”, making it clear under Truth in Takeovers language that Manikay was not going to get a higher price out of them.

Manikay continued to buy shares on the 20th and the 21st, getting to 16.16% of the company as filed on the 22nd.

On Monday 1 April, MYOB announced a supplemental disclosure to the Scheme documents noting KKR’s final intention, and that the directors continued to unanimously recommend the Scheme.

Today we have new news.

Manikay Caves and Agrees to KKR’s Reduced (Now Final) Offer

Earlier today a Reuters story about Manikay accepting the offer popped up and MYOB shares popped from A$3.34 to A$3.38-39 area where they closed. Partway through the day MYOB released a document on the ASX feed saying that Manikay had sent a letter saying…

In order avoid speculation regarding our voting intentions in respect of the Scheme, we are writing to inform you that we, Manikay Partners, intend to vote all the MYOB shares that we own or control FOR the upcoming Scheme, subject to there being no proposal that we consider to be superior prior to the vote.

We remain very disappointed that, despite our repeated efforts to convince you otherwise, you failed to change your recommendation in light of the material improvement in market conditions since announcement of the Scheme, among other factors. We are also disappointed that the disclosures to MYOB shareholders did not fully explain the impact of such improved market conditions on the value of MYOB.
excerpt of the letter.

4. TRADE IDEA – Melco (200 HK) Stub: Lose a Little Sleep in Macau

Visitors to Macao will notice the gaudy designs of new properties like Studio City and the City of Dreams owned by Melco. Few will know that the Melco of today traces its roots back almost 100 years when it was named The Macau Electric Lighting Company. Melco was listed in Hong Kong in 1927 when it was still managing the electricity supply service for the island of Macau, which it had done since 1906. After the CEM was established in 1972 to supply power in Macau, Melco changed its name to Melco International Development Limited and became a subsidiary of Stanley Ho’s real estate holding company, Shun Tak Holdings (242 HK). With the burden of supplying electricity off its shoulders, the company did what any logical Hong Kong firm would do when its business disappears, it bought real estate.

To this day, Melco International Development (200 HK) still maintains ownership of one of these classic Hong Kong destinations which I will take a closer look at in my note. In the rest of this insight I will:

• finish the historical overview of Melco
• present my trade idea and rationale
• give a detailed overview of the business units of Melco International
• recap ALL of my stub trades on Smartkarma and the performance of each 

5. China Three Gorges’ Rebuttable Presumption

In my initial insight on China Power New Energy Development Co (735 HK, “CPNED”)‘s privatisation by China Power New Energy Limited (the Offeror) by way of a Scheme, I concluded China Three Gorges, CPNED’s largest shareholder with 27.10%, will likely be required to abstain at the Court Meeting as it is presumed to be a connected party to the Offeror as per the Takeovers Code.

But the announcement states that CTG has given an irrevocable undertaking to vote for the Scheme and to elect the share alternative.

It seems illogical to mention in the irrevocable CTG will vote for the Scheme when in actuality it cannot vote. So, which one is it?

The short answer is: CTG cannot currently vote. 

But understanding this requires diving into the minutiae of Hong Kong’s Takeovers Code. So I do.

In this briefing:

1. Hanjin Kal Short Idea: Current Situation & Trade Approach
2. Wynn’s Whale Of A Deal For Crown Off the Hook
3. OUE Commercial REIT & Hospitality Trust Merger Proposed
4. Lynas Investor Briefing – Looks Like More Capex Ahead
5. DHICO Rights Offer: Current Status & Trade Approach

1. Hanjin Kal Short Idea: Current Situation & Trade Approach

This post examines the current price pushing factors being laid on Hanjin Group holdco Hanjin Kal after the second generation owner’s sudden death. It then discusses the limitations of these price pushing factors.

2. Wynn’s Whale Of A Deal For Crown Off the Hook

After a brief pause in trading yesterday morning, Crown Resorts (CWN AU) announced it is in confidential discussions with Wynn Resorts (WYNN US) concerning an acquisition of Crown by way of a Scheme. The announcement states that Wynn has approached Crown on more than one occasion.

But it does not remove the reason for a deal. The Crown commentary clearly indicated that they were not averse to doing a deal. That would suggest James Packer is not either.

The proposal arrived at a unique time for both companies after the CEOs and major shareholders of both companies relinquished their roles in 2018: Packer for health reasons, and Steve Wynn after allegations of sexual harassment.

If Wynn wants to expand its footprint into the hemisphere and James Packer wants to arrange his affairs, a deal somewhere should be in the offing. This deal may just get pushed to the back burner before coming back to the fore. Several years ago, ADM launched a proposal at Graincorp. Months later there had been no apparent communication and the shares drifted off and then, all of a sudden, there was an agreed deal.

Or perhaps this opens up Crown to other suitors.

3. OUE Commercial REIT & Hospitality Trust Merger Proposed

After a WSJ article on Sunday suggesting as much, Monday morning 8 April 2018 saw the announcement of a Proposed Merger between OUE Commercial Real Estate Investment Tr (OUECT SP) and OUE Hospitality Trust (OUEHT SP) whereby OUEHT unitholders would receive a combination of cash and OUECT shares (S$0.04075 + 1.3853 shares of OUECT) for every share of OUEHT held. Investors in each would receive any “permitted distributions” (dividends, etc) declared by the respective managers in respect of the period from 1 Jan 2019 up to the day immediately before the date on which Trust Scheme becomes effective.

This would create a REIT with S$6.8bn of assets, a pro-forma market cap of ~S$2.9bn, and a free-float of S$1.1bn (up by 57%). OUE Group would continue to own 48.3% of the total. 

The benefits to investors would be increased scale (2.2mm square feet of commercial net lettable area, + 1,640 hotel rooms), more borrowing capacity, increased diversification as asset concentration would be lowered, and because the scope of NewREIT would be broader, it would allow REIT managers more flexibility. The above-mentioned points are advertised as being the fodder for a re-rating. The idea of possible index inclusion is mooted as well. 

The OUECT presentation says that the merger is “DPU accretive to unitholders” (+2.1% on a 2018 pro-forma basis) while the OUEHT presentation says that the merger is “value accretive to stapled securityholders” (+18.7% NAV uplift per stapled security). 

Details of how this all works below.

Separately, two other Singapore deals announced at the end of last week include:

• Kingboard Laminates Hldgs (1888 HK) buying out Kingboard Copper Foil (KCF SP) discussed in Kingboard Starts Voluntary Unconditional Offer for 88% Held Sub Kingboard Copper Foil

• China Everbright (165 HK) announces an MGO for Ying Li International Real Estate Ltd (YINGLI SP) as discussed in Everbright Mandatory Offer for Ying Li Intl Real Estate – Going Cheap

• To accompany these, there is a Quiddity Singapore M&A Guide 2019.

4. Lynas Investor Briefing – Looks Like More Capex Ahead

At noon Sydney time Lynas Corp Ltd (LYC AU) held an investor briefing by webcast regarding comments made by the Malaysian Prime Minister in his first cabinet press conference on Friday 5 April 2019. Those comments were noted in the ASX regulatory update. 

5. DHICO Rights Offer: Current Status & Trade Approach

This post looks at the current trading status of DHICO rights offer on each of the major movement days. It still seems that the share price should be kept high to give the Mar 25~26 arb traders an opportunity to short. This explains recent strong prices. It is presumed that shorting hasn’t been fully done. About half is still to be shorted. This suggests that strong prices should be kept a little longer. Once this is done, we will likely see a strong downward pressure until the price hits ₩6,250. This sets the floor price at ₩5,000. This will be good time to do one-way shorting.

In this briefing:

1. TRADE IDEA – Hang Lung (10 HK) Stub: A Timeless Arb
2. Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU): Rejecting the API Bid Is the Difficult but Right Choice
3. StubWorld: Wharf Under Pressure As Cooling Measures Bite
4. Shinetsu Buyback – Maybe More Than It Appears
5. Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders

1. TRADE IDEA – Hang Lung (10 HK) Stub: A Timeless Arb

An old favorite in the Asian arbitrageur’s investment universe is the Hang Lung stub. The Hang Lung Group acquired Hang Lung Properties (formerly named Amoy Properties) and designated the subsidiary as its property investment arm.  After both companies were listed in 1992, the same year that the company entered the mainland with its purchase of the Grand Gateway 66 and Plaza 66 in Shanghai, the pair was open to arbs. The Hang Lung Group now controls over RMB 130 (USD 19.4b) billion of property in Hong Kong and China. 

In the wonderful world of Asian holding companies, Hang Lung needs little introduction. However, in this insight I would like to highlight a trade idea. I will detail why I think now is the right time to setup a stub trade and some background information on the company and what assets constitute the stub. 

In this insight I will cover:

I. The Trade

II. The Stub Assets

III. My Track Record with Stub Trades

2. Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU): Rejecting the API Bid Is the Difficult but Right Choice

On Wednesday, Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU) rejected an indicative takeover offer from rival Australian Pharma Industries (API AU). Shareholders were disappointed with the news, with Sigma’s shares closing 12.3% lower at A$0.54 per share. API shares fared better and fell 3.6% to A$1.35 each.

3. StubWorld: Wharf Under Pressure As Cooling Measures Bite

This week in StubWorld …

• Wheelock & (20 HK) is coming up “expensive”, but it’s Wharf Holdings (4 HK) which is under-performing after PRC property sales targets are lowered amid Beijing’s cooling measures.

Preceding my comments on Wheelock and other stubs are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.

These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold – the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent – of at least 20%.

4. Shinetsu Buyback – Maybe More Than It Appears

On 12 March 2019 after the close, Shin Etsu Chemical (4063 JP)announced a share buyback program to buy up to 14 million shares for up to ¥100 billion. If it bought all 14 million shares, that would be 3.3% of shares outstanding. Simultaneously, it announced a ToSTNeT-3 buyback of 11,001,100 shares at today’s closing price of ¥9,090/share which if all bought would complete the buyback program. 

As I write, the shares are up 4-6% in thin trading in the ADRs. 

There was some speculation across the Street there would be a buyback because of slowing earnings expectations and a surfeit of capital, which was itself important because of the company’s lack of recent history of buybacks (the last and only time the company has bought back shares (to date) was a repurchase of 3 million shares for ¥13.6 billion in late October 2008 when things were hairy (and cheap)). 

The shares are down over the past year, but the price in the past few days is not dramatically at the low end of the range of the past six months or so.

There may be some information in the context and structure of this buyback which tells you something different than people’s first reaction. 

5. Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders

The key point of interest for investors regarding Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) continues to be details surrounding its upcoming capital raise. The company has, since early November when it incurred these losses, offered scant details regarding the structure of the capital raise, except to note that the components would include additional loans and equity from industrial partners and most likely, main shareholder Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP).

We visited the company to gather as much information as possible on the potential structure of the capital increase and to update the order outlook and reasons for further cost overruns.

In this briefing:

1. IPH Goes Hostile on Xenith
2. Korean Stubs Spotlight: A Pair Trade Between Hyosung Corp and Hyosung TNC
3. Nongshim Stub Trade: Sub Moving Up on New Hit Product, Now at Near -2σ

1. IPH Goes Hostile on Xenith

Iph Ltd (IPH AU) has gate crashed Xenith Ip (XIP AU)/Qantm Intellectual Property (QIP AU)‘s marriage of equals, submitting a proposal (by way of a Scheme) for Xenith comprising cash (A$1.28) and IPH shares (0.1056 IPH shares) or A$1.97/share, 23.3% above the implied QANTM merger consideration.

Last November, Xenith and QANTM , both leading providers of IP origination services in Australia, announced a merger via an all-scrip scheme of arrangement, whereby Xenith shareholders will receive 1.22 QANTM shares for every Xenith share, or an implied value of A$1.598/share. QANTM and Xenith shareholders would own 55% and 45% of the merged group with a then pro-forma capitalisation of A$285mn. Pre-cost synergies are estimated at A$7mn/annum at the end of  year three.

Xenith’s board unanimously recommended the merger to its shareholders.

IPH did not blink and on the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, lobbed an unsolicited, indicative, preliminary, conditional and non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close.

QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. IPH countered those claims, spurring QANTM to counter those countered claims.

On the 13 February 2019, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support the QANTM scheme and intends to vote against it. In response, both Xenith and QANTM announced that neither had received a proposal from IPH. Xenith’s shares increased 20.3% to close at A$1.69/share.

The provisional date for ACCC s clearance of the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March. The provisional date for IPH/Xenith is the 2 May. The QANTM/Xenith Scheme meeting is scheduled for 3 April with a 24 April implementation date. IPH’s proposal has an indicative implementation date of mid-July.

IPH’s proposal currently offers an implied value of $1.98 (65% in cash) against $1.85 for QANTM’s all-scrip offer.

The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies. IPH is the oldest, and the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.

With IPH’s blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme will fail. Xenith should engage with IPH.

2. Korean Stubs Spotlight: A Pair Trade Between Hyosung Corp and Hyosung TNC

In this report, we provide an analysis of our pair trade idea between Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) (market cap of 1,612 billion won) and Hyosung TNC Co Ltd (298020 KS) (market cap of 712 billion won). Our strategy will be to be long Hyosung TNC and be short Hyosung Corp. 

In the past six months, Hyosung Corp is up 62% while Hyosung TNC is down 12%. We believe this price divergence has been excessive. The four major reasons why Hyosung Corp’s share price has surged in the past six months are mentioned below. There is a case to be made that the market has already factored into Hyosung Corp’s share price many of the positive factors mentioned below. 

• Excellent dividends 
• Corporate activism related stock 
• Strong financial results 
• Timing of the increased insider ownerships/Completion of tender offers

Hyosung TNC has underperformed the market as well as Hyosung Corp in the past six months. However, Hyosung TNC appears to be a turnaround story driven by the following factors: 

• Decline in raw material prices 
• Aggressive spandex investment in India 
• Stabilization of spandex prices in 2H19 
• Consolidation of the global spandex industry

3. Nongshim Stub Trade: Sub Moving Up on New Hit Product, Now at Near -2σ

• Shin Ramyun non-frying noodle dramatically reversed Sub’s fortune. Local street starts believing Sub will hit a ₩100bil OP milestone this year. Local institutions began to scoop up Sub shares since a week ago. Yesterday, local pension/foreign money came in. This led to the largest Sub pushing in many weeks. Holdco/Sub are not at near -2σ.
• Street consensus on Sub’s FY19e OP is already upwardly adjusted to ₩106bil. On this, Sub is already at a 17x earnings. ₩106bil OP is immaturely aggressive. 17x isn’t particularly cheap given Sub’s FY18 year-end PER (18.4x).
• Valuation wise, Sub price should be pressed down at this level until more dramatic and tangible sales data come out. Holdco discount is still hovering at 50% to NAV. I’d make a stub trade here. Holdco liquidity can be an issue.

In this briefing:

1. Descente Tamed, Itochu Delicacy Required And Investors Can Probably Wait
2. Linkbal (6046 JP) SmallCap Growth Stock: Offering This Morning, TOPIX Inclusion Late Summer 2019?
3. Ho Bee Ups Stake In Villa World After AVID Lobs An Offer
4. Mindtree (MTCL IN): L&T’s Hostile Takeover Offer Is an Awkward Opening Gambit
5. Kosaido (7868 JP) – Reno Goes Bigger But TOB Price (This Time) Is Final So What Next?

1. Descente Tamed, Itochu Delicacy Required And Investors Can Probably Wait

I started writing this over the weekend after the results of the Itochu Corp (8001 JP) Tender Offer for 9.56% of Descente Ltd (8114 JP) were announced late Friday. 

Itochu planned on buying 7.21 million shares out of the 75.37mm shares which bear voting rights (as of the commencement of the Tender), and 15,115,148mm shares were tendered, which led to a pro-ration rate of 47.7% which was 0.3% below my the middle of my “wide range” expected pro-ration rate of 42-54% and 0.7% beyond the 44-47% tighter range discussed in Descente Descended and Itochu Angle Is More Hostile of 28 February.

Two more central ideas were discussed in that piece:

1. The hostility shown by Descente management during the Tender Offer had led Itochu to abandon discussions about post-tender management until after the Tender Offer was completed. Both sides indicated a willingness to pick up where things had left off – at Descente’s request – but Descente needed to stew a bit.
2. The revelation by ANTA Sports in an interview with the CEO in the Nikkei in late February that ANTA supported Itochu meant that the likelihood of Itochu NOT having enough votes to put through its own slate of directors was almost zero. At a combined 47.0% of post-Tender voting rights, if 94% or less of shares were to vote, it would mean Itochu could get the majority of over 50% and determine the entire slate of directors themselves. If there was another shareholder holding a couple of percent which supported Itochu, it would be a done deal even if everyone voted. And that 2-3% existed.

So… the threat that Itochu would hold an EGM to seat new directors to oblige a stronger course for management was a very strong probability. Management who was rabidly opposed to Itochu owning the stake could not very well bow down in front of Itochu post-tender just to save its own hide – not after the employee union and the OB group came out against. President Ishimoto had effectively put himself in an untenable position unless a miracle occurred because Itochu could not legally walk away from its offer, and Ishimoto-san was bad-mouthing Itochu even as they were negotiating during the Tender Offer Period. 

It was not, therefore, any surprise that President Ishimoto would step down. The surprise for me was that the news he would go came out as talks commenced over the weekend (but did not “bridge the gap” as the Nikkei reported), before we got to the first business day post-results. 

Talks apparently continue with no resolution, and the media reports offer no hint as to what the issues might be. 

2. Linkbal (6046 JP) SmallCap Growth Stock: Offering This Morning, TOPIX Inclusion Late Summer 2019?

On November 13th last year, Linkbal Inc (6046 JP) announced it was looking to move from MOTHERS to the TSE First Section. The stock rallied. At the same time the company said that it was preparing to file an application for the move. 

On March 5th, the company announced a forthcoming tachiaigai bunbai offering designed to increase the float. That tachiaigai bunbai offering (designed for retail investors only) takes place this morning after an announcement the company would oversee the offer of 970,000 shares (about 5% of the company but about 180% of the float currently held by public retail investors) at a price of ¥905/share (1,000 shares max per buyer), which is a 3% discount to yesterday’s close of ¥933 yen. 

This will get it most of the way towards meeting the requirements, but likely not all the way. An inclusion is still months off. And there would likely be another sale to increase shareholder count by 800-1000 before then, whether in the form of a Public Offering/Uridashi or in the form of another tachiaigai bunbai.

Given where we are on timing, as shown in Historical TOPIX Inclusions:  How Do They Do Around Inclusion Date? this would seem an interesting bet. Given the company’s prodigious growth in sales and profits, even though it is small, more people will look at it.

3. Ho Bee Ups Stake In Villa World After AVID Lobs An Offer

On the 14th March 2019, Australian property developer, Villa World Ltd (VLW AU) announced that it had received an unsolicited proposal, by way of a scheme, from AVID Property Group Australia at an offer price A$2.23, or a 12% premium to last close. 

The offer is conditional on due diligence, unanimous approval of VLW’s board of directors and the receipt of FIRB and other regulatory approvals.

AVID’s indicative offer translates to an LTM PER and P/B of 6.4x and 0.9x, with the P/B metric roughly in line peers.

During 2018, VLW’s share price declined by 36% to A$1.76 from A$2.77, with a large chunk of that downward move occurring in December after VLW withdrew its FY19E earnings guidance. That forecast withdrawal was exacerbated by the fact VLW had maintained the 2019 forward guidance at its mid-November AGM.

Ho Bee Land Ltd (HOBEE SP), VLW’s largest shareholder and JV partner, responded to AVID’s proposal by buying 2.2mn shares (~1.8% of shares out) at an average of A$1.95/share – and a high of A$2.18/share – lifting its stake to 9.41%. Its stake in VLW accounts for only 1.5% of its market cap. I would not be surprised if Ho Bee is still buying in the market.

VLW announced a 1H19 NPAT of A$17.6mn ($17.3mn) last month – slightly above its $16mn to $17mn guidance – and declared a A$0.08/share franked dividend. Assuming FY19E profit of $27mn, VLW is trading at a not unreasonable 10x PER and an attractive 7.3% yield, one of the highest yields among its peer group, assuming the high-end of the 50-75% payout ratio policy. 

4. Mindtree (MTCL IN): L&T’s Hostile Takeover Offer Is an Awkward Opening Gambit

Late Monday evening, Larsen & Toubro (LT IN) launched India’s first ever hostile takeover in the tech sector. L&T is seeking to acquire a 20.3-66.3% stake in Mindtree Ltd (MTCL IN) through a three-step transaction. Mindtree’s founders/promoters together have a 13.3% stake and staunchly oppose the takeover. L&T’s open offer presents an opportunity for longstanding large shareholders to partially or fully exit their stakes at a reasonable price.

5. Kosaido (7868 JP) – Reno Goes Bigger But TOB Price (This Time) Is Final So What Next?

The quietly disputed Tender Offer MBO for Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) continues on its merry way. 

Originally scheduled to close March 1st, near the end of February 2019, Bain Capital Japan’s acquisition vehicle (BCJ-34) extended the ¥610/share Tender Offer MBO deadline by 11 days from March 1st to March 11th. Of course, that was something of a moot point – by that time, the shares hadn’t traded at less than a 15% premium to terms for a week after well-known local activist Yoshiaki Murakami’s vehicle Reno KK and affiliates had taken a stake of just below 10%. 

On the 8th of March, BCJ-34 raised its Tender Offer Price by 14.8% to ¥700/share and extended the Tender Offer by almost two weeks to the 25th of March. It also lowered the amount which needs to be bought to 50.1% from 66.67%. In that amended filing the buyer included words 「公開買付者は、本開買付条件の変更後の本公開買付価格を最終的なものとし、今後、本公開買付価格を一切変更しないことの決定をしております。」which roughly translates to “The Offeror, having changed the terms, has made This Tender Offer Price final, and from this point onward, has decided to absolutely not raise the Tender Offer Price.”

That’s that, but since then, the shares have not traded as low as the newly raised Tender Offer Price.

With one week to go, Aoyama Fudosan yesterdat announced it had lifted its stake to 747,800 shares or 3.00% of shares out, which brings the combined Reno KK/Aoyama Fudosan stake to 11.71%. 

Given the 1.1mm shares traded since the 11th (i.e. shares which if Murakami-san had bought he would not have to report until the 19th (today)) and that the share price was up sharply in decent volume this afternoon, it would not be difficult to imagine a higher stake being reported in the days ahead.

Murakami-san is not going away. This is starting to look a bit like another Murakami situation of recent. And that one turned out well.

In this briefing:

1. Last Week in Event SPACE: Chiyoda, Shin Etsu Chemical, GLOW, HNA, Hyosung, Wheelock
2. BGF Stub Trade: Sub Price Diverged Further than Usual, I’d Make Trade on Reversion
3. Samsung Electronics Share Class Trade: Common at +2σ, Expect Reversion After AGM This Week
4. MYOB (MYO AU): Manikay’s Valuation Requires Flawless Execution
5. GLOW’s Done Deal As SPA (Almost) Completes

1. Last Week in Event SPACE: Chiyoda, Shin Etsu Chemical, GLOW, HNA, Hyosung, Wheelock

Last Week in Event SPACE …

• One interpretation on how Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) may source additional loans and equity.
• Shin Etsu Chemical (4063 JP)‘s chunky buyback, but who is the seller?
• Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB)‘s plain vanilla arb as the SPA completes.
• HNA cashes in its Hong Kong International Construction Investment Management Group Co., (687 HK) stake after the Kai Tak property buy/sell roller coaster.
• Both Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) and Hyosung TNC Co Ltd (298020 KS) have under performed the broader market, however TNC is the turnaround story.
• Non-PRC exposed Wheelock (20 HK) companies in favour as cooling measures challenge Wharf Holdings (4 HK)‘s property sales forecasts.
• Plus other events, CCASS movements and upcoming key dates for M&A transactions.

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events – or SPACE – in the past week)

Chiyoda Corp (6366 JP) (Mkt Cap: $649mn; Liquidity: $13mn)

Since early November, when Chiyoda incurred substantial losses, scant details regarding the structure of the likely capital raise have emerged, except that the components would include additional loans and equity from industrial partners and most likely, main shareholder Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP).

• LightStream Research‘s conversations with the company suggest a high likelihood a deal would not be in place by the end of Mar, though in a one-on-one meeting they said they were in the final stages of discussions. Lightstream believes a deal is almost certain to be in place by the time of the company’s fiscal year earnings announcement which should be in mid May.
• Getting injections of debt capital from banks (likely Mitsubishi Ufj Financial (8306 JP)) and equity capital from Mitsubishi are unlikely to be stumbling blocks. It is plausible that Mitsubishi would be keen to retain its current 33.39% stake in the company, so if the capital is in the form of prefs, Lightstream would expect them to be convertible.
• As for the industrial partner, Chiyoda noted that there was significant interest due to their long track record as the leading LNG EPC player in the world, and that it was not so much a matter of being able to secure the financing, as it was a matter of finding a partner where there would be mutual benefits without constraining Chiyoda in terms of its business operations. But that implies the stake would be so large as to imply a controlling or heavily influential stake.
• In terms of numbers, Lightstream speculates about ¥30bn in debt from banks with MUFG a likely lead candidate given the keiretsu ties. Perhaps ¥75bn in equity (prefs and common) split between Mitsubishi and an industrial partner. More likely, if Mitsubishi opted for pref shares, the industrial partner would end up with a stake of around 20% in Chiyoda, which could mean a ¥25bn injection, with Mitsubishi buying ¥50bn in prefs.

(link to Lightstream’s insight: Chiyoda: Minor Updates About the Major Capital Infusion, Cost Overruns and Upcoming Orders)

Shin Etsu Chemical (4063 JP) (Mkt Cap: $33bn; Liquidity: $122mn)

Shin Etsu announced a share buyback program to buy up to 14mn shares for up to ¥100bn. If it were to have bought all 14mn shares, that would be 3.3% of shares outstanding. Simultaneously, it announced a ToSTNeT-3 buyback of 11,001,100 shares at today’s closing price of ¥9,090/share which if all bought would complete the buyback program. 

• There was some speculation across the Street there would be a buyback because of slowing earnings expectations and a surfeit of capital, which was itself important because of the company’s lack of recent history of buybacks (the last and only time the company has bought back shares (to date) was a repurchase of 3 million shares for ¥13.6 billion in late October 2008 when things were hairy (and cheap))
• It was a decent-sized buyback. That by itself is worthwhile. But it is not enormous. And with ¥1tn in net cash, buying back ¥100bn is not huge enough. It reduces the dividend out a little, and lifts EPS a little. But…
• The BIG trade here is to identify the seller as quickly as possible – if it is a corporate seller. If it is Hachijuni Bank, buy Hachijuni Bank. If it is another small listed financial for whom the position is meaningful portion of market cap, Travis Lundy would be inclined to buy that one.
• As a follow-up…
  • the result of the ToSTNeT-3 transaction was that the company bought back 9.84mm shares using 89.5% of the funds. The remaining ¥10.5bn to buy will likely be bought on market. It represents less than one day of volume.
  • Travis notes that there have been no announcements on TDNET which indicate who the seller might have been. If it had been a life insurer, it would not have made the news because it was portfolio gains, not corporate gains. It is also possible that corporate or bank holders in question would have other sales to offset the gains. We may not know until the yuho.
  • Nonetheless, the selldown of cross-holding has continued since the Nintendo situation discussed here (Nintendo Offering & Buyback: The Import & The Dynamics) as well-known cross-holders Tokyo Broadcasting System (9401 JP) and Ibiden Co Ltd (4062 JP) have also sold large single cross-holdings in the last two weeks.

(link to Travis’ insight: Shinetsu Buyback – Maybe More Than It Appears)

Omron Corp (6645 JP) (Mkt Cap: $9.7bn; Liquidity: $69mn)

The previous Friday, the Nikkei announced that because the third party share sale of Pioneer Corp (6773 JP) had been completed, it would be deleted from the Nikkei 225 Average (and the Nikkei 500 Index). Omron will replace Pioneer in the Nikkei 225, with a deemed par value of ¥50 per share. The date for this index deletion and inclusion event was the 15th of March.

• The Pioneer exclusion has been known/certain since the deal was approved. The Omron inclusion was less well-flagged. There is a lot of Pioneer stock to come out this week. Because it is so much, and because many people will not want to hold more than 5% of the company, Travis expects there is room for several people to increase their stake for an OK size.
• There is a possibility that Sharp Corp (6753 JP) and possibly Japan Display (6740 JP) and Murata Manufacturing (6981 JP) get hit on this because they were also in the “maybe this will be selected” group of tech shares. 
• Because of the path of Omron over the past year, Travis expected there would be many foreign holders unwilling to sell their shares at the current price. And they would be ill-prepared to sell large quantities in the market on Friday just because there was a Nikkei 225 inclusion. Travis expected the shares to squeeze. It is not easy to dislodge 25% of the float.
• THE HINDSIGHT:  As Travis notes in a discussion point appended to his piece, it appears every single buyer post-announcement was down-money by the inclusion, which happened at the lowest price of any traded post-announcement. This indicates substantially more pre-positioning than he thought, and the low volume on the print itself suggests substantially more shorting than might be healthy.

(link to Travis’ insight: Omron into the Nikkei 225, Pioneer Out)

Hyundai Heavy Industries (009540 KS) (Mkt Cap: $7.8bn; Liquidity: $39mn)

The Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (042660 KS) deal between HHI and KDB is now officially finalised, and it will take the following four-step process:  the HHI (to be renamed Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering, or KSOE) spin-off of the opco (HHI opco); the KDB PIK into HHI; the KSOE rights issue; followed by the DSME rights issue. These details were further elaborated upon in Sanghyun Park‘s prior insight: Hyundai Heavy/DSME Event – Comprehensive Summary.

• HHI declined 4% when the deal was finalized while DSME stayed flat. Apparently HHI and Korea Eximbank agreed that the ₩2.3tril CBs wouldn’t be converted into DSME shares and disposed any time soon. Plus, there will be a downward interest adjustment to help ease DSME’s financial burden.
• This sparked a speculation that HHI must have pledged Korea Eximbank with some sort of DSME expected valuation. Sanghyun would close the current HHI long/DSME short position. Short-term, he expects DSME will outperform HHI. Longer term, he’d rather stay away from both.

(link to Sanghyun Park‘s insight: HHI – DSME Acquisition: Current Situation & Trade Approach)

Glow Energy Pcl (GLOW TB) (Mkt Cap: $4.2bn; Liquidity: $5mn)

The revised SPA between Engie SA (ENGI FP) and Global Power Synergy Company Ltd (GPSC TB) closed this week – i.e. Engie crossed its 69.11% holding in GLOW to GPSC – triggering a mandatory Tender offer for GLOW.

• The revision – the divestment on the SPP1 co-generation plant – was a remedial requirement by the ERC regulator. The sale of SPP1 to B Grimm Power (BGRIM TB) for Bt3.3bn was announced on the 22 February and was completed mid-week. 
• Subsequent to the SPP1 sale, the purchase price under the SPA was adjusted to Bt91.9906/share, a ~3% decline from the initial Bt94.892/share price under the original SPA.
• My discussions with GLOW indicate that the 247-4 Tender Offer form may be submitted to the SEC & SEC by GPSC as early as next week, with the Offer open to acceptances shortly after. The ERC signed off on the SPA the previous Friday. Assuming mid-May payment, this is currently trading at a gross/annualised spread of 1.6%/10.8%.

(link to my insight: GLOW’s Done Deal As SPA (Almost) Completes)

Hong Kong International Construction Investment Management Group Co., (687 HK) (“HKICM”) (Mkt Cap: $1.3bn; Liquidity: $2mn)

HKICIM announced HNA Finance had entered into a SPA in which Times Holdings, a Blackstone-controlled vehicle, had conditionally agreed to buy 69.54% of HKICIM’s issued shares for HK$3/share in an HK$7bn transaction. Should the SPA complete, Times will make a mandatory unconditional offer – also at $3.00/share (14.5% premium to last close) – for the remaining 30.46% of shares out. This proposal arrives nearly three years after HNA bought a 66% in Tysan Holdings  – as HKICIM was previously known – from Blackstone for HK$4.53 per share, triggering an MGO.

• After a rapid-fire acquisition spree – at record prices, oddly motivated to “snatch land and pricing power from the city’s real estate cartel” – and similar disposal pace of Kai Tak properties,   HNA is presumably recycling these sales proceeds to offset its debt obligations.
• This will continue to trade tight to, if not through terms, with an anticipated completion late April. There will be no bump to the Offer. Times does not intend to avail itself to compulsory acquisition and intends to maintain HKICIM’s listing; while both Times and HKICIM will take appropriate steps to maintain a sufficient public float after the close of the Offer.

(link to my insight: Another MGO For HKICIM As HNA Sells Stake Back To Blackstone)

Xenith Ip (XIP AU) (Mkt Cap: $115mn; Liquidity: $1mn)

Iph Ltd (IPH AU) has gate crashed Xenith/Qantm Intellectual Property (QIP AU)‘s marriage of equals, submitting a proposal (by way of a Scheme) for Xenith comprising cash (A$1.28) and IPH shares (0.1056 IPH shares) or A$1.97/share, 23.3% above the implied QANTM all-scrip merger consideration, based on QANTM’s 26 Nov 2016 closing price.

• On the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, IPH lobbed a non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close. QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. So, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support QANTM’s merger and intends to vote against it at the forthcoming scheme meeting on the 3 April.
• The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent – the provisional clearance date for the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March; while IPH/Xenith‘s is the 2 May. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies, and IPH is the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.
• With a 19.9% blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme is toast. 19.9% of institutional investors have already cashed out at $1.85/share. Xenith should engage with IPH.

(link to my insight: IPH Goes Hostile on Xenith)

Hyosung Corporation (004800 KS) / Hyosung TNC Co Ltd (298020 KS) 

In the past six months, Hyosung Corp is up 62% while Hyosung TNC is down 12%. Corp’s share price has surged in the past six months on account of excellent dividends, strong financial results and the timing of the increased insider ownerships/completion of tender offers. Douglas Kim believes the market has already factored into Corp’s share price many of these positive factors.

• Both TNC and Corp have underperformed the market. However, TNC appears to be a turnaround story driven by a decline in raw material prices, aggressive spandex investment in India, the stabilization of spandex prices in 2H19 and the consolidation of the global spandex industry
• Douglas would be long TNC and short Corp on a dollar-for-dollar basis. His base case strategy is to achieve gains of 7-9% on this pair trade. Plugging in Douglas’s numbers results in the discount to NAV at extreme levels. One pushback is that TNC accounts for just 16% of Corps’ NAV. Five other listco holdings total 40% of NAV.

(link to Douglas’ insight: Korean Stubs Spotlight: A Pair Trade Between Hyosung Corp and Hyosung TNC)

Hang Lung (10 HK) / Hang Lung Properties (101 HK)

Curtis Lehnert flags this simple holdco structure wherein the bifurcation between the two counters is in excess of 2 STDs. I also touched on this pair last month (StubWorld: Hang Lung’s Implied Stub At Extreme Levels) and this unreasonably wide discount which is made more than unreasonable by the fact that there is very little to distinguish between the two stocks.

• Curtis proposes one avenue for narrowing the discount – by HLG divesting its stake in HLP. Maybe. Over a decade ago, HLG’s stake dipped below 50% in HLP, but it still consolidated the accounts.
• However the last few years has seen HLG gradually increasing its stake in HLP; and in one instance selling property to HLP (at book), then buying shares in HLP at 0.6x P/B. HLG is cheap, but a catalyst for narrowing the discount remains elusive.

(link to Curtis’ insight: TRADE IDEA – Hang Lung (10 HK) Stub: A Timeless Arb) 

Wheelock & (20 HK) / Wharf Holdings (4 HK) / Wharf Real Estate Investment (1997 HK)

Inputting the latest of Wheelock’s, Wharf’s and WREIC’s FY18’s numbers backs out a discount to NAV of 37.5%, bang in line with its 12-month average. Wheelock is coming up “expensive” vs. Wharf, but Wharf accounts for only 25% and 22% of NAV & GAV respectively. 

• Wharf’s net profit decreased by 11% in FY18. While the company said cooling measures in China have had minimal impact on demand, it added “the timing of sales launch continued to be dictated by local government approval to sell at full or close to full market price“.
• Chairman & MD Stephen Ng said it will sell/reduce its mainland property investments, ruling out any possibility of returning. This suggests the momentum is with non-PRC asset portfolio companies under the Wheelock group, favouring both Wheelock and WREIC.

(link to my insight: StubWorld: Wharf Under Pressure As Cooling Measures Bite)

Briefly …

• Sanghyun flagged the Street’s FY19 net profit for Nongshim Co Ltd (004370 KS) will touch ₩100bn or a ~16% increase yoy. He sees the Holdco/Sub at -2σ and recommends a set-up trade. Plugging in Sanghyun’s numbers, I back out a discount to NAV of ~47% vs. the 12-month average of 42.5% and one-year range of 34%-53%. The pushback: Nong Shim Holdings Co (072710 KS) is illiquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Nongshim Stub Trade: Sub Moving Up on New Hit Product, Now at Near -2σ)

• First Pacific Co (142 HK) exits from the Goodman Fielder JV for US$300mn. First Pac will incur a US$280mn non-cash loss on the sale. Not an ideal return on a five-year investment. Shares closed marginally up suggesting this announcement was largely expected.

Samsung Electronics (005930 KS)‘s Common/1P has reached a +2σ level and on a 120D horizon, the price ratio is currently at the peak. The div yield difference on FY19E is 0.87%p, even higher than last year which was a record high in 3 years. Sanghyun favours SamE’s 1P over Common here. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Samsung Electronics Share Class Trade: Common at +2σ, Expect Reversion After AGM This Week)

• MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU)‘s scheme doc is out.  The Scheme meeting is scheduled for 17 April, with an expected implementation date of the 8 May. The independent expert, Grant Samuels, considers the Scheme consideration to be fair & reasonable, with an assessed value range of $3.19-$3.69 vs KKR’s Offer of $3.40.

• Trade Me (TME NZ)‘s scheme book is out. The vote will take place on the 3 April. The Independent Adviser concluded that the Scheme consideration of NZ$6.45 is above its valuation range for the shares of NZ$5.93 – NZ$6.39. OIO consent has also been received.
• The IFA believes Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) shareholders should accept the Tender Offer of Bt71/share as it is above its fair value range of Bt62.33-Bt67.80/share. 

• Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU) has rejected  Australian Pharma Industries (API AU)’s non-binding indicative offer and terminated discussions in relation to the merger. Sigma believes its future potential is on a standalone basis. Sigma also cited API’s share price decline of >15% since the 11 October announcement, implying a 12% decline in value for its shareholders; and also flagged the potential execution risk in regards to ACCC consent. (link to Arun George‘s insight: Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU): Rejecting the API Bid Is the Difficult but Right Choice)

• Restaurant Brands Nz (RBD NZ)‘s takeover is now unconditional after Finaccess waived the 75% condition.  The offer has been extended until 26 March.

• Mastercard’s offer has now lapsed, leaving Visa as the sole bidder for Earthport plc (EPO LN). Visa’s 37 pence offer has been extended for two weeks until the 25 March. 

• The IFA (UOB) considers the $3.10/share Offer for Kian Joo Can Factory (KJC MK) is “not fair” but “reasonable”. (Best to open the link in Chrome not Edge). UOB considers the Offer price represents a 25 sen or 7.46% discount to the estimated fair value of RM3.35/share. The Offer will be open for acceptances until the 22 March – unless extended.

• Australian property developer, Villa World Ltd (VLW AU) announced that it had received an unsolicited proposal from AVID Property Group Australia to acquire all of the company’s shares for A$231/share (a 12% premium to last close) by way of a scheme of arrangement. 

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions.  These may be indicative of share pledges.  Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings. 

Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.   

2. BGF Stub Trade: Sub Price Diverged Further than Usual, I’d Make Trade on Reversion

• BGF Holdco/Sub have been oscillating within ±1σ since early Feb. Last Friday, Sub again made a move. This time it diverted a little further. They are now close to -2σ. Holdco is now at a 46% discount to NAV.
• Overall sector outlook is still unpromising. Local street sentiments are still divided. BGF Retail is showing interest in Korea’s third internet bank. This may become a price divergence factor. But this issue is still too early to have real impact.
• Shorting is still going pretty heavy on Sub. Sub price divergence shouldn’t last any further from this point. I’d make my trade here.

3. Samsung Electronics Share Class Trade: Common at +2σ, Expect Reversion After AGM This Week

• SamE Common/1P reached a +2σ level. On a 120D horizon, price ratio is currently at the peak. Pref discount is at 21.04%. This of course is a 120D high. We are now right at the AGM phase (Mar 20). Common gets boosted around this time. It seems true that the recent M&A stories also helped Common move over 1P.
• I don’t expect to see a continued upwardly divergence in favor of Common from this point. AGM factor should be gone this week. We still have M&A factor. This will likely be offset by shorter-term fundamentals factors such as further falling profits and DRAM design flaws.
• Div yield difference on FY19e is 0.87%p. This is even higher than last year which was a record high in 3 years. I expect SamE 1P to make a move over Common from this point.

4. MYOB (MYO AU): Manikay’s Valuation Requires Flawless Execution

On Thursday, MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) released its Scheme Booklet in which the Independent Expert, Grant Samuel, valued MYOB between A$3.19 and A$3.69 per share. Consequently, Grant Samuel concluded that KKR & Co Inc (KKR US)‘s revised proposal of A$3.40 cash per share is fair and reasonable. However, Manikay Partners continues to voice concerns about the KKR proposal as it believes MYOB is worth well in excess of A$4.00 per share.

5. GLOW’s Done Deal As SPA (Almost) Completes

In this briefing:

1. Korean Stubs Spotlight: A Pair Trade Between Ecopro Co and Ecopro BM
2. TRADE IDEA – Amorepacific Stub (002790 KS): Buyback Helped, Close the Trade
3. Murakami-San Goes Hostile on Kosaido (7868 JP), Overbids Bain’s “Final” Offer
4. CEVA Logistics: Okay, Now You Can Tender
5. Harbin Electric’s Offer: One For The Brave

1. Korean Stubs Spotlight: A Pair Trade Between Ecopro Co and Ecopro BM

In this report, we provide an analysis of our pair trade idea between Ecopro Co Ltd (086520 KS) and Ecopro BM Co Ltd (247540 KS). Our strategy will be to go long Ecopro Co and to go short on Ecopro BM. Our base case strategy is to achieve gains of 7-9% on this pair trade. 

Our SoTP valuation suggests a value per share of 52,004 won for Ecopro Co Ltd (086520 KS), representing 65% higher than current share price. Ecopro Co. currently has a market cap of 691 billion won. Ecopro Co’s 56% stake in Ecopro BM is worth 819 billion won, representing 119% of its market cap. Ecopro BM’s share price has jumped nearly 50% since its IPO on March 5th. We believe Ecopro Co has a much higher upside right now versus Ecopro BM over the next one to six months. 

Established in 1998, Ecopro Co started its business focusing on air pollution control related products. It also has major investments in companies such as Ecopro BM Co Ltd (247540 KS) and Ecopro Innovation (unlisted). Ecopro Co’s major customers include Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix, and Hyundai Heavy Industries. 

2. TRADE IDEA – Amorepacific Stub (002790 KS): Buyback Helped, Close the Trade

In my original insight on January 15, 2019 TRADE IDEA: Amorepacific (002790 KS) Stub: A Beautiful Opportunity, I proposed setting up a stub trade to profit from the mis-priced stub business of Amorepacific that was trading at its widest discount to NAV in at least three years. During the 65 calendar days that followed, Amorepacific Group (002790 KS) has gained 7.3% and the outperformed Amorepacific Corp (090430 KS) by 2.84%. The trade has reverted to average levels in a period of about two months and in this insight I will outline why I think the trade is over.

In this insight I will discuss:

• Performance of ALL my recommended stub trades
• a post-trade analysis on the Amorepacific stub

3. Murakami-San Goes Hostile on Kosaido (7868 JP), Overbids Bain’s “Final” Offer

I should have seen this coming. The asset is juicy enough, and they have a large enough stake, and the company is small enough, that this is an easy trade to do if you can get the funding. It makes eminent sense to be able to put the money down and go for it. 

I have covered this minor disaster of an MBO (Management BuyOut) of Kosaido Co Ltd (7868 JP) since it was launched, with the original question of what one could do (other than refuse). Famed/notorious Japanese activist Yoshiaki Murakami and his associated companies started buying in and then the stock quickly cleared the Bain Capital Japan vehicle’s bid price. The deal was extended, then the Bain bid was raised to ¥700/share last week with the minimum threshold set at 50.01% not 66.67% but still the shares had not traded that low, and did not following the news. But Bain played chicken with Murakami and the market in its amended filing, including the words 「公開買付者は、本開買付条件の変更後の本公開買付価格を最終的なものとし、今後、本公開買付価格を一切変更しないことの決定をしております。」which roughly translates to “The Offeror, having changed the terms, has made This Tender Offer Price final, and from this point onward, has decided to absolutely not raise the Tender Offer Price.”

So now Murakami-san has launched a Tender Offer of his own. Murakami-affiliated entities Minami Aoyama Fudosan KK and Reno KK have launched a Tender Offer at ¥750/share to buy a minimum of 9,100,900 shares and a maximum of all remaining shares. The entities currently own 3,355,900 shares (13.47%) between them – up from 11.71% reported up through yesterday [as noted in yesterday’s insight, it looked likely from the volume and trading patterns prior to yesterday’s Large Shareholder Report that they had continued buying]. 

Buying a minimum of 9,100,900 shares at ¥750/share should be easier for Murakami-san’s bidding entity than buying a minimum of 12,456,800 shares (Bain Capital’s minimum threshold) at ¥700/share, but the Murakami TOB Tender Agent is Mita Securities, which is a lesser-known agent and it is possible that the main agent for the Bain tender (SMBC Securities) could make life difficult for its account holders.

The likelihood that Murakami-san doesn’t have his bid funded or won’t follow through is, in my eyes, effectively zero. Tender Offer announcements are vetted by both the Kanto Local Finance Bureau and the Stock Exchange. You know this has been in the works for a couple of weeks simply because of that aspect. But one of the two documents released today includes an explanation of the process Murakami-san’s companies have gone through to arrive at this bid, and that tells you it may have gone on longer.

So what next? The easy answer is there is now a put at ¥750/share. Unless there is not. Weirder things have happened.

Read on…

And now there is more below.

4. CEVA Logistics: Okay, Now You Can Tender

CMA CGM SA (144898Z FP) has 89.47% of Ceva Logistics AG (CEVA SW) and will now move to squeeze out and delist. The additional tender period will run from 20 March to 2 April.

After issuing the prospectus back in late January, CEVA’s board of directors recommended shareholders to not tender shares in the belief that shareholders could realise a higher value with their continuing investment.

Investors thought otherwise and have cashed out at CHF 30/share, a 62.8% premium to the undisturbed price. The massive share price under performance of CEVA subsequent to its listing on the 4 May 2018 – down 33% five months out from the IPO – would have crystallized that decision to tender.

CEVA’s board now recommend shareholders tender into the upcoming additional offer period. If delisting occurs, it is expected concurrently occur with a squeeze-out, which would be expected to take place in the third quarter of 2019 once all stock exchange and other legal conditions are fulfilled.

5. Harbin Electric’s Offer: One For The Brave

Harbin Electric Co Ltd H (1133 HK)‘s (“HE”) composite doc for its merger by absorption has been dispatched. HE’s major shareholder Harbin Electric Corporation (HEC), an SOE, is seeking to delist the company by way of a merger by absorption at HK$4.56/share, an 82.4% premium to last close. The offer has been declared final. The IFA (Somerley) considers the offer fair & reasonable.

As HE is PRC-incorporated with unlisted domestic shares, the transaction is executed as a hybrid scheme/tender offer. The proposal requires ≥ 75% for, ≤10% against, in a scheme-like vote from independent H-shareholders. HEC holds no H shares. A 10% blocking stake is equal to 67.5mn shares. Should the resolution pass, the tendering acceptance condition in this two-step Offer is 90% of H shares out. Those who do not tender will be left holding unlisted scrip.

Indicative Timetable

A Word on Harbin’s Net Cash

In my prior insight, I discussed how the offer was below Harbin’s net cash, using CapIQ 1H18 numbers. That conclusion was not correct. While CapIQ’s net cash exceeds the consideration, its number excludes notes payable, a material number.

Using FY18 figures provided in the composite document, I estimate net cash/share of $3.18, ~70% of the consideration payment. Bloomberg’s number is higher again, while my understanding is Eikon’s $1.73/share (as at 30 June 2018) net cash figure includes (I have not verified, nor drawn a conclusion whether this would indeed be correct) deposits from customers and banks.

What to Do?

The significant offer premium to last close, the material drop in FY18 profit and the zero possibility of a competitive bidder emerging, suggests this Offer falls over the line.

The blocking stake at the H-share meeting is a risk. Although no single shareholder has the requisite stake to block the deal, collectively it is achievable.

The 90% tendering also, prima facie, appears a risk; yet such an acceptance threshold is not uncommon (Shanghai Forte (2337 HK) also required a 90% acceptance condition in 2011; while Hunan Nonferrous Metals H (2626 HK)‘s 2015 merger by absorption required 85%) and once the EGM resolution has been approved, there is little incentive to hold onto shares as Harbin will be delisted. Shares cannot be compulsory acquired.

However, I still consider “fair” to be something like the distribution of net cash to zero then taking over the company on a PER with respect to peers.

Dissension rights are available, although I am not aware of any precedents, nor the calculation methodology of a “fair price” under such a dissension, nor the timing of payment. 

Trading at a wide gross/annualised spread of 9.6%/61.4%, implying a >80% chance of completion. The current downside should this break is 40%. I don’t see an attractive risk/reward here.

In this briefing:

1. Aveo: Take Advantage of the Lull To Take a Second Crack
2. Yungtay Tummy Rumblings Continue But Not Clear To What Avail
3. PG&E: Turnaround; A Mission Impossible Task
4. Delta Electronics (DELTA TB): Thoughts on the IFA’s Valuation Range
5. Smartkarma’s Week that Was in 🇯🇵/🇰🇷 : Korea’s NPS, Samsung, Toshiba, Hitachi Hi-Tech, Payments

1. Aveo: Take Advantage of the Lull To Take a Second Crack

Back in August, I argued a case for the privatisation of Aveo Group (AOG AU), which at the time was trading at a P/B of 0.6x versus ~2x for peers. Also in late August, Aveo announced a strategic review to examine all options to close the gap between Aveo’s market capitalisation and the value of the underlying retirement properties.

Aveo’s steep discount to peers was/is ostensibly due to the presence of Mulpha International (MIT MK)‘s large stake (22.5%), crowding out institutional ownership; Mulpha and Aveo sharing the same chairman, inferring (yet categorically denied) Aveo’s absence of independence; and the ongoing class action lawsuit. 

That was a brutal recommendation, and lacking a hard catalyst, shares declined to $1.55 in January, recovering to $2.05 today, still ~12% shy of the price at the time of my last note.

This time is different.

Aveo announced in early February a number of indicative non-binding bids were received for a “whole of company transaction” with AFR reporting (paywalled) that Lone Star had joined the fray. Other interested parties are believed to include Blackstone and Cerberus Capital Management.

Aveo’s share price is up ~20% since announcing the receipt of the indicative bids, having drifted down from a (recent) closing peak of $2.14 earlier this month.

Aveo is currently trading at an attractive 0.52x P/B vs. 1.8x for its peer group, with the next closest peer valuation at 0.7x P/B. An offer of >0.7x, a level last traded as recently as June 2018, appears reasonable with ~92% of assets in investment property. 

Further afield, Mulpha trades at a P/B of 0.25x, while the stake in Aveo accounts for 104% of its market cap, and around 25% of NAV. It’s discount to NAV has significantly narrowed since February, but Mulpha continues to trade at a discount to 76%.

Timeline of Events 

2. Yungtay Tummy Rumblings Continue But Not Clear To What Avail

On March 6th, a day before the Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) Taiwan elevator business Tender Offer for just over a third of Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT) was expected to close, the closing date was extended to 22 April, notably because the acquiring entity had not yet received Taiwan Ministry of Economy Investment Commission approval for the foreign investment, and the Fair Trading Commission had not yet given the green light, so there was no hope of getting it done by the next day in accordance with Taiwan’s Public Acquisition of Public Company Shares Administrative Law Article 18 Para 2. The proposed purchase price was unchanged at NT$60. 

While there have been noises in the market that both Otis and Schindler, which are reported to hold roughly 5-6% each (last year’s shareholder list included UT Park View which United Technologies (UTX US)‘s 10-K showed was a wholly-owned sub) were willing to offer more than Hitachi’s offered NT$60 (and MOPS filings indicate the board approval meeting in end-January referenced a NT$63 potential bid), there was no competitive bid made public and to the authorities by five business days prior to the first bid close (which would have been 26 Feb) as per the same law Article 7 Para 2.

Since then, there have also been other ructions. While terms remain unchanged, it is worthwhile looking into what has been going on. This is still interesting and because of its various inputs, slightly disconcerting to some, and the modalities continue to surprise me.

Past coverage of this situation can be found at:
28 Oct 2018 – Going Up! Hitachi Tender for Yungtay Engineering (1507 TT)
17 Jan 2019 – Hitachi Tender for Yungtay Engineering Launches
26 Feb 2019 – Yungtay Noises Haven’t Produced a Result Yet

3. PG&E: Turnaround; A Mission Impossible Task

We write this note to provide P G & E Corp (PCG US) current state of affairs. First and foremost, we believe that the equity value is zero as the company restructures under chapter 11 bankruptcy code. Most companies that enter chapter 11 bankruptcy either face operational or financial headwinds. PG&E problems are compounded by complications of litigation and regulatory risk along with operational and financial risks.

4. Delta Electronics (DELTA TB): Thoughts on the IFA’s Valuation Range

Delta Electronics Thai (DELTA TB) (Delta) released its opinion (Form 250-2) and the opinion of the Independent Financial Advisor (IFA) on the tender offer. Delta Electronics (2308 TT) (DEI) launched the conditional voluntary tender offer for Delta, an electronics contract manufacturer, on 26 February 2019. The tender offer of THB71.00 cash per share values Delta at an EV of THB72 billion ($2.2 billion).

5. Smartkarma’s Week that Was in 🇯🇵/🇰🇷 : Korea’s NPS, Samsung, Toshiba, Hitachi Hi-Tech, Payments

Something of a slower week on Smartkarma this week (I contributed to that slowness by being away and under the weather when back) with about 120 insights published. A list of the insights to do with Japan and Korea this week are listed below.

There will be a couple more shortly. 

For more detail, read on below the fold…

For me, the MUST READS of this weak are the cashless payment-related pieces by Kirk Boodry and Michael Causton shown at the bottom.