ESG

Lucror Analytics’ ESG Scores are based on a 3-tiered scale and are adjusted for Controversies (if applicable).
We assess Casino Guichard-Perrachon’s ESG as “Adequate”, in line with its Environmental score, while the Social pillar is “Strong”. We assess Governance as “Weak” due to a lack of data following the company’s recent debt restructuring, which led to a change of control. Controversies are “Material”, while Disclosure is “Strong”. 

• The problem with cross-shareholdings is not simply that they weigh heavily on ROE and ROA improvement, but also that they do not create tension in management.
• The degree of seriousness of the company’s efforts to reduce policy shareholdings is a measure of the improvement in return on capital. The level of seriousness must be monitored.
• The fact that there are inappropriate entries in the items required of prime market listed companies indicates that many companies are not suitable for prime market listed companies.

Lucror Analytics’ ESG Scores are based on a 3-tiered scale and are adjusted for Controversies (if applicable).
We assess New World Development’s ESG as “Strong”, in line with its Environmental score, while the Social and Governance scores are “Adequate”. Controversies are “Immaterial” and Disclosure is “Strong”.

• While it’s commendable that more companies are publishing their skills matrices, it’s not enough to verify that the skill items are useful in expanding the value of the company.
• Since management strategies vary from company to company, the skills required to formulate and execute a company’s strategy are not likely to be the same as those of other companies.
• Director candidates should be selected based on the skills needed to expand the value of the company in future and skills that complement the skills lacking in the current directors.

• The reversal of foreign and cross-held shares in shareholding ratio is the main catalyst for today’s change. Companies with high foreign ownership gradually accepted the proposals of overseas investors.
• The issues of low profit margins, high policy shareholdings, excess cash on hand, and consequently low ROE are still unresolved in many companies, while some companies did successful through engagement.
• More companies will seek compromise with shareholders by enhancing shareholder returns in the face of the fact that the gap between cost of capital and return on capital wasn’t filled.

• For companies facing challenges in maximizing sustainable shareholder returns, it is not a bad idea to rethink management strategies for corporate value growth in the quiet environment of going private.
• MBOs began to attract attention as managers became more aware of the listing costs. TSE’s request last March was the product of making companies even more aware of the costs.
• It is not easy for a company that has not been recognized in the marketplace for many years to increase its stock valuation in a short period of time.

• Many Japanese managers have little idea that what belongs to shareholders is net profit and not free cash flow. This has created two problems.
• If Japanese companies, mostly manufacturers, use dividend payout ratios as a criterion for shareholder returns, cash on hand will not decline even if shareholder returns are increased to some extent.
• The inability to move beyond the concept of allocating investment and shareholder returns based on increases or decreases in cash may be the reason for the unclear cash allocation policy.

• Companies with higher foreign shareholdings have superior board practices, suggesting that overseas investor engagement played an important role in improving management that resulted in return on capital.
• Clues to changes in management reform can be found in the percentage of independent board members, the percentage of female board members, and policy shareholdings/total assets.
• While the substance of the goals is important, the focus has shifted to management’s strong will to achieve the goals to raise valuations and return on capital.

• Even companies with high valuations and return on capital have room to further raise their return on capital and valuations because of cash allocation challenges.
• Companies whose valuations have not changed over the past year have low ROE and ROA, yet have high policy shareholdings. They have not taken steps to improve return on capital.
• As for whether many companies without high foreign ownership can raise their return on capital and valuations, strong will of management to achieve their goals is necessary.

• Companies with low valuations have lower ROE, ROA, and foreign ownership as well as inferior board practices and key actions. Conversely, companies with high valuations show the opposite relationship.
• Over the past year, companies that increased their valuations were those with already  high valuations, return on capital and foreign ownership that further improved their earnings and increased their valuations.
• This suggests that companies that have begun to make progress in management reform by improving board operations and clarifying management policies through engagement by overseas investors have achieved positive results.

• Although few shareholder proposals will be passed, companies that receive shareholder proposals and don’t like the attention are likely to seek compromise and come to terms with shareholders before AGM.
• Companies with low valuations have significantly lower ROE, ROA, market capitalization, and foreign ownership. In order to raise valuations, the first step should be to increase return on capital.
• Companies with higher valuations can be expected to have begun to steer their board operations in an improved direction. Policy shareholding reductions can be considered as seriousness toward management improvement.