Whilst OUE C-REIT’s DPU yield and Price-to-NAV appears to be attractive vis-à-vis its peers, investors should take note of the implications of the S$375 mil Convertible Perpetual Preferred Units (“CPPU”) and its impact on OUE C-REIT’s DPU going forward.
Assuming that all S$375 mil CPPUs are converted, a total of 524.2 mil new OUE C-REIT will be issued to OUE Ltd, and the total unit base of OUE C-REIT will expand by 18% to 3,385.8 mil units.
For minority investors of OUE C-REIT, they face the risk of having their DPU yield diluted from a projected 7.1% (before conversion) to 6.2% after conversion.
A Rights Issue to fund CPPU Redemption will be more dilutive than the conversion scenario. Assuming a Rights Issue at 20% discount, DPU yield of OUE C-REIT will drop from a projected 7.1% (before conversion) to 5.8% after Rights Issue.
Minority investors are likely to be at the losing end of this CPPU issue and suffer from yield dilution. Investors should avoid OUE C-REIT for now as the uncertainty over the CPPU conversion remains.
For investors who are still keen to take a position in OUE C-REIT, a fair post-conversion diluted DPU yield would be 6.6%, translating to a recommended entry price of S$0.465 per unit.
BGF Sub had a 5.39% gain on better-than-expected 4Q18 results. Holdco stayed flat. As a result, we had a 2+σ jump from 95% of σ to -133% of σ. This is the widest jump in 120D. Holdco discount is currently at 47% to NAV.
On a 120D horizon, price ratio is still well below 120D mean. Despite recent gains, Holdco price relative to Sub is nearly 20+%p down since 120D ago. 4Q results seem to be encouraging. But local sentiments are still heavily divided on Sub’s fundamentals. 4Q results aren’t strong enough to turn the tide drastically.
Sub has been one of the most heavily shorted stocks in Korea lately. Yesterday’s huge gain might have been a short covering. This shouldn’t be a structural price pushing up for Sub. Sub staying below -1σ wouldn’t last another day. I expect a quick mean reversion at this point.
Parco (8251 JP) is enjoying a new lease of life under J Front Retailing (3086 JP) ownership, investing assiduously in updating existing buildings and showing a decisiveness to rebuild entirely where location merits it and even closing down stores that don’t work.
It will celebrate its 50th anniversary this year by opening four new buildings, including the flagship Parco Shibuya and is forecasting a 28% rise in revenue for 2016-2021.
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LG Uplus Corp (032640 KS) actually pays ₩800bil (not ₩1tril) for the controlling stake of CJ Hello (037560 KS) from CJ ENM (035760 KS). LG Uplus gets not all of the shares owned by CJ ENM. It gets a total 38,723,433 shares. This is 50% + 1 share. Cost per share is ₩20,659. This is a 107% premium.
I suggested a long/short trade on LGU+/CJH starting this Monday on the grounds that their MC ratio should revert back to above 10. This trade is paying off very handsomely now. Current yield stands at 10.5%. But I wouldn’t close this position yet.
CJ ENM still owns nearly 4% CJH stake. SKT owns 8.61%. Neither of them has any reason to retain these shares. LG Uplus doesn’t seem to be interested in getting any of these additional shares. This means one thing. It is very likely that CJH will suffer huge stock overhang concerns.
Not only that, merger between them is inevitable. The LGU+/CJH MC ratio should be reverted back to 10. The MC ratio is now at 8.4. We still have more room on this. I expect it to reach at least near 9 level in very near future. I’d hold onto this position until then.
Anheuser Busch Inbev Sa/Nv (ABI BB), the world’s largest brewer, is looking to list its Asian operations in order to lighten its debt burden. The listing will probably be in Hong Kong and the company could raise around US$5bn at a valuation of around US$70bn, as per media reports, which will make it one of the largest listings for 2019. Earlier this month, the company picked JPM and MS to lead the deal.
When listed, the company will be the third biggest brewer in China and the largest in South Korea and Australia.
While we have to wait for the application proof to be filed later this year to get more details on the operations, in this insight I’ll take a early look at the Asian operations using the data already available in the parent’s annual and quarterly reports. I’ll primarily address where the business is now and how it has shaped up over the past few years.
Three months ago, Minebea Mitsumi (6479 JP) announced that it would launch a Tender Offer for U Shin Ltd (6985 JP) and it would take just under three months until the approvals were received and it could officially start the Tender Offer process. It took a couple of weeks longer, as proposed by U Shin’s update on 30 January, which indicated anti-trust approvals had been received.
My first conclusion in November was that this was the “riskiest” straight-out non-hostile TOB I had seen in a while.
This is a wide-open deal. The buyer owns 1 round lot. The largest holder is an activist. The deal is being proposed at not such a super-high multiple (8x forecast FY earnings for the year ending 31 December 2018) and 4.9x EV/EBITDA. It is 3.7-4.0x when taking into account the 67 different equity positions they held at the end of last year, some of which they have recently liquidated.
In the interim, the activist dropped their position in half (necessitating a filing of a Large Shareholder Report for going below 5% – and they may have completely liquidated by now), and an investment bank has gone above 5% since then.
data source: investing.com
The financial advisory “valuations” at the time were more than questionable. A discussion of the valuation levels can be found in the previous insight (I don’t need to repeat them here, just go there).
Today, the company raised its OP and Ordinary Income forecasts for the year ended 31 December 2018, but lowered its Net Income forecast by 98.8% due to writeoffs at many overseas facilities. Then the promptly reported earnings (also only in Japanese) a few seconds later (only available in Japanese).
Op is now forecast to drop 2% in 2019 vs 2018, but the 2019 forecast is 11+% higher than the 2018 forecast was just yesterday. The forecast for Net Income is ¥99.35/share, putting the deal at <10x forecast PER. And even less if one considers that the cross-shareholdings could be reduced.
The New News
Today Minebea Mitsumi announced the launch of its Tender Offer, to commence tomorrow, at the same price as originally planned (¥985/share), and to run for 38 days.
This deal is still perplexing to me. It’s easy enough from an industrial standpoint. I mean, why not buy relatively cheap assets then see if you can cross-sell or assume some attrition. But for investors… I wonder why they put up with this.
LG Uplus’ acquisition of CJ Hellovision is likely to further accelerate the consolidation of the Korean cable TV/media sector. KT Corp (030200 KS) is now likely to aggressively try to acquire D’Live cable company. SK Telecom (017670 KS) has shown some interests in acquiring Tbroad cable company.
Potential M&A Valuation Price for Tbroad- If we assume our base case EV/EBITDA valuation multiple to be 5.5x for Tbroad and assume annualized EBITDA of 181.8 billion won in 2018, this would suggest an implied EV of 1.0 trillion won. After adjusting for net cash, the implied market cap would be 1.2 trillion won for Tbroad. Thus, if Taekwang Industrial decides to sell just over 50% stake in Tbroad, this could potentially be worth about 600 billion won. Taekwang Industrial currently has a market cap of 1.7 trillion won so its stake (53.9% stake in Tbroad) could be nearly 35% the value of its entire market cap.
The long battle to acquire CJ Hellovision has been completed (with the final stamp of approval from FTC). This move should help to consolidate the cable TV industry with SK Telecom and KT potentially battling out for either Tbroad or D’Live. In the midst of these uncertainties, there could be some further positive momentum for Taekwang Industrial (003240 KS), the majority owner of Tbroad.
United Arrows’ (7606 JP) decision to cancel its e-commerce services contract with ZOZO Inc (3092 JP) was not a surprise at all but could not have come at a worse time. While a move to direct operation of its online store was expected, United Arrows did not have to choose a moment when Zozo’s stock was collapsing. That it did shows how much cooler relations are between the two firms, a critical development given United Arrows was the principal reason for Zozo’s emergence as the leading fashion mall in the early 2000s.
United Arrows will still be selling through Zozotown and its president last week praised Zozotown’s capacity to bring new and younger customers to its brand. The bigger problem is that United Arrows relies less and less on sales from Zozotown each year and more from its own online store – direct e-commerce sales have increased from 20% of all e-commerce sales in FY2016 to 27% in 9M2018.
At Baycrews, another leading merchant on Zozotown, 50% of e-commerce sales are from its own online store, up 12 percentage points in two years.
A further problem is that other merchants are leaving. We reported before that Onward’s departure, while significant, is less of a threat than it might first appear given that Onward already garners 70-75% of sales from its own store so it did not cost much to leave Zozo.
However, another big retailer, Right On, also quit Zozo last month despite the fact that more than 50% of its online sales come from Zozo and it has intermittently been one of the top 20 merchants on Zozo. Right On has struggled in recent years, so leaving Zozo cannot have been an easy decision, suggesting just how seriously upset it was.
Other merchants are likely to view these departures with some concern. Six months ago, the idea of quitting Zozo was not even a remote thought in Japan’s fashion industry but it is now a lively subject of discussion. While most merchants will stay, the recent high profile departures will make a threat to leave look much more real, giving merchants more leverage to negotiate, particularly on Zozo’s take rates.
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Parco (8251 JP) is enjoying a new lease of life under J Front Retailing (3086 JP) ownership, investing assiduously in updating existing buildings and showing a decisiveness to rebuild entirely where location merits it and even closing down stores that don’t work.
It will celebrate its 50th anniversary this year by opening four new buildings, including the flagship Parco Shibuya and is forecasting a 28% rise in revenue for 2016-2021.
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Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
Parco (8251 JP) is enjoying a new lease of life under J Front Retailing (3086 JP) ownership, investing assiduously in updating existing buildings and showing a decisiveness to rebuild entirely where location merits it and even closing down stores that don’t work.
It will celebrate its 50th anniversary this year by opening four new buildings, including the flagship Parco Shibuya and is forecasting a 28% rise in revenue for 2016-2021.
Valuetronics reported its 3Q19 figures this week which showed a 7.5% decline in revenues but a small (+2.6%) increase in bottom line profits. Stronger margins in its ICE segment offset weakness in its CE segment.
Valuetronics Holdings (VALUE SP) remains a solid company run by a good management team with interesting clients in consumer electronics and automotive. The valuation of the company is cheap (5x ex-cash 2019 P/E) and the balance sheet is rock solid.
All these positives are currently being overshadowed by the US-China trade war as the company has 100% of its production in China and does 45.7% of its sales in North-America. While many companies try to downplay the impact of the trade-war Valuetronics cannot hide and the alternatives it is working on to offset the tariff impact will surely cause short-term disruption and increased costs.
YTD the share price is +12% as the market is hoping for a positive resolution to the US-China trade war. Management is cautious on macro political improvements as trade war friction is unlikely to dissipate soon. Given the weak outlook for its CE segment and no significant new customer wins in its ICE segment risk/reward does not seem very attractive despite good dividend yield and cheap valuation.
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Three months ago, Minebea Mitsumi (6479 JP) announced that it would launch a Tender Offer for U Shin Ltd (6985 JP) and it would take just under three months until the approvals were received and it could officially start the Tender Offer process. It took a couple of weeks longer, as proposed by U Shin’s update on 30 January, which indicated anti-trust approvals had been received.
My first conclusion in November was that this was the “riskiest” straight-out non-hostile TOB I had seen in a while.
This is a wide-open deal. The buyer owns 1 round lot. The largest holder is an activist. The deal is being proposed at not such a super-high multiple (8x forecast FY earnings for the year ending 31 December 2018) and 4.9x EV/EBITDA. It is 3.7-4.0x when taking into account the 67 different equity positions they held at the end of last year, some of which they have recently liquidated.
In the interim, the activist dropped their position in half (necessitating a filing of a Large Shareholder Report for going below 5% – and they may have completely liquidated by now), and an investment bank has gone above 5% since then.
data source: investing.com
The financial advisory “valuations” at the time were more than questionable. A discussion of the valuation levels can be found in the previous insight (I don’t need to repeat them here, just go there).
Today, the company raised its OP and Ordinary Income forecasts for the year ended 31 December 2018, but lowered its Net Income forecast by 98.8% due to writeoffs at many overseas facilities. Then the promptly reported earnings (also only in Japanese) a few seconds later (only available in Japanese).
Op is now forecast to drop 2% in 2019 vs 2018, but the 2019 forecast is 11+% higher than the 2018 forecast was just yesterday. The forecast for Net Income is ¥99.35/share, putting the deal at <10x forecast PER. And even less if one considers that the cross-shareholdings could be reduced.
The New News
Today Minebea Mitsumi announced the launch of its Tender Offer, to commence tomorrow, at the same price as originally planned (¥985/share), and to run for 38 days.
This deal is still perplexing to me. It’s easy enough from an industrial standpoint. I mean, why not buy relatively cheap assets then see if you can cross-sell or assume some attrition. But for investors… I wonder why they put up with this.
LG Uplus’ acquisition of CJ Hellovision is likely to further accelerate the consolidation of the Korean cable TV/media sector. KT Corp (030200 KS) is now likely to aggressively try to acquire D’Live cable company. SK Telecom (017670 KS) has shown some interests in acquiring Tbroad cable company.
Potential M&A Valuation Price for Tbroad- If we assume our base case EV/EBITDA valuation multiple to be 5.5x for Tbroad and assume annualized EBITDA of 181.8 billion won in 2018, this would suggest an implied EV of 1.0 trillion won. After adjusting for net cash, the implied market cap would be 1.2 trillion won for Tbroad. Thus, if Taekwang Industrial decides to sell just over 50% stake in Tbroad, this could potentially be worth about 600 billion won. Taekwang Industrial currently has a market cap of 1.7 trillion won so its stake (53.9% stake in Tbroad) could be nearly 35% the value of its entire market cap.
The long battle to acquire CJ Hellovision has been completed (with the final stamp of approval from FTC). This move should help to consolidate the cable TV industry with SK Telecom and KT potentially battling out for either Tbroad or D’Live. In the midst of these uncertainties, there could be some further positive momentum for Taekwang Industrial (003240 KS), the majority owner of Tbroad.
United Arrows’ (7606 JP) decision to cancel its e-commerce services contract with ZOZO Inc (3092 JP) was not a surprise at all but could not have come at a worse time. While a move to direct operation of its online store was expected, United Arrows did not have to choose a moment when Zozo’s stock was collapsing. That it did shows how much cooler relations are between the two firms, a critical development given United Arrows was the principal reason for Zozo’s emergence as the leading fashion mall in the early 2000s.
United Arrows will still be selling through Zozotown and its president last week praised Zozotown’s capacity to bring new and younger customers to its brand. The bigger problem is that United Arrows relies less and less on sales from Zozotown each year and more from its own online store – direct e-commerce sales have increased from 20% of all e-commerce sales in FY2016 to 27% in 9M2018.
At Baycrews, another leading merchant on Zozotown, 50% of e-commerce sales are from its own online store, up 12 percentage points in two years.
A further problem is that other merchants are leaving. We reported before that Onward’s departure, while significant, is less of a threat than it might first appear given that Onward already garners 70-75% of sales from its own store so it did not cost much to leave Zozo.
However, another big retailer, Right On, also quit Zozo last month despite the fact that more than 50% of its online sales come from Zozo and it has intermittently been one of the top 20 merchants on Zozo. Right On has struggled in recent years, so leaving Zozo cannot have been an easy decision, suggesting just how seriously upset it was.
Other merchants are likely to view these departures with some concern. Six months ago, the idea of quitting Zozo was not even a remote thought in Japan’s fashion industry but it is now a lively subject of discussion. While most merchants will stay, the recent high profile departures will make a threat to leave look much more real, giving merchants more leverage to negotiate, particularly on Zozo’s take rates.
Whilst OUE C-REIT’s DPU yield and Price-to-NAV appears to be attractive vis-à-vis its peers, investors should take note of the implications of the S$375 mil Convertible Perpetual Preferred Units (“CPPU”) and its impact on OUE C-REIT’s DPU going forward.
Assuming that all S$375 mil CPPUs are converted, a total of 524.2 mil new OUE C-REIT will be issued to OUE Ltd, and the total unit base of OUE C-REIT will expand by 18% to 3,385.8 mil units.
For minority investors of OUE C-REIT, they face the risk of having their DPU yield diluted from a projected 7.1% (before conversion) to 6.2% after conversion.
A Rights Issue to fund CPPU Redemption will be more dilutive than the conversion scenario. Assuming a Rights Issue at 20% discount, DPU yield of OUE C-REIT will drop from a projected 7.1% (before conversion) to 5.8% after Rights Issue.
Minority investors are likely to be at the losing end of this CPPU issue and suffer from yield dilution. Investors should avoid OUE C-REIT for now as the uncertainty over the CPPU conversion remains.
For investors who are still keen to take a position in OUE C-REIT, a fair post-conversion diluted DPU yield would be 6.6%, translating to a recommended entry price of S$0.465 per unit.
BGF Sub had a 5.39% gain on better-than-expected 4Q18 results. Holdco stayed flat. As a result, we had a 2+σ jump from 95% of σ to -133% of σ. This is the widest jump in 120D. Holdco discount is currently at 47% to NAV.
On a 120D horizon, price ratio is still well below 120D mean. Despite recent gains, Holdco price relative to Sub is nearly 20+%p down since 120D ago. 4Q results seem to be encouraging. But local sentiments are still heavily divided on Sub’s fundamentals. 4Q results aren’t strong enough to turn the tide drastically.
Sub has been one of the most heavily shorted stocks in Korea lately. Yesterday’s huge gain might have been a short covering. This shouldn’t be a structural price pushing up for Sub. Sub staying below -1σ wouldn’t last another day. I expect a quick mean reversion at this point.
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LG Uplus’ acquisition of CJ Hellovision is likely to further accelerate the consolidation of the Korean cable TV/media sector. KT Corp (030200 KS) is now likely to aggressively try to acquire D’Live cable company. SK Telecom (017670 KS) has shown some interests in acquiring Tbroad cable company.
Potential M&A Valuation Price for Tbroad- If we assume our base case EV/EBITDA valuation multiple to be 5.5x for Tbroad and assume annualized EBITDA of 181.8 billion won in 2018, this would suggest an implied EV of 1.0 trillion won. After adjusting for net cash, the implied market cap would be 1.2 trillion won for Tbroad. Thus, if Taekwang Industrial decides to sell just over 50% stake in Tbroad, this could potentially be worth about 600 billion won. Taekwang Industrial currently has a market cap of 1.7 trillion won so its stake (53.9% stake in Tbroad) could be nearly 35% the value of its entire market cap.
The long battle to acquire CJ Hellovision has been completed (with the final stamp of approval from FTC). This move should help to consolidate the cable TV industry with SK Telecom and KT potentially battling out for either Tbroad or D’Live. In the midst of these uncertainties, there could be some further positive momentum for Taekwang Industrial (003240 KS), the majority owner of Tbroad.
United Arrows’ (7606 JP) decision to cancel its e-commerce services contract with ZOZO Inc (3092 JP) was not a surprise at all but could not have come at a worse time. While a move to direct operation of its online store was expected, United Arrows did not have to choose a moment when Zozo’s stock was collapsing. That it did shows how much cooler relations are between the two firms, a critical development given United Arrows was the principal reason for Zozo’s emergence as the leading fashion mall in the early 2000s.
United Arrows will still be selling through Zozotown and its president last week praised Zozotown’s capacity to bring new and younger customers to its brand. The bigger problem is that United Arrows relies less and less on sales from Zozotown each year and more from its own online store – direct e-commerce sales have increased from 20% of all e-commerce sales in FY2016 to 27% in 9M2018.
At Baycrews, another leading merchant on Zozotown, 50% of e-commerce sales are from its own online store, up 12 percentage points in two years.
A further problem is that other merchants are leaving. We reported before that Onward’s departure, while significant, is less of a threat than it might first appear given that Onward already garners 70-75% of sales from its own store so it did not cost much to leave Zozo.
However, another big retailer, Right On, also quit Zozo last month despite the fact that more than 50% of its online sales come from Zozo and it has intermittently been one of the top 20 merchants on Zozo. Right On has struggled in recent years, so leaving Zozo cannot have been an easy decision, suggesting just how seriously upset it was.
Other merchants are likely to view these departures with some concern. Six months ago, the idea of quitting Zozo was not even a remote thought in Japan’s fashion industry but it is now a lively subject of discussion. While most merchants will stay, the recent high profile departures will make a threat to leave look much more real, giving merchants more leverage to negotiate, particularly on Zozo’s take rates.
Whilst OUE C-REIT’s DPU yield and Price-to-NAV appears to be attractive vis-à-vis its peers, investors should take note of the implications of the S$375 mil Convertible Perpetual Preferred Units (“CPPU”) and its impact on OUE C-REIT’s DPU going forward.
Assuming that all S$375 mil CPPUs are converted, a total of 524.2 mil new OUE C-REIT will be issued to OUE Ltd, and the total unit base of OUE C-REIT will expand by 18% to 3,385.8 mil units.
For minority investors of OUE C-REIT, they face the risk of having their DPU yield diluted from a projected 7.1% (before conversion) to 6.2% after conversion.
A Rights Issue to fund CPPU Redemption will be more dilutive than the conversion scenario. Assuming a Rights Issue at 20% discount, DPU yield of OUE C-REIT will drop from a projected 7.1% (before conversion) to 5.8% after Rights Issue.
Minority investors are likely to be at the losing end of this CPPU issue and suffer from yield dilution. Investors should avoid OUE C-REIT for now as the uncertainty over the CPPU conversion remains.
For investors who are still keen to take a position in OUE C-REIT, a fair post-conversion diluted DPU yield would be 6.6%, translating to a recommended entry price of S$0.465 per unit.
BGF Sub had a 5.39% gain on better-than-expected 4Q18 results. Holdco stayed flat. As a result, we had a 2+σ jump from 95% of σ to -133% of σ. This is the widest jump in 120D. Holdco discount is currently at 47% to NAV.
On a 120D horizon, price ratio is still well below 120D mean. Despite recent gains, Holdco price relative to Sub is nearly 20+%p down since 120D ago. 4Q results seem to be encouraging. But local sentiments are still heavily divided on Sub’s fundamentals. 4Q results aren’t strong enough to turn the tide drastically.
Sub has been one of the most heavily shorted stocks in Korea lately. Yesterday’s huge gain might have been a short covering. This shouldn’t be a structural price pushing up for Sub. Sub staying below -1σ wouldn’t last another day. I expect a quick mean reversion at this point.
Parco (8251 JP) is enjoying a new lease of life under J Front Retailing (3086 JP) ownership, investing assiduously in updating existing buildings and showing a decisiveness to rebuild entirely where location merits it and even closing down stores that don’t work.
It will celebrate its 50th anniversary this year by opening four new buildings, including the flagship Parco Shibuya and is forecasting a 28% rise in revenue for 2016-2021.
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Valuetronics reported its 3Q19 figures this week which showed a 7.5% decline in revenues but a small (+2.6%) increase in bottom line profits. Stronger margins in its ICE segment offset weakness in its CE segment.
Valuetronics Holdings (VALUE SP) remains a solid company run by a good management team with interesting clients in consumer electronics and automotive. The valuation of the company is cheap (5x ex-cash 2019 P/E) and the balance sheet is rock solid.
All these positives are currently being overshadowed by the US-China trade war as the company has 100% of its production in China and does 45.7% of its sales in North-America. While many companies try to downplay the impact of the trade-war Valuetronics cannot hide and the alternatives it is working on to offset the tariff impact will surely cause short-term disruption and increased costs.
YTD the share price is +12% as the market is hoping for a positive resolution to the US-China trade war. Management is cautious on macro political improvements as trade war friction is unlikely to dissipate soon. Given the weak outlook for its CE segment and no significant new customer wins in its ICE segment risk/reward does not seem very attractive despite good dividend yield and cheap valuation.
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We visit the large format stores of Future Retail (FRETAIL IN) fbb, Big Bazaar and Big Bazaar Gen Next, along with visiting stores run by Future Lifestyle Fashions (FLFL IN) Brand Factory and Central in Ahmedabad, Gujarat to understand some of the drivers behind SSSG of over 10% over the last 15 consecutive quarters. Our regional checks indicate the large format growth might be maintained in the future driven by loyalty programs like Future Pay. Interestingly the group has resorted to using its stores to mobilise funds for its fixed deposits, which could be a final indication that the planned of deal with Amazon.com Inc (AMZN US) is finally being called off.
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United Arrows’ (7606 JP) decision to cancel its e-commerce services contract with ZOZO Inc (3092 JP) was not a surprise at all but could not have come at a worse time. While a move to direct operation of its online store was expected, United Arrows did not have to choose a moment when Zozo’s stock was collapsing. That it did shows how much cooler relations are between the two firms, a critical development given United Arrows was the principal reason for Zozo’s emergence as the leading fashion mall in the early 2000s.
United Arrows will still be selling through Zozotown and its president last week praised Zozotown’s capacity to bring new and younger customers to its brand. The bigger problem is that United Arrows relies less and less on sales from Zozotown each year and more from its own online store – direct e-commerce sales have increased from 20% of all e-commerce sales in FY2016 to 27% in 9M2018.
At Baycrews, another leading merchant on Zozotown, 50% of e-commerce sales are from its own online store, up 12 percentage points in two years.
A further problem is that other merchants are leaving. We reported before that Onward’s departure, while significant, is less of a threat than it might first appear given that Onward already garners 70-75% of sales from its own store so it did not cost much to leave Zozo.
However, another big retailer, Right On, also quit Zozo last month despite the fact that more than 50% of its online sales come from Zozo and it has intermittently been one of the top 20 merchants on Zozo. Right On has struggled in recent years, so leaving Zozo cannot have been an easy decision, suggesting just how seriously upset it was.
Other merchants are likely to view these departures with some concern. Six months ago, the idea of quitting Zozo was not even a remote thought in Japan’s fashion industry but it is now a lively subject of discussion. While most merchants will stay, the recent high profile departures will make a threat to leave look much more real, giving merchants more leverage to negotiate, particularly on Zozo’s take rates.
Whilst OUE C-REIT’s DPU yield and Price-to-NAV appears to be attractive vis-à-vis its peers, investors should take note of the implications of the S$375 mil Convertible Perpetual Preferred Units (“CPPU”) and its impact on OUE C-REIT’s DPU going forward.
Assuming that all S$375 mil CPPUs are converted, a total of 524.2 mil new OUE C-REIT will be issued to OUE Ltd, and the total unit base of OUE C-REIT will expand by 18% to 3,385.8 mil units.
For minority investors of OUE C-REIT, they face the risk of having their DPU yield diluted from a projected 7.1% (before conversion) to 6.2% after conversion.
A Rights Issue to fund CPPU Redemption will be more dilutive than the conversion scenario. Assuming a Rights Issue at 20% discount, DPU yield of OUE C-REIT will drop from a projected 7.1% (before conversion) to 5.8% after Rights Issue.
Minority investors are likely to be at the losing end of this CPPU issue and suffer from yield dilution. Investors should avoid OUE C-REIT for now as the uncertainty over the CPPU conversion remains.
For investors who are still keen to take a position in OUE C-REIT, a fair post-conversion diluted DPU yield would be 6.6%, translating to a recommended entry price of S$0.465 per unit.
BGF Sub had a 5.39% gain on better-than-expected 4Q18 results. Holdco stayed flat. As a result, we had a 2+σ jump from 95% of σ to -133% of σ. This is the widest jump in 120D. Holdco discount is currently at 47% to NAV.
On a 120D horizon, price ratio is still well below 120D mean. Despite recent gains, Holdco price relative to Sub is nearly 20+%p down since 120D ago. 4Q results seem to be encouraging. But local sentiments are still heavily divided on Sub’s fundamentals. 4Q results aren’t strong enough to turn the tide drastically.
Sub has been one of the most heavily shorted stocks in Korea lately. Yesterday’s huge gain might have been a short covering. This shouldn’t be a structural price pushing up for Sub. Sub staying below -1σ wouldn’t last another day. I expect a quick mean reversion at this point.
Parco (8251 JP) is enjoying a new lease of life under J Front Retailing (3086 JP) ownership, investing assiduously in updating existing buildings and showing a decisiveness to rebuild entirely where location merits it and even closing down stores that don’t work.
It will celebrate its 50th anniversary this year by opening four new buildings, including the flagship Parco Shibuya and is forecasting a 28% rise in revenue for 2016-2021.
Valuetronics reported its 3Q19 figures this week which showed a 7.5% decline in revenues but a small (+2.6%) increase in bottom line profits. Stronger margins in its ICE segment offset weakness in its CE segment.
Valuetronics Holdings (VALUE SP) remains a solid company run by a good management team with interesting clients in consumer electronics and automotive. The valuation of the company is cheap (5x ex-cash 2019 P/E) and the balance sheet is rock solid.
All these positives are currently being overshadowed by the US-China trade war as the company has 100% of its production in China and does 45.7% of its sales in North-America. While many companies try to downplay the impact of the trade-war Valuetronics cannot hide and the alternatives it is working on to offset the tariff impact will surely cause short-term disruption and increased costs.
YTD the share price is +12% as the market is hoping for a positive resolution to the US-China trade war. Management is cautious on macro political improvements as trade war friction is unlikely to dissipate soon. Given the weak outlook for its CE segment and no significant new customer wins in its ICE segment risk/reward does not seem very attractive despite good dividend yield and cheap valuation.
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Whilst OUE C-REIT’s DPU yield and Price-to-NAV appears to be attractive vis-à-vis its peers, investors should take note of the implications of the S$375 mil Convertible Perpetual Preferred Units (“CPPU”) and its impact on OUE C-REIT’s DPU going forward.
Assuming that all S$375 mil CPPUs are converted, a total of 524.2 mil new OUE C-REIT will be issued to OUE Ltd, and the total unit base of OUE C-REIT will expand by 18% to 3,385.8 mil units.
For minority investors of OUE C-REIT, they face the risk of having their DPU yield diluted from a projected 7.1% (before conversion) to 6.2% after conversion.
A Rights Issue to fund CPPU Redemption will be more dilutive than the conversion scenario. Assuming a Rights Issue at 20% discount, DPU yield of OUE C-REIT will drop from a projected 7.1% (before conversion) to 5.8% after Rights Issue.
Minority investors are likely to be at the losing end of this CPPU issue and suffer from yield dilution. Investors should avoid OUE C-REIT for now as the uncertainty over the CPPU conversion remains.
For investors who are still keen to take a position in OUE C-REIT, a fair post-conversion diluted DPU yield would be 6.6%, translating to a recommended entry price of S$0.465 per unit.
BGF Sub had a 5.39% gain on better-than-expected 4Q18 results. Holdco stayed flat. As a result, we had a 2+σ jump from 95% of σ to -133% of σ. This is the widest jump in 120D. Holdco discount is currently at 47% to NAV.
On a 120D horizon, price ratio is still well below 120D mean. Despite recent gains, Holdco price relative to Sub is nearly 20+%p down since 120D ago. 4Q results seem to be encouraging. But local sentiments are still heavily divided on Sub’s fundamentals. 4Q results aren’t strong enough to turn the tide drastically.
Sub has been one of the most heavily shorted stocks in Korea lately. Yesterday’s huge gain might have been a short covering. This shouldn’t be a structural price pushing up for Sub. Sub staying below -1σ wouldn’t last another day. I expect a quick mean reversion at this point.
Parco (8251 JP) is enjoying a new lease of life under J Front Retailing (3086 JP) ownership, investing assiduously in updating existing buildings and showing a decisiveness to rebuild entirely where location merits it and even closing down stores that don’t work.
It will celebrate its 50th anniversary this year by opening four new buildings, including the flagship Parco Shibuya and is forecasting a 28% rise in revenue for 2016-2021.
Valuetronics reported its 3Q19 figures this week which showed a 7.5% decline in revenues but a small (+2.6%) increase in bottom line profits. Stronger margins in its ICE segment offset weakness in its CE segment.
Valuetronics Holdings (VALUE SP) remains a solid company run by a good management team with interesting clients in consumer electronics and automotive. The valuation of the company is cheap (5x ex-cash 2019 P/E) and the balance sheet is rock solid.
All these positives are currently being overshadowed by the US-China trade war as the company has 100% of its production in China and does 45.7% of its sales in North-America. While many companies try to downplay the impact of the trade-war Valuetronics cannot hide and the alternatives it is working on to offset the tariff impact will surely cause short-term disruption and increased costs.
YTD the share price is +12% as the market is hoping for a positive resolution to the US-China trade war. Management is cautious on macro political improvements as trade war friction is unlikely to dissipate soon. Given the weak outlook for its CE segment and no significant new customer wins in its ICE segment risk/reward does not seem very attractive despite good dividend yield and cheap valuation.
We visit the large format stores of Future Retail (FRETAIL IN) fbb, Big Bazaar and Big Bazaar Gen Next, along with visiting stores run by Future Lifestyle Fashions (FLFL IN) Brand Factory and Central in Ahmedabad, Gujarat to understand some of the drivers behind SSSG of over 10% over the last 15 consecutive quarters. Our regional checks indicate the large format growth might be maintained in the future driven by loyalty programs like Future Pay. Interestingly the group has resorted to using its stores to mobilise funds for its fixed deposits, which could be a final indication that the planned of deal with Amazon.com Inc (AMZN US) is finally being called off.
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