Equity Bottom-Up

In this briefing:

1. Momo (MOMO): Paying Users Up 17%, Benefiting from Bankrupt Competitors, 80% Upside
2. Snippets #20: Dark Clouds in Thai Equities
3. Meituan Dianping: Time to Bail? Relax, Core Business Progressing Toward Profitability
4. Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 3 – Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ)
5. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

1. Momo (MOMO): Paying Users Up 17%, Benefiting from Bankrupt Competitors, 80% Upside

• The stock price has risen 32% after the short seller J Capital slammed it.
• MOMO’s paying user base of live video increased 22% yoy in 3Q18 and 17% yoy in 4Q2018 even though the live show market shrank in 2018.
• We believe MOMO will benefit from small competitors’ bankruptcy.
• The growth rate of the main business revenues stopped declining.
• Our P/E band suggests upside of 80% for MOMO’s stock price.

2. Snippets #20: Dark Clouds in Thai Equities

Of the five interesting trends/events/developments we heard this month, we highlighted five and how they could impact Thai equities in the near term:

• Thai Raksa Chart Party dissolution. The dissolution of the TRC, the second largest Thaksinite party, poses some political risks but could affect sentiments for companies founded by Thaksin, such as Intuch and AIS.
• Thai Air Asia says no to Nok Air. After the briefest considerations, the larger airline came to the conclusion that they wouldn’t acquire a stake in struggling Nok Air.
• Capital Gains Taxes are currently under consideration by the government for the first time. If implemented, they are likely to have negative impact on overall equities but the brokers in particular.
• From LINE to BEC. LINE (Thailand)’s Country Manager Ariya Phanomyong has agreed to move to BEC. Though mildly positive, we believe improvements will revolve around distribution rather than the more key issue of content.
• True Move’s Request for 5G delay may sound odd at first glance, but we see it as a rational, if not very tactful, way of delaying a new round of capex.

3. Meituan Dianping: Time to Bail? Relax, Core Business Progressing Toward Profitability

• Conference call with Meituan Dianping (3690 HK) reveals that ballooning losses from new initiatives (incl. one-off expenses) largely contributed to record quarterly EBIT losses in 4Q18.
• Importantly, this masks Meituan Core’s (combined food delivery and in-store, hotel & travel divisions) continued progress toward profitability.
• Management is bullish on every division’s outlook in 2019, particularly guiding for 1) balanced growth and profitability strategy for food delivery and 2) disciplined investments in new initiatives.
• Meituan attractively trades at 2.9x 2019E P/S, only around half of peers’ valuation (5.5x).  

4. Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 3 – Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ)

In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks. 

The third company that we explore is Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ), the biggest retail mall operator, and mixed-use high rise and township developer since 1986. PWON has five major projects in the two biggest cities: Jakarta and Surabaya. 

Its recurring income base is the highest in the Indonesian property universe, playing a big role in the company’s solid earnings performance in the past few years of property downturn. However, currency depreciation, stricter mortgage regulations, and falling rental yields curb investors’ appetite for property investments, leading to weak presales in the past three years. Property development revenues are expected to be trending down going forward on lower presales in 2016-2018. Contrary to peers, cashflow generation remains very strong, led by the large recurring income base and thick margin. There is however no plan to increase dividends, but rather reserving the excess cash for future landbank acquisition.  

The weaker presales in 1H19 is widely anticipated, but we fear that there may be some selling pressure on each weak presales announcements, given PWON’s premium valuations and stock outperformance YTD. Nonetheless, potential portfolio inflow to high beta stocks and rising risk appetite for smaller-capped stocks should be beneficial for PWON. Our blended target price of IDR773 per share offers 21% upside.

Summary of this insight:

• PWON currently operates 7 retail malls, 4 office towers for lease, 4 hotels, and 1 serviced apartment as its recurring income base, representing 52% of revenues. Retail mall division is PWON’s single biggest revenue contributor, growing at 16% Cagr over the past 5 years, making up 40% of total revenues and 77% of total recurring incomes. 
• The company sells landed housings, condominiums, and offices in five project locations as its “non-recurring” property development revenues, which account for the remaining 48% of revenues. Condominiums and offices are PWON’s second biggest revenue generator, comprising about 30-40% of sales. PWON has been pushing more landed residential projects to mitigate the impact from slower condominiums and offices market.
• Accessibility is a key factor to land appreciation and hence, company’s total NAV. With the traffic worsening around the Greater Jakarta area, time to commute is an increasingly important factor in determining where to stay and access to public transportation such as MRT and LRT will be a powerful driver going forward. PWON’s landbanks are located in strategic locations, essential to the success of its past projects in Jakarta and Surabaya.
• Presales are more sensitive to investment appetite and rental yield rather than BI rates. Cash and cash installments typically make up 65-85% of total payments, while mortgages comprise a minority 15-35%.

• Slower take up rate on high-rise projects leads to larger funding requirement. Condominiums can take up to four years to complete if it is part of a superblock project, and a big portion of the raw materials for construction has to be secured and paid upfront to lock in prices and ensure availability.  Meanwhile, the presales mortgage disbursement regulation issued in 2014 diminishes cash inflow from mortgage-paying customers. We constructed a cashflow simulation model for a typical condominium tower launch to analyze the monthly cashflow impact from slower take up rate and mortgage regulation changes.
• Pros: The operating cashflow remains positive and strong over the past five years of property downturn, the best among the property developers that we visited. The seven retail malls generate over IDR1tn cash per year in the past three years, enough to sustain company’s working capital and capex requirements. Free cashflow (FCF) is mostly positive with the exception of 2014 and 2015 when PWON had two big acquisitions. Net gearing peaked in 2015 and had slowly decreased over the years.

• Cons: For the first time since 2010, PWON’s advances-to-inventory ratio, which is an indicative figure for the property developers’ working capital, fell below 100%. We are expecting a slow recovery for PWON as its inventory account should continue to grow higher in the short term as the company plans to launch few new condominium towers in Surabaya and a new superblock in Bekasi.

• Cons: Election year to election year, we may see some similarity between the 2014 and 2019’s quarterly presales split. 1Q14 and 2Q14 contributed 36% to total FY14 presales, while 4Q14 contributed a chunky 36%. If we assume the same quarterly split for 2019 presales target, we may potentially see 4-32% YoY declines in the next three quarters of presales reporting. Note however that the BI issued its first round of tightening regulations at the end of 2013 and this may have an impact to the 1H14 presales. Also there is a difference in the election schedules as the 2014 election was dragged on until late August, while the 2019 contest will be done by end of April.
• Recommendation: PWON share price is performing relatively in line with the JCI over the past year, outperforming its property peers. Its solid earnings and cashflow are rewarded with premium valuations against peers. The discount to net asset value (NAV) and price-to-earnings (PE) ratio are close to +1 standard deviation above the 5-yr historical mean. After a solid 45% bounce off recent lows, the stock is no longer cheap. However, with better interest rate environment and positive regulatory tailwinds, we may see improving activities after the election. Furthermore, potential portfolio inflow to high beta stocks and better sentiment towards the property sector should also benefit PWON. We derive an IDR773 target price per share for PWON, assuming discount to NAV, PB, and PE valuation re-rating to +1 standard deviation above mean.

5. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

Yesterday, King Street sent a letter to Toshiba Corp (6502 JP) CEO Nobuaki Kurumatani, applying pressure by threatening to nominate alternative directors to the company’s board. The full contents of the letter can be found here.

King Street’s requirements for the new board are stated as:

Among other things, the new Board must:

(i) ensure management applies rigorous financial discipline to capital allocation decisions, including use of excess cash, determination of optimal capital structure and capital expenditure return requirements;

(ii) drive management to re-examine Toshiba’s business portfolio with a critical eye on competitive position, sector landscape, synergies available and profitable growth prospects;

(iii) direct management to evaluate non-operating and underperforming businesses and assets (while respecting that Toshiba may need to be engaged in certain activities important to Japan’s national security interests);

(iv) ensure that management attains global peer profitability levels at each business segment based on projections supported by robust, bottoms-up analysis; and

(v) instill a culture of accountability and ownership at all levels of the organization.

By and large these demands amount to, “follow the instructions in our previous presentation“. That presentation, while thorough in some respects struck us as being naively optimistic, as we noted in Toshiba: King Street Assumptions Look Exceedingly Optimistic.

Travis Lundy also commented on the presentation in Toshiba: King Street’s Buyback Proposals Lack Required Detail and Toshiba: King Street’s Valuation Analysis Is… Punchy?

Given developments in the intervening time period including a sell-down of about 27% of King Street’s initial stake at a price of ¥3,925 (some 64% below the “well over ¥11,000” per share they feel Toshiba is worth) according to Bloomberg, and a downward revision to OP guidance from ¥60bn to ¥20bn, we feel that there is little reason to change our assessment.

In this briefing:

1. Meituan Dianping: Time to Bail? Relax, Core Business Progressing Toward Profitability
2. Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 3 – Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ)
3. Toshiba: King Street Round Two
4. Lippo Malls REIT – Acquisition of Lippo Mall Puri Announced. Dilutive Rights Issue Coming.
5. Bharti Infratel: Bad News Largely in the Price Now. Upgrade to Neutral

1. Meituan Dianping: Time to Bail? Relax, Core Business Progressing Toward Profitability

• Conference call with Meituan Dianping (3690 HK) reveals that ballooning losses from new initiatives (incl. one-off expenses) largely contributed to record quarterly EBIT losses in 4Q18.
• Importantly, this masks Meituan Core’s (combined food delivery and in-store, hotel & travel divisions) continued progress toward profitability.
• Management is bullish on every division’s outlook in 2019, particularly guiding for 1) balanced growth and profitability strategy for food delivery and 2) disciplined investments in new initiatives.
• Meituan attractively trades at 2.9x 2019E P/S, only around half of peers’ valuation (5.5x).  

2. Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 3 – Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ)

In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks. 

The third company that we explore is Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ), the biggest retail mall operator, and mixed-use high rise and township developer since 1986. PWON has five major projects in the two biggest cities: Jakarta and Surabaya. 

Its recurring income base is the highest in the Indonesian property universe, playing a big role in the company’s solid earnings performance in the past few years of property downturn. However, currency depreciation, stricter mortgage regulations, and falling rental yields curb investors’ appetite for property investments, leading to weak presales in the past three years. Property development revenues are expected to be trending down going forward on lower presales in 2016-2018. Contrary to peers, cashflow generation remains very strong, led by the large recurring income base and thick margin. There is however no plan to increase dividends, but rather reserving the excess cash for future landbank acquisition.  

The weaker presales in 1H19 is widely anticipated, but we fear that there may be some selling pressure on each weak presales announcements, given PWON’s premium valuations and stock outperformance YTD. Nonetheless, potential portfolio inflow to high beta stocks and rising risk appetite for smaller-capped stocks should be beneficial for PWON. Our blended target price of IDR773 per share offers 21% upside.

Summary of this insight:

• PWON currently operates 7 retail malls, 4 office towers for lease, 4 hotels, and 1 serviced apartment as its recurring income base, representing 52% of revenues. Retail mall division is PWON’s single biggest revenue contributor, growing at 16% Cagr over the past 5 years, making up 40% of total revenues and 77% of total recurring incomes. 
• The company sells landed housings, condominiums, and offices in five project locations as its “non-recurring” property development revenues, which account for the remaining 48% of revenues. Condominiums and offices are PWON’s second biggest revenue generator, comprising about 30-40% of sales. PWON has been pushing more landed residential projects to mitigate the impact from slower condominiums and offices market.
• Accessibility is a key factor to land appreciation and hence, company’s total NAV. With the traffic worsening around the Greater Jakarta area, time to commute is an increasingly important factor in determining where to stay and access to public transportation such as MRT and LRT will be a powerful driver going forward. PWON’s landbanks are located in strategic locations, essential to the success of its past projects in Jakarta and Surabaya.
• Presales are more sensitive to investment appetite and rental yield rather than BI rates. Cash and cash installments typically make up 65-85% of total payments, while mortgages comprise a minority 15-35%.

• Slower take up rate on high-rise projects leads to larger funding requirement. Condominiums can take up to four years to complete if it is part of a superblock project, and a big portion of the raw materials for construction has to be secured and paid upfront to lock in prices and ensure availability.  Meanwhile, the presales mortgage disbursement regulation issued in 2014 diminishes cash inflow from mortgage-paying customers. We constructed a cashflow simulation model for a typical condominium tower launch to analyze the monthly cashflow impact from slower take up rate and mortgage regulation changes.
• Pros: The operating cashflow remains positive and strong over the past five years of property downturn, the best among the property developers that we visited. The seven retail malls generate over IDR1tn cash per year in the past three years, enough to sustain company’s working capital and capex requirements. Free cashflow (FCF) is mostly positive with the exception of 2014 and 2015 when PWON had two big acquisitions. Net gearing peaked in 2015 and had slowly decreased over the years.

• Cons: For the first time since 2010, PWON’s advances-to-inventory ratio, which is an indicative figure for the property developers’ working capital, fell below 100%. We are expecting a slow recovery for PWON as its inventory account should continue to grow higher in the short term as the company plans to launch few new condominium towers in Surabaya and a new superblock in Bekasi.

• Cons: Election year to election year, we may see some similarity between the 2014 and 2019’s quarterly presales split. 1Q14 and 2Q14 contributed 36% to total FY14 presales, while 4Q14 contributed a chunky 36%. If we assume the same quarterly split for 2019 presales target, we may potentially see 4-32% YoY declines in the next three quarters of presales reporting. Note however that the BI issued its first round of tightening regulations at the end of 2013 and this may have an impact to the 1H14 presales. Also there is a difference in the election schedules as the 2014 election was dragged on until late August, while the 2019 contest will be done by end of April.
• Recommendation: PWON share price is performing relatively in line with the JCI over the past year, outperforming its property peers. Its solid earnings and cashflow are rewarded with premium valuations against peers. The discount to net asset value (NAV) and price-to-earnings (PE) ratio are close to +1 standard deviation above the 5-yr historical mean. After a solid 45% bounce off recent lows, the stock is no longer cheap. However, with better interest rate environment and positive regulatory tailwinds, we may see improving activities after the election. Furthermore, potential portfolio inflow to high beta stocks and better sentiment towards the property sector should also benefit PWON. We derive an IDR773 target price per share for PWON, assuming discount to NAV, PB, and PE valuation re-rating to +1 standard deviation above mean.

3. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

Yesterday, King Street sent a letter to Toshiba Corp (6502 JP) CEO Nobuaki Kurumatani, applying pressure by threatening to nominate alternative directors to the company’s board. The full contents of the letter can be found here.

King Street’s requirements for the new board are stated as:

Among other things, the new Board must:

(i) ensure management applies rigorous financial discipline to capital allocation decisions, including use of excess cash, determination of optimal capital structure and capital expenditure return requirements;

(ii) drive management to re-examine Toshiba’s business portfolio with a critical eye on competitive position, sector landscape, synergies available and profitable growth prospects;

(iii) direct management to evaluate non-operating and underperforming businesses and assets (while respecting that Toshiba may need to be engaged in certain activities important to Japan’s national security interests);

(iv) ensure that management attains global peer profitability levels at each business segment based on projections supported by robust, bottoms-up analysis; and

(v) instill a culture of accountability and ownership at all levels of the organization.

By and large these demands amount to, “follow the instructions in our previous presentation“. That presentation, while thorough in some respects struck us as being naively optimistic, as we noted in Toshiba: King Street Assumptions Look Exceedingly Optimistic.

Travis Lundy also commented on the presentation in Toshiba: King Street’s Buyback Proposals Lack Required Detail and Toshiba: King Street’s Valuation Analysis Is… Punchy?

Given developments in the intervening time period including a sell-down of about 27% of King Street’s initial stake at a price of ¥3,925 (some 64% below the “well over ¥11,000” per share they feel Toshiba is worth) according to Bloomberg, and a downward revision to OP guidance from ¥60bn to ¥20bn, we feel that there is little reason to change our assessment.

4. Lippo Malls REIT – Acquisition of Lippo Mall Puri Announced. Dilutive Rights Issue Coming.

Lippo Malls Indonesia Retail Trust (LMRT SP) (“LMIRT”) today announced the acquisition of Lippo Mall Puri from its sponsor PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk for a consideration of Rp.3,700.0 bil (S$354.7 mil).

There is a significant amount of vendor support provided by Lippo Group to improve the net property income and NPI yield of Lippo Mall Puri. If we exclude the vendor support from the target NPI, the NPI yield excluding vendor support will just be 6.52% per annum.

The transaction is DPU and yield dilutive. The resultant DPU post-transaction will decline from 2.05 S-cents to 1.61 S-cents / 1.42 S-cents. Distribution yield will also fall from 10.25% to 9.28% / 8.85% based on TERP.

The transaction could also potentially result in LMIRT’s gearing increasing from 34.6% to 39.0% which will worsen its balance sheet strength and credit standings. 

In view of the unattractive acquisition and potential EFR dilution, investors should avoid LMIRT for now and wait for opportunity to enter with a greater margin of safety. 

5. Bharti Infratel: Bad News Largely in the Price Now. Upgrade to Neutral

Following three years of share price declines, Chris Hoare has started to moderate his negative view on Bharti Infratel (BHIN IN). Our thesis, that Infratel would struggle as the market consolidated to three players, has largely played out. We remain wary of the viability of Vodafone Idea (IDEA IN) at current tariff levels but the ongoing capital raising at IDEA puts off the day of reckoning, while IDEA’s exit penalties (as they consolidate with Vodafone) are being paid quarterly which will flatter revenues/cash flow. We think earnings forecasts have probably bottomed for the time being and raise our recommendation to Neutral and upgrade our price target to INR270 (from INR220).

In this briefing:

1. Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 3 – Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ)
2. Toshiba: King Street Round Two
3. Lippo Malls REIT – Acquisition of Lippo Mall Puri Announced. Dilutive Rights Issue Coming.
4. Bharti Infratel: Bad News Largely in the Price Now. Upgrade to Neutral
5. Geo Energy (GERL SP): Recovery in Coal Price from 4Q18 Bottom; Continue to Wait for M&A Action

1. Indonesia Property – In Search of the End of the Rainbow – Part 3 – Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ)

In this series under Smartkarma Originals, CrossASEAN insight providers AngusMackintosh and Jessica Irene seek to determine whether or not we are close to the end of the rainbow and to a period of outperformance for the property sector. Our end conclusions will be based on a series of company visits to the major listed property companies in Indonesia, conversations with local banks, property agents, and other relevant channel checks. 

The third company that we explore is Pakuwon Jati (PWON IJ), the biggest retail mall operator, and mixed-use high rise and township developer since 1986. PWON has five major projects in the two biggest cities: Jakarta and Surabaya. 

Its recurring income base is the highest in the Indonesian property universe, playing a big role in the company’s solid earnings performance in the past few years of property downturn. However, currency depreciation, stricter mortgage regulations, and falling rental yields curb investors’ appetite for property investments, leading to weak presales in the past three years. Property development revenues are expected to be trending down going forward on lower presales in 2016-2018. Contrary to peers, cashflow generation remains very strong, led by the large recurring income base and thick margin. There is however no plan to increase dividends, but rather reserving the excess cash for future landbank acquisition.  

The weaker presales in 1H19 is widely anticipated, but we fear that there may be some selling pressure on each weak presales announcements, given PWON’s premium valuations and stock outperformance YTD. Nonetheless, potential portfolio inflow to high beta stocks and rising risk appetite for smaller-capped stocks should be beneficial for PWON. Our blended target price of IDR773 per share offers 21% upside.

Summary of this insight:

• PWON currently operates 7 retail malls, 4 office towers for lease, 4 hotels, and 1 serviced apartment as its recurring income base, representing 52% of revenues. Retail mall division is PWON’s single biggest revenue contributor, growing at 16% Cagr over the past 5 years, making up 40% of total revenues and 77% of total recurring incomes. 
• The company sells landed housings, condominiums, and offices in five project locations as its “non-recurring” property development revenues, which account for the remaining 48% of revenues. Condominiums and offices are PWON’s second biggest revenue generator, comprising about 30-40% of sales. PWON has been pushing more landed residential projects to mitigate the impact from slower condominiums and offices market.
• Accessibility is a key factor to land appreciation and hence, company’s total NAV. With the traffic worsening around the Greater Jakarta area, time to commute is an increasingly important factor in determining where to stay and access to public transportation such as MRT and LRT will be a powerful driver going forward. PWON’s landbanks are located in strategic locations, essential to the success of its past projects in Jakarta and Surabaya.
• Presales are more sensitive to investment appetite and rental yield rather than BI rates. Cash and cash installments typically make up 65-85% of total payments, while mortgages comprise a minority 15-35%.

• Slower take up rate on high-rise projects leads to larger funding requirement. Condominiums can take up to four years to complete if it is part of a superblock project, and a big portion of the raw materials for construction has to be secured and paid upfront to lock in prices and ensure availability.  Meanwhile, the presales mortgage disbursement regulation issued in 2014 diminishes cash inflow from mortgage-paying customers. We constructed a cashflow simulation model for a typical condominium tower launch to analyze the monthly cashflow impact from slower take up rate and mortgage regulation changes.
• Pros: The operating cashflow remains positive and strong over the past five years of property downturn, the best among the property developers that we visited. The seven retail malls generate over IDR1tn cash per year in the past three years, enough to sustain company’s working capital and capex requirements. Free cashflow (FCF) is mostly positive with the exception of 2014 and 2015 when PWON had two big acquisitions. Net gearing peaked in 2015 and had slowly decreased over the years.

• Cons: For the first time since 2010, PWON’s advances-to-inventory ratio, which is an indicative figure for the property developers’ working capital, fell below 100%. We are expecting a slow recovery for PWON as its inventory account should continue to grow higher in the short term as the company plans to launch few new condominium towers in Surabaya and a new superblock in Bekasi.

• Cons: Election year to election year, we may see some similarity between the 2014 and 2019’s quarterly presales split. 1Q14 and 2Q14 contributed 36% to total FY14 presales, while 4Q14 contributed a chunky 36%. If we assume the same quarterly split for 2019 presales target, we may potentially see 4-32% YoY declines in the next three quarters of presales reporting. Note however that the BI issued its first round of tightening regulations at the end of 2013 and this may have an impact to the 1H14 presales. Also there is a difference in the election schedules as the 2014 election was dragged on until late August, while the 2019 contest will be done by end of April.
• Recommendation: PWON share price is performing relatively in line with the JCI over the past year, outperforming its property peers. Its solid earnings and cashflow are rewarded with premium valuations against peers. The discount to net asset value (NAV) and price-to-earnings (PE) ratio are close to +1 standard deviation above the 5-yr historical mean. After a solid 45% bounce off recent lows, the stock is no longer cheap. However, with better interest rate environment and positive regulatory tailwinds, we may see improving activities after the election. Furthermore, potential portfolio inflow to high beta stocks and better sentiment towards the property sector should also benefit PWON. We derive an IDR773 target price per share for PWON, assuming discount to NAV, PB, and PE valuation re-rating to +1 standard deviation above mean.

2. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

Yesterday, King Street sent a letter to Toshiba Corp (6502 JP) CEO Nobuaki Kurumatani, applying pressure by threatening to nominate alternative directors to the company’s board. The full contents of the letter can be found here.

King Street’s requirements for the new board are stated as:

Among other things, the new Board must:

(i) ensure management applies rigorous financial discipline to capital allocation decisions, including use of excess cash, determination of optimal capital structure and capital expenditure return requirements;

(ii) drive management to re-examine Toshiba’s business portfolio with a critical eye on competitive position, sector landscape, synergies available and profitable growth prospects;

(iii) direct management to evaluate non-operating and underperforming businesses and assets (while respecting that Toshiba may need to be engaged in certain activities important to Japan’s national security interests);

(iv) ensure that management attains global peer profitability levels at each business segment based on projections supported by robust, bottoms-up analysis; and

(v) instill a culture of accountability and ownership at all levels of the organization.

By and large these demands amount to, “follow the instructions in our previous presentation“. That presentation, while thorough in some respects struck us as being naively optimistic, as we noted in Toshiba: King Street Assumptions Look Exceedingly Optimistic.

Travis Lundy also commented on the presentation in Toshiba: King Street’s Buyback Proposals Lack Required Detail and Toshiba: King Street’s Valuation Analysis Is… Punchy?

Given developments in the intervening time period including a sell-down of about 27% of King Street’s initial stake at a price of ¥3,925 (some 64% below the “well over ¥11,000” per share they feel Toshiba is worth) according to Bloomberg, and a downward revision to OP guidance from ¥60bn to ¥20bn, we feel that there is little reason to change our assessment.

3. Lippo Malls REIT – Acquisition of Lippo Mall Puri Announced. Dilutive Rights Issue Coming.

Lippo Malls Indonesia Retail Trust (LMRT SP) (“LMIRT”) today announced the acquisition of Lippo Mall Puri from its sponsor PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk for a consideration of Rp.3,700.0 bil (S$354.7 mil).

There is a significant amount of vendor support provided by Lippo Group to improve the net property income and NPI yield of Lippo Mall Puri. If we exclude the vendor support from the target NPI, the NPI yield excluding vendor support will just be 6.52% per annum.

The transaction is DPU and yield dilutive. The resultant DPU post-transaction will decline from 2.05 S-cents to 1.61 S-cents / 1.42 S-cents. Distribution yield will also fall from 10.25% to 9.28% / 8.85% based on TERP.

The transaction could also potentially result in LMIRT’s gearing increasing from 34.6% to 39.0% which will worsen its balance sheet strength and credit standings. 

In view of the unattractive acquisition and potential EFR dilution, investors should avoid LMIRT for now and wait for opportunity to enter with a greater margin of safety. 

4. Bharti Infratel: Bad News Largely in the Price Now. Upgrade to Neutral

Following three years of share price declines, Chris Hoare has started to moderate his negative view on Bharti Infratel (BHIN IN). Our thesis, that Infratel would struggle as the market consolidated to three players, has largely played out. We remain wary of the viability of Vodafone Idea (IDEA IN) at current tariff levels but the ongoing capital raising at IDEA puts off the day of reckoning, while IDEA’s exit penalties (as they consolidate with Vodafone) are being paid quarterly which will flatter revenues/cash flow. We think earnings forecasts have probably bottomed for the time being and raise our recommendation to Neutral and upgrade our price target to INR270 (from INR220).

5. Geo Energy (GERL SP): Recovery in Coal Price from 4Q18 Bottom; Continue to Wait for M&A Action

Geo Energy Resources (GERL SP) reported weak 4Q18 results late last month. The reason for the 5M USD net loss in 4Q18 was mainly due to Chinese import restrictions for Indonesian coal in November and December last year. With the import quota removed as of January ICI4 coal prices have rebounded from +/-30 USD/ton late 2018 to 40 USD/ton this week. 

Geo remains in deep value territory (3x EV/EBITDA) as the company still has over 200M USD+ in cash it raised from a 300M USD bond placing almost 18 months ago. While the CEO announced plans to organize a HK dual listing in 1H19 this cannot materialize unless management can execute on a significant acquisition opportunity it has been considering for the last twelve months. With Indonesian elections coming up next month the hope is that clarity on this potential transaction can be sorted by late 1H19.

While Europe is obsessed with Climate Change doomsday scenarios being shouted around by school-skipping teenagers, the reality is that three out of four of the most populated countries in the world (China, India and Indonesia) will remain heavy users of coal for decades to come. With cleaner coal technology being the key differentiator how much pollution is emitted.

My Fair Value estimate (Base case) remains 0.35 SGD or 89% upside.  Please recall, Macquarie paid 0.29 SGD for a 5% stake in November 2018 and had warrants issued to it at 0.33 SGD.

In this briefing:

1. Nsk (6471) Conditions Have Deteriorated Significantly but Given Valuations, This Is Now in the Price
2. New J. Hutton Exploration Report (Weeks Ending 08/03/19)
3. NIO (NIO): NIO Is Essentially a Distributor, Not an OEM…3 Things to Keep in Mind at Lock-Up Expiry
4. REIT Discover: Sasseur Sizzles with 9% Yield
5. HK Connect Discovery Weekly: PICC, Xinyi Solar (2019-03-08)

1. Nsk (6471) Conditions Have Deteriorated Significantly but Given Valuations, This Is Now in the Price

Over the last 12 months, these shares have been a dreadful performer (as have the other ball bearing makers), both in absolute terms (-36%) and on a relative basis (underperformed TOPIX by 30%). Operating profits for the full year have recently been revised down (for the second time). The operating environment has deteriorated markedly into 4Q. It would appear to us that the market, and analysts, are aware of the current poor trading conditions. The question is when will conditions start to improve. The first half of next year will be very poor indeed with profits down perhaps 35% year-on-year. And it now appears that some analyst’s numbers do not assume recovery for any of next fiscal year, which we believe as too harsh.

Clearly the first half of next year (3/20) is going to show very poor year on year comparisons. This will be unavoidable given a good first half this year and business conditions now. The company itself is now forecasting a 4Q operating profit of Y16.7bn (-40%) having made Y24.8bn in 1Q, Y20.2bn in 2Q and Y21.3bn in 3Q. Assuming this level carries on into the first half of next year before starting a gradual recovery in the second half, then first half operating profit may well come in at about Y32-33bn, a 35% year-on-year fall. The consensus for the full year is currently about Y70bn with the lowest number being Y64bn. Sell recommendations have also begun to appear. To us this appear to be a bit after the event given where earnings are now and where the shares are trading.

The shares currently yield 4.2% and the pay-out ratio this year is 36%. Management’s target is for 30% but at the same time they are reluctant to cut the dividend going forward. This may well prove some support. Meanwhile the company owns 7% of itself and on our calculation is trading on an EV/ebitda of just under 4x. Finally, its book value (0.9x) relative to the market’s book value is now at a very depressed level (see chart below) which suggests to us that although there may be some short term down side risk, we would look to buy on a longer term.

2. New J. Hutton Exploration Report (Weeks Ending 08/03/19)

• Coverage now expanded to 730 mining companies
• Retain Peel Mining Ltd (PEX AU) as a Speculative Buy
• Current drilling infill only
• Est. A$4-4.5m cash with capital raising soon
• Very solid geological genetic model honing future extensional exploration efforts 
• Expect maiden Resource computation to commence after next three hole assays released
• Aeon Metals Ltd (AML AU), Blackearth Minerals NL (BEM AU), Boss Resources (BOE AU), Centaurus Metals (CTM AU), Catalyst Metals (CYL AU), Amur Minerals (AMC LN), Patagonia Gold (PGD LN), Tyranna Resources (TYX AU), Gladiator Resources (GLA AU), King River Resources (KRR AU), Vango Mining (VAN AU), Hummingbird Resources (HUM LN), Caravel Minerals (CVV AU), Lefroy Exploration Ltd (LEX AU), Millennium Minerals (MOY AU), Northern Minerals (NTU AU), Blackham Resources (BLK AU), Avz Minerals (AVZ AU), Orocobre Ltd (ORE AU), Serabi Gold plc (SRB LN), Paringa Resources (PNL AU), Artemis Resources (ARV AU), Centrex Metals (CXM AU), Great Boulder Resources Ltd (GBR AU), Superior Lake Resources (SUP AU), Cora Gold Ltd (CORA LN), European Metals Holdings Ltd (EMH LN), Savannah Resources PLC (SAV LN) , IronRidge Resources Ltd (IRR LN)

3. NIO (NIO): NIO Is Essentially a Distributor, Not an OEM…3 Things to Keep in Mind at Lock-Up Expiry

NIO’s 6-month Lock-up expires today and as of the time of this writing the stock is down by 6.6% from the closing price on Friday, March 8.  The stock’s share overhang issue have been well covered on the Smartkarma platform by other analysts (see NIO Post-CBS Rally Making TSLA Valuation a Grand Bargain (Price Target =$3) , NIO (NIO US): Lock-Up Expiry – This Could Get Messy) so while we do not see a need to rehash those details in this insight, here are 3 things that we believe every NIO investor and would-be investor should keep in mind about the company especially if one wants to play the Tesla vs. NIO scenario:

1. Licensing/Regulatory Risk – NIO has an autonomous driving testing license but no EV manufacturing license.  An EV manufacturing license issued by the NDRC is required for EV manufacturers to market and sell their products but a 100k unit scale is a main prerequisite.  This is a key reason why NIO entered into a 5-year outsourcing relationship with JAC.  While this relationship was assumed to be temporary, there could be many hurdles for NIO to actually obtain a license in the coming years should it decide to invest in production facilities again.
2. Core IP Held by Suppliers – Powertrain technology is held by CATL and the State-owned JAC is listed as the ES8’s manufacturer on the Ministry of Information and Technology website.  Continental AG designs NIO’s vehicle suspension and chassis.  It is also unclear how much actual development work other than exterior/cockpit design is done in-house at NIO based on publicly available information.  Without scale and IP we believe NIO’s bargaining position with its suppliers is weak and displays stronger characteristics of a distributor than a final assembler. 
3. Low ASP, low margins – NIO’s ASP on the ES8 from what we have seen was $64k per unit in 2018 and $63k per unit in 1Q19 while Tesla’s Model X ASP is about $100k per unit.  There is a reason why gross margin at NIO is razor thin and it has more to do with low price point than low volumes in our view.   

Given differences between the U.S. and China operating environment for EV makers, we believe Tesla is not a good equity valuation comp for NIO, which is basically a distributor in our view.  As such, long term value drivers would most likely come from aftermarket and service revenues, while short-mid term value drivers seem elusive especially in the aftermath of the company’s decision to scrap its production plant investment plans in Shanghai.

The NIO ES8

4. REIT Discover: Sasseur Sizzles with 9% Yield

REIT Discover is an insight series featuring under-researched and off-the-radar REITs in an attempt to identify hidden gems and gems in-the-making. In this issue, we follow up on the first China outlet mall REIT listed in Singapore, Sasseur Real Estate Investment (SASSR SP) , whose share price is down 7.5% from its IPO price of S$0.80 since its debut on 28 March 2018. Its distributable income exceeded its IPO forecast for FY2018. Annualized distribution per unit (DPU) yield for FY2018 was 9.1% based on current price. Moving forward, FY2019 DPU projection is S$0.06, translating into a DPU yield of 8.1% compared to FY2018. It is likely that the DPU for the projection years are conservative and the REIT manager will endeavour to beat the IPO forecast for FY2019 and even the annualized DPU for FY2018.

Sasseur REIT’s business model differs from other typical retail malls which lease out assets and receive rental income based on an agreed rental rate. Instead, it has structured a complex form of master lease, called the Entrusted Management Agreement (EMA), where it received a percentage of tenants’ sales turnover as the rental. As such, income generated its portfolio of properties are mainly sales-driven and hence may be unstable.

Essentially, the EMA encompasses a set of obligations that binds the sponsor to a two-year income support to Sasseur REIT in exchange for a long-term master lease which limits DPU upside. This is because a large chunk of the portfolio’s potential revenue growth will go to the sponsor. 

We are not saying this is all bad; the master lease under the EMA provides income stability to the REIT given that gross revenue is sales-driven. Rather, we acknowledge the resilience of the outlet mall business model as seen from the long and successful track record of Tanger Factory Outlet Centers Inc (SKT US) in the United States and strong growth of Bailian Group’s outlet business in China.  What is striking is China’s small outlet market size relatively to the mature regions despite the sheer size of its growing middle to upper-middle class population. This suggests that China’s outlet industry could grow significantly.

At 29% gearing ratio, Sasseur REIT has additional debt headroom of S$283mn to tap on its right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) pipeline of assets to grow its S$1.5bn initial portfolio. Even without inorganic growth, two of its properties, representing 43% of total portfolio valuation, are relatively new assets in their third year of operation, suggesting strong potential for growth. Sasseur REIT looks promising based its results in the last three quarters. Sasseur REIT’s premium P/NAV of 1.03x at the point of listing was surprisingly expensive given that its properties are non-prime outlet malls in China’s Tier-Two cities. P/NAV has since fallen to an attractive 0.8x.  

5. HK Connect Discovery Weekly: PICC, Xinyi Solar (2019-03-08)

In our Discover HK Connect series, we aim to help our investors understand the flow of southbound trades via the Hong Kong Connect, as analyzed by our proprietary data engine. We will discuss the stocks that experienced the most inflow and outflow by mainland investors in the past seven days.

We split the stocks eligible for the Hong Kong Connect trade into three groups: component stocks in the HSCEI index, stocks with a market capitalization between USD 1 billion and USD 5 billion, and stocks with a market capitalization between USD 500 million and USD 1 billion.

In this insight, we will highlight PICC and Xinyi Solar.

In this briefing:

1. Toshiba: King Street Round Two
2. Lippo Malls REIT – Acquisition of Lippo Mall Puri Announced. Dilutive Rights Issue Coming.
3. Bharti Infratel: Bad News Largely in the Price Now. Upgrade to Neutral
4. Geo Energy (GERL SP): Recovery in Coal Price from 4Q18 Bottom; Continue to Wait for M&A Action
5. Meituan Dianping 4Q2018 Quick Read: Monetization Rate and Margins Disappointed

1. Toshiba: King Street Round Two

Yesterday, King Street sent a letter to Toshiba Corp (6502 JP) CEO Nobuaki Kurumatani, applying pressure by threatening to nominate alternative directors to the company’s board. The full contents of the letter can be found here.

King Street’s requirements for the new board are stated as:

Among other things, the new Board must:

(i) ensure management applies rigorous financial discipline to capital allocation decisions, including use of excess cash, determination of optimal capital structure and capital expenditure return requirements;

(ii) drive management to re-examine Toshiba’s business portfolio with a critical eye on competitive position, sector landscape, synergies available and profitable growth prospects;

(iii) direct management to evaluate non-operating and underperforming businesses and assets (while respecting that Toshiba may need to be engaged in certain activities important to Japan’s national security interests);

(iv) ensure that management attains global peer profitability levels at each business segment based on projections supported by robust, bottoms-up analysis; and

(v) instill a culture of accountability and ownership at all levels of the organization.

By and large these demands amount to, “follow the instructions in our previous presentation“. That presentation, while thorough in some respects struck us as being naively optimistic, as we noted in Toshiba: King Street Assumptions Look Exceedingly Optimistic.

Travis Lundy also commented on the presentation in Toshiba: King Street’s Buyback Proposals Lack Required Detail and Toshiba: King Street’s Valuation Analysis Is… Punchy?

Given developments in the intervening time period including a sell-down of about 27% of King Street’s initial stake at a price of ¥3,925 (some 64% below the “well over ¥11,000” per share they feel Toshiba is worth) according to Bloomberg, and a downward revision to OP guidance from ¥60bn to ¥20bn, we feel that there is little reason to change our assessment.

2. Lippo Malls REIT – Acquisition of Lippo Mall Puri Announced. Dilutive Rights Issue Coming.

Lippo Malls Indonesia Retail Trust (LMRT SP) (“LMIRT”) today announced the acquisition of Lippo Mall Puri from its sponsor PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk for a consideration of Rp.3,700.0 bil (S$354.7 mil).

There is a significant amount of vendor support provided by Lippo Group to improve the net property income and NPI yield of Lippo Mall Puri. If we exclude the vendor support from the target NPI, the NPI yield excluding vendor support will just be 6.52% per annum.

The transaction is DPU and yield dilutive. The resultant DPU post-transaction will decline from 2.05 S-cents to 1.61 S-cents / 1.42 S-cents. Distribution yield will also fall from 10.25% to 9.28% / 8.85% based on TERP.

The transaction could also potentially result in LMIRT’s gearing increasing from 34.6% to 39.0% which will worsen its balance sheet strength and credit standings. 

In view of the unattractive acquisition and potential EFR dilution, investors should avoid LMIRT for now and wait for opportunity to enter with a greater margin of safety. 

3. Bharti Infratel: Bad News Largely in the Price Now. Upgrade to Neutral

Following three years of share price declines, Chris Hoare has started to moderate his negative view on Bharti Infratel (BHIN IN). Our thesis, that Infratel would struggle as the market consolidated to three players, has largely played out. We remain wary of the viability of Vodafone Idea (IDEA IN) at current tariff levels but the ongoing capital raising at IDEA puts off the day of reckoning, while IDEA’s exit penalties (as they consolidate with Vodafone) are being paid quarterly which will flatter revenues/cash flow. We think earnings forecasts have probably bottomed for the time being and raise our recommendation to Neutral and upgrade our price target to INR270 (from INR220).

4. Geo Energy (GERL SP): Recovery in Coal Price from 4Q18 Bottom; Continue to Wait for M&A Action

Geo Energy Resources (GERL SP) reported weak 4Q18 results late last month. The reason for the 5M USD net loss in 4Q18 was mainly due to Chinese import restrictions for Indonesian coal in November and December last year. With the import quota removed as of January ICI4 coal prices have rebounded from +/-30 USD/ton late 2018 to 40 USD/ton this week. 

Geo remains in deep value territory (3x EV/EBITDA) as the company still has over 200M USD+ in cash it raised from a 300M USD bond placing almost 18 months ago. While the CEO announced plans to organize a HK dual listing in 1H19 this cannot materialize unless management can execute on a significant acquisition opportunity it has been considering for the last twelve months. With Indonesian elections coming up next month the hope is that clarity on this potential transaction can be sorted by late 1H19.

While Europe is obsessed with Climate Change doomsday scenarios being shouted around by school-skipping teenagers, the reality is that three out of four of the most populated countries in the world (China, India and Indonesia) will remain heavy users of coal for decades to come. With cleaner coal technology being the key differentiator how much pollution is emitted.

My Fair Value estimate (Base case) remains 0.35 SGD or 89% upside.  Please recall, Macquarie paid 0.29 SGD for a 5% stake in November 2018 and had warrants issued to it at 0.33 SGD.

5. Meituan Dianping 4Q2018 Quick Read: Monetization Rate and Margins Disappointed

Meituan Dianping reported 4Q2018 numbers last night. As we covered the company’s IPO and lock-up expiry, we took a close look the company 4Q2018 results and listened in the conference call. While we are encouraged by the company’s strong transaction volume and revenue growth in 4Q2018, we are less bullish given the deceleration of monetization growth. We also note that the company trimmed down the details of reporting, in particular, the operation of its New Initiative segment and hence results were less transparent. 

In this briefing:

1. Geo Energy (GERL SP): Recovery in Coal Price from 4Q18 Bottom; Continue to Wait for M&A Action
2. Meituan Dianping 4Q2018 Quick Read: Monetization Rate and Margins Disappointed
3. Nsk (6471) Conditions Have Deteriorated Significantly but Given Valuations, This Is Now in the Price
4. New J. Hutton Exploration Report (Weeks Ending 08/03/19)
5. NIO (NIO): NIO Is Essentially a Distributor, Not an OEM…3 Things to Keep in Mind at Lock-Up Expiry

1. Geo Energy (GERL SP): Recovery in Coal Price from 4Q18 Bottom; Continue to Wait for M&A Action

Geo Energy Resources (GERL SP) reported weak 4Q18 results late last month. The reason for the 5M USD net loss in 4Q18 was mainly due to Chinese import restrictions for Indonesian coal in November and December last year. With the import quota removed as of January ICI4 coal prices have rebounded from +/-30 USD/ton late 2018 to 40 USD/ton this week. 

Geo remains in deep value territory (3x EV/EBITDA) as the company still has over 200M USD+ in cash it raised from a 300M USD bond placing almost 18 months ago. While the CEO announced plans to organize a HK dual listing in 1H19 this cannot materialize unless management can execute on a significant acquisition opportunity it has been considering for the last twelve months. With Indonesian elections coming up next month the hope is that clarity on this potential transaction can be sorted by late 1H19.

While Europe is obsessed with Climate Change doomsday scenarios being shouted around by school-skipping teenagers, the reality is that three out of four of the most populated countries in the world (China, India and Indonesia) will remain heavy users of coal for decades to come. With cleaner coal technology being the key differentiator how much pollution is emitted.

My Fair Value estimate (Base case) remains 0.35 SGD or 89% upside.  Please recall, Macquarie paid 0.29 SGD for a 5% stake in November 2018 and had warrants issued to it at 0.33 SGD.

2. Meituan Dianping 4Q2018 Quick Read: Monetization Rate and Margins Disappointed

Meituan Dianping reported 4Q2018 numbers last night. As we covered the company’s IPO and lock-up expiry, we took a close look the company 4Q2018 results and listened in the conference call. While we are encouraged by the company’s strong transaction volume and revenue growth in 4Q2018, we are less bullish given the deceleration of monetization growth. We also note that the company trimmed down the details of reporting, in particular, the operation of its New Initiative segment and hence results were less transparent. 

3. Nsk (6471) Conditions Have Deteriorated Significantly but Given Valuations, This Is Now in the Price

Over the last 12 months, these shares have been a dreadful performer (as have the other ball bearing makers), both in absolute terms (-36%) and on a relative basis (underperformed TOPIX by 30%). Operating profits for the full year have recently been revised down (for the second time). The operating environment has deteriorated markedly into 4Q. It would appear to us that the market, and analysts, are aware of the current poor trading conditions. The question is when will conditions start to improve. The first half of next year will be very poor indeed with profits down perhaps 35% year-on-year. And it now appears that some analyst’s numbers do not assume recovery for any of next fiscal year, which we believe as too harsh.

Clearly the first half of next year (3/20) is going to show very poor year on year comparisons. This will be unavoidable given a good first half this year and business conditions now. The company itself is now forecasting a 4Q operating profit of Y16.7bn (-40%) having made Y24.8bn in 1Q, Y20.2bn in 2Q and Y21.3bn in 3Q. Assuming this level carries on into the first half of next year before starting a gradual recovery in the second half, then first half operating profit may well come in at about Y32-33bn, a 35% year-on-year fall. The consensus for the full year is currently about Y70bn with the lowest number being Y64bn. Sell recommendations have also begun to appear. To us this appear to be a bit after the event given where earnings are now and where the shares are trading.

The shares currently yield 4.2% and the pay-out ratio this year is 36%. Management’s target is for 30% but at the same time they are reluctant to cut the dividend going forward. This may well prove some support. Meanwhile the company owns 7% of itself and on our calculation is trading on an EV/ebitda of just under 4x. Finally, its book value (0.9x) relative to the market’s book value is now at a very depressed level (see chart below) which suggests to us that although there may be some short term down side risk, we would look to buy on a longer term.

4. New J. Hutton Exploration Report (Weeks Ending 08/03/19)

• Coverage now expanded to 730 mining companies
• Retain Peel Mining Ltd (PEX AU) as a Speculative Buy
• Current drilling infill only
• Est. A$4-4.5m cash with capital raising soon
• Very solid geological genetic model honing future extensional exploration efforts 
• Expect maiden Resource computation to commence after next three hole assays released
• Aeon Metals Ltd (AML AU), Blackearth Minerals NL (BEM AU), Boss Resources (BOE AU), Centaurus Metals (CTM AU), Catalyst Metals (CYL AU), Amur Minerals (AMC LN), Patagonia Gold (PGD LN), Tyranna Resources (TYX AU), Gladiator Resources (GLA AU), King River Resources (KRR AU), Vango Mining (VAN AU), Hummingbird Resources (HUM LN), Caravel Minerals (CVV AU), Lefroy Exploration Ltd (LEX AU), Millennium Minerals (MOY AU), Northern Minerals (NTU AU), Blackham Resources (BLK AU), Avz Minerals (AVZ AU), Orocobre Ltd (ORE AU), Serabi Gold plc (SRB LN), Paringa Resources (PNL AU), Artemis Resources (ARV AU), Centrex Metals (CXM AU), Great Boulder Resources Ltd (GBR AU), Superior Lake Resources (SUP AU), Cora Gold Ltd (CORA LN), European Metals Holdings Ltd (EMH LN), Savannah Resources PLC (SAV LN) , IronRidge Resources Ltd (IRR LN)

5. NIO (NIO): NIO Is Essentially a Distributor, Not an OEM…3 Things to Keep in Mind at Lock-Up Expiry

NIO’s 6-month Lock-up expires today and as of the time of this writing the stock is down by 6.6% from the closing price on Friday, March 8.  The stock’s share overhang issue have been well covered on the Smartkarma platform by other analysts (see NIO Post-CBS Rally Making TSLA Valuation a Grand Bargain (Price Target =$3) , NIO (NIO US): Lock-Up Expiry – This Could Get Messy) so while we do not see a need to rehash those details in this insight, here are 3 things that we believe every NIO investor and would-be investor should keep in mind about the company especially if one wants to play the Tesla vs. NIO scenario:

1. Licensing/Regulatory Risk – NIO has an autonomous driving testing license but no EV manufacturing license.  An EV manufacturing license issued by the NDRC is required for EV manufacturers to market and sell their products but a 100k unit scale is a main prerequisite.  This is a key reason why NIO entered into a 5-year outsourcing relationship with JAC.  While this relationship was assumed to be temporary, there could be many hurdles for NIO to actually obtain a license in the coming years should it decide to invest in production facilities again.
2. Core IP Held by Suppliers – Powertrain technology is held by CATL and the State-owned JAC is listed as the ES8’s manufacturer on the Ministry of Information and Technology website.  Continental AG designs NIO’s vehicle suspension and chassis.  It is also unclear how much actual development work other than exterior/cockpit design is done in-house at NIO based on publicly available information.  Without scale and IP we believe NIO’s bargaining position with its suppliers is weak and displays stronger characteristics of a distributor than a final assembler. 
3. Low ASP, low margins – NIO’s ASP on the ES8 from what we have seen was $64k per unit in 2018 and $63k per unit in 1Q19 while Tesla’s Model X ASP is about $100k per unit.  There is a reason why gross margin at NIO is razor thin and it has more to do with low price point than low volumes in our view.   

Given differences between the U.S. and China operating environment for EV makers, we believe Tesla is not a good equity valuation comp for NIO, which is basically a distributor in our view.  As such, long term value drivers would most likely come from aftermarket and service revenues, while short-mid term value drivers seem elusive especially in the aftermath of the company’s decision to scrap its production plant investment plans in Shanghai.

The NIO ES8

In this briefing:

1. Meituan Dianping 4Q2018 Quick Read: Monetization Rate and Margins Disappointed
2. Nsk (6471) Conditions Have Deteriorated Significantly but Given Valuations, This Is Now in the Price
3. New J. Hutton Exploration Report (Weeks Ending 08/03/19)
4. NIO (NIO): NIO Is Essentially a Distributor, Not an OEM…3 Things to Keep in Mind at Lock-Up Expiry
5. REIT Discover: Sasseur Sizzles with 9% Yield

1. Meituan Dianping 4Q2018 Quick Read: Monetization Rate and Margins Disappointed

Meituan Dianping reported 4Q2018 numbers last night. As we covered the company’s IPO and lock-up expiry, we took a close look the company 4Q2018 results and listened in the conference call. While we are encouraged by the company’s strong transaction volume and revenue growth in 4Q2018, we are less bullish given the deceleration of monetization growth. We also note that the company trimmed down the details of reporting, in particular, the operation of its New Initiative segment and hence results were less transparent. 

2. Nsk (6471) Conditions Have Deteriorated Significantly but Given Valuations, This Is Now in the Price

Over the last 12 months, these shares have been a dreadful performer (as have the other ball bearing makers), both in absolute terms (-36%) and on a relative basis (underperformed TOPIX by 30%). Operating profits for the full year have recently been revised down (for the second time). The operating environment has deteriorated markedly into 4Q. It would appear to us that the market, and analysts, are aware of the current poor trading conditions. The question is when will conditions start to improve. The first half of next year will be very poor indeed with profits down perhaps 35% year-on-year. And it now appears that some analyst’s numbers do not assume recovery for any of next fiscal year, which we believe as too harsh.

Clearly the first half of next year (3/20) is going to show very poor year on year comparisons. This will be unavoidable given a good first half this year and business conditions now. The company itself is now forecasting a 4Q operating profit of Y16.7bn (-40%) having made Y24.8bn in 1Q, Y20.2bn in 2Q and Y21.3bn in 3Q. Assuming this level carries on into the first half of next year before starting a gradual recovery in the second half, then first half operating profit may well come in at about Y32-33bn, a 35% year-on-year fall. The consensus for the full year is currently about Y70bn with the lowest number being Y64bn. Sell recommendations have also begun to appear. To us this appear to be a bit after the event given where earnings are now and where the shares are trading.

The shares currently yield 4.2% and the pay-out ratio this year is 36%. Management’s target is for 30% but at the same time they are reluctant to cut the dividend going forward. This may well prove some support. Meanwhile the company owns 7% of itself and on our calculation is trading on an EV/ebitda of just under 4x. Finally, its book value (0.9x) relative to the market’s book value is now at a very depressed level (see chart below) which suggests to us that although there may be some short term down side risk, we would look to buy on a longer term.

3. New J. Hutton Exploration Report (Weeks Ending 08/03/19)

• Coverage now expanded to 730 mining companies
• Retain Peel Mining Ltd (PEX AU) as a Speculative Buy
• Current drilling infill only
• Est. A$4-4.5m cash with capital raising soon
• Very solid geological genetic model honing future extensional exploration efforts 
• Expect maiden Resource computation to commence after next three hole assays released
• Aeon Metals Ltd (AML AU), Blackearth Minerals NL (BEM AU), Boss Resources (BOE AU), Centaurus Metals (CTM AU), Catalyst Metals (CYL AU), Amur Minerals (AMC LN), Patagonia Gold (PGD LN), Tyranna Resources (TYX AU), Gladiator Resources (GLA AU), King River Resources (KRR AU), Vango Mining (VAN AU), Hummingbird Resources (HUM LN), Caravel Minerals (CVV AU), Lefroy Exploration Ltd (LEX AU), Millennium Minerals (MOY AU), Northern Minerals (NTU AU), Blackham Resources (BLK AU), Avz Minerals (AVZ AU), Orocobre Ltd (ORE AU), Serabi Gold plc (SRB LN), Paringa Resources (PNL AU), Artemis Resources (ARV AU), Centrex Metals (CXM AU), Great Boulder Resources Ltd (GBR AU), Superior Lake Resources (SUP AU), Cora Gold Ltd (CORA LN), European Metals Holdings Ltd (EMH LN), Savannah Resources PLC (SAV LN) , IronRidge Resources Ltd (IRR LN)

4. NIO (NIO): NIO Is Essentially a Distributor, Not an OEM…3 Things to Keep in Mind at Lock-Up Expiry

NIO’s 6-month Lock-up expires today and as of the time of this writing the stock is down by 6.6% from the closing price on Friday, March 8.  The stock’s share overhang issue have been well covered on the Smartkarma platform by other analysts (see NIO Post-CBS Rally Making TSLA Valuation a Grand Bargain (Price Target =$3) , NIO (NIO US): Lock-Up Expiry – This Could Get Messy) so while we do not see a need to rehash those details in this insight, here are 3 things that we believe every NIO investor and would-be investor should keep in mind about the company especially if one wants to play the Tesla vs. NIO scenario:

1. Licensing/Regulatory Risk – NIO has an autonomous driving testing license but no EV manufacturing license.  An EV manufacturing license issued by the NDRC is required for EV manufacturers to market and sell their products but a 100k unit scale is a main prerequisite.  This is a key reason why NIO entered into a 5-year outsourcing relationship with JAC.  While this relationship was assumed to be temporary, there could be many hurdles for NIO to actually obtain a license in the coming years should it decide to invest in production facilities again.
2. Core IP Held by Suppliers – Powertrain technology is held by CATL and the State-owned JAC is listed as the ES8’s manufacturer on the Ministry of Information and Technology website.  Continental AG designs NIO’s vehicle suspension and chassis.  It is also unclear how much actual development work other than exterior/cockpit design is done in-house at NIO based on publicly available information.  Without scale and IP we believe NIO’s bargaining position with its suppliers is weak and displays stronger characteristics of a distributor than a final assembler. 
3. Low ASP, low margins – NIO’s ASP on the ES8 from what we have seen was $64k per unit in 2018 and $63k per unit in 1Q19 while Tesla’s Model X ASP is about $100k per unit.  There is a reason why gross margin at NIO is razor thin and it has more to do with low price point than low volumes in our view.   

Given differences between the U.S. and China operating environment for EV makers, we believe Tesla is not a good equity valuation comp for NIO, which is basically a distributor in our view.  As such, long term value drivers would most likely come from aftermarket and service revenues, while short-mid term value drivers seem elusive especially in the aftermath of the company’s decision to scrap its production plant investment plans in Shanghai.

The NIO ES8

5. REIT Discover: Sasseur Sizzles with 9% Yield

REIT Discover is an insight series featuring under-researched and off-the-radar REITs in an attempt to identify hidden gems and gems in-the-making. In this issue, we follow up on the first China outlet mall REIT listed in Singapore, Sasseur Real Estate Investment (SASSR SP) , whose share price is down 7.5% from its IPO price of S$0.80 since its debut on 28 March 2018. Its distributable income exceeded its IPO forecast for FY2018. Annualized distribution per unit (DPU) yield for FY2018 was 9.1% based on current price. Moving forward, FY2019 DPU projection is S$0.06, translating into a DPU yield of 8.1% compared to FY2018. It is likely that the DPU for the projection years are conservative and the REIT manager will endeavour to beat the IPO forecast for FY2019 and even the annualized DPU for FY2018.

Sasseur REIT’s business model differs from other typical retail malls which lease out assets and receive rental income based on an agreed rental rate. Instead, it has structured a complex form of master lease, called the Entrusted Management Agreement (EMA), where it received a percentage of tenants’ sales turnover as the rental. As such, income generated its portfolio of properties are mainly sales-driven and hence may be unstable.

Essentially, the EMA encompasses a set of obligations that binds the sponsor to a two-year income support to Sasseur REIT in exchange for a long-term master lease which limits DPU upside. This is because a large chunk of the portfolio’s potential revenue growth will go to the sponsor. 

We are not saying this is all bad; the master lease under the EMA provides income stability to the REIT given that gross revenue is sales-driven. Rather, we acknowledge the resilience of the outlet mall business model as seen from the long and successful track record of Tanger Factory Outlet Centers Inc (SKT US) in the United States and strong growth of Bailian Group’s outlet business in China.  What is striking is China’s small outlet market size relatively to the mature regions despite the sheer size of its growing middle to upper-middle class population. This suggests that China’s outlet industry could grow significantly.

At 29% gearing ratio, Sasseur REIT has additional debt headroom of S$283mn to tap on its right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) pipeline of assets to grow its S$1.5bn initial portfolio. Even without inorganic growth, two of its properties, representing 43% of total portfolio valuation, are relatively new assets in their third year of operation, suggesting strong potential for growth. Sasseur REIT looks promising based its results in the last three quarters. Sasseur REIT’s premium P/NAV of 1.03x at the point of listing was surprisingly expensive given that its properties are non-prime outlet malls in China’s Tier-Two cities. P/NAV has since fallen to an attractive 0.8x.  

In this briefing:

1. New J. Hutton Exploration Report (Weeks Ending 08/03/19)
2. NIO (NIO): NIO Is Essentially a Distributor, Not an OEM…3 Things to Keep in Mind at Lock-Up Expiry
3. REIT Discover: Sasseur Sizzles with 9% Yield
4. HK Connect Discovery Weekly: PICC, Xinyi Solar (2019-03-08)
5. Japan Tobacco: No Dire Consequences Despite Late Entry to Heated Tobacco

1. New J. Hutton Exploration Report (Weeks Ending 08/03/19)

• Coverage now expanded to 730 mining companies
• Retain Peel Mining Ltd (PEX AU) as a Speculative Buy
• Current drilling infill only
• Est. A$4-4.5m cash with capital raising soon
• Very solid geological genetic model honing future extensional exploration efforts 
• Expect maiden Resource computation to commence after next three hole assays released
• Aeon Metals Ltd (AML AU), Blackearth Minerals NL (BEM AU), Boss Resources (BOE AU), Centaurus Metals (CTM AU), Catalyst Metals (CYL AU), Amur Minerals (AMC LN), Patagonia Gold (PGD LN), Tyranna Resources (TYX AU), Gladiator Resources (GLA AU), King River Resources (KRR AU), Vango Mining (VAN AU), Hummingbird Resources (HUM LN), Caravel Minerals (CVV AU), Lefroy Exploration Ltd (LEX AU), Millennium Minerals (MOY AU), Northern Minerals (NTU AU), Blackham Resources (BLK AU), Avz Minerals (AVZ AU), Orocobre Ltd (ORE AU), Serabi Gold plc (SRB LN), Paringa Resources (PNL AU), Artemis Resources (ARV AU), Centrex Metals (CXM AU), Great Boulder Resources Ltd (GBR AU), Superior Lake Resources (SUP AU), Cora Gold Ltd (CORA LN), European Metals Holdings Ltd (EMH LN), Savannah Resources PLC (SAV LN) , IronRidge Resources Ltd (IRR LN)

2. NIO (NIO): NIO Is Essentially a Distributor, Not an OEM…3 Things to Keep in Mind at Lock-Up Expiry

NIO’s 6-month Lock-up expires today and as of the time of this writing the stock is down by 6.6% from the closing price on Friday, March 8.  The stock’s share overhang issue have been well covered on the Smartkarma platform by other analysts (see NIO Post-CBS Rally Making TSLA Valuation a Grand Bargain (Price Target =$3) , NIO (NIO US): Lock-Up Expiry – This Could Get Messy) so while we do not see a need to rehash those details in this insight, here are 3 things that we believe every NIO investor and would-be investor should keep in mind about the company especially if one wants to play the Tesla vs. NIO scenario:

1. Licensing/Regulatory Risk – NIO has an autonomous driving testing license but no EV manufacturing license.  An EV manufacturing license issued by the NDRC is required for EV manufacturers to market and sell their products but a 100k unit scale is a main prerequisite.  This is a key reason why NIO entered into a 5-year outsourcing relationship with JAC.  While this relationship was assumed to be temporary, there could be many hurdles for NIO to actually obtain a license in the coming years should it decide to invest in production facilities again.
2. Core IP Held by Suppliers – Powertrain technology is held by CATL and the State-owned JAC is listed as the ES8’s manufacturer on the Ministry of Information and Technology website.  Continental AG designs NIO’s vehicle suspension and chassis.  It is also unclear how much actual development work other than exterior/cockpit design is done in-house at NIO based on publicly available information.  Without scale and IP we believe NIO’s bargaining position with its suppliers is weak and displays stronger characteristics of a distributor than a final assembler. 
3. Low ASP, low margins – NIO’s ASP on the ES8 from what we have seen was $64k per unit in 2018 and $63k per unit in 1Q19 while Tesla’s Model X ASP is about $100k per unit.  There is a reason why gross margin at NIO is razor thin and it has more to do with low price point than low volumes in our view.   

Given differences between the U.S. and China operating environment for EV makers, we believe Tesla is not a good equity valuation comp for NIO, which is basically a distributor in our view.  As such, long term value drivers would most likely come from aftermarket and service revenues, while short-mid term value drivers seem elusive especially in the aftermath of the company’s decision to scrap its production plant investment plans in Shanghai.

The NIO ES8

3. REIT Discover: Sasseur Sizzles with 9% Yield

REIT Discover is an insight series featuring under-researched and off-the-radar REITs in an attempt to identify hidden gems and gems in-the-making. In this issue, we follow up on the first China outlet mall REIT listed in Singapore, Sasseur Real Estate Investment (SASSR SP) , whose share price is down 7.5% from its IPO price of S$0.80 since its debut on 28 March 2018. Its distributable income exceeded its IPO forecast for FY2018. Annualized distribution per unit (DPU) yield for FY2018 was 9.1% based on current price. Moving forward, FY2019 DPU projection is S$0.06, translating into a DPU yield of 8.1% compared to FY2018. It is likely that the DPU for the projection years are conservative and the REIT manager will endeavour to beat the IPO forecast for FY2019 and even the annualized DPU for FY2018.

Sasseur REIT’s business model differs from other typical retail malls which lease out assets and receive rental income based on an agreed rental rate. Instead, it has structured a complex form of master lease, called the Entrusted Management Agreement (EMA), where it received a percentage of tenants’ sales turnover as the rental. As such, income generated its portfolio of properties are mainly sales-driven and hence may be unstable.

Essentially, the EMA encompasses a set of obligations that binds the sponsor to a two-year income support to Sasseur REIT in exchange for a long-term master lease which limits DPU upside. This is because a large chunk of the portfolio’s potential revenue growth will go to the sponsor. 

We are not saying this is all bad; the master lease under the EMA provides income stability to the REIT given that gross revenue is sales-driven. Rather, we acknowledge the resilience of the outlet mall business model as seen from the long and successful track record of Tanger Factory Outlet Centers Inc (SKT US) in the United States and strong growth of Bailian Group’s outlet business in China.  What is striking is China’s small outlet market size relatively to the mature regions despite the sheer size of its growing middle to upper-middle class population. This suggests that China’s outlet industry could grow significantly.

At 29% gearing ratio, Sasseur REIT has additional debt headroom of S$283mn to tap on its right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) pipeline of assets to grow its S$1.5bn initial portfolio. Even without inorganic growth, two of its properties, representing 43% of total portfolio valuation, are relatively new assets in their third year of operation, suggesting strong potential for growth. Sasseur REIT looks promising based its results in the last three quarters. Sasseur REIT’s premium P/NAV of 1.03x at the point of listing was surprisingly expensive given that its properties are non-prime outlet malls in China’s Tier-Two cities. P/NAV has since fallen to an attractive 0.8x.  

4. HK Connect Discovery Weekly: PICC, Xinyi Solar (2019-03-08)

In our Discover HK Connect series, we aim to help our investors understand the flow of southbound trades via the Hong Kong Connect, as analyzed by our proprietary data engine. We will discuss the stocks that experienced the most inflow and outflow by mainland investors in the past seven days.

We split the stocks eligible for the Hong Kong Connect trade into three groups: component stocks in the HSCEI index, stocks with a market capitalization between USD 1 billion and USD 5 billion, and stocks with a market capitalization between USD 500 million and USD 1 billion.

In this insight, we will highlight PICC and Xinyi Solar.

5. Japan Tobacco: No Dire Consequences Despite Late Entry to Heated Tobacco

• Late entry to Japanese heated tobacco market resulted in Japan Tobacco (2914 JP) losing market share to peers
• New product launches to give Japan Tobacco a fighting chance against IQOS
• Early maturity of heated tobacco in Japan: a blessing in disguise for Japan Tobacco
• Pricing power is expected to be back on track in future
• PloomTECH will soon be ready to compete with IQOS at a global level
• More product offerings targeting different customer needs in reduced risk products category
• International segment volume growth driven by global flagship brands and acquisitions
• Market unjustly penalising Japan Tobacco for the early maturity of heated tobacco segment
• Transformation of dividend yield from industry worst to industry best
• Undervalued at 10.09x EV/Forward EBIT: DCF target price yields 21.8% upside

In this briefing:

1. NIO (NIO): NIO Is Essentially a Distributor, Not an OEM…3 Things to Keep in Mind at Lock-Up Expiry
2. REIT Discover: Sasseur Sizzles with 9% Yield
3. HK Connect Discovery Weekly: PICC, Xinyi Solar (2019-03-08)
4. Japan Tobacco: No Dire Consequences Despite Late Entry to Heated Tobacco
5. Hitachi High Tech’s Ace in the Hole

1. NIO (NIO): NIO Is Essentially a Distributor, Not an OEM…3 Things to Keep in Mind at Lock-Up Expiry

NIO’s 6-month Lock-up expires today and as of the time of this writing the stock is down by 6.6% from the closing price on Friday, March 8.  The stock’s share overhang issue have been well covered on the Smartkarma platform by other analysts (see NIO Post-CBS Rally Making TSLA Valuation a Grand Bargain (Price Target =$3) , NIO (NIO US): Lock-Up Expiry – This Could Get Messy) so while we do not see a need to rehash those details in this insight, here are 3 things that we believe every NIO investor and would-be investor should keep in mind about the company especially if one wants to play the Tesla vs. NIO scenario:

1. Licensing/Regulatory Risk – NIO has an autonomous driving testing license but no EV manufacturing license.  An EV manufacturing license issued by the NDRC is required for EV manufacturers to market and sell their products but a 100k unit scale is a main prerequisite.  This is a key reason why NIO entered into a 5-year outsourcing relationship with JAC.  While this relationship was assumed to be temporary, there could be many hurdles for NIO to actually obtain a license in the coming years should it decide to invest in production facilities again.
2. Core IP Held by Suppliers – Powertrain technology is held by CATL and the State-owned JAC is listed as the ES8’s manufacturer on the Ministry of Information and Technology website.  Continental AG designs NIO’s vehicle suspension and chassis.  It is also unclear how much actual development work other than exterior/cockpit design is done in-house at NIO based on publicly available information.  Without scale and IP we believe NIO’s bargaining position with its suppliers is weak and displays stronger characteristics of a distributor than a final assembler. 
3. Low ASP, low margins – NIO’s ASP on the ES8 from what we have seen was $64k per unit in 2018 and $63k per unit in 1Q19 while Tesla’s Model X ASP is about $100k per unit.  There is a reason why gross margin at NIO is razor thin and it has more to do with low price point than low volumes in our view.   

Given differences between the U.S. and China operating environment for EV makers, we believe Tesla is not a good equity valuation comp for NIO, which is basically a distributor in our view.  As such, long term value drivers would most likely come from aftermarket and service revenues, while short-mid term value drivers seem elusive especially in the aftermath of the company’s decision to scrap its production plant investment plans in Shanghai.

The NIO ES8

2. REIT Discover: Sasseur Sizzles with 9% Yield

REIT Discover is an insight series featuring under-researched and off-the-radar REITs in an attempt to identify hidden gems and gems in-the-making. In this issue, we follow up on the first China outlet mall REIT listed in Singapore, Sasseur Real Estate Investment (SASSR SP) , whose share price is down 7.5% from its IPO price of S$0.80 since its debut on 28 March 2018. Its distributable income exceeded its IPO forecast for FY2018. Annualized distribution per unit (DPU) yield for FY2018 was 9.1% based on current price. Moving forward, FY2019 DPU projection is S$0.06, translating into a DPU yield of 8.1% compared to FY2018. It is likely that the DPU for the projection years are conservative and the REIT manager will endeavour to beat the IPO forecast for FY2019 and even the annualized DPU for FY2018.

Sasseur REIT’s business model differs from other typical retail malls which lease out assets and receive rental income based on an agreed rental rate. Instead, it has structured a complex form of master lease, called the Entrusted Management Agreement (EMA), where it received a percentage of tenants’ sales turnover as the rental. As such, income generated its portfolio of properties are mainly sales-driven and hence may be unstable.

Essentially, the EMA encompasses a set of obligations that binds the sponsor to a two-year income support to Sasseur REIT in exchange for a long-term master lease which limits DPU upside. This is because a large chunk of the portfolio’s potential revenue growth will go to the sponsor. 

We are not saying this is all bad; the master lease under the EMA provides income stability to the REIT given that gross revenue is sales-driven. Rather, we acknowledge the resilience of the outlet mall business model as seen from the long and successful track record of Tanger Factory Outlet Centers Inc (SKT US) in the United States and strong growth of Bailian Group’s outlet business in China.  What is striking is China’s small outlet market size relatively to the mature regions despite the sheer size of its growing middle to upper-middle class population. This suggests that China’s outlet industry could grow significantly.

At 29% gearing ratio, Sasseur REIT has additional debt headroom of S$283mn to tap on its right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) pipeline of assets to grow its S$1.5bn initial portfolio. Even without inorganic growth, two of its properties, representing 43% of total portfolio valuation, are relatively new assets in their third year of operation, suggesting strong potential for growth. Sasseur REIT looks promising based its results in the last three quarters. Sasseur REIT’s premium P/NAV of 1.03x at the point of listing was surprisingly expensive given that its properties are non-prime outlet malls in China’s Tier-Two cities. P/NAV has since fallen to an attractive 0.8x.  

3. HK Connect Discovery Weekly: PICC, Xinyi Solar (2019-03-08)

In our Discover HK Connect series, we aim to help our investors understand the flow of southbound trades via the Hong Kong Connect, as analyzed by our proprietary data engine. We will discuss the stocks that experienced the most inflow and outflow by mainland investors in the past seven days.

We split the stocks eligible for the Hong Kong Connect trade into three groups: component stocks in the HSCEI index, stocks with a market capitalization between USD 1 billion and USD 5 billion, and stocks with a market capitalization between USD 500 million and USD 1 billion.

In this insight, we will highlight PICC and Xinyi Solar.

4. Japan Tobacco: No Dire Consequences Despite Late Entry to Heated Tobacco

• Late entry to Japanese heated tobacco market resulted in Japan Tobacco (2914 JP) losing market share to peers
• New product launches to give Japan Tobacco a fighting chance against IQOS
• Early maturity of heated tobacco in Japan: a blessing in disguise for Japan Tobacco
• Pricing power is expected to be back on track in future
• PloomTECH will soon be ready to compete with IQOS at a global level
• More product offerings targeting different customer needs in reduced risk products category
• International segment volume growth driven by global flagship brands and acquisitions
• Market unjustly penalising Japan Tobacco for the early maturity of heated tobacco segment
• Transformation of dividend yield from industry worst to industry best
• Undervalued at 10.09x EV/Forward EBIT: DCF target price yields 21.8% upside

5. Hitachi High Tech’s Ace in the Hole

Last Friday, Hitachi (6501) was reported to be considering selling Hitachi Chemical (4217), according to media sources over the weekend. This has sent Hitachi Chemical and its parent into a frenzy with Hitachi Chemical ADR up 13% last Friday. We believe this news is relevant for Hitachi High Tech because both subsidiaries are 51-52% consolidated by the parent Hitachi, and both have arguably businesses with little synergy with the parent. We believe that Hitachi High Tech is also rumored to be on the block for sale or spin-off.  Media sources say that Hitachi is considering a sale of Hitachi Chemical and would reap Y300bn.  The current value of their 51% ownership in Hitachi Chemical is Y211bn, and thus there is 42% implied upside if the Y300bn figure is achieved.

To recap Q3 results for Hitachi High Tech from January 31, 2019, the numbers were decent with earnings above consensus forecasts by 33% for Q3 (Y15.8bn OP versus Y13.8bn forecast). The profit rise was due to improved margins in medical and continued strength in process semiconductor equipment. The shares are up 20% year-to-date, outperforming the Nikkei by 15%. Some of the fears of a sharp slowdown in semiconductor have been nullified by the continued strength in logic chip investments as well as the improved profitability in medical clinical analyzers. Medical profits soared 46% YoY in Q3 to Y7.6bn on a 13% YoY increase in revenues. OP margin improved from 12.3% to 15.8% YoY.

In this briefing:

1. REIT Discover: Sasseur Sizzles with 9% Yield
2. HK Connect Discovery Weekly: PICC, Xinyi Solar (2019-03-08)
3. Japan Tobacco: No Dire Consequences Despite Late Entry to Heated Tobacco
4. Hitachi High Tech’s Ace in the Hole
5. Bank Alfalah: Metrics Point to Falāh

1. REIT Discover: Sasseur Sizzles with 9% Yield

REIT Discover is an insight series featuring under-researched and off-the-radar REITs in an attempt to identify hidden gems and gems in-the-making. In this issue, we follow up on the first China outlet mall REIT listed in Singapore, Sasseur Real Estate Investment (SASSR SP) , whose share price is down 7.5% from its IPO price of S$0.80 since its debut on 28 March 2018. Its distributable income exceeded its IPO forecast for FY2018. Annualized distribution per unit (DPU) yield for FY2018 was 9.1% based on current price. Moving forward, FY2019 DPU projection is S$0.06, translating into a DPU yield of 8.1% compared to FY2018. It is likely that the DPU for the projection years are conservative and the REIT manager will endeavour to beat the IPO forecast for FY2019 and even the annualized DPU for FY2018.

Sasseur REIT’s business model differs from other typical retail malls which lease out assets and receive rental income based on an agreed rental rate. Instead, it has structured a complex form of master lease, called the Entrusted Management Agreement (EMA), where it received a percentage of tenants’ sales turnover as the rental. As such, income generated its portfolio of properties are mainly sales-driven and hence may be unstable.

Essentially, the EMA encompasses a set of obligations that binds the sponsor to a two-year income support to Sasseur REIT in exchange for a long-term master lease which limits DPU upside. This is because a large chunk of the portfolio’s potential revenue growth will go to the sponsor. 

We are not saying this is all bad; the master lease under the EMA provides income stability to the REIT given that gross revenue is sales-driven. Rather, we acknowledge the resilience of the outlet mall business model as seen from the long and successful track record of Tanger Factory Outlet Centers Inc (SKT US) in the United States and strong growth of Bailian Group’s outlet business in China.  What is striking is China’s small outlet market size relatively to the mature regions despite the sheer size of its growing middle to upper-middle class population. This suggests that China’s outlet industry could grow significantly.

At 29% gearing ratio, Sasseur REIT has additional debt headroom of S$283mn to tap on its right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) pipeline of assets to grow its S$1.5bn initial portfolio. Even without inorganic growth, two of its properties, representing 43% of total portfolio valuation, are relatively new assets in their third year of operation, suggesting strong potential for growth. Sasseur REIT looks promising based its results in the last three quarters. Sasseur REIT’s premium P/NAV of 1.03x at the point of listing was surprisingly expensive given that its properties are non-prime outlet malls in China’s Tier-Two cities. P/NAV has since fallen to an attractive 0.8x.  

2. HK Connect Discovery Weekly: PICC, Xinyi Solar (2019-03-08)

In our Discover HK Connect series, we aim to help our investors understand the flow of southbound trades via the Hong Kong Connect, as analyzed by our proprietary data engine. We will discuss the stocks that experienced the most inflow and outflow by mainland investors in the past seven days.

We split the stocks eligible for the Hong Kong Connect trade into three groups: component stocks in the HSCEI index, stocks with a market capitalization between USD 1 billion and USD 5 billion, and stocks with a market capitalization between USD 500 million and USD 1 billion.

In this insight, we will highlight PICC and Xinyi Solar.

3. Japan Tobacco: No Dire Consequences Despite Late Entry to Heated Tobacco

• Late entry to Japanese heated tobacco market resulted in Japan Tobacco (2914 JP) losing market share to peers
• New product launches to give Japan Tobacco a fighting chance against IQOS
• Early maturity of heated tobacco in Japan: a blessing in disguise for Japan Tobacco
• Pricing power is expected to be back on track in future
• PloomTECH will soon be ready to compete with IQOS at a global level
• More product offerings targeting different customer needs in reduced risk products category
• International segment volume growth driven by global flagship brands and acquisitions
• Market unjustly penalising Japan Tobacco for the early maturity of heated tobacco segment
• Transformation of dividend yield from industry worst to industry best
• Undervalued at 10.09x EV/Forward EBIT: DCF target price yields 21.8% upside

4. Hitachi High Tech’s Ace in the Hole

Last Friday, Hitachi (6501) was reported to be considering selling Hitachi Chemical (4217), according to media sources over the weekend. This has sent Hitachi Chemical and its parent into a frenzy with Hitachi Chemical ADR up 13% last Friday. We believe this news is relevant for Hitachi High Tech because both subsidiaries are 51-52% consolidated by the parent Hitachi, and both have arguably businesses with little synergy with the parent. We believe that Hitachi High Tech is also rumored to be on the block for sale or spin-off.  Media sources say that Hitachi is considering a sale of Hitachi Chemical and would reap Y300bn.  The current value of their 51% ownership in Hitachi Chemical is Y211bn, and thus there is 42% implied upside if the Y300bn figure is achieved.

To recap Q3 results for Hitachi High Tech from January 31, 2019, the numbers were decent with earnings above consensus forecasts by 33% for Q3 (Y15.8bn OP versus Y13.8bn forecast). The profit rise was due to improved margins in medical and continued strength in process semiconductor equipment. The shares are up 20% year-to-date, outperforming the Nikkei by 15%. Some of the fears of a sharp slowdown in semiconductor have been nullified by the continued strength in logic chip investments as well as the improved profitability in medical clinical analyzers. Medical profits soared 46% YoY in Q3 to Y7.6bn on a 13% YoY increase in revenues. OP margin improved from 12.3% to 15.8% YoY.

5. Bank Alfalah: Metrics Point to Falāh

Bank Alfalah (BAFL PA) is heading in the right direction as testified by its metric progression, embodied in its quintile 1 PH Score™.

Valuations are not stretched – especially the Total return Ratio of 1.8x and an Earnings Yield of 14.5%.

Combining the fundamental momentum signals (PH Score™) with franchise valuation, and a low RSI, places BAFL PA in the top decile of bank opportunities globally.