On Wednesday, Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU) rejected an indicative takeover offer from rival Australian Pharma Industries (API AU). Shareholders were disappointed with the news, with Sigma’s shares closing 12.3% lower at A$0.54 per share. API shares fared better and fell 3.6% to A$1.35 each.
We believe Sigma’s board were left with the tough choice of accepting a lowball offer or improving the existing business and riding out the inevitable share price fall. By rejecting the API bid, the Sigma board made the difficult but right choice, in our view. While further downside risk to the share price is limited, we caution that shareholders require patience as the road to share price recovery will be long.
Last November, Xenith and QANTM , both leading providers of IP origination services in Australia, announced a merger via an all-scrip scheme of arrangement, whereby Xenith shareholders will receive 1.22 QANTM shares for every Xenith share, or an implied value of A$1.598/share. QANTM and Xenith shareholders would own 55% and 45% of the merged group with a then pro-forma capitalisation of A$285mn. Pre-cost synergies are estimated at A$7mn/annum at the end of year three.
Xenith’s board unanimously recommended the merger to its shareholders.
IPH did not blink and on the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, lobbed an unsolicited, indicative, preliminary, conditional and non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close.
QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. IPH countered those claims, spurring QANTM to counter those countered claims.
On the 13 February 2019, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support the QANTM scheme and intends to vote against it. In response, both Xenith and QANTM announced that neither had received a proposal from IPH. Xenith’s shares increased 20.3% to close at A$1.69/share.
The provisional date for ACCC s clearance of the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March. The provisional date for IPH/Xenith is the 2 May. The QANTM/Xenith Scheme meeting is scheduled for 3 April with a 24 April implementation date. IPH’s proposal has an indicative implementation date of mid-July.
IPH’s proposal currently offers an implied value of $1.98 (65% in cash) against $1.85 for QANTM’s all-scrip offer.
The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies. IPH is the oldest, and the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.
With IPH’s blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme will fail. Xenith should engage with IPH.
While the downgrades to the ECB outlook may not have been unexpected, they appear to have been viewed as the last straw for EUR bulls. EUR has failed to respond to lower US rates in recent months or a moderate recovery in global risk appetite. An expectation that ECB rates policy normalisation may take much longer may be encouraging the use of the EUR as a funding currency for ‘carry trades’. The AUD is flirting with key support (0.70), and widespread expectation that the RBA will capitulate on its long-held reluctance to cut rates below 1.5% is weighing on the currency. Labour market data may hold the key.
Best of luck for the new week – Rickin, Venkat and Arun
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For years semiconductor makers and investors have worried that Moore’s Law will end. Although it is not difficult to find proponents of this argument today, this Insight provides evidence that the venerable phenomenon not only is still moving forward, but that it has, in some cases, been moving faster than it has in the past.
The last three years have been characterized by significant M&A activity in the upstream oil and gas industry. As the oil cycle recovered from the price bottom in January 2016, lower asset prices and corporate valuations created opportunities for the companies with a stronger balance sheet to grow inorganically while their weaker competitors were forced to downsize their portfolios. 2018, in particular, has seen a surge of corporate M&A which has been driving consolidation in the industry. This insight examines the trends that have shaped the M&A markets since 2016 with a closer view of 2018 and the outlook for 2019.
Exhibit 1: M&A volume compared to the E&P index and the oil price since 2016
Source: Energy Market Square, Capital IQ. Market value weighted index including independent E&P companies with market value greater than $300m as of 19 April 2018. Data as of 7 March 2019. The M&A volume in September 2018 includes the merger of Wintershall and DEA with an estimated value of $10bn.
On Thursday, MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) released its Scheme Booklet in which the Independent Expert, Grant Samuel, valued MYOB between A$3.19 and A$3.69 per share. Consequently, Grant Samuel concluded that KKR & Co Inc (KKR US)‘s revised proposal of A$3.40 cash per share is fair and reasonable. However, Manikay Partners continues to voice concerns about the KKR proposal as it believes MYOB is worth well in excess of A$4.00 per share.
With the shares 4 cents below KKR’s revised proposal, we continue to believe shareholders should cash out as Manikay’s valuation is only justifiable if MYOB’s delivers flawless execution.
Brexit fear diminishing boosting GBP and other currencies
Eurozone IP rebounds, the first sign of stabilisation
Pressure increases for a rate cut in Australia
We can see a case for GBP to rise towards 1.40 helping recoveries in EUR and AUD, and weakening the USD more broadly. But the outlook for a more sustained period of low EUR rates, no structural underweight in EUR, and limited demand for Euro assets suggest that its upside may be limited. Rate cut expectations have reached a new peak in Australia, and the AUD should continue to remain heavy. Chinese economic reports (trade, credit, PMIs) have been weak, Jan/Feb activity data are due later today. The overall outlook for the USD remains mixed and cautious trading continues to be advised. Event risk will keep traders playing the short game.
On Wednesday, Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU) rejected an indicative takeover offer from rival Australian Pharma Industries (API AU). Shareholders were disappointed with the news, with Sigma’s shares closing 12.3% lower at A$0.54 per share. API shares fared better and fell 3.6% to A$1.35 each.
We believe Sigma’s board were left with the tough choice of accepting a lowball offer or improving the existing business and riding out the inevitable share price fall. By rejecting the API bid, the Sigma board made the difficult but right choice, in our view. While further downside risk to the share price is limited, we caution that shareholders require patience as the road to share price recovery will be long.
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The last three years have been characterized by significant M&A activity in the upstream oil and gas industry. As the oil cycle recovered from the price bottom in January 2016, lower asset prices and corporate valuations created opportunities for the companies with a stronger balance sheet to grow inorganically while their weaker competitors were forced to downsize their portfolios. 2018, in particular, has seen a surge of corporate M&A which has been driving consolidation in the industry. This insight examines the trends that have shaped the M&A markets since 2016 with a closer view of 2018 and the outlook for 2019.
Exhibit 1: M&A volume compared to the E&P index and the oil price since 2016
Source: Energy Market Square, Capital IQ. Market value weighted index including independent E&P companies with market value greater than $300m as of 19 April 2018. Data as of 7 March 2019. The M&A volume in September 2018 includes the merger of Wintershall and DEA with an estimated value of $10bn.
On Thursday, MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) released its Scheme Booklet in which the Independent Expert, Grant Samuel, valued MYOB between A$3.19 and A$3.69 per share. Consequently, Grant Samuel concluded that KKR & Co Inc (KKR US)‘s revised proposal of A$3.40 cash per share is fair and reasonable. However, Manikay Partners continues to voice concerns about the KKR proposal as it believes MYOB is worth well in excess of A$4.00 per share.
With the shares 4 cents below KKR’s revised proposal, we continue to believe shareholders should cash out as Manikay’s valuation is only justifiable if MYOB’s delivers flawless execution.
Brexit fear diminishing boosting GBP and other currencies
Eurozone IP rebounds, the first sign of stabilisation
Pressure increases for a rate cut in Australia
We can see a case for GBP to rise towards 1.40 helping recoveries in EUR and AUD, and weakening the USD more broadly. But the outlook for a more sustained period of low EUR rates, no structural underweight in EUR, and limited demand for Euro assets suggest that its upside may be limited. Rate cut expectations have reached a new peak in Australia, and the AUD should continue to remain heavy. Chinese economic reports (trade, credit, PMIs) have been weak, Jan/Feb activity data are due later today. The overall outlook for the USD remains mixed and cautious trading continues to be advised. Event risk will keep traders playing the short game.
On Wednesday, Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU) rejected an indicative takeover offer from rival Australian Pharma Industries (API AU). Shareholders were disappointed with the news, with Sigma’s shares closing 12.3% lower at A$0.54 per share. API shares fared better and fell 3.6% to A$1.35 each.
We believe Sigma’s board were left with the tough choice of accepting a lowball offer or improving the existing business and riding out the inevitable share price fall. By rejecting the API bid, the Sigma board made the difficult but right choice, in our view. While further downside risk to the share price is limited, we caution that shareholders require patience as the road to share price recovery will be long.
Last November, Xenith and QANTM , both leading providers of IP origination services in Australia, announced a merger via an all-scrip scheme of arrangement, whereby Xenith shareholders will receive 1.22 QANTM shares for every Xenith share, or an implied value of A$1.598/share. QANTM and Xenith shareholders would own 55% and 45% of the merged group with a then pro-forma capitalisation of A$285mn. Pre-cost synergies are estimated at A$7mn/annum at the end of year three.
Xenith’s board unanimously recommended the merger to its shareholders.
IPH did not blink and on the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, lobbed an unsolicited, indicative, preliminary, conditional and non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close.
QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. IPH countered those claims, spurring QANTM to counter those countered claims.
On the 13 February 2019, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support the QANTM scheme and intends to vote against it. In response, both Xenith and QANTM announced that neither had received a proposal from IPH. Xenith’s shares increased 20.3% to close at A$1.69/share.
The provisional date for ACCC s clearance of the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March. The provisional date for IPH/Xenith is the 2 May. The QANTM/Xenith Scheme meeting is scheduled for 3 April with a 24 April implementation date. IPH’s proposal has an indicative implementation date of mid-July.
IPH’s proposal currently offers an implied value of $1.98 (65% in cash) against $1.85 for QANTM’s all-scrip offer.
The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies. IPH is the oldest, and the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.
With IPH’s blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme will fail. Xenith should engage with IPH.
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While not new news, US-based hedge fund – somewhat well-known for being involved in M&A situations – started accumulating a position in MYOB in January and has now reached a stake of 11%. The last chunks purchased appear to have been done at (or around) A$3.40/share, which is equal to terms. The Manikay letter to the Board asks the Board to consider the market movements since December and posits a fair value in excess of A$4.00/share.
Manikay says that it is interested in becoming a long-term shareholder. But the letter seems to level its criticism of the deal price most pointedly at the fact that the deal was offered and agreed to just a few days off a two-year low in the S&P/ASX200 Index and since then the index has rebounded to within 1.5% of an 11-year high.
A “market context” bump is not a bad case in and of itself because of where peers have moved and where the market has moved, and we won’t know whether that point is taken up by the IER in the Scheme Document.
This strikes Travis Lundy as not a bad reward/risk to buy up to 1-2% through terms. The back end “undisturbed price” has risen and the recent earnings release shows online penetration continues to grow.
Irrespective of whether the Malaysian rare earth processing licence provided to Lynas was without adequate due process (as has been speculated) or whether the facility is indeed an environmental concern; the fact remains the Malaysian government has reneged on the previously agreed-upon three-step licence process – imposing unachievable pre-conditions by the licence renewal date this September – and that is wrong.
Ongoing negotiation with the Malaysian government is the only course of action by which Lynas will achieve the renewal of its operating licence (unencumbered or with “acceptable” caveats). The agreed management pathway for NUF provides scope for a positive outcome from extensive consultation.
But even if a viable resolution is reached, it would only serve to temporarily manage Lynas out of its current predicament – given the vocal domestic opposition, the long-term prognosis is likely the shuttering and removal of the LAMP.
Shares are down 45% from the pre-general election (for Malaysia) peak and ~24% down from when the Review Committee was first mooted in September 2018, and roughly a similar % compared to the 3 December closing price, the day before the pre-conditions were introduced. That still appears too optimistic. Resolving the Malaysian government roadblock will quite likely be a stop-gap measure, at best.
Posco Chemtech is to merge with POSCO ESM through a stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. The merger will be effective as of April 1. The merged company is planning to move from KOSDAQ to KOSPI. These proposals will be put to the vote at the upcoming AGM scheduled for March 18.
KOSPI 200’s re-balancing reference date is after the close of the last trading day in April and the change takes effect on the next trading day after the 2nd Thursday of June. If the KRX approves it before the end of April, Chemtech’s KOSPI inclusion will happen this June. If not, it will have to wait until next year.
New passive money flowing into Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bn. This represents 1.69% of market cap and 4.82% of float market cap. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
In a follow-up note John DeMasi provides an update of events, looking into VSM’s corporate governance documents, reviewing relevant landmark Delaware takeover case law, and elaborating on a possible path to control of Versum for Merck KGaA (MRK GR).
Merck has now filed form DFAN14A filed with the SEC. The talking points/Q&A confirm that the VSM/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) deal caught Merck by surprise as they had not been contacted by Versum as part of any market check.
Other important takeaways include number 7, where Merck stress (yet again) they are fully committed to pursuing their proposal; number 11, where they don’t rule out raising their price; and number 21, where they answer whether they have purchased any VSM shares with “The number of shares of Versum common stock held by Merck … does not exceed a level that would require disclosure.”
Merck continues to speak and act like a bidder who is not going away, and its upcoming roadshow in New York with shareholders underscores its commitment to the deal, adding to the pressure on the Versum Board.
JM has bought 662k shares in JS since the beginning of March, averaging 47.5% of daily volume, narrowing the simple ratio (JM/JS). JM has consistently bought back shares in JS over the years. Since December 2011, buybacks have taken place at an average price/book (for JS) of 0.75x (it is currently at 0.70x according to CapIQ) and at an average JM/JS ratio of 1.75x. The current ratio is 1.70x, bang in line with its 7+ year average. The 20-year average is 1.82x.
Presumably the Keswick family’s long-term plan is collapsing the circularity. But given the significant costs involved – either JM privatizing JS or vice versa – for now, the family will likely opt for the circularity creep, by continuing to chip away at minority ownership as JS takes its dividends in-specie, JM acquires JS, gradually increasing the inter holdings of the two entities.
JS is also trading “cheap”, at a 42% discount to NAV, adjusted for cross-holdings. JS is now around 25% points “cheaper” than JM (which has a discount to NAV of 17%), compared to a one-year average of ~24%. A year ago, the % difference was 6%.
JM has bought 1.8mn shares YTD compared to 2.5mn for the same period last year, while 4.9mn shares were acquired in 2018, compared to 7.6mn, 8.2mn, and 2.1mn in 2015-2017 respectively. The very long-term ratio is marginally in favour of JM, yet the more recent yearly average suggests it is line. JS looks cheap on a discount to NAV basis and it makes sense for JM to continue to acquire shares, favouring JS near-term. I also tilt in favour of this outcome.
Youngone Holdings (009970 KS)‘s 50.5%-held sub Youngone Corp (111770 KS) accounts for 70% of NAV. On a 20D MA, they are now at 312% of σ while the current price ratio is at a 120D high. Sanghyun recommended a set-up. The parent is up 9% this week vs 12% down for the sub. The NAV discount is now out of whack – plugging Sanghyun’s numbers I get a discount to NAV of 35% vs. an average of 48%. The parent is very illiquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide)
Restaurant Brands Nz (RBD NZ) has announced “Consent has now been granted in respect of the Partial Takeover by certain subsidiaries of Yum! Brands“. The remaining condition is receipt of acceptance from 75% of shareholders. Acceptances currently total 40.68%.
NASDAQ raised its bid for Oslo Bors VPS Holding ASA (OSLO NS) to NOK 158 and lowered its minimum acceptance condition from 90% to two-thirds. The offer period is extended to 29 March. The Long Stop is extended to 4 Mar 2020.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Japan skirts recession but near-term prospects remain weak
Deflationary headwinds to persist in H1, threatening business spending
Recovery likely in late 2019 as world trade finds a firmer footing
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On Thursday, MYOB Group Ltd (MYO AU) released its Scheme Booklet in which the Independent Expert, Grant Samuel, valued MYOB between A$3.19 and A$3.69 per share. Consequently, Grant Samuel concluded that KKR & Co Inc (KKR US)‘s revised proposal of A$3.40 cash per share is fair and reasonable. However, Manikay Partners continues to voice concerns about the KKR proposal as it believes MYOB is worth well in excess of A$4.00 per share.
With the shares 4 cents below KKR’s revised proposal, we continue to believe shareholders should cash out as Manikay’s valuation is only justifiable if MYOB’s delivers flawless execution.
Brexit fear diminishing boosting GBP and other currencies
Eurozone IP rebounds, the first sign of stabilisation
Pressure increases for a rate cut in Australia
We can see a case for GBP to rise towards 1.40 helping recoveries in EUR and AUD, and weakening the USD more broadly. But the outlook for a more sustained period of low EUR rates, no structural underweight in EUR, and limited demand for Euro assets suggest that its upside may be limited. Rate cut expectations have reached a new peak in Australia, and the AUD should continue to remain heavy. Chinese economic reports (trade, credit, PMIs) have been weak, Jan/Feb activity data are due later today. The overall outlook for the USD remains mixed and cautious trading continues to be advised. Event risk will keep traders playing the short game.
On Wednesday, Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU) rejected an indicative takeover offer from rival Australian Pharma Industries (API AU). Shareholders were disappointed with the news, with Sigma’s shares closing 12.3% lower at A$0.54 per share. API shares fared better and fell 3.6% to A$1.35 each.
We believe Sigma’s board were left with the tough choice of accepting a lowball offer or improving the existing business and riding out the inevitable share price fall. By rejecting the API bid, the Sigma board made the difficult but right choice, in our view. While further downside risk to the share price is limited, we caution that shareholders require patience as the road to share price recovery will be long.
Last November, Xenith and QANTM , both leading providers of IP origination services in Australia, announced a merger via an all-scrip scheme of arrangement, whereby Xenith shareholders will receive 1.22 QANTM shares for every Xenith share, or an implied value of A$1.598/share. QANTM and Xenith shareholders would own 55% and 45% of the merged group with a then pro-forma capitalisation of A$285mn. Pre-cost synergies are estimated at A$7mn/annum at the end of year three.
Xenith’s board unanimously recommended the merger to its shareholders.
IPH did not blink and on the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, lobbed an unsolicited, indicative, preliminary, conditional and non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close.
QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. IPH countered those claims, spurring QANTM to counter those countered claims.
On the 13 February 2019, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support the QANTM scheme and intends to vote against it. In response, both Xenith and QANTM announced that neither had received a proposal from IPH. Xenith’s shares increased 20.3% to close at A$1.69/share.
The provisional date for ACCC s clearance of the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March. The provisional date for IPH/Xenith is the 2 May. The QANTM/Xenith Scheme meeting is scheduled for 3 April with a 24 April implementation date. IPH’s proposal has an indicative implementation date of mid-July.
IPH’s proposal currently offers an implied value of $1.98 (65% in cash) against $1.85 for QANTM’s all-scrip offer.
The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies. IPH is the oldest, and the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.
With IPH’s blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme will fail. Xenith should engage with IPH.
While the downgrades to the ECB outlook may not have been unexpected, they appear to have been viewed as the last straw for EUR bulls. EUR has failed to respond to lower US rates in recent months or a moderate recovery in global risk appetite. An expectation that ECB rates policy normalisation may take much longer may be encouraging the use of the EUR as a funding currency for ‘carry trades’. The AUD is flirting with key support (0.70), and widespread expectation that the RBA will capitulate on its long-held reluctance to cut rates below 1.5% is weighing on the currency. Labour market data may hold the key.
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Brexit fear diminishing boosting GBP and other currencies
Eurozone IP rebounds, the first sign of stabilisation
Pressure increases for a rate cut in Australia
We can see a case for GBP to rise towards 1.40 helping recoveries in EUR and AUD, and weakening the USD more broadly. But the outlook for a more sustained period of low EUR rates, no structural underweight in EUR, and limited demand for Euro assets suggest that its upside may be limited. Rate cut expectations have reached a new peak in Australia, and the AUD should continue to remain heavy. Chinese economic reports (trade, credit, PMIs) have been weak, Jan/Feb activity data are due later today. The overall outlook for the USD remains mixed and cautious trading continues to be advised. Event risk will keep traders playing the short game.
On Wednesday, Sigma Healthcare (SIG AU) rejected an indicative takeover offer from rival Australian Pharma Industries (API AU). Shareholders were disappointed with the news, with Sigma’s shares closing 12.3% lower at A$0.54 per share. API shares fared better and fell 3.6% to A$1.35 each.
We believe Sigma’s board were left with the tough choice of accepting a lowball offer or improving the existing business and riding out the inevitable share price fall. By rejecting the API bid, the Sigma board made the difficult but right choice, in our view. While further downside risk to the share price is limited, we caution that shareholders require patience as the road to share price recovery will be long.
Last November, Xenith and QANTM , both leading providers of IP origination services in Australia, announced a merger via an all-scrip scheme of arrangement, whereby Xenith shareholders will receive 1.22 QANTM shares for every Xenith share, or an implied value of A$1.598/share. QANTM and Xenith shareholders would own 55% and 45% of the merged group with a then pro-forma capitalisation of A$285mn. Pre-cost synergies are estimated at A$7mn/annum at the end of year three.
Xenith’s board unanimously recommended the merger to its shareholders.
IPH did not blink and on the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, lobbed an unsolicited, indicative, preliminary, conditional and non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close.
QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. IPH countered those claims, spurring QANTM to counter those countered claims.
On the 13 February 2019, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support the QANTM scheme and intends to vote against it. In response, both Xenith and QANTM announced that neither had received a proposal from IPH. Xenith’s shares increased 20.3% to close at A$1.69/share.
The provisional date for ACCC s clearance of the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March. The provisional date for IPH/Xenith is the 2 May. The QANTM/Xenith Scheme meeting is scheduled for 3 April with a 24 April implementation date. IPH’s proposal has an indicative implementation date of mid-July.
IPH’s proposal currently offers an implied value of $1.98 (65% in cash) against $1.85 for QANTM’s all-scrip offer.
The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies. IPH is the oldest, and the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.
With IPH’s blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme will fail. Xenith should engage with IPH.
While the downgrades to the ECB outlook may not have been unexpected, they appear to have been viewed as the last straw for EUR bulls. EUR has failed to respond to lower US rates in recent months or a moderate recovery in global risk appetite. An expectation that ECB rates policy normalisation may take much longer may be encouraging the use of the EUR as a funding currency for ‘carry trades’. The AUD is flirting with key support (0.70), and widespread expectation that the RBA will capitulate on its long-held reluctance to cut rates below 1.5% is weighing on the currency. Labour market data may hold the key.
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Last November, Xenith and QANTM , both leading providers of IP origination services in Australia, announced a merger via an all-scrip scheme of arrangement, whereby Xenith shareholders will receive 1.22 QANTM shares for every Xenith share, or an implied value of A$1.598/share. QANTM and Xenith shareholders would own 55% and 45% of the merged group with a then pro-forma capitalisation of A$285mn. Pre-cost synergies are estimated at A$7mn/annum at the end of year three.
Xenith’s board unanimously recommended the merger to its shareholders.
IPH did not blink and on the same day as the Xenith/QANTM announcement, lobbed an unsolicited, indicative, preliminary, conditional and non-binding cash & scrip proposal to acquire QANTM at $1.80/share (including a a A$0.05 dividend) by way of a scheme, or a 42% premium to last close.
QANTM’s board rejected the proposal due to its highly conditional nature, significant execution risk, and that the offer undervalued the company. IPH countered those claims, spurring QANTM to counter those countered claims.
On the 13 February 2019, IPH bought a 19.9% stake in Xenith at $1.85/share (or ~A$33mn) from institutional investors, and further added that is does not support the QANTM scheme and intends to vote against it. In response, both Xenith and QANTM announced that neither had received a proposal from IPH. Xenith’s shares increased 20.3% to close at A$1.69/share.
The provisional date for ACCC s clearance of the QANTM/Xenith merger is the 21 March. The provisional date for IPH/Xenith is the 2 May. The QANTM/Xenith Scheme meeting is scheduled for 3 April with a 24 April implementation date. IPH’s proposal has an indicative implementation date of mid-July.
IPH’s proposal currently offers an implied value of $1.98 (65% in cash) against $1.85 for QANTM’s all-scrip offer.
The key risk to IPH’s proposal is ACCC’s consent. IPH, QANTM and Xenith are the only three ASX-listed intellectual property companies. IPH is the oldest, and the largest (in terms of revenue). However privately owned companies collectively hold a larger market share – and growing – compared to the three listcos. It is not apparent a merger between either of these two listcos would lessen IP service competition in Australia.
With IPH’s blocking stake, the QANTM/Xenith scheme will fail. Xenith should engage with IPH.
While the downgrades to the ECB outlook may not have been unexpected, they appear to have been viewed as the last straw for EUR bulls. EUR has failed to respond to lower US rates in recent months or a moderate recovery in global risk appetite. An expectation that ECB rates policy normalisation may take much longer may be encouraging the use of the EUR as a funding currency for ‘carry trades’. The AUD is flirting with key support (0.70), and widespread expectation that the RBA will capitulate on its long-held reluctance to cut rates below 1.5% is weighing on the currency. Labour market data may hold the key.
Gross capital flows lead World shipping activity by 4 months
Capital flows have been slowly rising since June 2018: in February they jumped
Reinforces out pro-Asia and pro-China investment message
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While the downgrades to the ECB outlook may not have been unexpected, they appear to have been viewed as the last straw for EUR bulls. EUR has failed to respond to lower US rates in recent months or a moderate recovery in global risk appetite. An expectation that ECB rates policy normalisation may take much longer may be encouraging the use of the EUR as a funding currency for ‘carry trades’. The AUD is flirting with key support (0.70), and widespread expectation that the RBA will capitulate on its long-held reluctance to cut rates below 1.5% is weighing on the currency. Labour market data may hold the key.
While not new news, US-based hedge fund – somewhat well-known for being involved in M&A situations – started accumulating a position in MYOB in January and has now reached a stake of 11%. The last chunks purchased appear to have been done at (or around) A$3.40/share, which is equal to terms. The Manikay letter to the Board asks the Board to consider the market movements since December and posits a fair value in excess of A$4.00/share.
Manikay says that it is interested in becoming a long-term shareholder. But the letter seems to level its criticism of the deal price most pointedly at the fact that the deal was offered and agreed to just a few days off a two-year low in the S&P/ASX200 Index and since then the index has rebounded to within 1.5% of an 11-year high.
A “market context” bump is not a bad case in and of itself because of where peers have moved and where the market has moved, and we won’t know whether that point is taken up by the IER in the Scheme Document.
This strikes Travis Lundy as not a bad reward/risk to buy up to 1-2% through terms. The back end “undisturbed price” has risen and the recent earnings release shows online penetration continues to grow.
Irrespective of whether the Malaysian rare earth processing licence provided to Lynas was without adequate due process (as has been speculated) or whether the facility is indeed an environmental concern; the fact remains the Malaysian government has reneged on the previously agreed-upon three-step licence process – imposing unachievable pre-conditions by the licence renewal date this September – and that is wrong.
Ongoing negotiation with the Malaysian government is the only course of action by which Lynas will achieve the renewal of its operating licence (unencumbered or with “acceptable” caveats). The agreed management pathway for NUF provides scope for a positive outcome from extensive consultation.
But even if a viable resolution is reached, it would only serve to temporarily manage Lynas out of its current predicament – given the vocal domestic opposition, the long-term prognosis is likely the shuttering and removal of the LAMP.
Shares are down 45% from the pre-general election (for Malaysia) peak and ~24% down from when the Review Committee was first mooted in September 2018, and roughly a similar % compared to the 3 December closing price, the day before the pre-conditions were introduced. That still appears too optimistic. Resolving the Malaysian government roadblock will quite likely be a stop-gap measure, at best.
Posco Chemtech is to merge with POSCO ESM through a stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. The merger will be effective as of April 1. The merged company is planning to move from KOSDAQ to KOSPI. These proposals will be put to the vote at the upcoming AGM scheduled for March 18.
KOSPI 200’s re-balancing reference date is after the close of the last trading day in April and the change takes effect on the next trading day after the 2nd Thursday of June. If the KRX approves it before the end of April, Chemtech’s KOSPI inclusion will happen this June. If not, it will have to wait until next year.
New passive money flowing into Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bn. This represents 1.69% of market cap and 4.82% of float market cap. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
In a follow-up note John DeMasi provides an update of events, looking into VSM’s corporate governance documents, reviewing relevant landmark Delaware takeover case law, and elaborating on a possible path to control of Versum for Merck KGaA (MRK GR).
Merck has now filed form DFAN14A filed with the SEC. The talking points/Q&A confirm that the VSM/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) deal caught Merck by surprise as they had not been contacted by Versum as part of any market check.
Other important takeaways include number 7, where Merck stress (yet again) they are fully committed to pursuing their proposal; number 11, where they don’t rule out raising their price; and number 21, where they answer whether they have purchased any VSM shares with “The number of shares of Versum common stock held by Merck … does not exceed a level that would require disclosure.”
Merck continues to speak and act like a bidder who is not going away, and its upcoming roadshow in New York with shareholders underscores its commitment to the deal, adding to the pressure on the Versum Board.
JM has bought 662k shares in JS since the beginning of March, averaging 47.5% of daily volume, narrowing the simple ratio (JM/JS). JM has consistently bought back shares in JS over the years. Since December 2011, buybacks have taken place at an average price/book (for JS) of 0.75x (it is currently at 0.70x according to CapIQ) and at an average JM/JS ratio of 1.75x. The current ratio is 1.70x, bang in line with its 7+ year average. The 20-year average is 1.82x.
Presumably the Keswick family’s long-term plan is collapsing the circularity. But given the significant costs involved – either JM privatizing JS or vice versa – for now, the family will likely opt for the circularity creep, by continuing to chip away at minority ownership as JS takes its dividends in-specie, JM acquires JS, gradually increasing the inter holdings of the two entities.
JS is also trading “cheap”, at a 42% discount to NAV, adjusted for cross-holdings. JS is now around 25% points “cheaper” than JM (which has a discount to NAV of 17%), compared to a one-year average of ~24%. A year ago, the % difference was 6%.
JM has bought 1.8mn shares YTD compared to 2.5mn for the same period last year, while 4.9mn shares were acquired in 2018, compared to 7.6mn, 8.2mn, and 2.1mn in 2015-2017 respectively. The very long-term ratio is marginally in favour of JM, yet the more recent yearly average suggests it is line. JS looks cheap on a discount to NAV basis and it makes sense for JM to continue to acquire shares, favouring JS near-term. I also tilt in favour of this outcome.
Youngone Holdings (009970 KS)‘s 50.5%-held sub Youngone Corp (111770 KS) accounts for 70% of NAV. On a 20D MA, they are now at 312% of σ while the current price ratio is at a 120D high. Sanghyun recommended a set-up. The parent is up 9% this week vs 12% down for the sub. The NAV discount is now out of whack – plugging Sanghyun’s numbers I get a discount to NAV of 35% vs. an average of 48%. The parent is very illiquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide)
Restaurant Brands Nz (RBD NZ) has announced “Consent has now been granted in respect of the Partial Takeover by certain subsidiaries of Yum! Brands“. The remaining condition is receipt of acceptance from 75% of shareholders. Acceptances currently total 40.68%.
NASDAQ raised its bid for Oslo Bors VPS Holding ASA (OSLO NS) to NOK 158 and lowered its minimum acceptance condition from 90% to two-thirds. The offer period is extended to 29 March. The Long Stop is extended to 4 Mar 2020.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Source: Company announcements. E = our estimates; C =confirmed
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While not new news, US-based hedge fund – somewhat well-known for being involved in M&A situations – started accumulating a position in MYOB in January and has now reached a stake of 11%. The last chunks purchased appear to have been done at (or around) A$3.40/share, which is equal to terms. The Manikay letter to the Board asks the Board to consider the market movements since December and posits a fair value in excess of A$4.00/share.
Manikay says that it is interested in becoming a long-term shareholder. But the letter seems to level its criticism of the deal price most pointedly at the fact that the deal was offered and agreed to just a few days off a two-year low in the S&P/ASX200 Index and since then the index has rebounded to within 1.5% of an 11-year high.
A “market context” bump is not a bad case in and of itself because of where peers have moved and where the market has moved, and we won’t know whether that point is taken up by the IER in the Scheme Document.
This strikes Travis Lundy as not a bad reward/risk to buy up to 1-2% through terms. The back end “undisturbed price” has risen and the recent earnings release shows online penetration continues to grow.
Irrespective of whether the Malaysian rare earth processing licence provided to Lynas was without adequate due process (as has been speculated) or whether the facility is indeed an environmental concern; the fact remains the Malaysian government has reneged on the previously agreed-upon three-step licence process – imposing unachievable pre-conditions by the licence renewal date this September – and that is wrong.
Ongoing negotiation with the Malaysian government is the only course of action by which Lynas will achieve the renewal of its operating licence (unencumbered or with “acceptable” caveats). The agreed management pathway for NUF provides scope for a positive outcome from extensive consultation.
But even if a viable resolution is reached, it would only serve to temporarily manage Lynas out of its current predicament – given the vocal domestic opposition, the long-term prognosis is likely the shuttering and removal of the LAMP.
Shares are down 45% from the pre-general election (for Malaysia) peak and ~24% down from when the Review Committee was first mooted in September 2018, and roughly a similar % compared to the 3 December closing price, the day before the pre-conditions were introduced. That still appears too optimistic. Resolving the Malaysian government roadblock will quite likely be a stop-gap measure, at best.
Posco Chemtech is to merge with POSCO ESM through a stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. The merger will be effective as of April 1. The merged company is planning to move from KOSDAQ to KOSPI. These proposals will be put to the vote at the upcoming AGM scheduled for March 18.
KOSPI 200’s re-balancing reference date is after the close of the last trading day in April and the change takes effect on the next trading day after the 2nd Thursday of June. If the KRX approves it before the end of April, Chemtech’s KOSPI inclusion will happen this June. If not, it will have to wait until next year.
New passive money flowing into Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bn. This represents 1.69% of market cap and 4.82% of float market cap. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
In a follow-up note John DeMasi provides an update of events, looking into VSM’s corporate governance documents, reviewing relevant landmark Delaware takeover case law, and elaborating on a possible path to control of Versum for Merck KGaA (MRK GR).
Merck has now filed form DFAN14A filed with the SEC. The talking points/Q&A confirm that the VSM/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) deal caught Merck by surprise as they had not been contacted by Versum as part of any market check.
Other important takeaways include number 7, where Merck stress (yet again) they are fully committed to pursuing their proposal; number 11, where they don’t rule out raising their price; and number 21, where they answer whether they have purchased any VSM shares with “The number of shares of Versum common stock held by Merck … does not exceed a level that would require disclosure.”
Merck continues to speak and act like a bidder who is not going away, and its upcoming roadshow in New York with shareholders underscores its commitment to the deal, adding to the pressure on the Versum Board.
JM has bought 662k shares in JS since the beginning of March, averaging 47.5% of daily volume, narrowing the simple ratio (JM/JS). JM has consistently bought back shares in JS over the years. Since December 2011, buybacks have taken place at an average price/book (for JS) of 0.75x (it is currently at 0.70x according to CapIQ) and at an average JM/JS ratio of 1.75x. The current ratio is 1.70x, bang in line with its 7+ year average. The 20-year average is 1.82x.
Presumably the Keswick family’s long-term plan is collapsing the circularity. But given the significant costs involved – either JM privatizing JS or vice versa – for now, the family will likely opt for the circularity creep, by continuing to chip away at minority ownership as JS takes its dividends in-specie, JM acquires JS, gradually increasing the inter holdings of the two entities.
JS is also trading “cheap”, at a 42% discount to NAV, adjusted for cross-holdings. JS is now around 25% points “cheaper” than JM (which has a discount to NAV of 17%), compared to a one-year average of ~24%. A year ago, the % difference was 6%.
JM has bought 1.8mn shares YTD compared to 2.5mn for the same period last year, while 4.9mn shares were acquired in 2018, compared to 7.6mn, 8.2mn, and 2.1mn in 2015-2017 respectively. The very long-term ratio is marginally in favour of JM, yet the more recent yearly average suggests it is line. JS looks cheap on a discount to NAV basis and it makes sense for JM to continue to acquire shares, favouring JS near-term. I also tilt in favour of this outcome.
Youngone Holdings (009970 KS)‘s 50.5%-held sub Youngone Corp (111770 KS) accounts for 70% of NAV. On a 20D MA, they are now at 312% of σ while the current price ratio is at a 120D high. Sanghyun recommended a set-up. The parent is up 9% this week vs 12% down for the sub. The NAV discount is now out of whack – plugging Sanghyun’s numbers I get a discount to NAV of 35% vs. an average of 48%. The parent is very illiquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide)
Restaurant Brands Nz (RBD NZ) has announced “Consent has now been granted in respect of the Partial Takeover by certain subsidiaries of Yum! Brands“. The remaining condition is receipt of acceptance from 75% of shareholders. Acceptances currently total 40.68%.
NASDAQ raised its bid for Oslo Bors VPS Holding ASA (OSLO NS) to NOK 158 and lowered its minimum acceptance condition from 90% to two-thirds. The offer period is extended to 29 March. The Long Stop is extended to 4 Mar 2020.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
A credible poll — the first new trustworthy data in a month — shows Widodo having expanded his lead to 59 percent, versus 31 percent for Prabowo. The latter’s prospects are dim. Indonesia’s Comprehensive Partnership (Cepa) with Australia will bring myriad import prices down — although, contrary to a spate of international press reports, it does not raise ownership ceilings for Australian investors. A senior activist with Amnesty International Indonesia suffered arrest for critizing the military’s plan to place hundreds of active officers in civilian posts. The BKPM’s OSS system for online permiting is making progress, although its smooth functioning remains a distanct prospect.
Politics: President Joko Widodo proposed monthly income support for graduates of vocational programs who lack immediate employment and need to search for jobs. He did not specify an amount per recipient. The proposal has some merit – but simple regulatory changes to facilitate investment and job‑creation would obviate its need. Politically, the concept will likely prove popular, further boosting Widodo (Page 2). A prominent Partai Demokrat official, Andi Arief, left the party to undergo drug rehabilitation. This marks yet another blow for a party that had been Indonesia’s largest only five years ago (p. 3). A human rights activist and lecturer suffered arrest for allegedly defaming the military (p. 4).
Surveys: In the first new poll data to emerge in over a month, the Survey Network (LSI) showed that, as of late February, nationwide support for Widodo stood at 59 percent, versus 31 percent for Gerindra Chair Prabowo Subianto. The findings, which are credible, suggest that Widodo strengthened during February, perhaps due to the two televised debates – and despite Prabowo’s emphatic attempts to provoke various economic fears. The data portray Prabowo’s prospects as distinctly remote. A Widodo landslide would further reduce the likelihood of disruption or unrest, as Prabowo‑camp claims of fraud or manipulation would lack credence. Meanwhile, Widodo would emerge with an unequivocal mandate and particularly strong political capital. Parties that defy him would jeopardize their own image. But whether he would use this strength effectively is questionable (p. 5). Findings from Polmark, a somewhat obscure firm employed by the National Mandate Party (Pan), claim that Widodo’s margin over Prabowo is only 15 percentage points – but the poll is old, it has a large error margin and it featured a 34 percent level of undecided respondents. As a percentage of decided respondents, Widodo’s support is comparable to other (and better) polls (p. 6).
Justice: In the first verdicts in Lippo’s Meikarta scandal, four Lippo personnel including Billy Sindoro received sentences ranging from 1.5‑3.5 years each. This is Sindoro’s second conviction from the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) (p. 8).
Policy News: A new phase of implementation is underway for online permitting (p. 8).
Produced since 2003, the Reformasi Weekly Review provides timely, relevant and independent analysis on Indonesian political and policy news. The writer is Kevin O’Rourke, author of the book Reformasi. For subscription info please contact: <[email protected]>.
International: During an election that features strident economic critiques, the government concluded the Comprehensive Economic Partnership with Australia (IA‑Cepa). Parties may yet posture when it comes due for ratification, but other trade agreements have managed to pass. The IA-Cepa reduces tariffs on myriad Australian goods from five percent to zero, while higher tariffs on certain foods will fall precipitously. Contrary to reports, it sets no new foreign ownership ceilings (p. 8).
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
While not new news, US-based hedge fund – somewhat well-known for being involved in M&A situations – started accumulating a position in MYOB in January and has now reached a stake of 11%. The last chunks purchased appear to have been done at (or around) A$3.40/share, which is equal to terms. The Manikay letter to the Board asks the Board to consider the market movements since December and posits a fair value in excess of A$4.00/share.
Manikay says that it is interested in becoming a long-term shareholder. But the letter seems to level its criticism of the deal price most pointedly at the fact that the deal was offered and agreed to just a few days off a two-year low in the S&P/ASX200 Index and since then the index has rebounded to within 1.5% of an 11-year high.
A “market context” bump is not a bad case in and of itself because of where peers have moved and where the market has moved, and we won’t know whether that point is taken up by the IER in the Scheme Document.
This strikes Travis Lundy as not a bad reward/risk to buy up to 1-2% through terms. The back end “undisturbed price” has risen and the recent earnings release shows online penetration continues to grow.
Irrespective of whether the Malaysian rare earth processing licence provided to Lynas was without adequate due process (as has been speculated) or whether the facility is indeed an environmental concern; the fact remains the Malaysian government has reneged on the previously agreed-upon three-step licence process – imposing unachievable pre-conditions by the licence renewal date this September – and that is wrong.
Ongoing negotiation with the Malaysian government is the only course of action by which Lynas will achieve the renewal of its operating licence (unencumbered or with “acceptable” caveats). The agreed management pathway for NUF provides scope for a positive outcome from extensive consultation.
But even if a viable resolution is reached, it would only serve to temporarily manage Lynas out of its current predicament – given the vocal domestic opposition, the long-term prognosis is likely the shuttering and removal of the LAMP.
Shares are down 45% from the pre-general election (for Malaysia) peak and ~24% down from when the Review Committee was first mooted in September 2018, and roughly a similar % compared to the 3 December closing price, the day before the pre-conditions were introduced. That still appears too optimistic. Resolving the Malaysian government roadblock will quite likely be a stop-gap measure, at best.
Posco Chemtech is to merge with POSCO ESM through a stock swap at a ratio of 1 to 0.2172865. The merger will be effective as of April 1. The merged company is planning to move from KOSDAQ to KOSPI. These proposals will be put to the vote at the upcoming AGM scheduled for March 18.
KOSPI 200’s re-balancing reference date is after the close of the last trading day in April and the change takes effect on the next trading day after the 2nd Thursday of June. If the KRX approves it before the end of April, Chemtech’s KOSPI inclusion will happen this June. If not, it will have to wait until next year.
New passive money flowing into Chemtech is estimated at ₩68bn. This represents 1.69% of market cap and 4.82% of float market cap. This is less than twice total daily trade value.
In a follow-up note John DeMasi provides an update of events, looking into VSM’s corporate governance documents, reviewing relevant landmark Delaware takeover case law, and elaborating on a possible path to control of Versum for Merck KGaA (MRK GR).
Merck has now filed form DFAN14A filed with the SEC. The talking points/Q&A confirm that the VSM/Entegris Inc (ENTG US) deal caught Merck by surprise as they had not been contacted by Versum as part of any market check.
Other important takeaways include number 7, where Merck stress (yet again) they are fully committed to pursuing their proposal; number 11, where they don’t rule out raising their price; and number 21, where they answer whether they have purchased any VSM shares with “The number of shares of Versum common stock held by Merck … does not exceed a level that would require disclosure.”
Merck continues to speak and act like a bidder who is not going away, and its upcoming roadshow in New York with shareholders underscores its commitment to the deal, adding to the pressure on the Versum Board.
JM has bought 662k shares in JS since the beginning of March, averaging 47.5% of daily volume, narrowing the simple ratio (JM/JS). JM has consistently bought back shares in JS over the years. Since December 2011, buybacks have taken place at an average price/book (for JS) of 0.75x (it is currently at 0.70x according to CapIQ) and at an average JM/JS ratio of 1.75x. The current ratio is 1.70x, bang in line with its 7+ year average. The 20-year average is 1.82x.
Presumably the Keswick family’s long-term plan is collapsing the circularity. But given the significant costs involved – either JM privatizing JS or vice versa – for now, the family will likely opt for the circularity creep, by continuing to chip away at minority ownership as JS takes its dividends in-specie, JM acquires JS, gradually increasing the inter holdings of the two entities.
JS is also trading “cheap”, at a 42% discount to NAV, adjusted for cross-holdings. JS is now around 25% points “cheaper” than JM (which has a discount to NAV of 17%), compared to a one-year average of ~24%. A year ago, the % difference was 6%.
JM has bought 1.8mn shares YTD compared to 2.5mn for the same period last year, while 4.9mn shares were acquired in 2018, compared to 7.6mn, 8.2mn, and 2.1mn in 2015-2017 respectively. The very long-term ratio is marginally in favour of JM, yet the more recent yearly average suggests it is line. JS looks cheap on a discount to NAV basis and it makes sense for JM to continue to acquire shares, favouring JS near-term. I also tilt in favour of this outcome.
Youngone Holdings (009970 KS)‘s 50.5%-held sub Youngone Corp (111770 KS) accounts for 70% of NAV. On a 20D MA, they are now at 312% of σ while the current price ratio is at a 120D high. Sanghyun recommended a set-up. The parent is up 9% this week vs 12% down for the sub. The NAV discount is now out of whack – plugging Sanghyun’s numbers I get a discount to NAV of 35% vs. an average of 48%. The parent is very illiquid. (link to Sanghyun’s insight: Youngone Holdco/Sub Trade: Price Divergence Got Too Wide)
Restaurant Brands Nz (RBD NZ) has announced “Consent has now been granted in respect of the Partial Takeover by certain subsidiaries of Yum! Brands“. The remaining condition is receipt of acceptance from 75% of shareholders. Acceptances currently total 40.68%.
NASDAQ raised its bid for Oslo Bors VPS Holding ASA (OSLO NS) to NOK 158 and lowered its minimum acceptance condition from 90% to two-thirds. The offer period is extended to 29 March. The Long Stop is extended to 4 Mar 2020.
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained – the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
A credible poll — the first new trustworthy data in a month — shows Widodo having expanded his lead to 59 percent, versus 31 percent for Prabowo. The latter’s prospects are dim. Indonesia’s Comprehensive Partnership (Cepa) with Australia will bring myriad import prices down — although, contrary to a spate of international press reports, it does not raise ownership ceilings for Australian investors. A senior activist with Amnesty International Indonesia suffered arrest for critizing the military’s plan to place hundreds of active officers in civilian posts. The BKPM’s OSS system for online permiting is making progress, although its smooth functioning remains a distanct prospect.
Politics: President Joko Widodo proposed monthly income support for graduates of vocational programs who lack immediate employment and need to search for jobs. He did not specify an amount per recipient. The proposal has some merit – but simple regulatory changes to facilitate investment and job‑creation would obviate its need. Politically, the concept will likely prove popular, further boosting Widodo (Page 2). A prominent Partai Demokrat official, Andi Arief, left the party to undergo drug rehabilitation. This marks yet another blow for a party that had been Indonesia’s largest only five years ago (p. 3). A human rights activist and lecturer suffered arrest for allegedly defaming the military (p. 4).
Surveys: In the first new poll data to emerge in over a month, the Survey Network (LSI) showed that, as of late February, nationwide support for Widodo stood at 59 percent, versus 31 percent for Gerindra Chair Prabowo Subianto. The findings, which are credible, suggest that Widodo strengthened during February, perhaps due to the two televised debates – and despite Prabowo’s emphatic attempts to provoke various economic fears. The data portray Prabowo’s prospects as distinctly remote. A Widodo landslide would further reduce the likelihood of disruption or unrest, as Prabowo‑camp claims of fraud or manipulation would lack credence. Meanwhile, Widodo would emerge with an unequivocal mandate and particularly strong political capital. Parties that defy him would jeopardize their own image. But whether he would use this strength effectively is questionable (p. 5). Findings from Polmark, a somewhat obscure firm employed by the National Mandate Party (Pan), claim that Widodo’s margin over Prabowo is only 15 percentage points – but the poll is old, it has a large error margin and it featured a 34 percent level of undecided respondents. As a percentage of decided respondents, Widodo’s support is comparable to other (and better) polls (p. 6).
Justice: In the first verdicts in Lippo’s Meikarta scandal, four Lippo personnel including Billy Sindoro received sentences ranging from 1.5‑3.5 years each. This is Sindoro’s second conviction from the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) (p. 8).
Policy News: A new phase of implementation is underway for online permitting (p. 8).
Produced since 2003, the Reformasi Weekly Review provides timely, relevant and independent analysis on Indonesian political and policy news. The writer is Kevin O’Rourke, author of the book Reformasi. For subscription info please contact: <[email protected]>.
International: During an election that features strident economic critiques, the government concluded the Comprehensive Economic Partnership with Australia (IA‑Cepa). Parties may yet posture when it comes due for ratification, but other trade agreements have managed to pass. The IA-Cepa reduces tariffs on myriad Australian goods from five percent to zero, while higher tariffs on certain foods will fall precipitously. Contrary to reports, it sets no new foreign ownership ceilings (p. 8).
Speedcast International (SDA AU) recently reported FY18 (Dec YE) results which showed a solid recovery in 2H. That has allowed the stock to start to recover from a torrid 1H18 performance which saw targets missed. The strong recovery in operating performance in 2H18 has allowed Ian Martin to reset forecasts and he now looks for the EBITDA margin to increase steadily as acquisitions are bedded down. By FY20, we expect Speedcast to be in a much stronger position as rising cash flow leads to lower debts. We have a new 12m target price of A$4.40 based on 11.7x FY20F EPS. We expect SpeedCast to be in a materially better operating position as it moves into FY20, and good cash flow will be used to reduce debt through the year. Operating execution in 1H19 is crucial.
Get Straight to the Source on Smartkarma
Smartkarma supports the world’s leading investors with high-quality, timely, and actionable Insights. Subscribe now for unlimited access, or request a demo below.
